Siman 122

Any forbidden substance that was mixed with a permitted substance and its mixture imparts a flavor for the worse is permitted. All the details of this law have already been explained in siman 103, as well as what is to be asked regarding this, see there. It was also explained there to what extent the permission of imparting a flavor for the worse applies. Now, a pot that is not "of its day" imparts a flavor for the worse. The Tur wrote in siman 121: And what is considered not "of its day"? Rabbeinu Tam explained: Any that a single night passed over it without cooking; even if one cooked in it yesterday evening, immediately in the morning it is not "of its day." But the Ri explained that it must remain for twenty-four hours, and such is the primary view. And if within the twenty-four hours one heated even water alone in it, one must wait twenty-four hours from the cooking of the water. But regarding meat and milk it is not so; if one cooked water alone in it after the cooking of meat and comes to render it fit for milk, one does not need to wait twenty-four hours after the cooking of the water, but rather after the cooking of the meat. Thus far the words of the Tur. And above in siman 103 he did not bring the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam at all, but he wrote it here to teach that post facto, when they performed hagalah on it after it remained overnight, it is called hagalah when it is not "of its day" [Bach], for this explanation deals with hagalah. And know that regarding the law of heating water within twenty-four hours, our teachers the authors of the Shulchan Aruch wrote it in section 4 and in siman 103, and they wrote there: "before a single night passed they heated water in it," see there. And we explained there in section 26 that even though they took as the primary view the opinion of the Ri that one requires twenty-four hours regarding the matter of imparting a foul flavor, nevertheless regarding the cooking of water they were lenient with a single night; see there carefully.

Any pot that is not ben yomo is permitted by the Torah to cook in, and thus the Sages, of blessed memory, said: The Torah only prohibited a pot that is ben yomo. And even though one may not nullify a prohibition lekhatchilah even if it is to the detriment, and there are opinions that hold that by the Torah one may not nullify a prohibition lekhatchilah as was written in siman 99, nevertheless, when his intention is not to nullify the prohibition but rather his intention is to cook in the pot, and consequently that which is absorbed in the pot is nullified within the cooked food, it is permitted by the Torah [Bach]. However, the Rabbis prohibited every pot that is not ben yomo due to a decree, lest one come to use it on its day [end of HaSokher]. And they did not distinguish in the prohibition between metal vessels and wooden vessels which are capable of being purged, and earthenware vessels which have no remedy, unlike some of the great authorities who wished to be lenient regarding earthenware vessels after twenty-four hours [according to the Pitchei Teshuvah in the name of Minchat Yaakov]. And Heaven forbid to say so, and so the ruling has spread throughout all the dispersions of Israel [but from this there is support for what was written in siman 121, section 27, see there and be precise].

And know that there is one who was uncertain whether even in a clay pot in which they cooked a rabbinic prohibition if we also prohibit it when it is not ben yomo or not, since it would be like a decree upon a decree—a decree lest one use it as a ben yomo, and when one uses it, it is still only a rabbinic prohibition [Noda BiYehuda Tinyana, siman 51]. And there is no doubt in this, for the sages did not differentiate. And a proof for this appears to me from what is explained in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch siman 113, that vessels in which they cooked their cooking are prohibited and are permitted through hagalah three times, see there, and they did not permit them when they are not ben yomo, and this is a rabbinic prohibition. And another proof is from what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 115, section 1, and this is his wording: Milk of a non-Jew prohibits vessels in which it was cooked like any other prohibition etc. Thus far his words. And likewise with kavush, it prohibits the vessel as he wrote there, and this is rabbinic, and he did not permit it after twenty-four hours. And there is no doubt in the matter, and such is the simple custom.

