Siman 85

Grasshoppers include those that are impure and those that are pure, as it is written in Shemini: "Every winged swarming thing that goes on four is an abomination to you. But this you may eat of every winged swarming thing that goes on four, which has jointed legs above its feet with which to leap on the earth. These of them you may eat: the arbeh after its kind, the sol'am after its kind, the chargol after its kind, and the chagav after its kind. But every other winged swarming thing that has four feet is an abomination to you." And since impure grasshoppers are included in "winged swarming things," one who eats an impure grasshopper violates a positive commandment and a negative commandment, just as with an impure bird, as I wrote in siman 82, and we explained this in siman 78, section 2; see there.

The Torah permitted eight species of chagavim, for it specified four species, and regarding each one it is written "according to its kind," which included four more. These are: the chagav and the kind of chagav, which is the ravzanit; the chargol and the kind of chargol, which is the artzubia; the arbeh and the kind of arbeh, which is the tziporet keramim; the salam and the kind of salam, which is the yochana yerushalmit [Rambam, end of chapter 1]. One who is expert in them and in their names may eat them, and a hunter is trusted regarding them like a bird. One who is not expert in them examines the signs, and there are three signs in them: any that has four legs, and four wings that cover most of the length of its body and most of the circumference of its body, and it has two jointed legs for leaping, which are two long legs in addition to the four, and they are near its neck above the legs to leap with them when it desires to leap [Rashi on the Mishnah 59a wrote four signs, and so it is in the Gemara which counts covering most of its body as a sign unto itself, and the Rambam counts wings covering etc. as one, and examine closely].

Our sages, of blessed memory, expounded [65a] from that which is written "which has no (lo) legs," where the written form is with an aleph, implying it has no legs, but the read tradition is "it has (lo) legs" with a vav—that even though it does not yet have legs now, but it is destined to grow them after a time, since it is known that this species is such that when it grows it will have legs, it is permitted. The Rambam wrote this law also regarding wings, for when it does not have wings now but is destined to grow them, it is permitted; for what is the difference? Since the Merciful One revealed this regarding legs, the same applies to wings [Pri Chadash, and so wrote the Ran, see there].

Among these species that the Torah specified, there are some whose heads are long and some whose heads are not long; there are some that have a tail and some that do not have a tail, and therefore there is no concern regarding these signs, however they may be. And there are some that have a bald spot, which is to say that their head is plucked, and there are some whose head is not plucked, and therefore there is no concern regarding this sign as well. And the impure ones all have long heads and they have a tail, but regarding a bald spot, they also differ from one another [see the Beit Yosef, that for this reason the Rambam and the Tur did not write "bald spot" for this reason].

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said [59a] that for these signs it is also required that its name be hagav. The Tur wrote that for this reason one should not eat them even if they have all the signs unless there is a tradition regarding this species that its name is hagav. This is the wording of the Rambam: And even if its head is long and it has a tail, if its name was hagav it is tahor. Thus far his words. It is implied from his words that the name hagav is only required for one with a long head and a tail, but for one with a short head and no tail, the name hagav is not required. From the sugya of the Gemara [65b] one may also learn this. Nevertheless, the Maggid Mishneh wrote that his intention was not specifically so, and in every case the name hagav is required, see there, and it requires further study. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote similarly. And the hunter is trusted to say that its name is hagav based on his tradition [according to the Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav]. And now we are accustomed not to eat any hagav even with all the signs and even if it is known that its name is hagav [Shulchan Aruch section 7, subsection 1], and in our days we have never heard of a place where they eat hagavim.

It was taught in the Torat Kohanim [Shemini 65]: Rabbi says, "Every winged swarming thing that has four legs is tamei to you"—if it has five, it is tahor. Thus far his words. For this verse is redundant, as it was already written previously: "Every winged swarming thing that goes on four... yet these you may eat..." Why did the Torah repeat once more to say that that which has four legs is tamei? Rather, it comes for an exposition: that if it has five, it is tahor. And in my humble opinion, its explanation is as follows: so that you should not say, since it is written "yet these you may eat from all... that goes on four" etc., that specifically that which goes on four is kosher with the signs that have been explained, but in one that goes on five or more, these signs do not avail and everything is tamei; for this the Torah informed us, that only a possessor of four legs without signs is tamei, but with signs, even with more than four it is kosher. The Ra'avad, of blessed memory, explained that in one that goes on five, one does not need signs at all, and even without signs it is tahor; see there. And I am very much astonished, for if so, the Shas would not have omitted mentioning this; and on the contrary, from the language of the Mishnah and the Gemara in Chullin, it is clear that without signs it is certainly tamei. And it requires further study.

Locusts do not require shechitah, like fish, and their blood is permitted, like fish; and on the contrary, they are even more lenient than fish, for the brine of impure fish is forbidden, as was written in siman 83, yet regarding the brine of impure locusts, the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch ruled that it is permitted because they have no moisture at all. And it is an explicit Mishnah in Eduyot [chapter 7]; that is to say, their moisture is like mere sweat, as they have no fatness in them [and so the wording of the Levush is precise]. Nevertheless, some say that their brine is forbidden, for they hold that the Mishnah deals with the matter of the flesh regarding impurity and purity and not regarding the permission of eating. This is the opinion of the Ra'avad in Eduyot there, and it is likewise implied in the Yerushalmi Terumot [chapter 10], see there. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not bring this opinion [see Shach, subsection 4, who brought it in the name of the Yam Shel Shlomo that its brine is forbidden, but their mixture does not forbid].

And behold, after we have explained with the help of Heaven all the impure species that the Torah forbade us, and also previously all the laws of nevelot and terefot were explained, we must now explain the general laws that exist regarding the prohibition of foods. This is the wording of the Rambam, of blessed memory, at the beginning of the fourteenth chapter of Ma'akhalot Assurot: All forbidden foods in the Torah, their measure is like a medium-sized kezayit, whether for lashes, for karet, or for death at the hands of Heaven; and anyone liable for karet or death at the hands of Heaven for a food receives lashes. And this measure, along with all the measures, are a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai. It is forbidden by the Torah to eat any amount of a forbidden thing, but one does not receive lashes except for a kezayit; and if one ate any amount less than the measure, they strike him with makkat mardut. Thus far his words. And that which he wrote, that all forbidden foods are with a kezayit, this refers to most things, but there are some exceptions to the rule, for the eight sheratzim in the Torah, their measure is like a lentil, as I wrote in siman 84, section 6, see there. And that which he wrote, "a medium-sized kezayit," so it is in the Mishnah in Kelim, chapter 17 [mishnah 8], for we learned: The kezayit they spoke of is neither large nor small but medium; this is the Aguri. And this means that its oil is gathered (agur) within it, for it is not absorbed in the fruit like the juice of apples and berries, but like the juice of grapes [Rashi, Berakhot 39a]. And I do not know why the Rambam omitted it, and it seems to me that it is the name of a place, and in their time it was so, and in every time one must know what the medium is [and so it appears in Berakhot ibid., which says: its name is not Aguri but its name is Abruti, and why etc., because its oil etc.; behold, it is the name of a place and they changed it to Aguri because of the reason].

