Siman 105

It is a settled law in the mouths of all our teachers that pickling is like cooking. And even though in the Gemara [111b] there is a dispute regarding this, nevertheless the Rishonim decided thus like the one who holds that pickling is like cooking, because in several places this is proven [ibid. 97b, 112b; Pesachim 76a; and even though it refers to salting, nevertheless since it also brought this of pickling, we learn from it that such is the halacha]. Furthermore, from the Mishnayot of Shevi'it [chapter 6] and of Terumot [chapter 10] this is explicitly proven, as will be explained with the help of Heaven:

Therefore, one must wonder about the Rambam, of blessed memory, that he did not mention at all in the entirety of the laws of forbidden foods the law of kavush at all, and only at the end of chapter 15 did he write the law of a pure fish that was pickled with an impure fish, that if there is one in two hundred it is forbidden, which is a Mishnah in Terumot there. And this law does not apply to all picklings, which do not forbid more than sixty, as it is no greater than cooked. And one cannot say that his reasoning is because in the Jerusalem Talmud, Terumot there, they said that the version in the Mishnayot is not "pickled" but "stewed," see there, and therefore he ruled like the one who holds in our Talmud that pickled is not like cooked—it is impossible to say so, for he himself in the laws of Terumot, chapter 15, ruled according to those Mishnayot, see there, and also regarding fish he wrote "pickled" as we have cited. And also this cannot be said, that he relied upon what he ruled in the laws of Terumot, for there the laws are entirely different as is explained there; and furthermore, the laws of forbidden foods precede the laws of Terumot, and he would not rely from the earlier upon the later [and the Noda BiYehudah already addressed this in siman 26, see there].

And that which appears correct in my humble opinion regarding his reasoning is that he follows his own approach in his commentary on the Mishnah in Shevi'it [Chapter 7, Mishnah 7], where it is taught: New rose that one pickled in old oil, one should pick out the rose; and old [rose] in new [oil] is subject to the law of bi'ur. New carobs that one pickled in old wine, and old [carobs] in new [wine], are subject to the law of bi'ur. See there. The Rash and the Bartenura labored over the reasons for this Mishnah; see there. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, explains there that when the oil is new and the rose is old, the flavor of the rose enters the oil immediately, and therefore it is subject to bi'ur. But when the oil is old and the rose is new, the flavor does not enter unless they leave it for a long time. However, the flavor of carobs in wine enters immediately, whether the carob is new and the wine is old, or whether the wine is new and the carob is old. See there. Behold, it is explicitly explained that there is no general rule for all picklings regarding how much time it takes for the flavor to enter, and of necessity [one must] know the natures of all things, for there are those that require a long time and there are those for which a short time is sufficient. And behold, we also see with cucumbers, which are called "ogurkes," and with cabbage, which is called "kraut" or "kapusta," that when one pickles them in water with much salt, despite all this, many days will pass until the water absorbs the flavor of the cucumbers or the cabbage. And if one pickles them in vinegar, in a short time like a day or two, it absorbs the flavor. And with soft fruits like tree fruits or cherries, the time for pickling is shorter than for produce of the ground.

And in the tenth chapter of Terumot [mishnah 7] we learned: Chullin olives that one pickled with terumah olives; crushed chullin with crushed terumah, crushed chullin with whole terumah, or in the liquid of terumah, it is forbidden. But whole chullin with crushed terumah is permitted, see there. And ostensibly it is implied from the mishnah that to expel is easier than to absorb, and therefore when the chullin are crushed, meaning cut or pounded, even though the whole terumah olives expel, the terumah olives expel and the crushed chullin absorb. But when the chullin are whole and the terumah is crushed, the chullin do not absorb from the terumah. And this is not a logical reasoning at all. Therefore, in truth, the Yerushalmi there explains that the power of absorption and expulsion of both is equal, but crushed ones absorb and expel and then absorb again, while whole ones absorb and expel and do not absorb again, see there. Behold, it is explicit that even olives, which are a sharp thing and are pickled in water and salt as the commentators wrote, nevertheless, if both are whole they do not absorb from one another, and even when one is whole and the second is crushed there is a distinction between them, as has been explained. Behold, it is explicit also from here that the nature of all pickled items is not equal [see Chochmat Adam who wrote that regarding terumah they were lenient, but it is not clear; and from the Rash in chapter 11 there is no proof at all, and examine carefully].

We have further learned there: a non-kosher fish that was pickled with a kosher fish renders it forbidden up to two hundred parts, according to one Tanna whose opinion the Rambam rules in accordance with. There is a dispute there regarding this, as there is one who increases this measure and one who decreases it; see there. Behold, the opposite is true, that there are matters in pickling where it forbids more than boiling. Behold, it is explicit that aside from the fact that the natures of pickling are not equal regarding the time it becomes pickled, there is further a distinction in the measure, as there is that which forbids in more than sixty and there is that which forbids in less, for behold, there is one there who says that it only forbids up to a sixteenth part; see there.

We further learned there: All things pickled with one another are permitted, except with the chasit. That is to say, any type of vegetable of chullin that was pickled with a vegetable of terumah does not forbid it, as they do not absorb from one another, except with a vegetable called chasit, which is a sharp item. And it is explained there: chasit of chullin with chasit of terumah, or a vegetable of chullin with chasit of terumah, is forbidden; but chasit of chullin with a vegetable of terumah is permitted. And the Rambam ruled these in the Laws of Terumot, see there. Behold, it is explicitly stated that all types of vegetables are not subject to the law of kavush at all, except for chasit. And even this is not an absolute rule, for behold, rose in oil or carobs with wine are subject to pickling. And also that which we learned at the end of chapter 7 of Shevi'it, "One who pickles three types of pickles etc.," must be referring to those that are subject to pickling, like rose and carobs and those similar to them. Therefore, the Rambam was unable to bring the law of "kavush is like cooked" because it would be necessary to know the natures of all things regarding what pickling applies to and in how much time pickling occurs, and how could he bring something that is impossible to clarify? Therefore, he relied upon what he wrote at the beginning of chapter 15 of Forbidden Foods, where he wrote, and this is his wording: A forbidden item that was mixed with a permitted item, a different species, is by imparting flavor etc. Thus far his words. He was precise and wrote "that was mixed" and did not write "that was cooked," and his intention was for every type of mixture, whether by cooking or by pickling; when we know the nature of the thing and in how much time it is pickled, it is forbidden up to sixty. And he only clarified the pickling of an impure fish with a pure fish, as this is explained in the Mishnah. Therefore, also the Gemara in Chullin there, regarding the dispute of kavush, the Gemara did not bring proofs from these Mishnayot because the natures of all things are not equal, and they only argued whether there is a concept of kavush at all. And the one who says that kavush is not like cooked would interpret all the Mishnayot as referring to sehlika, like the Yerushalmi. And a proof for this is that behold, in our Gemara, Rabbi Yochanan says so, that kavush is not like cooked, and also in the Yerushalmi there, Rabbi Yochanan says that the version is not "kavush" but rather "sheluk," and kavush is like the heat of a roast and not according to the explanation of the commentators [and with this, all the difficulties of the Tosafot Yom Tov in Terumot there are answered, as he raised many difficulties, see there; and according to our words, everything is settled, and also that of the impure fish they explain in another manner, that it refers to the fish itself and because of the status of a biryah, and examine this].

But all of our teachers ruled without qualification that soaking is like cooking in every matter. And these Mishnayot that we brought should not be a difficulty for them, for they interpret the Mishnah of Shevi'it in a manner that holds that soaking prohibits, see there. And the Mishnah of Terumah, that case of an impure fish that was soaked with a pure fish, they interpret regarding the fish itself, in what amount it is nullified due to being a complete entity. And the Mishnah of mundane olives and the Mishnah that all things soaked with one another are permitted, even though it holds that soaking does not prohibit regarding vegetables and whole olives, nevertheless, since regarding this Mishnah it is stated in the Yerushalmi that the version there is "boiled" and not "soaked," there is no proof from there, and they would say that "soaked" is worse than "boiled" and prohibits. Therefore, the Gemara in Chullin there also did not bring from these Mishnayot. And know that there in the Yerushalmi it is stated that regarding meat with meat, all agree that there is soaking [the commentator there explained that it refers to boiling, but it appears to me that it refers to soaking as previously there, see there carefully; however, according to the Rambam we will interpret that it refers to boiling, and reflect on this].

It is called kavush when one places a solid item into a liquid item and one of them is forbidden and the other is permitted, or two solid items, one forbidden and one permitted, within a liquid item, like that Mishna regarding non-sacred olives with terumah olives. However, regarding two liquid items that fell into one another, kavush is not applicable; for granted, a solid in a liquid emits and absorbs from one to the other, but two moist items immediately mix and forbid one another [Pri Megadim, subsection 1]. And similarly, when both are solids, even if they are somewhat moist, kavush is not applicable to them even if they stand for many days [ibid.]. And even fat with a forbidden item placed within it, as long as the fat is not soft, the forbidden item does not forbid it [ibid.]. And it is called soft as long as the forbidden item can move there, but if it cannot move, it is called hard even though it is soft to the touch of the hand [ibid.]. And an item placed in frozen water is also not called kavush since it does not move from place to place [ibid.]. And know that regarding any dry item with a dry item, even if they are somewhat moist, such that it is not called kavush as has been written, even netilah is not required [ibid.], and rinsing or peeling is sufficient if they are somewhat salty. Therefore, treif cheese that was placed upon kosher cheese for a long time does not forbid it; even if the cheese is fatty, like the cheese of Holland and Switzerland, nevertheless the kosher one is permitted, and he should rinse the place of contact or peel the place, and this is sufficient.

Rashi, of blessed memory, explained in all places that kavush is in vinegar or brine, and it is clear from his words that kavush is specifically in a sharp substance. However, regarding soaking in water or other liquids that are not sharp, kavush does not apply to this. And a great proof can be brought for his words from that mishna in Terumot, that all things that are kavush with one another are permitted except with lettuce because it is sharp. And similarly regarding olives, we learned there that with whole ones kavush does not apply, because when they are whole they do not possess sharpness. And the mishna in Shevi'it he would explain according to the explanation of the Rambam that we cited. And that which they said in the Gemara that regarding meat and milk it is a novelty, for if one soaks it all day in milk it is permitted, which implies explicitly that there is kavush even in a substance that is not sharp, it can be said that meat is different, as we cited in section 7 from the Yerushalmi there, that regarding meat everyone agrees there is kavush [see the Beit Yosef who questioned Rashi, and similarly the Mordechai in the second chapter of Beitzah questioned him, and according to what I have written all is well, and examine this].