There is one who forbids, for just as we say regarding wine of gentiles that after twelve months the vessels are permitted because the absorbed substance is completely finished, as I wrote at the end of siman 135, so too regarding all prohibitions, after twelve months they are permitted because the absorbed substance within them is completely finished [Chacham Tzevi, siman 75]. And granted that one should not permit this ab initio regarding other prohibitions—and only regarding wine of gentiles, where they are forbidden by law for the entire twelve months, is the matter very evident that the permission is because of the twelve months, but regarding other prohibitions where that which is not "of its day" is permitted ex post facto, if we permit after twelve months ab initio, one might come to permit even after "its day" ab initio—nevertheless, regarding chametz on Pesach, where "imparting a foul taste" is forbidden by law and it is like wine of gentiles, one should permit the vessels after twelve months [ibid.]. And there are those who disagree with this, for from where do we have the basis to learn from wine of gentiles for other prohibitions? Perhaps the nature of wine is such. Furthermore, their absorption is through cold. And so it appears to me to be the primary view; for behold, regarding wine they were lenient with the fruit itself as well, such as with the grape seeds and skins which are permitted after twelve months, as I wrote in siman 123. Would we also say such a thing regarding other prohibitions, that after twelve months the taste is finished? This is certainly not so. And if so, regarding vessels as well, one cannot compare one to the other, and we have only that which the sages stated. On the contrary, from the language of the Gemara in Pesachim [30b] which stated, "The Torah testified concerning an earthenware vessel that it never leaves its walls," it implies explicitly that it is not finished at any time. And one cannot say that the Torah testified that it does not come out but in its place it is finished, for it is impossible to say so, since the testimony of the Torah is from the fact that it required breaking for an earthenware vessel in holy offerings, as Rashi explained, see there. And if it should enter your mind that in its place it is finished, it is still difficult: why did it require breaking? And if because of a potential pitfall, this would only be a rabbinic decree. And this is clear proof that regarding an earthenware vessel, this law does not exist. And regarding wine of gentiles, this law applies to all vessels, even earthenware. Therefore, any vessel that was used with heat in a "first vessel" for treifa, or meat, or milk, or chametz, there is no permission for this after twelve months [see the end of tractate Tohorot, where it implies that twelve months is like boiling water, and it requires further study, and examine it closely].

Regarding that which the sages forbade cooking in a pot that is not "of its day," the Tur and Shulchan Aruch wrote, and this is their wording: Even so, the sages forbade cooking in it ab initio as a decree on account of a pot that is "of its day," whether it has absorbed a forbidden substance and one comes to cook a permitted substance in it, or whether it has absorbed milk and one comes to cook meat in it or vice versa. Thus far their words. And the Tur concluded, and this is his wording: For even though the pot became tainted before it reached the state of meat in milk, it is forbidden to cook in it ab initio. Thus far his words. That is to say, even though the prohibition of meat in milk would only be in a tainted state after the twenty-four hour period of the cooking of the meat or the milk, nevertheless the sages forbade it.

There is a question regarding this, for our teacher, the Rema, wrote above in siman 103, section 2: Some say that even though the prohibition is to its detriment and the food is permitted, nevertheless the pot is prohibited, and if one subsequently cooked in it within twenty-four hours a dish in which the first prohibition imparts a flavor to its benefit, it becomes prohibited, etc. Thus far his words. And the Levush explained there that the prohibition is only when one subsequently cooks in it a dish in which the prohibition imparts a flavor to its benefit, see there. And we explained there in section 16, based on the words of the Issur Ve-Heter, that even without this it is prohibited to cook in it even a dish in which the first prohibition imparts a flavor to its detriment, for the reason that perhaps one will cook in it that which imparts a flavor to its benefit, see there. However, in any event, if it were not a reality at all that there would be a dish in which the prohibition would impart a flavor to its benefit, the pot would also not be prohibited, for the sages only prohibited a pot of "imparting a flavor to its detriment" when it had absorbed a flavor to its benefit and subsequently became detrimental, such as when it became not within its day. But if from the beginning it absorbed to its detriment, the law of the pot is like the law of the food. And one must necessarily say so, for the sages explicitly said that they prohibited a pot that is not within its day on account of a pot that is within its day, but otherwise, the law of the food and the pot is one and the same, for everything to its detriment is permitted. If so, when one cooked meat in it, why is it prohibited to cook milk in it after twenty-four hours? Behold, its beginning is to its detriment and it is impossible at all to be to its benefit. However, the answer to this matter is simple: just as they decreed regarding the cooking of a prohibition after twenty-four hours because of a decree lest one cook in it within twenty-four hours, so too they decreed regarding meat and milk. For if you say that after twenty-four hours it is permitted to cook milk in it, he will also come to cook within twenty-four hours. And even though it is not entirely comparable, for regarding a prohibition we rightly fear because it has no permitted use, and they feared lest he cook in it within twenty-four hours, but here, behold it has a permitted use within twenty-four hours, so why would he cook the second species in it? Nevertheless, they feared for this, that he should not distinguish between before twenty-four hours and after twenty-four hours.

