Siman 87

The prohibition of meat and milk is explicit in the Torah, as it is written: "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" (Exodus 23:19), and Onkelos translated: "You shall not eat meat with milk." And "kid" is not specific, for the law is the same for an ox, a lamb, and a goat, as "kid" includes the offspring of the ox, the offspring of the lamb, and the offspring of the goat, unless the verse specifies "a kid of the goats," as it is written: "And Judah sent the kid of the goats" (Genesis 38:20), and likewise: "And the skins of the kids of the goats" (Genesis 27:16), where it specified goats specifically; but in every place where "kid" is stated without qualification, even an ox and a lamb are included (Chullin 113a). And "in its mother's milk" is not specific, for it makes no difference whether it is in its mother's milk or in the milk of another, but the verse spoke of the common occurrence, for when it is small, its mother nurses it and has milk [Perisha]. And the matter is an a fortiori argument: for if the Torah prohibited cooking the meat with the milk that were together from one mother and it nursed from the milk, how much more so for other milk where they were never together at all (Chullin 114a). And this is not of the category of a fortiori arguments of which it is said "one does not punish based on a logical derivation" (Sanhedrin 54a), for this is merely a general clarification of the matter, and even more than a clarification. [And see what I wrote at the end of section 6, and examine it closely.]

The prohibition of meat and milk is different from all other prohibitions in two matters: for most Torah prohibitions are permitted for benefit, except for orlah and kilayim of the vineyard, whereas meat and milk is forbidden for benefit; and regarding all Torah prohibitions, the prohibition is only on their consumption alone, or for those forbidden for benefit also on their benefit, but not on their cooking, whereas meat and milk is forbidden even for cooking alone, without consumption and even without benefit. However, one is only liable for lashes for consumption and for cooking, and not for benefit according to the approach of the Rambam that we explained in siman 85, section 36, and we explained the reason there, see there. And there are some of our teachers from whose words it is implied that they disagree on this, and they hold that one also receives lashes for the prohibition of benefit. [See Mishneh LaMelekh chapter 5 of Hilkhot Yesodei HaTorah law 8 who elaborated on this, and see Peri Chadash Orach Chaim siman 443, and see Pri Megadim in his opening to Hilkhot Meat and Milk.]

And there is an additional stringency regarding it more than all other prohibitions of eating, for regarding all other prohibitions of eating, one is not lashed for them except when consumed in the manner of their enjoyment, because their prohibition is written with the language of eating, implying the manner of eating; however, regarding meat and milk, one is lashed even not in the manner of their enjoyment, and we explained this above in siman 85, see there. And thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said (Pesachim 25a) that for this reason the language of eating is not written regarding meat and milk, to say that one is lashed for them even not in the manner of their enjoyment. Therefore, even if one mixed a bitter substance into a pot of meat and milk and ate it—he is liable, and similarly if he ate the meat and milk after it became putrid and ceased to be human food—it seems to me that he is liable [so it is implied from the Rambam chapter 14 halacha 11 (Rambam Hilchot Ma'achalot Assurot 14), and even though he did not conclude this explicitly, he did not care to elaborate, see there and examine it closely]. However, the formation of the meat and milk must be without defect, as I wrote in section 33.

And from where did we learn that meat and milk are forbidden for benefit? Thus our sages, of blessed memory, received: It is stated, "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk" three times—in Mishpatim (Exodus 23:19), in Ki Tisa (Exodus 34:26), and in Re'eh (Deuteronomy 14:21). One for the prohibition of eating, one for the prohibition of benefit, and one for the prohibition of cooking (Chullin 115b). The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that for this reason the Torah wrote the prohibition of eating in the language of cooking, to say that it is not forbidden by the Torah except by way of cooking, and not through salting nor through soaking. And even though regarding all prohibitions soaking is like cooking, nevertheless, regarding meat and milk the Torah only forbade by way of cooking alone. However, by rabbinic law it is forbidden in every manner, and even to eat both of them together without salting or soaking is forbidden by rabbinic law. Furthermore, one must wait between the eating of meat and milk, as will be explained in siman 89.

And know that this reason, that the Torah only prohibited by way of cooking, is found in the Gemara (Chullin 108a), see there; and therefore the Torah wrote it with the language of cooking and not with the language of eating, as the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote. And according to this, one must understand that which our sages, of blessed memory, said (Pesachim 25a) for another reason why it did not write it with the language of eating: to say that one is lashed for them even not in the manner of their enjoyment, as I wrote in section 3. And they are as if contradicting one another, for from where do we have the authority to derive two laws from this change? And even more than this, the words of the Rambam in chapter 9, law 2 (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 9) are astonishing, and this is his wording: "The verse did not refrain from prohibiting the eating except because it prohibited the cooking; that is to say, even its cooking is prohibited, and it goes without saying its eating, just as it refrained from prohibiting the daughter since it prohibited the daughter's daughter." Thus far his words. And this is from the words of the Midrash, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote, see there, and not like the words of the Gemara [Lechem Mishneh].

However, in my humble opinion, it appears that everything is well-settled. For behold, three verses are written with the language of cooking: one verse is for the matter itself, for actual cooking according to its plain meaning; one verse is for the prohibition of eating; and one is for the prohibition of benefit. And why did the Torah change in both of them and write the language of cooking? Regarding that which is derived from the verse that comes for eating, and it did not write it with the language of eating—this is to tell you that one is lashed for it even not in the manner of the pleasure of eating. And the verse that comes for benefit, which it changed to the language of cooking and did not write "you shall not benefit"—this is to teach us that the Torah only prohibited it in the manner of cooking alone. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, informs us of another matter. For behold, one must ask: while it is true that all of them come for a derivation, nevertheless, where in the Torah is the prohibition of eating explicitly explained? To this he says that eating is literally included in the language of cooking; for since even its cooking is prohibited, all the more so its eating, and it is as if it were explicitly written: "you shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk to eat it," for why does one cook if not to eat? It was only that the explicit language of eating could not be written because of the derivations we explained. And this is why he compares it to a daughter; for since the daughter of the daughter is explicit, it is as if the daughter is explicit, for it is impossible to have a daughter of a daughter without a daughter. Likewise, eating and cooking are one matter, and it is as if it wrote eating explicitly. And the matter is a kal vachomer: for if all the prohibitions that are permitted in their cooking are prohibited in eating, all the more so for meat in milk, which is prohibited in cooking, that it is prohibited in eating. And this is not from the categories of kal vachomer, but rather a mere disclosure of the matter. Furthermore, since there is a negative commandment in its own right regarding the prohibition of eating, even if this were from the category of kal vachomer, we would properly lash for its eating [see Lechem Mishneh; and therefore even according to Rava in Sanhedrin 76a, who derives "his daughter" from a gezerah shavah and not from the perspective that it is a mere disclosure of the matter, it is also well-settled; and delve into this].