Our sages, of blessed memory, said [end of the third chapter of Nazir] that this which the Torah obligated for a kezayit of a forbidden substance is because his throat benefited from a kezayit, even if a kezayit did not enter the intestines. For example, if he ate a half-kezayit and vomited it, and then went back and ate a half-kezayit, even though there was only a half-kezayit in his intestines from the two times, nevertheless, his throat benefited from a kezayit. And not only that, but even if he ate that same half-kezayit that he vomited, he is liable, for his throat benefited from two half-kezayits; for that which was in the intestines for a brief moment is not considered digestion such that we would consider it as mere dust, and his throat has benefited from a kezayit. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said there that even if a small amount of the kezayit remained between the gums, meaning in his palate, and a full kezayit did not descend to the intestines, nevertheless he is liable, for "the palate tastes its food" and his throat benefited from a kezayit. But that which remains between the teeth we do not combine to the kezayit, for the throat does not benefit from what is between the teeth [see the Rambam there, law 2, and the Kesef Mishneh; and his words require further study, but that which the emender there wondered about regarding the Rambam is an error, for Rav Papa said that regarding "between the teeth" everyone does not disagree, etc., and examine closely].

And know that we have great questions regarding this matter, for behold, in the eighth chapter of Terumot we learned: regarding a kohen who placed terumah into his mouth and it became known to him that he is not a kohen—for example, if he was the slave of a kohen and his master sold him to an Israelite—and he had not yet swallowed the terumah, Rabbi Eliezer says he should swallow it and Rabbi Yehoshua says he should spit it out. And likewise, if it became known to him that he is tamei or that the terumah is tamei, he should spit it out, and Rabbi Eliezer does not disagree on this. And the Yerushalmi says there that the reason of Rabbi Eliezer is because he began in a permitted state. And the Yerushalmi brings a baraita that Rabbi Natan disagrees with this, as it was taught: Rabbi Natan says, it was not that Rabbi Eliezer would say it because he began in a permitted state, but rather that Rabbi Eliezer would say: that which is chewed is like that which is swallowed; even regarding Shabbat so, even regarding Pesach so, even regarding Yom Kippur so, even regarding a nazir so, even regarding nevelot so, even regarding terefot so, even regarding creeping things and swarming things so. Thus far his words. And the reason of Rabbi Eliezer is that since he chewed the food, behold his throat has derived benefit, see there. And this is like the reasoning of our Gemara that we wrote, that the Torah obligated for benefit of the throat even if it did not enter his intestines. And if so, behold we established that the halakha is not like Rabbi Eliezer, for it is a great principle that between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua the halakha is like Rabbi Yehoshua, and so the Rambam ruled in the tenth chapter of Terumot, see there. And furthermore, even according to Rabbi Eliezer it is only according to Rabbi Natan. And it must be said that this which Rabbi Yehoshua disagrees is for the reason that he has not yet swallowed at all; but if he swallowed and vomited, even Rabbi Yehoshua admits, even though according to the reason of benefit of the throat we should not have distinguished between swallowed and not swallowed, for ultimately behold his throat derived benefit; nevertheless, without swallowing there is no name of "eating" upon this, only the name of "benefit," and for benefit without eating the Torah did not obligate lashes [see there in the Kesef Mishneh who wrote regarding carrying on Shabbat and forgot the words of the Rash there who explained regarding detaching from muktzeh, and automatically all that he wrote in the Minchat Chinuch is not so, and also that which he explained the matters like that of the chapter Kol HaNishreket, rather to say so as occurred to us with the help of Heaven, and examine carefully].

And behold, also in Berakhot [14a] we say regarding a fast that one may taste the dish and it is of no consequence, and the Rishonim explained that he swallows and spits out, and similarly regarding a blessing, tasting does not require a blessing. It is explained in the Gemara there that even though he derives pleasure, nevertheless there is no "eating" here; see there. And this accords with our words, that as long as the food has not entered into his innards, the name "eating" does not apply to it. But if so, we should not combine what is between the gums, for a full kezayit never entered into his innards. And it is understandable in a case where he ate a half-kezayit and vomited and then ate it again, for in any event a kezayit entered in combination; but what is between the gums was never in the innards. And it must be said that since the main part descended into his innards and the name "eating" applies to it, therefore even if a small amount of it did not descend, since the pleasure was from the entire kezayit, he is liable. And the reason can be said to be that behold, the Torah obligated for the eating of a kezayit, and there is no eating without pleasure, and the way of eating is for a small amount to remain in the gums; therefore it is called the eating of a kezayit when a small amount remains between the gums. But what is between the teeth, since he derives no pleasure from it at all, and furthermore there are things that do not enter between the teeth such as liquid and a large eating, automatically it is impossible to combine them to the kezayit.

And we further have to ask, for behold, the Gemara explained to us regarding the eating of a forbidden substance that one includes what is between the teeth, and what is the law regarding the eating of a mitzvah, such as matzah and maror and the Pesach offering and all mitzvot of eating—if one fulfills his obligation by eating a kzeit with what is between the teeth? And similarly, if one ate half a kzeit of matzah and vomited it and returned and ate it, does he fulfill the obligation of the mitzvah or not? And from the Yerushalmi that we cited, which says so even regarding Pesach, one cannot bring proof, for it is possible to say his intention was regarding chametz on Pesach and regarding liability, and not regarding the obligation of matzah. And seemingly there is no logical reason to distinguish between one and the other, and also some proofs can be brought for this.

And I saw one of the great authorities who wrote that regarding birkat hamazon, where it is written "and you shall be satisfied," we require that his intestines be satisfied and we do not combine what is between the gums. He brings proof from the wording of the Rosh in Berakhot [chapter 2, section 10] regarding the matter we cited, who wrote that one does not require a blessing when tasting and spitting out even more than a revit because we require the enjoyment of the intestines; see there. But it appears to me that this is no proof at all, for according to what we explained, even regarding all prohibitions we require the enjoyment of the intestines, for without this one is not liable as it is not called eating at all; only when there is enjoyment of the intestines do we also combine what is between the gums. And if it is because it is written "and you shall be satisfied," behold our sages of blessed memory explicitly expounded [Berakhot 49b]: "and you shall be satisfied" refers to drinking or to the measure of an egg; and they explicitly said that a kazayit is not included in satisfaction [ibid. 20b]. Furthermore, if it entered your mind that the law of birkat hamazon is different from everything else because of "and you shall be satisfied," why did our sages of blessed memory not expound "and you shall be satisfied" for this? Rather, it is certain that birkat hamazon is not distinct from all other things [see Chatam Sofer, Orach Chaim, siman 127, who cited this in the name of the Panim Me'irot to distinguish birkat hamazon from everything else].