But the method of the Rosh and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch and most of the poskim is that in any liquid substance, the law of kavisah applies, and the duration of kavisah is twenty-four hours. There are some among the Rishonim who wished to say three periods of twenty-four hours, as with the purging of vessels where we say in the chapter "Ein Ma'amidin" (Avodah Zarah 33) that one fills them with water and pours it out for three periods of twenty-four hours, and just as the expelling is three days, so too is the absorption. But we do not rule accordingly [see Beit Yosef], for food is not comparable to vessels; and furthermore, there, to expel that which has been absorbed over many days requires more time. And there is proof from "basar be-chalav" where we consider it a novelty regarding soaking for twenty-four hours as has been written, which proves that the law of kavush applies within twenty-four hours. And regarding a sharp substance such as vinegar, brine, or salt water, they ruled that the duration of kavisah is a small amount of time, enough so that one could place it on the fire and it would begin to boil.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 1: A forbidden substance that was soaked with a permitted substance for twenty-four hours in cold liquid is called kavush, and it is like cooked, and it is all forbidden. But less than this, rinsing is sufficient. And if it is kavush within brine or within vinegar, if it remained for the time it would take to place it on the fire and it would boil and begin to cook, it is like cooked; and in less than this amount of time, it is only forbidden up to a kedi klipah. Thus far his words. And there are those who say that only in brine, because it has the strength of salt, is this amount of time sufficient, but in vinegar it requires twenty-four hours [Shach subsection 2 and Pri Chadash]. And the primary view is like the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, for in the Mishnayot at the end of the first chapter of Ma'aser and the third chapter of Shabbat, the Tanna compares vinegar to brine, see there. And certainly wine vinegar that is not so strong does not have the law of brine, but strong vinegar has the law of brine [Magen Avraham siman 447 subsection 28]. Therefore, our vinegar, which is not so strong, does not have the law of brine. And regarding what he wrote, that in less than this amount of time it is only forbidden up to a kedi klipah, which implies that a kedi klipah is forbidden immediately, see what I wrote in siman 91, section 29, that the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, is that the duration of melichah to forbid is after the time it would take to remain for the duration of salting for the pot, and here it does not imply so. And so is the primary law as I wrote there, and so wrote one of the great Acharonim [Pri Chadash at the end of subsection 4].

The measure of kavush for a twenty-four hour period must be without interruption. However, through combination—for example, if one soaked it today for several hours and tomorrow for several hours, or even on the same day—since there was an interruption, it does not become kavush even if through combination there was a twenty-four hour period [Chavat Da'at, subsection 2]. And even regarding combination, if one changed the water in the middle of the twenty-four hour period for other water, we do not combine them with one another, and a twenty-four hour period is required from the second water [Pri Megadim ibid. in the name of Minchat Yaakov]. And such is the law for all types of kavush. And it appears that also regarding brine and vinegar, where the measure is the time it takes to place it on the fire and it begins to boil, the law is also thus. And it is possible that in this one should be stringent, and it requires further study for the practical law.

Just as there is a prohibition of kavush regarding food, so too regarding a vessel; for if one soaked a prohibited substance in a permitted vessel for twenty-four hours, the vessel becomes prohibited. And if one soaked a permitted substance in a prohibited vessel that is ben yomo, when the soaking lasted twenty-four hours, the permitted substance becomes prohibited [Issur V'Heter, Klal 30]. And likewise if one soaked milk for twenty-four hours in a meat vessel that is ben yomo [ibid.]. And there are those who disagree regarding soaking a permitted substance in a prohibited vessel, for the completion of the kavush is after twenty-four hours, and then it becomes pagum according to the law of a vessel that is not ben yomo [Taz, subsection 1, and Shach, subsection 2]. And even though the absorption occurs bit by bit and the majority of the absorption was within twenty-four hours, nevertheless, ultimately the completion of the prohibition is at the point of being pagum. And there is one who says that the spoiling and the absorption come as one; that is to say, at the same moment it becomes pagum, at that same moment the absorption is completed and it becomes prohibited. According to this, the vessel does not prohibit the permitted substance placed within it unless they placed the permitted substance immediately when they poured the prohibited substance out of it, for if not so, the spoiling preceded the absorption [Magen Avraham, Siman 447, subsection 16]. And some say that the spoiling comes after twenty-four hours and the absorption at the end of twenty-four hours, and it turns out that the absorption preceded the spoiling [ibid. and Pri Chadash, subsection 1]. And all vessels are equal in this, whether of metal, or of wood, or of earthenware. And some say that a new earthenware vessel absorbs immediately; and see further in Siman 135 [see Pri Chadash and Pri Megadim].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that wherever we say "soaking is like cooking," even that which is outside of the soaking is forbidden, for through the soaking below it permeates upward just as in cooking; and some are lenient regarding what is outside. Thus far his words. And even though regarding meat that was salted in a vessel that is not perforated we forbid even what is outside the brine, as was written in siman 69, this is because of the blood that spreads from place to place as is explained there; but regarding other prohibitions, we do not say that it permeates upward. And even though regarding a fatty prohibition we say that it permeates upward, this is in salting and roasting and not in soaking. And one can explain the reason that the upward permeation is due to the heat, as is understood; therefore, in salting and roasting, which contain much heat from the salt and the fire—and therefore the time for salting and roasting is a short time—heat is applicable to them. But soaking, which requires twenty-four hours because the absorption proceeds slowly and there is no heat in it, does not permeate upward. Therefore, in soaking in brine or in vinegar, where the duration is like in roasting, it permeates upward as well. And so it appears to me as the primary ruling, and in this way both opinions are sustained in the halacha. And some say that regarding a fatty prohibition, even in soaking we say that it permeates upward, and only according to that which we are stringent in salting and roasting even regarding a lean substance, according to what I wrote in this siman further on, in this we are not stringent regarding soaking [Shach subsection 1 and Pri Chadash]. But from the plain meaning of his wording it does not appear so, for if it were according to this opinion, he should have mentioned that regarding fat everyone agrees; rather, it is certain that in soaking for twenty-four hours, even with fat it does not permeate, and in soaking in brine and in vinegar it is no worse than salting, as will be explained that we are stringent in all cases [so it appears to me].

He further wrote that a doubt regarding kavush is forbidden, except for meat with milk where we follow the lenient view, as from the Torah it is only forbidden through actual cooking. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that that which we say "kavush is like cooked" is from the Torah, and so it appears from all the poskim. And there is a proof from what the sages, of blessed memory, said regarding meat with milk, that it is a "novelty," for if one soaks it all day in milk it is permitted; and if the prohibition of kavush is rabbinic, what novelty is there in this? Rather, it is certainly from the Torah. And even though from the Rambam, chapter 22 of Shabbat, it does not imply so—for behold, he enumerated there all the shevutim and wrote there also the law of kavishah on Shabbat, and if it were from the Torah he should have written this in chapter 9 there among the laws of cooking—however, from the Rambam there is no proof, for he has a doubt regarding this entire matter of what is fit for kavishah and what is not fit, as we explained at the beginning of this siman. Furthermore, even there one could say that it is from the Torah, and that which he wrote it in the laws of shevutim is because there he is dealing with another matter regarding the law of salting a radish, and he wrote that this is like one who preserves, and kavush is like cooked, and salting a radish on Shabbat is certainly only rabbinic, but kavush itself one could say is from the Torah. And I saw one who is in doubt regarding kavishah in vinegar and brine, whether this is from the Torah or rabbinic [Kereiti U'Pleti and Pri Megadim], and I do not know the basis for the doubt; and certainly it is also from the Torah according to what the poskim held, that kavishah applies to everything. And one could only say that from the Torah it requires a greater duration until it becomes kavush. And there is one who wrote that kavush only causes emitting and absorbing but is not actual cooking [ibid. in Minchat Yaakov, subsection 1], and that which they said "kavush is like cooked" is regarding emitting and absorbing. And this requires further deliberation, for ostensibly it implies like actual cooking.

And what is called a doubt regarding kavush? For example, if there are two pieces here, one permitted and one forbidden, which became forbidden through kavush, both pieces are forbidden. And similarly, if a permitted item was found soaking in a forbidden substance and there is a doubt if it soaked within it for twenty-four hours, it is also a doubt regarding kavush and is forbidden [Issur V'Heiter there]. And there is one who permits in such a case, for we establish the piece in its status of being permitted and we do not forbid it out of doubt [Taz, subsection 3]. And it is not similar to a case where it was spilled into a different species when there is a doubt if there was sixty, which is forbidden as written in siman 98, for there, there is a clear prohibition—meaning, for a certain prohibition fell here. But here, in that the permitted item is in a forbidden vessel, there is no clear prohibition here at all, for prior to twenty-four hours there is no prohibition here [ibid. and this is his intention]. And similarly, it is not similar to what will be explained in siman 111 regarding a Torah prohibition that fell into two pots, one forbidden and one permitted, where both are forbidden and we do not hang it on the possibility that it fell into the forbidden one, nor do we establish the permitted one in its status of being permitted; for there too there is a clear prohibition before us, and you come to permit it, and it is impossible to permit it out of doubt. But here, there is a doubt if there is a prohibition here at all [according to the Pri Megadim there, and his words require investigation]. However, many disagree on this and hold that even in this case the doubt is forbidden [Nekudot HaKesef, Pri Chadash, Pri Toar, and Knesset HaGedolah]. And it can be said that they compare this to a mikveh that was measured and found lacking, where we say "behold, it is lacking before you," and here too we say "behold, it is placed in a forbidden substance before you." And just as regarding a mikveh all purities that were performed upon it are impure, and a person who immersed in it and touched purities has defiled them, and we do not establish the purities in their status, so too it is here. Even though in the essence of the matter they are not similar to each other—for there the person is in a status of impurity and here this is not applicable—nevertheless, since from the language of the Gemara "behold, it is lacking before you" it implies that this is the primary flaw, so too it is here. And the primary ruling appears to me to depend on the two opinions in siman 3 regarding a flaw found in a certain organ where there is a doubt if it occurred before shechitah and it is treifah, or if it occurred after shechitah. And the one who forbids there because of the flaw that is before us forbids here as well, for behold there is a flaw before us. And the one who permits there because we establish it on its status of kashrut and we are not concerned for the flaw that was found, permits here as well [according to the Rosh Yosef, subsection 3, and Chavat Da'at, subsection 4, and I have written what appears correct to me].