And since it is forbidden for benefit, it is also forbidden to give it to dogs; rather, one must cast it into a place of filth. And even if one burned it—its ash is forbidden, as the Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 9: This is his wording: "Meat and milk is forbidden to be cooked and forbidden to be eaten by the Torah, and it is forbidden for benefit, and one buries it, and its ash is forbidden like the ash of all things that are buried. And one who cooks a single kezayit of both of them—is lashed, as it is said: 'You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk,' and likewise one who eats a kezayit of both of them, from the meat and the milk that were cooked as one—is lashed, even though he did not cook" Thus far his words, meaning even though he did not cook it himself but others cooked it.

And any basar be-chalav whose prohibition is rabbinic is permitted for benefit, such as basar be-chalav through salting or through soaking, and likewise the cooking of poultry meat in milk, or the meat of a wild animal, as it will be explained that its prohibition is rabbinic—it is permitted for benefit and likewise for cooking. For so wrote the Rambam there in law 4: This is his wording: "And likewise the meat of a wild animal or poultry, whether in the milk of a wild animal or the milk of a domestic animal—it is not prohibited for eating from the Torah; therefore, it is permitted to cook it, and it is permitted for benefit, and it is prohibited for eating by the words of the Scribes, so that the people shall not be negligent and come to the Torah prohibition of basar be-chalav, etc." Thus far his words. And so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 3: This is his wording: "And the meat of a wild animal or poultry, even in the milk of a pure animal—is permitted for cooking and for benefit, and even regarding eating it is only prohibited rabbinically." Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur: This is his wording: "And the meat of a wild animal or poultry, even in the milk of a pure animal—is only rabbinic, and is permitted for cooking and for benefit." Thus far his words. And also our teacher, the Rema, in section 1 wrote, and this is his wording: "Any basar be-chalav that is not prohibited from the Torah—is permitted for benefit." Thus far his words. And his intention is for basar be-chalav through salting or soaking; for just as the meat of a wild animal or poultry in milk is permitted for benefit because they are rabbinic, and they are permitted even when cooked together, so too the meat of a domestic animal in milk through salting or soaking or other rabbinic prohibitions that will be explained in this siman—they are permitted for benefit, and this was his intention to add to the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch.

And there are some of the great authorities who say that even regarding a rabbinic prohibition of basar be-chalav, it is prohibited for benefit, for they treated them like those of the Torah [Bach, and Yam Shel Shlomo siman 100], and some wish to say that the meat of a wild animal or poultry is prohibited by the Torah [ibid.]. However, the great Acharonim rejected their words, for we must not move from the words of the Rambam and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, [Taz subsection 1, and Shach subsection 2 and subsection 4, and I am astonished at the Pri Megadim in the Mishbetzot Zahav subsection 1 and Siftei Da'at subsection 2 who wrote that it should be prohibited to cook because of appearances, see there; from where does he have this to innovate a matter against the fathers of the world, for certainly any rabbinic basar be-chalav is permitted for cooking and for benefit].

Frying meat in butter on a pan is a subject of dispute among the great authorities whether it is a Torah prohibition or a rabbinic prohibition, and the practical difference is whether it is permitted for benefit and for cooking—that is, whether it is permitted for an Israelite to fry meat in butter for a gentile and receive profit from this, and this matter is very common in inns. For some say that it is like cooking, for even if it is only roasted by fire like the roasting of the Paschal offering, it is written: "And they cooked the Paschal offering" (II Chronicles 35:13), all the more so frying. However, the opinion of Rashi and Tosafot (Sanhedrin 4b) is that frying is not cooking, see there; and it must be said that as for the verse calling the roasting of the Paschal offering "cooking," it comes for an interpretive derivation, as they derived in the Sifrei at the end of Parshat Re'eh (Sifrei on Deuteronomy 16:7) where it is written regarding the Paschal offering "And you shall cook and eat," see there, or that it refers to the festival offering that is with the Paschal offering. Therefore, some say that frying is not included in cooking and is permitted for benefit [Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav, subsection 1 in the name of Minchat Yaakov], and in a case of great loss one may rely on this [ibid.]. And one should not bring a proof for permission from the beginning of the sixth chapter of Nedarim (Nedarim 49a): "One who vows against cooked food is permitted roasted food," for one thing, frying is more significant than roasting, and furthermore, there the reason is because we follow the common language of people as is explained there in the Gemara; but in the language of the Torah, it is explained there in the Yerushalmi that roasting is included in cooking, and it brings proof from "And they cooked the Paschal offering," see there, and if so, all the more so frying. And likewise, conversely, one should not bring a proof for a prohibition from the Yerushalmi Shabbat (Yerushalmi Shabbat 7:2), that on Shabbat one is liable for roasting and frying just as for cooking, for what does Shabbat have to do with this? For is it as if "cooking" is written in the Torah regarding Shabbat? Rather, they are a primary category of labor like cooking, or they are a derivative of cooking and one is likewise liable on Shabbat, for on Shabbat even one who melts lead is liable because of cooking, as is explained there.

Since Rashi and the Tosafot hold that frying is not included in the category of cooking regarding meat and milk—certainly it is so. And those who forbid, who raised the difficulty that according to the Torah frying and roasting are included in cooking, it seems to me that it is possible to say that even if it is so in all other matters, nevertheless in meat and milk it is not so. For since the Torah said, "You shall not cook a kid in its mother's milk," and in milk one does not find roasting or frying, for if one fries meat in milk, this is not frying but rather cooking, as is understood. And granted that in butter one finds frying, nevertheless since in milk one does not find it, and the Torah said "in its mother's milk," it follows that frying is not included in this, and certainly roasting. And so it seems in my humble opinion to be the primary ruling. Nevertheless, the Israelite is obligated to distance himself such that he himself shall not fry this, and he shall command a gentile to fry, [for in this there is also no concern of appearance that we brought previously in the name of the Pri Megadim, and see what I wrote in section 9].

