Siman 102

It is a fixed law in the Shas that a thing that has permitters—meaning that the prohibition is not forever—even in a thousand it is not nullified. And this is only in like-kind with like-kind, and not in unlike-kind, as will be explained. And the reason for the matter is that the rabbis were stringent in this, for since after a period of time he can eat it through permission, he should not eat it now by means of nullifying the prohibited with the permitted [Rashi at the beginning of Beitzah]. And they further said regarding this a correct reason: because any thing that is similar to its fellow does not nullify it, but on the contrary, strengthens it; and any thing that is not similar to its fellow weakens it and nullifies it. And this fact that like-kind with like-kind is nullified by a majority, even though they are similar to one another, nevertheless, since in prohibition and permission they are opposites, they are not similar to one another. Therefore, in a thing that has permitters, where they are equal even in permission after a period of time, they do not nullify one another. Therefore, in like-kind with unlike-kind, since essentially they are not similar to one another, it is nullified even in a thing that has permitters [Ran, Nedarim 52b]. And according to the first reason it is also well-settled, for whenever it is mixed with unlike-kind, the permitted status is not called upon the prohibited thing itself, but rather by the name of the thing with which it was mixed, and it is like that which does not have permitters [Shach, subsection 4].

And so our sages, of blessed memory, said [Nedarim 58a]: Anything that is a davar sheyesh lo matirin, such as tevel, ma'aser sheni, hekdesh, and chadash, the sages did not set a measure for them; meaning, that even in a thousand it is not nullified. And anything that does not have matirin, such as terumah, terumat ma'aser, challah, orlah, and kilayei hakerem, the sages set a measure for them. Thus far their words. Tevel is called a davar sheyesh lo matirin because one is able to separate for it from another location [Ran]. However, from this itself one cannot separate, for since it was mixed with chullin and is not recognizable, perhaps he will separate from the chullin, and it would be from the exempt for the obligated and would not be terumah. And also from another location he should not separate from certain tevel for it, for according to the Torah, tevel mixed with a majority of chullin is exempt, rather he should separate from rabbinic tevel, such as from an unperforated pot [Rosh]. And so too, if this tevel that was mixed is only tevel for ma'aser from which terumah was taken, he can separate for it from demai [and with this the difficulty of Tosafot in HaSoker 73b can be settled, which says the reason regarding tevel is "as its permission so is its prohibition," and only the Rambam in chapter 15 of Ma'achalot Assurot wrote this reason, while in Nedarim they said it is due to the reason of davar sheyesh lo matirin; for in HaSoker it deals with complete tevel even for terumah and he does not have an unperforated pot, and this has no matirin because he cannot separate from demai for it since demai is exempt from terumah, but in Nedarim it deals with tevel for ma'aser for which he can separate from demai which is very common]:

And ma'aser sheni and hekdesh are called davar she-yesh lo matirin because they have a permit through redemption; and hekdesh refers to hekdesh of bedek ha-bayit, for which there is redemption. And chadash is a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for after the sixteenth of Nisan it is permitted. And similarly, nedarim and konamot are davar she-yesh lo matirin [ibid. 59] because one can request of a sage to uproot the neder and the konam, and there is a mitzvah in this to request regarding a neder [ibid.]. Therefore, terumah and challah—even though one can also request of a sage—nevertheless, this is not a mitzvah and it is not considered davar she-yesh lo matirin. But regarding nedarim, it is a mitzvah to request regarding his neder [ibid.]. And similarly, ma'aser sheni is a mitzvah in its redemption as is written in the Torah, and similarly hekdesh bedek ha-bayit, when it is not fit for bedek ha-bayit, it is a mitzvah to redeem it. But kedushat ha-guf is impossible through redemption. And similarly, tevel is a mitzvah and an obligation to rectify it. And all these matters are not like a thing that involves effort and expenses, which some say in such a case it is not a davar she-yesh lo matirin, as will be explained; for since one must do this according to the law, he is obligated to do so, and automatically it becomes a davar she-yesh lo matirin when he does so [and shevuot are like nedarim, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 5 of Hilkhot Nedarim, and even though there is no mitzvah to request, nevertheless, it is no different from a neder, and look closely].