And now we will explain the laws of absorption and emission from cooking itself, at what level of heat it is forbidden when a solid forbidden item falls into a permitted liquid, or when a solid permitted item falls into a forbidden liquid, for the permitted item absorbs from the forbidden item; or when two solid items, one forbidden and one permitted, fall into a liquid, and the forbidden item emits and the permitted item absorbs, and this is called emitting and absorbing simultaneously. And there is no difference between the absorption of a permitted item from a forbidden item, or the absorption of milk from meat or meat from milk, for in the case of soaking there is a difference between them, as in the case of forbidden and permitted items the prohibition of soaking is from the Torah, and in the case of meat and milk it is rabbinic, for the Torah only prohibited it by way of cooking. However, regarding absorption through cooking, even from the heat of a kli rishon, even in the case of meat and milk it is from the Torah, for any type of heat that emits and absorbs is called the way of cooking. And know that this is all when there is liquid, for the liquid surrounds all the solid items within it and it all becomes forbidden. But two solid items that touched one another, even in the heat of the fire itself, such as kosher meat and treifa meat that were roasted on one spit over the fire, there are other laws regarding this, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven in section 30, etc.:

At what degree of heat do we concern ourselves with the discharge of the forbidden substance and the absorption of the permitted substance from it? It is not only when the pot stands near the fire, but even after it was removed from the fire; if it is still hot to the degree that the hand recoils from it, it cooks, discharges, and causes absorption. And even according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam that we explained in siman 68, section 24, that regarding cooking, a kli rishon does not cook according to the Torah unless it stands near the fire, nevertheless, regarding discharge and absorption, even according to the Torah a kli rishon discharges and absorbs, as I wrote there in section 25, see there. And it is called a kli rishon after the pot was removed from upon the fire as long as the hand recoils from it. Therefore, if a forbidden item fell into permitted broth in a kli rishon, or a permitted item into forbidden broth, it is all forbidden if there is not sixty in the permitted against the forbidden. And all this is when the hand recoils from it, but if it cooled until the hand does not recoil from it—and even if it stands near the fire, if the hand does not yet recoil from it—it is nothing, and a kelipah or a mere hadachah is sufficient [Shach, end of subsection 5]. And there are those who wish to be stringent based on the Yerushalmi, chapter 3 of Shabbat, even when the hand does not recoil, but it is not so, for on the contrary, from the Yerushalmi there is proof to the opposite [ibid.]. And the interpretation of the Yerushalmi is also thus: [they made a distance for a kli rishon that the hand does not control, meaning that the hand cannot control it because of the recoiling; and this which it says "they made a distance," this is for cooking, for according to the Torah it does not cook even in a kli rishon except near the fire, and we explained this in siman 68, and examine closely].

And a kli sheni, just as we maintain regarding the matter of Shabbat that a kli sheni does not cook, so too it does not release or absorb flavor even when the hand recoils from it, and rinsing alone is sufficient. The reason is that since it is a kli sheni, the vessel itself is cold, and the walls of the vessel cool the broth such that it does not have the power to cause absorption or release. This is the opinion of most poskim. Only the opinion of the Rashba, of blessed memory [Torat HaBayit, Bayit 4, Sha'ar 1], is that even though a kli sheni does not cook, it nevertheless releases and absorbs flavor when the hand recoils from it, and it forbids to the depth of a klifeh. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 2 that it is proper to be concerned and careful in this matter ab initio, but ex post facto it is permitted without klifeh, and rinsing alone is sufficient. Thus far his words. And there are those who say that it does not release and absorb simultaneously, such as two solid items, one forbidden and one permitted, that fell into the broth of a kli sheni—it does not have the power to release from the forbidden item and cause absorption into the permitted item. However, for one of them it does have power; therefore, when a forbidden item fell into a permitted broth in a kli sheni, the broth becomes forbidden from the forbidden item, for the forbidden item releases into the broth, and regarding broth, "absorption" is not applicable, but rather mixture. Or, if a permitted item fell into a forbidden broth, the permitted item absorbs from the broth, for there is only absorption alone here [Yam Shel Shelomo, Perek Kol HaBasar, siman 71]. And there are those who agreed with his words [Taz, subsection 4, and Pri Chadash in siman 68]. But the opinion of most poskim is not so, and thus the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch stated their words without qualification in every place, that for a kli sheni, rinsing is sufficient. [And the proof that the Rashba brought from the fat of the flanks and from the heat of the sun, as the Tur wrote, the poskim rejected, for even there it is only ab initio, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 7 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, and we explained it in siman 68, section 31; and also the words of the Tur regarding the Rashba, which are very puzzling, we settled there in section 28 with the help of Heaven, see there].

Several of the poskim agreed that the difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheni is only regarding a clear liquid like broth and the like. However, a solid item like a pastida, or meat and fish, or other thick food, prohibits even when it was removed from the kli rishon and placed into a kli sheni or even into a kli shlishi, as long as the hand recoils from it. This is a logical reason, for whereas regarding a clear liquid the walls cool the clear liquid which moves and cools, a solid item always remains in its own heat and does not cool by means of the vessel. These are words of reason [Taz subsection 4 and Shach subsection 8 in the name of the Rashal, and so wrote the Issur V'Heter Klal 37]. And although there are those who disagree on this, nevertheless the primary view is like the words of those who are stringent. However, broth in which they cook vegetables or rice or legumes and the like, where they are not all one solid, one does not judge regarding this the law of a solid item [Shach ibid.]. And see what I wrote in siman 94, section 32, and below in section 24, that our teacher, the Rema, does not hold of this law.

Regarding pouring—that is, when one pours forbidden broth from a kli rishon that is yad soledet bo onto cold permitted food—dispute has increased. For there are those who say that pouring is like a kli sheni, since we maintain tata'ah gavar, and since the bottom is cold, it does not absorb. And there are those who say that it does absorb, for so it is explicitly explained in Zevachim [95b]. The halachic decision is thus: that pouring causes absorption to the depth of a k'lipah, for even according to the rule of tata'ah gavar the law is so, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. In this regard, pouring is more stringent than a kli sheni. Nevertheless, it is not similar to a kli rishon, where even if cold fell into it, it forbids the whole, as will be explained regarding tata'ah gavar; for there, since the hot is on the bottom, it has strong power to cause absorption in the thing that fell into it, and it causes absorption in the whole, as anything that is in its place has strong power. But regarding pouring, where the hot is from above and the cold is on the bottom, it does not have power to cause absorption more than a k'lipah. And so is the primary law. We have already explained this in siman 68, section 26, see there. We explained further matters there with the help of Heaven [and so it seems is the opinion of the Shach, subsection 5, see there]. And see what I wrote in section 29.

Everything we have explained regarding the laws of a keli rishon and a keli sheni, there is no difference whether a hot item or a cold item fell into them; for even a cold food that fell into hot broth in which the hand is scalded, and it is in a keli rishon, it forbids the cold food that fell into it and forbids all of it. We do not say that, on the contrary, the cold will cool it, because we hold tata'ah gavar over the upper one and overcomes it, for an item that is in its place is stronger than the item that comes into it. Therefore, if hot forbidden matter fell into hot permitted matter in a keli rishon, or even cold forbidden matter into hot permitted matter, everything is forbidden, for the lower one overcomes the upper one and heats it until it causes it to exude into the lower one. We do not say that since tata'ah gavar, behold the lower one is permitted matter and why should it not overcome the forbidden matter? For forbidden and permitted status is not relevant to this matter; rather, the overcoming is regarding the matter of heat and cold. And all the more so if cold permitted matter fell into hot forbidden matter, that everything is forbidden. But if the upper one is hot and the lower one is cold, it only forbids a kedei kelipah, even if the hot upper one is the forbidden matter. The reason that it forbids a kedei kelipah is explained in Pesachim, that even though the lower one overcomes and cools it, nevertheless, until it cools it, it absorbs a kedei kelipah. This matter applies whether both items are liquid, such as when forbidden broth fell into permitted broth or vice versa, or a solid item that fell into broth, or broth that fell onto a solid item. But two solid items where one fell upon the other, there are other laws regarding this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And all these laws also apply to meat and milk; when milk fell on meat or vice versa, we also hold that tata'ah gavar, as I wrote in siman 91. And there we asked great questions regarding this matter, see there. And we also explained there in section 12 that this speaks of when the upper and lower are equal in quantity, but if the upper is much greater than the lower, it is not relevant to say in this case tata'ah gavar, as is understood; see there.

Regarding this law that the bottom prevails, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3, and this is his wording: And all this only deals with the heat of a kli rishon, for example, immediately upon removing it from the fire one places it with the permitted substance; but if it is already placed in a kli sheni and afterwards one places the permitted substance next to it or upon it, it does not forbid at all, for a kli sheni does not forbid, as has been explained. And if one placed them next to each other, if both are hot from the heat of a kli rishon, everything is forbidden; and if one is cold, the permitted substance requires klikhah in the place where it touched. A forbidden substance that one placed in a permitted vessel, or vice versa, we also say regarding it the law that the bottom prevails, just as with two pieces. And see above siman 94. If one cut meat with a milky knife, it is forbidden to pour from a vessel containing kosher fat into a burning lamp that contains milk or oil, but post facto one need not be concerned. Thus far his words. And his words require clarification: for what does he come to teach us that it only deals with the heat of a kli rishon? This has already been explained. And there is a further difficulty from the continuation of his wording where he wrote "places it with the permitted substance etc. and afterwards one places the permitted substance next to it or upon it etc. and if one placed them next to each other etc." Thus far his words. For this phrasing belongs to two solid items, yet previously in this section we were dealing with something that fell into broth, and the laws of solid items are below in section 4, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, and this is his wording: In what case does this apply? When it fell into the cooked food, because the broth etc. Thus far his words. And what is the relevance of solid items here in section 3?

However, one difficulty is resolved by the other, and he has informed us of a new law through this, as we will explain with the help of Heaven. For behold, it will be explained further on that two hot solid items touching one another require only the removal of a layer, and this is regarding lean meat; but regarding fatty meat, it spreads through the whole thing as in cooking and requires sixty. And he wrote further on that we are not experts in distinguishing between lean and fatty, and in every case sixty is required, as will be explained. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 6 that in this case there is also the law of "the bottom prevails," and if cold fell upon hot in a fatty item, it forbids all of it if there is not sixty, see there. And consequently, according to him, the law is the same even in a lean item. And behold, according to the poskim who hold that regarding a solid item there is no difference between a kli rishon and a kli sheni, as I wrote in section 20, it follows that in a kli sheni a solid item is more stringent than a liquid item. But our teacher, the Rema, does not hold this law, as is proven from his words above in siman 94, section 7, and we explained this there in section 32, see there. And by right, he should have written this in section 6, but because it is his way to be brief, and in section 6 kli rishon and kli sheni are not mentioned at all—for there it deals with a roast near the fire where kli rishon and kli sheni are not relevant—and he would have had to elaborate, therefore he relied upon section 3. But his primary intention was to innovate that even regarding a solid item it is permitted in a kli sheni, to exclude the opinion of those who disagree [and see Shach, subsection 8, and delve into it], and as I wrote in siman 94.

And the explanation of his words is thus: and all of this only deals with the heat of a kli rishon. That is to say, every law of tata'ah gavar—both what was explained previously regarding a liquid substance and what will be explained afterwards regarding a solid substance—only deals with the heat of a kli rishon. And what is the kli rishon of a solid substance? Granted, regarding a liquid substance, the pot in which it was cooked is called a kli rishon after they removed it from the fire. But a solid substance, such as a roast that was on the fire, what is called a kli rishon? To this he says: for example, immediately when he removes it from the fire, he places it with the permitted substance, one upon the other or one next to the other, whether they are resting on the table or whether they are resting in a vessel. And we do not say that since the vessel is cold it should have the law of a kli sheni; for since he placed it immediately upon removing it from the fire, which is the intensity of the heat, the vessel also became heated and its law is like a kli rishon. [And therefore he was precise to say "immediately," for if it was after some time, even though the hand still recoils from it, nevertheless its law is like a kli sheni when he placed it in a vessel, for the vessel cools it].

