Siman 286

These are the places that are obligated in mezuzah: both the gates of houses and courtyards. And the gates of provinces, such as the land of Hagar which is surrounded by mountains and forests, and one only exits from it by way of gates (Rashi Yoma 11a). And the gates of cities, as in ancient times when Israel had specific streets, and the streets had gates. And in this time this is not applicable, for we do not have cities specific to ourselves. And also the entrances of houses and the gates of courtyards – specifically those designated for Israel alone. Even those of many people, for a house of partnership is obligated in mezuzah. But a house, that is to say a room in which an Israelite and an idolater dwell together – is exempt from mezuzah according to what our teacher, the Rema, ruled in section 1 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:1), as will be explained. (Government prisons – are exempt from mezuzah.)

This is the wording of our teacher, the Rema: And specifically when the house of the partners is of Israelites. But a house of an Israelite and a star-worshipper—they are exempt from mezuzah. And so too courtyards or cities where some star-worshippers dwell—they are exempt from mezuzah. Thus far his words. And I wonder that he decided the halacha accordingly. For it is true that the Mordechai ruled so at the end of the chapter "Before their festivals," see there. But the Rashba in Chullin (Chullin 135b) wrote explicitly that it is obligated in mezuzah, and so ruled our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book "Bedek HaBayit." And so ruled the Maharshal in "Yam Shel Shlomo" Chullin, chapter "Reshit HaGez" (siman 2). And they infer it from the fact that the Shas says there that a house of partnership is obligated in mezuzah, as it is written: "In order that your days shall increase"—a plural expression. And it asks: If so, why do I need "your house"? For the way of the right. See there. And why did it not say to exclude the partnership of a star-worshipper, as it says there previously regarding several things? And so the Tosafot questioned there. Rather, it is certainly obligated in mezuzah. And the "Yam Shel Shlomo" rejected all the words of the Mordechai there with good reason, see there. Therefore it seems to my humble opinion for the din: Since it is a doubt regarding a Torah commandment in a courtyard where Israelites and a star-worshipper dwell—the courtyard is obligated in mezuzah, unless the star-worshipper does not allow it and uproots it. But we have seen with our own eyes that they allow the fixing of a mezuzah and are not particular. (And behold the Levush and the Taz, subsection 2, wrote that partnership was included from "in order that your days shall increase," and in this case it is not applicable. And these are the words of the Mordechai, and they are astonishing words as the "Yam Shel Shlomo" wrote. And in truth, the Shach, subsection 6, also criticized this and wrote: Because the portion belongs to a star-worshipper, meaning: the Israelite does not have a complete house. And this too is from the Mordechai, and he learned this from nega'im as is explained in "Yam Shel Shlomo." And this too he rejected, see there. But the second reason that the Shach wrote due to danger, that he should not say the Israelite is performing sorcery against him—it is certainly a simple matter. For if the star-worshipper does not allow it, what shall the Israelite do? But in our days we have seen that they allow it. And behold, in a house this law is not applicable now, as it is not common for them to dwell in one room. But in a courtyard it is very common. And one must fix a mezuzah in a courtyard where an Israelite and a star-worshipper dwell. And so one should instruct the halacha in practice, unless the star-worshipper will not allow it.)

The house of a woman or the house of partners is obligated in mezuzah, for women are also obligated in mezuzah, as will be explained in siman 291. And it appears to me that even a room designated for minors alone is obligated in mezuzah, for there is an obligation to train them in this mitzvah, as I wrote there. And there is reason to doubt when an Israelite keeps non-Jewish servants in his house and designates a room for them alone, whether that room is obligated in mezuzah. And it appears that it is obligated, for this is the dwelling of an Israelite for his servants. And it is not similar to one who leases his house to a non-Jew, which is exempt because mezuzah is an obligation of the dweller, as I wrote in siman 291; for there it is not called the dwelling of an Israelite, as a temporary lease is like a sale for several matters. But here, it is the dwelling of an Israelite. And for this reason, it appears to me that even a room designated for minors is obligated by the Torah in mezuzah. (And know that every place where "house" is mentioned, the intention is "room" in our language, for in the language of our sages, of blessed memory, it is so. And every room is a "house" unto itself.)

The obligation of mezuzah is not specifically for a house in which he and the members of his household dwell, and eat and drink and sleep there. For the law is the same if he only uses it for some purpose—it is obligated in mezuzah. Therefore, the sages taught in Yoma (Yoma 11a) that a straw-house, and a cattle-shed, and a wood-house, and a cow-pen, and storage-sheds, and a room, and a cellar where treasures of wine and oil are placed, or other types of fruit, or types of merchandise—are obligated in mezuzah. And the proof for this is: for behold, the Torah obligated gates in mezuzah. And the term "gate" applies only to a courtyard and a street and a city, for in a house it is called a "doorway," as is explained at the beginning of Eruvin. And behold, in courtyards and in streets there is no permanent dwelling but merely walking. And all the more so in these, where there are uses. And even if he does not use it himself there but rather through his non-Jewish servants, nevertheless it is his dwelling, and it is obligated in mezuzah. And a prison is obligated in mezuzah (Yoma 10b).

And specifically a residence of honor, or at least one that is not of disgrace or of filth. But one of disgrace or of filth is exempt, and therefore a bathroom and a bathhouse. And just as the wealthy have a room for bathing where bathtubs stand, and a tannery, and a mikveh house—they are exempt because they are not made for a residence of honor, for it is not the honor of Heaven to have a mezuzah there (see Rashi, Yoma ibid. s.v. mai). And one should not ask: why do we need this reason? For since it is a place of filth and a place of nakedness, is there not a prohibition to bring a holy object there? For it can be said: that if it were because of this, there would be a permission by means of a covering, to cover the mezuzah, just as it is permitted to enter a bathroom with an amulet or with holy books when they are covered, as I wrote in siman 282. And especially mezuzot, which for the most part are wrapped in paper or in iron or in wood, and there is no prohibition for this reason. Therefore, we need the reason that it is not a residence of honor, and the Merciful One did not obligate it in such a case, for we require it to be similar to a house and a gate which are in the manner of honor. And it is not specifically an exemption, for the law is the same that it is forbidden to place a mezuzah there in these places, as it disgraces the honor of Heaven. (See Shach, subsection 11, and this is his intention. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

