Siman 11

One may always slaughter, whether by day or by night. In what case does this apply? When there is a torch opposite him, which is two candles braided together, or even if they are not braided but the fire connects from one to the other such that their light is great, or thin pieces of wood. However, if there is no torch opposite him, or by day in a dark place, he should not slaughter ab initio, for we concern ourselves that perhaps he will not slaughter the majority of the simanim [Rashi 13b], and we do not rely on what he will see afterward in a place of light, for perhaps he will forget. And all the more so at night, one may not rely on the examination of the day, as there is an additional concern that perhaps they will expand through struggling; and even though this is a remote concern, as written in siman 25, nevertheless there is some concern in this. There is also some concern that he might press down or bury the knife and not sense it [Rashba]. Nevertheless, ex post facto, we do not concern ourselves with all this when he says, "It is clear to me that I did not press down and I did not bury," because in truth even in the dark one can sense this, and only ab initio do we concern ourselves with this. And all the more so when there was one candle, even a small one, or by the light of the moon, there is no concern ex post facto. But ab initio, it is certainly forbidden to slaughter by the light of the moon, since the sages of blessed memory required a torch, and it is obvious that its light is not comparable even to the light of one candle, and all the more so to the light of a torch [and there are those who are uncertain about this, but I do not know the basis for the doubt]. And for these reasons, a blind person also does not slaughter ab initio, as written in siman 1.

If one began to slaughter by the light of a torch and it was extinguished, he shall finish the slaughter and not pause, for a pause during part of the act renders it prohibited [Tevuat Shor]. And similarly, if one began to slaughter without a torch and remembered in the middle of the slaughter, he shall not pause and shall finish the slaughter [ibid.]. And there is one who says that if the candle was extinguished in the middle of slaughter, there is concern that he was startled and committed a pause [Pitchei Teshuvah in the name of Shevut Yaakov]. But I do not know from where he derives to be concerned for this, and we are not to decree decrees from our own minds; therefore, if he says "it is clear to me that I did not pause," the slaughter is kosher.

The Rambam wrote [at the end of chapter 1]: One who slaughters on Yom Kippur or on Shabbat unintentionally, even though if he had been intentional he would have incurred a capital obligation or incurred lashes for Yom Kippur, his slaughtering is valid. Thus far his words. And it is explicitly clarified that if intentional, his slaughtering is forbidden. The explanation of this is in his commentary on the Mishnah in the first chapter of Chullin: that even though he is only disqualified after the slaughtering, nevertheless, from the moment he slaughters a portion of the simanim he is desecrating Shabbat, and at the time he completes the slaughtering, he is disqualified. See there. It is clarified from this that his opinion is that through one desecration of Shabbat he becomes a transgressor and his slaughtering is forbidden. This is not like what was written in siman 2, section 16, that the Rambam holds that desecration of Shabbat is similar to other transgressions, where his slaughtering is not forbidden unless he is habituated to transgressing several times; see there. According to this, we would need to press the intent of his words in several places; see there. Nevertheless, it requires investigation, for behold, he explained this matter explicitly there, that only in public is he called a transgressor. If so, even if intentional, he should have permitted it when he slaughtered in private. It appears to me that this is included in what he wrote, "that if he had been intentional he would have incurred a capital obligation or lashes," and it is known that this is only through forewarning, and this is like being in public. Therefore, he explained this to teach us that if it was not in public, even if intentional it is valid, and if unintentional, even though he performed it before many people, it is permitted because he is unintentional [and with this it can be said why the Mishnah required this, and delve into it]. And in Orach Chaim siman 318 it was explained when it is permitted for eating; see there.