And that which he wrote, "but if it is already placed in a kelli sheni and afterwards he places the permitted food next to it," etc., the depth of his intention appears to me to be as follows: Behold, regarding a solid mass roasted over the fire, the definition of kelli rishon and kelli sheni does not apply to it as it does to a cooked dish, as I have written. For if we were to judge this like a cooked dish, even the kelli rishon into which one places the solid mass would also be like a kelli sheni, since the walls cool it down. Rather, one must certainly say as I have written: that since he places it immediately upon its removal from the fire, the vessel also becomes heated. If so, even if he moves it from vessel to vessel, if this is done immediately, the second also has the status of the first, as is understood. Furthermore, for if it were not so, when he removes it from the fire onto the table and immediately places it in a vessel, it would be judged as a kelli sheni, for the table is like a kelli rishon and the vessel is like a kelli sheni. Rather, it is certain that they are all like a kelli rishon. It follows that the definition of kelli sheni regarding this is only when it remains for some time in the vessel or on the table until the great heat of the fire passes, and afterwards he places it into a vessel—this is a kelli sheni. And this is what he says, "but if it is already placed in a kelli sheni," and this is like saying, "but if it was already placed and he put it into a kelli sheni," and his intention is as I have written [so it appears to me].

And afterwards he wrote: and if he placed them one next to the other—meaning that with "one next to the other" there is neither "the lower" nor "the upper," and the law is like "the upper," that if one is cold, a kelipah is sufficient. For since they are placed side by side, they do not press against one another such that it would heat the whole thing, and a kelipah is sufficient. Nevertheless, if both are hot, even though there is no pressure here, nonetheless everything is forbidden, for through the heat of both of them, the absorption spreads through the whole thing. And so too with meat and cheese that touched one another and one is cold and one is hot, one must peel both of them. And some say that regarding issur and hetter that are placed side by side and the issur is hot with the heat of a keli rishon, the hetter is entirely forbidden [Yam Shel Shelomo, siman 63]. But the primary view is like the opinion of our teacher, the Rema [Shach, subsection 9], since there is no pressure here, as I have written.

And afterwards he wrote that regarding a prohibited substance placed in a permitted vessel, we also say in this case "the bottom prevails" just as with two foods. And his intention is that if one placed a hot permitted substance in a prohibited bowl and the bowl is cold, we say "the bottom prevails" and the permitted substance requires a kelipeh and that is sufficient. And likewise, if one placed a hot prohibited substance in a permitted bowl, one must peel the bowl [and so it appears from the Shach, subsection 7, and so wrote the Issur V'Heter, Principle 36, Law 5]. And if the bowl is hot and the prohibited substance is cold, seemingly since "the bottom prevails," the entire bowl is prohibited. And likewise, if the bowl is of a prohibited substance and the food is permitted, the entire food is prohibited, for a vessel prohibits the food even without liquid, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 7. However, to prohibit the entire bowl is impossible, for even with the insertion of a spoon, it does not prohibit the place that was not inserted, as is written in siman 94. Therefore, it appears that in all cases the bowl requires only a kelipeh [and see Shach, subsection 10, and Chavat Da'at, subsection 9, and it requires further study, and examine it closely]. And in a case where there is the pressure of a knife, it is more stringent, as is written in siman 94 regarding the law of one who cut meat with a milky knife, see there.

And regarding that which he wrote, that it is forbidden to pour from a vessel containing kosher fat into a burning lamp etc., the reason is because the vapor rises from the lamp upward; however, post facto there is no concern, as this is not like the essence of the prohibition. Nevertheless, one who pours hot forbidden fat into cold permitted fat, even post facto it is forbidden, and it is not relevant to permit it on the basis of "the bottom prevails," because through the pouring, the permitted fat is melted and dissolved, and everything becomes mixed and forbidden [Darkhei Moshe and Taz subsection 6]. And the law of pouring regarding foods we explained in section 21. And some say that even if the stream was interrupted, it requires peeling [Shach subsection 5], and it is not similar to siman 92, for there it concerns vessels; and it is also not similar to siman 68 regarding pouring upon a chicken, for there the absorption and expulsion are simultaneous, see there, which is not the case here [ibid.].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 4 wrote regarding that which was explained, that hot in hot or cold in hot forbids the whole thing if there is no sixty. This is their wording: In what case are these things said? When they were mixed by way of cooking, such as if it fell into the cooked food. But by way of roasting, such as a hot forbidden item or even a cold one that fell onto the roast that is near the fire, it does not forbid the whole thing, but only a kedei netilah, which is the thickness of a finger's width. Therefore, a thigh that one roasted with its sinew [and its fat], or a forbidden piece that one roasted with a permitted piece and they touch one another, one must remove a kedei netilah around the sinew, and likewise from the piece in the place where it touched the forbidden piece. And likewise, if a forbidden item fell onto a piece in the pot that is outside the broth, and one did not shake the pot and did not cover it, it only forbids a kedei netilah. But if it is in the broth, according to Rashi the whole thing [is forbidden], and according to Ri even a part of it, as was written in siman 92; or even if the whole thing is outside the broth and one shook or covered the pot, the broth diffuses the taste and mixes it and it enters into the whole thing. Thus far their words. And the reason is explained, for with a liquid thing like broth, the broth carries the discharge of the forbidden item and mixes it into the entire cooked food. But a solid thing that fell onto another solid thing, even if both are boiling or even near the fire, if they were completely dry, it would not be forbidden at all, as was written in siman 91; only since they are moist, it forbids up to a kedei netilah, for so the sages estimated, that up to the thickness of a finger the forbidden item enters into the permitted item. And consequently, such is the law regarding a piece in a pot that is outside the broth, as was written in siman 92, and there the dispute of Rashi and Ri was explained; see there.

They further wrote: In what case is this said, that the roast only forbids the amount of a netilah? Regarding a thigh with its sinew and similar lean items, which do not have the power to diffuse through the entire piece. However, a fat kid that was roasted with its chelev, if there is not sixty in the entire kid against all the chelev within it, it is forbidden to eat even from the tip of its ear; for since it is fat, it diffuses through all of it [meaning that it oozes and continues to spread throughout all the meat]. But if it is lean, even though there is not sixty against all the chelev within it, it only forbids the amount of a netilah, for the chelev of a lean animal is lean by its nature and does not diffuse. And even if the forbidden piece is lean and the permitted piece that was roasted with it is fat, the forbidden matter diffuses through all of it [because the permitted matter fattens the forbidden matter until it also becomes like fat, and afterwards the forbidden matter fattens the permitted matter and diffuses through all of it]. And any item that has diffusion that fell upon a known location of the piece in a roast, even though there is sixty in the piece to nullify the forbidden matter, it requires netilat makom. Thus far their words. For in this, a fat roast is more stringent than cooking, and the reason is simple: for in cooking, all the forbidden matter, even in the place where it fell, is entirely mixed within the cooked food, for the broth mixes it; but in a fat roast, granted that it diffuses through the entire piece, nevertheless, in the place where the forbidden matter fell, we consider it as if it is still present and has not entirely exited. Therefore, in that place, it forbids the amount of a netilah. However, from the words of the Rambam in chapter 15, it is explicitly clear that regarding a fat item, when there is sixty, all of it is permitted and it does not require netilat makom at all, see there. And there are others among the Rishonim who hold accordingly [see the Beit Yosef]. Nevertheless, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled without qualification according to the words of the one who forbids, as his reasoning is logical.

And there is a question regarding this: how did we say that even when the permitted substance is fat and the forbidden substance is lean, sixty is required because the permitted substance fattens the forbidden and the forbidden fattens the permitted? For it is a great principle in the laws of prohibitions that the forbidden object cannot prohibit except in a place where the prohibition itself is able to travel. Since the forbidden substance is lean and does not have the ability to spread throughout the entire permitted substance, how can the permitted substance prohibit it more than the prohibition itself prohibits? And some wish to answer that here it is because of aroma, as written in siman 108, for regarding aroma it is necessarily so that the forbidden substance receives an aroma from the permitted substance and prohibits it. But it is impossible to say so, for if it were because of aroma it would not be prohibited, as we established there that aroma is of no consequence [Taz, subsection 10].

And regarding the Tur, there is even more reason to wonder, for he himself wrote at the end of this siman, and this is his wording: And this matter of a piece of forbidden food forbidding its neighbor through its touch is specifically when its prohibition is due to itself etc. but if it has no prohibition other than what it absorbed from elsewhere, it does not forbid its neighbor even if they were roasted together etc. even if the piece of permitted food is fatty etc. because the fat does not carry the prohibition with it except to a place where the prohibition can go by its nature. Thus far his words. Behold, he contradicts his own words, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already wondered about him in his great book; see there. Therefore, there are those among the Acharonim who rejected this law entirely [Taz ibid. and Pri Chadash subsection 19].

However, in truth, Heaven forbid that we should reject their words, and the Tur also does not contradict himself. For the matter is thus: it is certainly an absolute principle that the forbidden item cannot forbid more than the prohibition itself; however, this is regarding the essence of the prohibition. But in the matter of lean and fat, where the lean item does not have the strength to diffuse, for by its nature it is capable of diffusing but because of its leanness its strength has been weakened, therefore when it smells the aroma of the fat of the permitted item, it strengthens itself and diffuses. And this is the matter of "aroma" that they answered—meaning, not because of the prohibition of the aroma, but rather that the aroma strengthens it. And the Tur holds that this strengthening is only relevant if, at any rate, the lean forbidden item is a prohibition in its own right; but if it is only absorbed with a prohibition, the fat of the permitted item does not avail it, and we do not grant the fat two powers: to make the absorbed matter like the essence of a prohibition and that its fat should strengthen it with the power to diffuse. [And the Beit Yosef himself, even though he wondered at the Tur, nevertheless did not bring this law in section 7 and wrote only when the forbidden item is fat, as is written there in the Be'er HaGolah, letter aleph]. Furthermore, the source of the law is from that which is found in Pesachim [76b] in the dispute regarding "aroma," that even when the forbidden item is lean and the permitted item is fat, the permitted item fattens the forbidden item, see there. And in the Aruch, entry "patam," he explains that it is a term meaning they make it fat, and if so, it automatically becomes fat and in all its laws its status is like a fat item. And in truth, we only say this law in a matter where fatness is relevant, such as meat and the like, for even though it is lean, it nevertheless possesses the power of fatness; but in a thing where fatness is not relevant at all, such as bread and the like, we do not say this law. [See the Nekudot HaKesef and Bach and Kereti U-Peleti subsection 10 who labored over this, and according to what I have written it is settled simply; and so wrote the Rema in Darkhei Moshe, that we only say "fattens" regarding lean fat, see there, and his intention was not specifically "fat" (chelev), and the Taz wondered at him since in Pesachim it is meat, however his intention was a matter where "fat" is relevant, meaning fatness, and note this].