There are some among the early authorities who hold that this which they said, that a pot that is not of its day is considered a giver of a flavor that impairs, this is even when the pot is not washed; and even though there is still fat on the walls of the vessel, nevertheless, since it is not actual fat but rather a coating on the surface of the vessel from within, it too becomes impaired after twenty-four hours [the Rashba in Torat HaBayit there in the name of "some say"]. And they wrote that this is also the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 17, see there. However, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 3 wrote that this fact that it is considered impaired when it is not of its day is specifically when the pot is clean and all the prohibited fattiness attached to it has departed from it; but if he did not rinse it well, such that the prohibition is present in substance, it does not become impaired by the passing of twenty-four hours. Thus far their words. Meaning, rather specifically after a long time. And nevertheless, if there is sixty only against that which is attached to the pot, everything is permitted, for that which is in the pot has already become impaired and does not require nullification, and we do not say that the attachment that was not impaired makes that which is absorbed also like that which was not impaired [and the sugya of radish and turnip and beet in Chullin 112a, this opinion would explain it for the reason that an ordinary knife has its fattiness congealed upon its surface; and regarding the bit of asafoetida at the end of Avodah Zarah, the Rashba wrote there in the name of our teacher Yonah that it is because shopkeepers wipe their knives, see there and in the Beit Yosef, and delve into this].

It appears to me that even according to the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, that when it is not washed it is not considered noseit ta'am lifgam, the coating on the surface of the pot from within refers specifically to an actual coating that has fattiness, such as if they roasted very fatty meat in the pot or the like. However, such as our cooked dishes where the primary element is water and groats or potatoes or dumplings and there is little meat in it, and similarly with milk foods, even though the pot is not washed, nevertheless, that which is on the surface of the wall has no substance at all and is almost unfit for eating. Therefore, it should be considered noseit ta'am lifgam after a twenty-four hour period in every case [so it appears to me in my humble opinion, and particularly since according to the opinion of the Rambam and other poskim even a complete coating is considered noseit ta'am lifgam as I have written].

