Siman 431

Included within the subject of Pesach are three positive commandments and four negative commandments, and according to the opinion of the Rambam, five. Namely, the positive commandments are: to eat matzah on the first night, the positive commandment to recount the exodus from Egypt on that night, and the positive commandment to remove chametz and leaven on the fourteenth day. And four negative commandments: not to eat chametz all seven days, not to eat a mixture of chametz all seven days, that chametz shall not be seen all seven days, and that chametz shall not be found all seven days. And according to the opinion of the Rambam, there is a negative commandment against eating chametz on the eve of Pesach from midday and onwards. But according to the rest of the poskim, it is only a positive commandment, which is the positive commandment of "you shall remove." And the prohibition of chametz and the prohibition of leaven are one and the same, for leaven is that with which one causes fermentation. And one who eats chametz or leaven during the seven days of Pesach, if he ate a kezayit intentionally, he is liable for kareth, as it is said: "For whoever eats chametz—that soul shall be cut off." And if unintentionally, he is liable for a chatat; this applies whether one eats or one who liquefies the chametz and drinks it. However, for a mixture of chametz, one is not liable for kareth, but rather for a negative commandment. (Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagreed regarding chametz before its time and after its time. For Rabbi Yehuda holds it is a negative commandment, and Rabbi Shimon disagrees. And regarding after its time, Rava ruled in Pesachim 30a like Rabbi Shimon. And most of the poskim hold that also regarding before its time, the halacha is like Rabbi Shimon. And the Rambam holds that regarding before its time, the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda.)

Chametz on Pesach is forbidden for benefit, as it is said: "Chametz shall not be eaten" — there shall not be in it any permission for eating, meaning: there shall not be in it any permission that leads to eating. And standard benefits lead to eating, as one purchases a food item with the proceeds (Rashi 21b). And we require this according to the one who holds that "you shall not eat" is only a prohibition of eating. However, the Rambam has already ruled in chapter eight of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 15, like the one who holds that wherever it is said in the Torah "you shall not eat," both a prohibition of eating and a prohibition of benefit are implied, unless the verse specifies for permission, in the manner that it specified regarding a neveilah for a ger: "which is in your gates you shall give it to him and he may eat it." And regarding chametz, there is no specification for the permission of benefit, and consequently it is forbidden for benefit. (And as for that which the Rambam wrote at the beginning of Chametz U-Matzah, the reason of Hezekiah: there shall not be in it permission for eating, for the reason is from the variation, as it is written "lo ye'akhel" with a tzeirei and a kamatz, as is explained in the Gemara there. And according to Rabbi Abbahu, whose view we follow, he does not require this. But he cited the simple derivation and did not wish to be lengthy, and such is his way in several places.)

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter one, law 8: It is forbidden to eat chametz on the fourteenth from midday and onwards, which is from the beginning of the seventh hour of the day. And anyone who eats during this time receives lashes according to the Torah, as it is said: "You shall not eat chametz with it," meaning: with the Pesach sacrifice. By oral tradition they learned: Do not eat chametz from the time that is fit for the slaughtering of the Pesach sacrifice, which is in the afternoon, and that is midday. Thus far his words. And even though the Pesach sacrifice was offered after the daily afternoon offering, which is offered after midday, and if so, the time of the Pesach sacrifice is drawn further than midday—this is not relevant to the validity of the Pesach sacrifice. For certainly the Pesach sacrifice as well, if one slaughtered it immediately after midday, it is valid, for regarding the Pesach sacrifice it is also said "in the afternoon." Rather, they prioritize the daily offering for the reason explained in Pesachim (59a), because regarding the Pesach sacrifice it is also said "in the evening"—therefore they delay it until after the daily offering. Furthermore: the daily offering is more frequent (Tosafot ibid.). But if after the fact they offered it before the daily offering, it is valid, as the Rambam wrote in chapter one of the Pesach Sacrifice. And if so, when the Torah said not to eat chametz from the time of the slaughtering of the Pesach sacrifice, it is from midday, for that is the primary time. And the Ra'avad and the rest of the poskim disagreed with him, and they hold that there is no negative commandment from the Torah for after midday, but rather the positive commandment of "you shall remove," as I have written.