And know that regarding this which has been explained, that with roasting it only forbids a k'dei netilah, seemingly it must be said that this is in a case where the thigh, or the forbidden and the permitted, were roasted on the coals or are placed in a hot oven. For if they were roasted on the spit, since it is the way of a spit to be turned, it automatically imparts flavor to the whole, as was written in Orach Chaim siman 467 section 15 regarding a chicken roasted on the spit on Pesach in which a grain of wheat was found, where for this reason the whole is forbidden. However, there is no proof from there, for the turning of the spit only causes the absorption of a mashehu, and this is only regarding the prohibition of chametz which is forbidden in a mashehu, and not regarding other prohibitions [and so wrote the Magen Avraham there subsection 35, and see Chavat Da'at subsection 10].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that anything cooked without broth or baked has the status of roasted in every respect. And there are those who say that we are not experts in what is called lean or fat, and one must forbid in every case until there is sixty, and even if there is sixty, it requires removing the place of contact, and such is the custom. And specifically regarding the prohibition of chelev or other prohibitions where fatness is relevant, but regarding a prohibition where fatness is not relevant and it is certainly lean, it only forbids the amount of a removal. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters is that it is not specifically meat, but rather anything cooked without broth or baked which is a solid mass where a prohibited item touched a permitted item and they are hot and have moisture, they forbid the amount of a removal, and a peeling is not sufficient as it is in salting. And afterwards he wrote: and there are those who say that we are not experts between lean and fat; meaning, regarding meat where we distinguished between lean and fat—that in fat one requires sixty and in lean a removal of the place is sufficient—we are not experts, and in all of them one requires sixty and also a removal of the place, and such is the custom. For indeed there are opinions that according to the essential law, any hot item with a hot item, even without broth, requires sixty, and this is the opinion of the Ra'avad in chapter 9, see there. However, we do not rule accordingly except regarding fat meat, and if so, we who are not experts must require sixty in every case. And so as not to err that in every lean thing one requires sixty, he returns and explains that only regarding meat and milk and the like where fatness is relevant do we forbid even in lean ones, but in a case where fatness is not relevant at all, such as in bread and matzah and the like, a removal is sufficient.

And know that even though we do not distinguish between lean and fat, nevertheless there is a practical difference regarding the removal that we required in addition to the sixty. In this, the lean is more stringent, for with fat, when it was lost and we did not know the location of the removal, since there is sixty it is permitted. This is not the case with lean; even post facto, one requires sixty against the location of the removal [Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav, subsection 11]. And the reason is simple: for with fat, it is merely a stringency that we required removal of the location, since it spreads through the entire piece. Indeed, there are poskim who hold that even ab initio removal is not required with fat [Yam Shel Shelomo, chapter Gid HaNasheh, section 28, as the Shach wrote in subsection 15], but we do not rule accordingly; therefore, post facto it is valid. This is not the case with lean, where the sixty is a stringency and the removal is according to the essential law; therefore, even post facto it is a hindrance. Consequently, in a case where the permitted substance is fat and the prohibited substance is lean, and we explained that the permitted substance fattens it and its law is like fat, here too the removal is not a hindrance post facto. And it appears that the law that the permitted substance fattens the prohibited substance applies only when both are hot; but if one is cold, even if it is the upper one, we do not say "the lower one overcomes" to such an extent that it heats it and fattens it [and so it appears in Da'at Torah, subsection 22, and from the Yam Shel Shelomo; and the Pri Megadim in Siftei Da'at, subsection 14, is in doubt about this, but his opinion also appears so, see there].

And it has already been explained that even regarding two solid things we say "the bottom one prevails." Therefore, regarding something that has seepage in a roast, if one was hot and one was cold, the bottom one prevails. Consequently, if hot fell upon cold, it only forbids a peel's thickness. And if cold fell upon hot, if there is not sixty in the permitted substance against the forbidden substance, everything is forbidden, and all the pieces join together for sixty, as will be explained in the laws of salting [part 4, subsection 19].

And this matter, that a piece of forbidden food prohibits its neighbor in a case of cold upon hot when it touches it, is specifically when the piece is forbidden in its own right, such as a piece of nevela or terefa, or a piece of basar be-chalav—meaning a piece of meat that has absorbed milk—for the entire piece is considered like the substance of the prohibition and not like an absorbed prohibition, as I wrote in siman 92. However, if it contains no prohibition other than what it absorbed from elsewhere, such as a piece of kosher meat that was cooked or roasted with nevela meat and became forbidden, it does not prohibit another piece that touches it even if they were roasted together, for an absorbed prohibition does not exit from one piece to another piece without liquid, and it does not prohibit even a kedei kelipa. And some maintain that even meat that has absorbed milk is called an absorbed prohibition, for even though they treated it like a piece of nevela, they did not treat it like nevela itself regarding this matter; and this is the opinion of the Rashba [Torat HaBayit, Bayit 4, Shaar 1], and so is the opinion of several poskim. However, from the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 7, it does not imply so. Therefore, it is certain that in this case we do not require sixty, and removing the place of contact is sufficient; for since the reason we required sixty is because we are not experts in distinguishing between lean and fat, as I wrote, therefore in this case we do not judge it like a fat prohibition [Shach, subsection 17].

And this, that an absorbed prohibition does not exit without liquid, is specifically when the absorbed matter is a prohibition that is not fatty and does not spread; but if it absorbed from things that spread by their nature, such as fat, it prohibits its neighbor, whether in roasting or when they touch one another, hot with hot, or when the bottom one is hot and the top one is cold, because the prohibition absorbed within itself spreads and exits from piece to piece. But if the bottom one is cold, even a peeling is not necessary, for the reason that one peels when hot falls into cold is because until it cools it absorbs, as has been written, and this is only from the substance of the thing itself, but from that which is absorbed within it, the coldness arrives beforehand [Shach, subsection 21].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 8: A kidney that was roasted in its chelev does not forbid more than the thickness of a peel, for the membrane separates. Thus far their words. This means that although even with lean chelev a taking-away is required at the very least, and certainly the chelev of the kidney which is surely fatty and requires sixty, nevertheless, since the membrane separates between the chelev and the kidney, the absorption does not enter the kidney, and only a peel from the kidney is required because the membrane itself has absorbed from the chelev [Tosafot 97a, s.v. "kilya"], and as I have written above in siman 64, see there. However, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who forbid, and such is the custom and one should not change it, for according to the conclusion of the Gemara there, this reasoning does not stand, and also there is a concern that perhaps the membrane was torn. Therefore, if we judge it as fatty, it requires sixty, and if it was cooked thus, the entire kidney becomes neveila and requires sixty against all of it. And it is not necessary to say if it was salted or roasted first, that it previously became neveila and automatically requires sixty in the cooking; rather, even if it was cooked without salting or roasting, it requires sixty against all of it because of the prohibition of "attached," for the kidney is attached to the chelev and hastens to absorb more than the other pieces in the pot. And we do not say that at least for this the membrane should be effective so that it is not considered an attached prohibition—arguing that by the time it passes through the membrane it will also pass to all the pieces and the travel of the absorption will be equal—we do not say so. And such is the law regarding the membrane on the diaphragm. And this is here regarding roasting and cooking, but regarding salting, it has already been explained in siman 64 that for all membranes one only requires a peel in a place where there is some loss, see there. [And that which is written in the Shulchan Aruch section 9, that even in salting membranes require a taking-away, this refers to the fat of the membranes and not to the membranes that separate between chelev and meat, as is proven there. And I wonder at the Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav subsection 18 who remained with this in further study, for it says there "if it is the fat of the sinew and the threads within it and the membranes etc.," meaning the fat of the membranes, and examine this carefully].

And that which we said, that an absorbed prohibition does not emerge without liquid, this applies to a food item; since it has its own discharge from its body, that which it absorbed from others does not emerge from it without liquid. However, a prohibition absorbed in a vessel, which has no discharge of its own, the absorbed substance emerges from it even without liquid. Therefore, a vessel that absorbed a prohibition, even a lean prohibition, and it is hot from the heat of a kli rishon and they placed heter in it, it prohibits the food up to the thickness of a peel and no more, even if a prohibition is absorbed in it. And if the food has some moisture, it prohibits up to the thickness of a finger-breadth. In this, a vessel is more lenient than food, for with oil it prohibits up to sixty, and there is one who wishes to say that with oil, even in a vessel, sixty is required, but the halacha is not so [see Shach subsection 24, but the Magen Avraham siman 451 subsection 37 and the Pri Chadash subsection 28 disagree on this, see there]. And from vessel to vessel, the absorption certainly does not travel without liquid and it does not prohibit at all. But a cooked dish, such as of rice or of fish or other things in which meat or milk or a prohibited item was absorbed, and there was not sixty in the dish against them, and one inserted a spoon into it, the absorbed substance certainly prohibits; and the entire dish is considered as if it is entirely meat or milk or prohibition, for the term "absorbed" does not apply to this, but rather "mixture" [Shach subsection 22 in the name of the Rashal, see there]. And in siman 92, section 34, we explained that regarding meat alone or milk alone, one only needs to measure according to the value of the meat or the milk, see there; but regarding a prohibition, according to that which we establish that "a prohibited piece itself becomes prohibited" regarding all prohibitions, one must measure against the whole of it, and there we explained the reason, see there.

It appears to me that in all the laws that were explained regarding the contact of a hot item with a hot item without liquid, it is only so if they were placed one upon the other or one next to the other for some time, for if they were immediately removed from one another, there is no logic at all that it should forbid in a single moment. And all the more so regarding placement in a vessel, which does not forbid unless it remained for some time. And more than this, I saw a certain great authority who wrote that even a solid mass that fell into liquid and was immediately raised out does not forbid. And he brought proof from what was written in siman 92, that if milk fell into a pot of meat onto a piece that was outside the liquid, and one stirred and covered it immediately, we join the entire pot to sixty [Pithei Teshuvah, subsection 8, in the name of Hemdat Yamim]; evidently, it is not forbidden immediately. And these are words of reason. Nevertheless, it appears to me that there it is literally immediate, but in hot with hot without liquid or in a vessel, if it did not remain for some time, it is not forbidden. And perhaps the measure is the time it would take to place it on the fire and for it to begin to boil, like pickling in brine. And one must deliberate on this for the halachic ruling.

