Siman 29

One who eats a kezayit of the meat of a domestic animal that died, or a wild animal that died, or a bird that died, is lashed, as it is said: "You shall not eat any nevelah." And anything that was not slaughtered properly is a nevelah, and in every place where it was explained in the laws of slaughtering that the slaughtering is invalid, it is a nevelah, for nothing removes it from the status of nevelah except a valid slaughtering as we were commanded from the mouth of Moses our teacher from the mouth of the Almighty. And any doubt regarding the slaughtering is a doubt of nevelah, and one who eats a kezayit from it is struck with lashes of rebellion.

And there are six other nevelot even while they are alive, and these are they: a beast whose thigh and its cavity were removed and its deficiency is visible when it is crouching [21a]. And similarly if one made it into a ghistra, meaning that he cut it across its width, either entirely at its neck or at the spine until the cavity [Rashi ibid.]. And similarly if it was torn from its back like a fish. And similarly if the neck was broken and the majority of the flesh with it; and some say specifically when the spinal cord was severed, and without this it is a terefah and not a nevelah [the brother of the Taz at the end of siman 27]. And some disagree regarding this. And similarly when the majority of the trachea is severed or the esophagus is perforated in the place fit for shechitah, it is a nevelah while alive according to the opinion of the Rambam, chapter 3 of Shechitah. And some say that his intention is that when he performs shechitah, the shechitah is not effective and its law is like one disqualified during shechitah, and then it becomes a nevelah, but while alive it is only a terefah [see Shach, section 33, subsection 4, and Nekudat HaKesef, and Pri Chadash]. And this is also implied by the opinion of Rashi and Tosafot [32b]. And some say that this is regarding the tumah of nevelot, but regarding the prohibition of eating, it has the law of nevelah while alive [Tevu'ot Shor and Kereti U'Peleti ibid.].

The Rambam wrote in chapter 4 of Maakhalot Assurot, law 2: Nothing is forbidden as nevelah except for pure species alone, because they are fit for shehitah, and if they were slaughtered with a valid shehitah they would be permitted for eating. But impure species, for which shehitah is not effective, whether one slaughtered it properly, or it died on its own, or one cut flesh from the living animal from it and ate it—he does not receive lashes on account of nevelah and tereifah, but rather on account of eating impure meat. Thus far his words. And according to this, if they warned him regarding the nevelah of an impure animal on account of nevelah, he does not receive lashes. And this matter is not found explicitly in the Shas except regarding the nevelah of an impure bird, and regarding tumah, that it does not contract the tumah of the throat like the nevelah of a pure bird [at the end of chapter 7 of Zevahim]. But regarding an animal we have not found it, and similarly regarding a bird in terms of the prohibition it is not found in the Gemara. And it is possible that he holds there is no difference between prohibition and tumah, and between a bird and an animal regarding the prohibition of nevelah, as he wrote in chapter 3 of Shehitah; see there. However, there is no doubt about the matter, and so the Semag ruled in mitzvah 133, see there, for we do not find regarding any prohibition of eating, such as gid hanasheh and ever min hahai, that it applies to an impure animal, as is explicit in the Shas. Furthermore, it must be so, for just as regarding gid hanasheh the sages of blessed memory stated the reason [Perek Gid HaNasheh 100b] because a prohibition does not take effect upon an existing prohibition, so too the prohibition of nevelah does not take effect upon the prohibition of an impure animal, for there is neither an inclusive prohibition nor an additional prohibition here. Furthermore, when we examine the entire Torah, we do not find in the Torah the term "eating" regarding the nevelah of an impure animal, only tumah, as it says in Vayikra: "Or a soul that touches... or the nevelah of an impure animal," and in Parshat Tzav: "And a soul that touches... or an impure animal," and in Parshat Shemini regarding the impure species it is written explicitly: "Of their flesh you shall not eat and their nevelah you shall not touch," and similarly regarding impure fish and birds; see there. This is to the exclusion of pure animals, where it is written there: "And he who eats of its nevelah," see there, and similarly in Parshat Re'eh, see there. And regarding the eating of nevelah, it deals there explicitly with a pure animal, for so it is written there: "Every pure bird you may eat; you shall not eat any nevelah... for you are a holy people," etc. And from this itself it is proven that it does not deal with an impure animal, for he gave the reason "for you are a holy people," and therefore you shall not eat it when it dies; and if it dealt with an impure animal, behold even with shehitah it is forbidden to a holy people [and see Maggid Mishneh and Lehem Mishneh, and according to what I wrote it is well understood; and delve into it].