And know that for this reason we have never been accustomed to make a mezuzah for a cattle shed, even though it is obligated in a mezuzah as I have written. Nevertheless, this was in their days, when the shed was nonetheless clean and the manure did not lie there for a long time, just as they do today in the large cities. But in our places where the stench is great there, and they also go there for their needs—it is obvious that it is exactly like a latrine, and there is a prohibition to make a mezuzah there. And regarding coops where they keep chickens, one must see if the filth is not great there—it is obligated in a mezuzah if they are in a room obligated in a mezuzah. But when there is much filth there—one should not make a mezuzah there. (See Shach subsection 2, and Taz subsection 1. And in their days the filth in a shed was not great, which is not the case in our times. And as the Pitchei Teshuva wrote in subsection 2 in the name of the Ya'avetz.)

And for this reason they said in Yoma ibid. that even a wood-house, a straw-house, and storehouses, if it is the way of women to wash there while they are naked—they are exempt from mezuzah. For since they stand there naked, it is not for the honor of Heaven for a mezuzah to be there. But when they only adorn themselves there—it is obligated. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention that adorning is obligated. And perhaps because it is a simple matter, for since they wrote that only those who wash are exempt, it automatically follows from this that those who adorn are obligated. And it appears to me that it is not specifically women, but rather the same law applies to men if they wash there naked that it is exempt, for it is one and the same reason, as is understood. It is only because it is the way of only women to wash and adorn, therefore they mentioned it thus in the Gemara and the poskim. But the same law applies to men.

And know that that which we wrote, that "a straw-house etc. are obligated in mezuzah" – this is the opinion of the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch. And even though there is a dispute regarding this in the Gemara there, they decided thus for the halacha. However, the Rambam in chapter six, law 7, wrote: A straw-house, a cattle-shed, a wood-shed, a storehouse – are exempt from mezuzah, as it is said: "your house" – your house that is designated for you, excluding these and their like. Therefore, a cattle-shed in which women sit and adorn themselves – is obligated in mezuzah, for it has a designation for human dwelling. Thus far his words. And the Rif also wrote, and this is his wording: And a straw-house, and a cattle-shed, and a wood-shed, and a house where women wash – are exempt from mezuzah. Thus far his words. And this is also like the Rambam. And the Riaz also wrote, and this is his wording: A straw-house etc., if women adorn themselves in them – they are obligated in mezuzah, for they are a dwelling house for those women. But if there are no women adorning themselves in them – they are exempt, for they do not resemble a house designated for human dwelling. Thus far his words. (And so wrote Tosafot, Menachot 44a, end of the heading starting with "Talit".)

And according to this, I wonder at our teacher, the Beit Yosef, for not bringing their opinion at all. And it appears clearly from his words in his great work, where he wrote that the Rif ruled like the Rosh, see there (and so wrote the Bach), and it appears that they did not have the version in the Rif of "and the last house." And therefore, that which he wrote "that the women wash etc." — refers to the preceding. But otherwise they are obligated. And so it is implied from the Rosh, who always transcribed or brought the words of the Rif, and here he wrote: "a straw-house etc. and a wood-house where the women wash etc.", see there. And since the Rif and the Rosh do not hold so, they did not concern themselves with the opinion of the Rambam and the Riaz. But according to our version, it appears in my humble opinion that regarding the matter of the berakhah one should be concerned for their opinion. And behold, in the vast majority of cases the Rambam follows the approach of the Rif, and presumably the version in the Rif before him was also like our version. If so, since berakhot are not indispensable, it appears in my humble opinion to fix a mezuzah without a berakhah. But the whole world has already become accustomed to making a berakhah, and it requires further study.

Regarding that which has been explained, that a place where one bathes is exempt from mezuzah because it is not for the honor of Heaven—this is when this place is permanently for bathing. However, when it is merely incidental, we have no concern with it. Only at the time of the act must one cover the mezuzah if it is without a cover. And a glass cover is not effective regarding nakedness since it is visible, as I wrote in Orach Chaim siman 75. But if a filth of excrement occurred, even a glass cover is effective, as I wrote there (see Taz at the end of subsection 5). Therefore, in the homes of the poor where the infants relieve themselves near the entrance, and especially during the winter season, nevertheless they are unable to exempt themselves from the mezuzah at this entrance; rather, they shall cover it. And among us, all mezuzot are covered with paper or in a case or with glass.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 5 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:5): In a place where there is filth, such as where infants are commonly found—it is good to cover the mezuzah. And in a place of purity—it is good for it to be visible. Thus far his words. And this is as I have written. Nevertheless, they should be careful not to regularly do a filthy thing near the entrance from the outside, such as regularly pouring wastewater, or washing the filthy garments of small children, or urinating there. And certainly not to defecate, for there is no greater disgrace than this, as is understood. And it appears to me that if it is impossible to avoid this—one should fix the mezuzah not within the space of the entrance according to its primary law as I have written in siman 289, but rather on the doorpost toward the inside of the house, adjacent to the space of the entrance, so that the mezuzah will not see the filth. For post facto one fulfills the obligation even in this location according to the opinion of the Tur and our teacher, the Rema, as will be explained there. And it seems to me that such is the custom, and it is proper to do so.

There are some among the poskim who wrote that a room where a man and his wife sleep is exempt from mezuzah. For if bathhouses are exempt, all the more so when there is tashmish hamitah (Mordechai). Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, rejected these words and wrote, this is his wording: And I say that there is no proof from there. For they only exempted where women bathe in a straw-house etc., but an actual dwelling house, even though they bathe there, is obligated in mezuzah. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words appears to me: that when it is not an actual dwelling house but only for general uses, it follows that when they bathe there, the house is called by the name of the bathing. But an actual dwelling house is not called by the name of the bathing. And if it is because they stand naked—they should cover the mezuzah, as I have written that with a cover there is no prohibition.

