Siman 108

Regarding the law of the aroma of a forbidden substance, whether it forbids the permitted substance, the dispute among our early teachers is extensive, as we will explain with the help of Heaven. What is clear to me from Yerushalmi Terumot chapter 10, halacha 2, is that even according to the one who holds that aroma is of no consequence, nevertheless, if the permitted item was placed directly upon the forbidden item that possesses an aroma and they were attached to one another, everyone agrees it forbids. For it says there that Rabbi Yochanan said: When we were studying Torah, etc., we would place our cakes upon fish brine and we would taste the flavor of the fish brine in them. And the Yerushalmi poses a difficulty against the one who permits in the case of aroma, and answers: they were "halumin," meaning they were attached to the fish brine, and everyone agrees in such a case. See there. Behold, it is explicit that when they are attached to one another, we certainly hold that aroma is of consequence and it forbids.

Furthermore, it appears to me correct to infer from the Mishnah in Makhshirin [Chapter 3, Mishnah 2] that fruit placed in a barrel, where the barrel was placed in liquids, the fruit draws in the substance of the liquid and not only the scent. Therefore, if the liquids were forbidden, they forbid the fruit, for thus we learned there: A barrel that is full of fruit and placed into liquids, or full of liquids and placed into fruit, and they drew in—all that they drew in is under the rule of "if water be put." Regarding which liquids did they say this? Regarding water, and wine, and vinegar; but all other liquids are pure. See there. Behold, it is explicit that fruit draws in the substance of these three liquids. And since no Tanna disagrees on this, as they disagree later in that same chapter regarding one who removes hot bread and places it over the mouth of a barrel of wine—for this dispute is also in Chapter 10 of Terumot regarding scent—it follows that the law of preparation for impurity and the law of scent are of one type. And just as they disagree regarding scent, so too they would disagree regarding the law of preparation. And since they do not disagree in this Mishnah, it proves that here everyone agrees regarding the matter of preparation, and consequently they also agree regarding the matter of scent [and also in the Yerushalmi there, it brings this Mishnah regarding this law of scent; see there and in the Pri Megadim]. And it concludes there in the Mishnah that legumes do not have the nature to draw in. And there is room to doubt regarding other things besides fruit, whether they are similar to fruit or to legumes, and there is no definitive proof for this [see there in the Tosafot Yom Tov who wrote that it is only with fruit, and the Pri Megadim on the Yerushalmi there disagrees with him; see there and examine closely].

We find in the Gemara several types of aromas. In Pesachim [76b] there is a dispute regarding kosher meat of a slaughtered animal that was fat which one roasted with lean meat of a carcass, for one forbids it because they fatten one another; that is to say, it is not only necessary to state that if the carcass is fat and the slaughtered animal is lean that certainly the slaughtered animal draws the aroma of the carcass, but even the opposite, we also say that the slaughtered animal fattens the carcass and then the slaughtered animal returns and draws aroma from the carcass. And one permits it because aroma is of no consequence, and even with a fat carcass we are not concerned with it, as is explained there. Furthermore, it is stated there that bread which one baked with a roast in an oven is forbidden to be eaten with kutach, and similarly a fish that one roasted with meat in one oven, they forbade eating it with kutach because there is milk in kutach, and this was explained in siman 97, see there [and regarding the danger of meat and fish, there is no danger in aroma].