And it has already been explained in siman 95 and siman 96 that regarding sharp items, there is no concept of not-for-improvement for a vessel that is not of its day, because the sharpness makes it for improvement, as is written there. Therefore, if one cooked a sharp food in a pot of forbidden substance that is not of its day—for example, a dish that is mostly vinegar or spices or other sharp things—it is forbidden. However, the dish is not considered sharp because of a small amount of spices in it, and so we practice. But if the forbidden substance was a sharp item, and afterwards the pot remained for twenty-four hours and they cooked permitted food in it that was not sharp, it is permitted, for the first sharpness does not make it for improvement. And similarly, if one cooked a sharp item in a meat pot that was not of its day, and afterwards cooked milk in it, the milk is permitted; and we do not say the sharpness in the pot causes it to now emit for improvement [Shach, subsection 2 in the name of Issur V'Heter]. And the same law applies if one cooked a sharp item in a pot of forbidden substance that was not of its day, and afterwards it remained for twenty-four hours from when the sharp item was cooked in it, it is permitted [ibid.]. And even though the sharp item became forbidden, nevertheless, it does not make the food after it sharp [and the same law would apply if one were cooking the sharp item in a pot of its day, except that in a pot of its day, even with an item that is not sharp, one must wait twenty-four hours after the second cooking because of the "act of a carcass," as I wrote in section 1. And since regarding this law we need the sharp item to inform us that it does not make the dish after it sharp, the Shach correctly spoke of a pot not of its day, and the difficulty of his son in Nekudot HaKesef is answered; see there. And in this there is a greater novelty than in the ruling of the Rema, even though there are two cookings of forbidden substance here—the previous forbidden substance and the sharp item after it—and with this, that which they questioned him "what is he coming to teach us" is answered. And this is what he wrote further: "And similarly if one cooked a sharp item in a meat pot of its day, if they cooked in it after twenty-four hours from when the meat was cooked, even though it is not twenty-four hours from when the sharp item was cooked etc." Thus far his words. Meaning, that regarding meat which is permitted, with a non-sharp item one does not need twenty-four hours except after the first; therefore the novelty regarding the sharp item is that one does not need twenty-four hours except after the first. And in this there is a greater novelty than in the previous law, for even within twenty-four hours the sharp item does not make the cooking after it sharp. And this is why he concludes: "But if there was cooked etc. a forbidden item, even etc. an item that is not sharp etc. we count from the second dish etc." Thus far his words. Meaning, and therefore he was compelled to say in the previous law "after twenty-four hours." And this is the depth of his intention, and everything they wondered about him is answered; and examine this].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 5: A small amount of forbidden substance that was absorbed into a vessel whose typical use is not with a small amount of permitted food such that this would impart flavor into the permitted food that they will use in it—such as a large pot or a barrel and the like—it is permitted to use it ab initio even if it is ben yomo, because it is impossible to come to the point of imparting flavor. However, if it is a vessel used with a small amount, such as a bowl and the like, it is forbidden to use it, for one may not nullify a forbidden substance ab initio, even a small amount of forbidden substance and even an absorbed forbidden substance. Thus far his words. The Tur brought this law in the name of the Rashba and took issue with him, and this is his wording: And it does not seem correct to permit this based on a kal vachomer, for even a pot that is not ben yomo, which is permitted, is forbidden due to a decree when it is ben yomo; certainly regarding that same vessel itself, even though it is not typical to use it with a small amount of permitted food, we must decree lest one use it with a small amount of permitted food. Thus far his words. But the comparison is not equal, for there it is typical to use a ben yomo vessel, therefore we decree regarding one that is not ben yomo on account of one that is ben yomo; but here it is not typical to use it with a small amount of permitted food [Beit Yosef]. Rather, the intent of the Tur is that since we see that the sages decreed in that case, if so, in this case too one should decree on account of a vessel whose typical use is not with abundance [Bach]. However, there is no proof from a decree they made regarding one vessel that is not ben yomo on account of ben yomo that we should decree regarding this vessel on account of another vessel, and at the end of siman 99 we explained it.

However, one must be precise regarding the words of the Rashba, for he himself says that one may not nullify an issur le-khatchilah, and if so, even in its usual manner of being used in abundance, it would also be nullifying an issur le-khatchilah, so how did he permit this? And one must say that when there is not sixty here, it is not called nullifying an issur, but in a vessel that is used for a small amount, there will not be sixty, and if so, it is a complete prohibition, and why did he say that one may not nullify an issur le-khatchilah? Rather, one must say that the intention is that even when they use it in abundance and there will be sixty, it is also nullifying an issur le-khatchilah, and if so, even in its usual manner of being used in abundance, there is also a prohibition. And in truth, above at the end of siman 99, when he brought this law, he did not write with this wording, see there. And one must say that the law that one may not nullify an issur le-khatchilah is in truth only regarding an issur that is present, but regarding an absorbed issur, his intention is not to nullify the issur but rather to cook in the pot, and the absorbed issur is nullified automatically. Rather, this is what he is saying: that since sometimes it is a complete prohibition because they use it even not in abundance and there will not be sixty, and it turns out it has the status of an issur upon it, automatically even in abundance one should not use it, for this is like one who nullifies an issur; that is to say, that he uses it now because now the issur is nullified in more than sixty. This is not the case if its usual manner is always to be used in abundance and it could never come to a state of prohibition; if so, it does not have the status of an issur upon it, and there is no status of nullifying an issur here, since his intention is not to nullify it but rather to cook in it.