The prohibition of meat and milk applies only to the meat of a pure animal with the milk of a pure animal, even if the meat is treifah or nevelah, and similarly the milk. However, the meat of an impure animal in pure milk, or the meat of a pure animal in impure milk, and certainly when both are impure—the prohibition of meat and milk does not apply to them regarding cooking and benefit, and it is permitted to cook them and derive benefit from them, and regarding this it is stated "a kid in its mother's milk," meaning a pure one. And the Rambam wrote there (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 9:6): "One who cooks the meat of a carcass or chelev and the like in milk is lashed for its cooking, but is not lashed for its eating on account of meat and milk, for the prohibition of meat and milk does not take effect upon the prohibition of nevelah or the prohibition of chelev, as there is neither an inclusive prohibition, nor an additional prohibition, nor a simultaneous prohibition." Thus far his words. And similarly, it is not forbidden for benefit [in the Commentary on the Mishnah, chapter 3 of Keritot]. And benefit is not called an additional prohibition such that we would say that in truth it should be forbidden for benefit, for we have already explained in siman 85, section 36, that regarding forbidden foods, the prohibition of benefit in those that have a prohibition of benefit is not a matter unto itself, and eating is one of the parts of benefit, and therefore there is no liability of lashes for benefit, and consequently this is not an additional prohibition, and it is permitted for benefit. Only regarding hekdesh, where the prohibition of benefit in it is a matter unto itself, is benefit correctly considered an additional prohibition [and this is the essence of his intention there, and examine it closely]. And some say that even regarding hekdesh, the prohibition of benefit is not an additional prohibition, and the sages who called it an additional prohibition [Keritot 14a] did not mean it precisely, but rather to mean a severe prohibition [Tosafot Chullin 101a, s.v. "issur"]. And why is the prohibition of cooking not called an additional prohibition, such that we would say since the prohibition of cooking was added to this piece, he should also be lashed for its eating as with every additional prohibition? It appears to me because before the cooking it is impossible to make him liable for its eating on account of meat and milk, for the Torah only forbade it by way of cooking, and after it was cooked the prohibition of cooking has already passed and there is no longer a prohibition of cooking in it, and how can we say that he should now be lashed for its eating because it has an additional prohibition, for this prohibition has already passed [and so it must be said regarding the Gemara 113b (Chullin 113b), see there]. Or it is possible to say since on the meat itself without the joining of the milk there is no prohibition of cooking, it is impossible to add to this meat of nevelah or to the milk a prohibition of eating by reason of meat and milk, for in the meat alone there is no additional prohibition, and it is not similar to every additional prohibition where the addition is upon this piece itself without the joining of another thing, and consequently this reason can also be said regarding benefit, and it requires further study [according to what I have written there is no concern regarding candles in which they mix butter, and see Yad Ephraim section 10, and examine it closely].

Regarding the wording of the Tur on this matter, the commentators have labored over it, as he wrote: "And it only applies to a pure animal etc. but the meat of a pure animal in the milk of an impure animal, or the meat of an impure animal in the milk of a pure animal, and the meat of a wild animal or a bird even in the milk of a pure animal—it is only rabbinic, and it is permitted in cooking and in benefit." Thus far his words. For it is implied from his wording that also a pure animal in an impure animal or an impure animal in a pure animal were forbidden by the rabbis for eating, just like the meat of a wild animal or a bird. And this is a wonder, for it is understandable regarding the meat of a wild animal or a bird that was cooked in pure milk, which are permitted by the Torah, that the rabbis properly decreed against their eating. But an impure and a pure animal which are forbidden by the Torah, why did the rabbis need to decree against their eating? Certainly his intention was only regarding the meat of a wild animal or a bird in milk, and if so, his wording is not precise [Beit Yosef]. And some say that the intention of the Tur is that also in these cases they decreed rabbinically, and the practical difference is regarding the matter of "a piece becomes a carcass" (chatikhah na'asit nevelah), for according to many poskim we do not say this except regarding meat in milk and not regarding other prohibitions; for this, he informs us that in the case of an impure animal in a pure animal we also say a piece becomes a carcass [Bach, and Derishah]. Many have rejected this, for certainly the prohibition of meat in milk does not apply to this; since it is forbidden by the Torah, why would the sages decree in this for any matter whatsoever [Taz subsection 2, and Shach subsection 3, and Pri Chadash, and Kreiti U'Pleiti]. And for us, as we hold regarding all prohibitions that "a piece becomes a carcass" as is written in siman 92, there is no practical difference at all in this.

And it appears to me that the Tur has informed us of a great matter in this, and there is a practical legal difference as will be explained, and it is not due to the reason of meat and milk, for certainly there is no prohibition of meat and milk in this even rabbinically, but rather there is another reason in it: For behold, one must raise a difficulty regarding the Gemara and the poskim who permitted cooking and benefiting from the meat of an impure animal in the milk of a pure animal or vice versa, and it implies that it is permitted to sell it to a gentile. But does it not stand before us in siman 117 that a thing forbidden for eating by the Torah is forbidden for one to profit from by selling it to a gentile to eat, and according to many poskim it is a Torah prohibition as will be explained there? And it is a forced explanation to say that it refers to when it happened upon him, for this is not applicable to an impure animal except in the case of a hunter, see there. And one must say that since here one of them is pure, the meat or the milk, his primary intention is for the pure one, and the impure one is like something that happened upon him, which is permitted. However, it is difficult, for even the pure one becomes forbidden through cooking with the impure one through the imparting of flavor. However, the Tur explained later in siman 98 that the imparting of flavor of one species into a different species according to the method of Rashi is rabbinic, and according to the other poskim, even though it is from the Torah, one is not lashed for it until there is a kezayit within the time of eating a pras, see there, and it is also not more stringent in this regard than a rabbinic prohibition which is permitted for one to profit from, as is explained there. Therefore, the Shas and the poskim did not permit cooking and benefit except when one of them is pure, but the meat of an impure animal in the milk of an impure animal is forbidden in cooking and benefit due to the reason of the prohibition of conducting commerce. Therefore, the Tur was precise to write regarding both of them that it is only rabbinic, and his intention regarding the meat of a bird in milk is that the prohibition of its eating is rabbinic, and regarding an impure animal in a pure one, the prohibition of its sale is rabbinic, and therefore it is permitted in cooking and benefit, meaning to sell it to a gentile and to profit from this [so it appears in my humble opinion].