Rashi ruled there, and likewise the Rif in the seventh chapter of Chullin and the Rambam in the fifteenth chapter of Ma'achalot Assurot, that the halakha follows the one who permits, and "scent is nothing." They brought proof from that which is in HaSokher [66b], where Rava and Abaye disagree whether it is permitted to smell the scent of wine used for idolatry, specifically to make a hole in the stopper of a barrel of wine used for idolatry to smell from within it; for Rava permits, and the halakha follows him that "scent is nothing." Rava brought proof from a Mishnah in Terumot, chapter 10, regarding an oven that was heated with cumin of terumah and one baked bread in it: the bread is permitted because it does not contain the taste of cumin but only the scent of cumin, and "scent is nothing." And that which they forbade the bread that was baked with roasted meat to be eaten with kutach, and likewise the fish as has been written, this is because one can eat it without kutach; for ab initio we certainly concern ourselves with scent, as the dispute in Pesachim there is only ex post facto when one roasted slaughtered meat with carrion meat, but ab initio it is certainly forbidden. And even though in the Yerushalmi of Terumot, chapter 10 [halakha 2], this dispute is found and the one who permits permits even ab initio—and thus it is stated there: "What is the law regarding roasting two skewers, one of slaughtered meat and one of carrion meat, in one oven? Rav forbade and Levi said it is permitted. The Baraita disagrees with Rav, etc.," see there—our teachers did not concern themselves with it because in our Gemara it implies that only ex post facto is it permitted. This is what the Rambam wrote there: One may not roast slaughtered meat with carrion meat, etc., even though they do not touch each other; but if one roasted them, this is permitted, even if the forbidden meat was very fatty, etc. Thus far his words. [And this is what the Rif wrote there regarding the reason for the prohibition to eat the bread with kutach, because it is a "thing that has permitters"; since one can eat it without this, his intention is not literally "a thing that has permitters" but something similar to it, as the Issur VeHeter wrote in siman 39, letter 4. This is his wording: "And it is somewhat similar to a thing that has permitters, etc.," see there. And the difficulty of the Ran and the Hagahot Mordechai there is resolved; and see the Chiddushei Agudah].

The Rif, of blessed memory, explained it with the reasoning that certainly scent does not possess the capacity to provide taste, for it is a mere nothing; and whoever forbids in the case of scent truly holds that "kind in its own kind" is forbidden in any amount, and since we do not rule accordingly, it follows that scent is of no consequence. However, for Rashi, of blessed memory, it is impossible to say this reasoning, for he also ruled that "kind in its own kind" is forbidden in any amount, as is written in siman 98, and nevertheless he holds that scent is of no consequence. And it appears to me that Rashi holds that scent does not possess even any amount. And a proof for this is from Shabbat [62b], where we say there: One who carries out food less than the minimum measure in a vessel is exempt even for the vessel, because the vessel is secondary to it. And it is stated there that if he carried out a vessel in which a good scent was absorbed, he is liable for the vessel. And the Gemara explains the reason that scent is not called any substance, and there is not in it even less than the minimum measure; see there.

They further brought in the Gemara there a Mishnah from Terumot: One who removes hot bread from the oven and places it over the mouth of a barrel of wine of terumah, Rabbi Meir forbids and Rabbi Yehuda permits; and Rabbi Yossi permits in the case of wheat bread and forbids in the case of barley bread, because barley draws the substance of the wine into itself, and this is not merely aroma but rather taste. And it is explained in the Gemara there [according to Abaye] that with hot bread and an open barrel where he placed the bread against the opening, everyone agrees it is forbidden; and with cold bread and a sealed barrel, everyone agrees it is permitted. The dispute is regarding hot bread and a sealed barrel, or cold bread and an open barrel, see there. And the Rif wrote there that this passage is also rejected according to the one who holds that aroma is of no consequence. This is the opinion of the Rambam at the end of the Laws of Terumot, who wrote: One who removes hot bread and places it over the mouth of a barrel of wine of terumah, if it was wheat bread, it is permitted, and if of barley, it is forbidden because it draws in. Thus far his words. And he is dealing with an open barrel where he placed it against the opening. [And I wonder at the Kesef Mishneh there who raised a difficulty from this passage and answered in the name of the Mahari Korkus, see there; for the Rif wrote this explicitly in the chapter "Kol HaNishar." And know that in the Yerushalmi it is stated that "hot bread" was taught as an even greater case, for even though the heat of hot bread repels the aroma, how much more so cold bread, see there; but our teachers did not concern themselves with this because in our Talmud it does not imply so, and examine this.]

