Siman 1

Shechitah is a positive commandment. It is not an obligatory duty like shofar, sukkah, and lulav, for if one does not wish to eat meat—there is no obligation upon him to slaughter. Rather, anyone who wishes to eat meat—it is a positive commandment that he must perform shechitah and afterwards eat, as it is said (Deuteronomy 12:21): "And you shall slaughter of your cattle and of your sheep as I have commanded you." Similarly, the shechitah of a wild animal is from the Torah, as it is said (Deuteronomy 12:22) regarding a blemished firstborn: "However, as the deer and the hart are eaten"—thus you have learned that a wild animal is like a domestic animal regarding the matter of shechitah (the Rambam chapter one and the Smag positive commandment 63). Similarly, the shechitah of a bird is from the Torah, as it is written: "who hunts a catch of wild animal or bird and pours out its blood"—teaching that the pouring of the blood of a bird is like the pouring of the blood of a wild animal (Sifrei Parshat Re'eh). And Bar Kappara taught: "This is the law of the animal and the bird and every living soul that teems in the waters"—the verse placed the bird between the domestic animal and the fish. To require it in two simanim is impossible, for it has already been compared to fish, and fish are by gathering alone and not by shechitah, as it is written: "if all the fish of the sea be gathered for them." And to exempt it with nothing is impossible, for it has already been compared to a domestic animal. How is this? It was rendered fit with one siman (Chullin 27b, and see Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh).

All the laws of shehitah were told to Moses our teacher orally at Sinai, like the entire Oral Torah, as it is written: "And you shall slaughter from your cattle and from your sheep as I have commanded you." And the commandment is the Oral Torah (Rambam ibid.). And it was taught, Rabbi says: "And you shall slaughter as I have commanded you" – this teaches that Moses was commanded regarding the esophagus and regarding the trachea, and regarding the majority of one in a bird, and regarding the majority of two in an animal (Hullin 28a). And there is an allusion to this in the word "ka'asher": the aleph is "one in a bird," and the shin is "two in an animal," and the resh – "the majority of one is like the whole." And "ka'asher" backwards in its initial letters – is "the majority of one is like the whole" (Tosafot).

Every individual of Israel is trusted regarding shechitah, for the Torah trusted each and every individual, as it is written (Deuteronomy 12:21): "And you shall slaughter from your cattle and from your sheep." "And he shall slaughter the young bull" as is written (Leviticus 1:5) regarding kodashim, and Kohanim eat by his hand, and the Torah did not require him to establish witnesses in the matter. The Torah only required witnesses for monetary punishment, for death by beit din, and for forbidden relations, as we derive "matter" "matter" from monetary law (Rashi (Chullin 10b)) that one witness is trusted regarding prohibitions (the Rambam, end of the tenth chapter (the Rambam, Laws of Shechitah 10)). And even though regarding a status of prohibition one witness is not trusted to remove it from its status, and a living animal stands in a status of prohibition—this applies to a matter that is not in his hand. However, in a matter that is in his hand—he is trusted (Yevamot 88a), and here it is in his hand to slaughter or to seek a slaughterer to slaughter. And every person is trusted regarding his own even in a status of prohibition, for this reason that it is in his hand to remove it from the status of prohibition (the Rosh, fifth chapter of Gittin 68). And our sages, of blessed memory, stated this reason there regarding tevel, that he is trusted to say that he separated terumot and ma'asrot from this because it is in his hand to separate them.

However, according to this, when the animal or the bird is not his, and he says that he slaughtered them with the knowledge of the owners, and the owners are not before us that we may ask them, how is a single witness believed? For this is not called "in his hand" since it is not his. And our sages, of blessed memory, explicitly said so regarding tevel, see there. And it is possible to say that in such a case, a single witness is indeed not believed. But it appears more likely, since the poskim did not mention this distinction, that even in such a case the shochet is believed. And the reason: since he is a fit man and is not suspected of theft, if we were to say that he slaughtered without the knowledge of the owners—behold, he is a thief. But he is established in his fitness, and certainly he slaughtered with the knowledge of the owners. And it is not similar to tevel where he is not believed in such a case, for regarding tevel, even if he acted without the knowledge of the owners—they lost nothing and he is not a thief, and we say that it remains tevel as it was. But regarding shechitah, when he slaughtered without the knowledge of the owners—behold, he is a complete thief. (And perhaps this is the intention of the Mordechai at the beginning of Chullin in the name of Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, who wrote that the fact that a single witness is not believed to remove something from a status of prohibition—this is specifically regarding the empty and reckless and not regarding the fit, see there. And his words are puzzling, as the Pri Megadim wrote in the introduction, see there. And according to our words, his intention is as I wrote regarding when the animal and the bird are not his and the owners are not here. Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

And there is a question regarding this: Since the primary basis for the permissibility of a single witness regarding shechitah is due to the principle of "it is in his power," if so, how is a person who does not perform shechitah himself trusted to testify even regarding his own animal that was slaughtered based on the reasoning that "it is in his power" to seek an expert shochet to slaughter it? Let us say: Who says a shochet would make himself available to him for such a thing? Our sages, of blessed memory, said (Shabbat 46b) regarding the inspection of a blemish in a firstborn animal: Who says a sage would make himself available to him? See there. And according to this, when the butcher says regarding his animal that it was slaughtered—we should not trust him unless we heard from the shochet that he slaughtered it. And granted that regarding a shochet appointed over the shechitah we may say that certainly the shochet slaughtered, for he did what was incumbent upon him, and the butcher is trusted. But in a village where there is no appointed shochet, and the homeowner says that he brought a shochet from the city and they slaughtered, or that he brought it to a shochet—why is he trusted? For this is not called "in his power." And it must be said that since there are shochetim in the world who take payment for the shechitah and slaughter—it is called "in his power," for it is in his power to hire a shochet. (And regarding the availability of a sage for blemishes of a firstborn—it is different, for it is forbidden to take payment for this, as we learned in Bekhorot 28a. Furthermore, it is implied from Rashi in Shabbat ibid. that it is because on a Yom Tov the sage would not want to make himself available. And according to this, it can be said that on a weekday we do not say "who says he will make himself available" at all. And see there in Tosafot, and examine carefully and you will find it easy. And so it is implied from Tosafot at the beginning of Gittin, starting with the words "Ad," that this is called "in his power," see there.)

The Rambam wrote at the end of the tenth chapter of Shechitah: Any butcher who knows these terefot, and is in the presumption of kashrut – it is permitted for him to slaughter, and to inspect for himself, and to sell. And there is no concern in this, for a single witness is trusted regarding prohibitions, whether he has a benefit from his testimony or whether he does not have a benefit. And we have already explained that we do not take meat from a butcher who slaughters and inspects for himself in the diaspora or in the Land of Israel in this time, unless he was an expert. Thus far his words. And so he wrote in the eighth chapter of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 7, and this is his wording: And we do not take meat from any butcher, unless he was a fit person and held in the presumption of kashrut, who slaughters for himself and sells and is trusted. Thus far his words. And in the Shas this law is not found; rather, the Rambam compared this to what they said in the chapter "Ein Ma'amidin": We do not take wine etc. in Syria except from an expert, see there – and all the more so meat. And he explains that since in Syria we do not take except from an expert, it is a kal vachomer in the diaspora. And the Land of Israel in this time, since there is no Sanhedrin to supervise – its law is like the diaspora. And it must be said according to his opinion that the reason the Shas did not count meat is because it is a kal vachomer from the other things it counted there. (And see there in the Maggid Mishneh and in the Lechem Mishneh, and in the Beit Yosef at the beginning of siman 119.)

And so it is proven from his words there at the end of the eleventh chapter (the Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 11) where he wrote: And in this time, one may not purchase wine anywhere except from a person who is established in fitness, and similarly meat and cheese, etc. Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad disagreed with him on the grounds that commoners are not suspected of selling a forbidden item unless they have been suspected, see there. And this is the opinion of the Tur and the Beit Yosef below at the beginning of siman 119 (Tur, Yoreh Deah 119), who wrote that only one who is suspected is not to be believed, see there. And our teacher, the Rema, there brought the opinion of the Rambam, see there. And also the opinion of Rashi, Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Ran is not like the Rambam, for they explained regarding that which one may not purchase wine in Syria—because there the shopkeepers were suspected, see there. And it is explained that regarding one who is not suspected, all are believed, like the opinion of the Ra'avad, of blessed memory.

And in the Yerushalmi at the end of the second chapter of Avodat Kochavim, it considers meat. This is the wording of the Yerushalmi: One may only purchase tekhelet from an expert. One may only purchase cheeses of the house of Unayki from an expert. One may only purchase wine in Syria from an expert. One may only purchase meat that has no sign except from an expert. Thus far his words. And according to the opinion of those who disagree with the Rambam, we say that it also refers to Syria, and because there they were suspected, but not in every place. And in the Tosefta there at the end of the fifth chapter, it is also stated as in the Yerushalmi, see there.

And there is reason to be in doubt regarding the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, whether his intention is specifically when the butcher slaughters by himself and sells to others, for then we require an expert, but a butcher who sells meat that another slaughtered – there is no need for the butcher to be an expert in order for us to believe him that he gave it to an expert slaughterer. Or, that even in such a case it is necessary either that the butcher be an expert, or that we know who it was that slaughtered the animal. And from the words of the Tur and the Beit Yosef at the end of siman 65 (Tur Yoreh Deah 65), who wrote in the name of the Rambam that one may not purchase meat from any butcher who slaughters for himself and sells for himself unless he was established in fitness, thus far his words – it implies that they interpret that specifically in such a case is an expert required. And so wrote explicitly our teacher, the Rema, in his book Darkei Moshe in this siman, letter 12, see there. And therefore, even though regarding the essence of this law they do not hold like the Rambam, as is proven from their words at the beginning of siman 119 as I have written (see there in the Shach and Pri Chadash), nevertheless in this they hold like the Rambam, since he slaughters by himself to sell – there is concern if he is not an expert.