The law of a davar she-yesh lo matirin applies even to a rabbinic prohibition, such as an egg laid on Yom Tov, which is currently muktzeh and forbidden for eating and for moving, that became mixed with many eggs; it is not nullified even in a thousand, for after Yom Tov it will be permitted, and it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin. And it is not only necessary to state that a whole egg mixed with whole eggs is not nullified, as it is also a davar she-be-minyan, but even a broken egg mixed with broken eggs is not nullified due to the reason of davar she-yesh lo matirin. And they were so stringent regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin that whereas in all rabbinic prohibitions when there is a doubt we say "a rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently," in a davar she-yesh lo matirin it is not so; for even if this egg is a doubt whether it was laid on Yom Tov or not, and it became mixed with a thousand, they are all forbidden [beginning of Beitzah].

The Rishonim asked that if so, why do we say in Menachot [68b] that those who held that chadash in the diaspora is rabbinic ate chadash on the sixteenth of Nisan because it was a rabbinic doubt, see there? For regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin, we forbid even a rabbinic doubt, as I have written. They answered that since in truth we are experts in the fixing of the month, and the fact that we observe two days of Yom Tov of the diaspora is because they decreed so upon us, we do not fear a doubt such as this [Mordechai, beginning of Beitzah]. And one should not ask that if so, an egg laid on the second day of Yom Tov of the diaspora should be permitted on the grounds that we are experts in the fixing of the month; however, it is not comparable, for regarding an egg the prohibition is due to Yom Tov, and anything that is due to Yom Tov, they did not distinguish between the first day of Yom Tov and the second day of Yom Tov so that people would not come to treat it with disrespect, as is found in the Gemara. But regarding chadash, it depends only on the days of the month, for on the sixteenth of Nisan it is permitted and before this it is forbidden; therefore, since we are experts in the fixing of the month, they did not fear the doubt [Knesset HaGedolah]. And similarly regarding eruv, they were lenient in a rabbinic doubt even though it was a davar she-yesh lo matirin [Tosafot Eruvin 45b], for in several matters they were lenient regarding eruv, as the halacha follows the words of the one who is lenient in eruv, and even a single individual against many [ibid. 46a], and therefore they were lenient in this as well.

And even though a davar she-yesh lo matirin is not nullified even in a thousand, nevertheless, if the davar she-yesh lo matirin was mixed into a majority of permitted substance, and afterwards the entire mixture was mixed into a majority of permitted substance against the entire mixture, some say it is permitted [Taz subsection 4], for they did not apply the stringency to two mixtures. And some forbid even in such a case [Shach subsection 2], and even with three mixtures they did not permit a davar she-yesh lo matirin. And specifically a sefek sefeka created through mixtures was not permitted regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin, but a sefek sefeka regarding the forbidden substance itself was permitted even for a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for later in siman 293 they permitted chadash on the grounds of sefek sefeka, and in Orach Chaim siman 497 they permitted a doubt of muktza on the second day of Yom Tov on the grounds of sefek sefeka, and in siman 110 more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven [see there in the Shach subsection 56].

It has already been explained that only in a case of "kind with its own kind" is it forbidden regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin, but not in a case of "not with its own kind," for in "not with its own kind" it is nullified in sixty. And even though regarding a biryah and a piece fitting for an honored guest the prohibition applies both in its own kind and not in its own kind, it is different there, for the prohibition is due to the importance. But regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin, the prohibition is not due to importance, but rather because he can eat it in a permitted state, and also for the reason that they resemble one another and reinforce it and do not nullify it; consequently, in "not with its own kind," it is not called by the name of the permitted substance at all, and they also do not resemble one another and it nullifies it, as I wrote in section 1. And know that here everyone agrees that we follow the name regarding the matter of "kind" and "not its kind," and not after the taste; for when they are equal in name it is called "its own kind" even though they are not equal in taste, for it is called by this name and they also resemble one another in name. And when they are not equal in name, even if they are equal in taste, it is "not its own kind" [Shach, subsection 3].