It has already been explained that the meat of a wild animal and fowl is permitted from the Torah, and by rabbinic decree it is forbidden to eat it; therefore, they are permitted in cooking and in benefit, and so the great later authorities have decided, and not like those who wish to be stringent in this, and such is the law regarding the meat of a domestic animal with the milk of a wild animal. However, the meat of fish and locusts has no prohibition of eating with milk even by rabbinic decree, and it is obvious that one may cook fish with milk and eat them, and such is the simple custom in all the dispersions of Israel. And know that an error fell in the great book of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote that one should not eat fish with milk because of danger as is explained in Orach Chaim siman 173, and there it is explained regarding meat with fish that there is danger, and our teacher, the Rema, already challenged him in his book Darkhei Moshe. And there are those who wish to sustain this and said that they found in the books of the physicians that there is danger in fish with milk, but it is not so, for Rabbeinu Bahya wrote in Parshat Mishpatim that the danger is in fish with cheese, and from this leprosy falls upon a person, see there, and not in fish with milk. Furthermore, if it were according to their words, why did he not establish this in the Shulchan Aruch, and furthermore, the whole world eats this and it is considered an important food. Therefore, there is no one who is concerned for this matter, and they may eat without any hesitation, Heaven forbid, [and see Tosafot at the end of the first chapter of Moed Katan (Moed Katan 11a)].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 87:3): That it is the custom to make milk from almonds and place poultry meat in it, since it is only a rabbinic prohibition; but with domestic animal meat, one must place almonds next to the milk because of marait ha-ayin, as has been explained above in siman 67 regarding the matter of blood. Thus far his words. And there are those who raised an objection against him, for we find that even regarding rabbinic prohibitions they were concerned for marait ha-ayin, in the prohibitions of Shabbat (Shabbat 54a). And it seems to me that one cannot learn from the prohibitions of Shabbat, for the Ramban, of blessed memory, already wrote that all rabbinic prohibitions of Shabbat are like Torah law, and the proof is that we find in the Prophets the prohibition of buying and selling in Nehemiah (Nehemiah 13), see there. Furthermore, it is possible to say simply, that certainly it is not the way to cook meat in almond milk, but rather that they eat the meat with the almond milk. Therefore, with domestic animal meat, even though without cooking it is also only a rabbinic prohibition, nevertheless they were concerned for marait ha-ayin. But with poultry meat, since even with cooking its eating is only a rabbinic prohibition, therefore without cooking there is no concern at all, for this is like a double rabbinic prohibition [see Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav sub-section 4], and nevertheless it is proper to be stringent even with poultry since there are those who prohibit it.

It is forbidden to cook in human milk because of mar'it ha-ayin, and if it fell into a cooked dish—it is nullified and does not require a specific shiur; so wrote the Rashba. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 87): "And it appears according to this that certainly it is forbidden to cook ab initio in the milk of an impure animal, or impure meat in pure milk. And specifically the meat of a beast, but regarding poultry which is d'rabbanan, there is no concern" thus far his words. And there are those who disagree with this, for specifically regarding a thing that is permitted to eat did they concern themselves with mar'it ha-ayin, but not regarding a thing that is forbidden for consumption [Taz and Shach]. Furthermore, how is it possible to forbid a thing that the sages of the Shas explicitly permitted, and it is a forced explanation to say that this is in a place where there is no mar'it ha-ayin, for we hold that anything which they forbade because of mar'it ha-ayin is forbidden even in the innermost chambers, and although one could distinguish, nevertheless it is not logical to say so. And it is also a forced explanation to say that the Mishnah and the Gemara were not dealing with the prohibition of mar'it ha-ayin [see Shach subsection 7], and the Rashba himself wrote in responsa that it is permitted to cook with the milk of an impure animal, yet it is difficult to be lenient since it emerged from the mouth of our teacher, the Rema, and it requires further study, and it is simple that for medical healing there is no concern here at all.

They asked the Radbaz, of blessed memory [Part 3, Siman 606], regarding the custom to place within the sugar at the time they cook it the milk of a pure animal, two parts to a hundred, whether it is permitted to eat it with meat. And he responded that there is no cause for concern here, for behold they place double the amount of water, and behold it is nullified in the water and in the sugar. And it is not relevant in this case to say "one may not nullify a prohibited substance le-khatchilah," for behold at the time he nullifies it, it is not a prohibited substance, and the prohibition is only at the time he eats it with meat, and by then it has already been nullified; and furthermore, the fire absorbs and burns the milk. [See Peri Chadash, subsection 7, and his words are not understood; and see Yad Ephraim by the Gaon Rabbi Zalman Margolios that the holy Arizal would eat this sugar with meat. He further wrote there in the name of Knesset HaGedolah, that in Constantinople at a seudat mitzvah they eat after meat rice that was cooked in almond milk, and cabbage stuffed with meat with almond milk, and since the almond milk is covered and is not clearly recognizable, there is no issue of marit ayin here.]

The Tur wrote (Tur Yoreh Deah 87): "And eggs found inside birds—it is permitted to eat them with milk. In what case does this apply: when they are complete, but if they are not complete—they are like the meat of the bird itself. And what is a complete one: the Rashba wrote: 'Any that has a white and a yolk, even though it is attached by sinews—this is complete. If it has only a yolk—it is still meat.' And Rashi explained: 'When the yolk is finished and it is still red and attached like the string of eggs connected in a cluster—it is permitted,' and it appears from his words that he permits even if it does not yet have a white" thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 5 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 87, 5) wrote: "Eggs found inside birds, if they are complete, meaning they have a white and a yolk, even though it is attached by sinews—this is complete, and it is permitted to eat it with milk. But if it has only a yolk—it is forbidden to cook them with milk, but if one ate them by themselves it is permitted to eat cheese or milk after them" thus far his words, and this is according to the system of the Rashba in the Tur, and not like the system of Rashi.

