Siman 109

It has already been explained in siman 98, section 26, that regarding a dry substance mixed with a dry substance, according to the Torah, it is nullified by a majority, and we do not require twice as much of the permitted substance; rather, if the permitted substance is only slightly greater, the forbidden substance is nullified by it. And according to the Torah, there is no difference between a species mixed with its own species and a species mixed with a different species, though some disagree on this, see there. Furthermore, a liquid substance mixed with a liquid substance of its own species is nullified by a majority according to the Torah. According to the plain meaning of the Gemara in Menachot [22b], we derive this from the blood of the bull and the goat, which do not nullify one another because they ascend to the altar; however, were it not for this, since they are of the same species, the smaller amount of the goat's blood would be nullified by the greater amount of the bull's blood. The Semag wrote likewise in Prohibition 138, and the Rashba wrote likewise in Torat HaBayit, see there in section 28.

However, Rashi, Tosafot, and the Rosh wrote that we derive this from "follow after the majority," and the Rosh added that the forbidden substance is transformed into a permitted substance. We analyzed there what the matter of "follow after the majority" entails, for there we rely on saying that this is from the majority; but that the forbidden substance should be nullified and transformed into a permitted substance, from where do we have this? We explained there in section 31 that we learned this very thing from the verse, "And he shall take from the blood of the bull and from the blood of the goat," for this extra "and from the blood" is superfluous, as it should have written "and he shall take from the blood of the bull and the goat." Rather, it comes to teach that the blood of the goat is not nullified in the blood of the bull because they ascend to the altar. And it is difficult: why do we need a derivation for this? From where would we have said it should be nullified if not from the verse "follow after the majority"? Behold, it is explicit that the verse of "after the majority" also applies to the matter of the nullification of a forbidden substance in a permitted one; see there.

And consequently, since we derive this from the verse "follow the majority," there is no longer a distinction in a dry mixture between its own kind and a different kind. And that which is said regarding a liquid mixture applies only to its own kind, because a liquid of a different kind imparts flavor, and "flavor is like the substance itself" is a Torah prohibition. But in a dry mixture where there is no imparting of flavor, there is no distinction between its own kind and a different kind. And according to this, it can be said that the "some who disagree" in section 1, who hold that even a dry-in-dry mixture is only nullified in its own kind, hold that we learned this only from the verse regarding the blood of the bull and the goat and not from "follow the majority"; and there it was only a kind with its own kind, and we have no derivation for a different kind. [And one should not ask: behold, the "some who disagree" are the Tosafot in Pesachim 44a, and the Tosafot in Avodah Zarah 67a wrote the reason of "follow the majority"? As is known there, the authors of the Tosafot are many, and the Tosafot there is the latter, the son-in-law of the Smag, and the Tosafot in Pesachim is from our teacher Shimshon, as is known].

And behold, since according to the opinion of the Rosh we say that the forbidden substance is transformed into a permitted substance when it is the minority, if so, it appears all the more so that the permitted substance is transformed into a forbidden substance when it is the minority. For example, if a kezayit of fat was mixed into two kezayim of chelev, the law of all of them is like complete chelev based on the verse "after the majority," for if we say so regarding a permitted status, all the more so regarding a forbidden status. And this is not a matter of wonder that we should say the permitted substance is transformed into a forbidden substance, for regarding the matter of lashes for "taste is like the substance," we say so according to the system of the Rosh and the Tur, that one requires a kezayit within the time of eating a half-loaf, and one is lashed for every kezayit within it because the permitted substance is transformed into a forbidden substance. Only the Rambam does not hold so, as I wrote in siman 98, section 12, see there. And if so, here too it is so [and the Rambam perhaps also here would not hold like the Rosh].

However, I have seen in the name of one of the great authorities that we do not say that the permitted substance is transformed to become forbidden, and he did not explain the reason [Pri Megadim in the conclusion to Ta'aruvot in the name of Minchat Kohen]. And it is a wonder, from where does he have this to say so? And perhaps this can be learned from that which the Torah obligated an asham talui in the case of two pieces, one of chelev and one of fat, and he ate one of them. And it is certainly forced to say that the Torah only obligated an asham talui when both are equal, and not when one is larger than the other. And certainly, even when one is large and one is small, the Torah also obligated an asham talui. And behold, if we say that the minority is always transformed to the majority, how do you find a case of asham talui? For either way: if the fat is larger than the chelev, the chelev is transformed to become fat and it is completely permitted; and if the chelev is larger than the fat, the fat is transformed to become chelev and he is liable for a chatat and not an asham talui. Rather, certainly, since the Torah obligated an asham talui, it proves from this that we do not say that the permitted substance is transformed to become forbidden [And there is room to reject this, for even if it were so, ultimately there is a doubt, and therefore he brings an asham talui just as in the case of one piece that is a doubt of chelev or a doubt of fat, according to the one who holds in Keritot that he is liable for an asham talui because of the doubt].