And even though regarding a different species we do not say "a thing that has permitted status," nevertheless our teacher, the Rema, wrote that an egg laid on Yom Tov with which one glazed food or placed in a pot to improve the pot, such as where they filled a chicken with it, it is not nullified. Thus far his words. And the reason regarding glazing food with it is because since it is done for appearance, it is not nullified. And similarly regarding improving the pot, for whenever things are maintained together, it is like the same species and is not nullified, like water and salt in dough which is considered like the same species, as is proven in the Gemara at the end of Beitzah. And it is similarly explained in Orach Chaim siman 514, which deals with where it is done for appearance and taste, it is not nullified; see there. And know that appearance is only like a minute amount, and therefore only regarding a prohibition of "a thing that has permitted status" is it not nullified, but regarding other prohibitions that are nullified in sixty, appearance is of no consequence. Therefore, if one glazed food with a treif egg, the food is permitted, for there is certainly sixty in this, and appearance is of no consequence [Kereiti U'Peleiti and Chavat Da'at].

And that which was explained, that anything made to improve the pot is considered like kind with its kind, there is one who disagrees with this. For since regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin we follow the name and not the taste, and when they are not equal in name, even if they are equal in taste, it is called not of its kind, as I have written, if so, it is obvious that that which improves the pot is no better than those that are truly equal in taste, and nevertheless, since they are not equal in name, it is not of its kind [Yam Shel Shlomo, Chullin chapter 8, siman 88]. And according to this, he ruled that without appearance it is nothing, but rather when there is taste and appearance, it is like the prohibited substance itself and is not nullified. And even when that egg that was laid on Yom Tov was mixed with many eggs and they whitened a food with them, and there is taste and appearance in this, even though this is from all the eggs and not from this egg alone, nevertheless, since they were all prohibited in the mixture due to the reason of davar she-yesh lo matirin, they all became like the body of the prohibited substance, and their taste and appearance is like the prohibited substance itself and is not nullified [ibid.]. But the Tur wrote in siman 92 that by means of a minute amount of prohibition it does not become nevelah; if so, they did not all become like the body of the prohibited substance [Pri Megadim in Shiftei Da'at, subsection 3]. And perhaps regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin it is different, and it requires further study for the law. And from the words of our teacher, the Rema, it is explicitly clear that the prohibition is only if they whitened the food with the egg itself, and not when they whitened with the mixture.

There is one who wrote that if one smeared loaves on Yom Tov with an egg that was born on that day, he should remove from each loaf a "taking's worth," which is the thickness of a finger, and then the loaf is permitted to be eaten on Yom Tov, and that which he cut off as a "taking's worth" he shall eat the next day [Ba'er Heitev subsection 1 in the name of the Knesset HaGedolah]. But it appears to me that the loaves are completely permitted, for the smearing of the loaves contains no substance, and it is not similar to the flavoring of food. And so it is explicitly proven in Pesachim [76a] that smearing is nothing, and they call it a mere "something," see there. And even though regarding a "thing that has permitters" even a "something" is forbidden, that is when the essence of the forbidden item was a substance, but through the mixture it became a "something," such as if it was mixed in a thousand, nevertheless it is not nullified. However, this is not so when the essence of the forbidden item is a "something." And is the prohibition of a "thing that has permitters" superior to Pesach, where the Torah forbade the cooking, and nevertheless they said there that regarding a mere smearing we have no concern? Furthermore, it will be explained that in a case where the food will spoil, we do not apply the law of a "thing that has permitters." And it is known to all that regarding loaves, if they leave them for the next day, the taste will be lost, for warm bread is much better. And see what I wrote in section 19, and it requires further study.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2 that they only said a davar sheyesh lo matirin applies when the permitting factor is destined to come in any event, such as an egg born on Yom Tov that was mixed with others, which is permitted in the evening in any event certainly. And likewise, if the permitting factor is in his hand to perform without loss, such as tevel that was mixed with tithed fruits and he has other tevel in his hand from which he can separate for this mixed tevel, and likewise anything similar to this. But anything that is not in his hand and it is not certain that the permitting factor will come is not under the law of a davar sheyesh lo matirin. Therefore, an egg of a doubtful terefah that was mixed with others, even though it is possible that the hen will conceive again and they will all be permitted, or that the hen will live twelve months, it is not under the law of a davar sheyesh lo matirin, because the permitting factor is not certain and is not in his hand. Therefore, it is nullified like a forbidden egg that was mixed with others, and likewise anything similar to this [and this is from the Rashba in Torat HaBayit].