But our teacher Tam and all our teachers the authors of the Tosafot, and the Rosh, and the Tur, do not hold this way, and they divided this matter of aroma into several details. Certainly, regarding the aroma of stuffing, such as slaughtered meat and carrion meat, we establish the law like the one who forbids even post facto, because it is a strong aroma and is like the substance of the prohibition, for fatty meat gives off a strong aroma. Therefore, even the bread baked with it or the fish roasted with it absorb the aroma, and therefore they forbade them to be eaten with kutach. However, to smell the aroma of wine where the aroma enters his body and harms him, this is not a prohibition, and we establish the law like the one who permits. And so too, if one kindled with cumin of terumah and baked bread with it, we are not concerned about it and it is of no consequence. And so too, to place hot bread upon an open barrel is forbidden according to everyone because it is a strong aroma, and it implies that even with wheat bread it is forbidden. And a proof for this view is from the fact that the Shas in Pesachim there, in the matter of carrion meat, did not bring those matters of the laborer; learn from this that they are not related to one another, and the aroma of stuffing is different and is not merely pleasure, but is like actual eating [Tosafot ibid.].

And there are some of the early authorities who added to say that regarding the scent of a sharp item, whether the forbidden item is sharp or the permitted item is sharp, and all the more so when both are sharp, it is certainly forbidden [Mordechai, Perek Gid HaNasheh, and his proof is from cumin which is sharp, and Abaye rejects it because it is burnt, and without this it would have been forbidden, see there; and it requires great study, for it is Abaye who said it, and indeed we rule like Rava, and so the Pri Chadash questioned in subsection 8 and the Erech HaShulchan in subsection 6; however, one who examines the Issur VeHeter there, sign 21, will see that from the perspective of logic he says so, see there, regarding types of onions that were roasted with nevelah, and perhaps this is sharper than cumin, and Rava's proof from cumin is well-settled, and delve into this]:

All the great authorities agreed that even according to the approach of those who prohibit in a case of slaughtered meat and carrion meat that one roasted together, and similarly according to the approach of those who permit, however, ab initio it is prohibited as has been explained—this is all when one of them is fat. But when both are lean, it is permitted even ab initio [Taz and Shach subsection 1, and Pri Chadash and Kereti U-Peleti, see there]. And in my humble opinion, this does not seem so from the wording of the Rambam there, who wrote: One may not roast slaughtered meat with carrion meat etc. and if one roasted it, it is permitted, and even if the prohibited piece was very fat etc. Thus far his words. Behold, regarding the matter of ab initio, he did not mention lean and fat at all. And similarly in the Yerushalmi that we cited, it says plainly: What is the law regarding roasting slaughtered meat with carrion meat? And it did not mention lean and fat at all. And also from Pesachim there, it implies explicitly so, for the Gemara raised a difficulty against the one who prohibits from that which was taught: One may not roast two Paschal offerings as one, so that the bodies do not become mixed with one another and they eat the Paschal offering not for its designated subscribers. And according to the words of the one who prohibits, even without this it is prohibited because this absorbs from that through the aroma. And the Gemara was pressed to find excuses, see there. And if it were according to the words of our teachers, there is no difficulty here at all, for it would be necessary for a case where both are lean. Rather, certainly even in such a case it is prohibited ab initio. And that which the Gemara explains there according to the one who prohibits, even slaughtered meat that is fat and carrion meat that is lean, see there—this is regarding the matter of ex post facto, for in such a case even ex post facto it is prohibited, and when both are lean it is permitted ex post facto, but ab initio even when both are lean it is prohibited. And similarly it is implied in Sha'arei Dura siman 35, who wrote in this wording: But types of meat that are fattened, he admits that ab initio at least it is prohibited, see there, for he did not distinguish between lean and fat.

The poskim wrote that even according to those who are stringent, it is specifically in a small oven, but in a large oven that holds twelve esronim of bread—and each esron is the shiur of challah, and according to this, for us who calculate the shiur of challah as three liters of flour, twelve esronim are thirty-six liters of flour—and in addition to this the oven is open from the side, one should not be stringent even ab initio regarding reach, because it has a wide airspace and is also open from the side, and it will not absorb the reach from the prohibited item onto the permitted item. For specifically in the days of our sages, of blessed memory, whose ovens were small and their opening was on top, we prohibit roasting kosher and treif or meat and milk as one, but not in our ovens which are large and their opening is from the side. And there are those who said that even twelve esronim are not required, but rather anything like our ovens has no prohibition [Beit Yosef in siman 97 in the name of the Rashba].