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said that a salted item is like a boiling one, and the measure of salting is whenever it is not edible because of its salt [112a]. We have already explained in siman 91, section 26, that there is a dispute among the Rishonim regarding this, for Rashi, of blessed memory, explained that this refers to the salting of meat for preservation, which is not edible until they soak it in water and rinse it well. This is the opinion of the Ra'avad and the Ra'ah [Torat HaBayit, beginning of Bayit 4], and their inference is from the fact that the Gemara did not say "whenever it is not edible with its salt" but rather "because of its salt"; perforce the intention is that because of its salt it is not edible even after rinsing until they soak it well in water. However, the opinion of the Rashba, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch is like the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, that it is any that was salted like the salting for a pot, and "whenever it is not edible because of its salt" means that because of the salting it is impossible to eat without rinsing. Therefore, with salting less than this measure, such as salting for roasting which is possible to eat while the salt is on it, it is not like a boiling item. And thus we rule, as this is the opinion of most of the poskim. And the brine that drips even from salting for roasting is forbidden.

And we further explained there that the time of boiling begins immediately after the salting, and some say that until the duration of salting, which is the walking of a mil, it is not yet considered as boiling, and only from then onwards, once the salt has already become heated, is it considered as boiling; and we do not rule accordingly, as I wrote there in section 28, see there. And we also explained there in section 29 that even according to those who hold in siman 69 that after the time of salting it is not considered as boiling, they admit here that it is always considered as boiling until the rinsing; for just as when the salt is engaged in extracting it weakens its strength, it is not so regarding salting that is not for the purpose of removing blood, where its strength is not weakened and it is like boiling, as I wrote there in section 30, see there, even though our teacher, the Rema, does not hold accordingly; and even if salted on one side it is considered as boiling.

However, as to how much the salting prohibits, our teachers disagreed on this. And although in the Gemara it is explicit that salted is like the heat of a roast, and if so, just as in a roast it requires the removal of a finger's breadth, and a fatty substance that permeates requires sixty, so too in salting; and indeed some say so [the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit]. Nevertheless, most of the poskim agreed that in salting, a peeling is sufficient. For indeed, the measure of removal in a roast is not explicitly explained in the Gemara, only the poskim learned it so, as the Rosh wrote [chapter Gid HaNasheh, section 24]. This is his wording: However, we have not found in any place that a peeling is sufficient for a roast etc., therefore a roast requires removal etc. However, it appears that one need not be stringent regarding the heat of salting, and a peeling is sufficient. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that the decision of the poskim is so. And it can be said according to their words that when the sages said "salted is like heat," the primary intention is that it is not like cooked but like the heat of a roast, and less than it, for its heat is not as strong as the heat of a roast; and because there is no other name, they therefore said "like the heat of a roast," but in truth it is less than it.

And even regarding fatty meat and fat, the Ramban, of blessed memory, is of the opinion that it does not diffuse like a roast to forbid up to sixty. And that which they said, that it is like the heat of a roast, this was to exclude the heat of a cooked dish; however, regarding this matter it is inferior to a roast, for even though in a roast the chelev diffuses, in salting it does not diffuse [Beit Yosef]. But the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that it diffuses like a roast, and on the contrary, according to logic one could say that in salting it diffuses more than in a roast because of the moisture that exits the meat by means of salting, and it is like a broth to carry the forbidden substance and spread it throughout [ibid.]. And this is the opinion of the Tur and the Beit Yosef in section 9, and he divided them into three levels: that in lean meat it is like a "peel's thickness," and in the fat of the sinew and the veins and membranes which are not so fatty it requires "taking away," and in complete chelev it requires sixty.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef: A salted item that cannot be eaten due to its saltiness has the status of a boiling item and it emits its entire volume. If it is the fat of the gid, its tendrils, or the membranes, one should be stringent and require them to have the place of contact removed. If it is actual chelev, one requires sixty to nullify it. If the meat that was salted with it is fatty, even with the fat of the gid and its tendrils, one requires sixty to nullify it and must remove from the place it touched the thickness of a finger-breadth, and not less than a peel, etc. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words in what he wrote, "and if the meat that was salted with it is fatty," etc., means that the fatty meat is attached in one piece with the fat of the gid and the tendrils [Taz, subsection 20]. But if so, he should have stated an even greater novelty: that fatty meat, when connected to something entirely lean, also requires sixty, just as in the case of roasting where the permitted substance goes and fattens the forbidden substance [Shach, subsection 28]. However, his intention was because the fat of the gid is only a rabbinic prohibition, and I might have said to be lenient in this, for there are those who said that for this reason we are lenient regarding it with removal of the place of contact, as has been explained, and not because it is lean. There would have been room to say that in this case too one should be lenient; he comes to teach us that it is not so, and all the more so when it is connected to a Torah prohibition, even if it is entirely lean [Pri Chadash, subsection 34, see there]. There are some of the poskim who disagree on this and hold that this reasoning, that the permitted substance fattens the forbidden substance, only applies to roasting where the heat of the fire fattens both this and that, but not in the heat of salting [Shach, ibid. and Pri Chadash, subsection 35]. As long as the forbidden substance itself is not fatty, one does not require sixty in salting. And even according to the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, this only applies when both are salted, but when one is unsalted, even if the permitted substance is unsalted, we are not stringent in this, for when it is unsalted it does not have the power to fatten the forbidden substance [ibid.].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this, and this is his wording: And there are those who say that any salting only forbids to the extent of a kedei kelipah, and since we are not experts in distinguishing between fatty meat and lean meat, we are accustomed to estimate in every salting with sixty, just as in cooking, etc., and all this applies to a forbidden substance that possesses fattiness, etc. Thus far his words. And his words are puzzling, for these "those who say" hold that even with a fatty substance it only forbids to the extent of a kedei kelipah, and if so, what is this that he concludes, that since we are not experts in distinguishing between lean and fatty we estimate everything with sixty? Even with a fatty substance, a kelipah should suffice. And there is one who explained that this is what he meant: And there are those who say that even with a fatty substance a kelipah suffices, but the primary view is like the first opinion, and since we are not experts, we require sixty even for a lean substance [Shach, subsection 34]. And according to this, the main point is missing from his words. And there is one who explained that this is what he meant: And there are those who say that even with a fatty substance a kelipah suffices, but it is proper for us to be stringent like the first opinion, and since we are not experts, etc. [Taz, subsection 24]. And this is even more puzzling, for besides the fact that the main point is missing from his words, why was he so stringent due to a lack of expertise in lean substances, since according to the essential law he holds that even with a fatty substance a kelipah suffices? Furthermore, at the end of the section it is proven that he does not hold like this opinion at all, for he wrote, and this is his wording: There are those who say that in a case of great loss one may permit in salting by means of a kelipah, even though it is already the custom to estimate every salting with sixty even with a lean forbidden substance; and one may rely on this for a lean forbidden substance, for which it is only a custom to estimate with sixty, but not for a fatty forbidden substance, which by the law requires sixty. Thus far his words. Behold, he holds as the law like this opinion that a fatty substance requires sixty, and if so, why did he bring at all this "there are those who say" that any salting only forbids to the extent of a kedei kelipah, since he does not hold so? Therefore, it appears to me to reverse the version, and it should be said thus: "And since we are not experts, etc." and it refers back to the words of the author, that we estimate even with a lean substance with sixty due to the lack of expertise; and afterwards he says, "And there are those who say that any salting only forbids to the extent of a kedei kelipah," and therefore if there is sixty among everything—and his intention is regarding what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, was stringent about with other pieces, as will be explained with the help of Heaven—he was lenient as will be explained, and he made this opinion, which holds that every salting is only a kedei kelipah, a supporting factor for this leniency. But regarding the essential law, he does not hold so, and therefore he was compelled to conclude at the end of the section that with a fatty substance even in a case of great loss we do not rule leniently with a kelipah, since by the essential law it requires sixty. [So it appears to me].

The opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, regarding this matter requires clarification, for he wrote at the end of chapter 15 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, and this is his wording: Salty nevela meat that was mixed with slaughtered meat is forbidden because the essence of the nevela is absorbed into the body of the slaughtered meat, and it is impossible here to rely upon either the taste or the measure. Thus far his words. This implies that he forbids it even in more than sixty [and so wrote the Bach and the Kesef Mishneh]. This is very astonishing, for from where does he have the basis to say so? Behold, in the Gemara they explicitly said that it is like the heat of roasting and requires sixty as in the case of boiling, so how can he forbid even in more than sixty? And what logic in the world is there to forbid more than sixty? However, it appears to me clear that the Rambam, of blessed memory, had another approach in all these matters of roasting and salting, and he does not hold at all to the distinction between lean and fat, neither in salting nor in roasting. This is evident from his words there previously, where he wrote: A kid that one roasted with its chelev, it is forbidden to eat even from the tip of its ear, for the chelev is absorbed into its limbs and it improves it and imparts taste to it; therefore, if it was lean and had no chelev of the kidneys nor chelev of the innards, but only a small amount like one in sixty, he peels and eats until he reaches the chelev. Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote the reason for the permission in a lean animal because it was nullified in sixty, and not because a lean animal does not diffuse [and this is like the second answer in Tosafot 97a, starting with the word "Hahu," see there, while the poskim adopted the first answer, and examine this closely].

And according to this, it has been explained that the Rambam holds that even regarding roasted meat one requires sixty as with cooked meat, and consequently, since salted is like boiling, even with salted meat one requires sixty for everything, even for a matter that is not fatty. And if you should say, if so, what difference is there between cooked, roasted, and salted? The truth is that there is no difference between them except regarding rabbinic prohibitions, such as the fat of the gid, and similarly the veins and the membranes where they are stringent regarding their fat and not by Torah law; in this case, with cooked meat they were concerned to require sixty, but not with roasted meat. This is explained in his words there, where he wrote, and this is his wording: Similarly, a thigh that one roasted with the gid hanasheh within it, he peels and eats until he reaches the gid and casts it away; and similarly, an animal that one roasted whole and did not remove the prohibited veins or membranes, he peels and eats, and when he reaches a prohibited matter, he cuts it and casts it away, for there is no imparting of flavor in the gidin, etc. Thus far his words. Behold, he was not concerned for the fat of the gid or for the prohibited membranes in roasted meat, whereas regarding cooking, he wrote there previously in law 17, and this is his wording: Similarly, the fat of the gid hanasheh that fell into a pot of meat, one measures it with sixty, etc., and even though the fat of the gid hanasheh is from their words, etc. Thus far his words. And besides this, there is no difference between them.