And there is a question regarding this: why do we need the reason that an egg of a doubtful terefah is not considered a davar she-yesh lo matirin because the permit is not certain and is not in one's hand? Even without this, this is not a matter of davar she-yesh lo matirin at all, for davar she-yesh lo matirin applies to something that is now forbidden and tomorrow will be permitted, like an egg laid on Yom Tov. But a doubtful terefah is permitted in any event: for if it becomes clear that it is kosher, it is kosher, and if it becomes clear that it is a terefah, then it has no permit; and if so, in any event it is permitted to eat it immediately when it is mixed. And there is one who answered that this refers to an egg of a doubtful terefah that was laid on Yom Tov; for if based on the "in any event" reasoning, granted that from the perspective of the doubtful terefah this is so, but from the perspective of it being laid on Yom Tov, one would have to wait until tomorrow. But because of the reason that the permit is not certain and is not in one's hand, one is permitted to eat it on that very day when it is mixed, for even from the perspective of Yom Tov it is not appropriate to call it a davar she-yesh lo matirin since the permit is not certain due to the doubt of its terefah status, and consequently it is not included in davar she-yesh lo matirin [Be'er Heitev of R.Z.M. subsection 5].

However, some say that an egg from a doubtful terefah or a certain terefah that was laid on Yom Tov and became mixed requires waiting until the night because of Yom Tov, as it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin [Pri Chadash subsection 7, and Tzemach Tzedek, and Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav subsection 7]. Therefore they answered that even though in truth it is permitted from whichever way you look at it, nevertheless, now when there is a doubt, he eats in a state of doubtful prohibition; and if there were a law of davar she-yesh lo matirin in this, he would be obligated to wait until the permission is clarified. And a proof for this is from a woman who vowed to be a nazirite, and her husband heard and annulled it for her, and she did not know of the annulment and drank wine and became impure to the dead—she requires atonement [end of Kiddushin]. And I do not know the comparison to this, for there, according to her mind, she indeed committed a prohibition, but here in a mixture, it is permitted from whichever way you look at it and is not in the category of davar she-yesh lo matirin [and the Kereti U-Peleti subsection 4 rightly wondered at this answer, and the Pri Megadim there wondered at him in vain, and his words are clear]:

However, according to the second reason we wrote in section 1 regarding the reason for davar sheyesh lo matirin, that similar things do not nullify one another, it is well-settled that only the name of the prohibition causes the nullification, and we follow the name as I wrote in section 7. And if so, even though it is revealed before Heaven that she will be prohibited, nevertheless, in the language of people, the name of permission is still upon her, for they expect that she will be permitted. According to this, she does not yet have nullification as long as the prohibition is not clarified, for permission in permission is not nullified. Therefore, we are forced to the reason that the permitting factor is not certain to come and is not in one's hand [Kereiti U'Peleiti there]. According to this, the primary cause is that perhaps she will be prohibited, and she has no nullification according to the language of people [and according to this, a doubt is more stringent than a certainty, and it requires further study; and examine this]. And know that every nullification of an egg that we wrote in this siman is according to the one who holds that "anything whose way is to be counted" is nullified, for we require "that which is its way to be counted," or that even this is nullified as will be explained at the beginning of siman 110. But according to the one who holds that "anything whose way is to be counted" is not nullified, it has no nullification anyway when it is whole, unless it is broken and mixed with broken ones [Issur Ve'Heter, klal 25, din 8; and he further wrote there in the name of the Or Zarua: a piece that was prohibited due to a Torah doubt (teiku) is nullified like other prohibited items, and even though it is possible that it will be permitted when Eliyahu comes, it is not called a davar sheyesh lo matirin because of this, since then the matter will be revealed that it was never prohibited at all, etc. Thus far his words. Nevertheless, this is not a contradiction to what was said above, for the coming of Eliyahu, which is only for the future to come, is not similar to the permission that will be clarified through the laying of eggs or that she will live twelve months; and examine this].