But in truth, from the words of the Rambam himself, it appears that in any case one should not purchase meat except from an expert, as is proven from his words at the end of the eleventh chapter (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 11) which we cited. Furthermore, since according to his system there is no trustworthiness in the diaspora regarding prohibitions except for an expert, if so, what does it matter to me if he slaughters by himself or not? For behold, ultimately there is reason to suspect him of selling treifah under the presumption of being kosher, and how is this any less than wine and cheese? And so I found one of the great authorities who wrote simply that according to the opinion of the Rambam there is no distinction (Torat Yekutiel, siman 18, subsection 10). And the Tur and the Beit Yosef did not come to explain the opinion of the Rambam, but rather that in the case of one who slaughters for himself and sells, they were concerned for his words. And according to this, in the opinion of the Rambam, it is impossible to buy meat from a butcher unless he is established in kashrut, or we know who it was that slaughtered, or in large places where there are appointees over the butchers. But in a small city or in a village, it is impossible to buy from any butcher whatsoever unless the butcher also eats from this meat, for in such a case even the Rambam admits, as he wrote there at the end of the eleventh chapter (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 11). This is his wording: One who stays as a guest with a homeowner in any place and at any time, and he brought him wine or meat or cheese and a piece of fish – behold, this is permitted. And he does not need to ask about it even though he does not know him, but only knows that he is a Jew. Thus far his words. And all the more so when the butcher eats from this meat itself. Unless he was established to the contrary, that he is not a proper Jew as is explained there, for then it is simple that it is forbidden to eat at his home and all the more so to purchase from him, and as will be explained in siman 119 in the laws of one who is suspected, with the help of Heaven.

Nevertheless, it is possible that the intent of the Rambam is like the words of our teacher, the Rema, which we cited: that when he does not slaughter for himself, we are not concerned about it. The reason is: although regarding rabbinic prohibitions such as wine and cheese there is a concern with one who is not an expert that he will sell a forbidden item to others—and similarly a piece of fish, even though this is a Torah prohibition, nevertheless there is a concern that he will reason in his mind that this piece of fish is from a pure fish and will not be concerned to investigate well—however, regarding meat, when he does not slaughter himself, we would have to suspect him of violating a Torah prohibition to feed treifot to an Israelite. We do not suspect any person of Israel as long as he is not suspected of prohibitions, even when he is not an expert. Certainly, he slaughtered with a shochet, and the majority of those found at slaughtering are experts. But when he slaughters for himself and sells, we suspect him; for even if perhaps some nick is found in the knife or some question in the examination of the lung, he will reason in his mind that it is not treifah and will sell it to others. Therefore, specifically an expert is required. And in truth, in all our regions, it is not common at all for a butcher to slaughter for himself and sell the meat himself. However, if such a case is found, it is obvious that it is forbidden to buy from him unless they know him to be an expert and established in kashrut. And even if he is an expert in shechitah and took kabbalah, for certainly he is established in kashrut, nevertheless one must look after him well, for it is a near matter that because of monetary desire he will permit for himself some leniency not according to the law. One must know that he is exceedingly God-fearing, and this matter is incumbent upon the rabbi of the community and the leaders of the city to scrutinize this well.

A Yisrael who does not know all the laws of shechitah—namely, the things that invalidate the shechitah, such as shehiyah, derasah, haladah, hagramah, and ikkur, which will be explained, and the like—and slaughtered by himself without an expert shochet standing over him, even though the knife was checked, it is forbidden to eat from his shechitah, neither he nor others. This is close to a doubt of nevelah, for it is very likely that he committed shehiyah or derasah and did not know. And one who eats a kezayit from it is lashed with makkat mardut (the Rambam, beginning of the fourth chapter).

And not only that, but even if he slaughtered four or five times before us with a valid slaughter—we do not say that presumably this one was also a valid slaughter, and it is forbidden to eat from it according to the law of a doubtful nevelah. For we say: since he does not know what spoils the slaughter—it is likely that he spoiled the slaughter and did not know. And that which he slaughtered previously with fine slaughters—it just so happened for him (ibid.). And not only that, but even if they asked him "Did you do such and such?" and from his answer it appears that he slaughtered properly—one may not rely on him. And not only that, but even if he learned the laws of shehitah afterward and said "It is clear to me that I slaughtered well"—we do not listen to him, for any matter that is not incumbent upon a person—he does not have it in mind (Taz, subsection 8). And all the more so when he did not learn but merely says "It is clear to me regarding all the questions that you are asking me," and we do not pay him any heed (see Shach, subsection 12).

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the fourth chapter, law 3 (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 4): An Israelite who knows the laws of shechitah—behold, he may not slaughter by himself ab initio, until he slaughters before a sage many times until he is practiced and expert. And if he slaughtered initially by himself—his shechitah is valid. One who knows the laws of shechitah and slaughtered before a sage until he became practiced—he is the one called a "mumcheh." And all the mumchin slaughter ab initio by themselves. And even women and slaves, if they were mumchin—they slaughter ab initio. Thus far his words. And afterwards he wrote: One who is not known to us who slaughtered by himself—we ask him. If he knows the essentials of the laws of shechitah—his shechitah is valid. Behold, if we saw an Israelite from a distance who slaughtered and went away, and we did not know if he knows or if he does not know—behold, this is permitted, etc., for the majority of those found near shechitah are mumchin. Thus far his words.

And it appears to me that the Rambam interprets "expert" mentioned in the Gemara not according to the interpretation of all the Rishonim, as being one who knows the laws of shehitah. For even though it is certainly so, that when he does not know the laws of shehitah it is forbidden to eat from his shehitah when another is not standing over him, nevertheless the title "expert" is a different matter. And that is, that he has expertise in his craft, that he knows the artistry of shehitah. And this we see with our senses, that there is one who knows the laws of shehitah but is not proficient in the craft of shehitah: how to move the knife, and how to hold the neck, and how to hold the simanim, and the like. And it is not because of fainting, for we conclude explicitly in the Shas at the beginning of Hullin that we do not fear fainting. And therefore the Rambam did not mention this except to be an expert in his artistry. And therefore he wrote that the condition for the permissibility of shehitah depends on these two things: that he must know the laws of shehitah and that he must be a craftsman. And that is, that he slaughtered several times before a sage, and he saw that he knows how to slaughter. And then he is called an "expert," and he is permitted to slaughter by himself.

Nevertheless, there is a difference between the two. For regarding one who knows the laws of shechitah but is not yet an expert in his craft, granted that ab initio it is forbidden for him to slaughter by himself, nevertheless post facto if he slaughtered – his shechitah is valid. For since he knows the laws, if there were any defect, he would know of it. But when he does not know the laws of shechitah, even if he is a craftsman whom we have seen slaughtering many times beautifully, nevertheless if he slaughtered by himself – his shechitah is invalid as I have written previously, for perhaps he caused a defect and did not know since he does not know the laws. And all these laws pertain to the shochet himself.

But for others, when one comes to them to slaughter and they do not know him, the law is as follows: If they know him to be expert in the laws of shechitah, they permit him to slaughter even when we do not know if he is an expert in his craft, based on the reason that the majority of those found at shechitah are experts. And all the more so we do not fear lest he faint. However, regarding expertise in the laws of shechitah, we do not rely on this unless he has already departed and gone on his way, for then we say regarding this as well that the majority of those found at shechitah are experts. But ab initio it is forbidden to permit him to slaughter before they know if he knows the laws of shechitah. And the reason: since this matter renders it forbidden even ex post facto as has been explained, therefore we do not rely on this. And the sugya of the Shas is explained very well according to this interpretation. (And this is its interpretation: Ravina said everyone is an expert and may slaughter, meaning that he is an expert in his craft even though they are not established as not fainting. In what case are these words said? When they know of him that he knows how to state the laws of shechitah. That is to say: for an expert, he also needs to know the laws of shechitah, but if they do not know etc. and if he slaughtered we examine him if he knows the laws of shechitah etc. and if not it is forbidden etc. That is to say: and if this expert in his craft slaughtered—we examine him in the laws of shechitah. And in the conclusion of the Shas it says they all do not say like Ravina, the majority of those found etc. That is to say: for according to Ravina one does not permit him to slaughter unless they know that he is an expert in his work, and we do not fear for this as the majority of those found at shechitah are experts. But regarding the knowledge of the laws of shechitah they did not disagree with Ravina, and such are the words of Rav Nachman on page 12a (Chullin 12a): If one saw another who slaughtered etc. and rather that he did not know if he learned or did not learn, let us say the majority of those found etc.? And it means to say that certainly if he is present here—we examine him if he knows the laws of shechitah. But when he has gone—we rely also in this on the majority etc. And Ravina holds that also in the craft we examine him afterward, and ab initio it is forbidden to give to him when we did not know his craft. And in this the Shas disagrees, but in the knowledge of the laws of shechitah the Shas does not disagree, and with this it works out well what the Shas says regarding Ravina. In what case are these words said? When they know of him that he knows how to state the laws of shechitah, and the language changed from before. And so the Torat Yekutiel questioned. And so below where it says: rather on those who are not experts, is an examination sufficient, and it does not say: but you said an examination is sufficient, as in the "some say" version regarding those who are not established, where it says but you said "it is clear to me" is sufficient, see there. Rather it is because in the first version Ravina said we examine him on the laws of shechitah, and here it challenges regarding those who are not experts, and it challenges from the side of logic that an examination should be sufficient, for why should it not be effective. And according to this it works out well what the Rishonim, of blessed memory, labored over, that for the conclusion the Shas's rejection of Ravina's first version is not similar to the "some say" version. And according to what I have written there is no difference. And it appears in my humble opinion that the Rif also followed this approach, and also the author of the Halachot whom the Ran cited holds so. However, the Ran, of blessed memory, inclined their words according to the interpretation of all the Rishonim, and inclined the intention of the Rambam who feared for fainting, see there. And all the poskim followed this path. And in my humble opinion it is clear as I have written, and see Torat Yekutiel. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 1: Everyone may perform shechitah ab initio, even women and slaves. Any person, even if they are not acquainted with him, who is presumed to perform shechitah without fainting—and even if they do not know him to be an expert who knows the laws of shechitah—it is permitted to give him [an animal] to perform shechitah ab initio, and it is permitted to eat from his shechitah, for the majority of those who regularly perform shechitah are under the presumption of being experts and established. In what case are these words said? When he is not before us; then it is permitted to eat from his shechitah and we rely on the presumption. But if he is before us, he must be examined to see if he is an expert and knows the laws of shechitah. However, one does not need to ask him if he faints. And some say that one should not rely on the presumption except ex post facto, but ab initio one should not rely on the presumption in a place where they are able to clarify it. And all this deals with others who are not proficient and do not know if this shochet is proficient or not. But the shochet himself shall not perform shechitah even though he knows the laws of shechitah and is an expert, until he has performed shechitah three times before a sage and an expert in the laws of shechitah, so that he knows that he is practiced and quick and will not faint (Tur in the name of the Rambam). Therefore, it is the custom that a person does not perform shechitah until he has received a kabbalah before a sage, and the sage does not give him a kabbalah until he knows regarding him that he knows the laws of shechitah and is proficient with his hand. Therefore, it is the custom that regarding all those who come to perform shechitah, we rely on them ab initio, and we do not examine them neither at the beginning nor at the end, for all those found near shechitah have already received a kabbalah before a sage. Thus far the wording of the Shulchan Aruch.

