Siman 57

A derusah is terefah, and this is because all predatory animals and birds have venom between the claws of their forelimbs, which are the front legs. When they strike with their claws upon any place of the body of the animal, the venom enters them and burns them, and their end is to die. The reason is not because it will eventually be perforated, for if so, it would be included under the category of "perforated," and in truth, it is a terefah unto itself. It is one of the eight types of terefot stated to Moses at Sinai, as written in siman 29, where "perforated" is counted individually and "derusah" is counted individually. Rather, the reason for derusah is because the venom burns and its end is to die [Tosafot 42b]. This is not related to the matter of "derisah" that will be explained regarding the signs of impure birds in siman 82, for there the definition is that it spreads its feet or catches from the air as written there, whereas here it is venom, as has been written.

And derusah is explicitly stated in the Torah, as it is written: "And flesh in the field that is terefah you shall not eat," and this refers to one that was preyed upon by forest beasts such as a lion or a wolf and the like, or a bird that was preyed upon by a bird of prey such as a hawk or a marten and the like. And in siman 29, section 8, we explained this; see there. And perhaps you will say: but it is a law given to Moses at Sinai among the eight types of terefot that were told to Moses, as has been written? And since it is explicit in the Torah, why do we need a law given to Moses at Sinai? For in truth, many detailed laws were stated regarding this, as will be explained in this siman, and the details were told to Moses at Sinai like all of the Oral Torah, and we have already explained it there in section 11; see there. And according to the opinion of the Rambam, they were more stringent regarding the prohibition of derusah in a case of doubt than in other terefot, as he wrote at the beginning of the fifth chapter of Shechitah. And although they disagreed with him on this matter, we have nevertheless settled his words with the help of Heaven in siman 29, section 25; see there. And it will also be explained in this siman in section 38 with the help of Heaven.

All impure animals and all impure birds have the power of derisah according to the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 5 and the Rashba in Torat HaBayit, and such is the opinion of most poskim. However, the Rosh, of blessed memory, holds [chapter 3, siman 40] that for impure animals there is no derisah except for the lion, the wolf, the cat, the weasel, the fox, and the mongoose, each according to its level as will be explained, for all of these were mentioned by the sages of the Shas [52b]. But other impure animals, even the large and fierce among them like the leopard, the shachal, the bear, and the like, do not have this power of derisah. For behold, the Shas [53a] asks regarding all impure birds if they have this power of derisah and concludes that they do, see there, and it does not ask regarding impure animals; learn from this that they do not have derisah. And according to the first opinion, it can be said that regarding animals it was simple to the sages of the Shas that they all have derisah, as their strength is great and their venom is apparent from the sound of their roaring. But regarding birds, which are weak, I would have said that there is no derisah except for the hawk and also those that were taught in the Mishnah, and therefore it was a question. And a proof for this is that they said in the Gemara there: We hold that there is no derisah for a dog, and a dog is a species of animal as taught in chapter 8 of Kilayim. And if we say that other animals have no derisah, why did they need to say that there is no derisah for a dog? Furthermore, the expression "we hold" (nakti-nan) means that this law came to us through tradition [as Rashi wrote in Eruvin 5a]. And if it is according to the opinion of the Rosh, why did they need a tradition? And this cannot be asked according to the first opinion—why did they need to say there that there is derisah for a fox since all animals have derisah—for that is because there is one version in the Gemara that there is no derisah for a fox, they needed to say that there is derisah. And also one cannot ask according to the first opinion: behold, a snake is a species of animal, as it is written, "And the snake was more cunning than any animal of the field etc.," and so too in the Gemara all the animals gathered by the snake [Taanit 8a], and it has no derisah, as will be explained in siman 60, for the bite of a snake is forbidden because of danger to life and not because of treifot, see there. For in truth, it appears to me that after the snake was cursed, it left the category of "animal" and entered the category of "creeping thing" (sheretz). And a proof for this is that in the Gemara [Sanhedrin 59b] we include the snake from the verse "and every animal that creeps upon the earth," see there. And a further proof is that it does not contract the impurity of carcasses like animals, and its law is like a sheretz [Tosafot Eruvin 13b, see there; and see Tosafot Niddah 23a, s.v. letni, and examine it closely]. And even if its law is like an animal, behold it has no claws since it has no legs, and derisah is with the claw [and according to this, even a bear would have no derisah as the Rosh wrote, because it has no claws]. And regarding the law, we hold that all impure animals and impure birds have derisah, but impure domesticated animals have no derisah. And so too, pure animals and birds have no derisah, for the pure has no venom. And so too, creeping things have no this derisah, except for the weasel as will be explained. And in the verse it is counted among the eight creeping things, as it is written, "The weasel, the mouse, and the toad according to its kind." And perhaps even the weasel, which will be explained as having derisah, this refers to the "weasel of the bushes" which we learned in Kilayim [chapter 8, mishnah 5] that this is a species of animal. And so it implies explicitly from the Aruch, entry cheled, see there [and the Aruch requires further study, for in Megillah 14b it is explained that a chuldah is a karkushta, and on the verse "the weasel (hacholed) and the mouse," Targum Yerushalmi translates karkushta, and the Aruch himself brought it in entry karkushta, see there].

Not all beasts and birds are equal in their drisah, for there are various levels, as the strength of the dores must be proportionate to the value of the strength of the one being subjected to drisah. Therefore, a bird of prey does not perform drisah on a beast at all, except for the hawk, as has been explained, because the strength of their venom is too weak to burn the beast. Furthermore, regarding the beasts that perform drisah, the dores must be according to the value of the one subjected to drisah. And behold, in all types of animals there are large and small; for example, in beasts, there are large beasts such as oxen and cows, and there are small ones such as the sheep and the goat. And within the species itself there are large and small, as among the large there are small ones such as calves, and among the small the large ones are sheep and goats and the small ones are kids and lambs, for the goat in its youth is called a kid and the sheep in its youth is called a lamb. And similarly regarding birds, the large ones are chickens, geese, wild geese, and turkeys, and the small ones are turtledoves, young pigeons, and birds, and likewise regarding beasts.

And behold, in the Mishnah of "These are the Terefot," we learned: the clawing of a wolf in small livestock, and the clawing of a lion in large livestock; the clawing of the hawk, which they call "esparver," in small birds, and the clawing of the large [bird of prey], which they call "astur," and some say "falcon" [Tur], in large birds. And even though all impure birds possess the ability to claw, as is explained in the Gemara [53a], why did the Tanna specify the hawk and the large [bird of prey]? They explained in the Gemara that the hawk and the large [bird of prey] have an advantage over all other impure ones, for all other impure birds do not claw pure birds except when they are equal, meaning when the clawer and the clawed are equal in their size; but if the clawed is larger than the clawer, the venom of the clawer does not take effect in it. But these two species, their venom takes effect even in birds larger than them. For this reason, the Tanna specified the clawing of the hawk in small birds, even if this small clawed bird is larger than the hawk, and the clawing of the large [bird of prey] in large birds, meaning even though the large clawed bird is larger than the large clawing bird and above them in size, as will be explained. [And although in the Gemara they only explained regarding the hawk, it cited the first part of the matter, and automatically the same applies to the large [bird of prey] in large birds. And the Rambam there omitted the large [bird of prey], and they wondered about him; and it can be said that for this reason he omitted it and explained in another manner, as will be explained with the help of Heaven, and examine this closely]:

And according to this, according to the approach of the Rambam and the Rashba in section 3, that all wild animals possess the power of derisah, it is necessary to also explain that what the Tanna specified regarding the lion and the wolf was also for this reason: that all other wild animals are not similar to them, and they possess a superiority. This is what the Tur wrote in the name of the Rashba, and this is his wording: And regarding all other wild animals besides these, my father, our teacher, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote that they do not have derisah, for even though the bereaved bear and the leopard are fierce, they do not perform derisah. But the Rashba wrote: Any impure wild animal that is not larger than a wolf does not have derisah in a large small-livestock animal such as sheep and goats, even if it is as large as a wolf; but it does have derisah in kids and lambs, and certainly in birds. And if it was larger than a wolf, its law is like a wolf, and it has derisah in small-livestock, but not in large-livestock. Even if it is as large as a lion, if it was larger than a lion, it is like a lion and has derisah in everything. And so it appears from the words of the Rambam. Thus far the words of the Tur. [And it is clear to me that from this source they ruled so. And see the Bach who raised a difficulty: that if so, Rav, who said "in animals, from the wolf and above," and the Gemara asks "what does this come to exclude?"—let us say that this is the explanation: "from the wolf and above" its law is like a wolf, and it excludes nothing. And he answered that if so, why does he not also say "from the lion and above"? See there. And this is not sufficient, for is he like a peddler who must list everything? For even regarding birds, the Shas only explains the hawk, which is the beginning, and it is automatically understood that the same applies to what is larger, as I have written, and here too it is the same. But in truth, it is not a difficulty at all: first, because if so, the main point is missing from his words, and he should have said "from the wolf and above is like a wolf." Furthermore, it is impossible to explain it so, for Rav also says "and in birds, from the hawk and above," and it is impossible to explain that "above a hawk" its law is like a hawk, for it is not so, as I wrote in section 5; and automatically, regarding the wolf it is also impossible to explain so. And delve into this.]

And regarding birds, the Tur wrote, and this is his wording: And birds among birds, how so? The large, etc., and any that is greater than it has derisah against all birds, even against the largest of the large. And other birds that are smaller than the large down to the hawk have derisah against all birds like them, but not against species larger than them. The hawk has derisah against all small birds, such as pigeons and the like, and certainly against sparrows even if they are larger than it, but not against large birds like geese and chickens. In what case does this apply? Regarding large chickens, but against small ones it has derisah. My father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote: Any that is smaller than the hawk has no derisah at all, even against species smaller than it. Thus far his words.