It appears to me that regarding what they wrote according to the position of the Rashba—that when it has a white and a yolk, even if it is attached by sinews, it is permitted to eat it with milk—the intention is not specifically that the white was also completely finished with its soft shell, and only the hard shell was missing. For if so, how could it be attached by sinews? For we see with our senses that when we find a finished egg with a white and a yolk but without the hard shell, it lies by itself and is not attached at all, even slightly. And so wrote the Rashba himself in Torat HaBayit [Bayit 3, Shaar 4], and this is his wording: "And clusters, those that were detached from the sinews and separated, and their upper shell has not yet hardened, for regarding them, according to everyone, they are not like meat etc., for even Rabbi Yaakov only prohibited as long as they are attached by sinews." Thus far his words. Meaning, and we hold according to the Rabbis (Beitzah 6b) that even when attached by sinews it is permitted; behold it is explicit that even before the hardening of the upper shell, it is not attached by sinews. Rather, their intention is that it has a white and a yolk, meaning the yolk is finished and the white is still in its growth, for then it is still somewhat attached by sinews, and when the white is also finished, it separates entirely from the sinews even before the hardening of the shell.

And this is what the Tur was precise about in his words, for according to the opinion of Rashi he wrote that the yolk is finished, and according to the opinion of the Rashba he wrote that it has a white and a yolk and did not write that the white and the yolk are finished, because the white is not yet finished. And with this it is also understood what he wrote according to the opinion of Rashi: "And it appears from his words that he permits even if it does not yet have a white," thus far his words, and seemingly it is not understood what he wrote "And it appears from his words etc.," for does Rashi not explicitly write so, that the yolk is finished, and automatically there is no white here yet? Rather, because it is possible to say regarding his intent that the yolk is finished and the white is not yet finished, but some of the white exists, and according to this Rashi does not disagree with the Rashba; and for this the Tur says that from the words of Rashi it is implied that even if it does not yet have a white at all it is permitted, since the yolk is finished in its entirety, and according to this they disagree in the law. [And the essence of his intent is because Rashi explained there: "and even though it is still attached etc.," and according to this it could be even when there is a white. However, from what he wrote that the yolk alone is finished, it is implied that it has no white at all. And one must further study the Tosafot there 7a, s.v. 'u-matza' (Beitzah 7a), who wrote: "And the Kuntres explained that 'finished' refers to the yolk, but it has not yet hardened etc.," thus far his words, and Rashi did not write so, see there, and according to their words this is like the Rashba and even more so. And perhaps for the 'others say' there it is so, and Rashi explained according to the first version and they do not disagree with the Rashba, but the Tur does not hold so, and it requires further study and examine it well.]

And I saw one of the great commentators who wrote, and this is his wording: "The main point is that 'completed' means they were completed with yolk and white, for if those whose shell is soft are attached—even post facto it is forbidden, and if they are not attached—it is permitted. But those small ones that were completed only with yolk alone, even if they are not attached—it is forbidden even post facto, for they are like the body of the meat itself." And he ruled similarly in Torat Chattat, except that he did not distinguish between whether they were attached or not, and it is implied from his words that those completed with yolk and white are permitted even if attached, and the main point is as I wrote; also it requires some study why he did not emend anything here [Shach, subsection 10]. And in my humble opinion, these are astonishing matters, for anything completed with yolk and white cannot possibly be attached, and anything where only the yolk is completed cannot possibly not be attached, and our teacher, the Rema, did well that he did not distinguish in Torat Chattat and did not emend anything here, as we have clarified in the previous sections with the help of Heaven.

The great authorities raised a difficulty: for here we permit when they have a yolk and white even though they are attached by sinews, yet above in siman 86 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 86) it was explained regarding one who struck a hen on its tail and it laid eggs—that they are forbidden due to eiver min hachai when they are still attached by sinews, and this law is also from the Rashba, as is written there in section 18. And we have already written there that regarding the matter of nevelah they were stringent, and there is one who answered that regarding meat of poultry in milk, which is rabbinic, they were lenient [Shach, sub-section 9], and there is one who answered that the prohibition of eiver min hachai is different, for if the Torah had not permitted eggs, we would have forbidden all eggs due to eiver min hachai, and when the Torah permitted, it only permitted those that are not attached [ibid.]. And there is one who answered that the prohibition of meat in milk depends on taste, and when there is a white and a yolk, even though they are attached, they do not have the taste of meat, which is not the case for the prohibition of eiver min hachai, which does not depend on taste [Yam Shel Shlomo, siman 2]. And there is one who says that in truth, here too it is forbidden as long as they are attached [Taz, sub-section 6 in his name]. And it appears to me that certainly there too the law is like here, but there it is impossible to clarify in any other way; for behold, we have already explained that when the white is also finished, they are no longer attached by sinews, and before the completion of the white it is very soft, such that when the hen drops it, it would spill out entirely and only the yolk would remain, and the growth of the white can only be recognized when it is found inside the hen and not when she drops it. According to this, the Rashba spoke well there, that if it is not attached by sinews, meaning at the completion of the yolk and the white—it is permitted, and when it is attached by sinews, it is impossible to recognize anything but the yolk—and it is forbidden.

And that which our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, that if it has only a yolk it is forbidden to cook it in milk, is not precise, for cooking poultry in milk is permitted as has been explained, and his intention was regarding eating, and he employed the language of the Torah which refers to eating as cooking [Shach, and Peri Chadash subsection 10]. And that which he wrote, that if one ate them by themselves it is permitted to eat cheese or milk after them, there are those who disagree on this, and they hold that whatever the sages ordained, they ordained similar to a Torah law [Peri Chadash], and one who is lenient has upon what to rely. And the great Acharonim wrote that our daughters of Israel have practiced that even when they find whole eggs in their hard shell not to eat them with milk, but when the egg has been laid, even in a soft shell, it is permitted to eat it with milk, and one should not be stringent at all.

Meat in milk that was smoked, meaning that one soaked meat in milk and afterwards hung it in smoke, and similarly that which was cooked in the hot springs of Tiberias—one is not lashed for it, because this matter was a question in the Yerushalmi Nedarim (Yerushalmi Nedarim 6:1) whether they are considered like cooking regarding the matter of meat in milk or not, and it is a doubt of Torah law, and therefore it is also forbidden for benefit out of doubt. And there is one from whose words it is implied that this is only forbidden by rabbinic law, but it is not so [see Shach subsection 13, and Levush, and examine carefully]. And there is one who says that regarding smoked there is no doubt, and one is lashed for it, because in the Yerushalmi Shabbat (Yerushalmi Shabbat 7:2) it says there that on Shabbat one is liable for the category of cooking, and automatically the same law applies regarding the matter of meat in milk [Pri Chadash]. However, we have already written in section 10 that from Shabbat there is no proof at all, see there [and so wrote the Pelati subsection 12]. And on the contrary, from the fact that the Yerushalmi did not mention there also regarding the matter of meat in milk, learn from this that meat in milk is a doubt.