And consequently, according to the Rambam, even after midday it is forbidden for benefit, for since there is a verse "you shall not eat" – it is automatically included in this also a prohibition of benefit, as he himself wrote at the end of the eighth chapter of Ma'akhalot Assurot, which we cited in section 2 (Kessef Mishneh at the beginning of the first chapter). And according to those who disagree with him – it is not forbidden for benefit until nightfall, and this is the position held by most of the poskim. However, by rabbinic decree it is forbidden for benefit, as will be explained below in siman 443. And regarding the matter of nullification – even according to the Rambam it is more lenient on Erev Pesach after midday than during all the days of Pesach; for while during all the days of Pesach the prohibition is even in the smallest amount, on Erev Pesach – it is nullified in sixty, since it does not yet carry the prohibition of karet, as will be explained in siman 447 with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam wrote in the first chapter, law 7: One who eats any amount of the chametz itself during Pesach—this is forbidden by the Torah, as it is said: "It shall not be eaten." Nevertheless, one is not liable for kareth or a sacrifice except for the minimum measure, which is a kezayit. And one who eats less than a kezayit intentionally—they strike him with lashes of rebellion. Thus far his words. And the Maggid Mishneh explained: because a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah. But if so, it is difficult: why did he need to clarify this regarding chametz? Is this not like all forbidden foods? Furthermore: the verse he cited implies the opposite, for "eating" is a kezayit (Kesef Mishneh). And there is one who wishes to say: because the prohibition of chametz only exists during the days of Pesach, I might have said it is not included in all the prohibitions where a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah—therefore the Rambam was required to specify a verse for itself regarding chametz (Mishneh LaMelech in the name of the Ralnach). But it is not understood, for at the beginning of the last chapter of Yoma (74b) the Gemara brought this matter of a half-measure regarding Yom Kippur, and the prohibition of Yom Kippur also only exists on its day. Furthermore: the verse implies the opposite. And there is one who says that "eating" unspecified refers to any amount, and the measure of a kezayit is from the perspective of a Law given to Moses at Sinai (ibid. in the name of the Re'em). And this is even more difficult, for in the entire Talmud "eating" unspecified is a kezayit. And the truth is that the measures are a Law given to Moses at Sinai, but nevertheless, the Law revealed that the Torah's intent with the term "eating" is a kezayit. Therefore, the Talmud is accustomed to saying "eating" unspecified is a kezayit.

In my humble opinion, the intent of the Rambam appears to be as follows: that regarding chametz, there is a specific verse for a partial measure. For behold, according to Hizkiyya in the Gemara (21b), the prohibition of benefit is learned from "lo ye'akhel," which is written with a tzeirei and a kamatz. Rabbi Abbahu holds that any expression of "eating" also includes benefit. And the Rambam rules according to Rabbi Abbahu, as I wrote in section 2. If so, it is difficult for Rabbi Abbahu: why was it necessary for the verse to change the expression to "lo ye'akhel" regarding chametz? To this he says: it comes to include a partial measure. And the intent of the Rambam, when he says that it is stated "lo ye'akhel" – refers to the change in expression, which implies an inclusion. And if it is difficult: what do we care about chametz, for is it not so regarding all prohibitions?! For certainly there is a great practical difference, as behold, the reason for the prohibition of a partial measure – we say in Yoma is because it is fit to be combined. According to this, when one eats exactly at the end of the seventh day a half-olive bulk – it is no longer fit to be combined, for it will then be permitted to eat chametz. But when there is a verse for this – even in such a case it is prohibited by the Torah. Nevertheless, there is no karet or sin-offering for this. Since this is only from an inclusion of the verse, and not from its plain meaning – it is like any partial measure of other prohibitions.