And behold, in this all the poskim disagree with him and hold that even those that are smaller than the hawk have the power of derisah over those equal to them, and so it is explained from the words of the Rambam as we will explain with the help of Heaven. And also in that which he wrote that all those larger than the vulture are judged like the vulture, that they perform derisah even on those larger than them, it does not appear so from the words of the Rambam as will be explained, and even regarding the vulture he disagrees, and it will be explained with the help of Heaven. However, the Rashba and the Ran agreed in this to the opinion of the Tur [and from the words of the Rashba, page 29b, it implies that they learned this from the words of Rav who said "from the hawk and above," and its explanation is that "above" is judged like the hawk, and so too regarding the vulture; and even though the Gemara explained the words of Rav as an exclusion as I wrote in section 6, nevertheless this too is included in his intention, and it requires further study]:

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 5: There is no derisah in a large animal or a large beast except for a lion alone, and in a small animal or a small beast from a wolf and above, etc. And the hawk has derisah even in a bird larger than it, but other birds of prey have derisah in a bird like them and do not have derisah in a bird that is larger than them. Thus far his words. And it is implied from his words that in a large animal there is no derisah for any species of beast, even one larger than a lion, except for a lion alone. And that which he wrote previously in this language: Derusah is when a lion or its like preys upon the animal and performs derisah upon it with its paw, or a hawk or an eagle or their like performs derisah upon a bird. Thus far his words. And there are some of the commentators who inferred from the language "and its like" that his intention was a lion and its like that is large or similar to a lion; and that which he wrote afterward, "there is no derisah in a large animal except for a lion alone," his intention was a lion and anything greater than a lion, as he wrote regarding a small animal, "from a wolf and above" [Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh].

And this is a great wonder, and how is it possible to say so? For does he not say explicitly "the lion alone"? Furthermore, why did he change his wording from "wolf" to "lion"? And that which he wrote previously, "the lion and its like," this refers to the general matter of derusah, meaning the lion and the wolf and all the species, but he was not dealing with the specific laws; and afterwards he explains the specific laws. And there is no doubt in the matter that the Rambam holds that in a large animal there is no derusah except for the lion alone [and so wrote the Beit Yosef in the second explanation, and so wrote the Bach]. And so it is clearly explained from his words in the Commentary on the Mishnah, see there. And it appears to me that he inferred this from the words of the Gemara [52b] which said, "In an animal, from the wolf and above," for this is the explanation: from the wolf and above—above until the end of all the large beasts—their law is like the wolf and not like the lion [and according to this, the Gemara rightly asks "to exclude what?" for perforce it excludes some thing that is below a wolf, for if not so, let it say "all beasts, their law is like the wolf," and according to this explanation all the inferences are settled for us, and delve into this]. [And that which the Tur wrote, "according to the opinion of the Rashba, and so it appears from the words of the Rambam," his intention is only regarding what he wrote that other beasts perform derusah, unlike the Rosh]:

And regarding birds, he wrote that the hawk has the power of derisah even against that which is larger than it, and other birds do not have derisah except against those equal to them. And he did not mention at all the large bird mentioned in the Mishnah. The Rishonim have already written that he does not interpret that it too is a specific name, but rather it means a large bird against a large bird—meaning that the proportion of the predator must be as the proportion of the prey. And this is the law he wrote, that for other birds their derisah is against those equal to them [and even though it is explained in the Gemara there, "regarding birds, from the hawk and above," and he should have ruled that from the hawk and above its law is like the hawk, just as he interpreted regarding the wolf, nevertheless he rejects this from the halakhah because of the "there are those who say" on page 53a. See there. Furthermore, since he does not interpret it as a specific name as has been written, it is impossible to interpret it thus, as is understood. And of necessity one must interpret "from the hawk and above" to mean that above the hawk their law is different from the hawk, and it is not similar to "from the wolf and above." Therefore, the Shas does not challenge "to exclude what?" except regarding the wolf and not regarding the hawk, for regarding the hawk there is no need to exclude according to this interpretation, unlike "from the wolf and above" where the interpretation is that above the wolf their law is necessarily like the wolf, which comes to exclude as has been written in the previous section].

And also that which he wrote, that a hawk has a drisah even on a bird larger than itself, and he stated his words without qualification and did not specify that this is only regarding a small bird, implies that he holds that a hawk performs drisah even on the largest bird [and so wrote the Bach]. And even though we learned in the Mishnah, "a hawk on small birds," it teaches the common occurrence, for it is the way of the hawk to perform drisah on small birds; but in truth, its drisah renders prohibited even the largest bird, such as geese and chickens [ibid.]. And this is a stringency against all the poskim; nevertheless, in practice, one should be concerned for this [ibid.]. And from the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, it appears that he understood the words of the Rambam as also intending the small species, see there, and it requires further study. [And the truth is, since it is explicit in the Mishnah that the drisah of a hawk is on small birds, how is it possible to say that it performs drisah also on large ones? And perhaps because we learned that a hawk performs drisah also on kids and lambs when it reaches the cavity, as will be explained, and all the more so it performs drisah on all birds even without reaching the cavity; or perhaps even with large ones it must reach the cavity, and with this the wording of the Mishnah is settled, and he did not concern himself with explaining because this is not clarified, and it requires further study, and delve into it.]

The halachic ruling according to the opinion of the Rashba, which is the opinion of most poskim, is found to be: a lion has derisah in a large animal, even in an ox larger than the lion and in the largest of beasts. A wolf does not have derisah in a large animal, even in the smallest of them such as calves, but it has derisah in a small animal, even in the largest of the small ones such as large sheep. Regarding other impure beasts, any that is not larger than a wolf does not have derisah in the large of the small animals such as sheep and goats, even if it is as large as a wolf; however, it has derisah in kids and lambs, and certainly in birds. If it was larger than a wolf, its law is like a wolf and it has derisah in a small animal but not in a large animal, even if it is as large as a lion. If it was larger than a lion, it is like a lion and has derisah in everything. Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, ruled thus without elaboration in section 1 and did not bring another opinion, and this is the opinion of most of our teachers.

Regarding birds, it is the opinion of the Rashba and most of the poskim that the hawk possesses derisah even against a bird larger than itself, provided it is of the small types like turtledoves and pigeons, but not against a hen, and certainly not against anything larger than a hen. Those that are smaller than the hawk possess derisah against small birds equal to the hawk, but not against anything larger than the predator. And although they call it a "falcon" or "astur," all those larger than it possess derisah against all birds, even those larger than them. All those smaller than the large predator down to the hawk possess derisah against birds similar to them, but not against those larger than them; and this too is only regarding a small bird, but not regarding a hen and larger. There are some of our teachers who hold that from the hawk until the large predator, they possess derisah against birds similar to them even among the large species [the Ran and others, as the Bach wrote]. One should be stringent according to this opinion, as it is a doubt regarding a Torah prohibition [Bach]. We have already explained that according to the Rambam, the hawk possesses derisah against all types of birds, and one must certainly be concerned for his opinion and prohibit [ibid.]. And regarding a small hen, even the first opinion prohibits in the case of a hawk.

The opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, regarding birds is perplexing, for he wrote: The hawk has drisah even in a bird larger than itself, provided it is of the small type like turtledoves and pigeons, but not in a hen or those larger than it; and other predatory birds have drisah in a bird of their own size, but not in a bird larger than them. Thus far his words. This is exactly like the opinion of the Rambam, and if so, how did he write regarding a hawk "provided it is of the small type"? For according to the Rambam, the hawk performs drisah on all types of birds, as I wrote in section 12, and he himself in his great work wrote so in the second resolution; see there. And it must be said that even though the opinion of the Rambam is so, nevertheless, since most of the poskim disagree with him and also the wording of the Mishnah which stated "the drisah of the hawk is in small birds" indicates not like him, therefore he did not rule like him. But regarding the large predator that performs drisah on all types of birds, he ruled like him; even though in this too most of the poskim disagree with him, nevertheless, since the wording of the Shas does not contradict this, he ruled like him.

However, our teacher, the Rema, added to his words and wrote: except for the large one called "falcon," which has a striking-power against all birds. Thus far his words. This is according to most of the poskim, and even though in this he disagrees with our teacher, the Beit Yosef, nevertheless he did not write it in the language of a dispute, as is his way in several places whenever the opposite is not explicitly explained in the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef. He did not want to mention the name of a dispute in this at all because the opinion of the Rambam is a minority opinion, and it is obvious that it must be forbidden by the law according to the opinion of most of the poskim. But one must wonder about our teacher, the Rema, for if so, why did he not write "except for the large one and everything larger than the large one"? There are some of the commentators on the Shulchan Aruch who wrote that in truth this was his intention [Shach, subsection 15], but it does not appear so from his wording, for if so, how could he leave room for error in such a severe prohibition? And it is explicitly explained from his wording that only regarding the large one alone is the law so.

And it appears to me that his opinion is that only the gas alone has the power of derisah over all birds, even those larger than it, and all other impure birds, even those larger than the gas, do not have the power of derisah except over a bird like themselves. For this is clearly implied by the wording of the Shas and the Rif, who wrote that all other impure birds do not have the power of derisah over those larger than them. And it is likewise clarified from the wording of Rashi [who wrote that the inquiry is excluding the netz and the gas, see there and examine carefully]. And so wrote the Rashba and the Ran according to one explanation [and it was brought in the Yam Shel Shlomo, section 73]. And according to this, the law of the netz regarding small birds and the gas regarding large birds is equal, for just as above the netz they do not perform derisah except upon a bird like themselves, so too with the gas, for it is clearly clarified from the wording of the Mishnah that the netz and the gas are equal in their laws in all matters. However, for the law we do not rule accordingly, and all birds larger than the gas, which are called falcon or astur, have the power of derisah over all birds. And the Rishonim wrote that the eagle also has the power of derisah over all birds, even the very largest, and thus we rule:

And behold, according to what has been explained, all our teachers are equal in the matter that the wolf does not have drisah in a large animal, and so it is explicitly explained from the sugya of the Shas [52b], see there. Nevertheless, there are some of the poskim who wrote in the name of Rashi and Tosafot that the wolf does have drisah in a large animal, and there are those who were concerned for their words [see Beit Yosef in the name of Ba'al HaTerumot]. Most of the great later authorities wrote that the primary view is like the opinion of the majority of the poskim that a wolf does not have drisah in a large animal [Yam Shel Shlomo siman 70, and Taz subsection 3, and Shach]. And there is one who wrote that in a case where it is possible to sell it to a gentile without loss, one must sell it [Shach subsection 1]. However, regarding soft calves, one should be concerned for this opinion and forbid [Yam Shel Shlomo and Bach] in a place where there is no significant loss, and it is permitted to sell to a gentile and we are not concerned that perhaps he will sell it to an Israelite, since many poskim permit it entirely [and in truth, before us in Tosafot this matter is not found at all, and also in Rashi on the Gemara this is not found, only in the Mishnah he explained that the first Tanna disagrees with Rabbi Yehuda, see there, and this is no proof, for it is known that the commentary of Rashi, of blessed memory, on the Mishnah follows the flow of the language and not according to the conclusion; and the proof of all the Rishonim is decisive, since Rav Bar Bar Hana said explicitly that Rabbi Yehuda came to explain, and for the inquiry Rav also holds so, there is no concern for the first version, see there and delve into it].