However, some say the opposite: that even according to the one who holds that aroma is of no consequence, this is only regarding their ovens whose openings were on top, such that the aroma exits through the opening upward. But our ovens, which are closed on top and the opening is from the side, everyone agrees the aroma forbids, for since their opening is from the side, it contains the aroma and seasons from the forbidden to the permitted. And behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in siman 97 in his great book, rejected this matter with both hands. However, there are those who upheld this reasoning, as the Sha'arei Dura [section 95] wrote so, and they wrote that the teacher of Rabbeinu Gershom Me'or HaGolah ruled accordingly [Bach], and certainly one should be concerned for this. But the primary view is like the first reasoning, which was written by our teachers the authors of the Tosafot, the Rosh, the Rashba, and the Mordechai [and this opinion was not cited in the Shulchan Aruch at all].

It is a matter agreed upon by all the poskim that the concern of reacha is only regarding roasting on a spit, when one roasts the forbidden item near the permitted item and the spits are not far from one another and the oven is small; in this case there is a dispute. However, when they roasted or cooked in a pot, this one by itself and that one by itself, even if the pots are not covered on top, and even in a small oven with its opening closed, it is permitted. Thus ruled our teacher in section 2. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote on this that this is specifically when the oven is slightly open, but if it is closed from all sides in the manner that one preserves hot food for the needs of Shabbat, it is forbidden; and even post facto there are those who are stringent and forbid if the forbidden item and the permitted item are uncovered, and in a case of hefsed merubeh one should be lenient. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that it is true that even with its opening closed it is permitted, but on the condition that it is not a closing like the closing of hot food for Shabbat where they close every small and large crack, but rather it is closed and nevertheless there are small holes on the side, for then it is permitted even ab initio even when the pot is not covered on top. But without this, the pot requires a cover. Therefore, one must be careful on Shabbat when they preserve the cholent and seal the opening of the oven and the chimney is also closed, if they place milk or butter foods in the oven, one must cover them or cover the openings of the meat pots [and however post facto one should not forbid, and especially for the honor of Shabbat or in a case of hefsed merubeh, and see Shach sub-section 18]. And when the chimney is open, it is obvious that it is permitted even ab initio.

And so, even if they baked kosher and treif pasties in one oven, and not in a vessel but rather on the floor of the oven, and in a small oven that is closed, or two pasties, one of meat and one of milk in such a manner on the floor of the oven—if one of them is covered with a bowl or with dough and the like, it is permitted. And even initially it is permitted, even in a small oven with its opening closed. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1 regarding this law that it is the custom to be stringent initially even in a large oven, and post facto to be lenient even in a small oven. Thus far his words. And the reason for the stringency initially seems to me not to be because of aroma, but rather because since both of them are on the floor of the oven, there is a concern that liquid will flow from this one to that one. And it has already been explained in siman 97 that one may not bake any bread with a pasty or a fladen in one oven due to this concern; see there.

And if one baked bread in an oven with roasted meat on a spit, one should not eat the bread with milk when he has other bread. And similarly, if they baked bread with a forbidden roast on a spit, one should not eat that bread if he can obtain other bread, for all this is called le-khatchilah. And even in a large oven with its opening open, it should be forbidden le-khatchilah. But if he does not easily have other bread, it is permitted in both cases, even in a small and closed oven, for regarding this matter it is called bedi'avad. So ruled our teacher, the Rema, and this is according to the approach of those who hold that reiha lav milta hi. But if reiha milta, even bedi'avad it is forbidden in a small oven with its opening closed. And for this reason he added further in his wording and wrote: There are those who say that we do not permit reiha even bedi'avad unless the oven is slightly open from the side or above in the place where the smoke exits, and in a case of loss one should not be stringent bedi'avad even if it is completely closed. Thus far his words. Meaning, that when it is not open at all, we are concerned for the approach of those who hold that reiha milta hi and it is forbidden even bedi'avad, and only in a case of hefsed merubeh do we rely on Rashi, the Rif, and the Rambam [so it appears to me in my humble opinion is the explanation of the words of the Rema in section 1, see there].