The explanation of the matters: For the majority of our teachers explain that "expert" in the Talmud is one who knows the laws of shechitah, and "established" is one who is established as not fainting. And the halachah was decided in the Gemara that the majority of those found near shechitah are experts, and we are not concerned about fainting. And according to this, we should have permitted anyone who comes to perform shechitah to do so, and he would not require examination neither at the beginning nor at the end. And indeed, there are some of the Rishonim who wrote so. (The Me'or at the beginning of Chullin, and so it is implied from Rashi and Tosafot who wrote: Therefore, he does not need to be examined. And see the Beit Yosef).

However, the Rosh wrote in the name of the Geonim (beginning of Chullin, siman 5) that because the majority of those found near slaughtering are experts—we hand over [the animal] ab initio to anyone who comes to slaughter, based on the fact that we will examine him after the slaughtering as to whether he is an expert or not. Because even if it should happen that he goes away and we cannot examine him, or if it was forgotten and we did not examine him—it is also permitted, and we rely on the majority. But when he is before us, it is forbidden for us to eat from his slaughtering until we examine him to see if he is proficient in the laws of shechitah. And one must also ask him if he did not faint (ibid. end of siman 6), and the Tur wrote similarly in his name. And the reason: that we do not rely on the majority except ex post facto and not ab initio. And there are several matters where we rely on the majority only ex post facto and not ab initio, such as the examination of the knife after slaughtering—we do not rely on the majority, and only if the knife was lost is it permitted to eat. And similarly the lung must be examined, and if it was lost we rely on the majority (ibid.). And some disagree, holding that we are not concerned for fainting at all, and there is no need to ask him about this. And only regarding expertise do we not rely on the majority, because the minority who are not experts is joined to the status of prohibition of the animal, and the majority is weakened. And this is the opinion of the Shulchan Aruch. (And the Rashba and the Ran wrote similarly. And according to the Beit Yosef and the Rishonim—the opinion of the Rishonim is also thus, see there.)

And there is a question regarding this: for in truth, why are we lenient ex post facto? Let us say "attach the minority to the presumption." And for this reason, there is one who says that that which our sages, of blessed memory, said, "the majority of those found near slaughtering are experts" – is a common phrasing, and in truth all those found near slaughtering are experts (the Ra'ah in "Bedek HaBayit"). And according to this, that which we are stringent ab initio – this is not from the core of the law but rather a measure of piety (the Rashba in "Mishmeret" there). But it does not imply so (ibid.), rather the reason is that it is a majority, and frequently found, and very common (Tosafot Bekhorot 20b, s.v. "chalav"), and one should not be stringent ex post facto. Furthermore: that it is not relevant here to say "attach the minority to the presumption," for is it so that the minority who are not experts certainly render it treif? Behold, even this is a doubt, and it is possible that they slaughtered properly. If so, this is only a minority of a minority, and it is sufficient that we are stringent ab initio (the Rashba ibid.). Furthermore: that ex post facto it is not relevant here to say "attach the minority to the presumption," for there is no presumption of prohibition here, as the slaughtered animal is before you. And this slaughterer was occupied with removing it from its presumption of prohibition (ibid.).

And there are some of the Rishonim who hold the opposite: that which they said, "the majority are experts," is only ex post facto when they did not examine him before the shehitah, for then we rely on the majority and there is no need to examine him. But ab initio, it is forbidden for us to allow him to slaughter without examination. And even on the basis that he will be examined after the shehitah—it is forbidden. And this is the opinion of the "there are those who say" in the Shulchan Aruch (Hagahot Ashri and Mordechai and the Tur in the name of the Ittur). And for the halachah, one should be stringent like both opinions: that ab initio it is forbidden to give him to slaughter without examination, and when they gave it to him without examination—one must examine him afterward. And even if he went away from here, if they can only reach him and examine him—one must do so, unless he is already at a distance (so it is implied from the Shach, subsection 5). And also that which is written in the Shulchan Aruch, that one who slaughters for himself should not slaughter unless he slaughtered three times before a sage, and that he knows that he is practiced and quick so that he will not faint—and this is according to their interpretation of the words of the Rambam. But according to what I have written, it is not due to the reason of fainting, but rather that this is the essence of an expert, that he be a craftsman in the work of shehitah, and it is from the core of the law. Therefore, that which is written in the Shulchan Aruch, that it is the custom that a person does not slaughter unless he took kabbalah before a sage, according to our explanation of the words of the Rambam, this is not from custom, but rather from the core of the law it is so.

When the sage comes to grant a kabbalah: "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of Hashem." And especially in this generation of ours, in which heresy, leniency, and doubts regarding the words of our holy sages, of blessed memory, have increased, and they say "this tradition is pleasant and this one is not pleasant," and grave matters have become like light matters to them, may Hashem have mercy—it is certainly and obviously necessary that before everything, the sage must see to investigate the one receiving the kabbalah regarding his ways and his affairs. And afterward, he shall examine him on the laws of shechitah and bedikah, if he knows them well according to the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch and the great Acharonim. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 1:2) that he does not need to know all the distinctions of the laws, but rather if he says regarding a matter "I would have been in doubt" and asks, meaning "if this law came before me I would ask a sage"—we properly call him "one who knows," provided he does not say regarding the forbidden that it is permitted. Thus far their words. And certainly it is so, for many doubts arise; however, this was in their generation. But now that the books of shechitah and bedikah have increased, and especially the book "Tevuot Shor" which has been accepted in all the dispersions of Israel, and all the shochatim are expert in its text, and most of the questions are found in it—this one receiving the kabbalah is obligated to be expert in its text. And the sage shall warn him to be careful from ruling on any question that requires the question of a sage. And afterward, the sage shall examine his knife and see that he prepares it before him. And we are accustomed to greatly dull the knife and give it to him to repair. And the sage shall see that he has a good sense of touch and is quick in preparing the knife sharp and smooth. And if the sage himself does not understand the feeling of the knife—he shall call for an expert shochet in the city and the shochet shall see the knife. And then he shall give him a kabbalah in writing. And he shall warn him in what is proper to warn: that he should always review the laws of shechitah and bedikah. And it is also proper to warn him that he should engage occasionally in books of musar, in order to awaken his heart so that he should not, Heaven forbid, be lenient in such heavenly work that many rely upon him, and his punishment is great if he is negligent in this, Heaven forbid.

There are those who cast doubt upon the rabbis who take a fee for the kabbalah that they give to a shochet and bodek. There is no prohibition in this according to the law, for this is neither a legal judgment nor testimony, but rather a notification that this man is fit for shechitah and bedikah. And that we should suspect the rabbi that for the sake of the fee for the kabbalah his heart would incline him to give a kabbalah even to one who is not worthy of it—Heaven forbid, no rabbi is suspected of this, to cause Israel to stumble in an eternal stumbling block for the sake of a small monetary gain. And it is not similar to other suspicions found in the Shas. And so the "Tevu'ot Shor" agreed, and so is the common custom.

In our times, it has become common in small towns to hire a shochet and bodek who also serves as a sheliach tzibbur. This is proper, but on the condition that he does not occupy himself extensively with the art of music. For if he sets his heart and soul to delve deeply into the art of music with a troupe of assistants, he will not set his heart toward the shechitah, the bedikah, and the preparation of the knife. Furthermore, from this, levity increases, as is known. In small towns, there is no one to supervise him; on the contrary, women and the ignorant rejoice because he plays music with a troupe of assistants, and they do not understand that through this, he will ruin the matter of shechitah. If I had the power, I would abolish it. Rather, he should pray simply before the amud without melodies, and his heart should turn only toward the shechitah and the bedikah.

There is one who wishes to say that nowadays, since we do not slaughter without kabbalah, if one slaughtered without kabbalah – his slaughtering is forbidden in every case (Tevuot Shor section 25). And it is a great stringency, and we have not found that the enactment of the early authorities was so. For they only enacted that one should not appoint a permanent shochet and checker without kabbalah, but to forbid his slaughtering when they checked him and he knows the laws of shechitah – there is no reason for this. And only in this is it possible to be stringent now: that we should not permit if he went away, and we did not know if he knows the laws of shechitah, and we shall not rely on the principle that "the majority of those found engaged in shechitah are experts." And the reasoning is so: for how can we rely on this, when he has departed from the general majority who do not slaughter without kabbalah, and he slaughtered without kabbalah? But when he knows the laws of shechitah, and is proficient in the preparation of the knife, and slaughtered the majority of the simanim – there is no reasoning to forbid his slaughtering post facto (and so wrote the Torat Yekutiel in siman 18, subsection 7).