It appears to me that he learned this from the Mishnah regarding a thigh in which the gid hanasheh was cooked, etc. And it is stated in the Gemara: Shmuel said, they only taught this if it was cooked with it, but if it was roasted with it, one peels it and eats until he reaches the gid. And the reason is because of the fat of the gid, for regarding the gid itself we hold that there is no imparting of flavor in gidin. And so too later in the Gemara [97b]: Those thighs that were salted in the house of the Exilarch with the gid hanasheh; Ravina prohibited them and Rav Aha permitted them. Rav Aha said to Ravina: What is your reasoning? Because Shmuel said that a salted item is like a hot item, etc.? But didn't Shmuel say they only taught this if it was cooked with it, but if it was roasted with it, one peels it and eats until he reaches the gid? And if you should say, what is "like a hot item"? Like a hot item of a cooked dish—but since he said "pickled is like cooked," it implies that by "hot" he meant the heat of roasting. It is a difficulty. Thus far his words. According to this, we do not find in the Gemara a distinction between roasting and cooking except regarding this matter and not regarding any other matter. And according to this, it is also so regarding salting, that in all matters sixty is required. [And that which is answered, "chelev is different because it permeates," this is the explanation: chelev which permeates is different because it is prohibited by Torah law, and the novelty is not the permeation; and examine this carefully].

And according to this, that which is found in the Gemara [112b]: Rav Mari bar Rachel had meat from a slaughtered animal salted together with meat from a terefah animal, and Rava prohibited it for him, and he also brought this rule that "salted is like boiling," see there. And behold, according to most poskims we will need to press the matter, either that it was fatty meat and requires sixty, or that in truth he only prohibited it for him to the depth of a peel, and the plain meaning of the Gemara does not imply so, for if it were so, it should have been specified. But according to the Rambam, it is explained according to its plain meaning as with all prohibitions, that it prohibits until sixty, and the Shas did not need to clarify this, for it is obvious that when there is sixty it is permitted even in cooking, and there is no novelty in this.

And these are the words of the Rambam that we cited, and from here he learned this law. And this is what he says: Meat of a nevela that was salted and mixed with meat of a shechita, it is prohibited—meaning, until sixty. And he did not need to clarify this, as it is a simple matter, and as is written in the Gemara. And he added: "Because the essence of the nevela is absorbed into the body of the meat of the shechita, etc." He comes to provide a reason for this law that "salted is like the heat of roasting," for seemingly there is no heat of fire here. To this he says that also by means of salting, the essence of the nevela is absorbed into the meat of the shechita—meaning, and kelipa or netila is not sufficient. And he adds and says that "it is impossible to determine here neither the taste nor the measure"—meaning, that even if according to logic it is possible that the strength of its heat is not like the strength of the heat of fire, nevertheless it is impossible to determine the taste and the measure to know how far the absorption entered because it is min be-mino. Therefore, it is necessary to measure with sixty as with all prohibitions, for it is for this reason the sages, of blessed memory, said: "salted is like the heat of roasting."

And according to this, for him the essential law is thus: that salting and roasting require sixty, whether it is fat or lean. And know that the commentators raised an objection against him from his words in chapter 7, law 17, where he wrote: one may not salt fats with meat, etc., and if it was done, the meat is not forbidden, see there. And they answered several resolutions for this [Kessef Mishneh]. And there is one who resolved that there it deals with a case where both are salted, and since the permitted substance is also occupied with discharging, it does not absorb. And even though regarding fattiness we do not say this reasoning, nevertheless the absorption is minimal [Radbaz in the Warsaw edition]. However, it is impossible to say so, for the source is from that of Rav Mari that we cited, and there it is explicit that the permitted substance was also salted. But in truth, this is not necessary, for even though the permitted substance was also salted, nevertheless it was not a salting to extract the blood, but rather a salting to preserve it for a time, and it had already been purified of its blood; therefore, the permitted substance is not occupied with discharging, as I have written. And therefore he was precise here to say that slaughtered meat was mixed with it, because in the salting for preparation one salts in order, one next to the other, but in the salting that occurs afterwards they mix them together, as is known, that they place them together in a vessel, one upon the other and one inside the other. And above in chapter 7 he wrote: one may not salt fats with meat, and this is at the time of the salting of the meat for preparation, for the entire subject there speaks of the preparation of salting, see there [and he does not interpret like the interpretation of Rashi].

It results from this that there are three opinions regarding salting: according to the Rambam, it always requires sixty; according to the Ra'avyah and the Ramban, it always requires a kelipah; and the Rosh, the Rashba, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch distinguish between lean and fatty, for lean a kelipah suffices and for fatty sixty is required. According to our custom, we are stringent even with lean due to a lack of knowledge. Therefore, in a matter where fatness is not relevant at all, such as with chametz on Pesach, according to everyone it only forbids up to a kelipah, and in Orach Chaim siman 467 several laws were explained regarding this, see there. So too, in a case of great loss, one may permit it by means of a kelipah in lean meat. All of this is the decision of our teacher, the Rema, and such is the custom.

Everything that has been explained is regarding the piece that the chelev is attached to, or where the chelev is placed upon the piece or placed exactly next to it. But what is the law regarding other pieces that were salted together with that piece which the chelev is attached to? Do we say that just as in roasting it was explained that the prohibition of fat absorbed in a piece—the prohibition exits to another piece even without juice, as I wrote in section 40 [and in the Shulchan Aruch section 7]—so too in salting, since "salted is like boiling"? Or perhaps not for all matters is "salted like boiling," for behold, in roasting we require the removal of a finger's breadth, and in salting a peeling is sufficient, as I wrote in section 46. And according to the opinion of the Ramban, even in the essence of the diffusion they are not equal, as I wrote in section 47. And it is possible that also in this law they are not equal [and the difficulty of the Taz subsection 22 is answered, and the Nekudat HaKesef and Pri Megadim there, and according to what I wrote it is simply settled]:

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 9: And all this is regarding the piece itself that the chelev is attached to; and regarding the other pieces that were salted together, if there is not in each one of them individually enough to nullify the chelev, they are forbidden, and they do not combine together to nullify the chelev, for chelev does not diffuse from piece to piece without liquid. And if it is not known if it touched all of them, all are forbidden. And if it is known that it only touched one, but it is not known which one it is, all are permitted, for one is nullified in two, even if they are pieces fit to be honored. Thus far his words. Since the prohibition is not due to itself, we do not judge in this the law of a piece fit to be honored, as I wrote in siman 101. And the explanation of his words is as follows: if it is known that the chelev touched each one of the pieces, there must be sixty in each piece to nullify the chelev, and therefore those that do not have sixty are forbidden, and they do not combine with one another for nullification as in cooking or roasting, because in salting chelev does not diffuse from piece to piece without liquid. And therefore, even if it is not known if it touched all of them, they are forbidden, as it is a doubt regarding a Torah prohibition. And only if it is known that it only touched one are they all permitted, according to the law of dry in dry, where one is nullified in two. And one cannot say: granted that the chelev did not touch the other pieces, nevertheless, all of them touched the piece that the chelev is on; and granted that there is no concern here that perhaps from the chelev absorbed in the piece it will exit to the other pieces, because chelev does not exit without liquid as I wrote, nevertheless, the piece that the chelev is attached to becomes neveilah, and if so, even its own discharge forbids. However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, follows his reasoning in siman 92 that regarding other prohibitions, except for meat and milk, we do not say "a forbidden piece becomes itself forbidden." And if so, according to us, as we hold "a forbidden piece becomes itself forbidden," there must necessarily be sixty against the entire piece that the chelev is attached to. And more will be explained regarding this, with the help of Heaven, in section 62; see there.

And there is one who asked a great question regarding this: since the prohibition is only due to the chelev itself, if so, when there is sixty among all the pieces, in any case it should be permitted even when the chelev touched all of them, for the chelev only has the power to prohibit up to sixty. And if so, if we divide all the parts of the discharge from it among all the pieces, of necessity there is sixty to nullify it. And ultimately, one can only say that perhaps into this piece all the chelev was discharged and there is not sixty against it, and if so, this piece should be nullified among the rest of the pieces according to the law of "dry in dry." And what difference is there between when we know that it only touched one of them or that it touched all of them? Behold, it does not have the power to prohibit more than sixty since he holds "the piece itself does not become a prohibited carcass" [Shach, subsection 30]. Therefore, the great authorities were forced to explain his words as referring to a case where only in all the pieces combined is there sixty to nullify, but in the majority of them there is not sixty against the chelev, and therefore it is impossible to nullify in the majority [Pri Chadash, subsection 39 and Kereti U'Peleti, subsection 21]. However, it does not seem so, as he did not clarify all of this. However, the reason is simple according to what we established in siman 106, that even one who does not hold "the piece itself becomes a prohibited carcass" regarding other prohibitions, nevertheless the piece always remains in its prohibited state, see there. And if so, the reason is simple, for it can be said that one piece absorbed the entire discharge of the chelev and became prohibited, and afterwards the discharge of the chelev exited from the piece into the chelev, and the chelev returned and was absorbed into another piece, and from there as well it exited into the chelev and the chelev returned and was absorbed into another, until they all became prohibited [the Gara].

And there is a further question regarding this: why did he rule that if it is not known if he touched all of them, all of them are forbidden? For behold, each one should be permitted by the reasoning of a double doubt: a doubt if the chelev touched it, and if you say it did touch it, perhaps it only touched it alone and not the others, and it is nullified in the majority of permitted matter. And the answer to this is: since the majority was never clarified for us, as regarding each one we can say that this is the forbidden one, this is not within the category of a majority. For nullification in a majority does not apply unless we know that there is certainly a majority of permitted matter here, such as a piece of forbidden matter that was mixed with two pieces of permitted matter and it is impossible to recognize them, where we know clearly that there is a majority of permitted matter here. But here, behold, it is possible that there is no majority of permitted matter here, and it is only by reason of doubt that perhaps there is a majority, and therefore nullification in a majority does not apply [ibid.]. And a proof for this is from that which the Torah obligated an asham talui for one piece from two pieces, even if one is large and one is small. And seemingly, he should not be obligated for the small one in any case: for if the large one is the chelev, then this [the small one] is fat; and if the large one is the fat and the small one is the chelev, it should be nullified in the majority. Rather, certainly since there is also a doubt regarding the large one that perhaps it is chelev, there is no clarified majority here, and nullification in a majority does not apply [ibid. in the name of the Responsa of the Rashba, siman 272, and it requires further study, and one must deliberate on this a great deal].

And know that there are those who disagree with what I wrote, that if it is known that it only touched one of them they are all permitted because one is nullified in two, and they raised a difficulty against him: for milk and meat are "kind with a different kind," as written at the beginning of siman 98, and "kind with a different kind" by Torah law requires sixty because "taste is like the substance" is by Torah law. If so, how can the piece that contains the taste of milk be nullified? For if they taste the flavor of milk in it, it would be a "recognizable prohibition" which is not subject to nullification, and if so, let a specialist taste it and the prohibition will be clarified [Pri Chadash, subsection 41, and this is the intent of the Shach at the end of subsection 30]. And as for that which we hold that by Torah law "dry in dry" is nullified by a majority even when it is a different kind, as the Tur wrote below in siman 109, this is in a place where there is no recognition of taste, such as where there are many kinds and one of them is prohibited and it is not known which it is [ibid.]. Therefore, they rejected his words in this. And in my humble opinion, the law is with our teacher, the Beit Yosef, for it does not appear so from all the poskim, and the law is settled that "dry in dry" by Torah law is nullified by a majority even in a different kind, provided only that the prohibition is not recognizable, such as if it was crumbled into thin pieces; and if he truly senses the prohibition, he shall not eat it [see Shach, siman 109, subsection 8]. And all the more so in a case like this, which is literally "kind with its own kind," except that one of them absorbed a different kind, and in appearance it is literally "kind with its own kind" as will be seen in siman 109, and even by rabbinic law it is nullified, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven [see Pri Megadim in Shiftei Da'at, subsection 30, who also wondered about this and wrote that what they cited from the Issur V'Heter is a different matter and refers to what the Mordechai wrote, that even if it touched all of them they are permitted; see there].