But our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1, and this is his wording: And there are those who are even more stringent, that anything from a wolf and above has derisah even in a large animal, and one should be concerned for the stringency. Thus far his words. For it is implied from his wording that one should be concerned for this stringency, as the language "from a wolf and above" implies the wolf is also included. However, the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch wrote [Taz and Shach] that his intention was regarding above the wolf, and not the wolf itself, see there. And so it is explicitly implied from the source of the law, for its source is from the Terumat HaDeshen, siman 178, and there he deals explicitly with a bear and not with a wolf, see there. Therefore, that which he says "from a wolf and above," this is like "above the wolf." And in this he disagrees with our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who ruled that even above the wolf there is no derisah except in a small animal and not in a large one, as has been written in section 13; and regarding this he says that above the wolf there is derisah in a large animal.

And that which he wrote, that one should be concerned for the stringent view, this is the explanation: that one should be concerned for the stringent view not to eat it, but to sell it to gentiles is permitted; and similarly, one should not apply a leniency by means of this opinion, such as to exempt it from kisuy hadam or from priestly gifts when the kohen seized them, and the like [Shach subsection 7]. And there is one who wrote that now it is the custom to forbid the piercing of a wolf in a large animal [Be'er Heitev in the name of the Keneset HaGedolah], but it is not relevant to say "custom" regarding a matter that is not so common, for this is a remote reality that an Israelite would see with his own eyes that the wolf preyed upon it, and it is naught but a doubt whether it was a wolf or a dog. And even in a place where wolves are more common and in a small animal one should forbid it, nevertheless, in a large animal it is simple that it is permitted, and it is enough for us to be stringent to sell it to a gentile when there is no loss involved, as I wrote in section 18.

And behold, regarding birds all the details were specified, but regarding impure beasts only the wolf and larger than the wolf up to the lion and larger than the lion were specified, but smaller than the wolf was not specified. And the sages in the Gemara reckoned four beasts that are smaller than the wolf and explained regarding them the manner of their derisah, and these are they: the fox, the cat, the marten, and the weasel. And this is their law: the fox, the cat, and the marten do not have derisah in large sheep, but they do have derisah in kids and lambs, and certainly in all birds. And the weasel does not have derisah in livestock at all, even in kids and lambs, but it does have derisah in all birds, even in the largest among them.

The fox is known to us, and the cat is also known, and it is the shunra that is called "katz." However, the namiyah and the chuldah have not been clarified to us. I have seen someone who explained namiyah as what is called "marder" in our language [in the Aruch] and regarding chuldah, "weasel" [ibid.]. It is not known to us what this is. Behold, among us there are predators common in the chicken coop that are called in our language "tabor" and also "krat," and they are presumed to be predators; perhaps they too are included in chuldah. In the Gemara [Chullin 20b] we find that the chuldah dwells in the foundations of houses, and Rashi explained "krat" in the foreign tongue; behold, it is explicit that this is the chuldah. The "tabor" also appears to dwell in the foundations of houses. The hawk, which is called "isparber," is known to us, but the "agam" which is called "astur" or "falcon" is not known to us. There are those who explained that the bardelas is the "tachur."

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2: All birds do not have the law of derisah regarding animals, even with kids and lambs, except for the hawk, which has derisah with kids and lambs. And it is not like other derisah to be concerned when the flesh becomes red [Tur], but rather if it was pierced by its claw into the body cavity, we are concerned for its derisah, for then it injects venom. Thus far his words. For the sages established that its venom regarding an animal is weak and does not take effect by the reddening of the flesh alone as with all other victims of derisah, but only when it reaches the body cavity, for then the venom takes effect. And even though once it reaches the cavity we do not need its derisah, as it is no worse than a thorn that pierced into the cavity which is a terefah, for there is no inspection for a small hole that pierced into the body cavity as was written in siman 51, for in truth it is not comparable. For here, if the concern were not because of derisah, inspection would have been effective regarding the hole; for that which was explained in siman 51 that there is no inspection for a small hole, this applies only when the thorn is embedded in the body, where we must be concerned that it moved here and there and it is impossible to inspect. But here, where it struck and withdrew immediately, we are not concerned for a hole in any other place but only opposite this place. However, when the concern is because of derisah, there is no inspection for this [Yam Shel Shlomo and Perisha]. Furthermore, there are several differences between the concern of a piercing and the concern of derisah [see Beit Yosef and Bach and Taz subsection 7 and Shach].

There is one who says that since the hawk possesses this power of derisah, all the more so the gas possesses this derisah, as do those larger than the gas [Shach, subsection 8]. And there are those who say that only the hawk alone possesses this derisah, and no other species of bird, even the largest [Perishah]. The later authorities agreed with the first opinion. And know that according to this, all that has been explained regarding predatory birds—that this species of bird possesses derisah and another species does not possess derisah—this is all where it did not puncture into the body cavity. However, when it performs derisah until the body cavity, even the smallest predator possesses derisah in the largest bird; for since a derisah such as this prevails even over kids and lambs, all the more so it prevails over all birds. And the reason the poskim did not explain this is because it is a simple matter, for all the types of derisah refer to the flesh alone and it did not reach the cavity [as the Shach wrote in subsection 12, see there].

Our sages, of blessed memory, said that there is no drisah for a dog at all, even regarding birds; and if it perforated until the cavity, its law is like a thorn that perforated the cavity. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, received as a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai: that the dog, even though it is a beast, nevertheless does not have the power of drisah. And there is room to doubt if all species of dogs have this same law, for behold we find in the Gemara [Bava Kamma 80a] that village dogs have the same nature as a cat and a marten, see there; and if so, perhaps regarding drisah it is also so. However, since the poskim wrote without qualification, it implies that there is no distinction in this, and in practice it requires further study. But it has not been clarified for us what this "village dog" is, and now in our times the city dog is equal to the village dog. And in Kilayim chapter 1 [Mishnah 6] we learned: the village dog; and they explained that it is a dog that the villagers raise, and it is small and resembles a fox, see there. And in the Aruch he explained: a small dog that shrieks at night in the deserts, from "villages" etc., see there. And all of this has not been clarified for us.

Since it has been explained that the cat is a predator to all birds, the early authorities asked a great question: if so, how do we raise cats in our homes when there are also many chickens inside the house, and how do we not fear for an act of derisah occasionally when they make some sound? And even more than this, it is a daily occurrence that a cat enters the coop where chickens are found, and no one is concerned for it. The Rashba wrote in Torat HaBayit [page 30] that some give a reason for the matter: that a cat only commits derisah in a place where there are rescuers, for then its anger is great and it injects venom, but not in a place where there are no rescuers. But this reason is not primary. And it is possible that our cats are domesticated with the chickens, and as long as we have not seen it chase after them and strike them, we are not concerned for them. But this is forced, and a person of soul should be concerned for himself. Thus far his words. Others of the early authorities also wrote this reason, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 5 also wrote this reason. And the Tur concluded: "and it is proper to be concerned for them," meaning that a person of soul should be concerned for himself; but when it has struck them, they are forbidden. And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in section 59, see there.

Regarding all those of whom we have said that they possess the ability to inflict derisah, there is no distinction between whether they have rescuers or whether they do not have rescuers. For behold, there are some among the earlier authorities who hold that a cat, a weasel, and a mongoose do not possess derisah unless there are those who wish to rescue [the prey] from their hand, for then their anger is great and the venom is strong; or that the prey itself flees from it, for this is also like having rescuers, and its anger will increase. Therefore, cats that enter a coop of chickens, there is no concern of derisah in this, for they have no place to flee, and it is like having no rescuers, and their anger is not great and the venom does not take hold to burn. But those cats that insert their paws into holes in a closed coop, it is like having rescuers because the chickens evade it and its anger increases. And in truth, there is an interpretation in the Gemara [52b] that these three are not similar to other predators that possess derisah in all circumstances, and the derisah of these three is only in a place where there are rescuers [and this is the opinion of Sefer HaTerumah, and also the Rosh inclines toward this]. Nevertheless, the opinion of most of the poskim is that there is no distinction between them and all other predators, and in all circumstances they possess derisah. And those of whom the sages said that they do not possess derisah at all, such as a dog, or that they do not possess derisah in this species, as has been explained, they do not possess derisah even in a place where there are rescuers. And this is the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam and most of the poskim, and so ruled the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 4 [according to the latter version there, stringently].

Our Sages, of blessed memory, received a tradition that there is no derisah except with a claw, for from there it injects venom, and without a claw there is no venom. It does not inject the venom at the time it thrusts the claw into the living creature, but rather at the time it withdraws the claw from there. Therefore, if one covered the claws of the predator with silver or another substance, one need not be concerned for its derisah further [siman 38, subsection 52]. A beast only performs derisah with its hands, meaning with the front legs and not with the hind legs, but a bird performs derisah with its legs and not with its wings. All these matters are the tradition of our Sages, of blessed memory, reaching back to Moses from Sinai [53a]. According to this, there would be an easy remedy for the cats in our homes in a place where there are chickens, to cover their claws of the front legs with some type of metal, yet this is not the practice.