The Tur wrote: One who slaughters on Shabbat or on Yom Kippur, even though if he were intentional on Shabbat he would be liable for his life and would be lashed on Yom Kippur, his slaughtering is valid. Thus far his words. And so it is in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2. And there are those who explained his intent like that which the Rambam wrote, that specifically when unintentional is it permitted [Beit Yosef]. And there are those who explained that the opinion of the Tur is to permit even when intentional [Bach], since he did not write "one who slaughters unintentionally," and this is the explanation: One who slaughters on Shabbat and Yom Kippur, it is valid whether unintentional or intentional; and even though if it were intentional he would be liable for his life, nevertheless his slaughtering is valid, for during the first slaughtering he has not yet become a transgressor. And this is the opinion of the Tosafot, the Rashba, and the Ran, as was written in siman 2; see there. [However, according to this, the language is not precise, and it should have said "even though it was intentional" and not "that if he were intentional." Nevertheless, the opinion of the Derisha is also like the Bach, see there, and such is the opinion of the Shach and the Taz; and they hold that since it is all one act, he has not yet become a transgressor, and not like the reasoning of the Rambam, of blessed memory. And see the Tevuot Shor who agrees with the explanation of the Beit Yosef].

There are some among the great authorities who investigated, according to what Rava said at the beginning of Temurah, that any matter which the Merciful One said "do not do," if one did it, it is not effective—shall we say also regarding one who slaughters on Shabbat or Yom Kippur, if he did it, it is not effective, and it should be like mere stabbing and not be a slaughtering at all? They offered several resolutions for this. And it appears to me that this is not a matter of "if one did it, it is not effective" at all, for here, even if we consider it as stabbing, there is in this a desecration of Shabbat just as with slaughtering, and there is no benefit in this regarding the transgression; if so, what does it matter to me if we call it slaughtering or stabbing? Furthermore, it appears that any act performed through a prohibition where the act cannot be reversed to be as it was before the act, "if one did it, it is not effective" does not apply to it, for it is necessarily effective since it is impossible to return it to its original state. And we learn this from the slaughtering of the Pesach offering over chametz, as it is found in the Yerushalmi Pesachim [Chapter 5, Halacha 4] that the Pesach is valid, for it is written, "You shall not slaughter the blood of My sacrifice over chametz"—the Torah called it "My sacrifice," see there. Behold, the Torah revealed that regarding slaughtering, as long as the prohibition is not in the essence of the slaughtering, it is called slaughtering and is valid. And from this we learn also for one who slaughters on Shabbat [and therefore the Tosafot in Temurah there did not raise a difficulty from one who slaughters on Shabbat, for since they raised a difficulty from one who slaughters the Pesach over chametz and resolved it as I wrote, we automatically learn for all slaughterings where the prohibition is incidental].

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote [at the beginning of chapter 2]: In any place it is permitted to slaughter except for the azarah, for one may only slaughter sacrificial offerings of the altar in the azarah; however, it is forbidden to slaughter chullin in the azarah, whether domestic animal, wild animal, or bird. Thus far his words. From the silence of his words, it is implied that even in this time the law is so, for he follows his reasoning at the end of chapter 6 of the Laws of the Chosen House, that the sanctity of the Temple was sanctified for its time and sanctified for the future to come; see there. And it appears that according to those who hold that now the sanctity of the Temple is nullified, if one slaughtered chullin in this time in the place of the azarah, it is not forbidden, and it requires further study.

He further wrote: One who slaughters chullin in the Azarah, that meat is tahor but forbidden for benefit like meat and milk and the like, and we bury it and its ash is forbidden, even if he slaughtered for medicine or to feed to dogs. But one who stabs in the Azarah, or one who uproots, or a gentile who slaughtered, or one who slaughters and it is found to be treifah, or one who slaughters an impure beast, animal, or bird in the Azarah—all of these are permitted for benefit. Thus far his words. And the reason is that chullin slaughtered in the Azarah is derived from the verse, "When the place is too far from you... then you shall slaughter of your cattle," etc., meaning at a distance from the place you may slaughter, but not in proximity to the place [Kiddushin 57b]. Consequently, only a valid shechitah is forbidden, and all of these are not considered shechitah. [The Kesef Mishneh raised a difficulty, that it is R. Shimon who permits benefit from the shechitah of a treifah in the Azarah, while the Sages forbid it [ibid. 55a], so why did he rule like R. Shimon? See there. And it appears to me his reason is because we say in Chullin [85a] that Rabbi saw the words of R. Shimon regarding covering the blood, that a shechitah that is not fit is not called shechitah, and they taught it in the language of the Sages. And he explains there the reason of R. Shimon because it is written "which may be eaten," see there. And here too, regarding chullin in the Azarah, it is written "you shall eat in your gates," and it is an anonymous Mishnah and a dispute in a Baraita, and the halachah follows the anonymous Mishnah].