However, even without this, one must be very precise regarding the matter of asham talui according to this principle that the forbidden is transformed into the permitted; and even without this, only since dry in dry is nullified by Torah law in a majority, if so, regarding two pieces, one of chelev and one of fat, one large and one small, and he ate the small one, why should he be liable for an asham talui? For whichever way you look at it: if the small one is the fat, he has surely eaten the permitted, and if the large one is the fat, surely the small one is nullified in the majority and it too is permitted. And we found in the Responsa of the Rashba [siman 272] that he was asked regarding something similar to this and he replied to it, and this is his wording: Also regarding what you questioned from that which is in Keritot regarding two pieces, one of chelev and one of fat, and it deals with dry matter, and if he ate the first one he is liable for an asham talui—the forbidden should be nullified in the majority of the permitted and he should be exempt; and you returned to find an answer and you found only when we say that there it is with equal pieces. And I wondered, for whichever way you look at it: if the pieces are recognizable, which is chelev and which is fat, the forbidden is not nullified, and if he ate it he is liable for a chatat, and if he ate the permitted he is not liable for anything; and if they are not recognizable, perhaps the large one was the forbidden, and when he ate the first one, perhaps it was the forbidden, whether he ate the large one or whether he ate the small one, or perhaps the permitted came into his hand, and that is why he brings an asham talui. Thus far his words. And the answer is not understood at all [according to the Pri Megadim in the introduction to Ta'aruvot and in the Novellae of the Gara"ch in Yoreh Deah siman 105].

And there is one who explained his intention to mean that the permitted becomes forbidden when it is smaller than the forbidden, and therefore there is a doubt whether the large one is the forbidden or if he is liable also for the small one, and if the small one is the forbidden it becomes permitted and he is exempt for both of them, and this is the doubt, and therefore he is liable for an asham talui [as is implied from the Pri Megadim there]. But this is not implied from his words at all. Furthermore, it appears to me that the Rashba does not hold at all of this rule that the forbidden becomes permitted, since he forbids eating all of them as one, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And if the forbidden becomes permitted, it would certainly be permitted to eat all of them as one, as the Rosh wrote that the forbidden becomes permitted and it is permitted to eat all of them as one, see there. And if so, since the Rashba forbids it, it proves that he does not hold so. And consequently, he also does not hold that the permitted becomes forbidden, for according to the Rosh, even if there is a logic that the permitted becomes forbidden we do not say so, all the more so according to the Rashba, as is understood [and in section 11 this will be explained].

And there is one who explained his intention that the reason is because it is a majority that is not clarified. For certainly, if the mixture was a piece of forbidden matter in two pieces of permitted matter, there is here a clarified majority, as we knew clearly that there are here two of permitted matter, but the forbidden matter was mixed among them. However, with a large one and a small one, we still do not know if there is here a majority of permitted matter, for perhaps the large one is the forbidden matter; and since the majority is not clarified, it is not called a majority, as we explained in siman 108, section 60, see there [the Gara"a]. And should you say, ultimately, if he ate the small one there is no sacrifice here regardless, for if it is of the permitted matter, it is permitted, and if it is of the forbidden matter, the large one is of the permitted matter and the small one was nullified in the majority—since there is no clarified majority, as we do not know with clarity that there is a majority of permitted matter, for perhaps the large one is of the forbidden matter, it follows that there is no nullification in the majority, and the small one also remains in doubt whether it is forbidden or permitted. Therefore, he brings an asham talui whether for the small one or for the large one. And according to this, we can also say for the Rosh that just as he holds that the forbidden matter is transformed to become permitted matter, so too the permitted matter is transformed to become forbidden matter. And that which he brings an asham talui is because it is a majority that is not clarified whether the large one is the permitted one and the small one was transformed from forbidden to permitted, or the large one is the forbidden one and the small one was transformed from permitted to forbidden, and it follows that there is a doubt regarding both of them.