And with that which has been explained, that according to the essential law, anyone who slaughtered and went on his way—we rely on the principle that the majority of those who engage in shechitah are experts. Nevertheless, they should check the simanim to see if the majority of them were slaughtered, for whatever is possible to check—we check. And nowadays, since they take kabbalah—it does not require checking at all. And even though he took kabbalah, nevertheless, he should always see to review his studies, and constantly prepare a knife so that he does not forget the craft and the sensitivity. And just as the law is in the laws of shechitah, so is the law in the laws of bedikah regarding one who comes to check the lung. And their law and custom are equal in all of this. And even though one could say regarding bedikah that it stands in the presumption of permissibility, and there is a majority and a presumption, and we would not need to check everyone who comes to perform the bedikah of the lung, and we would not require kabbalah for this, and it is not similar to shechitah which stands in the presumption of prohibition—nevertheless, one must be stringent also regarding bedikah. And it is for the beit din to investigate and check after the slaughterers and the checkers that they be experts and God-fearing, for great is the stumbling block in shechitah and bedikah when they are handed over to everyone. And especially in this generation where licentiousness has increased, one must supervise very, very carefully.

One whose nature is to faint—he should not slaughter ab initio, even if he knows the laws of shechitah, and even with another standing over him (Tevuat Shor), for perhaps neither he nor they will notice his fainting. And ex post facto, if he slaughtered even by himself, and said "It is clear to me that I did not faint"—his shechitah is kosher. For since he knows the laws of shechitah, had he paused or pressed—he would not have fed it to us (Beit Yosef). And some say that even if he remained silent and said nothing—it is also kosher, for had there been a flaw he would have said so (Shach). And some disagree on this (Tevuat Shor). And it appears to me that if it is not a complete certainty to this one who slaughtered that Jews will eat it—certainly the law follows the "some disagree." However, when it is clear to him that Jews will eat it—his silence is like his speech, and if he is not trusted in his silence—he would not be trusted in his speech either. For behold, you have no silence that is more like an admission than this, and he would become a wicked person through his silence if there were a flaw in the shechitah.

And similarly, one whose hands tremble—it is forbidden for him to perform shechitah ab initio, for it is close to leading to drasah. And post facto, his law is like the previous law. And therefore, there are those who wrote that an elder after seventy years, it is proper that he should no longer perform shechitah, for his hands certainly tremble (see Pitchei Teshuvah). However, the truth is that everything is according to his health and the strength of his body, and according to the perception of the rabbi in the city.

One whom they know does not know the laws of shechitah—they may give him to slaughter if an expert stands over him and sees from beginning to end, for will he not see if he performed a disqualification? And if he saw one organ, but the second he did not see—it is forbidden. And we do not say that since he slaughtered this one well, the other he also slaughtered well. And there are those who are stringent and forbid giving him to slaughter ab initio even when standing over him since he does not know the laws of shechitah, as with a minor which will be explained, for we fear perhaps he will spoil it and they will not notice. And such is the common custom and one should not deviate.

The Rambam wrote in the fourth chapter, law 7: One who says to his agent, "Go and slaughter for me," and he found the animal slaughtered and does not know if his agent slaughtered it or another—it is permitted, for the majority of those found near slaughtering are experts. Thus far his words, and so it is in the Gemara (Chullin 12a). The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not bring this law, and it is possible they relied on the law of one who lost his kids and his chickens, which will be explained. It appears more likely that behold, this which the Rambam required the reason of "the majority of those found etc.," and we do not say to hang the matter on the fact that his agent slaughtered it, and there is no novelty in this at all—this is if we do not say the presumption that an agent performs his agency, as is explained in the Gemara there. And the Rambam holds accordingly in the fourth chapter of Terumot, see there. But the Tur, who rules later in siman 331 that we say the presumption that an agent performs his agency even in matters of Torah law—we do not need the reason of the majority of those found, but rather we hang it on the agent. (For the Tur follows the system of his father, the Rosh, in Eruvin 32a, who rules like Rav Sheshet. And the Rambam rules like Rav Nachman, see there in the Rif and the Rosh.)

Behold, if one lost his kids or his chickens and went and found them slaughtered, and in a manner where there is no prohibition of meat that was hidden from the eye, such as where he recognizes them through visual identification as being his, and the doubt is only regarding the slaughter, the law was decided in the Gemara (ibid.) that if they were found in a place where one does not throw carcasses, such as in a refuse heap in a courtyard or the like—they are permitted. For we hang the matter on the possibility that someone found them and slaughtered them, and the majority of those found near slaughtering are experts, and afterward he changed his mind about taking them for himself and left them. And even if we say that someone stole them, nevertheless they are permitted based on the reason of "the majority of those found," for one who is suspected of theft is not suspected regarding treifot. And thus it is explained in the Tosefta, the second chapter of Chullin (Tosefta Chullin 2), and so all the poskim ruled. And one should not ask according to the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, in the fourth chapter (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 4) that for one who is an apostate regarding one matter, we must check the knife for him as will be explained in siman 2, and here certainly the thief did not give it to another to check his knife. For it can be said: that despite all this, the sages did not see fit here to be stringent in this matter because it is a double doubt: perhaps he gave it to another to slaughter. And if you should say that he slaughtered it himself—perhaps he slaughtered well (Taz siman 2, subsection 9, and Shach subsection 18).

And all this is in a place where a majority of Jews are found there (Tur), for we follow the majority that a Jew found it or stole it and slaughtered it. And this is regarding chickens, which are not typically slaughtered by butchers to be sold. However, regarding kids and large animals that only butchers slaughter and sell, if only a majority of Jewish butchers are found there, even though the majority of the place itself is star-worshippers – it is permitted. For so it is implied in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 24b), and so wrote the great Acharonim (Bach and Shach, subsection 18). And our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 1:4) that we also require a majority of Jewish thieves. And so wrote the Rosh there, for if the majority of the city's thieves are star-worshippers, what benefit is a majority of Jews? Behold, we are in doubt lest it was stolen, and we must follow the majority of the thieves. And there is one who says that regarding those that were stolen, we require a majority of Jewish thieves, and then even if the majority of the city is star-worshippers – it is permitted (Shach, subsection 18). And regarding those that were lost and found – we do not require a majority of Jewish thieves at all (ibid.). And some say that even in this case we require a majority of Jewish thieves (Levush). And so it appears to me to be the primary view, for even regarding those that were found, there is reason to doubt lest they were stolen. (And so it is explicitly implied from the Rosh there in Bava Metzia. And the words of the Shach who wondered at the Levush require great study, see there. And examine closely and you will find it simple.)

And we have a great question regarding this: How can we permit this based on the majority? Let us say: join the minority of idolaters to the status of prohibition of the animal, and the majority is weakened. And in this, the excuses in section 21 are not applicable, obviously. And it appears to me that the primary basis for the permission is because the shechitah assists it, meaning that one must see that the simanim were slaughtered in the manner of the shechitah of an Israelite. And that which our sages, of blessed memory, said, "he found them slaughtered," the intention is that he found them slaughtered like the shechitah of an Israelite, for this too is a good sign. For indeed, there is one who says that this alone is sufficient (Rashba in Torat HaBayit in the name of the Ittur). And we do not hold accordingly (ibid.). And we have not found the rest of the poskim saying so, because this is not a definitive sign, for sometimes an idolater also cuts the simanim like the shechitah of an Israelite. However, it is an intermediate sign, and therefore if there is a majority of Israelites for this—we do not concern ourselves with idolaters, for it is like a minority of a minority.

The Tur wrote: One who finds an animal slaughtered properly in a place where the majority are Israel – it is kosher. Thus far his words. And he means to say: that it is not specifically when the animal was lost from him or stolen, and afterward he found it slaughtered as I have written. Rather, even if he found a slaughtered animal in a place with a majority of Israel – it is permitted, for we hang the matter on the assumption that it fell from the majority of Israel and not from the minority of star-worshipers, and like all the laws that we explained in the previous law. However, in this case it must be said that if it was found in the marketplace – we follow the majority of those passing through the marketplace, for presumably it fell from them, and we do not follow the majority of the city. (Kaftor VaFerach. And regarding the Tur one must say so, and not regarding the Shulchan Aruch which deals with cases where they were lost to him. And also what he questioned in subsection 13 requires great study. And be precise and you will find it easy.) And these laws will be explained in siman 63 with the help of Heaven.

However, regarding this one must ask: for it is prohibited due to the concern of meat that was hidden from the eye, since it was not lost from him and it is not relevant to say that he recognizes it by visual recognition? But in truth, the Tur follows his reasoning in siman 63 (Tur Yoreh Deah 63) who is lenient regarding meat that was hidden from the eye, see there. (And therefore he did not transcribe the wording of the Tur in the Shulchan Aruch, because they ruled later that it is prohibited like the Rambam. And therefore they wrote "that were lost to him." Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

It has already been explained that all are fit for shechitah, even women and slaves. And some say that one should not allow women to slaughter, as they have already practiced not to slaughter. And even though "we have not seen is no proof," nevertheless, in a constant matter such as this, "we have not seen" is a proof (Shach). And so is the simple custom, that women do not slaughter. And the Rishonim cited in the name of Hilkhot Eretz Yisrael that by the letter of the law women should not slaughter, and they wondered at this. And it can be said regarding their intention: for behold, we hold that we do not fear fainting as has been explained, but in women perhaps there is reason to fear fainting because their minds are weak and light. And their intention was: that they should not slaughter until we know that they do not faint. (And that which the Tosafot and the Rosh wrote in their name "because their minds are light," it can be said light to faint.) And that which we learned in the third chapter of Zevachim (Zevachim 31b) that women slaughter even regarding kodashim, it can be said: for example, where they recognize her that she does not faint. Furthermore: for when one stands over her, it is obvious that she is permitted to slaughter. And in kodashim, it is a necessity that the kohen stand over her in order to receive the blood, for the receiving is only by a kohen (Kaftor VaFerach). Furthermore: for the Rishonim wrote that in a matter that involves great exertion and much scrutiny—one is not to believe women regarding a Torah prohibition (Tosafot Eruvin 59a and Pesachim 4b, and the Rashba at the beginning of Torat HaBayit). And if so, granted that she is fit for shechitah, nevertheless, we are witnesses that to prepare a checked knife involves great exertion and much scrutiny. Therefore they are not believed, for because their minds are light they will not be exacting to prepare it well. But in kodashim they slaughter, for in the Mikdash there were checked knives. And a knife that became damaged they would not slaughter with further, even though it is possible to sharpen it, as is found in Zevachim (Zevachim 88b). And certainly to appoint them over the shechitah of many, which involves much exertion—certainly it is forbidden. (And with this one can settle the wording of the Kol Bo that the Beit Yosef wondered at, who wrote: for themselves and not for others, see there. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

And regarding slaves as well, the Tur wrote "emancipated." And it is not because one who is not emancipated is disqualified from shechitah, for a slave is like a woman. Rather, his intention is that he is not to be believed, for for the most part they are empty and reckless. And so wrote the great later authorities, and there is no one who disagrees on this. (And that which he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch "slaves" without qualification, is because this is required of every person. Pri Chadash.)