He further wrote that if the forbidden substance is a sharp thing, and all the more so if the permitted substance is a sharp thing, "smell is a substantial matter" and even post facto it is forbidden if both are uncovered. But if one of them is covered, even with simple dough, it is permitted. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that even though for the primary law we hold that "smell is not a substantial matter," nevertheless, regarding a sharp thing we are concerned to say that "smell is a substantial matter." And even though in section 8 we explained that this law does not align well according to the sugya of the Shas, nevertheless, since some hold this way, and some hold regarding the primary law that "smell is a substantial matter," therefore one must forbid even post facto regarding a sharp thing when both are uncovered. But if one of them is covered, even when the permitted substance is covered with dough, the dough intervenes and there is no law of smell here at all, and it is permitted even initially. [And that which he wrote, "and all the more so if the permitted substance is a sharp thing," his intention is if the permitted substance is also a sharp thing, and examine this carefully].

It is a simple matter that something made for its aroma and placed in an oven in order to provide an aroma, even in a large oven with its opening open, we say "aroma is a significant matter" [Shach, subsection 9]. Therefore, if it was placed for the aroma to enter into the bread that is in the oven, and there is meat in the aroma, it is forbidden to eat that bread with milk, and likewise the reverse. And all the more so if there was a forbidden substance in the aroma, that it is forbidden to eat that bread at all, and even if he has no other bread when there is no danger in the matter; for since he did it intentionally for the aroma, it is certainly a significant matter in every case.

He further wrote: if they baked or roasted forbidden and permitted items under one pan while they were uncovered, it is forbidden even post facto. And the same law applies if they baked bread with meat in this manner; it is forbidden to eat it with milk. However, if they were one after the other, there is no concern unless the pan perspired from both of them, for then it is forbidden even one after the other if both were uncovered, as it is like the cover of a pot. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters is that there are those who set up a pan that has high legs, which is called a "tripeda," and beneath it they roast and bake. It turns out that whatever is under the pan, the pan protects them. There are those who say that this is like the law of the small oven that was in the days of the sages of the Gemara, and it depends on the dispute of whether "smell is a substantial matter" or not. If so, according to that which we hold as the primary ruling that it is not a substantial matter, here too it is permitted post facto [see the Beit Yosef in the name of Tosafot, and examine it]. However, the opinion of the Issur Ve-Hetter, the Sha'arim, and the Terumat HaDeshen is that this is worse than an oven, and in this case, according to everyone, "smell is a substantial matter," and it is forbidden even post facto. And even if they baked bread with meat, it is forbidden to eat it with milk. There is one who says that this applies to a small amount of bread, but with a large amount of bread, it is forbidden to eat it at all, even with meat, so that one does not come to eat it with milk, as was written in siman 97 [Shach, subsection 11]. In my humble opinion, it is not so; for even though the Sha'arim indeed hold so, as was written in his book Darkhei Moshe in this siman, see there, nevertheless, from the precision of his wording here, it appears explicitly that in this he did not wish to be so stringent, for if not so, he should have specified. And in truth, this is an excessive stringency, for behold, according to the opinion of Tosafot, it is like an oven; if so, why should we be so stringent as to forbid it entirely? It is sufficient that we do not eat it with milk [and so wrote the Pri Chadash, subsection 10, and the Minchat Yaakov, see the Pri Megadim there].

And that which he wrote, that with one after the other there is no concern unless the pan sweated, etc., the explanation of the matter is that one baked a meat pastida in a stove under the pan, and afterwards baked in that very same place a dairy fladen, and upon the floor of the stove itself. And there is no prohibition in this, since no fat remained upon the place where the pastida was placed; and if because of the aroma of the pastida that was absorbed in that place, we have not found the satiation of aroma in a vessel such that it would return and satiate the food. However, if the pan sweats from both of them, the law of the pan is like the law of a pot cover in siman 93, for the pan is also like a cover and the sweat drips upon the fladen. Therefore, if there is not sixty against the area of the pan that was over the pastida, the fladen is prohibited. And such is the law regarding prohibited and permitted substances when one baked the permitted after the prohibited under the pan. And it is simple that if one of them is covered with a vessel, there is no prohibition here, for the sweat does not rise from the food itself.