However, according to the Rosh, of blessed memory, who holds that the forbidden substance is transformed into being permitted, a great question must be asked: for in Bekhorot [23a] we say that a kezayit of nevelah that was mixed with two kezayitim of slaughtered meat is pure from being defiled by contact because the nevelah is nullified in the majority, and nevertheless, regarding carrying, it defiles, see there. And if it enters your mind that the forbidden substance is transformed into being permitted, behold, the nevelah is literally like slaughtered meat, and why does it defile by carrying? And behold, the Tosafot also asked there why regarding eating it is nullified in the majority and regarding carrying it is not nullified, and they answered that regarding eating, every minute amount as it enters the gullet is nullified bit by bit in the majority of permitted substance, and it is similar to the impurity of contact when one touched and then touched again, where it is pure; but carrying, where one carries all of it at once, is impure, see there. However, in any event, it is heard from their words that they do not hold like the Rosh, for according to the Rosh, of blessed memory, that the forbidden substance is transformed into being permitted, behold, this is not necessary, since all of it is permitted. And even if we say that it is by rabbinic decree that it defiles by carrying, nevertheless, if it enters your mind like the Rosh, why did the rabbis decree in this case? For behold, it is completely permitted, just as the Rosh holds that one is permitted to eat them all as one.

It appears to me that according to the Rosh, it must be said that the prohibition is always transformed into permission, and only regarding tumah [is it different] because we maintain that tumah that was nullified returns and is reawakened when it finds its own kind, and we say "it found its kind and was reawakened," as we say there [22a]: One who purchases brine from an am ha'aretz which contains a minority of water and a majority of brine, or a majority of water and a minority of brine—and it says there that he may connect it to water [via hashakah] and it is tahor in any case: if it is a majority of water, hashakah is effective, and if it is a majority of brine, brine does not contract tumah. And if it is because of that minority of water which contracts tumah and for which hashakah is not effective, since the majority is brine, that minority of water is nullified in the majority of brine and does not contract tumah. And it says there: They only taught this regarding dipping bread into them, but to put it into a pot of water is forbidden, because the water in the brine finds the water in the pot and they join together and become the majority over the brine and make it tamei, because regarding tumah we say "it found its kind and was reawakened," see there. Therefore, the rabbis decreed regarding nevelah as well to be tamei through carrying, even though the prohibition was transformed into permission, because regarding tumah it returns and is reawakened. And if these three olive-bulks were to be mixed with another two olive-bulks of nevelah, the olive-bulk of nevelah within the three olive-bulks would join with the two olive-bulks of nevelah and return and be reawakened, and they would become the majority over the two olive-bulks of slaughtered meat. Therefore, the rabbis decreed regarding the tumah of carrying. But regarding the prohibition of eating, we do not find in a dry-in-dry mixture that it returns and is reawakened according to the Torah; only in a mixture of different kinds in a liquid-in-liquid mixture do we say it returns and is reawakened because it imparts flavor, but not in a dry-in-dry mixture, as is proven from his words in the chapter HaSoker, siman 28, see there. And see what I wrote above in siman 99. And that which will be explained, that regarding a prohibition it returns and is reawakened in a dry mixture, this is rabbinic, as I wrote in section 22, see there.

And behold, we have already written in section 5 that there is one who says that we do not say "permitted becomes forbidden," and we wondered about this, see there. And in my humble opinion, we do say "permitted becomes forbidden" just as we say "forbidden becomes permitted" according to the Rosh. And there is a clear proof for this from that which is found in Menachot [23a], where one says a carcass is nullified in slaughtered meat, meaning that a carcass is nullified in two pieces of slaughtered meat and does not transmit impurity; and one says the opposite, that one piece of slaughtered meat is nullified in two pieces of carcasses regarding the matter that all of them transmit definite impurity and not doubtful impurity, see there. And their dispute is whether we follow the nullifier or the nullified, see there. However, in any case, it is explicit that the slaughtered meat becomes a carcass; behold, it is explicit that permitted becomes forbidden. And one cannot say that we only say this regarding the matter of impurity and not regarding the matter of prohibition, for in this there is no logical reason to distinguish between them. And therefore, the Sages, of blessed memory, were precise regarding a guilt offering for uncertainty to say specifically "a piece from two pieces," for "a piece from three pieces" is not found; for if two are of fat and one is of forbidden fat, the forbidden becomes permitted and he is exempt, and if two are of forbidden fat and one is of fat, the permitted becomes forbidden and behold, he is liable for a sin offering. And on the contrary, I say that even according to the one who does not hold that forbidden becomes permitted, nevertheless we say permitted becomes forbidden, and it requires further study.