A cheresh who does not hear and does not speak, whether he was born so or whether he became a cheresh; and likewise a shoteh, whether he is a shoteh based on the things our sages, of blessed memory, enumerated at the beginning of Chagiga, such as one who goes out alone at night in places where it is not the way of people to go alone, or one who tears his garment, or one who sleeps in a cemetery, or one who loses what they give him if he does these things in a way of folly, or other types of shotim whose minds are disordered in any matter, or the extremely foolish who do not know how to connect one matter to another, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 35 section 7, see there—behold, their shechitah is forbidden even if they know the laws of shechitah, for due to their lack of da'at all their actions are flawed. And if there is an expert standing over them and he saw from beginning to end that he performed shechitah well—the shechitah is kosher even if he does not know the laws of shechitah, provided that he is able to steady his hands in any event, as with a katan which will be explained. And there are those who permit even if he does not know how to steady his hands (Tevu'ot Shor subsection 48). And it seems to me that it is impossible to permit in the case of a cheresh and shoteh when he lacks steadiness of hands, even when standing over him, for we do not find anywhere that a cheresh and shoteh are superior to a katan. (And the Tevu'ot Shor himself wrote that from the perspective of logic it appears so. And regarding what he inferred from the Rishonim who mentioned this only regarding a katan, I wonder: for regarding a katan they spoke in terms of his years, and regarding a cheresh and shoteh this is not applicable. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

In the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, a minor who knows how to train his hands or is an expert—slaughters ab initio when one stands over him. And when he does not know how to train his hands and also is not an expert—it is not permitted except ex post facto when one stands over him, and ab initio it is forbidden. The great later authorities disagree with him, and they hold that regarding one who does not know how to train his hands, even if he knows the laws of shechitah and others stand over him—his shechitah is invalid, for they lack the human power and they are like a mere act of a monkey (Yam Shel Shlomo and Tevuot Shor). And one who knows how to train his hands, even though he does not know the laws of shechitah—it is valid ex post facto when one stands over him and sees from beginning to end. And ab initio it is forbidden (ibid.). And if he knows how to train his hands and also knows the laws of shechitah—it is permitted ab initio when one stands over him and sees from beginning to end (ibid.). And without one standing over him—according to all opinions his shechitah is invalid, even if he knows how to train his hands and also knows the laws of shechitah. And there is no one who disagrees with this at all. There is one who says that even according to the first opinion, regarding one who does not know how to train his hands, even if he knows the laws of shechitah—he does not slaughter ab initio even when one stands over him (see Pri Megadim subsection 25). And he is called a "minor" until he is thirteen years and one day old, and we know that he brought two hairs afterward (see Magen Avraham siman 39 subsection 1), because the disqualification of a minor in shechitah without one standing over him is from the Torah, because he is not trusted to testify that it is slaughtered (Shach subsection 27). And whenever the prohibition is from the Torah—we do not rely on years without signs, as is explained in Even HaEzer siman 169. And consequently, in a place where women slaughter—she must be twelve years and one day old, and the bringing of hairs afterward. And there are those who are scrupulous not to give kabbalah to one who is less than eighteen years old, for then his mind is complete. And there is a proof for this from the Gemara (end of the fifth chapter of Shabbat regarding Josiah, see there). However, everything is according to what the person is (Shach and Taz).

For all those who are forbidden to slaughter, and without standing over them their slaughtering is invalid, even if one wishes to give them to slaughter to feed to dogs—it is also forbidden, for perhaps they will come to eat it because they see that they are handing it over to them to slaughter (Tosafot, beginning of Chullin). For for this reason we exempt their slaughtering from the covering of the blood, and it is forbidden to cover the blood for the reason that perhaps they will come to eat, as I wrote in siman 28. And what should one do if he needs it for dogs or for tereifot? If it is possible to slaughter it by means of a kosher slaughterer—it is best. And they should see to eat a little from it, for if not, it is not appropriate to recite a blessing over its slaughtering. And if it is not possible—he should pierce it, or slaughter with a knife that is not for slaughtering. And not with a notched knife, so that it will be visible to all that it is a complete nevelah, and they will not come to eat from it (Tevuat Shor). However, in truth there is no concern in this, for everyone knows that without checking the lung they do not eat, and when he slaughters with a notched knife, they will surely not open the lung (it seems to me). And that which we said that when it is possible to slaughter with kashrut it is best, the reason is because there are those who are meticulous not to perform an act of tereifut with their hands initially on a pure animal (ibid.). Furthermore: there is in this a prohibition of trade with forbidden things when he sells from this to an idolater. And there is one who permits in such a case. (See Taz later in siman 117, and in the Bach, Orach Chaim siman 551, and in the Ataret Zekenim there.)

A cheresh who speaks but does not hear, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 6 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 1:6) that ab initio he should not slaughter because he does not hear the berakhah, and for all berakhot one must ab initio make them audible to his ears. But ex post facto it is kosher, for even if he did not recite a berakhah at all the slaughter is kosher, as berakhot are not indispensable, as I wrote in siman 19, see there. And all the more so if he did not make it audible to his ears. They further wrote: One who hears but does not speak, if he is an expert—he may slaughter even ab initio if another recites the berakhah. Thus far their words. And specifically if the other is also slaughtering, and intends to fulfill the obligation for him (Shach, siff katan 32). This is similar to a berakhah over pleasure, which another cannot fulfill for him when he is not also eating. And it is not similar to a berakhah over mitzvot because slaughtering is not obligatory, for if he did not want to eat—he is not obligated to slaughter. And there is one who says that another can recite the berakhah even when he is not slaughtering himself (Taz, siff katan 17), for the reason that the berakhah over slaughtering is not a berakhah over pleasure but rather a berakhah of praise and thanksgiving, that He separated us from forbidden foods, and it pertains to another just as to the slaughterer. And it is like the berakhah of betrothal where the groom sanctifies and another recites the berakhah (ibid.).

And this is why they wrote regarding one who hears but does not speak that he must be a mummhe, and they did not write this regarding one who speaks but does not hear, and the great later authorities labored much over this. And it seems to me simply that regarding a person who speaks—behold, in any event we hear from him that he knows some of the laws of shehitah. And even if we did not know if he is a complete mummhe, we rely on the principle that the majority of those who engage in it are mummhin. But regarding one who does not speak, how do we know at all that he knows anything? Therefore, it is impossible to rely on the majority being mummhin until we know clearly that he is a mummhe. (And perhaps this is the intention of the Bach. And the difficulty of the Shach in subsection 30 is answered, see there.)

This is the wording of the Rambam (Rambam Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot 4): An expert who became mute, and he understands and hears and his mind is sound – behold, he may perform shechitah lekhatchilah. And likewise one who does not hear – behold, he may perform shechitah. Thus far his words. And they explained his intention that one who does not hear – does not perform shechitah lekhatchilah, because he does not hear the blessing (Rosh). And one who became mute performs shechitah lekhatchilah when another recites the blessing, as I have written (Beit Yosef). And in my humble opinion, it seems that in any such case he should not have been cryptic but rather should have explained. Furthermore, this law is not found in the Gemara at all regarding shechitah. Also, the phrasing "behold, he may perform shechitah" implies lekhatchilah. Therefore, were it not for their words, it would seem to me that his intention is that he says as follows: that even though regarding terumah and other mitzvot they should be prevented from acting because of the blessing, as we learned at the beginning of Terumot – this is because all of Israel are fit to separate terumah, as there is no craftsmanship or expertise involved. But shechitah, for which most of Israel are not experts and cannot perform shechitah – this expert should not prevent himself from performing shechitah. And the Rambam follows his own reasoning in the first chapter (Rambam Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot 1) regarding blessings, that bediavad one fulfills the obligation of a blessing even with thought, see there. And this is what he informs us, that an expert who became mute may perform shechitah lekhatchilah and shall think the blessing in his heart, for since it is impossible for him in any other way – it is like bediavad. And all the more so regarding one who does not hear, who can recite the blessing but only that he does not make it audible to his ear, that he may perform shechitah lekhatchilah. (And in practice, it is impossible to transgress the words of our teachers.)