He further wrote: Moreover, even in those cases they only exempt them because they wash there naked. If so, in a room where a man and his wife sleep, even though they cohabit—they do not stand naked, and it is obligated in a mezuzah. And such is the common practice. Thus far his words. And based on these words, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:2) regarding that which they wash, and this is his wording: And specifically these. But an actual room, even a place where a man and a woman sleep and cohabit there—is obligated in a mezuzah. And there are those who are lenient and say that in any place where women lie—it is exempt from a mezuzah. Thus far his words. And the first opinion is the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef. And also now in all countries they have practiced thus, to place mezuzot in this room. And with us the mezuzot are covered, as I have written. (And also the Shach in subsection 9 concludes thus as the law, see there.)

And I saw one who rejected the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, with this wording: Is being naked more disgraceful than tashmish? Behold, a house that contains tefillin, it is forbidden to perform tashmish until one places them vessel within vessel, and mezuzah is no less than tefillin, etc., and for nakedness a covering alone suffices (Ma'adanei Yom Tov in the laws of mezuzah, chapter 4, letter 46). And it appears explicitly that he holds that even a mezuzah requires vessel within vessel during tashmish hamitah. And so wrote one of the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chaim siman 40 (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 40) that even a mezuzah requires vessel within vessel (Magen Avraham subsection 2). And therefore he required spreading a cloth over the mezuzah, because one requires one vessel that is not designated for this, as is explained there. See there.

And in my humble opinion, these matters are very puzzling. For if so, the Shas and the poskim who required a vessel within a vessel for tefillin and books, why did they not mention mezuzah, which must necessarily be in the room? And also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this law at all, which is a necessity. And should you say that this is why they did not mention it: because in truth this room is exempt from mezuzah according to the opinion of those who exempt it as has been explained (and so wrote the Ma'adanei Yom Tov), this is even more puzzling: for if so, how did the Shas, the Rambam, and the poskim not mention such a great matter which is a necessity, and there is no house that does not have such a room? And they should have explained that a room where a man and his wife dwell is exempt from mezuzah. Rather, it is certainly not so, for since it is a necessity that the Torah decreed to make a mezuzah, and the Torah decreed regarding procreation, certainly there is no need for a vessel within a vessel but only a mere covering. And perhaps even this is not needed, since we were commanded regarding this. And therefore they only mentioned tefillin and books, which do not need to be in this room. And therefore the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, are well-founded. And this is his intention as I have written, and not because being naked is worse, but because this is a necessity according to the law of the Torah, and that is not a necessity. (And the Magen Avraham there inclined the intention of the Taz here in subsection 5, that what he wrote regarding a glass covering is in addition to the spreading of a cloth, see there. And who will not see that the Taz did not intend this. And according to our words it is settled well. And examine and you will find it easy.)

Our teacher, the Rema, further wrote: And it seems to me that in a place where the door is on the inside, and when they sleep there they close the door and the mezuzah is found to be on the outside—it is obligated according to everyone. Thus far his words. And even with a Sefer Torah it is permitted in such a case (the Gra, subsection 5). And I do not know what this comes to teach us? And it seems that it comes to teach us that you should not say that according to the opinion of those who exempt, this room is like a room designated for washing, which is inherently exempt from mezuzah, and if so, even when the door is on the inside it does not require a mezuzah. For it is not so, as they also admit that in such a case it is obligated in mezuzah, and it is not comparable to washing. And if this room has another room further inside it that is not designated for sleeping, and it is certainly obligated in mezuzah, but the hinge placement and the door turn toward it and perforce the mezuzah must be within the space of this room, some say that it is correct to make the mezuzah by fixing it behind the door, and to rely on the Tur in siman 289 (Tur Yoreh Deah 289) (Shach subsection 10 in the name of Ma'adanei Yom Tov). And according to what I wrote in section 15, there is no need for this. And know that in a place where there is concern that they will steal the mezuzah and it will come to disgrace—they should make a hole in the right doorpost and insert the mezuzah there, so that it will not be noticeable from the outside and the wicked will not harm it.

The Torah did not require a mezuzah except for a secular house, meaning one built for human needs, and not a holy dwelling, as it is written: "your house" – and a holy place is not a person's house but the house of Hashem. Therefore, they did not make mezuzot for the Beit HaMikdash at any gate or entrance that was there. Consequently, the Temple Mount, the chambers, and the courtyards are exempt from mezuzah. The Rambam wrote there: All the gates that were in the Mikdash did not have mezuzot, except for the Nicanor gate, those internal to it, and that of the Parhedrin chamber, because this chamber was a dwelling place for the Kohen Gadol during the seven days of separation. Thus far his words. Meaning: since the Nicanor gate and those internal to it opened to the Parhedrin chamber, they were all considered like his dwelling. The obligation exists only during the days of his separation and not the entire year (Kesef Mishneh). And even though the kohanim would eat the most holy sacrifices and meal-offerings in the courtyard, and likewise they would sleep in the Beit HaMoked chamber as we learned in Middot chapter one, nevertheless it is not called their dwelling, rather they merit it from the table of the Most High. And the sleeping was for the sake of the service.