He further wrote: One who eats any amount of a live pure bird is lashed for eating nevelah, and even though there is not a kezayit, since he ate it in its entirety. And if he ate it after it died, until there is a kezayit, and even though there is not a kezayit of meat in the whole of it, since there is a kezayit in the whole of it, he is liable for it because of nevelah. Thus far his words. And all of his words are astonishing, for it is explicitly stated in the Gemara [Chullin 102a] that the prohibition is due to ever min hachai. Furthermore, how is it possible to hold one liable for nevelah with less than a kezayit? And if it is because of biryah, which does not require a kezayit as written below in siman 100, it is explained there that regarding a pure species there is no prohibition of biryah; for whenever the prohibition is due to nevelah, the prohibition of biryah is not applicable, as biryah only applies when, if it were divided, its name would no longer be upon it, but nevelah, even if it is divided into several parts, the name nevelah remains upon it, and one is not liable for less than a kezayit. And so wrote all the Rishonim, and also the Rambam himself in chapter 2 of Ma'achalot Assurot, halakhah 21, wrote: But one who eats an impure biryah on its own is lashed by the Torah, and even if it was smaller than a mustard seed, whether he ate it dead or he ate it alive. Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote explicitly that specifically an impure one is a biryah, according to the opinion of all the Rishonim. And more astonishing than this is what he wrote, that if he ate a pure one after it died he requires a kezayit, and even though there is not a kezayit in the meat, nevertheless since there is a kezayit in the whole of it he is liable—meaning that the bones join together to the kezayit—and behold, he explicitly wrote below in halakhah 18 that the bones and the sinews do not join together to the kezayit in nevelah [see Lechem Mishneh who elaborated on this and remained with "tzarich iyun"].

It appears clear to me that the Rambam had another approach in this matter, and from the sugya of the Shas there he inferred thus. For behold, the Shas there brought a baraita where Tannaim disagree regarding one who ate a pure bird while it was alive, whether he is liable or not, and concludes there: if he strangled it and ate it, all agree he is liable for a kezayit, see there. And this is very difficult, for this baraita is a Tosefta at the end of tractate Avodah Zarah, and it is explicitly taught there regarding Bnei Noach, who are liable only for a limb from the living, and the Tannaim disagree whether while alive it is standing to be divided into limbs—meaning, if he ate it whole, whether "from the living" applies or not [as Rashi explained there]—and the Tosefta concludes there: if he strangled it and ate it, all agree he is exempt, see there, for a Ben Noach is not commanded regarding nevelah. How then can the Shas say that for a kezayit he is liable according to all?

The Rambam further explains that the reason a beriah does not require a kezayit is because a beriah is significant [and so wrote Rashi in Shevuot 21b, s.v. mefaresh], and not like the reason written by all the Rishonim. If so, there is no difference between an impure and a pure animal, for a pure one also has significance; therefore, he explains that a pure one is also a beriah [and so wrote the Kereti U-Peleti siman 100, subsection 5]. The difference between an impure and a pure animal is only when it is dead; for in this case, in an impure one it is a beriah even if there is not a kezayit in its entirety, but in a pure one a kezayit is required. The reason is simple: because in an impure one there is no prohibition of nevelah, as I wrote previously in section 3, and it remains a beriah as it was in its lifetime, as opposed to a pure one upon which the status of nevelah takes effect at its death, it is impossible to be liable for less than a kezayit. However, for this purpose it is effective that it is entirely whole and the name beriah is upon it: that whereas in all nevelot the bones and the sinews do not combine for a kezayit, in a beriah they do combine for a kezayit. With this, all his words are clarified, for here the liability is only because of nevelah and not because of ever min hachai, for he holds like the one who says that in its lifetime it is not destined for limbs, as is clarified from his words in chapter 5 of Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot, din 5, see there [and so wrote the Lechem Mishneh]. And when he ate it in its lifetime, when the status of nevelah had not yet taken effect upon it, he is liable for any amount as with an impure one because of the law of beriah; but at its death, when the status of nevelah takes effect upon it, he requires a kezayit, only that the bones and the sinews also combine for the kezayit. And that which he wrote in chapter 2 regarding the law of beriah in an impure one is because he wrote there both regarding a dead one and a living one, and here he explained that in a pure one there is a distinction between a living one and a dead one. And in the Gemara, the one who holds liable in its lifetime because of ever min hachai is because he holds that even in its lifetime it is destined for limbs, and we do not rule accordingly. [And in the discussion of the Shas 102a, this is the explanation: Rav said ever min hachai requires a kezayit, and it challenges from that which Rav said: one who eats a pure bird in its lifetime is liable for any amount, and at its death for a kezayit; meaning that this refers both to an Israelite and to a son of Noah, for in its lifetime both are liable because of ever min hachai, and at its death it refers to an Israelite, for a son of Noah is only commanded regarding ever min hachai. And it answers: with a minimal amount of flesh, sinews, and bones. And it is difficult: for it is the way of an Amora to explain his words? And furthermore, what does he come to teach us with "at its death for a kezayit"—do I not know that one is liable for a kezayit of nevelah? Rather, this is the explanation: that in its lifetime the Israelite is liable for literally any amount because of the law of beriah, and the son of Noah whose liability is only because of ever min hachai, his liability is for a minimal amount of flesh, sinews, and bones; and therefore he said simply "any amount" because of the Israelite. And at its death for a kezayit, also with a minimal amount of flesh, sinews, and bones. And from this the Rambam took his ruling. And with this, the precision of the Tosafot is settled, that it is not similar to the latter clause, see there; and according to what I wrote, it is exactly similar regarding an Israelite. And afterwards he brought the Tosefta which refers to a son of Noah, and therefore Rabbi exempts because he does not have the liability of beriah and ever min hachai in its lifetime is not destined for limbs; and Rabbi Elazar son of Rabbi Shimon holds liable because he holds it is destined for limbs, and also with a minimal amount of flesh, sinews, and bones as he answers. And if he strangled it and ate it, in a son of Noah he is exempt as is clarified in the Tosefta, and in an Israelite he is liable for a kezayit, and also with a minimal amount of flesh, sinews, and bones. And he infers from the Tosefta itself: since it exempted only in a son of Noah, it proves that in an Israelite he is liable. And the Rambam ruled that it is not destined for limbs, and everything is settled; and reflect on this.] [And let it not be difficult for you what the Rambam wrote in Hilkhot Melakhim chapter 9 that a son of Noah does not require a measure, see there, for this depends on what he ruled there like Rav Acha bar Yaakov on page 33a, that there is something that is permitted to an Israelite and forbidden to a son of Noah, and this discussion does not hold so, as I wrote in siman 27, see there and reflect]:

He further wrote: One who eats a kezayit of the meat of a carcass of a pure animal is lashed for eating nevelah, etc. The placenta that emerged with the offspring is forbidden for consumption, but one who eats it is exempt because it is not meat, and it does not even contract the impurity of foods [Avodah Zarah 74b] because it is not considered food. However, one who slaughters an animal and finds an offspring within it—since the offspring is permitted without slaughter according to the law of a ben pekuah—the placenta is also permitted if he is of refined soul such that he is able to eat it and his soul is not revolted by it due to disgust. And thus the sages taught in the Mishnah [ibid.]:

One who eats a kezayit of meat from a pure domestic animal, wild animal, or bird that became a treifah is lashed, as it is said: "And meat in the field that is a treifah you shall not eat; you shall cast it to the dog." The treifah mentioned in the Torah refers to one that was torn by a beast of the forest, such as a lion, a leopard, or the like, and similarly a bird that was struck by a bird of prey, such as a hawk or the like. You cannot say that it tore it and killed it, for if it died, it is a nevelah; why then did the Torah call it a treifah? For what difference is it to me if it died of its own accord, or if one struck it with a sword and killed it, or if a beast tore it and killed it? From here you learn that the verse speaks of one that was torn but did not die. The term "treifah" means that it was snatched from something, as it is written: "Yosef was surely torn [tarof toraf]," yet he was still alive. A proof for this is from what the prophet said [Hoshea]: "For He has torn [taraf] and He will heal us."

And perhaps you will say: if so, when the animal was snatched from the predatory beast by its hand or its leg, a place where it does not make it a tereifah, and a person came and rescued it, it is called a tereifah and is forbidden for eating? Behold, it says, "to the dog you shall throw it." The Torah taught that the intent of "tereifah you shall not eat" is until it becomes meat fit for a dog; that is to say, that it will not live from this wound and ultimately it will die and be thrown to the dogs. And the Torah forbade it even though it is still alive; shechitah does not avail it, and behold it is a tereifah. And its shechitah only avails it to remove it from the law of nevelah regarding the matter of impurity. And this is the explanation of the verse: "And meat in the field, a tereifah, you shall not eat"—that is to say, you have no permission to eat it even when you slaughter it, and even though you rescue it from the impurity of nevelah, nevertheless you shall not eat it, and "to the dog you shall throw it" like a nevelah.

And perhaps you will say that the verse did not forbid a treifah except when it was torn by forest beasts, such as a lion or a leopard that mauled it in the field and it is still alive, as has been written, but other types of treifot, such as a perforated lung or intestines, or a fallen animal, and all types of treifot do not forbid it—it is impossible to say so. For the Torah forbade a nevelah and forbade a treifah; and just as with a nevelah you did not distinguish between one that died of its own accord, and one that died because of a beast, and one that died because of a fall or strangulation or a sword strike and the like, so too you shall not distinguish regarding a treifah between one torn by the cause of a beast and one torn by another cause. Even if it was born a treifah, it is forbidden for eating. If so, why does the Torah say "treifah," which implies it was torn by a beast? The verse spoke of the common occurrence, because most animals are healthy. But if a treifah-condition developed in them such that they are unable to live for a long time, or if they were born so, as the sages taught in the Mishnah: "This is the rule: any that cannot live like it is a treifah"—there is no distinction between them. For if you do not say so, but rather follow the literal plain meaning of the verse, we would not forbid it even when it was torn by a beast in the house, for it is written, "And meat in the field, a treifah," and we would say "in the field" specifically and not in the house. And this is a matter of foolishness; rather, perforce, the verse spoke of the common occurrence. And thus the Sages of blessed memory expounded in the Mechilta Mishpatim, see there. And so it is explained in the Rambam there. Furthermore, the primary definition of "treifah" is an expression of breaking, as Onkelos translated in several places for "treifah" as "tevirah," and that is because it is not in its wholeness of life. Therefore, all types of prohibitions in a pure animal through which it is forbidden to eat are called by the name treifah.