I further saw regarding that great authority [ibid.] who wrote that concerning the matter of Yom Kippur, which requires the volume of a large date, we do not combine what is between the teeth because it is written "whoever is not afflicted," and as long as it has not entered the intestines, the affliction has not been removed. And I wonder at this, for just as the Sages received a tradition regarding the measure of a kezayit—that in all prohibitions we combine what is between the gums and the status of eating a kezayit applies to this—so too they received a tradition that by eating the volume of a large date on Yom Kippur the affliction is removed, even when combining what is between the gums. And there is further proof that it is not so from what the Sages said in Yoma [80a], that the Sages changed the measure of Yom Kippur from the measure of all other prohibitions, for all other prohibitions are with a kezayit and Yom Kippur is with the volume of a large date because it is written "will not be afflicted," see there. And if it were according to the words of that great authority, the Gemara should have said that for this reason its measure is also different, in that we do not combine what is between the gums. Furthermore, from the Yerushalmi Terumot that we cited, it appears explicitly that Yom Kippur is equal to all other prohibitions, for according to the one who holds that chewing is like swallowing, he says explicitly that also regarding the matter of Yom Kippur it is so, as I wrote in section 10. And if so, here too according to us, that chewing is not like swallowing but rather that we combine what is between the gums, also on Yom Kippur it is so. [See the Chatam Sofer ibid. who wrote that in the Yerushalmi there it implies that Yom Kippur is different, and it is a great wonder regarding him, for on the contrary, in the Yerushalmi it is the opposite. And his proof from Ketubot 31a, "one who steals his forbidden fat etc." and it did not say "one who steals his bread on Yom Kippur" because Yom Kippur requires descending to the intestines, see there—aside from it being a weak proof, it is no proof at all, for according to what I wrote, in all of them it requires descending to the intestines, and the place of the house of swallowing from which it cannot return is indeed descending to the intestines, and therefore it comes as one, see there and examine carefully].

The Rambam wrote [ibid. halacha 4]: A kezayit of chelev or nevelah or pigul or notar and the like that one placed in the sun and it diminished, one who eats it is exempt; if he then placed it in the rain and it swelled, one is liable for karet or lashes for it. If it was less than a kezayit from the beginning and it swelled and stood at a kezayit, it is forbidden but there are no lashes. Thus far his words. And one should not ask: since less than a kezayit that swelled carries no lashes, if so, regarding a kezayit that diminished, it has already been rejected from lashes, and if so, even after it swelled let us say since it was rejected, it is rejected, just as we maintain that there is rejection regarding sacrifices. However, in truth the sages of blessed memory said in Menachot [54b] that there is no rejection regarding prohibitions, see there [and behold, even regarding mitzvot there is no rejection as is found in Chullin 87a, but because regarding mitzvot and for leniency the Gemara is in doubt in Sukkah 33a, and regarding prohibitions it is obvious to the Gemara in all manners that there is no rejection even though there it deals with stringency, therefore he uses this phrasing, and examine this carefully]:

And one should not ask: since we maintain that there is no rejection regarding prohibitions, if so, why did the Rambam rule in chapter 18 of Shabbat, law 26, regarding one who carried out a dried fig's volume into the public domain, and it shriveled, and then returned and swelled, that it is a doubt whether there is rejection or there is no rejection and he is exempt? Granted that the Gemara in Shabbat [91] raises this as a query, see there; however, since in Menachot the Gemara ruled that there is no rejection regarding prohibitions, if so, why is the law of the prohibition of Shabbat different from all other prohibitions? For it can be said that they are certainly not comparable; for in all other prohibitions, he performs the prohibition after it has returned to its measure, whereas in Shabbat the prohibition is divided into two: the lifting up and the setting down. The lifting up was before the rejection, and afterwards it was rejected, and then it returned to its original state and he performed the setting down. If so, there is an interruption between the lifting up and the setting down and we do not combine them with one another, and it is not comparable to all other prohibitions. Therefore, the Rambam ruled that he is exempt due to the doubt [and see Rashi in Shabbat there who intended this, and examine it closely].

It appears to me that even though a kezayit that was diminished through shriveling and then expanded again through liquid is liable, nevertheless we require that it contain no void, even the smallest of the small, and in every kezayit measurement it is so, even if it is the way of this item to have a slight emptiness, such as wheat bread that has risen, which normally has small voids, and so too anything similar to this. For the expansion is only effective in that it spreads the contraction and creates looseness in the parts of the food, but if it creates voids, it is not effective. And a proof for this matter is from that which we learned in the second chapter of Uktzin: the meat of a calf that expanded and the meat of an old animal that diminished are measured as they are, meaning as they are now; and one is liable for the meat of a calf that expanded if it was a kezayit from its beginning. And prior to this we learned: onion leaves and onion shoots, if they contain slime, they are measured as they are; if they contain a void, one must compress its voids. Sargonit bread [soft like a sponge] is measured as it is; if it contains a void, one must compress its void. See there. Behold, it is explicit that the looseness joins together, even the looseness of slime which is moisture, and so too that which is soft like a sponge, which is very loose, joins together, but the void does not join together. And there is a further proof from the Yerushalmi Yoma [chapter 8, halacha 2], which says there regarding the measurement of a kakevoret, as we learned: "like it and its pit," Rabbi Yose said, "this means one must compress its void." See there. And this is what our teacher, the Rema, ruled in Orach Chaim siman 486 regarding maror, that one must compress the air void, see there. And so too regarding matzah, the void does not join to the kezayit [Magen Avraham], and the same applies to everything. And consequently, the same applies that also regarding malkot and kareth, the air does not join together. [And there is a slight need for further study regarding the Rambam, who wrote: "If it was less than a kezayit etc. and it expanded etc. it is forbidden etc." Thus far his words. For even without this, a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law. And in Menachot 54, which says "wherever from the beginning etc. it is by rabbinic decree," this is regarding tumah, but regarding eating, a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law. And so the Rambam wrote in the fourth chapter of Ma'achalot Assurot, law 13, this law regarding tumah, that it is tamei by rabbinic decree; but regarding a prohibition this is not applicable, rather his intention is that there are no malkot for this.]

All prohibitions in the Torah do not combine with one another to form a kezayit, such as a half-kezayit of chelev and a half-kezayit of blood; on the contrary, they nullify one another, as will be explained in siman 98, except for nevelah and terefah which do combine with one another as written in siman 29. Similarly, the prohibitions of a nazir combine with one another, for thus the Torah decreed [Nazir 37a]. The five species of grain, their flours, and their doughs all combine to form a kezayit, whether for the prohibition of chametz on Pesach, for the prohibition of chadash before the Omer, or for the prohibitions of ma'aser sheni and terumot. Se'or is like dough, such that they combine from all five species with one another, and se'or combines with dough, for dough and se'or are considered as one [as is evident in the first chapter of Challah].

The Rambam wrote [ibid.]: It appears to me that everything subject to terumot and ma'asrot joins together to a kezayit regarding tevel because it is one category. To what is this comparable? To the nevelah of an ox, the nevelah of a lamb, and the nevelah of a deer, which join together to a kezayit as we have explained. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is as follows: Behold, in the fourth chapter of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 16, he wrote that all prohibitions do not join with one another to a kezayit, such as a half-kezayit of chelev and a half-kezayit of blood, and similarly a half-kezayit of nevelah and a half-kezayit of an impure animal and the like; since each is divided by its own negative commandment, they do not join with one another. However, those that are under one negative commandment join together even if they are two species, such as the nevelah of an ox, the nevelah of a deer, and the nevelah of a bird, which join to a kezayit since they are all included in the negative commandment of nevelah, and so too with all prohibitions. See there.