Therefore, even batei knesiot are exempt from mezuzah, for this is a "minor sanctuary," and they are not made for dwelling. Therefore, if there is indeed a dwelling there for any person—it is obligated in mezuzah. And if the dwelling place is in the courtyard before the beit kneset—the courtyard is obligated and the beit kneset is exempt. And the Rambam wrote: A beit kneset of villages, where guests dwell—is obligated in mezuzah. And that of cities, if it contains a dwelling place—it is obligated. And so wrote the Tur. And in the Shulchan Aruch this was not mentioned, because among us, even in villages, guests do not dwell in it. And there is a question regarding this: Granted that guests dwell there, nevertheless, presumably they will not stay thirty days? And it will be explained further on that one who dwells in an inn—is exempt for all thirty days. For it can be said: Since in villages it is made for this purpose, that guests should dwell there, it is in any case like a dwelling house for the city for the sake of guests. And see what I wrote in section 48.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 10 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:10): A beit midrash is exempt from mezuzah. But if it has an entrance through which one is accustomed to exit to his house – it is obligated in mezuzah at that entrance. And some say that a beit midrash is obligated in mezuzah. It is proper to be concerned for their words, but one should not recite a blessing over it. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters: For the Rambam exempts it from mezuzah, for what difference is there between a beit kenesset and a beit midrash? Only when it has a specific entrance to his house which is literally adjacent to it, and the law is the same for a beit kenesset as the Rambam wrote, see there. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, did not mention a beit kenesset because of the "some say" who ruled according to the Yerushalmi that a beit midrash is obligated in mezuzah, because the students sit there all day and it is literally like their dwelling. But regarding a beit kenesset they do not disagree. The great authorities wrote that it is proper that when one fixes a mezuzah for his house and recites a blessing – he should then fix with this blessing, without interruption, for the entrance of the beit midrash, and it is simple (Bach and Shach subsection 9). The Tur wrote that Maharam of Rothenburg did not make a mezuzah for his beit midrash, and when he slept there during the day an evil spirit would terrify him. And when he made a mezuzah the evil spirit ceased, see there. (And in Tosafot Yoma 11b, s.v. "she-ein," they wrote to distinguish between that of the public and that of their own. See there.)

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of the sixth chapter (Rambam, Laws of Tefillin, Mezuzah, and Sefer Torah 6): There are ten conditions in a house, and afterwards the one who dwells in it becomes obligated to make a mezuzah. And if it lacks one condition of them – he is exempt from the mezuzah. And these are they: that it must have four cubits by four cubits or more, and that it must have two mezuzot, and it must have a lintel, and it must have a ceiling, and it must have doors, and the gateway must be ten handbreadths high or more, and the house must be secular, and it must be made for human habitation, and made for honorable habitation, and made for permanent habitation. Thus far his words. And behold, regarding the condition of a ceiling there are those who disagree, for even the gateway of a courtyard does not have a ceiling (Tosafot Menachot 33b, s.v. d'leit). However, the Rosh agreed with the Rambam, for it is not comparable, as a courtyard is not typically ceiled whereas a house is. And so we hold, and such is the opinion of Rashi there. And also regarding what he wrote that there must be doors, they wondered about him: what is the relevance of doors to a mezuzah? And he replied in a response to the sages of Lunel that it is not called a "gate" without doors. And he explains that which they said in Menachot (Menachot 33a): hang the door first and afterwards fix the mezuzah – this refers to doors. And those who disagree say that this is because of the recognition of the hinge, as will be explained. And there is no definitive ruling in this law. And so too regarding the condition he wrote that it must be made for human habitation, and his intention is to exempt a wood-house and storehouses. And it has already been explained that many disagree with him, and that his opinion was not brought in the Shulchan Aruch. And so all of Israel have practiced.

Four amot, how so? The Rambam wrote: A house that does not have four amot by four amot is exempt from mezuzah. And if it contains enough to square four amot by four amot equally, even if it is circular or has five corners, and it goes without saying if its length is greater than its width, since it contains enough to square four amot by four amot—it is obligated in mezuzah. Thus far his words. And the Tur, in the name of the Rosh, disagrees with him, and holds that we specifically require a square, for in any other manner it is not fit for a dwelling. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, decided according to the Rambam in section 13 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:13), and did not bring the opinion of the Rosh at all. However, in truth, there are other early authorities who hold like the Rosh, and therefore one should fix it without a berakhah (Shach, subsection 23), or recite a berakhah over another and intend to fulfill the obligation for this one as well (ibid.). And the measure of four amot according to our measurement in the land of Russia is three arshin, which is one sazhen in the Russian language. And we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 218.

That which he wrote, that it must have two mezuzot and a lintel, will be explained in siman 287 with the help of Heaven. And that which he wrote, that it must have a ceiling, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 14 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:14): A house that has no ceiling is exempt. If part of it was roofed and part of it was not roofed, if the roofing was opposite the entrance, it is obligated in a mezuzah. And this is provided that there is four by four in the roofed area. Thus far his words. And these are also the words of the Rambam. And the same law applies if it is possible to square it to four by four (Shach, subsection 24).

And know that regarding these two laws, where it does not have four amot and it does not have a ceiling, it appears that this is in a single room, or in the doorway through which they exit to the outside. However, if one enters from this room into a large and roofed room, certainly the doorway of the small one, or the one that is not roofed, which enters into the large one or the roofed one—it is obligated in a mezuzah from the perspective of the second room, for which it is a place of exit. And so a certain great authority ruled (see the novellae of the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger, who wrote this regarding the law of four amot, and the same law applies to being roofed). And it is necessary to say so, for remove the small one or the unroofed one from here, and the large, roofed one is obligated in the doorway through which they exit from it or enter into it.

And regarding that which he wrote, that it must have doors, we have already written that many disagree with this. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, decided not in accordance with the Rambam; nevertheless, he brought his opinion in the Shulchan Aruch, section 15 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:15), and this is his wording: A house, even though it does not have doors, is obligated in a mezuzah. And there is one who exempts. Thus far his words. And according to this, it is possible that one should affix it without a blessing. And there is a stringency in this according to the opinion of the Rambam, such as if one affixed the mezuzah before hanging the doors, and afterward hung the doors—according to the Rambam it is invalid because of "make it, and not from that which is already made," since it was affixed before the obligation. But according to the rest of the poskim, it is valid (Levush). And according to this, if he does not yet have doors, what should he do? He should affix the mezuzah without a blessing, and when he hangs the doors, he should remove the mezuzah from its placement and return and affix it (Shach, subsection 25) in order to fulfill the opinion of the Rambam. And consequently, as for a blessing, it is impossible to recite a blessing over it at any time, as is understood.