Therefore, if the animal trampled with its leg or bit with its teeth, this is not considered derisah at all and is nothing more than a mere thorn-wound. One should not ask that according to this, why do we prohibit in the case of a wolf that entered a pen of sheep or a weasel in a coop of chickens when the predator is silent and they are screaming, as will be explained—for is there not a double doubt: perhaps it did not perform derisah, and if you should say it did perform derisah, perhaps it performed derisah with its leg or with its teeth? For it can be said that this is all one doubt, because when we say perhaps it did not perform derisah, its leg and teeth are also included, as this too is called "did not perform derisah." Furthermore, if it indeed performed derisah, it certainly performed derisah with its foreleg and its claw, for derisah is due to anger and venom, and the venom is located there. [And according to the Rambam, it will be explained that a double doubt does not avail in the case of derisah, as I wrote in siman 29, section 24].

There is no derisah except with the intent of the predator, but without its intent—for example, if it fell upon it by chance and its claw was thrust into it—it is not derisah. Since it was without intent, its anger is not strong and it does not emit venom, even at the time it withdraws its claw from there. And all the more so if the predator was asleep, and during its sleep it fell upon it and its claw was thrust in, it is not derisah. However, if it withdrew its claw and thrust it back in with intent, or if it awoke and withdrew the claw and thrust it back in, it certainly has derisah.

And there is no derisah except during the lifetime of the predator. How so? If it stuck its claw into the prey, and before it withdrew its claw the predator was killed or its hand was severed, this is kosher. For since the venom is only discharged at the time of the withdrawal of the claw, at that point it is no longer alive; and similarly with the severing of the hand, it has been separated from the body and has no venom. And even if it withdrew the claw at the moment its soul departed, it does not have the strength for derisah then [Pri Chadash in the name of the Radbaz]. And this is only if they killed it or severed its hand at a time when it had not yet begun at all to withdraw the claw; but if it began to withdraw and did not manage to withdraw it completely before it was killed or its hand was severed, it is derisah, for perhaps the venom is discharged at the time of the beginning of its withdrawal [ibid.].

And regarding that which we have said, that if the predator was killed or its hand was severed it has no derisah, this is so even if the flesh turned red opposite the intestines, which is a sign of derisah as will be explained. Nevertheless, in this case we are not concerned even in such a manner, just as we are not concerned for this without any derisah at all, and here too it is as if it did not perform derisah at all [Shach, subsection 21, in the name of the Ran, see there]. And similarly, when the prey is not alive, such as if before the predator began to withdraw its claw they slaughtered the prey, it is kosher. For even if it injected venom after the slaughter of the prey, why should we care? For the reason for the venom is because it burns the intestines, and after slaughter it is considered as if it is resting in a basket, just as if they had made a hole in the intestines after the slaughter. Therefore, if between one siman and the other in an animal it withdrew the claw, it is terefah, as I have written in siman 26 regarding a hole, see there.

And there are those who, for this reason, wished to permit slaughtering the bird while the hawk is lying upon it and has not yet withdrawn the claw, but it is not so; for when the hawk pursues the bird and captures it, it strikes it many times with its feet and treads and withdraws many times [Tosafot 53a, s.v. kamah mashma lan], and this law applies only when we saw from the beginning until the end. Therefore, if it comes before us and the obligatory claw is in it, it is forbidden to slaughter it if we only knew that this claw comes from the force of the predator, as will be explained. And one should not permit it to be slaughtered on the grounds that it has not yet withdrawn it and injected venom, for we are concerned that perhaps it trod and withdrew and trod again, as is its way to do so. And even during the flight of the hawk after the flying bird, it strikes it during its flight with its claw and withdraws, and continues to fly and strikes it.

A hen that was clawed, the egg found inside her is forbidden, as was written in siman 86, for the egg of a tereifah is forbidden even if it was completely finished. However, the chick born from it is permitted, as was written there. Yet, regarding a clawed animal, there is reason to doubt whether perhaps the venom also affected the chick, even though the shell intervenes; for there are those who doubt regarding an animal that was clawed whether the fetus found inside her is also forbidden, for even though its months were completed and it would be permitted through its own shechitah, nevertheless, perhaps the venom affected it as well [Taz, siman 79]. And perhaps regarding a chick there is also reason to doubt thus. Therefore, if they slaughtered the offspring of the animal within twelve months, it is forbidden, and after twelve months, it is permitted [Pri Chadash, ibid.]. And if the animal was clawed in its neck or in its sides not opposite the cavity, certainly there is no concern for the offspring [ibid.], and similarly regarding a bird in a similar case.

A predator that entered a pen and a claw was found embedded in one of them in a manner that this animal is forbidden, as will be explained, and its fetus was at its side which it gave birth to, and it is not known if it gave birth before it was clawed and is permitted, or if it gave birth after it was clawed and the offspring is also in doubt of being clawed as I have written; even though there is reason to permit it on the grounds of a double doubt—perhaps it gave birth to it before it was clawed, and if you say it gave birth to it afterward, perhaps the venom does not affect the fetus—nevertheless, it is not to be permitted. And the reason is that even if it certainly gave birth to it before it was clawed, there is a doubt that perhaps the predator clawed the offspring as well, just as it clawed the mother [according to Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 3 in the name of Shevut Yaakov].

The halakha was decided in the Gemara [53a] that we are concerned for a case of a doubt regarding a drusa according to the details that will be explained. The concern is to examine the animal just as one must examine a definite drusa according to the poskim who hold that examination is effective for a definite drusa, as will be explained. For us, since we are not experts in examination as will be explained, a doubt regarding a drusa is also a complete tereifa, as with every doubt regarding a tereifa. And that which we do not say "once slaughtered it is permitted" and establish it upon its status of permissibility is because the doubt arose during its lifetime, as I wrote in siman 3. And according to the poskim who hold that even in a case of doubt where we cannot attribute it to having occurred after slaughtering we also say "once slaughtered it is permitted," nevertheless, we do not establish a doubt regarding a drusa upon its status of permissibility because drusa is common [Tosafot 43b s.v. Kasavar]. And so too in any similar case, a common matter is not established upon its status of permissibility, such as if a thorn was lodged in the esophagus and it is not perforated from one side to the other, which we forbid for the reason that perhaps there was a perforation and it became closed [Tosafot Yevamot 30a].

And know that our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote this reasoning, for they hold that even regarding a doubt that arose during its lifetime, we say "once slaughtered, it is permitted," and we explained this in siman 56, see there. And I have a question regarding this: for they hold that even for a certain derusa there is an examination [53b, s.v. Derusa], and if so, why is a doubt of derusa forbidden? For there is a double doubt here: perhaps it was not clawed, and if you say it was clawed, perhaps the venom did not spread, since there is an examination for this. And one cannot say that even in a case of a double doubt an examination is required, for it is not so, as in several matters we permit a double doubt regarding derusa, as will be explained, and we do not require an examination. And it is true that there is one of the Rishonim who wished to say that perhaps even in a case of a double doubt an examination is required, but he himself retracted [the Rashba on 53b asked regarding "he is silent and they are chirping," why do they forbid all of them, for in every cubit there is a double doubt: perhaps it did not claw, and if you say it did claw, perhaps it did not claw against the cavity; and he answered that perhaps even in a double doubt, when there is an examination, it requires an examination, see there. And it requires great study, for if so, for us who are not experts in examination, we should permit based on the reasoning of a double doubt. And in truth, in his book Torat HaBayit, page 30, he retracted and answered that all of them are under a single doubt: perhaps it did not claw, see there and examine closely] [the Shach in the rules of double doubt brought this, see there, and did not mention his words in Torat HaBayit]:

And it must be said that there, where we do not say "once slaughtered she is permitted" because an animal clawed by a predator is common, so too for this reason we shall not permit even with a sefek sefeka. And even though the matter is wondrous—that a sefek sefeka along with a chazakah of permissibility would be forbidden because it is common—nevertheless, it is possible to say so. Furthermore, it can be said that our teachers hold that this is not a sefek sefeka at all, for it is all one doubt: perhaps she was not clawed; for even if she was clawed not opposite the cavity, it is also called not clawed at all, similar to the reasoning we wrote in section 29, see there. However, regarding the system of the Rambam, of blessed memory, we explained in siman 29 that the sages were stringent regarding a clawed animal not to permit by way of a sefek sefeka because the Torah was stringent regarding a certain clawed animal to require an examination, even though from the Torah a doubt in Torah law is treated leniently. Therefore, the sages were also stringent regarding a sefek sefeka, and this is only regarding a clawed animal alone and not regarding other terefot. And this is what the Rambam wrote in chapter 5, law 3, that regarding a clawed animal they were more stringent than other terefot, and we explained it there in section 24, see there. And that which we permit certain things even regarding a clawed animal by reason of sefek sefeka will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

How do we fear for a concern of derusah? Our sages, of blessed memory, explained [ibid.] that if there is a doubt whether the predator entered at all or did not enter, we do not fear at all. And even if there is a doubt as to who entered, whether the predator or the dog, it is also permitted. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said: a doubt of a cat or a doubt of a dog, say it was a dog. And even if it is certain that the predator entered, if they are all silent or they are all crying out—meaning the predator is crying out and the prey are crying out—it is also permitted. Only if the predator is silent and the pursued are crying out, in this case we fear for a concern of derusah. And the reasons must be explained, for seemingly in all cases there is a doubt, so why in this case did they rule leniently and in this case they ruled stringently?