The Ra’avad wrote in the third chapter, law 8, in the Hassagot, and this is his wording: Perhaps this author grasped that one violates "it shall not be seen" and "it shall not be found" from six hours and onward. This is not so, for "seven days" is written. Thus far his words. Behold, according to the Ra’avad, one does not violate "bal yira’eh" and "bal yimatzeh" until the night. The Maggid Mishneh wrote that the Rambam also holds this way. However, one of the great ones has already elaborated (Noda BiYehudah Kama, Orach Chaim siman 20) that this is not so, and certainly the Rambam holds as the Ra’avad grasped in his words. And according to the system of the Rambam, it is certainly so, for since he holds that there is a negative commandment regarding eating after midday, and consequently after midday is included also regarding the matter of "bal yira’eh" within the seven days just as for eating—since the removal is similar to eating; even if in the essence of the punishments they are not equal—nevertheless, ultimately there is a negative commandment for after midday, just as for all seven days of Pesach. And according to the Ra’avad, that there is no negative commandment regarding eating—it is simple that there is no "bal yira’eh" here. And since most of the poskim hold like the Ra’avad regarding eating, consequently also regarding the matter of "bal yira’eh," we maintain that there is no prohibition of "bal yira’eh" until the night.

The Rambam wrote in the first chapter, law 3: One does not receive lashes for the prohibition of "it shall not be seen and it shall not be found" unless he acquired chametz during Pesach, or it became chametz such that he performed an action with it. But if he had chametz before Pesach, and Pesach arrived and he did not destroy it, but rather left it in his possession, even though he violated two prohibitions – he does not receive lashes according to the Torah, because he did not perform an action with it. And they strike him with lashes of rebellion. Thus far his words, for any prohibition that does not involve an action, one does not receive lashes for it. And so it is taught in the Tosefta of Makkot (fourth chapter, halacha 5): One who leaves over chametz, and one who maintains kilayim – does not receive lashes, because there is no action in this.

And they raised a difficulty against him: for even if one purchased chametz on Pesach or leavened it, thereby performing an action, why is he lashed? For we say explicitly in Pesachim (95a) that "bal yera'eh" is a negative commandment linked to a positive commandment. Rashi explained that throughout the days of the festival, one stands under the obligation of "stand and destroy it," and the Tosafot wrote likewise (29b). The great authorities labored much over this difficulty and did not find a clear answer (see Mishneh LaMelech there in the name of several great authorities). In my humble opinion, it is not a difficulty at all. For behold, the dispute in Makkot (16a) is well known, whether we require "he fulfilled it and did not fulfill it" or "he nullified it and did not nullify it." The Rambam, in the eighteenth chapter of Sanhedrin, ruled according to the one who holds "he fulfilled it and did not fulfill it." We explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 97, section 5, that according to the Rambam, when it is not in his power to fulfill the positive commandment, even if he did not nullify it with his hands—he is lashed; see there. If so, automatically, when the seventh day of Pesach arrives, at the final moment of the end of the day when there is no longer time to destroy it—at that point it is not called "linked to a positive commandment" and he is lashed, for nullification is not effective on Yom Tov. And every type of destruction, such as burning, or crumbling and scattering to the wind—requires a little time. At the final moment—it is impossible for him, and therefore he is lashed. (And I found in the Sha'agat Aryeh, siman 80, who wrote something similar to this. He rejected it, arguing that if so, it should have been specified; see there. But this is not a rejection.)