It further appears that this is what he meant: that something which lacks importance, such as a prohibited substance absorbed in a vessel that is incapable of reaching less than sixty, does not possess the status of a prohibited substance at all. It is not relevant to say regarding this that "one may not nullify a prohibited substance lechatchila," for in such a case we find this even regarding a prohibited substance in its physical form at the end of Terumot, where we learned in a Mishnah: A storehouse from which one cleared terumah, we do not obligate him to sit and gather one by one; rather, he sweeps in his usual manner and places chullin into it. And similarly, a barrel of terumah oil that spilled, we do not obligate him to sit and dab, but rather etc., see there. And the reason is because there is no importance to this at all, and all the more so regarding an absorbed prohibited substance in such a case. And it is true that the Rambam, of blessed memory, has another approach regarding terumah and holds that even regarding cooking there is no need for hagalah, and this is among the leniencies they applied to terumah and one does not learn from this for other prohibited substances. And so he replied to the sages of Lunel, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his book Kesef Mishneh at the end of the Laws of Terumot, see there. But all the Rishonim did not agree with him in this; rather, the reason is because there is no importance in this at all, as I have written. And so wrote the Rashba in a Responsum, siman 222, see there. And regarding the essence of this law for the final ruling, we have explained it with the help of Heaven at the end of siman 99, see there.

It is a matter agreed upon by all the poskim that the status of their vessels is that they are not ben yomo, except for the Rambam who does not hold this way, as I wrote at the beginning of siman 112, see there. The Tur wrote the reason for this matter is because it is a double doubt: perhaps they were not used today, and if you say they were used today, perhaps they were used for something that impairs the taste, and since it is a double doubt, we lean toward leniency. Several of the Rishonim also wrote this reason. According to this, the status of our vessels is also that they are not ben yomo for this reason. Indeed, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote so in section 7, and this is his wording: Just as the status of their vessels is that they are not ben yomo, so too the status of our vessels is the presumption that they are not ben yomo. Thus far his words. And perhaps you will ask: if so, why did they explicitly say "the status of their vessels is the presumption that they are not ben yomo" and did not say simply "the status of vessels is that they are not ben yomo"? One could say that regarding our vessels, one should not rely on this unless the homeowner is not in his house; but when he is in his house, one can ask him, and if he did not ask, it is proper to penalize him and be stringent and say that it is ben yomo [Mordechai, chapter "All Forbidden Stuffs," in the Shiltei HaGiborim in the name of the Maharam]. However, some say another reason, that this reason applies only to their vessels because such is their custom, that they rinse their vessels well, and a vessel in which they cooked today they will not cook in until tomorrow [ibid.]. [See the Turei Zahav, subsection 4, who wrote in the name of the Darkhei Moshe that the penalty is only for the owner of the vessel, for he should have known, and not for another; and in my humble opinion, it seems that also for another, when the owners are in their house and he could have asked them, the penalty also applies, as I wrote].

Therefore, if one transgressed and used their vessels before the kashering, the cooked food is permitted. However, if one heated water in their vessel to knead dough with them and the like, it is forbidden to knead with that water, for regarding this matter it is called le-khatchilah, since he has not yet begun his benefit, as he has not yet kneaded with them. For if he had heated the water for drinking as it is, it would certainly be bedi'avad, since he already heated it; but this heating was for the kneading, and he has not yet kneaded. And so too in any similar case. Furthermore, even when the gentile heated the water for himself for drinking and an Israelite buys it from him, it is also permitted le-khatchilah, for since it was already done by their hand, it is called bedi'avad, like all the things that the sages permitted to buy from them even though they were cooked in their vessels. And the permission is by reason of them not being ben yomo according to most poskims [like bread, oil, capers, hot water, and leeks in the chapter "Ein Ma'amidin," and all of them are by reason of not being ben yomo; see the Beit Yosef].