He further wrote: And not only a domestic animal or a wild animal, but it is forbidden to bring any chullin into the azarah, even the meat of a slaughtered animal, or fruits and bread; and if one transgressed and brought them in, they are permitted for eating as they were. All these matters are words of tradition. And anyone who slaughters chullin in the azarah, or who eats a kezayit of the meat of chullin that was slaughtered in the azarah, is given makkot mardut. Thus far his words. And the fact that one does not receive full malkot for this is not because their prohibition is rabbinic, for he derived it from a verse, "and you shall slaughter" in a distant place and not in a nearby place, as he himself wrote previously; rather, it is because it is a negative commandment derived from a positive commandment, for which one does not receive malkot [and so it appears from the Mishneh LaMelech in chapter 5 of Yesodei HaTorah, see there]. However, regarding that which is forbidden for benefit, he explained explicitly in chapter 16 of Ma'achalot Assurot, law 6, that the prohibition of benefit from chullin slaughtered in the azarah is rabbinic, see there [and even though in Kiddushin ibid. it excludes it from "it," yet in Pesachim 22 it is explained that this is according to Rabbi Meir and not according to Rabbi Yehuda, for words are as they are written, and he ruled in chapter 10 of Avodat Kochavim like Rabbi Yehuda, see there. And the opinion of the Tosafot in several places is that there is no prohibition of bringing chullin into the azarah except for something that is similar to an offering. And see the Mishneh LaMelech who elaborated on this. And see the Lechem Mishneh who raised a difficulty: since he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, if so, from where do we know that chullin slaughtered in the azarah is from the Torah? And his words are puzzling, for the primary prohibition we learned from the verse "if it be far," as I wrote, and the prohibition of benefit is rabbinic because he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, as I wrote; and delve into this].

He further wrote: One who says, "This animal is a shelamim and its offspring is chullin," if it was slaughtered in the azarah, its offspring is permitted for eating because he cannot slaughter it in a distant place. Thus far his words. Meaning, we do not say that since the offspring is permitted through the slaughter of the mother, as written in siman 13, we should consider it as if the offspring of chullin was slaughtered in the azarah and it should be forbidden; for since it is impossible to slaughter the animal in a distant place, as it would be shichutei chutz, we do not apply to it "if the place be too far from you" [and this is the Gemara in Temurah 11a]. However, in the opposite case, where he consecrated the offspring in its womb and the animal is chullin—and the sanctity of the offspring takes effect even while it is inside the animal, for we establish that the offspring of kodashim are holy in their mother's womb—and he slaughtered the animal inside, it appears that the offspring is also forbidden due to the slaughter of chullin in the azarah. For in this case we do apply to it "if the place be too far from you," and he is not liable for shichutei chutz as is stated there in the Gemara. And since he is not liable for shichutei chutz, it follows that he is liable for the slaughter of chullin in the azarah [and it appears to me that this is why the Gemara there did not inquire regarding a case where she is chullin and her offspring is shelamim with respect to chullin in the azarah, but rather with respect to shichutei chutz, see there; because this is dependent on that, as I have written, see there].

One may not slaughter into seas or rivers, lest they say he is a worshiper of water and it appears as if he is sacrificing to the water [the Rambam], or so that they do not say he is slaughtering to the prince of the sea [the Tur]. And he shall not slaughter into a vessel full of water, so that they do not say he slaughtered to the form reflected in the water; therefore, if the water is murky it is permitted, as there is no form here, and the prohibition is only when the water is clear. However, into empty vessels he shall not slaughter, so that they do not say he is collecting the blood to sprinkle it to the stars; but when he places earth in the vessel it is permitted, as the matter is recognizable that it is not fit for sprinkling. And so too with clear water, when he places earth into the water, it automatically follows that they are not clear and it is permitted. But in seas and rivers there is no distinction between a clear place and a murky place [the Taz and the Shach], for the suspicion is toward the prince of the sea, and there is no distinction between murky and clear. But it is permitted to slaughter on the roof of a house or on the prow of a ship, and we are not concerned that they will say he is slaughtering to the heavenly host, for it is not the way of their worshipers to ascend to a high place, and therefore there is no suspicion in this.