And that which he wrote, that it must be a height of ten tefachim – it will be explained in siman 287. And that which he wrote, that the house must be secular – it has already been explained. And likewise regarding what he wrote, that it must be made for human habitation – it has already been explained that they disagree with him on this. And that which he wrote, that it must be made for a dignified habitation – it has already been explained. And that which he wrote, that it must be made for a permanent habitation, this is the explanation: to exclude something like a sukkah, which is a temporary habitation only for the festival of Sukkot. This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 11 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286, 11): A sukkah of the festival during the festival, and a house on a ship, and shops in the marketplaces – are exempt. Thus far his words. Because they are a temporary habitation (Shach, subsection 21). And even if they sit there all day, nevertheless, since they do not sit there at night – it is a temporary habitation and they are exempt (Taz, subsection 10). But a shop in his house that opens to the public domain – is certainly obligated in mezuzah (ibid.).

In my humble opinion, the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, and the commentators who wrote the law of shops as halacha, are very perplexing. For this law is from the Rambam there, law 9, who wrote, and this is his wording: The shops in the marketplaces are exempt, because they are not fixed for dwelling. Thus far his words. And his intention is according to his own reasoning, that he requires it to be made for human dwelling, and a storehouse is exempt. But for us, as we hold that it is obligated—behold, a shop is no worse than a storehouse, for merchandise is placed there constantly. And the commentators understood that he exempts it because of a temporary dwelling, but it is not so. And a proof for this is that the Rambam previously (ibid. halacha 9) wrote the law of a sukkah and a ship, and wrote the reason that it is not a permanent dwelling, and this is his wording: "Because they are not made for permanent dwelling." But regarding shops he wrote: "Because they are not fixed for dwelling," meaning for human dwelling, but rather for merchandise. (And regarding the Tur I have no difficulty, because he previously brought the opinion of the Rambam regarding a straw-house as well, and therefore he wrote this according to the Rambam. But in the Shulchan Aruch he did not bring the opinion of the Rambam at all. And in any event, as a matter of law, every shop is obligated in mezuzah.)

And know: that which a sukkah is exempt from mezuzah—this is regarding a sukkah that one only sits in during Sukkot, and not throughout the entire year. However, our sukkot which are made in a room where one dwells throughout the entire year, and during Sukkot they remove the roof and cover it with s'chach, it appears that even during Sukkot it is obligated in mezuzah, for in any event it is a permanent dwelling for the entire year. And so it appears to me regarding that which was said of a house on a ship, this is when they made a temporary house on a ship. But in our ships which have permanent houses, and also in ships that travel on rivers where there is a permanent house in every ship and they call it a "kayuta"—it is obligated in mezuzah, for it is a permanent dwelling. (And regarding the law of a ship, we did not know its source. And the Bach wrote that he found it written that it is a Tosefta, see there. And I searched and did not find it.)

We say in Sukkah (Sukkah 8b): Two booths of potters, one inside the other—the inner one is obligated in mezuzah and the outer one is exempt. Rashi explained: It is the way of potters to make for themselves two booths; in the inner one he dwells and stores his pots, and in the outer one he does his work and brings out his pots to sell. Thus far his words. And it asks: But let the outer one be like a gatehouse for the inner one? And Rashi explained: Which is obligated in mezuzah by rabbinic law? And it answers: Because it is not fixed. And Rashi explained: Neither this one nor that one is a fixed thing, and the inner one is not significant enough to have a gatehouse. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that only regarding the matter of a gatehouse is it exempt, because it is not fixed. However, the inner one, even though it also is not fixed, nevertheless, ultimately he dwells in it all year, and it is obligated in mezuzah. From this it is to be learned that if one has a booth that is a temporary structure, and nevertheless if he dwells in it all the days of the year—it is obligated in mezuzah. And specifically a fixed dwelling. But if he does not dwell in it, even though he does his work in it—it is not called a "dwelling," for Rashi explained that he does his work in the outer one and despite this it is exempt, but only because it is temporary. However, in a fixed building when he does work in it—it is certainly obligated in mezuzah, for it is no worse than a storehouse (so it appears in my humble opinion).

The Rambam there wrote: Two booths of potters, one inside the other—the outer one is exempt from mezuzah because it is not permanent. Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad wrote, and this is his wording: Even the inner one has no permanence. Thus far his words. And his intention is according to the explanation of Rashi. But the Rambam, it appears that he explains that the inner one is permanent, for he did not write "they are not permanent" but rather "it is not permanent," meaning the outer one and not the inner one. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch left their words unspecified, see there. However, I wonder about the Rambam: why does he need this reason? For the Gemara answers this regarding the difficulty of a gatehouse, and the Rambam indeed ruled that a gatehouse is exempt from mezuzah there in law 7, and as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And according to what will be explained in section 33, it works well.

An exedra, which is a place that has three walls and a ceiling, even though it has two posts on the fourth side—is exempt. Because the posts are made to support the ceiling, and not for the sake of mezuzot. But if it has a partition on the fourth side as well, even though it is low or made of many windows—it is obligated. And according to the opinion of the Rambam, specifically when there is a door. And even if it is made of windows on all its sides—it is obligated in a mezuzah when it has mezuzot and a lintel. And according to the Rambam, also a door.

We learn in Yoma (Yoma 11a): It was taught in a baraita: "In your gates" – including the gates of houses, etc. I might think that I should also include a beit shaar, an exedra, and a balcony? The verse states: "house" – just as a house is designated for dwelling, these are excluded as they are not designated for dwelling. See there. And in Menachot (Menachot 33b) it was taught to the contrary: A beit shaar, an exedra, and a balcony – are obligated in mezuzah, see there. And behold, regarding an exedra, the Shas there challenges one against the other, and resolves that here it deals with one lacking a fourth side, for then it is exempt, and in Menachot it is when there is a partition on the fourth side, as I wrote in the previous section. However, the Shas there did not mention the baraita of Yoma, but rather the statement of Rav Hisda that an exedra is exempt from mezuzah, and it challenges from the baraita and resolves as I have written. But regarding a beit shaar and a balcony, it was not mentioned in the Gemara as a contradiction one against the other.