And similarly, one who cooks meat in the whey of milk, or in milk found within an animal that died or was slaughtered, or in the milk of a male animal [Shach, subsection 19], or if he cooked blood in milk—he is exempt, and one does not receive lashes for its consumption on account of meat in milk. For there is no Torah prohibition in this regarding cooking and consumption due to the prohibition of meat in milk, and it is only prohibited by rabbinic decree on account of meat in milk; therefore, it is permitted in cooking and in benefit. And the male milk of a man is not called milk at all, and if it fell into a pot of meat it does not render it prohibited, and it is no worse than the milk of a woman which has been explained does not render it prohibited. However, all those that have been explained—they prohibit the food like complete milk, and even regarding cooking it is proper to prohibit it ab initio.

There is one who says that regarding what has been explained that with whey one is exempt, this is not the whey which is the milk that drains from the thickening of the cheese, for this is not included in the category of whey but rather in the category of milk, and is prohibited by the Torah. Rather, whey is that after they make the cheeses they cook the whey, and the food floats to the top, and nothing remains in it but mere water, and this is what is called whey. And this has already been explained in siman 81, section 14 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 81:14), see there, and this is the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur. However, the opinion of the Tosafot in Chullin (114a s.v. 'hamvashel') is not so, and also the opinion of Rashi there does not appear so, see there [for he translated it as 'mesgue' in the vernacular, and also on 'nesyovei' at the beginning of the third chapter of Pesachim (Pesachim 42a) he translated it so, see there].

One who cooks a fetus in milk is liable, as it is like meat regarding this matter, and thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said: "'Kid'—to include the fetus" (Chullin 113b). And similarly, one who cooks meat in milk from a ben pekuah that emerged alive, even though it does not require shechitah according to the Torah, nevertheless we apply to this "in its mother's milk," and it is not similar to the milk of a slaughtered or dead animal [so it appears in my humble opinion, and so wrote the Noda BiYehudah, Second Edition, siman 36]. And there is one who wrote that it is like the milk of a slaughtered animal, and he brings proof from Bekhorot (6b) where the Gemara inquires from where we know that milk is not "a limb from the living," and says there: since the Torah forbade meat in milk, it implies that milk alone is permitted, see there. And if we say that there is a prohibition of cooking in a ben pekuah, we would say that it refers to the milk of a ben pekuah, which alone is permitted like the meat. This is no proof at all, for in the Gemara this is only a premise, and regardless, it is well-refuted there, see there, for this refutation is a forced interpretation as is understood, and the Gemara refutes it easily, [and there is no need for the forced interpretation of the Noda BiYehudah that it follows Rabbi Meir, and see Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 14].

But one who cooks a placenta, or skin, sinews, bones, and the soft roots of horns and hooves—is exempt, and likewise one who eats them is exempt. Nevertheless, there is at least a prohibition both in cooking and in eating, and even with hard bones and hard sinews [see Pri Megadim, subsection 22], and the marrow within the bones is like actual meat. And if a hollow bone is found that was cooked in milk, and there is a doubt whether perhaps there was marrow in it and it melted into the milk, and perhaps there is not sixty against it—one does not assume a defect, unless it is the way of this bone to have much marrow in it, for then it is a doubt regarding a Torah law and we follow the stringent view, for because of the bone alone, if it is hard, it appears that one does not require sixty after the fact, and with a soft bone it appears that one requires sixty [so it appears to me, and see Pri Megadim ibid., and examine carefully]. And it appears regarding skin in those whose skins are like their flesh, as the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 4 (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 4:21), which is the skin of a fetus, and the skin under the fat tail, and the skin of the pudenda, also regarding meat in milk one should judge them as meat, and it requires further study [see Pri Megadim ibid.].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 6: "Some say that it is forbidden to rake the fire under the pot of a gentile, because they cook in them sometimes milk and sometimes meat, and one who rakes under their pot comes to the point of cooking meat in milk. They further wrote that one should not mix water in which meat vessels were rinsed with water in which milk vessels were rinsed and give it before an animal, for they are forbidden for benefit. They further wrote that the vessel in which they prepare water for washing the head, one should not use it, for they prepare it from ash that is on the stove, and it is common for meat and milk to be mixed there. Therefore, it is also proper to forbid using the pots of the ovens in the winter house, because meat and milk sometimes splatter upon them from the pots that are cooking in the ovens. But post facto one need not be concerned with all this, and even ab initio there is nothing in this but mere stringencies, and one who is lenient has lost nothing." Thus far his words. Therefore, many are not careful in all this [see Shach subsection 18, and Pri Megadim, and examine closely].

And the reason that these are merely stringencies is as follows: regarding the first law of raking under their pot, it can be said for two reasons: either because there is no cooking after cooking regarding meat and milk just as regarding the matter of Shabbat, for according to many poskim there is no cooking after cooking as I wrote in Orach Chaim siman 318; or the reason is because with meat and milk absorbed in a vessel, cooking is not applicable to it, for this is not the "way of cooking" that the Torah prohibited, and so the Acharonim wrote that this reason is primary. And they wrote that there is cooking after cooking regarding actual meat and milk that is not absorbed [Pleiti subsection 13, and Pri Megadim subsection 18]. And there is one who wrote that even though according to logic it can be said that there is no cooking after cooking in meat and milk, nevertheless there is proof from the Gemara (Chullin 104b) that there is cooking after cooking, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

For they said there that the reason it is forbidden to bring cheese to the table with meat is a decree lest one place it in a boiling stew pot, and it is certain that one does not bring to the table something that has not been cooked, and certainly the meat has already been cooked; nevertheless, they decreed so as not to come to a Torah prohibition if they place cheese in this stew pot [Pleti there]. And I do not recognize this proof at all, for certainly since the cheese has not yet been cooked, it is not called "cooking after cooking"; even though the meat was cooked, nevertheless, the meat and milk together have not yet been cooked. But regarding meat and milk that have already been cooked, from where does he have the basis to say that there is "cooking after cooking" in this? Furthermore, Rashi explained there with this wording: "A decree lest one place animal meat with the cheese inside a boiling stew pot, which would constitute cooking." Thus far his words. And it implies explicitly that one would place raw meat with raw cheese into the boiling stew pot. And even if we were to press and say his intention was that the meat was already cooked, nevertheless, the cheese certainly was not cooked, and this is "first cooking" regarding the matter of meat and milk as I have written. Therefore, the law requires further study [and see what I wrote in section 12 and examine it closely].