Eight categories of treifot were told to Moses at Sinai, and their mnemonic is DaN ChaNaK NePaSh: drusa (clawed), nekuva (perforated), chasira (missing), netula (removed), kerua (torn), nefula (fallen), pesuka (severed), shevura (broken). All the types of treifot that will be explained are included in this general rule. In detail, the Rambam counted them in the tenth chapter of the Laws of Shechita as seventy treifot; see there. All of these are explained in the Mishnah and Gemara in the third chapter of Chullin, as they were received generation after generation until Moses our teacher, who taught them to Israel like the entire Oral Torah. And should you say: why do we need a law from Moses at Sinai regarding drusa, for it is explicitly stated in the Torah in the verse "And meat in the field that is treifa"? It is not so, for there are many laws regarding drusa, such as that there is no drusa except with the forepaw and the claw, and other laws, all of which have no hint in the verse and came to us by tradition from Moses our teacher from Sinai. [The Beit Yosef raised a difficulty: did not Ulla state this general rule on page 43, and he says there that it is to exclude the lesion of Rakhish, for if it was afflicted in the kidney it is treifa, and we indeed rule like Rakhish as written in siman 44? The Darkhei Moshe and the Bach labored much over this, see there, and it requires further study. It appears to me that since we only rule like Rakhish when the lesion reaches the place of the cleft, as it says on page 55b, and Rashi explained: to the place where the sinews are attached there, it automatically falls under the category of netula. But regarding the words of Ulla, it is impossible to say so, because Rakhish did not mention the place of the cleft. And so it must be said regarding the socket of the hip-bone, that when the tendons are decayed it falls under the category of netula; and delve into this.]

And one should not ask why we require a halacha le-Moshe mi-Sinai regarding this, since it is a great principle that anything whose like cannot live is tereifah; if so, it should be determined according to the rules of medicine—if there is no cure for this wound, it is tereifah, and if there is a cure, it is kosher. For this is no question at all, and the Rambam has already written in chapter 10 of Hilkhot Shehitah, law 12, and this is his wording: And one may not add to these tereifot at all; for anything that occurs to a beast or a wild animal or a bird other than those which the sages of the earlier generations enumerated and agreed upon in the battei din of Israel, it is possible that it may live, even if it is known to us through the way of medicine that it is not destined to live. And similarly, those which they enumerated and said that they are tereifah, even though it appears through the ways of medicine in our hands that some of them are not fatal and it is possible to live from them, you have only what the sages enumerated, as it is said, "According to the Torah which they shall teach you." Thus far his words. Furthermore, regarding these tereifot, the sages taught that if it is certainly a tereifah, even if it lived many years, it is tereifah. And that which the Sages, of blessed memory, said [57b] that the sign for a tereifah is twelve months, this is only regarding a doubtful tereifah and not a certain tereifah, as will be explained in siman 57 with the help of Heaven.

And similarly, one who cuts meat from a living animal from among the pure species, behold that meat is treifah, and one who eats a kazayit of it is lashed for eating treifah. And thus did our Sages, of blessed memory, expound [102b]: "You shall not eat the soul with the meat"—this refers to an eiver min hachai; "And meat in the field, treifah, you shall not eat"—this refers to meat from a living animal and meat from a treifah; see there. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 4 of Ma'akhalot Assurot explained this matter, and this is his wording: For behold, this meat is from an animal that was not slaughtered and did not die; what does it matter to me if a wild beast tore it, or if he cut it with a knife, or if it is the whole of it, or if it is part of it? Behold, it says, "And meat in the field, treifah, you shall not eat"—once the animal has become "meat in the field," behold it is treifah. Thus far his words. For "meat in the field" comes to teach regarding several things that left their partition, as was written in siman 14, and you have no greater "outside the partition" than this, where the meat was detached from the bone of the animal. And know that meat from a living animal is not an eiver min hachai, and it will be explained in siman 62. [And Onkelos also translated regarding "And meat in the field, treifah, you shall not eat" as "And meat detached from a living animal you shall not eat"; see there].

According to what has been explained, that we learned the prohibition of meat from a living animal from the verse regarding treifah, therefore, if one ate meat from a living animal and meat from a treifah, he is only lashed once, since they were stated in a single negative commandment. But if he ate a limb from a living animal and meat from a living animal, he is lashed twice, since they were stated in two negative commandments [Gemara ibid.]. And it is simple that one who eats nevelah and treifah, or nevelah and meat from a living animal, is lashed twice, as each one is a negative commandment unto itself. Nevertheless, regarding the combination to the size of a kezayit, nevelah and treifah, or nevelah and meat from a living animal, are considered as one negative commandment in the sense that if he ate a half-kezayit of nevelah and a half-kezayit of treifah or meat from a living animal, he is lashed. Even though all prohibitions do not combine with one another except for the prohibitions of a nazir, nevertheless, nevelah and treifah combine, and likewise nevelah and meat from a living animal. The Rambam ruled so there and gave the reason for this because a treifah is the beginning of nevelah; see there.