And behold, in the Shas this law is not explicitly explained, and on the contrary, seemingly from what the sages, of blessed memory, said [Pesachim 43b]: Regarding all Torah prohibitions, a permitted substance does not combine with a prohibited substance except for the prohibitions of a nazir, see there; it implies that a prohibited substance combines with a prohibited substance, for if not so, let it teach us an even greater novelty. However, this law is explicitly proven in several places from what the Shas said [HaSokher 66] that Rabbi Meir holds that all prohibitions in the Torah combine with one another based on the verse, "You shall not eat any abominable thing," anything I have abominated for you is under "you shall not eat," see there; and the sages disagree with him, and we rule like the sages. And furthermore, from what we learned in a Mishnah in Meilah [Chapter 4]: Consecrated objects of the altar combine with one another regarding meilah, and regarding pigul, notar, and impurity; terumah, terumat ma'aser, challah, and bikkurim combine with one another because they are all called "terumah"; all nevelot combine with one another, and all creeping things combine with one another; and pigul and notar combine with one another for the eating of a kezayit even though they are under two negative commandments because of a decree of the verse, "it shall not be eaten because it is holy," anything in the sanctuary that is disqualified has a negative commandment regarding its eating [ibid. 17b]. Behold, it is explicit that one does not combine a prohibited substance with a prohibited substance unless the Torah explicitly decreed it. And it must be said that that which they said, "a permitted substance does not combine with a prohibited substance," this is to teach a novelty regarding a nazir, that for a nazir even a permitted substance combines with a prohibited substance; or alternatively, that a permitted substance does not combine with a prohibited substance even from its exact same species, such as a half-kezayit of slaughtered ox meat with a half-kezayit of nevelah of ox meat, and this you will not find regarding a prohibited substance, as is understood.

However, one must raise a difficulty against this from the Mishnah in Orlah at the beginning of chapter 2, as we learned: Orlah and kilay ha-kerem etc. and they combine with one another; Rabbi Shimon says they do not combine. And we establish the law like the sages, and so wrote the Rambam himself in chapter 15, law 14. This is his wording: Orlah and kilay ha-kerem are neutralized in two hundred and one and they combine with one another, see there. And yet they are divided into two prohibitions. Furthermore, we learned there [Mishnah 14]: Leaven of terumah and of kilay ha-kerem that fell into dough, there was not enough in this one to leaven and not enough in this one to leaven, and they combined and leavened, it is forbidden to zarim and permitted to kohanim; Rabbi Shimon permits it to zarim and to kohanim. Spices of terumah and of kilay ha-kerem that fell into a pot, there was not enough in these to season and not enough in these etc., it is forbidden to zarim etc. Rabbi Shimon permits etc. See there. And the Rambam wrote them in chapter 7, law 13. This is his wording: Leaven of kilay ha-kerem and of terumah, not in this etc. that dough is forbidden to an Israelite etc. and so too spices etc. Thus far his words. And it is difficult: how do two prohibitions combine with one another? And more than this is astonishing, for in the Yerushalmi there it says explicitly that the first Tanna of Rabbi Shimon is Rabbi Meir. This is its wording there: They combine with one another whether for prohibition or for permission, these are the words of Rabbi Meir; Rabbi Shimon says they do not combine etc. Thus far its words. And how did the Rambam rule it as halacha? For we do not establish the law like Rabbi Meir, as I wrote in chapter 4 [and the commentators were silent on this].

There are further perplexing matters that his commentators have already raised regarding this, as we learned in a mishna there: Spices of two or three names from one species or from three species are forbidden and they combine; R. Shimon says etc. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot [Shabbat 89b and HaSokher 66], and similarly the Rash and the Bartenura in the commentary on the Mishnayot, explained that "names" means prohibitions; that is to say, three names from one species, such as peppers of orlah, and of an asherah, and of an apostate city, or terumah, and ma'aser sheni, and shevi'it. Or from three species, such as peppers, cinnamon, and frankincense, and from one prohibition. It is stated regarding this in the Yerushalmi [Halakha 5]: It is understandable regarding two names from one species, but two species from one name—meaning, how do we combine two species with one another? And it answers: They taught this regarding types of sweeteners; that is to say, since they all come to sweeten the pot, they are all like one species and they combine. Something similar to this is in our Gemara in Shabbat there, which brought this mishna and Hezekiah said: They taught this regarding types of sweeteners, since they are fit to sweeten a pot, see there.

And in HaSokher Et HaPoel [66a], Rava and Abaye disagree regarding the reasoning for the difference between a species with its own species, which is prohibited in any amount in a matter that provides flavor and in wine used for idolatry, etc., and a species with a different species, which is prohibited in sixty. What is called its own species and what is called a different species? For Abaye holds that we follow the flavor, and Rava holds that we follow the name. Abaye brings a proof from this Mishnah and from that of Hezekiah, that because it is one flavor they combine; but according to Rava, behold the names are distinct. Rava answers that it follows Rabbi Meir, that all prohibitions in the Torah combine with one another even though they are not equal in name or in flavor, and that of Hezekiah is rejected [Rashi]. And behold, between Abaye and Rava the halakha follows Rava, and so the Rambam ruled in chapter 16, law 32, like Rava, that we follow the name like Rava, see there. According to this, this Mishnah is rejected from the halakha, since according to Rava it follows Rabbi Meir, and we do not rule like Rabbi Meir.

And according to this, they raised a difficulty against the Rambam, who transcribed this Mishnah as the law in chapter 16, law 14. This is his wording: Two or three names of spices of one species, or three species of one name, combine to season and to forbid, and similarly to leaven. How so? Leaven of wheat and leaven of barley, since the name "leaven" is one, they are like one species and combine to the measure required to leaven a wheat dough if the taste of both is the taste of wheat, or to leaven a barley dough if the taste of both is the taste of barley. Three names of one species, how so? For example, river celery, field celery, and garden celery; even though each of them has its own name, since they are one species, they combine to season. Thus far his words. And behold, the Rambam explains a different explanation for "three names," that these are literal names and not prohibitions, and Rashi, of blessed memory, also explained so. However, in any case, since Rava established it according to Rabbi Meir, and we rule according to the Sages [and the Kesef Mishneh remained with "it requires further study," and the Lechem Mishneh lengthily offered forced explanations, and similarly the Pri Chadash and the Kereti U-Peleti in siman 98 lengthily addressed this difficulty; see there].

There is even more reason to wonder about the Rambam according to his interpretation that "names" refers to actual names; if so, what connection is there to the view of R. Meir that all prohibitions join together with one another? For according to R. Meir, are two prohibitions superior to one prohibition according to the Rabbanan? Just as according to the Rabbanan regarding one prohibition it is not called "kind with its kind" according to Rava except for those equal in their name and not in their taste, so too according to R. Meir regarding two prohibitions. For is it possible that according to R. Meir two prohibitions are superior to one prohibition according to the Rabbanan? Since they are not equal in name, why should they join together? [And similar to this, the Kereti U'Peleti questioned there]. And what was answered, "Who is this? It is R. Meir"? Furthermore, one must be precise according to his approach: why did the Tanna not actually mention the prohibitions? For throughout the entire chapter he mentions the names of the prohibitions, as is explained there.