And it appears to me that even if one derives benefit from chametz on Pesach – he does not receive malkot, since he did not eat. For even though benefit is also included in the expression "eating," nevertheless there are no malkot for it, as the Rambam wrote in the eighth chapter of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 16, and this is his wording: Any food that is forbidden for benefit, if one derived benefit but did not eat… he does not receive malkot… Thus far his words. And the reason for the matter he explained in Sefer HaMitzvot, negative commandment 187, and even there it is not understood. And the Ramban there (in Root 2) wrote that one receives malkot for benefit, and so it is implied from Tosafot Chullin (102b, starting with "Ela") and from Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, negative commandment 259, and so wrote the Shiltei HaGibborim in the name of the Riaz (Pesachim 82). And the great authorities have already labored over the reason of the Rambam (Pri Chadash later in siman 442, and Mishneh LaMelekh, fifth chapter of Yesodei HaTorah). And we have explained with the help of Heaven the reason of the Rambam in Yoreh Deah siman 88, section 37, because benefit is one part of the parts of the mitzvah, for in every eating there is benefit, and the primary focus of the verse is on eating. And the Rambam follows his consistent reasoning in Sefer HaMitzvot, Root 12, that one only receives malkot for the essence of the mitzvah, and not for a part of it. For there he wrote that one should not count a part as a mitzvah unto itself, and consequently one does not receive malkot for it, see there. And the rest of the laws pertaining to the eating of forbidden things – the Rambam explained in the fourteenth chapter of Ma'akhalot Assurot, and we explained them with the help of Heaven in Yoreh Deah there. And it is simple that the prohibition of "bal yera'eh" – is not for less than a kezayit. And likewise there is no difference between chametz and leaven. And the laws of mixtures of chametz, and chametz nuksheh, whether they are subject to the prohibition of "bal yera'eh" or not, as well as their other laws – will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 442 and in siman 447.

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of the second chapter: It is a positive commandment from the Torah to remove the chametz before the time of the prohibition of its eating, as it is said: "But on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses." And from the oral tradition they learned that this "first" is the fourteenth day. A proof for this matter is what is written in the Torah: "You shall not slaughter the blood of My sacrifice with chametz," meaning: do not slaughter the Pesach while chametz still exists. And the slaughtering of the Pesach is on the fourteenth day after midday. Thus far his words. And our sages, of blessed memory, received that "but" [ach] divides, meaning that it divides the day: that until midday—it is permitted to have chametz according to the Torah, and after midday—it is forbidden. And consequently, since the removal must be before the time of its prohibition—the removal must be before midday. And according to the rabbis there is a further distancing, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

And what is the removal mentioned in the Torah? Our sages, of blessed memory, said (4b) that according to the Torah, a mere nullification is sufficient. Rashi explained: Since it is written "you shall remove" and it is not written "you shall burn," we learn from this that removal in the heart is considered removal. Thus far his words. And Onkelos translated: "you shall nullify." And in the Sifrei it is taught: "Leaven shall not be seen to you" — nullify it in your heart. Our teachers, the Tosafists, wrote there that since one nullified it, it becomes hefker, and it leaves his domain, and it is permitted. For we say: Yours you may not see, but you may see that of others and that of the Most High. And as for that which we say in Nedarim: hefker must be before three — according to the Torah it is not necessary. Thus far their words. And so wrote the Semag, Prohibition 78, see there. But the opinion of the Rambam in the second chapter of Nedarim is that even according to the Torah, it is not effective between himself and himself; rather, one must declare it hefker before one, and by rabbinic decree it requires three, as we have explained regarding this in Choshen Mishpat siman 273 section 7, see there. And if so, this nullification is not effective by reason of hefker when he nullifies the chametz between himself and himself. Furthermore: hefker in the heart is not effective, for matters of the heart are not matters (Ran, beginning of Pesachim). Furthermore: behold, there is one who holds in Nedarim (43b) that hefker is like a gift, and until it reaches the domain of the acquirer, it remains in the domain of the one who declared it hefker. And if so, the chametz still remains in his domain (ibid.).