And I do not know his intention, for if his intention is a terefah that died afterward, it is obvious, for both this and that are nevelah. Furthermore, if so, it would not be similar to meat from a living animal, upon which the status of nevelah will never take effect. Rather, certainly his intention is a terefah that he slaughtered, and if so, how is it relevant to say that it is the beginning of nevelah? For when he slaughters it, it will not be nevelah even regarding the matter of impurity, as slaughtering purifies it from the status of nevelah. And in the Shas this is not explained at all. And it is true that in tractate Me'ilah they said there [16a] that regarding the matter of eating, pure does not combine with impure, but rather pure ones on their own and impure ones on their own. And it implies explicitly that all pure ones combine with one another; however, this is regarding nevelot, for it refers to the Mishnah there which taught: All nevelot combine with one another, meaning even pure with impure. And they explained in the Gemara that this is regarding the matter of impurity and not regarding the matter of eating, because the prohibition of nevelah does not take effect upon the prohibition of an impure animal. But pure nevelot combine with one another even for eating, such as a half-kezayit of an ox nevelah and a half-kezayit of a lamb nevelah and the like. But a terefah with a nevelah, from where do we know that they combine?

Therefore, it appears to me that his intention is regarding a terefah that died, and similarly regarding meat from a living animal where the animal died afterward. And even though when it died it became nevelah, nevertheless there is a reason to say that a prohibition does not take effect upon another prohibition; that is to say, since it became a terefah while alive, the prohibition of nevelah does not come and take effect upon the prohibition of terefah. And this is what he says, that it is the beginning of nevelah since it died afterward, and also the meat cut from it, when it died afterward, the status of nevelah takes effect upon the cut meat. And he inferred this from the Gemara there, that since it says all pure nevelot combine with one another, and a terefah that died is certainly called nevelah now, therefore he ruled that they combine.

Therefore, one who eats a half-kezayit of chelev and a half-kezayit of blood, or a half-kezayit of the nevelah of an impure animal and a half-kezayit of the nevelah of a pure animal, or a half-kezayit of impure fish and a half-kezayit of impure fowl, and similarly with other prohibitions, they do not combine with one another, and it is merely like eating a half-measure, which is prohibited by the Torah but does not carry the penalty of lashes. However, one who eats a half-kezayit of the nevelah of an impure animal and a half-kezayit of the nevelah of an impure beast, they combine with one another because they are under one negative commandment. Therefore, an impure animal or beast with impure fowl or impure fish do not combine with one another because they are divided into different negative commandments. The nevelah of a pure animal with the nevelah of a pure fowl combine with one another because they were stated under one negative commandment; and even though regarding the matter of tumah they have divided laws, as the nevelah of a pure fowl only imparts tumah in the esophagus, nevertheless, regarding the matter of the prohibition of eating, they are equal. Similarly, treifah with nevelah combine for the reason that was explained in section 14. And so it appears to me that a half-kezayit of chelev from a nevelah and a half-kezayit of meat from a nevelah combine for lashes, because the Torah decreed that the prohibition of nevelah takes effect upon the prohibition of chelev, and the same applies to treifah [Chullin 37a]. And even though there is a separate negative commandment for chelev, nevertheless, when it becomes nevelah, the status of nevelah also applies to the chelev, and similarly with treifah. And certainly chelev from a slaughtered animal and from a nevelah combine, as they are included in one negative commandment, and the same applies to blood, that they combine from this and from that. And a half-kezayit of chelev from a pure animal and a half-kezayit of chelev from an impure animal do not combine, for regarding chelev it is written, "Any chelev of ox, sheep, or goat you shall not eat," but regarding impure animals, their chelev is like their meat, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 7 of Ma'achalot Assurot; see there. And one who eats from the chelev of a nevelah or treifah, he ruled there that he receives lashes twice, on account of chelev and on account of nevelah or treifah, because there is an "added prohibition" here, for when it became nevelah or when it became treifah, a prohibition was added to the meat, and furthermore, the Torah decreed that nevelah and treifah take effect upon the prohibition of chelev, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote. But regarding blood, there is no distinction between an impure animal and a pure animal, for the Torah did not distinguish in blood between impure and pure, as it is written, "And any blood you shall not eat," as the Rambam wrote there in chapter 6; see there [so it appears to me in these laws].