And even though they permitted it ex post facto, and also initially to buy from them because this too is like ex post facto since it has already been made, nevertheless it is forbidden for an Israelite to say to him initially, "Cook vegetables for me in your pot," and likewise he should not say to him, "Make a preserve for me," for anyone who says "cook for me" is as if he is cooking with his own hands initially. However, that which we wrote regarding a preserve, if he is a professional apothecary, it is permitted initially to tell them to make it because they have vessels specifically designated for preserves and they do not cook cooked foods in them. And likewise all types of crafts such as the confectioners and all types of honey and candies, for all of these they have designated vessels. And also regarding their cooking there is no concern, for behold all of these are eaten as they are raw, and such is the common custom, and as I wrote in siman 113, see there. This is the wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch at the end of section 6: For all craftsmen designate clean vessels for their work so as not to spoil their craft; and a person of soul should be concerned, for these things lead to purity and cleanliness. Thus far his words. For any non-kosher food dulls the heart [Perisha]; meaning, even though according to the essential law we can rely on this that they have designated vessels, nevertheless it is proper for the person of soul to distance himself from this, for perhaps it is not so, and it dulls the heart. And according to this, in our times, when all the apothecaries and those who make confections and candies, there is no doubt at all in the matter if they have designated vessels, for it is a clear matter that they have designated vessels. And according to this, even a person of soul does not need to distance himself from this [so it appears to me].

Some say that this rule, that unspecified vessels of theirs are not ben yomo, means that one is not required to ask them; however, if one did ask them, he should be concerned for his words [Rashal]. And there are those who disagree on this [Taz and Shach subsection 4 in the name of the Ralbach]. However, in truth, there is no general rule in this, and everything is according to the matter. If he understands that they cooked in it today, or if according to the estimation this homeowner is not wealthy enough to rotate his vessels, or if it is toward evening when it is certainly probable that they cooked in it today, it is a complete prohibition even if he did not tell him that it is ben yomo. In all our days, we have not heard to rely on this leniency, and it shall not be done in Israel to eat even that which is permitted from their vessels based on this assumption that they are not ben yomo. And all the more so regarding coffee houses, where they drink with milk at all hours, and they are certainly ben yomo. But tea is permitted to drink, for everyone has specific vessels for this.

The Tur wrote in the name of the Rashba: A vessel that was forbidden through the absorption of a forbidden substance, which became mixed with others and is not recognizable, is nullified by a majority. Even though it is possible to perform hagalah upon it and return it to its fitness through this, we do not judge it as a davar she-yesh lo matirin to forbid them all until he performs hagalah upon them; rather, it is like a dry forbidden substance that mixed with a dry permitted substance and is nullified by a majority. For anything whose permission does not come on its own, and one must spend his money and incur expenses, is not included in the category of that which has permission. Thus far his words. And certainly regarding earthenware vessels, for which hagalah is not effective. And such is the law regarding a meat vessel that was mixed with those of milk, or those of milk with those of meat [Bach]. And this law has already been explained in siman 102; see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9 that one must be careful not to leave dining vessels in the house of a non-Jew, as we fear perhaps he will use them. Thus far his words. It is clear from his wording that only ab initio one must be concerned for this, but post facto, if he transgressed and left them, it is of no consequence. And so it appears from what he wrote in section 10: Bowls that an Israelite sent to a non-Jew with food and they remained there, if the food that the Israelite sent in them is recognizable, they are permitted; and if not, they are forbidden if they are accustomed to rinse the vessels with hot water, for we fear perhaps they were rinsed in a forbidden vessel. Thus far his words. That is to say, if they are accustomed to rinse with hot water of a kli rishon. And seemingly, why does he need this reason? Let it be derived that they are forbidden because perhaps the non-Jew used them for forbidden food. Rather, it is because this concern is only ab initio, but the concern of rinsing with hot water applies even post facto, as there is a basis for the matter since it is clean and not soiled [Pri Chadash subsection 8].

However, one must be precise regarding the concern of rinsing with his vessels; for did he not rule above in siman 95, section 3, that meat bowls that were rinsed in a milky cauldron are permitted when there is no fat stuck to them, because it is nat bar nat? And it must be said that here, regarding a prohibited substance, nat bar nat is not applicable, or because typically their vessels after eating have fat stuck to them, or for both reasons together; therefore it is prohibited even bediavad. But if there is a doubt whether perhaps he rinsed them together in a kli sheni, it is permitted bediavad.