And behold, this is the opinion of most of the poskim, that dry in dry is nullified by a majority even according to rabbinic law. And even though the Ra'avad does not hold this way, and so it appears from the words of the Rambam at the beginning of the fifteenth chapter, who wrote, and this is his wording: Even a piece of nevelah that was mixed with two pieces of slaughtered meat, everything is permitted from the Torah, but from the words of the scribes everything is forbidden until the forbidden item is lost due to the greatness of its minority, etc., see there. And also from the words of Rashi [Bava Metzia 52a] it appears so, as he explained regarding that which we say there, that ma'aser is nullified by a majority, meaning by an abundance, which is sixty. And as the Ra'avad wrote regarding that which we say in Chullin regarding a piece of nevelah, that it should be nullified by a majority [100a], that it is by an abundance of sixty. And their reasoning appears to be that since from the Torah even liquid in liquid of the same kind is nullified by a majority, and nevertheless according to rabbinic law sixty is required, there is no longer a distinction between liquid and dry, for if they were to cook them together it would impart flavor. Nevertheless, our teachers the authors of the Tosafot [ibid.] and all the poskim hold that even according to rabbinic law sixty is not required for dry in dry of the same kind. And in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch the opinion of those who are stringent in this was not brought at all, and thus we rule. [And know that I wrote the opinion of Rashi based on the words of the Beit Yosef, but before us this is not found in Rashi; on the contrary, from his words at the beginning of Beitzah [3b] and Zevachim [72a] the opposite is implied, that he holds it is nullified by a majority, see there].

The Tur wrote that it seemingly appears there is no difference whether it was mixed with its own kind or with a different kind, such as when it was separated into thin pieces where one is not recognizable from the other. However, the Baal HaTerumot wrote specifically when it was mixed with its own kind, but a kind with a different kind, even dry in dry, requires sixty, since if one cooks them it will impart flavor. Thus far his words. And like this opinion, our teachers the authors of the Shulchan Aruch ruled without qualification, that with a different kind even in dry it requires sixty. And the general rule is that anywhere it can lead to a Torah prohibition, such as with a different kind where if one cooks them it will impart flavor, and "flavor is like the substance" is a Torah principle, they decreed even in dry in dry. This is not the case with a kind in its own kind, where it is impossible to lead to a Torah prohibition, for even liquid in liquid is nullified by the Torah by a majority; therefore, they were not stringent in dry in dry [Beit Yosef in the name of the Ran, see there]. And on the contrary, there are those whose words imply that with a different kind even by the Torah it requires sixty even in dry, as was written in section 1 and in siman 98, see there. And their reasoning can be said to be that what the Torah said, "follow the majority," is only regarding a matter where it is impossible to come to "flavor is like the substance," like all majorities in monetary laws and capital laws, and this is a kind in its own kind. But a different kind is not included in this rule, but rather in the rule of "flavor is like the substance," meaning that there can be flavor when cooking them together or eating them together, and see there in section 15.

According to the reason that has been explained, that the sages were stringent regarding dry-in-dry of a different species because it is possible to come to a Torah prohibition, if so, regarding a rabbinic prohibition in dry-in-dry, even a different species is nullified by a majority, for it is impossible to come to a Torah prohibition. And thus ruled the great later authorities [Shach, subsection 9 and Pri Chadash, subsection 7]. However, from the words of our teacher, the Rema, it does not appear so, for he wrote in section 1 that there is no difference in all this between whether the prohibition is rabbinic or from the Torah. Thus far his words. And there are those who wished to press his words to say they do not refer to this law, but it does not seem so at all, for this law of a different species he explained adjacent to this, and his opinion appears explicitly that they did not distinguish in these laws between rabbinic and Torah prohibitions because not everyone is expert in this. And so there are some of the great authorities who ruled accordingly [see Pri Megadim there in the name of Minchat Yaakov and Torat Chatat]. And in a case of great loss, it is possible to rely on the opinion of those who are lenient [ibid.], but not in a case of great loss one should not be lenient, for the author of the Issur Ve-Hetter [rule 53, section 8] wrote another reason regarding a different species in a dry state: because it is called "a thing that has a remedy," as one can somewhat recognize the forbidden item and remove it. Thus far his words. And according to this, there is no difference between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition [and a spoiled taste, even in a Torah prohibition, is rabbinic; and see Pri Megadim there].