A drunkard who has reached the level of the drunkenness of Lot, which is to say that he acts and does not know what he is doing—initially he is forbidden to slaughter even if one is standing over him, and after the fact it is permitted. And without one standing over him, even after the fact it is forbidden, for his status is like that of a shoteh. And if he has not reached the level of the drunkenness of Lot—he should not slaughter initially, because his hands are heavy and he is close to coming to the point of derasa. And even with one standing over him, there is a doubt regarding the initial ruling (Tevuat Shor). And after the fact it is permitted even without one standing over him, provided that they know with certainty that he did not reach the level of the drunkenness of Lot. And if the matter is in doubt—it is forbidden (ibid.), for it is a doubt regarding a Torah law. And one who is accustomed to drinking much burnt wine—one must prevent him from slaughtering, until he accepts upon himself with all severity to distance himself from this (ibid.). And particularly regarding the preparation of the knife, it is very likely that he will not feel a thin nick. And the stumbling block in this is great, due to our many sins, in certain places, and therefore one must supervise this greatly.

One who is blind in both his eyes – he shall not slaughter ab initio even if he is an expert, lest he does not slaughter well. And ex post facto, one examines the simanim (ibid.), and if they were slaughtered properly – his slaughtering is valid even without one standing over him. And in our days, we have not heard nor have we seen that they allow a blind man to slaughter, for behold, there are those who say that ab initio one should not allow him to slaughter even with one standing over him (ibid. subsection 67 in the name of the Riaz).

One who is naked is forbidden to slaughter, as it is impossible for him to recite the blessing. And even if another person turns his face away from him and recites the blessing – it is also forbidden, since he must hear the blessing and intend to fulfill his obligation through it, and he is forbidden from contemplating the blessing. And likewise, even if he is not naked but his heart sees the nakedness – it is forbidden. (The Tevuot Shor wrote that it is specifically necessary to gird a belt even when one wears trousers, see there. And there is no reason for this, as is explained in Orach Chaim siman 91. And it is an excessive stringency, and the custom is not so.)

The matter is simple: even though the shehitah of a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is invalid without one standing over him, as I have written, nevertheless, to send a slaughtered bird or meat by their hand—there is no concern in this, for they are not suspected of switching it. And they are under the presumption that what is in their hand is that which was delivered to them. However, to send a live bird by their hand to the shochet so that he may slaughter it, it would appear from the perspective of logic that we are obligated to know that the shochet slaughtered it, for how can we rely on the trustworthiness of a minor? And so wrote one of the Rishonim (the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit). But the common custom is to send birds to be slaughtered by way of male and female minors, and we do not investigate afterward, and there is no one who opens his mouth or chirps regarding this. And it must be said that this fact that a minor has no trustworthiness—this is to extract money based on his word, or in a matter that requires complete testimony, or in a matter that they do on their own and involves great exertion. But in a matter that we send by their hand and does not involve excessive exertion—certainly they are not prone to ruin it and bring from the forbidden. And this is not testimony, but rather it is like the matter of a presumption, and like "we are witnesses" that they did as they were commanded (Rashba in Mishmeret HaBayit). And so wrote one of the great Acharonim (Tevu'ot Shor, subsection 35), provided that he has reached some level of understanding, and not the very small children. And it appears that by way of a deaf-mute it is also permitted. But not by way of an imbecile, for a deaf-mute possesses a weak understanding (Yevamot, end of the fourteenth chapter), but the imbecile has no understanding at all. (And this requires further study according to this in Eruvin 31b according to the explanation of the Tosafot there in the heading beginning "Here," that a minor is not trusted regarding eruvei techumin, see there. And it must be said because there is a significant action in this to acquire a place of dwelling, and he must say "with this eruv so-and-so shall be permitted to walk tomorrow," as I have written in Orach Chaim siman 409. And according to the explanation of Rashi and the Ri there, it works out well simply, and so too for Rabbeinu Chananel. Also according to the words of the Tosafot, as he wrote there in the heading beginning "And where," see there. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 1 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 1:1): And if they examined a certain shochet and bodek and he was found not to know, if he had taken a kabbalah once—we do not render treifah retroactively that which he slaughtered, for we say it is only now that his status has been compromised. But if he never took a kabbalah—everything he slaughtered is treifah. Also, all the vessels in which they cooked what he slaughtered require kashering. Thus far his words. And regarding one who took a kabbalah, one may say the reason is due to a double doubt: a doubt whether perhaps he had not yet forgotten at the time he slaughtered. And if you should say he had, perhaps he slaughtered well. For is it certain that one who is not an expert does not slaughter properly? Perhaps he slaughtered properly. But when he never took a kabbalah, the first doubt is removed.

And the great Acharonim disagree on this (the Taz, the Pri Chadash, and the Gra). And behold, below in siman 18, regarding one who slaughtered with a checked knife and after slaughtering we saw a notch in it, and there is a doubt whether it was notched by the skin and is treifah, or it was notched by the neck bone and is kosher. And we hold that if he did not break bones with it after slaughtering—it is treifah, even though there is a sefek sefeika: perhaps it was notched by the bone, and if you should say it was by the skin, perhaps he did not slaughter against the notch. And although one could distinguish, that here he presumably slaughtered according to his habit, and the second doubt is closer to permission than to prohibition, whereas there it is the opposite, as it is the way to move the knife across its entire surface and it is closer to prohibition than to permission, nevertheless, it is difficult to rely on this reasoning which is not found in the Shas. Similarly, one should not learn to permit from what will be explained in siman 81 regarding cheeses made from an animal that was afterwards found to be treifah, where one should permit the cheeses. And see there that the permission is because of a sefek sefeika: for if so, we should also permit without taking kabbalah. Rather, it is certain that these do not resemble each other for several reasons (see Shach, subsection 8). Furthermore: in the essence of the matter they do not resemble each other at all, for there it was slaughtered while standing in a chazakah of permission, and we rightly permit by means of a sefek sefeika. This is not the case regarding a doubt in slaughtering, for it stands in a chazakah of prohibition. And it is obvious according to those who hold in siman 110 that one may not permit a sefek sefeika in a chazakah of prohibition, that one may not permit here by reason of sefek sefeika. And it is more appropriate to compare this law to a mikveh that was measured and found lacking, where all purities performed upon it are impure. And the reason is stated in the Shas: because behold, the deficiency is before you, and here too, behold, he is not an expert before you. And even though there is no sefek sefeika there, nevertheless, behold the flaw is before you, and we establish the animal in its chazakah of prohibition. However, one could say that in a mikveh the flaw is clear since it is lacking, and similarly with a knife, behold it is notched. This is not the case here, which is a doubt of a flaw, for does one who does not know the laws of slaughtering certainly slaughter improperly? Behold, there is nothing here but a concern, and for the most part, he presumably slaughters according to his habit. And it is the opposite of this in a mikveh and a knife (it seems to me).

However, one who examines his book Darkhei Moshe (subsection 11), it appears explicitly that he permitted it for a different reason. This is his wording there: And if the shochtim and the checkers were examined, and it was found that they do not know, the Agudah wrote in the first chapter of Chullin that one should not declare treif retroactively what they already slaughtered, and they also do not need to kosher the vessels. For the person has been compromised, but the animals that were slaughtered were not compromised, and they were slaughtered with a presumption of permissibility. And establish the shochet on his presumption, and until now he knew. Thus far his words. And it must be understood: how did he write "and they were slaughtered with a presumption of permissibility," for behold the doubt is in the shechitah, and it stands with a presumption of prohibition? And behold it is explained in the Shas that we do not say they stand with a presumption of permissibility except when the doubt is regarding the treifot of the lung or another organ, and not when the doubt is in the shechitah. Rather, the matter is clear that his intention is this: that certainly if the doubt is adjacent to the shechitah, such as with a knife that was found notched—there is no presumption of permissibility here, and it stands with a presumption of prohibition. This is not the case here where the doubt arose after a long time, and the acts of shechitah have already been established with a presumption of permissibility. And even now when the flaw is found—there is no clear flaw here, because it can be said that until now he knew. And even though it is common to forget little by little, nevertheless there is no necessity that with a slight forgetting he would slaughter improperly. This law returns to a flaw in the lung, where we say it was slaughtered with a presumption of permissibility. And this is what he wrote, that the person was compromised and not the animal, meaning to say that the person is now compromised, and not the animal from a long time ago. And if so, it can be said that even the person was not compromised from before, and automatically it is not similar to a knife nor to a mikveh. And a clear proof for all this is from what they ruled in the Shulchan Aruch later in siman 18, section 13 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 18:13) regarding one who slaughtered with a checked knife, and it was lost before the examination that follows the shechitah, and afterwards it was found notched—the shechitah is kosher since it left with permissibility etc., for establish the knife on its presumption. Thus far his words. And behold, even with a notched knife we say this, and all the more so with forgetting the laws of shechitah where the flaw is not clear (and with this, everything that they questioned is answered).

Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that the primary ruling is according to our teacher, the Rema. There are also some of the great authorities who agreed in practice with his words (Shach, and Kereti U-Peleti, and Torat Yekutiel, and see Tevuat Shor). There is one who says that when it is found that the shochet forgot the feeling of the knife—we declare [the meat] treifah retroactively (Kereti U-Peleti). However, according to what I have written, one should not declare it treifah for a long time retroactively, and there is a clear proof from siman 18 (Aruch HaShulchan Yoreh Deah 18) that we have written. Nevertheless, in practice, it requires further study. Similarly, a shochet who was found to be wicked, who intentionally produced a treifah—the vessels are kosher according to the law, and we say that until now he was in a state of presumed fitness (Shach at the end of subsection 8, and Bach, and Yam Shel Shelomo, and Be'er Heitev, and Pri Chadash). There are those who disagree even in this (Tevuat Shor). And it appears to me that if he became wicked due to appetite—we maintain him until now in the status of a fit Jew, and now his inclination overcame him. But if he was found in heresy and apostasy—one should declare [the meat] treifah retroactively, for certainly there was a blemish in his heart from before, as is known.

A shochet who fell ill and recovered from his illness, and it was subsequently seen that he does not know the laws of shechitah, there is one who says that it is necessary to forbid everything that he slaughtered after his illness, for it appears that he became confused due to the illness (Knesset HaGedolah in the name of Rivar). And it is a great reasoning, for even in the Shas we find one who fell ill and forgot his learning. And for this reason it appears to me that a shochet who recovered from his illness—he must examine himself anew, and see if he has not forgotten the sensation, and if he has not forgotten the laws. However, I have not seen people practicing so, and one should deliberate on this.