And behold, regarding a doubt as to whether the predator entered at all or did not enter, the Rishonim wrote that it is permitted by reason of a double doubt: a doubt whether it entered, and if you will say it entered, perhaps it did not strike [Beit Yosef in the name of the Rashba]. And furthermore, the majority of animals and birds are under the presumption that they are not struck [ibid.], meaning that as long as there is a doubt regarding the essential striking, we properly establish it upon the presumption that comes by force of the majority. And even though in a case of a doubtfully struck animal we do not establish it upon the presumption, as I have written, this is when the matter of the striking is before us and there is a doubt whether it was a complete striking or not; in this, we do not establish it upon the presumption of permissibility because the doubt arose during its lifetime, or because striking is common, as has been explained. And all this is when there is a complete doubt regarding the matter of the striking, and not when the doubt is whether there was a striking here at all, for if not so, we would never escape such doubts; and when a lion or a wolf is seen walking in the field and there is a pen of animals and sheep there, we would create a doubt whether it entered or did not enter. Therefore, even according to the opinion of the Rambam that we explained, that in a struck animal a double doubt is not effective, this is in a complete doubt and not in a doubt regarding the essential striking.

And also in a case of doubt whether it was a dog or a cat, there is a double doubt: perhaps it was a dog, and if you say it was a cat, perhaps it did not claw [Bach]. And even according to the Rambam, for whom a double doubt is not effective regarding clawing, it is also well-settled, for the Bahag wrote another reason for this. This is his wording: A doubt whether it was a dog or a cat, say it was a dog. And why? Every doubt regarding a prohibition is to be ruled stringently; we say a doubt regarding a prohibition is to be ruled stringently in a case such as a piece of chelev that was mixed with other pieces, where there was certainly a prohibition present. But here, who says there is a prohibition? And we do not establish a flaw. Thus far his words. And the explanation of the matters is that every doubt of a prohibition where we do not see the prohibition, we are not to establish it as a doubt of a prohibition at all, unless there is clear evidence for this, such as when he is silent and they are chirping. And the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote the reason [9a] because a cat is not common, see there. And this is the opposite of what we wrote in section 36, that clawing is common, see there. However, even according to this reasoning, the method of the Rambam is well-settled, for as long as the doubt is not explicitly proven, such as when he is silent and they are chirping, the clawing is not common and we do not concern ourselves with it.

And so too in a case of doubt regarding a predator's clawing or a doubt whether it was struck by a reed, we likewise do not harbor concern for the reasons that have been explained. The practical difference in attributing it to a dog or a reed is that there is no need for an inspection except in the place where the blood is bubbling, whereas for the concern of a predator's clawing, an inspection is required against the entire cavity. There are many other practical differences in this; however, for us, there is no practical difference unless the scratch is in other parts of the body. But if it is in the neck, it is treifah in any case, as I wrote in siman 33, for whenever the blood is bubbling in the neck, one must forbid it, see there. If so, there is no practical difference between a predator and a dog or a reed. Yet, with a wide reed, there is grounds to permit even according to our practice, for in a wide area we are proficient, as I wrote there [Shach, subsection 33].

And this, that we attribute it to a dog or a reed to be lenient, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 13 that this is specifically when we have before us a dog and a cat or a reed and a cat, such that there is something to attribute it to in order to be lenient; but when they come before us thus and we do not know what to attribute it to, we attribute it only to that which is common, whether to be lenient or to be stringent. Thus far their words. And the Tur wrote this law in the name of the Rashba, see there. And I wonder, for did the Rashba not write the reason regarding a doubt of a dog or a doubt of a cat—that we attribute it to the dog—because a cat is not common? And we brought his words in section 41. And it is difficult according to his words here, where it deals with a case where there is a dog and a cat; if so, how is "not common" relevant, for it is before us? And how can we attribute it to be lenient? However, it is not difficult at all, for he himself explained his intention: that it is not common for the cat to claw, for behold, we see that it is common among the chickens and it does not claw. And behold, according to this, regarding a weasel, which for the most part claws as is known, this law would not apply to it, and the law would change in a doubt of a dog or a doubt of a weasel to a prohibition. And it is a great wonder, for the poskim established a general rule in this law, and behold the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote "a doubt of a lion or a doubt of a dog," and the lion certainly claws. And this requires great study. And it appears to me that even the Rashba only said it as a mere preference, and the primary reason is because of a double doubt as I wrote, and for the reason he himself wrote: that most animals and birds are under the presumption that they are not clawed, and as I wrote in section 40.

And that which they wrote, that we attribute to the common occurrence whether to be lenient or to be stringent, this is the explanation: that if there is an equal logic to attribute it to permission or to prohibition, we attribute it to permission, for the majority of animals are kosher. However, if the permission is not common and the prohibition is common, we attribute it to stringency [Taz, subsection 2]. And certainly it is so, for when there is before us a predator and a dog or a reed, we attribute it to the dog or the reed and not to the predator, for in this case both are common and the logic is equal. If so, even when both are not before us, but rather the animal or the bird comes before us bubbling blood, we do not attribute it to prohibition unless the prohibition is common and the permission is not common; but when both are equal, we attribute it to permission [and by this the difficulty of the Derishah is settled, see there. And one must further reflect on the wording of the Tur who wrote: an animal etc. that comes before us bubbling blood and we do not know what happened to it etc. we attribute it to leniency etc. and the Rashba wrote specifically when there is etc. but when they came etc. we attribute it to the common occurrence etc. Thus far his words. For the beginning of his words is like the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit and like the Tosafot that the Rashba cited, that even in that which is not common we attribute it to leniency; and it must be said that his intention is truly that the Rashba disagrees, and if so, he should have said "and the Rashba wrote," and it can be settled with difficulty, see there and examine it closely].

And so, even if the predator certainly entered the coop of the birds or the pen of the animals and they are all silent, it is also kosher, for they certainly made peace between them; for if it were preying upon them, they would cry out, and we do not say that its fear fell upon them so much that they are silent, for it is impossible that not even one of them would cry out. And so, if they are all crying out, we also say that they are terrified of one another, for otherwise the predator would not cry out, and it is obvious to him that there is no derisa here. However, when the predator is silent and they are crying out, this is a doubt of derisa that the sages prohibited, and even if some of them are silent, they are all also prohibited, and we say that the fear of the predator fell upon them so much that they were struck dumb. And know that we do not say that each and every one can be permitted by the reasoning of a double doubt—a doubt if it preyed at all upon this one, and perhaps it preyed upon another, and if you should say it preyed upon this one, perhaps the venom did not take hold—for it is impossible to say so, because since the predator was among them, each one is in a state of doubt of derisa [the Rashba in Torat HaBayit 32]. And according to the words of the Rambam, we do not permit a case of derisa by means of a double doubt, as I wrote in section 38. And it is simple that a doubt of derisa is a doubt of Torah law when there is no means of examination [and the Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav subsection 14 was uncertain about this, but there is no doubt here, and he too, of blessed memory, concludes so, see there].

This matter, that we are concerned for a potential derusa, is specifically when the oxen or the birds stood in a narrow place where they are unable to flee. However, if they have a place to flee, we say that they certainly fled from it, for such is the way of every living creature to flee from a predator. This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 9: We are concerned for a potential derusa, for example, a lion that entered among the oxen into a narrow place where they are unable to flee from it, such as if it entered into their pen. And similarly, a predatory bird that entered a cage full of birds or a coop of chickens, we are concerned lest it performed derusa. In what case does this apply? When it is silent and they are squawking. But if it is silent and they are silent, or it and they are squawking, we are not concerned. Thus far their words.

And what is called a wide place? From the language of the Tur in the name of the Rashba, who wrote: But a lion that entered a place where the animals graze there, even if we heard screams and he is silent, we do not fear, for we say they fled from before him and he did not reach them. Thus far his words. It implies explicitly that specifically a field or a valley, this is a wide place; but a fenced place, even if it is very large like a large courtyard, is not called a wide place and is forbidden. And there are some of the Rishonim who wrote that a large courtyard is also called a wide place (Sefer HaTerumah brought in the Beit Yosef). And certainly one should be stringent regarding the prohibition of derusah, and who knows how to estimate how great the size of the courtyard must be for the name "wide place" to be called upon it? And there is one who says that a width like the width of the Mishkan is called a wide place, but this has no correct foundation. Therefore, one should be stringent, and only to sell them to a gentile is it permitted, and so it implies from the great Acharonim (Shach subsection 24 and Pri Chadash).

And specifically regarding animals, but regarding birds it is obvious that as long as they are not in their cage or their coop, it is called a wide place, for they easily escape by flying here and there. Therefore, even if one or two or more are found clawed, those that were not clawed are permitted, and we say that they escaped from the predator [Shach, subsection 23]. And such is the law regarding animals in a very wide place, such as in large gardens and large orchards and extremely large courtyards, in a manner where there is no doubt whether it is a wide place or not. And see what I wrote in section 74.

It appears to me that if there were two pens and animals stood in this pen and in that pen, and each pen has an opening, and the predator was in one pen and it was silent and they cried out, and everything in that pen was forbidden, nevertheless those in the second pen were not forbidden even though they also cried out, for they have a place to flee through the second opening. Therefore, even when there is an open doorway from this pen to the second pen, those in the second pen were not forbidden. Furthermore, even if there was no opening in the second pen to the outside, the animals in the second pen were not forbidden when we saw that the predator was in the first pen and we did not explicitly see that it entered the second pen. And one should not forbid and say perhaps it entered the second pen, for it is like a double doubt regarding a permitted animal in a case of a doubt of derusah, as I wrote in section 9. And the same applies in similar cases regarding birds in two coops or two cages [and in a double doubt regarding a permitted animal, even where it was silent and they were chirping].

An incident occurred with chickens that were in a cage, and a sound of crying was heard among them at night. They went to see and found that one hen had squeezed herself out of the cage and fled, and the rest ran and went here and there, and one of them had its head stuck between the holes. They said that this was due to a predator called a tachur. They permitted all of them based on the reason of a double doubt: perhaps it was not near the cage, and if you say it was, perhaps it did not touch any of them [the Bach in a responsum]. For this is literally a doubt upon a doubt, not based on the crying alone. As long as we did not explicitly see the predator enter the cage or the coop, we are not concerned, for we can attribute the cries to another cause or because they saw the predator from a distance. And so too in a wide place, even if they all cry out and flee like madmen and one of them or more is trampled, it is also permitted, as I wrote in section 48.