And behold, Rashi there and in Sukkah (Sukkah 8b), and likewise the Tosafot in Menachot and in Yoma there, wrote that by Torah law they are exempt, as we derive from the verse. And the obligation is by rabbinic law, see there. And the Ran in Sukkah there agreed to this because they are open to a place of obligation, see there. And the Rif in the laws of mezuzah answered, and this is his wording: And if it is a difficulty for you etc., there is when the houses are open into it. Thus far his words. And it must be said that his intention is this: that if the beit shaar is in the courtyard, as Rashi explained in Yoma there, and this is his wording: Beit shaar – a small house that they make before the gate of the courtyard etc. Thus far his words – it is exempt from mezuzah. And if the beit shaar is before the house, and open to the house – it is obligated also in the second opening that is toward the outside, besides the place through which they enter it from the house (Tur). And similar to this, the Baal HaMaor answered there, that in one open to the house – it is obligated, and in one open to a courtyard and to an achsadra and a balcony – it is exempt, see there. And the Ran wrote regarding the intention of the Rif that one open to a courtyard is also obligated. And that which he exempts, it is specifically in one open to a garden, which is not a dwelling house. And so wrote the Ramban in the Milchamot, see there. And the Mordechai wrote indeed regarding the intention of the Rif as I have written, see there.

And so it is explained from the words of the Rambam, who wrote: A gatehouse, a portico, a balcony, a garden, and a stable are exempt from mezuzah, because they are not made for dwelling. But if houses that are obligated in mezuzah open into these places, they are obligated in mezuzah. Thus far his words. Behold, he obligates where houses open into it and not for any other thing, and it is known that the Rambam follows the approach of the Rif. Furthermore, the Rambam concluded there, and this is his wording: Therefore, whether the gates of courtyards, the gates of alleys, or the gates of provinces and cities—all are obligated in mezuzah, since houses obligated in mezuzah open into them. Even ten houses, one opening into another, and that one opening into another, since the innermost one is obligated in mezuzah, they are all obligated. And because of this they said: A gate that opens from a garden to a courtyard is obligated in mezuzah. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words: He follows his reasoning regarding a straw-storehouse etc., that anything not for human dwelling is not obligated in a mezuzah. The obligation of the gates of courtyards, and alleyways, and cities is not due to their own obligation, but rather because the houses open into them. That is to say: because one who wishes to enter the house is forced to pass through them. Therefore, a gatehouse, an exedra, and a balcony, and the garden, and the pen—if it is not a necessity that one coming to the house pass through them, such as where the gatehouse stands before the courtyard and it is possible to come to the house not through the gatehouse, such as where there is another entrance in the courtyard—that gatehouse is exempt. And so too the exedra, and the balcony, and the garden, and the pen, if it is a necessity to come to the house through them, they are obligated in a mezuzah. And if not, they are exempt. Therefore, a gate that opens from a garden to a courtyard, that is to say, and there is no other way to come to the house without them, is obligated in a mezuzah (so it appears in my humble opinion regarding his intention). And it appears that he would interpret that which is written, "And you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house and upon your gates"—the intention is the gates through which one enters the house. And it appears that he also understood this to be the intention of the Rif, which is why he made it dependent on houses opening into it, because the source of the obligation is only upon the houses, and consequently also for the places from which one enters the houses.

But most of our teachers did not follow this path; rather, the obligation of the gates is an obligation in its own right. And only a beit shaar and a balcony, which are neither a dwelling nor any functional use—are obligated by rabbinic law (Rashi and Tosafot). And these obligate those that open to a house and to a courtyard, and they only exempted those that open to a garden (Ramban and Ran). And according to the words of those who obligate, they obligate by rabbinic law even the entrance of a garden, if the entrance is made according to its law with two mezuzot and a lintel. And according to the Rambam also a door, for so it is proven in the Shas. And even though the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch mentioned only a beit shaar—the same law applies to all of them. And so agreed all the commentators of the Tur (Beit Yosef, and Bach, and Derisha) and the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch (Shach subsection 16, and Taz subsection 7). And that which they mentioned only a beit shaar is because this is the beginning of the baraitot and the difficulties and the contradictions—they are more from a beit shaar. Because the anonymous voice of the Gemara in Sukkah (Sukkah 8b) takes it as simple that a beit shaar is obligated in a mezuzah. And Rashi and Tosafot hold that by rabbinic law they obligated every entrance, even that of a garden. But regarding an achsadra, the law remains as I wrote in section 30 (siman 286, section 30), because so they said in Menachot there to distinguish between an achsadra that is obligated and one that is exempt, and they did not distinguish as they did with a beit shaar and a balcony. (And with this, everything that the Bach questioned is answered, see there. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

This is the wording of the Tur: A balcony that is a path to ascend to upper stories, and a gatehouse, and a garden—are exempt. And if a house opens to one of these—it is obligated even in the place where one enters it from the public domain, except for the place where one enters it from the house. And Ri explained that a gatehouse is obligated rabbinically, even if no house opens to it. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch in section 7. And it is not specifically a gatehouse, for the same law applies to a balcony and a garden, as I have written. And they further wrote: A gatehouse that opens to a house and to a courtyard is obligated in two mezuzot: one in the place that opens to the house, and one in the place that opens to the courtyard. And a gatehouse standing between a garden and a house is obligated in two mezuzot: one in the place open to the house and one in the place open to the garden. Thus far his words. (And we have already written why they mentioned only a gatehouse. And it further appears to me because a gatehouse is relevant to all of them, but a balcony is always open to a house, for through it one ascends to upper stories. And conversely: a garden is not commonly found such that a house opens to it. Therefore they mentioned a gatehouse, which is common in all manners. But for the law there is no practical difference. And in our countries we are not accustomed to a gatehouse).

And if there are many rooms in a house, one inside the other—all are obligated in mezuzah. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 17: If there are many entrances in a house, open to a courtyard or to the public domain, and they were all made for the entry and exit of the members of the household—all are obligated, even if the residents have decreased such that they are now accustomed to exit and enter through only one of them. Thus far his words. And that which they wrote that many entrances are all obligated in mezuzah—this is no novelty at all. Rather, the novelty is: even though the habit is to enter only through one of them. And so it is explicit in Menachot ibid. And this is what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 18: A house that has many entrances, even though one is not accustomed to exit and enter except through one of them—one is obligated to place a mezuzah on each and every entrance, since they were made for entry and exit. Thus far his words. And now it is common in the houses of the wealthy that there are many entrances, and the primary passage is only through one of them. Nevertheless, all are obligated in mezuzah.