A vessel that was forbidden due to the absorption of a forbidden substance, which became mixed with other vessels and is not recognizable, is nullified by a majority according to the law of a dry substance in a dry substance, as will be explained in siman 109. We do not judge this as a davar she-yesh lo matirin because it has a permit through hagalah when it is a metal vessel, since one must incur expenses to perform hagalah upon it, and a davar she-yesh lo matirin is only called such when the permitting factor comes on its own without expenses. Furthermore, since the permit does not come on its own through time but rather through effort and one must also perform an action, this is also not included in the category of davar she-yesh lo matirin [Yam Shel Shlomo, end of chapter 6]. It is not similar to vows, which we consider in the category of davar she-yesh lo matirin even though one must also perform an action to ask a sage, for there it is a mitzvah to ask, but hagalah is not a mitzvah but rather the prevention of a loss [and the difficulty of the Shach in subsection 8 is answered].

And there are those among the Rishonim who disagree with this law and hold that a vessel among vessels, aside from the reason of davar sheyesh lo matirin, does not undergo bitul for two reasons. The first is that bitul only applies when the prohibited substance is not recognizable, and here, since it is possible to remove the prohibited substance from within it by means of hagalah, it is as if the prohibited substance is recognizable and it is not nullified [the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit at the end of Bayit 4]. And furthermore, for that which is dry within dry is nullified one in two is because there is no taste of the prohibited substance, but wherever there is taste it is prohibited, and here, of necessity when one cooks in it, it will impart a prohibited taste [ibid.]. And according to this reason, even in an earthenware vessel it does not have bitul. However, it can be said that it is impossible to call this "the prohibited substance is recognizable," and this is no worse than wood that fell from a palm tree on Yom Tov where one adds more wood to them and kindles them because it becomes ash; and so too here, when they emit the prohibited substance by means of hagalah, nothing will remain of it. And the second reason regarding the taste of the prohibited substance—is the absorption of a prohibited substance greater than the prohibited substance itself in a case of dry within dry? [And this is the intention of the Rashba in Mishmeret HaBayit, see there]. But if the absorbed substances are not alike, such as a meat vessel among milk vessels, when one cooks milk in it, the meat will impart taste, and it is not similar to dry within dry of the same kind [Chavat Da'at]. However, even in this case, when it remains for twenty-four hours, it becomes a taste that impairs [ibid.]. [And that which he can sell to a gentile without loss is not relevant to be called davar sheyesh lo matirin, as is understood, and examine carefully].

And there is one who disagrees with this ruling for another reason, for since the expenses of hagalah are a small matter, it is not relevant to say regarding this that one must incur expenses [Shach ibid. in the name of Maharil]. And the proof for this is that the Shas considers ma'aser sheni as a davar sheyesh lo matirin even when one must bring it up to Jerusalem [Bava Metzia 53a]. But I do not know what measure is given for the expense, and from ma'aser sheni there is no proof, for there it is a mitzvah to bring it up to Jerusalem and it is like the vows in section 15, and especially according to the reason of effort that we wrote there, certainly there is no proof from ma'aser sheni, as the Torah imposed this effort upon him. Therefore, the primary ruling is according to the decision of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, that that which requires incurring expenses is not included in davar sheyesh lo matirin. And for this reason, meat that was not salted that was mixed with meat that was salted, when there is a majority it is permitted, and it is not like a davar sheyesh lo matirin on the basis that he is able to salt them, since he must incur expenses for salt [Taz subsection 8]. Furthermore, since he must salt all of them, those that were already salted will be spoiled, as they will absorb more salt than is necessary, as is known; and whenever there is a spoiling of the food, davar sheyesh lo matirin is not relevant, as will be explained with the help of Heaven in section 19.

And there is one who says that in any event one must perform hagalah on all the mixtures when he wishes to keep them for a long time, for this matter is like "dry in dry," and it will be explained in siman 109 that one may not eat them all at once, and here over the course of time it is possible that he will use them all at once [Taz there]. And in my humble opinion it appears that there is no concern in this, for one need only be careful in this on the first day, and on the morrow it will be a flavor that imparts a defect. And the primary view is like the decision of the great later authorities that he should wait twenty-four hours and use them [Shach subsection 8]. And there is one who requires casting away one vessel according to the law of "dry in dry," but it is not the primary view [ibid.]. Nevertheless, it is the custom to do so, to take one vessel and perform hagalah on it, and therefore with an earthenware vessel one should not be stringent at all if he has pity on the pot.