The Sages, of blessed memory, said [53a] that if he severed the head of one of them, his heat subsides; that is to say, if the predator removed the head of one of the animals or the birds, his anger is quieted and we do not fear for the others, and they are all permitted. And it is not specifically that he removed the head, for the same law applies if he killed it in another manner, since whenever he has killed one of them, his anger subsides and his venom is no longer dominant. And this is specifically when he killed it, but if he wounded one of them or trampled it, we fear for all of them, for all the more so his wrath burned within him when it saved itself and he did not kill it. Therefore, even in a case where he killed it, it is specifically that he actually killed it at the time of the act; but if he wounded it severely and afterwards it died, his anger did not subside [Sefer Mitzvot Gadol in the name of Tzemach Tzedek]. Therefore, if on the next day it is found dead, there is no proof that he killed it, for perhaps it died afterwards, unless it is evident that it died immediately, such as if he severed its head and the like, where it is evident that it died by his hand immediately [ibid.].

And as for that which we do not concern ourselves that perhaps it trampled others before it killed this one, it is because there is "clear evidence" that this was the first; for since it is in its power to trample whichever it desires, we say that it trampled this one first and killed it [Ran]. And reason dictates this, for the primary intention of the trampler is to instill its venom and to soothe its anger, and through trampling alone it does not soothe its anger as I have written; if so, it certainly fulfilled its desire first with this one that it killed. Therefore, if in truth we see another one that was trampled or wounded in addition to the one killed, behold they are all forbidden due to "whatever you will": for if it trampled this one after it killed the first, behold we have seen that its anger was not put to rest and they all stand in a state of doubt regarding trampling; and if it trampled this one before it killed the other, behold we have seen that it did not descend upon the first for killing but rather for trampling, and likewise they all stand in a state of doubt regarding trampling.

And if it killed two or more, there is a dispute among the poskim regarding this, as some forbid it on the grounds that we see that its wrath was not subsided by one of them, and if so, all of them stand in the status of a safek derusah. And some permit it because we say that it kills each one in succession until its anger subsides, for as long as it is able to kill, it will not occupy itself with derusah and wounding, because through this, on the contrary, its anger increases as has been written. And while it is true that its venom is very strong and its mind was not cooled by one of them, nevertheless, the act of killing takes precedence for it over the act of derusah and wounding. Behold, from the language of the Gemara it is slightly implied like those who forbid, but from the language of Rashi, of blessed memory, who wrote "its wrath was upon these etc.," it is implied like those who permit. The Shach, subsection 28, forbids and the Taz, subsection 16, permits, and with his opinion the Pri Chadash and the Chavat Da'at agreed; and I wonder that they did not bring proof from Rashi.

In what case is it said that if it severed the head of one of them or killed it in another manner that we do not concern ourselves with the others? Specifically when the predator entered the cage or the coop and stood with them, for since the predator is able to do as it wishes, we say that with its killing, its anger subsided. However, such as these cats that climb upon a cage full of birds and insert their paws inside and strike, even though it killed one of them, its anger has not yet subsided, for since they flee, it also remains angry at them, as it is not in its power to do as it wishes. Thus ruled our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 10, see there. And there are those who permit even in such a case [Rashba in Mahadura Batra], and the great authorities decided toward prohibition [Pri Chadash, and this is the opinion of the Shach and the Taz as well, since they did not write anything regarding this law].

And it must be understood: from where do we have the basis to establish a defect in the others? For he cannot touch them unless they were close to the hole where the cat inserted its hand, and who is to say they were at all opposite that place? And what do we care of its anger, for perhaps its hand did not reach them at all? And it is no worse than a doubt upon a doubt, no upon. And it is possible to say that since they lack intellect and flee here and there due to fear, they certainly also passed over this place as well and it clawed them, and just as it dominated one of them, so too it dominated the others. And if we did not see that it killed or clawed one of them, in truth they are not to be forbidden even though it inserted its hand into the hole, and we say that it did not dominate them at all. And according to this, this law would be the exact opposite of when it enters into it; for when it enters, if it did not kill one of them they are forbidden, and if it killed they are permitted, and here it is the opposite, for if it killed they are forbidden and if it did not kill and did not claw they are permitted. And the poskim should have explained this. And it is possible to say that since the cage is full of holes such that in every place the cat can insert its hand into it, in any event they are forbidden, for we say that into all the holes it inserted its hand and clawed them, because they could not escape from it. And all this requires further study.

An incident occurred where a cat inserted its hand into a coop of small birds, and there were nineteen birds there; it removed seven of them and ate them, and of those remaining, some died within the coop and six remained alive, and they prohibited those as well [Darkhei Moshe, letter 4]. And it is simple. An incident occurred in a pen where there were three geese in a cage, and two other geese and four wild geese were walking in the pen, and the next day they found the wild geese with their heads severed by a polecat, as polecats are common there. They ruled that the two in the pen that walked with the wild geese are prohibited, since the predator was certainly there; however, those in the cage are permitted, for since they were in a cage by themselves, it is like a doubt upon a doubt [Beit Yosef in a Responsum]. And this fact that they prohibited the two in the pen is according to the opinion that prohibits when more than one head is severed, but according to those who permit, even these two are permitted. From this we have learned that in a cage full of birds, even if it was certain that a predator was in this room, nevertheless, as long as we did not see it standing over the cage and extending its hand into the cage, they are not to be prohibited [and this is a proof for what I wrote in section 49].

Another incident occurred where there were chickens in a coop, and also outside the coop chickens went here and there in the pen; the next day they found two chickens in the coop dead, and of those that went in the pen one died, and they did not hear the sound of a cry at night, nor did they find any wound or bruise on those remaining, and also on the dead they did not find a wound or bruise that would be clearly recognizable as being caused by a common predator. And they ruled that all of them are permitted, and we do not establish a defect that they were killed by a predator, but rather we attribute it to them dying because of illness. Furthermore, this is a double doubt: perhaps it was due to illness, and if you say it was by a predator, perhaps it did not touch those remaining [Bach in a Responsum]. And in this case we need this permit even according to those who permit when more than one was killed, for since they were not found with severed heads but rather dead, there is no proof that they died by the hand of the predator such that we would say its anger subsided, for it was found the next day, and in such a case there is no permit even for one, as I wrote in section 51, see there.

And we learned from this that if there was a sound of screaming in a cage or in a coop and the next day they found a dead or injured hen there, all of them are forbidden if predators are common there, for we attribute it to what is common. However, if one is found with its head severed, all are permitted, and regarding more than one, it depends on the dispute explained in section 53. And this law is similar to the law that was explained in section 43, that when the predator is not seen, we attribute it to what is common, whether to be lenient or to be stringent. Therefore, if predators are common in this coop, just as there are places where weasels, polecats, or martens are common, we forbid. And if they are not common there, we should not forbid, and we attribute it to something else, unless there is nothing at all to attribute it to, for then we forbid in any case.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 11: When is it said that if he is silent and they are silent it is permitted? These words apply where we did not see that he touched them; but where we saw that he pounced upon them in the manner of those that claw, even if he is domesticated, it is forbidden. Thus far his words. And we say that the fact that they did not cry out is because great fear fell upon them and they were struck dumb; for what does it avail us that he is domesticated, for behold, he has abandoned his domestication. And we do not say that he did all this by way of play because he is domesticated and they also did not cry out, for we should not depend on this and be so lenient in a matter where we see an act of complete clawing. And according to this, that which was explained in section 26 regarding the permissibility of our cats because they are domesticated with the chickens, if we saw that it pounces upon the chicken, it is forbidden even if she is silent [see Shach sub-section 18 and Taz sub-section 18].

He further wrote in section 12: There is one who says that in a case where we do not know if it was silent or if it cried out, and if they were making noise or if they were silent, we do not concern ourselves with it. Thus far his words. For example, where we saw it enter the pen, and before we arrived at the pen it exited from there, and it was not known to us what occurred there. And they wrote the reason that we do not say we concern ourselves with a doubt of derusah except where there is a visible defect; otherwise, we do not, for the majority of animals are under the presumption that they do not perform derusah [Shach sub-siman 29 and Taz sub-siman 19]. And this is a baffling reasoning, for this is literally a doubt of derusah, and the reasoning that the majority do not perform derusah applies only to domesticated animals like cats raised in the house, and not to forest beasts which are presumed to be predators. And the proof for this is that in section 26 regarding our cats they wrote this reasoning, and it implies that only regarding domesticated animals do we say this. And even though there they permit even when they are crying out, see there, nevertheless, we have never heard it said of forest beasts that they are not under the presumption of performing derusah. And in truth, our teacher, the Rema, emended that there are those who forbid in such a case, and this is the opinion of the Ran, and the first opinion is the opinion of the Rashba, and he concluded that one should be concerned about the matter and it is forbidden. Thus far his words. And it implies that from the essential law he agrees with the first opinion, and it requires further study. And it appears to me that they only stated this law when there were many oxen, and according to this, it appears evident that it did not perform derusah on all of them since it exited quickly from the pen; and if so, regarding each one there is a double doubt: perhaps it did not perform derusah at all, and if you should say it did perform derusah, perhaps it did not perform derusah in a manner that renders it treifah. And it requires further study [and the Rashba himself there in another matter wrote this double doubt, and we brought his words in section 37, see there].