And know that there are those who say that dry in dry of a different species is not nullified by a majority according to the Torah, and also does not require sixty according to the Torah; rather, the measure is a kezait within the time of eating a pras. This means that if the forbidden substance was mixed into the permitted substance to such an extent that one would eat a kezait of the forbidden substance within the time of eating a pras of the mixture, it is forbidden according to the Torah, and less than this is permitted according to the Torah. And this is implied in the discussion of the Gemara in Pesachim [45a] that a kezait within the time of eating a pras is according to the Torah in a different species [Yam Shel Shelomo, Perek Gid HaNasheh, siman 47, and Pleiti]. However, rabbinically, it certainly requires sixty as I have written. And even though, seemingly, according to the reason that was explained—that if one cooks them it will impart flavor—sixty should not be required since the water would also join to make sixty, nevertheless, they did not differentiate in this, since it is not known to us now how much water there will be. Furthermore, perhaps one will cook them without water or the like; therefore, sixty is required in every case [vessels that were mixed are like dry in dry].

And there is a question regarding this: how can we say regarding different species in a dry-in-dry mixture that when one cooks them it will lead to a Torah prohibition? For since from the Torah it was already nullified and the forbidden substance was transformed into permitted substance, if so, what taste of prohibition could there be in this? For it is entirely permitted from the Torah [Taz, subsection 2]. And it is similar to what was explained in siman 98, section 36, regarding a case where a species was mixed with its own species and with a different species, where we say we view the different species as if it were not there, and its own species increases over it and nullifies it. And even though perforce the different species receives taste, nevertheless, since its own species increases over it, there is no prohibition here and there is no imparting of taste from a forbidden substance at all, as was written there. And here too it is the same. And one could say that there, the taste of the forbidden substance is not sensed on its own, for there is also the permitted substance of its own species, and both of them impart taste into the different species; whereas here, the entire taste is from the forbidden substance alone [ibid.]. But this is not sufficient, for still, what is the difference? Ultimately, there is no prohibition here at all. And also there, perforce the different species does not have the power to nullify the taste of the forbidden substance, for if it were not so, the permitted substance of its own species would not be necessary. Therefore, it appears to me to distinguish that there we are dealing with cooking, where it already imparted taste, and it is only because we say that its own species increases over it and nullifies it and removes the different species as if it were not there. But here, in a dry-in-dry mixture without cooking, where there was not yet any imparting of taste at all, but rather the nullification is because of the majority, if so, when one cooks them, a different prohibition will be renewed, and that is the imparting of taste, and this prohibition was not nullified at all.

There is one who says that since nullification is only applicable in a place where the forbidden substance is not discernible, but when the forbidden substance is discernible it cannot be nullified, therefore dry in dry of a different species, which is nullified in sixty, is only in a place where it is impossible to ascertain the taste. But where it is possible to ascertain the taste, such as a piece permeated with milk that became forbidden and was mixed with other pieces, or a dairy vessel that was mixed with other meat vessels, for in these it is possible to ascertain the taste of the forbidden substance by means of the tasting of a kapila, this has no nullification [Pri Chadash, subsection 7]. And these words are a wonder, for it has already been explained in siman 69, section 84, regarding meat that was cooked without salting and that piece was mixed with other pieces, that it is nullified in a majority because it is like species in its own species, see there. For although in this case it is not similar, and here sixty is required since being permeated with milk makes it like species in a different species—and there it is also like a different species, and the fact that it is nullified in a majority is because blood that was cooked is Rabbinic, as written there—nonetheless, if it should enter your mind that because it is possible to taste it has no nullification at all, behold, there too they are able to taste. Rather, it is certain that what is possible to taste is not called "discernible forbidden substance." Furthermore, behold, we do not rely upon the tasting of a kapila, and therefore it is certainly nullified in sixty [and so wrote the Pri Megadim in Shiftei Da'at, subsection 9]. And similarly, what he wrote regarding vessels has already been explained in siman 122, that vessels among vessels are like species in its own species and are nullified in a majority.

The Tur wrote that dry-in-dry of the same species, which is nullified by a majority, is permitted for one person to eat all of them together even though he is certainly eating the forbidden item. And similarly, it is permitted to eat each and every one individually, and it is not necessary to cast away one corresponding to the forbidden item. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Rosh, that the forbidden item is transformed into a permitted item, and therefore it is permitted to eat them all together since there is no prohibition here at all. And similarly, it is permitted to eat each one individually, meaning, that you should not say that this is worse, as we say regarding consecrated items where unblemished animals were mixed with blemished ones, where it is only permitted to offer them two by two [Zevachim 77b], but not one by one, for with two it can be said that since one is certainly permitted, the second is also permitted [Rashi]. And I would have said here as well that, on the contrary, he should only eat them two by two; he comes to teach us that since the forbidden item is transformed into a permitted item, he may eat them in any manner he desires [this appears to be his intent, and see Bach]. And also, it is not necessary to cast away one, for we find regarding certain prohibitions, such as terumah that was mixed with chullin, that even though it is nullified, one must nevertheless cast away one from the mixture; he comes to teach us that here it is not necessary, for there it is because of the theft from the tribe, which is not the case with other prohibitions [Beit Yosef].