One who eats from a nevela or treifa, or from impure cattle or wild animals, from the skin, the bones, the sinews, the horns, the hooves, or the claws of a bird from the places where blood would ooze if they were cut, or from their placenta—even though it is forbidden, he is exempt from malkot because these are not fit for eating and they do not join with the meat to form a kezayit. From the words of the Rambam there, it is explained that in a bird all of these have the law of meat because they are soft; and it requires further study regarding the bones of a bird, why their law should change from the bones of cattle [see Tosafot Chullin at the beginning of the chapter "Ha-Or Ve-ha-Rotev" starting with "Ve-ha-Talpayim"]. Regarding horns, hooves, and claws at their tips in the place where blood does not ooze, the status of food does not apply to them at all, and there is not even a prohibition in this [as is implied in the Gemara ibid. 121a; see there].

There are skins that are like meat, and one who eats a kezayit from them is like one who eats from the meat, such as the skin of a bird. There are even other skins when one eats them while they are soft, and these are: the skin of a human, the skin of a domestic pig, the skin of a camel's hump that has never carried a burden and has not reached the age to carry a burden such that it is still soft, the skin of the pudenda—which is the womb—the skin under the fat tail, the skin of a fetus, and the skin of the anaqa, the koach, the leta’ah, and the chomet. All these skins, when they are soft, are like meat in every respect, whether regarding the prohibition of eating or regarding tumah. Some disagree regarding the skin of the pudenda [Rashi's commentary 122b, s.v. "to include" and see Lechem Mishneh at the end of chapter 4 of Ma'achalot Assurot]. These skins, once they have hardened—for example, if one tanned them or walked on them enough to constitute tanning—are not like meat [Maggid Mishneh ibid.]. Even regarding human skin, where concerning tumah there is no distinction in this matter, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 1 of Avot HaTumah, nevertheless, regarding eating, its law is like the other skins we have enumerated [Lechem Mishneh].

It is stated regarding an ox that is to be stoned, "and its flesh shall not be eaten." Now, how would it have been possible to eat it after they stoned it, for it is a nevelah? Rather, the verse comes to teach that once its verdict is finalized for stoning, it becomes forbidden and is treated like a non-kosher animal; even if one preceded and slaughtered it with a valid shechitah, it is forbidden for benefit as if it had been stoned. And if one ate a kezayit of its flesh, he is lashed. There are some of our teachers who hold that an ox that is to be stoned is not forbidden for benefit while alive, and if one slaughtered it after its verdict was finalized, it is forbidden only for eating [Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot Zevachim 71a]. When it is stoned, it is forbidden for benefit, and one may not give of its flesh even to dogs; therefore it is stated, "and its flesh shall not be eaten." The dung of an ox that is to be stoned is permitted for benefit, but its hide is forbidden for benefit. One should remain in doubt regarding its bones, its sinews, and its blood as to whether they are forbidden for benefit, for in the Gemara [Bava Kamma 41b] only its hide was mentioned. However, its fat is certainly forbidden for benefit, since its law is like that of a non-kosher animal, and regarding a non-kosher animal there is no distinction between its fat and its flesh, as I wrote in section 17. It appears to me that a half-kezayit from an ox that is to be stoned does not combine with a half-kezayit of nevelah or a non-kosher animal for lashes, since there is a distinct negative commandment regarding an ox that is to be stoned. An ox whose verdict was finalized for stoning and whose witnesses were proved to be zomemim returns to its full status of fitness, and it goes out and grazes in the herd. If this became known after it was stoned, it is permitted for benefit [Keritot 24a].

The Rambam wrote in the fifth chapter of the Laws of Shechitah, law 3: Even though all the terefot are a law given to Moses at Sinai, since you have none explicitly in the Torah except for a drusah, they were more stringent regarding it, and any doubt that arises concerning a drusah is forbidden, whereas the other seven types of terefot include those where their doubt is permitted. Thus far his words. And all the sages of the generations found difficulty with his words: where do we find in the Gemara to be more stringent regarding drusah than other types of terefot? Furthermore, what difference is there between a law given to Moses at Sinai and what is explicit in the Torah? Furthermore, according to the law given to Moses at Sinai, all the terefot are included in this verse as he wrote. And many things were said regarding this [and there are those who raised a difficulty from page 43b: regarding a thorn that lodged in the esophagus, where it asks, "how is it different from a doubt of drusah?" and according to the Rambam, what is the difficulty? And they were pressed in this, but in truth this is no difficulty at all, for the Rambam holds regarding a perforation of the esophagus that it is a nevelah, as he wrote in section 1, and it is not similar to all the terefot, and it is rightly comparable to a doubt of drusah, as the Tevuot Shor wrote].

And behold, even if we find matters where we are lenient regarding other terefot out of doubt, such as a perforation in a place handled by the hand of the butcher, and similarly regarding a lung adjacent to the chest wall where a lesion is found on the chest wall—where we attribute it to the chest wall and not to the lung—and similarly regarding the reticulum where a needle emerged to the outside and no drop of blood was found upon it, where we permit it out of doubt, yet a doubt of derusah is forbidden as the commentators wrote; still, what comparison is there between one and the other? Regarding other terefot, the doubt arose after shechitah, when it stands in a status of permissibility, but in derusah the doubt arose during its lifetime, when it stands in a status of prohibition [the words of the Tosafot 43b, beginning with "He holds," require explanation; and examine this closely].