The Rishonim wrote that wherever the food is destined to spoil, the rule of davar she-yesh lo matirin does not apply; for specifically an egg and its like, which will not spoil if it remains until the evening, the rule of davar she-yesh lo matirin applies, but a cooked dish that will spoil if one waits, the rule of davar she-yesh lo matirin does not apply to it [Rashba and Ran and Mordechai at the beginning of Beitzah]. Consequently, regarding a pastida and the like, the rule of davar she-yesh lo matirin also does not apply, for it will certainly lose its taste, as it is only good when it is hot, as is known. Regarding bread, the Rishonim wrote that it does not spoil by waiting, and it appears to me that this is only regarding matzah bread, and rolls and the like do not spoil, but known leavened wheat bread on the second day is not the same in its taste as on the day it was baked, and in my humble opinion, one does not apply to it the law of davar she-yesh lo matirin either. According to this, if they mixed an egg that was born on Yom Tov with two other eggs and made a pastida with this or put them in dough, it is nullified by a majority. But if they made a food with this egg alone, it requires sixty, for in a case of a different species, granted that one does not apply to it the law of davar she-yesh lo matirin, but sixty is at least required. And it appears to me that even according to the reason we wrote in section 1 regarding the reason for davar she-yesh lo matirin, which is because of the comparison, and according to this, what does it matter to us if the food spoils or not—nevertheless, they did not decree in a place where the food spoils [and a proof for this is that the Ran is the author of this reasoning and he wrote this law at the beginning of Beitzah, and see Terumat HaDeshen who wrote specifically when it spoils significantly, and it requires further study].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that this rule, that a thing which will become permitted is not nullified, applies specifically if the forbidden substance is present in its original form or if there is still the substance of the forbidden item in the mixture, but its taste is nullified. Thus far his words. And that which has been explained, that if one whitened food with it, it is not nullified, is called the substance of the forbidden item. However, according to his words, that which has been explained—that a forbidden vessel that was mixed with other vessels is not judged with the law of a thing which will become permitted because one must incur expenses for it—why do we need this reason? For in this case it is certainly only its taste and not its substance. Rather, since the early authorities wrote the reason of expenses, it implies that they do not hold of this law. However, from this there is not such a strong proof, for that which is absorbed renders the pot forbidden to cook in, and the pot is present in its original form. Nevertheless, the great later authorities brought many proofs that even its taste forbids in a thing which will become permitted [Shach subsection 9, and Bach, and Pri Chadash]. And there is one who wrote that what he wrote, that its taste does not forbid, his intention was when the entire forbidden item was removed in its entirety and only its taste remained there, for in such a case it is nullified; but when the forbidden item is dissolved, even though it is not discernible, it is not nullified [Kereiti U'Pleiti subsection 13, and so it appears in the Taz subsection 9]. But from the language of our teacher, the Rema, it does not imply so, and he also explained explicitly in his book Torat Chattat that anything that is dissolved and is not present in its original form is nullified [the Shach cited him there]. And there are those who decided the law accordingly, that when the forbidden item is removed, it is nullified [Kereiti U'Pleiti and Chavvat Da'at subsection 4].

And in my humble opinion, his intention appears to be that certainly when the way of this thing is for the substance of the forbidden matter not to be there—such as with chadash when they made beer from the barley, or when they whitened a food with an egg and the like—then its taste is like its substance. However, if the way of this thing is for its substance to be there and it was mixed in as such, but afterwards it was dissolved into the permitted matter, its importance is nullified. To what is this comparable? To a biryah or a piece fit to be served to guests, which, when they are crushed, the prohibition is nullified in the mixture. And so too regarding a thing that will become permitted, for even though a thing that will become permitted is not due to its importance, nevertheless, we require that it be called by the name of the forbidden thing, as I wrote at the end of section 1, and in such a case it is not called by its name at all. It is then like a kind mixed with a different kind, which does not have the law of a thing that will become permitted for this reason [and with this, all that the Shach and the Pri Chadash questioned is settled, and also the proofs of our teacher, the Rema, from Tur Orach Chaim siman 513 and other places are good and correct; see there and examine it closely].