But the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that it is forbidden to eat them all as one, rather he must eat them one by one. This is his wording: A piece of nevelah that is not fit to be honored which was mixed with others, dry within dry, it is nullified even one within two, and there is not even a rabbinic prohibition here. And they were lenient in this matter because each one stands on its own and he eats each one on its own; and since it was nullified by a majority according to Torah law and there is no Torah prohibition here, when he eats one I say this is the permitted one, and so too with each and every one. And even with the last one, I say that which was eaten first was the prohibited one and it has already gone, and this one is the permitted one. This is not the case with things that are combined. Therefore, he may not eat them all as one and he may not cook them all as one. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words is that it must be understood: since min be-mino is nullified according to the Torah by a majority, whether in liquid-in-liquid or dry-in-dry, if so, what did the sages see to be stringent in liquid-in-liquid to require sixty and to be lenient in dry-in-dry? To this he answered that in dry-in-dry, I say regarding each piece that this one is of the permitted, which is not the case for things included as liquid-in-liquid, where in every part there is also some of the forbidden; therefore they required sixty. In any event, we learn from his words that he does not hold of the reasoning of the Rosh, of blessed memory, that the forbidden is transformed into the permitted, but rather that we follow the majority and say that each one is from the majority. For if we say the forbidden is transformed into the permitted, what relevance is there to attribute to each one that it is of the permitted? Behold, it is entirely permitted. And one should not ask according to the opinion of the Rosh, if so, why were they stringent in liquid-in-liquid to require sixty? For the reason is simple: since in min be-eino mino in such a case it imparts flavor, they were therefore also stringent in min be-mino in such a case. And know that there is one who wrote that even according to the Rashba there is no prohibition except to eat the entire mixture together, but two of them he may eat together even if the mixture is only one in two [Shach, subsection 7]. But it does not imply such from his wording, and so wrote one of the Rishonim explicitly, that to eat the majority is forbidden because we attribute that the forbidden is located within the majority [Shitah Mekubetzet, Beitzah 3b].

And there are some of our teachers who are even more stringent in this, that even when eating them one by one, one person may not eat the entire mixture [Semag], and there are those who are uncertain regarding this [Tosafot Chullin 100a, starting with the words "Beriyah"]. And it appears that they do not hold like the Rosh that the forbidden substance is transformed into a permitted one, for if they held so, there would be no room for these stringencies. And this is the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 1, who wrote that it is permitted to eat them one by one, each one by itself, but he should not eat all three of them together; and there is one who forbids one person from eating them even one after the other, and so one should act ab initio; and there are those who are stringent to cast one away or to give it to a non-Jew, and it is nothing but a mere stringency. Thus far their words. And we have already explained the reason, and the words of the Rosh and the Tur did not bring this at all. And know that there are prohibitions where when one of them is lost or fell into the sea, they all become permitted, and this is only in a mixture of a double doubt, as will be explained in siman 110, and this law is not applicable here. And this stringency, that there are those who are stringent, was established based on this matter, and therefore they wrote that it is nothing but a mere stringency, for according to the law of nullification by a majority, either this thing is not necessary or it is not effective at all. Nevertheless, according to this stringency, if they cast one of them away, one person may eat them all, and even all at once [even according to the Rashba, the Semag, and the Shulchan Aruch, and examine this].