It appears to me that since every opening that is in a house is obligated in a mezuzah, even though one does not exit and enter through this opening regularly as I have written, no nullification is effective for it to nullify it from the status of an opening except by nullifying the doorposts entirely: that he should fix it like a wall or like a window. But a mere blockage, even if he placed a large chest there such that it is impossible to walk through this opening because of the chest, nevertheless it is obligated in a mezuzah. And the proof for this matter is from what our sages, of blessed memory, said in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 12a): A closed house—it has four cubits. If he breached its doorposts—it does not have four cubits. A closed house—it does not defile all its surroundings. If he breached its doorposts—it defiles all its surroundings. And so we hold, as I have written in Choshen Mishpat siman 172. Consequently, for every opening, the status of an opening is not nullified from it until he breaches its doorposts. And here too regarding the law of mezuzah.

The Rambam wrote: A doorway that is between a beit midrash or between a beit kenesset and his house, if he is accustomed to exit and enter through that doorway—it is obligated in a mezuzah. Thus far his words. And the intention is not that we require in every doorway that there be a regular habit of exiting and entering through it, for it has already been explained that all doorways are obligated even though the habit is only to enter through one of them. And the Rambam himself wrote this there previously. Rather, this is the explanation: for a beit midrash and a beit kenesset are exempt from a mezuzah, as I wrote in section 19 (siman 286, section 19). And regarding this he says that a doorway between a beit midrash and his house, if he is accustomed to that doorway—it is like the doorway of his house and is obligated in a mezuzah. And if not—its law is like the doorway of a beit midrash and it is exempt from a mezuzah. And likewise what the Tur wrote: But one who has a small doorway to exit through it alone to his study, and the like, where the members of the household are not accustomed to exit through it—it is exempt. Thus far his words. And the intention is not that a doorway made for one person is not a doorway, but rather in a beit midrash the Tur holds that the law is so: that if only he alone exits through it—it is not the doorway of the house but rather the doorway of the beit midrash, and it is exempt from a mezuzah. (And the dispute of the Rambam and the Tur depends on the explanation of the Gemara in Menachot ibid., regarding the doorway of Rabbi and Rav Huna, see there. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 10 wrote like the Rambam, see there. However, in any event, these laws are only regarding the doorway of a beit midrash. Analyze and you will find it simple.)

The Tur was precise to say: If there are many entrances in the house etc., and they were all made for the entry and exit of the members of the household – all of them are obligated etc. Thus far his words. That is to say: specifically an entrance made for walking is considered an entrance regarding the matter of mezuzah. But an entrance made only to unload burdens through there, and immediately after the unloading of the burden they close it – this is not an entrance, and it is exempt from mezuzah. And this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 18 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286, 18): A cellar that has an entrance from the street, through which they bring in wine in large barrels, and it has a small entrance from the house through which they enter and exit constantly, if the small entrance is fit for a mezuzah (being ten high and four tefachim wide) – it is obligated and the large one is exempt. And if the small one is not fit for a mezuzah – the large one is obligated and the small one is exempt. Thus far his words. That is to say: for the large one is not for walking but rather to bring the wine into it, and afterwards they close it. And this is when the small one has the status of "entrance" upon it. But when it is not an entrance at all, perforce the large one is the entrance for walking as well, and the small one is merely like a hole (and this is the intent of the Shach, subsection 26). However, in our times there are cellars that have two entrances, large and small, and both are made for walking even though for the most part they only walk through one of them. Nevertheless, both are obligated in mezuzah, as I wrote in section 37.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 19 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:19): An aperture between a house and an upper story, where one ascends to it by a ladder, and they make a surrounding partition around the ladder, sometimes below at the feet of the ladder and sometimes above at its head, and it has the form of a doorway in the place where they make it—it is obligated in a mezuzah. And if they made it above and also below—it is obligated in both. Thus far his words. And the Rambam there wrote it in concise language: A small doorway between a house and an upper story—it is obligated in a mezuzah. Thus far his words. And there is no difference whether one ascends to the upper story via an aperture that is in the middle of the roof, as was the custom in the time of the Shas, or whether one ascends to the upper story at the side of the wall, as they custom in this time: if only there is a room surrounding with mezuzot and a lintel and a ceiling, and the doorway is ten tefachim high and ten tefachim wide—it is obligated in a mezuzah. But regarding a doorway where one ascends by a ladder to the roof which they call "boydem," and the door lies on the ground—it is exempt from a mezuzah. And so too in cellars in this manner, as will be explained in siman 287, for a door that lies and fills the doorway—this is not a doorway that is obligated in a mezuzah.

It is stated in the Gemara there: A doorway that is behind the door, if there is a tefach there—it requires another mezuzah. And if not—it does not require another mezuzah. And so it is in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 20 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:20), see there. Rashi explained there, and the commentators labored greatly to understand the intent (see Bach, and Derisha, and Taz subsection 11, and Shach subsection 27). And what appears to my humble opinion is that this is the explanation: that there are two doorways in the corner of this wall, one next to the other, one in the western wall near the north, and one in the north near the west. And in the northwestern corner stands a pillar, and it is the mezuzah for both of them: in the west to the right of the entrance, and in the north to its left. However, there is one room to the north further than this wall, in a manner that one who goes from the north to the room—that pillar becomes the right of the entrance as is understood. And according to this, if these doorways required two mezuzot, both would be on this pillar: this one would be fixed to the western side, and this one to the northern side in the spaces of the doorways as is understood. And there are two doors for these doorways, and when one door is opened—the second doorway is behind the door. And regarding this it says: if the pillar has a thickness of a tefach—it is like two doorways, and requires two mezuzot. And if it is not a thickness of a tefach—one mezuzah counts for here and for there. And even though in one it is not fixed within the space of the doorway—we have no concern with it, as the Tur wrote in siman 289 (Tur Yoreh Deah 289). And in the Rambam I did not find this law.