A lion that entered a pen of oxen, even if it is silent and they are silent, which has been explained as permitted, nevertheless, if a claw of the lion is found detached and resting in the back of one of the oxen, whether the claw is moist or whether it is dry, it is a case of "doubtful clawing" (safek derusa) and is forbidden. For it is clearly evident that the lion clawed with its paw and from it the claw was dislodged, and at the time it withdrew its paw, it injected the venom, even when the claw remained on the ox. And that which we said, that it injects the venom at the time of withdrawing the claw, this is all one, whether it withdrew the paw with the claw or whether it withdrew the paw and the claw remained [Taz, subsection 28]. And even though, according to the majority of cases, the claw is not dislodged from the lion's paw, and if so, it is possible to say that the lion thrust its paw into a wall and the claw was dislodged, and afterwards the ox rubbed against the wall and the claw from the wall was thrust into it; however, this too, according to the majority of cases, is not the way of the ox, that in its rubbing against a wall a claw would be thrust into it. And if so, in either case, this matter has departed from the rule of the majority, and it is a case of "doubtful clawing" and is forbidden [Gemara]. And all the more so if only the mark of the claw is recognizable on the back of the ox and not the claw itself, for such is its way when it claws, or if two or three claws of a lion were found, for it is certainly from the lion and not from a wall, that it is forbidden even according to the one who is not concerned with "doubtful clawing" [Gemara].

And it is not only that this ox is forbidden, but rather all the oxen in the pen are forbidden, for since the predator was certainly present and one of them was clawed, they all become forbidden as has been explained. And as for the fact that they all remained silent, we must necessarily attribute this to the fact that they were silent due to the magnitude of the fear. And one should not ask why we do not permit the others by means of a double doubt: a doubt whether it rubbed against a wall, and if you say it was from the lion, perhaps it only clawed this one since they remained silent; for it can be said that since there is the defect of a claw mark on its back, they all stand in a state of doubtful clawing [Bach], and we attribute the silence to the fear.

And all this is specifically when we saw that the lion entered, but if we did not see that it entered and a lion's claw was found in the back of the bull, it is nothing [Beit Yosef], because it is a double doubt: a doubt if the lion entered, and if you say it entered, perhaps this claw is from the wall where it rubbed itself [Rashba]. And even though this is not a complete double doubt, for even in the first doubt we must say that the claw is from the wall, and if so it is only one doubt—a doubt if it is from the wall or a doubt if it is from a lion—nevertheless, since regarding the lion there are two doubts and regarding the wall there is one doubt, we attribute it more to the wall than to the lion [Rema in Darkei Moshe]. Furthermore, since there is a doubt regarding the core of the matter, whether the predator was here at all, we follow the majority of bulls which are not preyed upon and it is permitted [Taz, subsection 21]. And know that it is not specifically a lion, for the same applies to all predators, they have this law [Beit Yosef], and it is simple. [And if two or three claws are found, where certainly this is not from rubbing against the wall, one should forbid even in a doubt if the lion entered to prey or not, and it requires further study; see Beit Yosef]. [And in a wide place, even if the lion entered and a claw was found, it is permitted, and even if he is silent and they are cackling; and regarding that bull upon which it was found, some forbid and some permit; see Beit Yosef and Taz, subsection 23].

This matter of being concerned for a doubt of derisah is not to forbid it completely, but rather to require an examination of the entire body, as will be explained, and without an examination it is forbidden. However, if one examined it and does not find a mark of derisah, it is permitted. But for a certain derisah, some say that even according to the law an examination does not avail it [Tur in the name of the Rivam and the Ittur]. However, the opinion of the Rambam, the Tosafot, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch is that even for a certain derisah, an examination avails according to the law. Yet for us there is no practical difference, for we are not experts in the examination of the entire body, as will be explained. And what is called certain derisah? When we saw that it struck, even though the redness of the derisah is not visible from the outside. Indeed, even when the redness of the derisah is visible from the outside, an examination avails according to the law. And according to the custom, even in a doubt of derisah we forbid because we are not experts, unless it is in a case where they said we are not concerned, or where there is a double doubt, such as a doubt whether it struck or did not strike, or a doubt if it was a dog or a doubt if it was a cat, or when they were all silent or they all cried out, or a wide area, and in similar cases to these, for then no examination is required at all and it is permitted even for us [see Shach, subsection 35].

How is the inspection performed? One slaughters the animal that was clawed and inspects its entire cavity from the hip socket—in order to inspect the tzomet hagidim there—until the skull, and one must also inspect the brain. If it is found entirely whole from all types of terefot, such that a limb whose removal renders it a terefah was not removed, and the organs that are rendered terefah by a perforation were not perforated, and the organs that are rendered terefah by being severed were not severed, such as the tzomet hagidim and the like—and as for ordinary flesh that was removed or perforated, we have no concern with it—and also no mark of the clawing is found in it, it is permitted. But if a mark of the clawing is found in it, it is forbidden. And what is the mark of the clawing? Any case where the flesh became reddened opposite the intestines or opposite other organs where a perforation forbids them. For whenever the flesh has reddened opposite the organ, our Sages, of blessed memory, held as a certainty that the venom permeates and perforates the organ. And even if it has not yet been perforated, anything that is standing to be perforated is considered as if perforated, for ultimately it will die from this. Except if the flesh opposite the simanim—the trachea and the esophagus—reddened, our Sages, of blessed memory, said that we have no concern with it, because the simanim are tough and the venom will not dominate them based on the reddening of the flesh opposite them, unless the simanim themselves reddened. For the majority of simanim are tough and venom does not dominate them, and therefore we do not fear the reddening of the flesh opposite them; but when they themselves have reddened, it is revealed that the venom has dominated them. And likewise, if the flesh decomposed opposite the intestines or opposite other organs, besides the simanim, and it is like flesh that a doctor scrapes away, it is a terefah. And even if the flesh reddened or decomposed opposite the tzomet hagidim, it is a terefah because they are destined to be severed.

If the trampling was in other places of the body and not in the place of the simanim, then the simanim do not require examination at all for the reason that has been explained. And if the trampling was in the neck in the place of the simanim, then the simanim require examination. And if the trachea or the esophagus became reddened from the outside, it is treifah. But if the flesh opposite them became reddened, it is nothing, as I wrote; rather, only they themselves when they have reddened. And even the trachea, which is not rendered treifah by a perforation, is rendered treifah by its own reddening, because the venom will eventually burn the majority of it, just as we said regarding the tzomet hagidim that they will eventually be severed, for the venom does everything and not specifically a perforation. Therefore, an animal that was trampled in the place of the simanim has no remedy through examination, because the esophagus has no examination from the outside but only from the inside, as I wrote in siman 33, and in an animal one is compelled to slaughter both. But in a bird, one can slaughter the trachea alone, and after the slaughter, he shall turn the esophagus inside out and examine it from the inside. And even though ab initio even in a bird one requires two simanim, nevertheless, since it is not possible, one siman suffices even ab initio. [That which is written in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 17, that an animal has no remedy, this refers to trampling in the simanim and not in another place, and so it is proven in the Shach, subsection 41, and so it is implied in the Beit Yosef, not like Mahari bin Habib who was cited there, for it is implied from his words that in an animal examination does not help at all for a trampled animal by law, and it is not so. However, regarding a doubt of trampling, it is implied in the Beit Yosef that examination does not help in an animal for the reason that perhaps the trampling was opposite the simanim, see there; and it is difficult, for is there not a double doubt? And it requires further study. However, for us, there is no practical difference at all in this.]

The reddening of the meat opposite the intestines or opposite other organs which testifies to the venom—some say that the reddening must be on the inside of the meat and not on the outside, for on the outside it is nothing [Rashba in Torat HaBayit]. And some say that even on the outside, when it has become red, it is evidence of the venom and is terefah [the Rosh]. And so it is explained from the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch. And it has already been explained that the examination is after the shechitah. And there is one who wishes to say that according to the opinion of Rashi the examination is while alive [Shach, subsection 36] and to examine the organs from the outside. And this is a matter of wonder, for is it so that if the venom did not dominate the skin it is proof that it also did not dominate the meat? Behold, the skin is hard and the hair obstructs, and we have not seen a single one of the poskim who holds thus [only that when he examines, he must also examine the skin after shechitah].

Some say that small birds do not have a discernible redness in them; therefore, they have no examination even according to the law, neither for a certain derusa nor for a doubtful derusa. And so too some say that the venom of the hawk is not so red; therefore, it has no examination even according to the law. For us, there is no practical difference in this, for in all of them we are not experts, as will be explained.

There are some of our teachers who wrote that this requirement to inspect for a drusah against the entire cavity only applies in a case of a doubtful drusah, or a certain drusah where we do not know in which location it clawed, such as when the location of the clawing is not recognizable from the outside. However, if the location of the clawing is recognizable from the outside, it does not require inspection except against that location [Tosafot 53b, starting with the word "Drusah"]. And this is the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, who wrote regarding what our sages, of blessed memory, said, "The drusah they spoke of requires inspection against the entire cavity," such as a doubtful drusah of a lion, or where he saw it clawing but the location of the clawing is not recognizable from the outside. Thus far his words. But when the location of the clawing is recognizable from the outside, it does not require inspection except against that location [Tosafot]. And the Rosh wrote similarly there [at the end of siman 42]. However, from the wording of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, it does not appear so.

The Rashba, of blessed memory, cited this in his book Torat HaBayit [page 30] and challenged them. This is his wording: I have not descended to the depth of their words, for if the place of the treading is not visible from the outside and even so you are concerned lest it be visible from the inside [meaning, in a case of doubt regarding a treading], it follows that sometimes the mark of the treading is visible from the inside even though it is not visible from the outside; if so, even when you find a place of redness on the outside in one location, why are you not concerned lest he also trod in other locations but it is not visible from the outside? Unless you would say that regarding the venom of this lion, since it causes redness here, had he trod in another location its mark would be visible likewise. But when it is not visible at all, there is reason to fear lest the venom of this lion is not visible from the outside—and these are nothing but the words of prophecy. And it stands to reason that as long as it is not visible from the outside, it is known that it was not trod upon there. And that which they said, "it requires examination from the membrane of the brain until the thigh," was to say that one must examine if there is a reddish place on the outside, and every place where it is found there, it requires examination corresponding to it; and if the flesh reddened on the inside corresponding to the intestines, it is forbidden, and if not, it is kosher. But the thigh, and from the thigh and below, even if a speck of blood is found there, it is of no consequence. Thus far the words of the Rashba, of blessed memory.