He further wrote: and similarly, if its prohibition is not due to itself, it is nullified. Therefore, a piece of meat that was not salted within three days, even though there are those who say it is called a davar she-yesh lo matirin since it is permitted for roasting, nevertheless it is nullified, for its prohibition is only due to the blood absorbed within it. Thus far his words. And all the great later authorities rejected his words, for only regarding a piece worthy of honoring is there a distinction between a prohibition in its essence and an absorbed prohibition, because the absorbed prohibition is not worthy of honoring. However, regarding a davar she-yesh lo matirin, there is no reason to distinguish in this, for ultimately it is a piece of prohibited matter and he has the ability to eat it in a permitted manner. And the poskim who permitted a piece that was not salted within three days permitted it for a different reason: for the fact that it is permitted for roasting is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin, since for roasting it was never prohibited. And it is as we say in Yevamot [82a] that terumah is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin for the reason that it is permitted to a kohen, since to the kohen it was never prohibited; and here too it is the same, but not because it is an absorbed prohibition.

And in my humble opinion, it appears that even in this law his reason is clear, for since the prohibition is only absorbed, the object is automatically not called by the name of the absorbed prohibition but rather by the name of the object into which it is absorbed. This is like a piece of meat that was not salted, which we do not call a "piece of blood" but rather a "piece of meat," and the object is not called by the name of the prohibition. Automatically, it is like a different species, and for this reason, the law of davar sheyesh lo matirin does not apply to it, and here too it is similar. Furthermore, how is it possible that the object in which the prohibition is absorbed should be more stringent than the prohibition itself? For if the blood absorbed in this meat were in a mixture with kosher meat, we would not apply the law of davar sheyesh lo matirin to it because it is a species in a different species; and how is it possible that the meat which absorbed the blood should be more stringent than the blood itself? And regarding that which he did not write the reason that for roasting it was never prohibited, it can be said that he holds that even in such a case it is called davar sheyesh lo matirin, and it is not similar to terumah, for there they are two different people, and how can we say it should be called davar sheyesh lo matirin for an Israelite because it is permitted to a kohen? But here it is one person, and why should he eat it cooked, let him eat it roasted [and this reasoning was written by the Ran in Nedarim 52a, see there].

He further wrote: Any prohibition that was not recognizable before it was mixed is nullified, even though it is a davar sheyesh lo matirin. Thus far his words. For example, a vat full of trodden grapes that contained much clear wine before the Shabbat, it is permitted to take from the wine on Shabbat; and even though wine is also emerging now from the grapes, the wine is nullified in the wine that already emerged, and it is not subject to the law of davar sheyesh lo matirin since it never possessed the name of wine independently. Similarly, a barrel full of whole grapes that they fill with water to make tamad, and the grapes burst after a time and all the wine emerged, it is permitted to draw from it on Shabbat to drink, because the small amount of wine that emerges on Shabbat mixes and is nullified with the wine that already emerged and was never recognizable independently. And so too with anything similar to this. And they have already raised an objection to this law from what we find to the contrary, that anything that was never recognizable independently is not subject to nullification, as in the case of a yevamah who spit blood, which is valid because it is impossible without glair of saliva, and we do not say that the small amount of saliva should be nullified in the majority of blood because each one was not previously recognizable independently and they came in a mixture, and nullification does not apply to this, as is written in Even HaEzer siman 169, see there [see Mishneh LaMelekh chapter 1 of Mishkav U-Moshav halakhah 14 and in Noda BiYehudah Tinyana siman 54]. And we have already explained this in Even HaEzer there section 57 and above in siman 14, to distinguish between a matter where the very creation is such, where certainly the minority is nullified in the majority, and only regarding blood and saliva is it not nullified because it does not have to be so and there is no importance to the majority to nullify the minority, see there. And here there is further reason to permit based on the principle of "the first, the first is nullified" [as in Rosh Yosef subsection 8], and also it does not have an independent name, and therefore regarding davar sheyesh lo matirin it is like min beshe'eino mino, as I have written.