And that which appears correct in my humble opinion regarding the method of the Rambam is that even though we do not hold like Rabbi Meir, and we do not combine this prohibition with another prohibition to be lashed for them for a kezayit even if they are exactly identical things—for example, if one ate a half-kezayit of wheat of terumah and a half-kezayit of wheat of kilayei hakerem—since they are separate prohibitions, they do not combine with one another. Conversely, that which comes under one prohibition combines to be lashed for them for a kezayit even if they have no similarity to one another, such as a half-kezayit of terumah of wheat and a half-kezayit of terumah of grapevine. And the proof for this is that we learned in Meilah [15b]: Five things in an olah combine with one another: the meat, the fat, the fine flour, the wine, and the oil. Behold, it is explicit that meat combines with fine flour and with wine and oil, which have no similarity; however, since they are stated in one prohibition, they combine with one another. And all of this is regarding the matter of eating the substance of the prohibition.

But regarding the imparting of flavor by the forbidden substance into the permitted substance, there are other laws. For those things that forbid only by imparting flavor into a different species, and in the same species are nullified by a majority, in this we follow only the equality of the flavor, and this will be explained in siman 98 [according to the opinion of the Shach there]. But forbidden substances that forbid in any amount, such as that which leavens or that which seasons, in this Abaye and Rava disagreed, and we rule like Rava that we follow the name. This matter will be explained at length in siman 98 with the help of Heaven. All of this pertains to the equality between the forbidden substance that fell and the permitted substance into which it fell. But regarding the equality between the forbidden substances that fell, if they fell from two different things, in this Abaye and Rava did not disagree at all, and this law is not explained in the Gemara. The explanation of this law is in the second chapter of Orlah which we cited, and this is the foundation of the entire chapter there, as is clear to the one who examines it.

And in this as well, R. Meir disagrees with R. Shimon, for R. Shimon holds that just as regarding the eating of the forbidden substance itself, two prohibitions do not combine with one another, so too regarding the imparting of flavor into a permitted substance, they do not combine. R. Meir holds that just as for the forbidden substance itself they combine, so too regarding the imparting of flavor. And the Rambam had a difficulty: for if it would enter your mind that they have one law, if so, why did Rabbi throughout this entire chapter state the words of R. Meir anonymously in the language of the sages, for he did not mention his name, and the words of R. Shimon he taught in the language of an individual? And regarding similar cases, our sages, of blessed memory, said in Chullin [85a]: Rabbi saw the words of R. Meir regarding "it and its offspring" and taught them in the language of the sages, and those of R. Shimon regarding the covering of the blood and taught them in the language of the sages. And from this the Rambam judged that in this the halacha is like R. Meir. And there is a great reason in the matter to distinguish one from the other, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

For behold, if we came to lash for the eating of two half-olive-bulks from two prohibitions, it is impossible in any way, even if they are truly different things, for how could we lash him when he did not eat a kazaith from one prohibition? And conversely, when he ate a kazaith from one prohibition, even if there is no similarity from this half-olive-bulk to this half-olive-bulk, nevertheless, in the end, he ate a kazaith from the forbidden matter of this prohibition, and why should he not be lashed? But regarding the falling of a forbidden substance into a permitted substance to forbid the permitted substance, where there is no lashings at all according to the system of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 15, for with less than a kazaith within the time of eating a half-loaf the concept of lashings does not apply, and it will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 98, and the matter only concerns the issue of forbidding the permitted thing into which it fell—in this, the halacha is certainly like Rabbi Meir, and we are not concerned whether this is from one forbidden substance or from two forbidden substances if the substance from the two forbidden substances is one thing and they impart flavor into the permitted thing into which it fell. And this is what we learned at the beginning of chapter 2: Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard are neutralized in two hundred and one and combine with one another. And the Rambam explained it, for example, where there was a revi'it of wine, half of it from orlah and half of it from kilayim of the vineyard, and it forbids up to two hundred according to the law of orlah and kilayim of the vineyard. And so too, forbidden leaven that leavened a permitted dough, which has no fixed measure, and so too spices in a pot, combine from two forbidden substances. And this is what we learned: Leaven of terumah and of kilayim of the vineyard that fell into a dough, etc., spices of terumah and of kilayim of the vineyard that fell into a pot, etc., are forbidden to non-priests because the two forbidden substances combine. Of blessed memory, since the two forbidden substances are leaven, it turns out that the leaven of forbidden substances leavened the dough, and so too the spices of forbidden substances in the pot. And this is what the Rambam was precise about in his words to say: "for behold, a thing forbidden to them seasoned it," etc.

And according to this, that which we learned in the Mishnah, "spices of two or three names, etc.," certainly there is no difference whether they are from one forbidden substance or from two or three forbidden substances, for the Tanna already explained this explicitly in the first Mishnah of Orlah, and kilayim of the vineyard join together with each other, and they are two forbidden substances; and what novelty did he innovate for us in this Mishnah? Therefore, the Rambam explains that it does not deal with this at all, and there is no difference between one forbidden substance and two forbidden substances. And in this Mishnah, he comes to teach us another novelty: for in the first Mishnah it deals with when the two forbidden substances are actually different things, as the Rambam wrote that in both of them it is wine, and now he comes to teach us that even though they are not actually one thing—for example, they have one name in that they are all leaven, but they are three species: of wheat, of barley, and of spelt; or one species where they are all species of celery but their names are distinct—nevertheless they join together with each other. And on this the Gemara poses a difficulty to Rava, who follows the name: since the names are distinct, what benefit is it that the taste is one? For Rava does not follow the taste. And Rava answers: "Whose [view] is this? It is Rabbi Meir," meaning that just as according to Rabbi Meir there is no difference between one forbidden substance and two forbidden substances, and for us as well we establish the law like Rabbi Meir, that forbidden substances that fell into permitted matter join together when they are equal in the action they perform to leaven or to spice. And now it is an argument a fortiori: if regarding two forbidden substances, which by law do not have joining when eating them as they are, they nevertheless join to forbid the permitted matter, then certainly regarding the equality of the name, which Rava requires for it to be called "species with its own species," we are not particular about the change of name if only they are equal in the action, such as to leaven or to spice. [And according to this, the words of Hezekiah are also necessary for Rava, unlike the explanation of Rashi; and that which it says, "Whose [view] is this? It is Rabbi Meir," its explanation is: it is Rabbi Meir, and in this the halacha is like him. And therefore also in Shabbat there and in the Yerushalmi it brings this [teaching] of Hezekiah. And with this, all that the Tosafot and the commentators of the Rambam questioned is settled. However, to forbid in any amount (mashehu) the permitted matter into which it fell, it requires its own species, and this is what he wrote: "in order to leaven in a dough of wheat, if etc." And examine carefully.]