And it is possible to say regarding his intent that concerning other terefot where the doubt arose during its lifetime, and nevertheless we incline toward leniency, this is not the case regarding a doubt of derusah, which is treated with stringency. We find three laws in this regard where we incline toward leniency even when the doubt arose during its lifetime: The first is regarding an animal that drags its legs; even though it is a great defect, nevertheless we do not assume that the spinal cord was severed, but rather we say it was seized by a tremor, and the Rambam wrote this in chapter 9, law 10. The second is regarding a bird that fell into fire; even though it is a great defect, nevertheless we do not establish a prohibition by saying its internal organs have changed unless we see that their appearance changed after cooking, as is evident from his words at the end of chapter 7, see there [and so wrote the Shach in siman 52, subsection 11]. And the third is regarding a geludah, where the Rambam is lenient in a case of doubt as he wrote in chapter 9, law 7, even though the doubt arose during its lifetime. Yet regarding derusah, they prohibit due to the doubt even though we do not see such a great defect, but only that the predator was among them and remained silent while they cried out, they prohibit due to doubt, as will be explained in siman 57. And in all the matters we enumerated, the defect appears greater, and nevertheless we permit in a case of doubt, only because they were more stringent regarding derusah.

Furthermore, it appears to me that the difference between derusa and other terefot is regarding all the doubts where we are lenient in other terefot, as the commentators have written. And even though in derusa the doubt arose while it was alive, nevertheless, the Rambam ruled in chapter 5 that even for a definite derusa, inspection is effective; see there. If so, even a definite derusa is nothing but a doubtful terefah, for if it were a definite terefah, inspection would not be effective. If so, in a case of doubtful derusa, it is a double doubt: perhaps it did not claw it at all, and if you will say it did claw it, perhaps the venom did not take effect. Therefore, a doubt of derusa that arises while alive is well-compared to other doubts of terefot that arise after shechitah because of the double doubt. And this is not a double doubt of one category, for we must necessarily investigate if it clawed at all, and it is also a reversible double doubt, as is explained in the rules of double doubt in siman 110 [see there in the Shach, note 15]. And even according to the opinion of those who are stringent regarding a double doubt in a place of a presumption of prohibition, nevertheless, it is no more severe than a single doubt that arose after shechitah. Furthermore, the primary view follows the opinion of those who permit a double doubt in a place of a presumption, as I have written there [and the Taz, subsection 1, was pressed on this detail, see there where he wrote regarding a double doubt in other terefot, and if so, they are necessarily not similar, and also regarding his double doubt that he wrote concerning derusa, there is room to deliberate on it, see there; but according to what I have written, that the reason is that a definite derusa is also nothing but a doubt, it is well-settled, and regarding other terefot we do not require a double doubt, and delve into this].

The reason that the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote that we are more stringent regarding derusah because it is explicit in the Torah—the intention is not that it is more severe than a matter that is a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, and Heaven forbid to say so; and furthermore, according to the halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, all of them are included in the verse "treifah you shall not eat," as I have written. Rather, his intention is as follows, in my humble opinion: that from the Torah it is explained that one must be more stringent regarding derusah. For behold, the position of the Rambam is well known, that regarding "a doubt in a Torah matter" of which the Sages said "a doubt in a Torah matter is to be treated stringently," this is a rabbinic decree, for they were stringent, but from the Torah, any doubtful prohibition is suspended leniently, as he wrote in the ninth chapter of Tumat Met and in other places. And behold, all the treifot that were told to Moses at Sinai apply when we see a definite treifah, such as a perforation of the lung, a perforation of the intestines, and similar cases. But when there is a doubt whether they were perforated or not, it is permitted from the Torah, and that which we forbid in many cases of doubt is rabbinic. According to this, how shall we interpret regarding derusah that which the Torah said, "And meat in the field, treifah, you shall not eat," the meaning of which is that it was clawed by a beast of the forest? For if it killed it, it is a nevelah, as I wrote in section 8; and if it tore from it a limb by which it becomes a treifah, such as if it tore its legs from the joint and above and similar cases, it is a treifah because of the missing limb, and what does it matter to me if a wild beast tore it or if it was torn by a thorn? This is not a matter of derusah. Rather, it must be actual derusah, where it is alive and whole. And since the Rambam ruled that even for a definite derusah there is an inspection, and according to this every derusah is only a doubt, if so, why did the Torah forbid it? Perforce, the interpretation of the verse is: "And meat in the field, treifah, you shall not eat" until you inspect it. For it is difficult to say that its interpretation is when it was clawed and they slaughtered it and inspected it and found that the venom took effect, that then you shall not eat it, for in the verse it is written plainly that if it was clawed you shall not eat it until you inspect it. Behold, the Torah itself was more stringent regarding derusah, and the reason is either because derusah is common or for another reason. In any case, it is proven that it was more stringent in this. Therefore, the Sages also saw fit to be more stringent in a doubt of derusah more than in other doubts of treifot. [So it appears to me in my humble opinion].