Regarding the second law, that one may not mix water in which meat vessels were rinsed with water in which milk vessels were rinsed and give it before an animal, this is only relevant if the water was boiling from a kli rishon and they were mixed while boiling; for if not so, it is not forbidden for benefit, as this is not the way of cooking, and also that there must be substance of meat and of milk within the vessels. And this matter is a remote possibility, for even if they rinsed with boiling water from a kli rishon, afterwards when they were mixed they are a kli sheni. And all the more so regarding the third law of washing the head which they do with ash from the stove, for certainly all the moisture has already been burnt, and it is also a flavoring that impairs. And even though we wrote in the name of the Rambam in section 3 that meat in milk is forbidden even if they put wormwood and bitterness into them, see there, that is when it has already become meat in milk, but to create meat in milk through impairing things, this we have not heard, and its law is like all prohibitions, that a flavoring that impairs is permitted [and so wrote the Pelati in subsection 15]. And you should know that it is so, for later it will be explained regarding a meat pot that is not of its day, if they cooked milk in it - the cooked food is permitted, because it is a flavoring that impairs, and so too regarding the pots of the winter house ovens it is only a mere concern, and therefore all these are not stringencies from the core of the law. And know that one must be careful not to draw water with a meat vessel and afterwards with a milk vessel if they are not completely clean, and even with a meat vessel alone that is not clean or a milk vessel alone that is not clean one should not draw water ab initio, lest he use the water with the second substance, and it is simple.

The Tur wrote: Milk found in the abomasum, according to the opinion of the Rif, is not milk, and it is permitted to cook meat in it, even in its liquid state, and so wrote the Rambam (Rambam Laws of Forbidden Foods 9:15). Rashi forbade it, and wrote that it is complete milk, even the curdled part within it, and all the more so the liquid. Rabbenu Tam distinguished: the curdled part within it is not milk, but the liquid is milk. Therefore, if one salted the abomasum with its milk—it is forbidden due to meat and milk, for salted is like boiling hot, and likewise if it stood in it for one day, for soaked is like cooked. And if one curdled cheeses with it: if there is enough to impart flavor, they are forbidden according to Rashi even with the curdled part, and according to Rabbenu Tam specifically with the liquid, and such is the conclusion of my master, my father, the Rosh, of blessed memory. Thus far his words.

The explanation of these matters: When a lamb, calf, or kid suckles and they are slaughtered, milk is found within the abomasum, and it is like vinegar and possesses great sharpness, such that with it—meaning with the milk in the abomasum, or with the abomasum itself, which is called the skin of the abomasum [because the flesh of the abomasum is only like skin and not like meat, for due to its acidity and sharpness it is not fatty]—one curdles cheese; for when one casts a small amount of them into a vat of milk, it becomes cheese, and this is due to the greatness of their sharpness. Sometimes clear milk is found in it, and sometimes curdled milk. Therefore, the Rif and the Rambam hold that the milk of the abomasum does not have the law of milk at all, but rather is like mere waste, like all the filth found in the abomasum, for it has no taste of milk at all; therefore, it is permitted to cook meat in it. It appears explicitly that according to this opinion it is permitted even rabbinically. You should know that this is so, for if it were regarding the Torah prohibition, even without this, the milk of a slaughtered animal is permitted by the Torah, as we expound in the Gemara (Chullin 113b): "'In its mother's milk'—and not in the milk of a slaughtered animal," and as I wrote in section 26. There is one who wrote that according to this opinion it is nonetheless forbidden rabbinically, and these are astonishing words [see Levush, and Chagurat Shmuel subsection 21]. The opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, is that it is like complete milk, even the curdled part within it; and Rabbeinu Tam decides: that the clear milk, since it is similar to all milk, its law is like milk, but the curdled milk is like mere waste. And if it was found clear and became curdled, there are opinions regarding this as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

Therefore, the Tur wrote that if one salted the abomasum with its milk—it is forbidden, for salted is like boiling, and likewise if it stood in it for one day, due to the reason of kavush. And this is according to Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam: according to Rashi even if it is congealed, and according to Rabbeinu Tam if it is clear. And the measure of salting is the time it takes to place it on the fire and for it to begin to boil, as was written in siman 91. And if one curdled cheeses with the salted or the kavush: if they have enough to impart flavor, that is, when there is not sixty in the cheeses against the salted and kavush milk—the cheeses are forbidden. However, according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam it is permitted, since it is merely waste. And one should not ask: granted that it is merely waste, nevertheless, did it not absorb from the skin of the abomasum by means of the salting and the kavush and it contains the flavor of meat, and if so, when one later put the milk into the cheeses, they contain the flavor of meat? And in truth, there are some of the poskim who forbid for this reason even according to the Rif and the Rambam [Beit Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham, and Mordechai in the name of the Ra'avyah]. And it must be said, according to the opinion of the Tur, that since it is merely waste, the power of the meat of the skin of the abomasum does not dominate it such that it would later impart the flavor of meat into the cheeses, and this is superior to "imparting flavor from that which imparted flavor," because the waste nullifies it completely [Beit Yosef]. And it seems to me to state another reason for this: that granted that regarding a rabbinic prohibition we are as stringent as a Torah prohibition, nevertheless, here it is like two rabbinic factors, for even actual milk is not forbidden by the Torah except through cooking, and not through salting and kavush, and here also the flavor of meat absorbed in this milk is only by means of salting and kavush, and the primary substance placed in the cheeses is merely waste, and only the flavor of meat came by means of salting and kavush, and it is like two rabbinic factors, and we are not stringent in this.