This is what the Rambam wrote in chapter 14: It appears to me that everything subject to terumot and ma'asrot joins together to a kezayit regarding tevel because it is one name, etc. And this is the explanation: since it has been explained that everything under one prohibition joins together with one another even though they have no similarity at all—for the matter of similarity is only to prohibit the permitted substance when prohibitions fall into it, and not regarding eating the forbidden substance itself—if so, a half-kezayit of tevel of wheat and a half-kezayit of tevel of grapes join together with one another to incur lashes for them. It is no worse than the five things in an olah which join together even though they have no similarity, such as meat, fine flour, and wine. And that which he made dependent on his own reasoning is because in the Mishnah it is only explained that the five species of grain join together with one another, and this is the law which they wrote previously; for even though they are not one species, as this is wheat and this is barley, nevertheless they are all a species of grain. But grain with grapes and olives, there is no proof that they join together with one another, and from an olah there is not such a proof, for perhaps the prohibition of kodashim is different. Therefore, the Rambam made it dependent on his own reasoning. And the Ra'avad disagreed with him, for we require a similar taste, see there. And according to what we have explained with the help of Heaven, this is only regarding prohibiting the permitted substance into which it falls, and not regarding eating the forbidden substance itself. [And that which the Ra'avad wrote "seven species of tevel," his intention was the five species of grain, wine, and oil, for he holds that the terumah of fruits is rabbinic; but the Rambam does not hold so, as he wrote in chapter 2 of Terumot and at the beginning of Ma'aser Sheni].

The Rambam wrote [Chapter 14, Halacha 7]: One who eats a large consumption of a forbidden substance is not liable for malkot or karet for each and every kezayit, but rather one liability for the entire eating. However, if the witnesses were warning him during the eating for each and every kezayit, he is liable for each and every warning, even though it is one eating and he did not pause. Thus far his words. And so it is regarding all prohibitions, as taught in the Mishnah at the end of Makkot. And know that in the Yerushalmi Nazir [Chapter 6, Halacha 4] it says an even greater novelty, and this is its wording: If there was a spit of nevela and he began to eat from it, and they said to him, "Be aware that since you are eating all of it, and it contains ten kezayit measures, you will be liable for ten sets of malkot," and he accepts the warning with this knowledge. Thus far its words. Meaning, he is liable for ten sets of malkot. And it is possible to include this also in the wording of the Rambam, in that which he wrote, "if they were warning him during the eating for each and every kezayit etc.," meaning that they were giving him all the warnings at one time. And specifically during the eating and not before, for all warnings are required at the time of the act of the transgression [see the Kesef Mishneh there who raised a difficulty from the end of Makkot, but it is not a difficulty at all, and examine it].

He further wrote: One who eats the volume of a barley grain or a mustard seed from any of the forbidden foods, and waited a bit and returned and ate the volume of a mustard seed, and so on until he completed a kezayit, whether unwittingly or intentionally—if he waited from beginning to end the duration of eating three eggs, it all joins together, and he is liable for karet or a sacrifice as if he ate a kezayit at once. And if he waited more than this from beginning to end, even though he did not wait between them but rather ate a mustard seed after a mustard seed, since he did not complete a kezayit within the duration of eating a pras, they do not join together and he is exempt. Similarly, one who drinks a revi'it of their wine little by little, or who dissolved chametz on Pesach or chelev and swallowed it little by little, or who drank from blood little by little—if he waited from beginning to end the duration of drinking a revi'it, they join together, and if not, they do not join together. Thus far his words. And there are some of our teachers who hold that the eating of a pras is like four eggs, and the Rashba, of blessed memory, agreed with his words, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote; see there [see Lechem Mishneh chapter 2 of Yom Kippur that it requires large eggs], and see in Orach Chaim siman 612.

And behold, regarding what he wrote that for drinking the combination is within the time of drinking a revit, all the sages of the generations have already wondered at him, for this is against a Mishnah in Keritot [12b]: If one drank impure liquids, or drank a revit of wine and entered the Sanctuary and lingered for the time of eating a pras, he is liable, see there; and so he himself wrote there in the Commentary on the Mishnah [and the words of the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 2 of Hilkhot Shevitat Asor require great study, as the Lechem Mishneh wrote there]. And the Rambam wrote "within the time of a revit" in chapter 2 of Hilkhot Shevitat Asor regarding Yom Kippur and in chapter 10 of Hilkhot Terumot regarding the drinking of terumah, and the Ra'avad and all the Rishonim and Acharonim challenged him, as is explained in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim siman 612 [see there in the Pri Chadash and the Gra]. And also regarding the essence of the matter, it is not understood: what relevance does "combination" have to the drinking of a revit "within the time of drinking a revit"? If so, this is not a combination, and he must drink it all at once [and see the Lechem Mishneh there who was pressed in this to say that he drank quickly little by little, and it is almost not understood at all; and in Pesachim 86b: One who drinks his cup etc. in two etc. is the way of the world etc.; and it requires great study].

He further wrote: Regarding all forbidden foods, one is not liable until he eats them in the manner of pleasure, except for meat in milk and kilayim of the vineyard, because "eating" was not stated regarding them; rather, the Torah expressed the prohibition of their consumption with different language—with the language of cooking and with the holy tongue [regarding kilayim of the vineyard, "lest the fullness be sanctified," etc.]—to prohibit them even not in the manner of pleasure. How so? If one melted chelev and swallowed it while it was hot to the point that his throat was scalded by it, or if he ate raw chelev, or if he mixed bitter things such as gall and wormwood into wine of idolatry or into a pot of nevelah and ate them while they were bitter, or if he ate a forbidden food after it became putrid and foul and ceased to be human food, behold, he is exempt. But if he mixed a bitter thing into a pot of meat in milk or into wine of kilayim of the vineyard and ate it, he is liable. Thus far his words. And above in chapter 5, law 16, he wrote: Regarding any food that is forbidden for benefit, if he derived benefit but did not eat, such as if he sold it or gave it to dogs, he does not receive lashes, but they strike him with a rabbinic lashing, and the money is permitted. Thus far his words. For prohibitions of benefit do not catch their monetary value, though some prohibit it for himself [the Maggid Mishneh]. And there are no lashes for prohibitions of benefit. Similarly, prohibitions of benefit are only forbidden in the manner of their pleasure, but not in the manner of their pleasure—such as making a compress or a poultice from prohibitions of benefit like chametz on Pesach and orlah and the like—there is no prohibition here, except for meat in milk and kilayim of the vineyard, which are forbidden for benefit even not in the manner of their pleasure, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 5 of Yesodei HaTorah, law 8; see there.

And his reason for why there are no lashes for prohibitions of benefit, he explained in Sefer HaMitzvot, Negative Commandment 187, and this is his wording there: That it is not proper to count the prohibition of benefit as a commandment unto itself, for it and eating are one matter, and eating is one part of the categories of benefit. And when the Torah said "it shall not be eaten," the intention is that one should not benefit from it, neither through eating nor through anything else. And this is what they said: Everywhere it is stated "it shall not be eaten," "you shall not eat," "you shall not eat [plural]," both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit are implied, until the verse specifies for you permission, in the manner that it specified regarding a carcass, etc. And even regarding meat and milk, where there is a verse "you shall not cook" for the prohibition of benefit unto itself, nevertheless we do not count it as a negative commandment unto itself, for it does not come for the sake of a negative commandment unto itself but for another reason; for if the negative commandment regarding meat and milk had been written with the expression "it shall not be eaten," in which benefit is also included, it would not have written a verse unto itself for benefit as with all prohibitions of benefit. And only because regarding meat and milk it could not have written the expression of eating, for if so, the liability would only be in the manner of benefit, and the Torah wanted to obligate regarding meat and milk even not in the manner of benefit, and it did not write the expression of eating and wrote the expression "you shall not cook," for in this benefit is not included, therefore it was forced to write "you shall not cook" again for the prohibition of benefit, but the intention is not for an additional negative commandment for the prohibition of benefit [this is the summary of his words there].