Some say that even according to the one who holds that aroma is a substantial matter and prohibits even post facto, this is specifically when there is not sixty of the permitted substance against the prohibited substance, but when there is sixty of the permitted substance it is permitted, and everything found in the oven joins together to sixty to nullify the prohibited substance. However, one should not rule accordingly except in a case of great loss, for without this, how does sixty apply to an aroma? For who knows where the aroma went, whether to all of them or to some of them, and each piece would require sixty. Rather, in a case of loss, one may compare it to what will be explained in siman 111, that everything that enters into the doubt joins together to nullify. Therefore, just as our teacher, the Rema, ruled there that only for the sake of loss should one act accordingly, see there, the same applies here [and with this the words of the Rema here are explained; and see the Gra, subsection 19, who wrote so, see there].

Some say that a prohibition that prohibits with a minute amount, such as chametz on Pesach, "aroma is a substantial matter" and it prohibits even after the fact if the oven is small and it is closed, and the prohibited and permitted items are uncovered within the oven. And they found support for this reasoning from the words of the Rif that we brought in section 5, that aroma is considered a minute amount, and since chametz on Pesach is prohibited in a minute amount, it follows that even the aroma is prohibited. And some say that there is no distinction, and they brought proof from the Temple, where they would bake in one oven the loaves of the Todah offering, which contained chametz and matzah [see Mordechai, chapter Kol Sha'ah]. However, according to what I wrote, there is no proof, for according to the Torah even chametz is nullified in sixty, and even by rabbinic decree they only prohibited it in a minute amount on Pesach due to the stringency of Pesach. Furthermore, the oven in the Temple was large. Nevertheless, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that in a case of loss one may rely on the words of those who are lenient, for indeed many poskim hold that regarding bread, aroma is not applicable [see Shach, subsection 66]. And in Orach Chaim siman 447 this was further explained. And there is one who wrote that if it is completely closed one should not be lenient, but if it is slightly open one may be lenient [Magen Avraham ibid., subsection 4]. And in siman 118 it will be explained if it is permitted to place in an oven two pots one next to the other, kosher and treif, or meat and milk, or to roast one next to the other; see there.

If there is prohibited fat on the marda, which they call pala and in our language lapita, it is prohibited to place permitted food upon it all day. Neither hagalah nor peeling is effective for a professional tool, and even hagalah after peeling is not effective because a marda is like a usage through fire, which specifically requires libun. However, when it is not ben yomo and he does not have another, it is permitted to use it and to eat the bread; but this is specifically when the baker is a gentile and in a place where they eat the bread of a baker, and he will not listen to us to obtain another when the Israelite will not give him a benefit like his own. But an Israelite who bakes is prohibited ab initio from using it even when it is not ben yomo, as with all vessels where they decreed regarding those that are not ben yomo [Taz subsection 8 and Pri Chadash]. And if he transgressed and removed bread with a marda that was ben yomo which had prohibited fat upon it, it appears that the first bread is prohibited and the rest is permitted, for the first absorbed the fat, and such is the law regarding meat fat for milk or vice versa [and so wrote the Chavat Da'at subsection 15]. And if the first was mixed among them, it is nullified by a majority, even if the bread is a piece fit to be served to guests, since its prohibition is not due to itself, as I wrote in siman 101 [ibid.]. And in Orach Chaim siman 451 it is explained regarding a marda of chametz where they baked matzah in it what its law is, see there.