However, the intention of our teachers is this: certainly regarding other matters, bittul is not like hefker, for the reasons we have explained. But chametz is different, for chametz on Pesach is not in a person's possession. For it is the King's expropriation, as He forbade it for benefit, and against his will He removed it from the person's possession. Rather, regarding the prohibition of "bal yera'eh" – the Torah established the chametz as being in his possession, as they said in the Gemara (6b): Two things are not in a person's possession, and the Scripture treated them as if they are in his possession: a pit in the public domain, and chametz from the sixth hour and onwards, see there. Therefore, with a mere disclosure of intent – it is sufficient. For since he discloses his intent that he does not want it to be in his possession, and he nullifies it so that it shall be like the dust of the earth – it automatically leaves his possession entirely (ibid.). And this is what is common in the language of the sages: he nullifies it in his heart, and it is enough for him. That is to say: for behold, it is not in his possession since the Torah forbade it to him. Therefore, even with bittul in the heart – it leaves his possession, and becomes like hefker.

And also, it cannot be said that the Torah only permitted nullification and not searching, for this is not logical at all: Behold, regarding all prohibitions of benefit, such as an asherah and idol worship—the Torah commanded only searching, as it is written: "You shall surely destroy...". Rather, it is certain that the Torah came to be lenient regarding chametz, that nullification is sufficient. But it is obvious that searching is also included in "you shall remove," for one who does not desire nullification, or who cannot direct his heart toward nullification—shall search all the places where they bring in chametz, and remove them from the world: either by burning, or by other means, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And after he has searched all the places, even if chametz is found afterward—he does not transgress according to the Torah. For the Torah relied upon legal presumptions (Ran ibid.), and he did everything that was necessary, and he is naught but like one under duress. Thus it is found that according to the Torah one may do one of two things: either the searching or the nullification, and he fulfills his obligation.

But the sages required two things: searching and nullification. For they did not wish to rely on nullification alone, because this nullification depends on a person's thought, and people's minds are not alike, and it is possible they would treat it lightly and not completely remove it from their hearts (ibid.). Therefore, they required searching. And regarding this we learned: On the night of the fourteenth, one searches for chametz. That is to say: so as not to rely on the nullification. Nevertheless, even for the searching they required the nullification, as we say in the Gemara (6b): One who searches must nullify, for the reason that perhaps he will find chametz afterward. And granted that from the Torah he does not transgress retroactively, as we have explained, nevertheless, he must immediately destroy it. And we fear perhaps it will be a fine loaf, and he will have pity on it for some small amount of time instead of destroying it, and he will transgress "it shall not be seen."

As we have explained, this is the approach of most of our teachers: that from the Torah, either bitul or bedikah is effective; whether regarding chametz known to the person, or regarding chametz that is not known to the person. And by rabbinic decree, both things are required: whether regarding known chametz, or regarding that which is not known. However, in the words of the Rambam at the beginning of the second (first) chapter, there is room for investigation, for he wrote: And what is this removal mentioned in the Torah? That he shall nullify it in his heart, and consider it as dust. And he shall resolve in his heart that there is no chametz in his possession at all, and that all chametz in his possession—behold it is like dust, and like a thing for which there is no need at all. And it is by the words of the scribes to search for the chametz in hiding places and in holes, and to check and remove it from all his borders. Thus far his words. And ostensibly his intention is that from the Torah there is only bitul. But this is not a logical reasoning, as I have written. However, his intention is indeed this: that from the Torah bitul suffices, and by the words of the scribes bedikah is required. And he did not explain his intention here at length. And the proof: for behold, from his wording it implies that by the words of the scribes bedikah suffices, for behold he did not write "and by the words of the scribes one must also search...". And in truth it is not so, for they said explicitly: One who checks must nullify, and so wrote the Rambam himself in chapter three, law 7, and this is his wording: And when he finishes checking... he must nullify... Thus far his words. Rather, he was not concerned with being lengthy, and his opinion is like the opinion of all the poskim.