And behold, even according to his opinion, one first examines from the outside, and when a reddish spot is found there, one examines from the inside corresponding to it, but in a place where no redness is found on the outside, an examination from the inside is not required. And this too is not implied by the wording of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, for from their words it is explicitly clear that whether it is a case of a doubtful derusa or a definite derusa, an examination is required corresponding to the entire cavity to see if there is no redness from the outside and from the inside. For if they held that one may rely only on an examination of the outside, they should not have written without qualification, but rather should have specified; and it is explicitly implied from their wording that this is not so. And as for what he questions against our teachers the authors of the Tosafot, it can be said that they too only spoke of when they saw the place upon which it struck, even though from their wording it is not explicitly proven so. And it can further be said that since we found one place where the predator certainly stood, we do not have to presume a defect in another place; but when the place is not recognizable at all and according to the law it is determined that the predator was here, then it is necessary to search in all places from the outside and from the inside. And indeed, regarding tumah we also maintain so, that when the tumah is lost, one continues to examine until it is found. However, for the practical law, one must certainly instruct according to the plain meaning of the words of the Rambam and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch to require an examination in every place in the body; but for us, as we are not experts, there is no practical difference in all of this.

The Tur wrote, and this is his wording: The Rashba wrote that if one inspected and the flesh did not redden on the outside, if he inspected close to its clawing, it is kosher; and if he did not inspect close to its clawing, it appears to me that we are concerned for it, for we are concerned for a doubt of clawing, and we are concerned that perhaps its appearance changed on the outside and it healed, while it descends and pierces below; and I do not know why we must be concerned for a matter that we have not found that the sages were concerned for. Thus far his words. And the commentators of the Tur labored much over the intent of the words of the Rashba [see Beit Yosef, Bach, and Derisha]:

And in my humble opinion, it appears that this is the explanation: for behold, the Rashba holds regarding derusah that one examines from the outside, and if redness is discernible there, one examines from the inside, and if it is not discernible from the outside, one does not need to examine from the inside, as we brought his words in section 70. And regarding this he says that if close to its derusah he examined from the outside and did not see redness, it is completely kosher; and if he did not examine close to its derusah, then we are concerned for it—meaning, we do not rely on an external examination, but rather it requires an internal examination. But if he also examined from the inside below and did not find redness, it is kosher [and so it appears from the Pri Chadash, subsection 43].

There is one who wrote that what has been explained—that in a wide area we are not concerned for derusa in those where we do not see a sign of derusa—this is only when three victims of derusa were not found; but when three victims of derusa were found, the pen of these animals or these birds is established as having victims of derusa, and all of them are forbidden. And he compared this to the laws of worms in siman 84 regarding a cooked dish in which three worms were found, which is forbidden, see there. And it is a great error, for there we say that the nature of these vegetables is to grow worms, or the crawling insect is common in this place and it is impossible to check them, as will be explained there. But here, every animal has a positive chazaka that it is not a victim of derusa, and what does one have to do with the other [Taz at the end of this siman]? For does every predator strike without limit? Behold, when he rests from his anger, he no longer strikes, as we said regarding one who killed one of them. And how can we establish a defect from one to another in a case where they are not connected to one another?

It is written in the Halachot Gedolot that in every place where a check is mentioned in the Shas, such as regarding an animal that was clawed, fallen, or broken, this was all in the early generations when they were more expert, for the early rabbis were wise and expert in checking. However, now we do not rely on our checking, and there is no permission for a doubtful clawing or for other doubtful terefot except when it lives twelve months, for a terefah does not live twelve months; and in a leap year, thirteen months. And some say that even in a leap year twelve months is sufficient [Pri Chadash, subsection 46], since in most places the sages mentioned the language of "month" and not the language of "year," there is no difference between an ordinary year and a leap year. And regarding a female, it is sufficient until she conceives and gives birth, for a terefah does not give birth; but conception alone is not enough, for it is possible that she will not give birth and will die in her pregnancy [Shach, subsection 45]. And if she gave birth to a miscarriage, or a bird that laid eggs that were not finished, it is possible that it is not effective, and it requires further study. And regarding a bird, if she finished laying all the eggs that she had already been impregnated with and waited twenty-one days, which is the gestation period of a bird, and afterwards returned to lay eggs, she is kosher. And so too, if at the time the doubt of terefot occurred to her she was not laying eggs, and she waited twenty-one days and began to lay eggs, she is kosher, for this is a sign that she is not a terefah, for if she were a terefah she would not have become impregnated. But in less than twenty-one days there is no proof, for perhaps she was impregnated before the doubt of terefot occurred to her.

Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote that a judge has only what his eyes see, and it is permitted to rely upon it, as it is written: "to the judge who will be in those days." Therefore, even in this time, one should rely on our examination, and he should only be very careful to bring before him all those expert in the matter so that a splinter of the beam will reach him. Nevertheless, the great poskim wrote that we in the later generations must not rely on our examination in a matter that requires great expertise, such as in the case of derusah and nefulah and the like, where the examination is difficult. Even Rashi, of blessed memory, only said it in his generation when Torah was clear and wisdom was abundant, and not in these times of ours [Or Zarua]. Our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly, and one must not deviate. This is not a general rule for all examinations, for Heaven forbid to say such a thing, as in many examinations we too are expert, as has been explained in many laws of terefot; rather, it refers to difficult examinations throughout the entire body, such as derusah and nefulah and those similar to these.

And there are those who are even more stringent, that anything which requires waiting twelve months, we fear a mishap over such a long period of time; and if there are many that are being trodden upon, it is certainly forbidden to keep them for twelve months so that he does not come to a mishap. However, there are those who are stringent even with one that stands in doubt, and such is the custom to be stringent even with one. But a waiting period of twenty-one days for birds, which is a short time, we do not fear a mishap. And even if it is currently laying eggs and it is necessary to wait until this laying period concludes and afterwards to wait twenty-one days, we also have no concern with this, for this is not a long time within a year. For regarding the primary concern of a mishap, there are several disputes in the Shas [and even though according to Beit Hillel we do not fear a mishap at the end of the first chapter of Pesachim, nevertheless the Rambam in chapter 12 of Terumot, halacha 12, ruled that we do fear it, see there; and he did not concern himself with Beit Hillel because of several sugyot, and see there in the Kesef Mishneh, and reflect on this].

This fact that staying twelve months or twenty-one days in birds applies to a doubtful terefah, but regarding a certain terefah, even if it increases like the sand of the seas, we do not pay heed to this. For anything that our sages, of blessed memory, received as being a certain terefah, we do not pay heed to anything, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 11. And we say that this fact that it lives is an exception to the rule and is a miraculous act, or that this fact that a terefah does not live twelve months is according to the majority, but a tiny minority exists that live and give birth; for all the words of our teachers, of blessed memory, are by tradition reaching until the law of Moses from Sinai. And know that even in doubtful terefot, staying does not avail in a matter where the terefah can be newly created every day, such as a broken wing in a bird near the body where we fear perhaps the lung was perforated, staying does not avail. And so too in a broken bone with the concern that it protruded outward, and so too in a break in the area of the digestive organs where we fear that the break will damage them, and similar to these; for every day there is a concern that the terefah will be made, and what will staying avail? Perhaps at the end of the year it was perforated or damaged or the break protruded outward.

It is forbidden to sell a derusah, or a doubtful derusah, or other types of terefot that are not recognizable to a gentile, for we fear lest he return and sell it to an Israelite. There is no distinction between a city where the majority are gentiles or the majority are Israelites, and even an Israelite man who dwells alone in a village is forbidden to sell, for we fear that he will go to the city and sell to an Israelite. And the Israelite will not understand that this is a terefah or a doubtful terefah. Rather, he should kill it beforehand and afterwards sell it to a gentile, or he should see at the time of its sale that the gentile kills it. Therefore, whenever the terefot are clearly visible, such as a severed leg and the like, it is permitted to sell, for in this there is no concern lest he sell it to an Israelite, since it is revealed to all that it is a terefah and the Israelite will not purchase it. There is no distinction in this between a bird and an animal, or between a small animal and a large animal. And so too even a doubtful terefah where there are some poskim who rule it kosher, even though we hold to forbid it, nevertheless it is permitted to sell it to a gentile based on the reasoning of a sefek sefeka: perhaps he will not sell it to an Israelite, and if you say he will sell it, perhaps we hold like those who permit it. The law of a flock in which a doubtful derusah was mixed, or a mixture of a terefah with kosher ones, will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 110. And they wrote in the name of the Radbaz that a derusah that was mixed into a flock, one may permit keeping them twelve months or until they give birth, and even if they are many, for in a mixture one should not be stringent due to the concern of a pitfall, and these are words of reason. And there is room to doubt regarding the concern of a pitfall whether it is permitted to hand over the animal or the bird to a gentile and pay him for his labor that he will toil with it for a year, for in this there is no concern of a pitfall since it is not in the possession of the Israelite, and also the concern that he will sell it to an Israelite [is removed] since it is not his and he is afraid to sell it lest the Israelite sue him in the courts for selling that which is not his; and one should deliberate on this. And know that even though it was explained that in a mixture we do not fear the concern of a pitfall, nevertheless to mix manually is forbidden as with all prohibitions, for one may not mix a prohibition ab initio. And there are many proofs for this from the Shas in all the places where they spoke of the concern of a pitfall, why did they not say to mix? Rather, it is certainly forbidden to do so. [And one should not raise a difficulty against what was explained that for a short time we do not fear a pitfall from the Tosafot in Pesachim 34a, s.v. "bishlikata," where it is explained that even for a very short time we fear a pitfall, see there, for a food item that is immediately ready is different, and the proof is from Rashi, Shabbat 18b, s.v. "vetuha," see there and examine carefully.]