It appears to me that there is a proof for the words of the Rambam from that which the Amora'im disagree as to whether we are concerned for a doubt of drusah or not [53a], and we rule that we are concerned for a doubt of drusah. It must be understood regarding what they disagree and why they only disagreed regarding a doubt of drusah. However, according to the opinion of the Rambam, it is well-settled; for behold, we rule that a double doubt is permitted, and if so, a doubt of drusah is a double doubt, for even if it was certainly clawed, it is a doubt as I have written. This is the reasoning of the one who holds that we are not concerned for a doubt of drusah. The one who disagrees holds that since a doubt regarding a Torah law is by Torah law lenient, and nevertheless the Torah was stringent regarding this doubt as I have written, therefore we are stringent even in a double doubt just as in every doubt regarding a Torah law where we rule stringently. [And one cannot say that the Torah was stringent due to a presumption of prohibition, as in the case of a suspended guilt offering where the Rambam admits that by Torah law it is stringent as is known, for there it is regarding that same prohibition itself, such as in the case of two pieces, one of chelev and one of fat; but here, regarding the essence of the prohibition of drusah, there is no presumption of prohibition, and the presumption of prohibition that an animal stands in a presumption of prohibition during its life is not relevant to this, obviously; and delve into this]:

Below in siman 50 it will be explained regarding a doubt of treifah where it is impossible to clarify whether it is a treifah or not, if it is a matter where it is possible to attribute it to having occurred after shechitah—such as if a wolf came and took the intestines and returned them perforated—we attribute it and say it was slaughtered with a presumption of permissibility until it is known to you that it was certainly rendered a treifah. However, in a matter that certainly occurred during its lifetime—such as if water was found in the head and it was not known if the brain surrounds it or not—we do not say "once slaughtered, it is permitted," and we forbid it. And there are those who disagree and say that even in this case we say "once slaughtered, it is permitted," and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven.

And I saw one who wrote that if a deficiency arose during its lifetime, this animal has left the general category of "the majority of animals are kosher." He brought a proof from what our sages, of blessed memory, said [at the beginning of the second chapter of Ketubot]: The majority of women are married as virgins, and the majority of those married as virgins have a public report; since this one has no public report, the majority is impaired. So too we should say here: The majority of animals are kosher, and the majority of kosher animals do not have such a deficiency; since this one has such a deficiency, the majority is impaired [Tevu'ot Shor]. In my humble opinion, it is not so, for the Rambam ruled in the second chapter of the Laws of Murderers, law 8, and this is his wording: One who kills a treifah etc. is exempt from human laws, and every person is presumed healthy, and one who kills him is executed until it is known with certainty that this one is a treifah, and the doctors say that this wound has no cure for a person and from it he will die if nothing else kills him. Thus far his words. And the matter is a fortiori: if regarding capital laws we do not say this reasoning—that the majority of people are healthy, and the majority of healthy people do not have a wound, and since this one has a wound the majority is impaired—but rather we say that he is within the general category of the majority of healthy people, and this deficiency of a wound is not a definitive deficiency and we execute because of this, all the more so regarding matters of prohibition and permission we do not say that the deficiency removes it from the general category of the majority. Rather, we say that it is not a definitive deficiency and it is within the general category of the majority. And from that case in Ketubot there is no proof at all, for extracting money is different, as the presumption of possession is great; even for one who does not hold that "we do not follow the majority in monetary matters," nevertheless there is a presumption against the majority. And so too in every place in the Gemara where we say such a reasoning, there is a presumption against the majority. This is not the case here; even if it was not given a presumption of life, such as if twelve months have not yet passed for it, or even if it is more than twelve months, nevertheless it is a presumption that is not clarified, like cheeses made from an animal and afterwards it was slaughtered and found to be a treifah, as will be explained in siman 81. Nevertheless, there is also no presumption for prohibition against the majority. And this is exactly like the ruling of the Rambam, for there too there is no presumption against the majority, unlike there where there is a presumption against the majority. Therefore, it seems clear to me that even for one who holds in siman 50 that when it is not possible to attribute it to having occurred after slaughter we do not say "once slaughtered it stands in its presumption of permission," nevertheless it has not left the general category of "the majority of animals are kosher," but rather it lacks a presumption of permission and it is an evenly balanced doubt. And there we will explain, if God wills, the laws that emerge from this. [And also from Niddah 29a, "Rosh Yehoshua ben Levi said: If she crossed a river and miscarried," there is a proof for our words, see there and look closely.] [And so too there is a proof from what the Taz wrote in siman 39, subsection 10, in the name of the Rashba, and see what I wrote there in section 57].