The Tevuot Shor wrote in section 6: That at the time the shochet receives kabbalah from a sage – he shall slaughter before the sage three valid slaughterings. And if he should render one of them treif – he must slaughter three others validly, so that he is established through consecutive acts as a skilled craftsman and one who does not faint. And they practiced that those three should be roosters, and one of them a male rooster because the slaughtering is difficult in it due to the concern of displacement. And then he shall give him permission to slaughter. And it is not sufficient etc. even from an expert shochet, but only from a sage who issues rulings etc. Thus far his words. And in our countries, we have not heard of this custom to slaughter before the sage. And the reason is simple: because with us, before he receives kabbalah from the sage, he has already slaughtered much before the expert shochet with whom he studied, and he is very accustomed to the slaughtering of large cattle, small cattle, and birds. And in any other manner we do not give kabbalah, as is known. And the sage only examines him in the setting of the knife and in the laws, and no more. Furthermore: for we have already clarified that regarding fainting we are not concerned at all. And the Rambam who wrote "he shall not slaughter until he slaughters many times before a sage etc." as we have cited – his intention is only regarding an expert shochet, and this indeed we do. (And the Tevuot Shor in subsection 2 wrote that the intention of the Rambam is regarding three times, see there. And it does not imply so, for it is not due to a chazakah but rather due to extensive habituation, as is the custom with us. And the Maharshal and the Shach who wrote that the custom is to begin with roosters – certainly such is the custom, but all of this is before the expert shochet. And they likewise wrote that even one who is proficient to slaughter a rooster – shall not slaughter small birds, namely sparrows, turtledoves, and young pigeons, unless it is one who has already slaughtered them and was established as an expert, see there. They further wrote that even the greatest expert shall not slaughter them except with a large bird, so that his blessing should not be in vain should he render it treif. Or that he should slaughter two of the small ones, for we are not concerned to that extent, see there. And it seems to me that with us we are not concerned with this, because with us the expert shochets are very proficient also in the slaughtering of small birds. And in truth, this matter depends on the level of craftsmanship of the shochet u'vodek.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 11: If the community imposed a cherem that no one should slaughter except for a known slaughterer, and another slaughtered—some say that his shechitah is forbidden. Thus far his words, because it is similar to one who is suspected regarding that matter (Taz and Shach). And it is not according to the core of the law, for behold, one who is suspected of violating a cherem is not suspected of eating nevelah. And it is likewise proven from the responsa of the Rosh, klal 7, which is the source of the law, that it is only due to a stringency and a mere penalty (Pri Chadash). And some say that if they explicitly disqualified the shechitah of everyone else—it is certainly forbidden. And if they did not disqualify but only imposed a cherem—where there is no great loss it is forbidden, and in a case of great loss one may permit it. And in a case of an unwitting act, in any event it is permitted. And where they explicitly disqualified—it is forbidden even in a case of an unwitting act (Tevuot Shor siman 2 and Pri Megadim).

In my humble opinion, it appears from the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, that in every case their shechitah is forbidden by law. This is also implied by the source of the law, for this is the wording of the Rosh there: And regarding what you asked: a community that imposed a cherem that no man should slaughter except for the communal butcher, and one person transgressed and slaughtered – it appears that it is forbidden to eat his shechitah, for the community has disqualified the shechitah of everyone except for the shechitah of the butcher, so that every person will not jump to slaughter etc. and the community is permitted to stipulate and to enforce their measures etc., and it does not involve a concern of theft. And likewise to forbid that which is permitted as a fence for the matter. And what they forbid – is forbidden to all the people of the city. And certainly this one who transgressed and slaughtered – it is proper to compare him to one who is suspect regarding that matter. And even though he is not suspect of eating a forbidden thing, nevertheless the matter is ugly, and it is proper to penalize him so that they do not eat from his shechitah. Thus far his words, and his intention is clear: that regarding that city, his shechitah is forbidden by law, for he compares this to monetary laws, and it is in the name of a complete law. Furthermore: for he says explicitly that it is forbidden to eat from his shechitah, as the city has the power to forbid a permitted thing. And that which he wrote "as a penalty" – this is regarding the essence of the slaughterer's shechitah for people of another city who were not included in the prohibition. Therefore, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, stated without qualification that it is forbidden by law, and in all manners it is forbidden, whether unintentionally or intentionally. And this is like the matter of "he makes it upon himself a piece of forbidden matter" (and so wrote the Gra).

And so the custom is widespread in our city that they do not bring meat from the outside, and they declare the meat and the vessels treif when they bring from the outside. But outside the city—it is permitted. And in several places there is such an enactment, and it is a proper enactment, for through this they are protected from ruin, as is known. However, in this case the enactment was explicit that outside meat should be like treifa. Furthermore, there is an enactment in our city that one shochet shall not slaughter large livestock without someone standing over him, and if the shochet transgressed and slaughtered alone—according to the words of the "there are those who say," the meat is kosher, for they did not invalidate the slaughter of the individual, but rather enacted that he should not slaughter alone. But according to what we explained, the meat is also forbidden, for in the query of the Rosh the enactment was not to invalidate the slaughter of others, but rather they enacted that another should not slaughter, and despite all this he wrote that it is forbidden to eat from his slaughter. Therefore, it seems to me that it is appropriate to stipulate explicitly in the enactment that the slaughter of the individual shall not be treifa, but rather that the shochet transgressed the enactment and they shall fine him. And even if they did not stipulate explicitly, it seems to me that the enactors of the enactment are believed to say that such was their intention. And all the more so regarding a shochet who accepted upon himself not to do such and such and transgressed this, if he did not stipulate explicitly that when he transgresses his slaughter shall be forbidden—his slaughter is permitted. For granted that he transgressed that which he accepted upon himself, nevertheless his slaughter is kosher, for one suspected of one transgression is not suspected regarding slaughter. But if he explicitly forbade his slaughter upon himself when he transgresses, and he transgressed and slaughtered—his slaughter is forbidden. And even though there is room to deliberate on this, for by what means was his slaughter forbidden? For it is well and good that a community has the power in their hand to forbid a permitted matter, for every community in its city has power as effective as the great beit din in Jerusalem, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 2. But an individual, by what means is his power effective to forbid a permitted matter? For if it is due to the principle that "he makes it upon himself a piece of prohibition," this is only regarding a matter where he is believed to say that it is truly forbidden. Such as when he says that this is chelev or meat of a treifa, and it is possible for it to be so. But regarding that which is certainly permitted—this is not applicable, as I wrote later in siman 205: One who says his wine shall be yayin nesech, and his bread the bread of Cutheans—it is not forbidden thereby, see there. And also this is not at all a matter of "if he did it, it is not effective." And it appears that this is only like a type of neder as I wrote there, when he said by way of a fine "if I do such, his wine shall be yayin nesech and his bread the bread of Cutheans"—there are those who forbid and there are those who permit, see there. And according to this, an annulment is effective even according to the opinion of those who forbid, as is explained there. (And also from Noda BiYehudah siman 1 there is a proof for this, see there. And also a proof from there for what I wrote in section 56, not like the Pri Chadash. But a community can make a "piece of prohibition" even from a completely permitted matter, as I wrote there in siman 205, see there. And examine and you will find it simple.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: And if the regulation was nullified—all shochetim are in a status of fitness as at first. Thus far his words, and I do not know what he is teaching us. And it appears to me that this is what he is saying: that even when they did not nullify it explicitly, but rather it was nullified on its own, such as when the regulation was weakened and they did not uphold it, and it was nullified automatically—all shochetim are permitted to slaughter as at first. And we do not say: since presumably the other shochetim caused the nullification of the regulation—we shall not permit them and we shall penalize them; for ultimately, the regulation has been nullified. And so it is implied in the source of the law in Terumat HaDeshen, siman 177. (This is his wording: That which you asked me regarding the matter of the regulation etc. and it was not fulfilled etc. how ugly the matter is etc. However, one should not forbid the slaughter of those butchers even ab initio etc. and in our case, since the community did not want to stand by the regulation, and they are weakening their hands from it, if so, there is no concern of "fencing the matter" etc. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explained according to our words.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 12 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 1:12): One who slaughters an animal for an idolater in the presence of witnesses, and when an Israelite comes to buy from it he said, "Do not buy from it because I did not slaughter it" – he is not believed. However, for himself it is forbidden, for he has made it upon himself a "piece of prohibition." Thus far his words. And even though he has a migo: for he could have said that he performed shehiyah, or derasah, or other types of treifot, nevertheless, according to his words where he says "I did not slaughter it at all" – the witnesses contradict him, and we do not say migo in the presence of witnesses. And only for himself is it forbidden because he made it upon himself a "piece of prohibition," meaning: that regarding himself he is believed more than a hundred witnesses, and since according to his words it is nevelah – therefore he himself is forbidden from eating of it. And even to others it is not permitted except when he stands by his statement and says "I did not slaughter it at all," but if they did not ask him to clarify his words – it is forbidden to everyone, for it is possible that his intention was that it is not a shechitah because it contains an act of treifot. And as for why he did not say so in this language from the outset, perhaps out of fear of the owners he was forced to speak thus. Or that in truth this is called "not slaughtering it," since there was an act of treifah in it. Therefore, this permission explained in the Shulchan Aruch is only when they went back and asked him not in the presence of the owners, and he stands by his statement to say that he did not slaughter it at all, for then he is not believed against witnesses. Thus the great Acharonim agreed, and thus it is explicitly explained in the source of the law in the Responsa of the Rashba which he himself brought in his great book, see there. And it requires investigation why he stated his words so cryptically in the Shulchan Aruch. (And there is no difference between one who slaughtered for an idolater and one who slaughtered for an Israelite, for follow the reasoning. Rather, the question was thus, see there in the Beit Yosef. And his way in the Shulchan Aruch is to write according to the language of the source of the law.)