And behold, even according to the approach of Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam there is a great question: why did they only forbid it when it imparts flavor, for it is a "davar hama'amid" which is not nullified even in a thousand? And granted that regarding the skin of the stomach itself when they curdled cheese with it, it will be explained that it only forbids when it imparts flavor, because the prohibition of meat and milk is dependent on flavor, as will be explained with the help of Heaven; nevertheless, when they curdled with the skin of the stomach of a nevelah, it will be explained that even in a thousand it is not nullified, according to the law of a "davar hama'amid." And here, the milk in the stomach is nevelah, since it was salted with the stomach itself or soaked, and the piece becomes nevelah; if so, why does it only forbid in sixty [Shach, subsection 30]? And it must be said that since the prohibition of this "ma'amid" is not due to itself but due to the prohibition of meat and milk, they were not stringent in this [ibid.]. Furthermore, since the "ma'amid" became nevelah from a rabbinic prohibition of meat and milk through salting and soaking, we should not judge it as absolute nevelah such that it would not be nullified even in a thousand [Pri Chadash, subsection 27]. And it seems to me that it is because here it is truly a double rabbinic prohibition, for even actual milk with meat through salting and soaking is rabbinic, and here even with actual cooking it would not even become a Torah prohibition, because it is the milk of a slaughtered animal. Therefore, in a double rabbinic prohibition, we are not stringent regarding a "ma'amid" to say that it is not nullified even in a thousand.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 9: "Milk found in the abomasum is not milk, and it is permitted to cook meat in it, even in its liquid state; and there is one who forbids." Thus far his words. And it appears clearly that he holds the halacha according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam, and the "one who forbids" refers to the liquid state according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, but the opinion of Rashi he did not bring at all, though there are those who were concerned even for the opinion of Rashi [Yam Shel Shlomo, siman 107]. And in section 10 he wrote: "Milk found in the abomasum that was salted within its abomasum, or that remained in it for one day, it is then forbidden to curdle with it." Thus far his words. And it is not logical to say that he wrote this only according to the "one who forbids," for if so, he should have written this in the same section. Rather, it is certain that he wrote this even according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam, and he holds that even though it is merely waste matter, nevertheless, since it was salted or pickled with the meat of the abomasum, it contains the taste of meat, and when one puts it afterwards into the cheeses, they contain the taste of meat, as he wrote in section 36 [Shach, subsection 29, and in a case post facto, the Beit Yosef wrote that it is permitted].

But our teacher, the Rema, does not hold this way, for he wrote there, and this is his wording (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 87): "And if one curdled with it: if it is liquid—it forbids all the cheeses until there is sixty in the milk that was curdled against the forbidden stomach [meaning the milk in the stomach], and if there was sixty in the milk—everything is permitted. And if the stomach was congealed—it does not forbid anything even if there was not sixty in the milk against the stomach. And if the stomach was liquid initially and congealed, it has the law of liquid. And there are those who are lenient in this, and in a place of loss one may be lenient." Thus far his words. Behold, he ruled entirely according to the opinion of the "there is one who forbids," which is the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, that with liquid it is forbidden even post facto when there is not sixty, and with congealed it is permitted even ab initio. And perhaps with congealed he also holds that it is forbidden ab initio, and only post facto is it permitted. And even with a kosher animal that nursed from a tereifah, and it was liquid and congealed, one may permit in a place of great loss, since there is no Torah prohibition here as it is not the manner of cooking, and according to the Rif and the Rambam it is permitted even with liquid; therefore, with liquid that congealed one may permit with a great loss even in this [Shach subsection 32]. And know that when there is sixty it is permitted even ab initio, and "one may not nullify a prohibition ab initio" is not applicable in this, since his intention is not to nullify the prohibition but rather to curdle the milk to make cheeses. And it requires further study for the law, however, in combination with the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam one may be lenient.

Since it has been explained that the milk in the abomasum has sharpness and acidity, therefore, ab initio one should not leave it in the abomasum until the milk inside the abomasum cools, and there is a concern that it will emit and absorb even without melichah and kavishah due to its sharpness, and it will receive the taste of the meat from the skin of the abomasum. However, ex post facto there is no concern as long as they did not salt it inside it and did not soak it, as has been explained according to the opinions. [See Taz subsection 10 and it requires further study, and the Nekudot HaKesef and the Pri Megadim already wondered at him].

All that has been explained refers to the kiva itself, meaning the milk within the kiva, which is called "kiva" in the language of the poskim. However, the flesh of the kiva itself, which is called "the skin of the kiva" in the language of the poskim, is actual meat. Therefore, if one curdled cheese with the skin of the kiva of a nevela, a tereifa, or an impure animal—it is forbidden in any amount according to the law of a "davar hama'amid," for even in a thousand it is not nullified. But when one curdled with the skin of the kiva of a kosher animal—it is nullified in sixty; that is, if there is in the milk into which the skin of the kiva was placed sixty times against the skin, it is nullified. And even though this too is a "ma'amid," nevertheless, regarding the prohibition of meat and milk where the Torah was particular about the actual taste—for it only prohibited it by way of cooking—one should not forbid it when there is no taste. Therefore, it is nullified in sixty, for as long as it does not impart taste, it is not meat and milk, but rather each stands on its own; so wrote the poskim [Shach, subsection 35]. And for this reason, even by rabbinic decree they did not forbid it, because this is not the category of meat and milk. But regarding nevela, tereifa, and an impure animal, which are forbidden in their own right, we follow the rule of "ma'amid."

And even regarding nevelah and tereifah, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 11: Specifically when there was no other curdling agent there except the forbidden matter, but if there was also a permitted curdling agent there—it is "this and that causes," and it is permitted if there is sixty against the forbidden matter. Thus far his words. And this too is specifically when the forbidden matter alone is not sufficient to curdle, but if the forbidden matter alone is sufficient to curdle, even if the permitted matter is also sufficient to curdle—it is forbidden, according to the law of every "this and that causes" in the Shas [Taz, and Shach, and Pri Chadash, and Kreiti U'Pleiti]. And even though the wording of our teacher, the Rema, implies somewhat that in every case it is permitted, nevertheless, this is the primary ruling. And according to this, if he curdled with the skin and the curdled milk, or with the liquid and the curdled milk, and there is not enough in one of them to curdle—it is permitted, and perhaps with the liquid and the curdled milk one should permit in all cases due to the combined opinion of the Rif and the Rambam, that the liquid too is like mere waste, and one should deliberate on this.

He further wrote in section 10 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 87:10): "The skin of the stomach is sometimes salted and dried until it becomes like wood, and they fill it with milk—it is permitted, for since it has dried it is merely like wood, and has no moisture of meat." Thus far his words. And the same law applies to other intestines when they are dried until they become like wood [Shach, subsection 33], but meat dried like wood—he forbids [Pri Megadim]. And there are those who permit even meat dried like wood [Pitchei Teshuvah in the name of the Noda BiYehudah and Tiferet Tzvi], and even if they are subsequently cooked, or soaked in water for a twenty-four hour period—it is permitted [ibid.]. And among us, they make cheeses by means of the skin of the stomach that has been dried until it is ground into dust with other things, as is known.