However, the matters are still not understood, for granted that they are included in one negative commandment, nevertheless, just as one is lashed for eating, why should he not be lashed for benefit? And in truth, the Ramban, of blessed memory, wrote explicitly that one is lashed for benefit from basar be-chalav [there in the second root]. And there are some of the early authorities who hold that one is lashed for all prohibitions of benefit [Shiltei HaGibborim in the name of the Riaz, the second chapter of Pesachim], and so it is implied from our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot [Chullin 102a, beginning with "Ela"], and so it is implied from the words of the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, negative commandment 259, see there. And there are those who wrote that the reason of the Rambam is because it is possible to transgress without an action [Mishneh LaMelech in the fifth chapter of Yesodei HaTorah in the name of the Chinuch, see there]. And there is one who wrote that his reason regarding basar be-chalav is that he holds like the one who derives the prohibition of benefit from a kal va-chomer [Pri Chadash in Orach Chayim, siman 442]. But it is impossible to say so, for he wrote explicitly that we learn it from "do not cook" [Mishneh LaMelech ibid.]. And it appears to me that his reason is this: because certainly the essence of the verse in all prohibitions of benefit is for eating, and the benefit is only like a part of the parts of the commandment; for since in eating there is also benefit, if so, benefit is only a part of it, and one is lashed only for the essence of the commandment and not for a part of it. And this is like the principle that he established in the twelfth root, see there, and there he wrote that one should not count a part as a commandment unto itself, and consequently one is not lashed for it.

We hold that one who acts unintentionally regarding prohibited fats and forbidden relations is liable, for he derives pleasure [Keritot 19b]. That is to say, even though regarding the matter of Shabbat he is exempt because the Torah prohibited "thoughtful labor," nevertheless regarding forbidden foods and forbidden relations he is liable because, ultimately, he derives pleasure from this. And what is called "acting unintentionally"? For example, prohibited fat and permitted fat are before him, and he knows that this is prohibited fat and this is permitted fat, and he intended to eat the permitted fat but looked elsewhere, and his hand went to the prohibited fat and he ate it. Alternatively, prohibited fat and prohibited fat are before him and he believes it is permitted fat, and he intended to eat this piece but ate that one. And this is not similar to a transgressor through error, for a transgressor through error is one who intended for this piece itself but believed it was permitted fat [Rashi].

This is what the Rambam wrote in chapter 14, law 12: One who eats a food from the forbidden foods by way of jest or as a mitasek, even though he did not intend for the act of eating itself, since he derives benefit, he is liable like one who intends for the essence of the eating. And benefit that comes to a person against his will from any of the prohibitions: if he intended, it is forbidden; and if he did not intend, it is permitted. Thus far his words. And he explains mitasek in a different manner, not like the explanation of Rashi, that he did not intend for this piece at all; for if so, that would be shogeg, for what does it matter to me if he did not know that this piece was forbidden or if he intended to eat the permitted and the forbidden happened to come to his hand? And granted that regarding Shabbat there is a distinction due to the principle of "thoughtful labor," but regarding other prohibitions it is one matter. Therefore, he explained that he intended for this piece and knew it was forbidden, but he did not intend with the intention of eating at all, such as if he acted by way of jest in order to perform a jest in this matter, or as a mitasek, meaning, for example, that he intended to throw it and it was thrown into his mouth and the like. Afterward, he wrote regarding the prohibition of benefit where he has no will for this at all, but rather it comes to him against his will, such as if he is walking in the street and there is a pleasant smell of forbidden benefits there: if he intended, it is forbidden, and if not, it is permitted. And this is not comparable to the first law, for in the first he was not forced into this and acted of his own will, only that his primary intention was for another matter, and therefore this can be depicted even regarding the matter of eating a prohibition. But in the second law, he is dealing with a case where he was forced into it, and this is impossible regarding the matter of eating, but only regarding the matter of smell and the like. Therefore, he wrote the language of "forbidden" and "permitted" and did not write the language of "liable" and "exempt," for he follows his own reasoning that there is no liability of lashes for forbidden benefits. [And in chapter 2 of Shegagot, he depicted mitasek as one who thought it was saliva and swallowed it, see there, for so it is in the Gemara Shabbat 73, and in truth the Shas calls this "shogeg without intention," see there; therefore there, where he deals with the laws of Shegagot, he depicted it in such a manner; and examine this carefully].

In section 9 it was explained that the Torah made one liable for the pleasure of the throat, see there. Consequently, if the throat did not derive pleasure, such as if he wrapped the chelev in a fiber and ate it, he is not lashed, just as we say regarding mצה that if he wrapped it in a fiber he has not fulfilled his obligation [according to Pesachim 115b]. However, if he wrapped the forbidden substance in another food, even a permitted one, food within food does not constitute an intervention, and it is as if the forbidden substance itself touches his throat. This matter is proven from the words of the Rambam, chapter 3 of Hilkhot Avot HaTumot, law 5, who wrote: One who wraps a kezayit of the meat of a carcass of a pure bird in lettuce or the like and swallowed it, even though it did not touch his throat, he is tamei; if he wrapped it in a fiber, he is tahor. And this is a Tosefta in Zavim, see there. It is also implied by the Yerushalmi in Shevuot, chapter 3 [halakha 3]: If one swore "I will not eat bread, grape seeds, and grape skins," and he wrapped them in grape seeds and grape skins, he is liable for each one individually because it is not an intervention. But if he wrapped the bread in reed leaves or grapevine leaves and swore regarding all of them, he is not liable for the bread because it is an intervention. [All of this I learned from the words of the Mishneh LaMelekh. The first clause of the Yerushalmi refers to when he also swore regarding the leaves, and so wrote the Pnei Moshe there; and the leaves are not fit for eating, therefore it was an intervention. From this we also learned regarding mצה that if he wrapped the mצה in food and ate it, he has fulfilled his obligation, and this requires further deliberation].

One who eats forbidden food due to appetite or even due to hunger is liable when there is no danger to life. However, when there is a danger to life, it is permitted to eat; for example, one who is lost in the desert and has nothing to eat except forbidden things, it is permitted for him to eat. And similarly, one who is in danger and an expert physician says that this forbidden food item will heal him, it is permitted for him to eat. The Rambam wrote: A pregnant woman who smelled forbidden food, such as sacrificial meat or pig meat, we feed her from the broth; if her mind is eased, it is well, and if not, we feed her less than the shiur, and if her mind is still not eased, we feed her until her mind is eased. And similarly, a sick person who smelled something containing vinegar or the like which agitates the soul, his law is like a pregnant woman. Thus far his words. For example, if there is danger if they do not give it to him, and this depends on experts or on the words of the sick person himself, as on Yom Kippur.