It is a simple matter that anything which was forbidden because he made it upon himself a "forbidden piece" – he cannot retract it unless he provides a good pretext for his words, as to why he said so. And with a pretext he is believed to retract, for so it is explained in the Shas (Ketubot 22a). However, some say that when witnesses contradict him, and he retracts even without a pretext – he can retract and it is permitted to him (Mishneh LaMelekh chapter nine of Ishut (the Rambam Laws of Ishut 9) halacha 15 in the name of Terumat HaDeshen, see there). And it appears to me that this is only when we ourselves have reason to attribute his previous statement to some motive, such as to gain money or the like, for then we say that now when he retracted even without a pretext, and witnesses contradict his words, that he did not make it upon himself a "forbidden piece" at all, and he spoke falsely because of the motive involving monetary gain or another matter. And the reason he does not provide this pretext now is because it is a disgrace for him to provide such a pretext. But if we find no motive at all as to why he said so previously – his retraction is of no avail even when witnesses contradict him, for since he is believed regarding himself more than witnesses, just as witnesses do not retract and testify again – so too he cannot retract. But when he provides a pretext, or we find some motive as to why he said so, which is also like a pretext – the matter is revealed that he never made it upon himself a "forbidden piece," and he spoke falsely. (And I examined the words of the Terumat HaDeshen brought by the Mishneh LaMelekh, and it is in siman 226 and he writes explicitly according to our words. This is his wording there: That what he said so, his intention was to be exempt from the fine etc. and therefore even though previously the Terumat HaDeshen did not explain this, he relied upon what follows, and the Mishneh LaMelekh was brief in this.)

He further wrote in section 13: A butcher who made a mark on the head of the slaughtered lamb so that it would appear to be treif, and also said that it was treif, and afterward says that it was kosher, and that he only said so so that they would not take it and it would remain for him to take meat from it, since he gave an amatla for his words—he is believed. Thus far his words. And there is one who disagrees regarding this, for it is explained later in siman 185 regarding a woman who said "I am tamei," and then retracted and said "I am tahor," that when she gave an amatla for her words—she is believed. But when she wore her niddah garments—an amatla is not effective, for an amatla is only effective regarding speech and not regarding an action, see there. And here too, since he made a mark on the head of the lamb—behold he performed an action and the amatla should not be effective (Taz). And some say that it is not comparable, for there she was not compelled to perform an action, and since she performed an action—presumably the truth is indeed that she is tamei. This is not the case here, where he was compelled to provide a mark so that they would not take from the meat. Therefore, the amatla is effective even in such a case (Bach and Nekudot HaKesef). And know that the amatla must be recognizable, a good amatla that is appropriate to act upon. But if in the eyes of the observers this amatla was not sufficient to say that it is treif—he is not believed with his amatla that according to his opinion he needed to say so (and so it is implied from the Tevuot Shor). And all the amatlaot that we find in the Shas were good and correct amatlaot, and therefore every amatla must be similar to this. And this matter depends on the assessment of the beit din. And also if he said "I erred in the law," if there is room for error, it is also considered an amatla (ibid.).

Since an explanation is effective when he initially said "treifah" and afterwards "kosher," if so, it appears all the more so when he initially says "it is kosher" and afterwards said "it is treifah," and gave an explanation for his initial words, that he is believed to render it treifah. And even though it could be said that they are not comparable, for it is well understood that when he says "treifah" initially—there is no ruin in his words. But when he says "kosher"—he comes to cause ruin, for someone might eat from it. And perhaps in this case he cannot retract, for this is similar to "a person cannot make himself out to be wicked." Nevertheless, it appears that one should not distinguish, because he can say: "Even though I said it is kosher, nonetheless I ensured that no person would take from it, and if one had wanted to take I would not have allowed him, and it would not come to ruin." Therefore, he is believed to render it treifah (in Pitchei Teshuvah he brought opinions on this, see there). And all the more so when he says "I erred in the law" that he is certainly believed.

If one witness contradicts the shochet, where the shochet said "I slaughtered properly," and one contradicts him saying that he paused or pressed or the like, regarding the shochet so that he should not be disqualified—certainly one witness in a case of contradiction is nothing. And regarding the item slaughtered now—the witness is certainly forbidden from eating from it, for he has made it upon himself a piece of forbidden matter. And regarding the future, whether it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering, there is a dispute among the poskim: for there are those who say it is permitted, as even according to his words it is not absolute that he should be forbidden forever. And if he returns in repentance—he has returned to his permitted status. Therefore, even in an ordinary case, it is not relevant to say that he has made it upon himself a piece of forbidden matter, for perhaps he performed repentance. This is the opinion of the Maharik, and the Shulchan Aruch section 14 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 1, 14). And there are those who disagree on this, for since in any event according to his words it is forbidden for him to slaughter by himself without repentance, if so, as long as it has not been clarified to him that he performed repentance—he remains in his forbidden status (Pri Chadash and Kereti U-Peleti).

And to me it seems that the primary view is like the opinion of the Maharik and the Shulchan Aruch. For it is explained in the Shas (Ketubot 9a) that regarding the law of "he made it upon himself a piece of forbidden matter," when there is a double doubt—it is permitted, see there. And here too, even according to the words of the witness that he lingered or pressed, there is a double doubt regarding other slaughterings: a doubt whether the slaughterer sensed the lingering or the pressing, and intentionally says that he slaughtered well, or did not sense it and he is unintentional, for this the witness has no ability to know. And if you should say that he is intentional, perhaps he performed repentance or perhaps he slaughtered while someone was standing over him. Furthermore: perhaps he slaughtered well, for is it certain that one suspected regarding slaughtering does not slaughter well? Behold, this is only a doubt. Thus it is found that there are three doubts here, and everyone admits that three doubts are permitted in a place of a presumption of prohibition, as I wrote in siman 110. (And that which the Tevuot Shor and the Pri Megadim wrote, that they are dealing with a case where the witness recants—the forced nature is evident and it does not imply so, see there.)

Regarding the matter of this shechitah for others, there is also a dispute: for the Maharik and the Shulchan Aruch permit it, based on the reasoning that since the Torah trusted the shochet, we hold that wherever the Torah trusted one witness, he is like two, and the single witness is not trusted against him. And even according to this opinion, it must be said that this is specifically when the shochet said beforehand that it is kosher. But if they spoke at the same time, he is not trusted, as is explained in Even HaEzer siman 17 regarding the matter of an agunah. And such is the law regarding a sotah as we explained in Even HaEzer siman 178, and regarding an eglah arufah which we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 425, see there. Or perhaps there is no distinction: for specifically there, the Torah trusted the witness who arrived first as two, and since the one who contradicts him arrived with him together, his trustworthiness is removed. But here, the Torah trusted the shochet alone as two and not another, and consequently, even if the other arrived with him together, ultimately the shochet is as two. And it requires further study.

But many disagree with this, and they hold that even for others this shechitah is forbidden, for the reason that one witness is set against another witness, and the animal remains in its status of prohibition from before shechitah. For regarding shechitah it is not relevant at all to say that the Torah believed him as two witnesses, for specifically regarding a sotah, and a broken-necked heifer, and an agunah, where by law two are required and the Torah believed one in this case, it is appropriate to say that the Torah believed him as two. But regarding shechitah two are not required at all, for one witness is believed regarding prohibitions in a matter that is within his power even in a status of prohibition, as I have written. If so, it is not relevant to say that it believed him as two but rather that it believed one, and his status is only that of one witness. Therefore, when another comes afterward and contradicts him—his status is as one witness against another witness, and leave it in its status (Yam Shel Shlomo 69, and Bach and Taz and Peri Chadash and Kereti U-Peleti). And it is obvious that one must be stringent like this opinion. (See Nimukei Yosef chapter "Ha-Isha Rabbah" in the name of Ritva.)

It appears to me that even according to this opinion, if the meat was already eaten and afterwards someone came and said that it became treifah during its shechitah—the vessels do not require hagalah. For since it was already eaten based on the shochet, and it was eaten permissibly as the Torah trusted him, it is as if he removed it from its status of prohibition, and like the law of all shechitot that when it is slaughtered—it stands in a status of permissibility. And now that this other person contradicts him—his status is like one witness against one witness, and establish it on its status, in the status of permissibility. But when two testified that it is treifah—the vessels require hagalah in any case. And even if two say it is kosher and two say it is treifah, it is not necessary to state before the meat was eaten—certainly from the Torah it is prohibited, for two against two from the Torah we establish it on its status, and it stands in a status of prohibition. Rather, even if the meat was already eaten, and according to our words it is now called a status of permissibility, nevertheless, by rabbinic law in a case of two against two we are stringent in every case as is explained in the Shas (Yevamot 30a), and the vessels require hagalah. (So it appears in my humble opinion. And perhaps after a "twenty-four hour period" one may be lenient, and it requires further study.)

All the matters that have been explained are only when one contradicts the shochet regarding a definite treifah according to the law. However, when he contradicts him and says that it became a treifah through a matter in which we are stringent—as will be explained in all the laws of shechitah regarding the stringencies that we apply which are not from the core of the law—the shochet is believed, and it is permitted to eat the meat (Dagul Mervavah). For even according to the words of the one who contradicts, it is not a treifah according to the law. And know that all this is when the shochet and the one who contradicts are people of the same standing. But if the one who contradicts is established as having more fear of Hashem than the shochet, it is proper to be stringent in every case. And the first opinion also holds this (as he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch: and everything is according to what kind of man he is). And know that if the community appointed a supervisor over the shochetim and the butchers, he is believed in every case. And perhaps even to contradict two shochetim and two butchers, since the community has empowered him over them. And certainly the Rav of the town is believed in every case, for since the community accepted him to rule and he says that it is clear to him that it is a treifah, how is it possible that they should eat? For they have accepted him upon themselves to listen to his words in all laws of issur v'heter (it appears to me).