And there is further proof from what he wrote below in siman 136, that one who sends vessels designated for wine via a Cuthite must seal them, and post facto he did not forbid them when he sent them without a seal, as he wrote there in his great work; see there. And so he wrote here in his great work in the name of the Ra'ah, and this is his wording: Pots or bowls that remained in the house of a Cuthite, one lets them stand for twenty-four hours and they are permitted. Thus far his words. And here too his intention is to let them stand for twenty-four hours, but he was brief in the Shulchan Aruch according to his custom ibid., for certainly one must let them stand for twenty-four hours so that it will be at least "to its detriment," and this is effective even if they remained in the house of the Cuthite for a long time [ibid. and Shach subsection 8]. And there are those who wish to be stringent in this even post facto [Bach and Taz], but it does not seem correct to forbid post facto due to a mere concern. And certainly ab initio it is forbidden to do so and to rely on letting them stand for twenty-four hours, but post facto it is permitted. And even if the Israelite cooked in it on the same day that he took it from the Cuthite, one should not forbid the food post facto, and we do not establish a flaw to say that he cooked in it or poured boiling liquid into it [as is implied in the Shach, see there]. And know that all this is only regarding vessels such as pots and large bowls where there is a concern of cooking or pouring from a first vessel, but regarding plates and spoons and forks and knives, where the usage is in a second vessel, and certainly regarding things whose usage is with cold items, one rinses them and they are permitted [ibid.].

And our teacher, the Rema, also holds this way, as he wrote, and this is his wording: And even if he gave it to a craftsman to repair it, he must make a mark on them so that the idolater does not use them [this is when he gave it only for a general repair, but if he gave it to be plated with tin, we do not fear use, for the craftsman wants it to appear as new]. And if he transgressed and did not do so, when he returns and takes them from the idolater, they require hagalah; and specifically if they remained for a bit with the idolater, that is, about half a day, but for a short time there is no concern. And all this is when he wants to use it on the day he gave it to him, for there is only a single doubt whether the idolater used it or not; but if he did not take it from the idolater until after some time, such that we can say even if he used it, it has already become spoiled and twenty-four hours have passed, or it remained in the hand of the Israelite for twenty-four hours after he took it from the Cuthite, we follow the lenient view and are not concerned after the fact. And if he took it from the idolater on the same day he gave it to him and transgressed and used it without hagalah, some forbid the food as with a vessel that is certainly within its day, and in a case of need one may be lenient after the fact. And initially one should be careful in every matter, even with male and female servants in the house of the Israelite, not to leave our vessels alone with them lest they use them for forbidden matters. Thus far his words. And now we are not careful about this because the Israelite is always going out and coming in, and it is permitted even initially [Shach subsection 9 and Pri Chadash]. And milk vessels that remained in the hand of the idolater, certainly there is no concern after the fact, for there is no concern of a Torah prohibition in this in any way, as is understood [meaning, vessels in which they set milk].

They further wrote in section 11: Regarding dining vessels in the possession of a cuthean, if he speaks according to his innocence and says they are new, and it appears as he says, it is permitted to purchase them from him. There are those who are stringent and say that he is not trusted, and one should not take vessels from him except when he sells many vessels and one buys a vessel from among the vessels; and so we conduct ourselves ab initio. However, in a case of pressing need, such as if one stayed as a guest in his house and has no vessels, we conduct ourselves according to the first opinion, and such is the primary ruling. Thus far their words. They further wrote that there is one who says that bowls coming from across the sea, which have greenish or reddish indentations, it is forbidden to ever use them with hot food, because they are not new, for they are used and it is not recognizable. Thus far their words. And it appears to me that all this is only regarding a householder who sells, but regarding a cuthean shopkeeper who sells, there is no concern at all, for for the most part, a shopkeeper sells new items, and we do not have to concern ourselves that perhaps he put them to use.