The Tur further wrote: and if one cooked the mixture after it was nullified by a majority, the Rashba wrote that each one is permitted individually, but the broth is subject to the rule of imparting flavor, requiring sixty against the forbidden substance. My father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, made a distinction in this and wrote that if its mixture was not known before they were nullified, one requires sixty against the forbidden substance; but if its mixture was known before it was cooked, even the broth is entirely permitted, just like the pieces that were mixed. And if after it was nullified by a majority, more was added to the forbidden substance, it becomes forbidden again. Thus far his words. And they follow their respective positions: for according to the Rashba, the forbidden substance does not transform into a permitted substance, and therefore he forbids the broth through the imparting of flavor; and according to the Rosh, since the forbidden substance transforms into a permitted substance, there is no forbidden substance here at all, and therefore the broth is permitted. Only if it was not known beforehand, then by the time it was cooked the forbidden substance had not yet been nullified, and therefore one requires sixty, for knowledge causes the nullification; for even regarding the prohibition of "the piece itself becomes forbidden," knowledge causes it, as is written in siman 99, section 33, and certainly regarding permission, for without knowledge there is no nullification here. And likewise, if more was added to the forbidden substance even after the knowledge, "kind found its kind and was awakened," even in a dry-in-dry mixture, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 99, section 6, and we explained this there in section 36. And it appears to me that this is only rabbinic according to the opinion of the Rosh, for according to the Torah, since the forbidden substance transformed into a permitted substance, it is already permitted; it is only in a liquid-in-liquid mixture, since there is an imparting of flavor from the forbidden substance, that it certainly is awakened again even according to the Torah, but in a dry-in-dry mixture it is rabbinic, because if one cooks them it will impart flavor [so it appears to me].

But that which he wrote in the name of the Rashba, that each and every one of the pieces is permitted, is difficult; what difference is there between the broth and the pieces? And the Rashba was already asked about this in a Teshuva [siman 273] and he replied that it is indeed an error, for since the broth is forbidden, the broth is absorbed into the pieces and the pieces are also forbidden, and so he wrote in Torat HaBayit [see Beit Yosef]. But on the Tur it is difficult. Therefore, there is one who says that the intention of the Tur is when there is sixty against the forbidden substance, and he comes to teach us that even though there is sixty, nevertheless one should not eat them as one, but rather each one by itself [Bach], and the forced nature of this is clear. And in my humble opinion, it appears that the Tur holds that since in truth the pieces are permitted to be eaten each one by itself, how is it possible that its discharge should be forbidden? And you have no matter more wondrous than this: that it itself is permitted and its discharge is forbidden. Rather, this is what he means: that the pieces are permitted as before, and as for the fact that the broth requires sixty, it is because in this case we judge it as dry matter in liquid which requires sixty. And since the primary prohibition is rabbinic, we are not concerned for the pieces regarding what they absorbed from the broth, since in truth everything is permitted, and they only ruled stringently regarding the broth because of the fence of dry matter in liquid that was mixed before the dry matter was mixed in dry matter. And in such a case, it is sufficient to be stringent regarding the broth and not regarding the pieces.

But our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 2 wrote: Dry in dry that was nullified one in two, if one cooked them all as one, even to eat each one individually it is forbidden if there is not sixty there, because the broth imparts flavor and is absorbed into the pieces. Thus far his words. This is the opinion of the Rashba, and he wrote that the pieces are also forbidden when there is not sixty. It is simple that for sixty we also combine the permitted pieces with the broth to nullify the forbidden piece. This is also the intention of the Tur. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: And some say that if the mixture was known before they were cooked together, everything is permitted, for they do not return and become forbidden once they were nullified in a dry state; and in a case of loss, one may rely on the words of those who are lenient and permit it. Thus far his words. This is the opinion of the Rosh. And since in section 1 regarding eating them all as one they ruled anonymously not like the Rosh, as we explained in section 21, see there, because they hold like the Rashba, therefore he wrote here that only in a case of loss may one rely on this opinion, but otherwise the primary view is like the Rashba. [And so it must be said regarding the Tur who brought the opinion of the Rashba in this, for previously he did not bring his opinion at all, rather his intention was to instruct that even according to the Rashba the pieces are permitted according to what I wrote in section 23. And see the Bach who wrote that he came to instruct that in this too the Rosh disagrees with the Rashba, and it requires further study what he comes to teach us, for is this not dependent on that? And according to what I wrote it is settled, and examine it.]