The Tur wrote: It appears from here that those entrances which are divided, and a pillar is in the middle—one mezuzah is sufficient for them, even if there is a handbreadth in the thickness of the pillar, for one is not obligated in two except when one is to the north and one is to the west. But when the two entrances are on one side, even if there is a handbreadth—it is all considered as one entrance. Thus far his words. And I wonder: why did they not bring this law in the Shulchan Aruch? For our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book agreed to this, see there.

And behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 21 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 286:21) wrote: One opening that was divided by a pillar in the middle, as long as there is the appearance of a hinge on this side and that side toward the pillar—behold they are like two openings, and one requires a mezuzah for each opening. But as long as there are no hinges toward the pillar—the pillar does not divide it into two, for it is nothing but mere decoration. Thus far his words. And it is from a responsum of the Rashba, and ostensibly it disagrees with the ruling of the Tur. But in truth it is not so, for even the Tur only spoke when there is no appearance of a hinge for both of them. But when there is the appearance of a hinge—the Tur admits. And according to this it works out well why he did not write the ruling of the Tur, for since he wrote the ruling of the Rashba—the ruling of the Tur is included automatically (so it appears to me). And see in the next section.

Everything that has been explained applies when the two entrances open as one, such that when this one is opened, that one is opened. But if they are entrances in their own right, as is common to make in the gates of courtyards—a small gate called a "purtel" next to a large gate called a "toier"—which is entirely an entrance in its own right and is completely separated from the large one, they require two mezuzot (Taz, subsection 12, and so it is implied in the Tur). And so is the widespread custom. And this is specifically when there is a separation of at least a tefach between one and the other, for if not so, even the distinction of a hinge is of no avail. And even when each is in its own right, for behold, even on two sides it was explained in section 42 that it is one entrance, and all the more so on one side. And know: there are those gates within which a small door opens in the middle or from the side—certainly the small one is exempt from a mezuzah, for it is not at all an entrance in its own right, and it is like a hole in the gate (it appears to me).

It is stated in the Yerushalmi of Yoma, the first chapter (halacha 1): The "chuldat hamolim" is obligated in a mezuzah, see there. And there is no understanding of this. There is one who explained: a hole that weasels dug in the hills (Korban HaEdah), and there is one who explained: a room where the mohelim store the circumcision instruments (Pnei Moshe). And their words are obviously puzzling. And it seems to me that the text must read "chultat hamolim" with a tet, and "chultat" in the language of the Yerushalmi means "baker," as it is stated in the seventh chapter of Shevi'it (end of halacha 1): Rabbi would command those "chaltorya," do not calculate your wages based on the oil but rather on the wheat. That is to say: he would command the bakers who bake bread with oil, that they should not calculate their wages based on the oil because of Shevi'it, but rather on the wheat, see there. And a "chultar" is a baker, and "chultat" is his room, where he stores the coals. And "molim" in their language means "coals," as it is stated in the chapter "Ein Ma'amidin" (Avodah Zarah 28b): let him bring a kidney etc., and let him place it "a-malla" of the fire. And Rashi explained: on coals, see there. And this is what the Yerushalmi says, "chultat hamolim," meaning: the room where the bakers place the coals, even though it is not used for any other purpose—it is obligated in a mezuzah. And one may learn from this that every room where one keeps any item, even if it is not of importance and one does not go there other than for this—it is obligated in a mezuzah.

It is further stated there: A window that is four by four, and slaves sit there and fan their masters (who sit there and fan with a fan for their masters who sit in the cooled room to bring them wind) – they are obligated in mezuzah, see there. And it is not understood that a window should have an obligation of mezuzah. And if we say that it is a doorway, and "window" is not meant literally – it should have said: ten tefachim in height. And it appears to me that this is the explanation: that this room had no other use and no passage, only that in the windows slaves sat and fanned their masters, nevertheless the doorway is obligated in mezuzah. For even this is called "use" for a room if it is four by four, a significant place that is fit for sitting. And it is similar to the previous law.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said in Menachot (Menachot 44a): One who dwells in an inn is exempt from mezuzah, for it is a temporary dwelling for the guest, who only stays there for a few days. However, if he sits there for thirty days, he is obligated in mezuzah, as it becomes like a permanent dwelling. And it seems to me that this is when the owner of the inn is an idolater. But an Israelite is obligated to place mezuzot in the rooms of the guests, for it is his house for the sake of guests, as I wrote in section 18; see there. And there is no distinction regarding an inn between Eretz Yisrael and outside the Land, as there is a distinction regarding renting, as will be explained in the next section.

It is further stated there: One who rents a house, even from an Israelite, is exempt from mezuzah for all of thirty days, as it is not yet called a "dwelling." In what case are these words said? In the Diaspora. But in the Land of Israel, the renter is obligated immediately in mezuzah. And it was an enactment for the sake of the settlement of the Land of Israel, so that he would be lazy to leave it because of the mezuzah which is forbidden to be removed, as I wrote in siman 291. And there is no difference between renting from an Israelite and renting from an idolater, for if he rented it for more than thirty days, it is like his house and he is obligated in mezuzah. And the law for one who borrows a house is the same as a renter in everything that has been explained. And it seems clear that that which was explained that for thirty days he is exempt, this is when he rented for less than thirty days, or rented without specification. But if he rented it for thirty days, he is obligated immediately, for a rental for a day is a sale regarding several matters, except that less than thirty is called "temporary." But when he rented it for thirty days or more, it is obvious that he is obligated immediately. (And so it appears from the Shach, subsection 28, and so wrote the Chavat Daat in Derech HaChayim. And I saw one who questioned this from the second answer of the Tosafot in Menachot there, that this is rabbinic; see there. I wonder: for what of it? For in any event he is obligated immediately by rabbinic law. And so is the simple custom, and one should not change it. And it is simple that the thirty days must be consecutive, and not like some who are in doubt about this.)