And know that there is a version in the Rambam, which the Kesef Mishneh brought in this wording: And what is the removal mentioned in the Torah? That he should remove the chametz known to him from his domain. And that which is not known – he annuls it in his heart... for it implies that only for chametz that is not known – does annulment help. But for known chametz – even from the Torah, nothing helps except for searching. And the Kesef Mishneh already rejected this version, for it is explicitly proven in the Gemara that for every type of chametz – annulment helps, as the language of the Gemara in several places is "from the Torah – a mere annulment suffices," which explicitly implies that it refers to every type of chametz. And there are further clear proofs, and it is clear that it is an erroneous version. Or if this version existed – the Rambam went back and corrected it. And a clear proof: that the Maggid Mishneh did not mention it, and who was more expert in the words of the Rambam than him? Therefore, even though this opinion is also found in the Kol Bo in the name of a Gaon, nevertheless, we should not innovate a matter that the majority of our teachers do not hold so. And from the Shas it does not imply so, as I have written (and so wrote the Pri Chadash). And there are some of the great ones who wanted to sustain these words through many forced arguments, and I do not know what compelled them to this. And if there is a distinction to be made between known chametz and that which is not known – it is not from the Torah that there is a distinction, but rather from the Rabbis, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

For behold, in section 15 we wrote that the sages required a search for this reason: because they did not want to rely on a nullification that depends on the heart, lest one not nullify it properly. This is from the words of the Ran, of blessed memory, at the beginning of Pesachim. According to this, even if he has no known chametz—nullification is not effective if he finds chametz afterwards. This is also clear from the wording of the Rambam, who wrote that by the words of the scribes—one is obligated to search for the chametz in hiding places and in holes. However, our teachers the authors of the Tosafot wrote at the beginning of Pesachim that the sages required a search for this reason: lest he come to eat from the chametz, see there. If so, this is only relevant when the chametz is before us in a known place. But in a place where it is not known—it is not relevant that he might come to eat it. If so, according to this, a person who has no known chametz—nullification should suffice for him. And perhaps it was regarding this that the Gaon cited in the Kol Bo said that for known chametz nullification is not effective, meaning: by rabbinic law. And the book of the Kol Bo is not in my hand to look into it. However, even according to the opinion of the Tosafot, in places where they bring in chametz and go there—it is obvious that there is a concern, lest there be chametz there and he come to eat it.

And so I have seen a dispute whether one violates "bal yera'eh" regarding chametz that is not known. And there are proofs for this side and that side. And in my humble opinion, it appears that there is no dispute here, and there are two levels regarding chametz that is not known: The first is in places where it is their way to bring chametz into them, but it is not known that there is chametz in them now, and in this one certainly violates "bal yera'eh" when chametz is found in them. And the second: places where they do not bring chametz into them, and it happened that chametz was found there. And in such a case, it is obvious that one does not violate "bal yera'eh" over it, for certainly from the Torah one is not obligated at all to search there. And in the Mishnah of "The light of the fourteenth" we learned: that every place where one does not bring chametz into it—does not require a search. And it is obvious that one does not violate "bal yera'eh" if chametz is found there.

And some bring proof from the commentary of Rashi (6a) regarding that which was said of one who sets sail or goes out with a caravan, and his intention is to return – he is obligated to check even if he went out at the beginning of the year. And Rashi explained that when he returns during the days of Pesach he violates the prohibition, and at that time it is not in his domain to nullify it… and when he sees it – he violates the prohibition. Thus far his words, which implies that as long as he does not see it – he does not violate the prohibition. And Heaven forbid to say so, for certainly if he knows that there is chametz in his house – he violates even if he did not see it. And here we are dealing with one who departed from his house and did not check, and he does not know if there is chametz there or if there is no chametz there. Therefore it is not relevant that he should violate, and when he saw it – he certainly violates it retroactively. And the intention of Rashi, of blessed memory, is that when he becomes aware – he will violate, and he stated the common occurrence: when he sees the chametz. And similarly, there are those who bring proof from the Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter "Kol Sha'ah," regarding that which they said in the Gemara: that therefore it was necessary to teach that during any hour that it is permitted to eat – one may feed it to cattle or wild animals. For if it had informed us of a wild animal – because it hides it. And the Tosafot wrote: that one does not violate the prohibition of "do not hide," which we derive from "it shall not be found," and this is not found, since it is not known where it is. Thus far their words. And Rashi also wrote that if it hides it – he does not violate "bal yera'eh," see there. And they inferred from this that he holds that when he does not see it – he does not violate. And I wonder at this proof, for here we are dealing with one who checked properly, but it informs us that we do not fear that it will hide it in its usual manner (and so wrote the Pnei Yehoshua). And if it were a certainty that it would hide it – he would certainly violate. However, the Tosafot themselves already wrote there that there is a distinction between a wild animal and a marten, and a wild animal does not hide it so much, see there. And it is like a place into which one does not bring chametz, where one does not violate even if chametz is found there, as I wrote in the previous section.