It appears to me that just as it is forbidden to slaughter into seas and rivers, so too it is forbidden into wells and springs. For even though the reason "lest they say he is slaughtering to the prince of the sea" is not relevant here, nevertheless, regarding the first reason, "lest they say he is a worshiper of water," there is no difference. Furthermore, there is an image here, and they will say he is slaughtering to the image seen in the water [see the Tevuot Shor, and his words require further study, for this is only according to the Tur, but according to the Rambam it is forbidden as I have written, and also because of the image as I have written].

Due to the prohibition that has been explained, that one may not slaughter into vessels, one must prohibit what they practiced in some places where they receive the blood at the time of slaughter in order to sell it to a non-Jew. And even though they do this at the time of the conclusion of the slaughter, nevertheless it must be prohibited since it is the law of the Gemara and it is an explicit Mishnah; it must be prohibited in every case. Therefore, they should see to it that the non-Jew receives the blood in the vessel and not the Israelite. And there is one who prohibits taking a high price for the blood due to the prohibition of trading in forbidden items, which will be explained in siman 117. But it does not seem so to me, for the prohibition is only regarding something designated for food, as is written there, and most nations do not eat blood plainly as a person's soul is repulsed by them. And it is not for their own eating that they take the blood, as is known.

If one was traveling on a ship and does not have a clear space to perform shechitah, he may perform shechitah on the back of a vessel where a portion of it protrudes into the sea, and he performs shechitah upon it and the blood flows and descends into the sea. Since he is not performing shechitah directly into the sea, and he is also not performing shechitah into the vessel, there is no suspicion in this. And the same law applies that he may place a board on the side of the ship where a portion of it is over the sea and perform shechitah upon it and the blood flows into the sea [Tevu'ot Shor]. Or, he may extend his hand outside the ship and perform shechitah on the side of the ship from the outside, and from there it flows into the sea. There is one who permits, in the case of the back of vessels that have an interior, to perform shechitah into the interior of the back, for it was only forbidden into the interior of the vessel's front and not the back of the vessel [Shach, subsection 5]. And there are those who disagree on this [Tevu'ot Shor, subsection 17] for the reason that we find regarding impurity that this too is considered an interior. But it is not definitive, for certainly regarding service it is not the way of reception on the back of the vessel, and regarding consecrated items it is obvious that the blood must be received in the interior of the front. Similarly, regarding impurity, there is a distinction between the back and the interior, as is explained in chapter 25 of Kelim [and the Pri Chadash also agreed with the Shach, and so it appears from the Kereti U'Peleti].

And know that the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory [13b], is that on the top of a roof one may slaughter even into a vessel, for the reason that everyone knows it is impossible for him to soil the roof, and there is no suspicion here. And similarly, on the prow of a ship, one may slaughter directly into the sea, for everyone knows it is impossible for him to soil his ship. And that which the sages, of blessed memory, said [41b]—that one who travels in a ship extends his hand outside the ship as we have written—this refers to one standing inside the ship and not on the prow of the ship [Bach]. And the reason is that inside the ship one is not afraid if he extends his hand outside the ship over the sides of the ship, whereas on the prow of the ship one is afraid to stand literally at the edge of the ship [it appears to me]. And many of our teachers disagree on this and hold that even on a roof it was not permitted into a vessel, and similarly on the prow of a ship it was not permitted to slaughter directly into the water. And all the permissions that were explained are only in a case of pressing need, but when it is not a case of pressing need, he should slaughter only in a manner where the blood flows onto the ground; and see what I have written in siman 12.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: Some shohetim are careful not to slaughter any goose in Tevet and Shevat unless they eat from its heart, because they have a tradition that there is one hour in those months that if one slaughters the goose, the shohet will die if he does not eat from it; and they are accustomed to eat from the heart. Thus far his words. And some wrote from the liver, and some wrote from the feet [Shach], and some from the fat [Kereti U-Peleti]. And in truth, one should not be particular about this, and "you shall be wholehearted with Hashem" [ibid.]. And that which he wrote of this custom was because in his days they practiced sorcery with geese, until many then abstained from eating geese; but in these days of ours, one should not be particular at all [ibid.].