And even according to the opinion of the Rashba that it is forbidden to cook them all as one, nevertheless, if one wishes to cook them, there is a remedy for this, and that is to add until there is sixty against the forbidden piece and to cook them together; and there is not in this a concern of nullifying a prohibition lechatkhila, since the status of permission has already been invoked upon it. And similarly, if one cooked them in two pots, they are all permitted, even if there is not in both of them sixty to nullify the prohibition; for since it was already nullified and it is permitted to eat them even rabbinically, rather that to cook them together is forbidden because the prohibition returned and became mixed with the permitted [pieces] and it is like any other prohibition that is mingled which requires sixty, therefore when it was cooked in two pots where they were not mingled together, and at the time that he eats the one, I say that the prohibition is in the other, it is permitted. And even if perhaps we would say that there is a doubt in this, it would be a rabbinic doubt and to be lenient. And further it should be said that there is not even a doubt, for in such a case the sages did not decree. But according to the opinion of the Rosh in such a case, if he cooked them in two pots before the mixture became known, certainly the two pots—the food and the pots—are forbidden; for since until after the cooking when the mixture was not yet known it is forbidden by the Torah, if so, it is a Torah doubt, for regarding each pot it can be said: perhaps the prohibition is placed in this pot. And there is one who wishes to permit even in such a case, but it is not primary [Shach, subsection 12], unless we say that even according to the Rosh the knowledge is only rabbinic, but from the Torah the knowledge does not cause the nullification, and if so, it is a rabbinic doubt and we follow the lenient [view]. [And see Bach and in the gloss of Rav B.P. in the Rosh, chapter Gid HaNasheh, it is explained thus, that the knowledge is rabbinic, see there].

It is forbidden to nullify a prohibited substance on Shabbat and Yom Tov, even in a case where it is permitted to nullify them from the perspective of the prohibition; and on Shabbat and Yom Tov it is forbidden because he is repairing a thing and it is like a melakhah. However, to estimate sixty or a majority is permitted even if it was mixed on Erev Shabbat. And similarly, a dry substance in a dry substance that was mixed, where we are accustomed to cast one out as has been explained, it is also permitted, since it is only a mere stringency and not from the essence of the law, as I wrote in section 21 [Magen Avraham siman 323, subsection 14].

The Tur wrote that even if the prohibition is a prohibition of benefit, such as chametz on Pesach, it is nullified by a majority since it is dry in dry. Rashi prohibits a mixture of chametz on Pesach, dry in dry, for eating, but permits it for benefit, except that he requires one to cast one of them into the river. The Rif prohibits everything, even for benefit. My father, our teacher, the Rosh, permits everything, even for eating. Thus far his words. These laws were explained in Orach Chaim siman 447; see there.

What is called "dry in dry"? Anything where the forbidden substance stands on its own and is not mixed together with the permitted substance, but rather one does not recognize which is the forbidden and which is the permitted. However, anything that is mixed together where each does not stand on its own—even if they are dry, such as flour in flour—is called "liquid in liquid" and not "dry in dry," and requires sixty, even though they do not impart flavor to one another. And one should not ask: behold, the primary distinction between liquid in liquid and dry in dry is due to the reason of imparting flavor, for if it were not so, even in liquid in dry we would not require sixty and it would be nullified by a majority since each is recognizable on its own—for this is no question at all. For certainly it is true that in a place where there is imparting of flavor, one requires sixty even if the forbidden substance is recognizable on its own, because of the decree of imparting flavor in a different species, which is from the Torah. However, the primary reason that dry in dry is nullified by a majority is from "follow the majority," as I wrote in section 2, and this is only relevant when each stands recognizable on its own, like the majority of the Sanhedrin and all majorities in the world, and not in that which is all mixed together like flour in flour; therefore the sages were stringent in such a case. Yet according to this, for the poskim whom we explained in section 1 that we learn this from the blood of the bull and the goat, see there, and they are mixed together—if so, it should be nullified as dry in dry even in such a case. And it is possible to say indeed that the poskim who hold that flour in flour is called dry in dry [Tosafot Yevamot 82a, see there], their reason is because of this which we wrote. However, according to the opinion of the Rashba, it is impossible to say so, for he holds that we learn it from the blood of the bull and the goat, yet he holds that we require it to stand on its own and not be mixed; rather, certainly this derivation is merely a clarification of the matter, and the primary point is because we follow the majority, and this is only relevant when each stands on its own. And know that even a cooked item is called dry in dry; for example, if a piece of nevelah was cooked with pieces of kosher meat and there is sixty in the entire pot against the nevelah, and they were all permitted except for the nevelah, and afterwards the nevelah became mixed with two pieces of the permitted meat and it is impossible to recognize them—this is also called dry in dry and is nullified by a majority [Shach, subsection 4]. And it is obvious that previously, when the nevelah was cooked with the pieces of permitted meat, even though there is sixty in the entire pot against the nevelah, nevertheless it is also required that there be a majority of permitted pieces against the nevelah, for if not so, even though there is sixty, the broth is permitted and the pieces are forbidden [ibid.]. [But in a different species, when there is sixty, it appears that one does not need sixty in the pieces on their own, though there is one who is stringent even in this; see Pri Megadim in Shiftei Da'at, subsection 4].