He further wrote that one who made a vow regarding a certain thing and it later became mixed, for him it is called a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for it is possible to seek an inquiry for his vow. Thus far his words. And behold, regarding a vow for a set time, this reasoning is not necessary, for when the time passes it will automatically be permitted, and it is obvious that it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin; rather, even regarding a vow forever, where I would have said that on account of the inquiry of a vow it is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin because there is exertion involved, he comes to teach us that it is not so. And the reason is because there is a mitzvah to seek an inquiry for a vow, for it is not pleasing to the Holy One, Blessed be He, when there are vows, as will be explained in siman 203. Therefore, it seems to me that regarding a vow for a matter of a mitzvah, it is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for there is no mitzvah in the inquiry of his vow, and also it is not subject to annulment, as will be explained in siman 228, see there. And similarly, when he prohibited something to his fellow, it is not for his fellow a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for it is not in his power to seek an inquiry.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 15, law 9: Chametz on Pesach, etc., is not within these general categories of prohibitions that are nullified, because the mixture is not prohibited forever, for after Pesach the entire mixture will be permitted, etc. Thus far his words. And he holds that chametz on Pesach is called a davar she-yesh lo matirin. However, the Mordechai wrote in the second chapter of Pesachim that since on the following Pesach it will return to its prohibition, it is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin; see there. Our teacher, the Rema, brought both opinions and did not decide between them. And it appears to me that it depends on the two reasons we wrote regarding the reason for davar she-yesh lo matirin: for according to the reason we wrote, that why should he eat it in a prohibited state since if he waits he will eat it in a permitted state, certainly chametz is a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for he can eat it after Pesach in a permitted state, and what does it matter to us that on the following Pesach it will return to its prohibition? But according to the reason of the equality of the things, it is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin, for there is no equality between them; since it always stands to return to its prohibition, it is like prohibited and permitted matter and is nullified. And it is possible that even according to the first reason one could say it is not a davar she-yesh lo matirin, because the Sages did not apply the stringency of not being nullified except when the permission remains forever, and not that which will return to its prohibition. And it is obvious that this deals with a case where the food will not spoil, but when it will spoil, everyone agrees that this is not included in davar she-yesh lo matirin, as has been written. And there are those who wish to say that the Rambam does not hold at all of this permission regarding the spoiling of the food, but it is not certain. And there is one who decided like the Rambam [Yam Shel Shlomo], but most of the poskim decided like the Mordechai [Magen Avraham siman 447, subsection 40], and so it is implied from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch in Orach Chaim there, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven [see Shach subsection 13 and subsection 14, and this is not the place]. And see the end of Beitzah, and it requires further study.

It appears to me that regarding the prohibition of chadash, when wheat sown in the summer—which the previous omer did not permit—was mixed before Pesach with a large amount of wheat sown the previous winter—which the previous omer did permit—and they made flour, fine flour, and tempered the wheat from them, even those who are careful regarding the prohibition of chadash may eat the mixture before Pesach, even according to the opinion of the Rambam. For when they were wheat, the chadash was nullified by the majority of the yashan according to the law of a dry substance in a dry substance, which is nullified by a majority. And there is no issue here of a thing that will eventually become permitted, for since the wheat was tempered, they are like chametz, and when Pesach arrives they will be prohibited, and even after Pesach they will have no permission, as only a mixture of chametz is permitted after Pesach but not actual chametz.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that it is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin unless it becomes permitted to the one for whom it was forbidden; but if it remains forbidden to one person forever, even though it is permitted to others—such as one who cooks on Shabbat—it is not called a davar she-yesh lo matirin. Thus far his words. This means that we maintain in Orach Chaim siman 318 that one who cooks on Shabbat intentionally, it is forbidden to him forever and permitted to others after Shabbat. Therefore, if the food was mixed on Shabbat, it is forbidden to others because for them it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin, but for him it is permitted, for behold, for him it will never be permitted. And there is one who wishes to say that specifically when it was mixed after Shabbat it is permitted to him since he has no permitters, but if it was mixed on Shabbat it is forbidden even to him because it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin for others, therefore it is also forbidden to him [Magen Avraham ibid. subsection 2]. And the matter is astonishing: for behold, it is similar to terumah in section 22, for since for him it is not a davar she-yesh lo matirin, what does it matter to me if for others it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin [Kereti U-Peleti and Chavot Daat; and that which the Magen Avraham wrote from Bikkurim is no proof, for there it was because of Jerusalem].