Our teacher, the Rema, followed a different approach and is lenient in all of this, namely, that we combine all the pieces for the nullification of the chelev. For he holds that a fatty substance passes from piece to piece by means of broth; and even according to the one who does not hold so, nevertheless, we rely in this matter on the opinion that even with a fatty substance one only requires kelipah in melihah. And only in one matter was he stringent, to require sixty in all the pieces against the entire piece that the chelev is attached to, and his reason is simple, because of an attached forbidden substance, for he ruled in siman 92 that regarding all prohibitions we say chanan.

This is his wording in section 9: And there are those who say that all salting only forbids a kedei klippah, etc., for if there is sixty among the whole against the piece that the chelev is attached to, then everything is permitted except for that piece that the forbidden substance is attached to; however, that piece that the forbidden substance touched requires a slight klippah, and if he does not know which one it touched, everything is permitted. And if there is no sixty, everything is forbidden, and one should not change the custom. And even though there is a slight leniency in this if the forbidden substance was fatty and spreads, nevertheless, one may rely in such a case on the words of those who are lenient and hold that it does not forbid through salting more than a kedei klippah, so that we should not need to estimate between a fatty forbidden substance and a lean one, for we are not experts, etc. Thus far his words. And there is one who wishes to explain that this refers specifically to when it is known that it did not touch most of them [Shach, subsection 35], but it does not imply this from the beginning of his words, for since he wrote that they all combine, it implies that even if it is known that it touched all of them. And that which he wrote afterward, "and if he does not know which one it touched, everything is permitted," his intention is regarding the matter of klippah, for if it touched all of them and the place of contact is known, they all require klippah, and if it is not known, they are all permitted and do not require klippah [and so it appears from the Pri Chadash, subsection 46, see there]. And the matter is simple, that if the chelev is not attached to a piece of meat at all, but rather it is by itself, that also all the pieces combine for the nullification, for this and that are one and the same.

And behold, we have explained all the matters according to the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, who distinguished between salting and roasting in several details, as has been explained. However, one of our teachers among the later authorities wrote that according to the opinion of our teachers among the early authorities, there is no difference between salting and roasting in any detail, except for the Rosh, of blessed memory, who wrote that regarding roasting we are accustomed to be stringent with the removal of a finger's breadth, and regarding salting with a peel's thickness, as I wrote in section 46. But all the early authorities did not hold this way, for the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that even regarding roasting a peel's thickness is sufficient, and only in boiling broth did the sages of blessed memory in Pesachim [page 87] require the removal of a finger's breadth, and not in the fat of meat. And such is the opinion of the Ran. And according to the opinion of the Tosafot and the rest of the poskekim, in both of them the removal of a finger's breadth is required [the Gra, subsection 52, see there].

And so too regarding the matter of permeation, whoever holds that in roasting a fatty prohibition goes out from piece to piece without liquid holds the same regarding salting, and this is the opinion of the Rashba, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote in his name (Chapter 9, Halacha 8), see there. And also regarding salting he holds thus (for he explains "a basket of meat" [98a] as being full of salted meat). And the Mordechai holds that both in salting and in roasting, a fatty prohibition does not go out without liquid, and this is also the opinion of the Tosafot (108a, s.v. "tipat"). And the Mordechai wrote this in the end of the chapter "Hanashah" in the name of Maharam of Rothenburg and in the name of Sefer HaTerumot (ibid. subsection 42). And also the opinion of Rashi appears so (since he explains "basket" as a pot, which is cooking, see there). And so is the opinion of our teacher Aaron HaLevi as I wrote in section 46. And so all the Rishonim equated salting to roasting in every matter. And we have, regarding the law, only the rulings of our teacher, the Rema, for it is customary to follow him (the Pri Chadash wrote in subsection 32 in the name of Mahariw that regarding the fat of the intestinal wall that was salted with the intestine, if the intestine is attached to the fat of the intestinal wall, then it is almost certain that there is sixty against the chelev).

It is a simple matter that what has been explained regarding the prohibition of salting together forbidden and permitted food, in what case does this apply? When both are salted, or the forbidden food is salted even if the permitted food is unsalted. However, if the permitted food is salted and the forbidden food is unsalted, it requires only rinsing, even if the forbidden food is placed upon the permitted food. We do not say that the bottom side of the forbidden food becomes salted from the top side of the permitted food, for through such contact it does not become salted. There are those who prohibit if they touch one another, and one may be lenient in a case of loss, for the primary view is like the first opinion; and in siman 70 this was explained, see there.

And this which we have forbidden regarding a salted forbidden substance and a bland permitted substance—and consequently, if it is fatty, it forbids up to sixty—this is specifically when the salted forbidden substance was on the bottom and the bland permitted substance was on top, for we establish that the bottom prevails. However, if the bland permitted substance was on the bottom and the salted forbidden substance was on top, it only forbids a peel's thickness. And there are some of our teachers who disagree on this and hold that regarding a salted substance, "the bottom prevails" does not apply, for the salted substance always emits into the bland substance and does not absorb from it. And the reason is that specifically with the heat of fire is there a distinction, that the one which prevails over its fellow heats it or cools it, for such is the way of the generation of fire. But with salting, that which is bland does not have the power to nullify the power of the salting, and similarly, the salted substance does not have the power to make the bland substance salted, for such is the way of salting, that it cannot be nullified except through rinsing [Shach, subsection 41]. And if both of them are salted, even according to the first opinion, it is forbidden in all manners.

Salting only applies to foods and not to vessels. That is to say, even if a vessel has absorbed a Torah prohibition and it is "of its day," and one salted permitted food within it, the permitted food does not become prohibited. This is because the power of salting is insufficient to extract that which is absorbed from the vessel. And even though we wrote in section 42 that regarding the extraction of an absorbed prohibition without liquid, a vessel is more stringent than foods, see there, that is when the heat is by means of fire, such as a kli rishon and the like, but not with the heat produced by salting. Furthermore, there is another reason here to be lenient, for it has already been explained that whenever the prohibition is unsalted and the permitted food is salted, it does not prohibit. Here too it is so, for the vessel in which the prohibition is absorbed is unsalted and the permitted food within it is salted, and therefore it does not prohibit. This is what is common in the mouths of the poskim to say: salting does not apply to vessels.

And it implies that specifically to expel from the vessel, salting does not have the power, but to absorb into the vessel, it does have the power. For example, if they salted a forbidden item in a vessel, the vessel becomes forbidden for cooking permitted food in it. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already explained this matter in his great book, siman 69, regarding what is explained there: that if one salted in a vessel that is not perforated, it is forbidden to use that vessel for a hot item. For even though "there is no salting for vessels," this means that what is absorbed does not exit by means of salting, but it does absorb by means of salting, and what was absorbed does not exit by means of salting but rather by means of cooking, as he wrote there.

Therefore, if they made cheeses in the molds of Cutheans and they are within their day of use, and the cheeses are very salty, the cheeses are not forbidden, for there is no "salting for vessels." The same law applies if permitted food was salted in other forbidden vessels within their day of use, and even if the vessel is not perforated such that the brine can flow from it, for "salted is like boiling" is not so potent as to extract from the vessel what is absorbed within it. However, this is specifically after the fact, but initially it is forbidden because there is one who holds that there is "salting for vessels." And even though we do not rule accordingly, nevertheless, initially one must be concerned [the Raviah holds there is "salting for vessels"]. And that which we permitted initially in siman 69 when they salted in a vessel that is not perforated—and the vessel became forbidden for returning to salt meat in it even after it was perforated—is because there is another reason there: "since it is occupied with emitting, it does not absorb." And also, one should not ask why they permitted initially at the end of siman 137 to salt in vessels forbidden due to wine of libation or to place other liquids in them, see there; because in many matters they were lenient regarding wine since their absorption is through cold. And in the Responsa of the Rashba [siman 385], he permitted salting meat in a vessel in which they place wine for storage, see there.

And so too, salt or spices that are placed in a meat bowl, it is permitted to place them into milk. And the same law applies if they are resting in a forbidden vessel, it is permitted to place them into the cooked food even ab initio; for since they are dry, it is not applicable at all that they should absorb from the vessel, provided that the vessel is clean and there is no forbidden substance attached to it. And if the salt and the spices are moist, it is permitted only ex post facto, for the reason that there is no salting for vessels, and it is like the previous law. However, one who is stringent in all this, a blessing shall come upon him. And it has already been explained in siman 88 that all of Israel have the custom to have a salt vessel for meat on its own and for milk on its own, because many times they dip the meat itself into the salt; see there.

Salt that has absorbed blood, such as from the salting of meat, and they placed it in a pot, or they placed salted meat in a pot without rinsing: if there is sixty times the volume of the salt, it is permitted. It is not sufficient to have sixty times the volume of the blood absorbed within it, even according to the one who does not hold of "the prohibited piece itself becomes prohibited" regarding other prohibitions, because we do not know how much blood it absorbed. When there is sixty, it is permitted even though the salt still imparts flavor to the pot, since the salt is not prohibited due to itself but rather due to the blood within it; for in any place where the prohibition cannot travel, that which was prohibited does not prohibit more than the prohibited substance within it. It is a simple matter that you have no pot that does not frequently contain sixty times the volume of the salt, for if it were not so, it would be impossible to eat the food due to the abundance of salt [Beit Yosef]. At the end of siman 134 it will be explained that salt into which they place blood to whiten it is permitted because it is to its detriment; see there. One of the great authorities was asked regarding salt that they stabilize with the blood of a nevela [this is not to whiten it but rather to stabilize it], and he replied that it is a "stabilizing agent" which is not nullified even in a thousand. Specifically, to eat it as it is is prohibited, such as to dip an egg or cold food into it, but to mix it into a cooked dish is permitted ab initio in a time of pressing need, and "one may not nullify a prohibition ab initio" does not apply to this, as his intention is not to nullify the prohibition. All the more so if the blood alone is not the stabilizer, as there is another thing that stabilizes it, it is "this and this cause it" and is permitted in every case. Also, if the fire causes the stabilization as well, the fire and the blood are "this and this cause it" and it is permitted [Responsa of the Rama mi-Fano siman 28, and the Pri Chadash brought it at the end of this siman and agreed with him in the ruling; see there].