We have already written in section 6 that the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam regarding one who removes hot bread and places it over the mouth of a barrel of yayin nesech is that it is permitted specifically with barley; and even though they said in the Gemara that with hot bread and an open barrel everyone agrees it is forbidden even with wheat, this is according to the one who holds that aroma is a substantial matter. However, according to the one who holds that aroma is not a substantial matter, it is not so; and since they ruled leniently regarding aroma, they ruled leniently in this as well. Therefore, the Tur, who ruled that aroma is a substantial matter, ruled stringently in this as well. This is the wording of the Tur: Hot bread that is placed upon an open barrel of yayin nesech is forbidden because it absorbs much of the aroma; but if the bread is cold, even if the barrel is open, or hot bread and a closed barrel, it is permitted. Thus far his words. And he did not distinguish between wheat and barley, and even with wheat it is forbidden [and he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Yosi, for he holds that only Rabbi Yehuda holds that aroma is not a substantial matter, whereas Rabbi Yosi, from the fact that he said "because barley absorbs," it is proven that he also forbids regarding aroma, only that he holds that barley absorbs and not wheat; and in this we hold like Rava that aroma is not a substantial matter, and only that the version of Resh Lakish who said that with hot bread and an open barrel everyone does not disagree that it is forbidden, this does not push aside the halacha; and see the Beit Yosef, Bach, and Pri Chadash, and examine carefully].

The words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 4 are perplexing regarding this matter, for he wrote: Hot bread placed upon an open barrel of wine of gentiles is forbidden, and specifically if it is placed opposite the bunghole; but if the bread is cold, even if the barrel is open, or hot bread and a sealed barrel, it is permitted. And if it was barley bread, it is forbidden if the bread is hot even if the barrel is sealed. Thus far his words. Yet he himself ruled in section 1 like the Rif and the Rambam that aroma is of no legal consequence, and the great authorities [Pri Chadash and Kreiti U'Pleiti] have already wondered at him. One must say that since this statement was stated in the Gemara plainly—that hot and open is forbidden, and cold and sealed is permitted, and hot and sealed or cold and open is a dispute between Rabbi Meir, Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Yossi—and whoever stated this statement did not make it dependent on the dispute regarding aroma, we learn from this that it is according to everyone. Therefore, he ruled according to this statement, and in the dispute of the Tannaim he ruled like Rabbi Yossi, for the halacha follows him against Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda [and in his great work he maintained that the Tur also holds this way, see there and examine carefully].

It is permitted to inhale with one's mouth the scent of yayin nesech through a hole in the barrel to know if it is good, and in this everyone agrees; even according to the one who rules that scent is a substantial matter, nevertheless in this case he rules like the one who holds in the Gemara that this is not a substantial matter because the scent of wine is strong and enters the body and harms it, and there is no benefit here [Tosafot ibid.], and he does not intend for benefit. Certainly, if his intention is to benefit from the scent, it is forbidden. Similarly, it is also forbidden to taste yayin nesech even though he does not swallow it, and similarly it is forbidden to lick it with his tongue. Similarly, it is forbidden to sprinkle yayin nesech because it is forbidden for benefit, but it is permitted to sprinkle stam yeinam since it is permitted for benefit.

A sack of peppers and ginger, which they call "ingber," that they place in jars of wine of gentiles, it is permitted to smell them because the wine does not impart strength into them; on the contrary, they impart strength into the wine. For this reason they place them in the wine, so that they will impart strength into the wine and not the wine into them. Nevertheless, for the besamim of Havdalah it is forbidden, because it is repulsive for a matter of mitzvah. Similarly, if they place them in wine so that they will receive the taste of the wine, it is forbidden to smell them. Similarly, besamim of idolatry, and of kilayim of the vineyard, and orlah, it is forbidden to smell them because they are forbidden for benefit. And even according to the one who says "fragrance is of no consequence," nevertheless, in a thing made for smelling, certainly fragrance is of consequence. Therefore, if this thing is from the prohibitions of eating and not from the prohibitions of benefit, it is permitted to smell it; but when they are from the prohibitions of benefit, it is forbidden to smell it [Shach, subsection 27]. And regarding the smoke-producing herb that they call "tobacco," if they placed in it a fragrance from prohibitions of benefit, it is forbidden to smell it and to smoke it, but from their ordinary wine it is permitted.