Regarding the matter of Yom Kippur, our sages, of blessed memory, said that one who eats an excessive eating is exempt [Yoma 80b]. And likewise, one who eats terumah as an excessive eating is exempt, as it is written, "if a man eats," which excludes one who causes damage [ibid.]. Since an excessive eating is not called "eating," it appears that also regarding all forbidden foods, one who eats them as an excessive eating is exempt. And it is called an excessive eating when he is very full, to the point that this eating damages him and the food, and it is not termed "eating." And there is room to doubt regarding meat and milk, where the expression of "eating" is not written, whether he is liable for an excessive eating or not; and likewise regarding kilayim of the vineyard, since "eating" is not written concerning it, whether one should be liable for an excessive eating, and it requires further study.

The Rambam wrote [ibid.]: One who is seized by bulmus, we feed him forbidden items immediately until his eyes brighten. Thus far his words. This means that we do not act as we do with a pregnant woman, giving first the broth perhaps her mind will be settled, because this illness does not tolerate waiting [Kessef Mishneh]. Therefore he wrote that we do not search for permitted items, but rather we hasten with what is found, and we feed him the least severe first; if his eyes brighten, it is sufficient, and if not, we feed him the more severe. How so? If there were before us tevel and nevelah, we feed him nevelah first, for tevel is punishable by death. Nevelah and the aftergrowth of shevi'it, we feed him the aftergrowth of shevi'it which is forbidden by the words of the scribes. Tevel and shevi'it, we feed him shevi'it. Tevel and terumah, if it is impossible to fix the tevel, we feed him tevel which is not holy like terumah, and similarly in cases like this. Thus far his words. And it is obvious that this deals with a case where regarding the brightening of his eyes they are all equal, but if with the more severe item we are certain that his eyes will surely brighten, and with the lighter item there is a doubt, it is simple that we give him the more severe item immediately, as I wrote regarding the broth [and these laws are in Yoma 83.].

It must be understood why regarding the matter of tevel and terumah the sages, of blessed memory, distinguished between when it is possible to rectify the tevel and when it is impossible to rectify it—such as when the chullin will not suffice for him—yet between nevelah and tevel they did not distinguish between whether it is possible to rectify or impossible. And this is certainly a simple matter: that if the chullin alone would suffice for him, certainly the obligation is to separate the tevel and feed him the chullin and not to feed him nevelah. However, since the chullin will not suffice for him and we would need to feed him terumah, it is better to feed him the lighter nevelah. From this we learned that it is better to feed him a light prohibition, even many kezayit amounts, than to feed him a severe prohibition even of one kezayit. And perhaps this will be difficult for you: if so, why did they make this distinction between tevel and terumah and not between tevel and nevelah, since with nevelah we must also be dealing with a case where the chullin does not suffice for him? However, the answer is that the Gemara comes to inform us that it is not only regarding a truly severe prohibition and a truly light prohibition—such as tevel which is punishable by death and nevelah which is a negative commandment—that it is better to feed him much nevelah than a little tevel; but even when both are severe—such as tevel and terumah, both of which are punishable by death, except that regarding some detail tevel is called light relative to terumah because it is not holy like terumah as I have written—nevertheless, it is better to feed him much tevel than a little terumah. For this reason, the Gemara explained this law regarding tevel and terumah and not regarding tevel and nevelah, but regarding the law, all are equal, as I have written [so it appears to me].

And according to this, that which is explained in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim siman 328, regarding a sick person on Shabbat who needs meat, that one slaughters for him on Shabbat; and the Rishonim, of blessed memory, asked: why should we desecrate Shabbat with a prohibition of skilah? Would it not be better to tell a kuthite to stab it and we will feed him nevelah? And the Ran, of blessed memory, answered that because with nevelah he would transgress for every single kezayit, and therefore, in order to minimize the quantity of the prohibition, it is better to transgress a severe prohibition so that it will then all be permitted [Ran in Yoma ibid.]. And behold, the sages of blessed memory told us not to look at the quantity, but only at the quality of the prohibition, that it should be light. And according to the words of the Ran, even if the chullin would not suffice for him, it would be better to separate and feed him a little terumah than to feed him much tevel. And so too with tevel and nevelah, it would be better to separate and feed him a little terumah than to feed him much nevelah [The Gaon Maharam Chaviv in his book Tosafot Yom HaKippurim wrote that the Ran explains the Gemara as referring to a case where chullin is not possible because there is no one who knows how to separate terumah, and it is a great difficulty; and furthermore, if he had explained it not like Rashi, he would have cited him in his usual manner and explained it in other ways; and although the Gaon Pri Megadim also wrote this, it is a difficulty, see there; and one can say it is when the owners are not there].

And some of our teachers answered that because Shabbat for a sick person is "permitted" to him and is not a prohibition at all, as the Tur and the Beit Yosef wrote there in siman 328. And regarding the opinion of the Ran, it appears to me that he holds that certainly if it is possible that the sick person will not need to eat a prohibited item at all, even though the labor performed for him is much more severe, nevertheless, since the Torah permitted performing it, we must distance him from eating a prohibited item. But since he is forced to eat a prohibited item, we no longer care between much or little, even if the little is more severe [and there is a semblance of support for this reasoning in Menachot at the beginning of the chapter "Rabbi Yishmael": it is better that he increase in one labor such as sifting, and not increase in many labors, see there, because many labors are more severe than one labor, and that which he increases in the one, we do not care; and here too it is so, and examine this].

It has already been explained in Even HaEzer siman 6, section 5, regarding forbidden sexual relations, that a prohibition does not take effect upon an existing prohibition unless they occurred simultaneously, or through an inclusive prohibition, or through an additional prohibition. And such is the law regarding forbidden foods concerning the matter of lashes, as the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 14. This is his wording: Therefore, there is one who eats a single kezayit and is lashed five sets of lashes for it, provided that they warned him regarding five prohibitions that were combined within it. How so? For example, an impure person who ate a kezayit of chelev that was notar from the consecrated offerings on Yom Kippur; he is lashed for eating chelev, for eating notar, for eating on Yom Kippur, for an impure person who ate a holy offering, and for benefiting from a holy offering and committing me'ilah.

And why does a prohibition take effect upon a prohibition here? For the fat of this animal was prohibited for eating but permitted for benefit; once he consecrated it, its fat became prohibited for benefit, and since the prohibition of benefit was added to it, the prohibition of consecrated items was added to it. And still, this fat was permitted for the Most High and prohibited for a commoner; once it became notar, since a prohibition for the Most High was added to it, it became prohibited for a commoner. And the man eating this was permitted to eat the meat of the animal but prohibited from its fat; once he became impure, he became prohibited even from its meat, and a prohibition was added to him regarding the fat. Yom Kippur arrived and included all foods, and since he became prohibited even from non-consecrated food, its prohibition was added to this fat, and so too anything similar to this. Thus far his words. And this is what we learned: There is one who eats a single eating and they are liable for it four sin-offerings and one guilt-offering: an impure person who ate fat that was notar from consecrated items on Yom Kippur (Keritot 13b).