Regarding the variation of the wordings in the Torah: in the parsha of "This month," it is written, "seven days leaven (se'or) shall not be found in your houses," and in the parsha of "Sanctify to Me every firstborn," it is written, "and chametz shall not be seen with you, and leaven (se'or) shall not be seen with you in all your borders." And the variations are that regarding "shall not be found," only "leaven" is written and "with you" is not written, and "in your houses" is written. And regarding "shall not be seen," chametz and leaven are written, and "with you" is written, and "in all your borders" is written. And behold, as for the halacha: chametz and leaven are all one, for we find two verses that begin with "leaven" and conclude with "chametz," as it is written: "but on the first day you shall remove leaven from your houses, for anyone who eats chametz..." And it is written: "seven days leaven shall not be found in your houses, for anyone who eats that which is leavened..." This shows that they have one law, and both were necessary, for from chametz we would not have known leaven, which is not fit for eating, and therefore regarding eating it is written "chametz" and not "leaven." And from "leaven" we would not have known chametz, because its leavening is intense and it is fit to leaven other doughs with it, which is not the case with chametz. And thus they expounded in the Mekhilta, and Rashi brought it in the Chumash there on the verse of "shall not be found in your houses," see there.

And the reason for the variations: It appears in my humble opinion that behold, in the Gemara (5b) we derive "houses" from "boundaries" and "boundaries" from "houses," see there. And the verse regarding se'or, "it shall not be found in your houses" – we expound there regarding the chametz of a non-Jew that he deposited in the hand of an Israelite, and the Israelite accepted responsibility for it, that he violates "bal yera'eh" and "bal yimatzé," see there. Therefore, it does not write "to you," for even if it is not yours – it is as if it were yours. And therefore it writes "in your houses," for the way of a deposit is to deposit it in a house, in a guarded place. And therefore it writes "shall not be found" and does not write "and shall not be seen," because the way of a deposit is to hide it in a place that is not visible to the eye. And therefore it writes "se'or," because chametz bread which is needed for eating – it is not the way to deposit it in the hands of others, which is not the case for se'or. And so as not to err that the prohibition of "bal yera'eh" and "bal yimatzé" is only in houses, and not in boundaries, therefore it writes: "And there shall not be seen to you... in all your boundary." That is to say: if it is yours – it is forbidden not only in your houses, but in every place of your boundary, in whatever place it may be. And yours you do not see, but you may see that of others and that of the Sanctuary – even in your houses, if you did not accept responsibility. For we learned one from the other. And so that you should not say: that the matter depends specifically on seeing, for this it writes "shall not be found" – that even if you do not see, but rather it is found in your boundary, you violate. And in law there is no distinction between chametz and se'or, and between houses and boundaries, and all is one. And the laws of a deposit will be explained in siman 440 with the help of Heaven. (And with this the Torah explained all the laws of the prohibition of chametz. And therefore in "Mishpatim" and "Ki Tisa" and in "Emor" where it mentioned the festivals – it did not mention the matter of chametz at all. And only in Mishneh Torah, which is the repetition of the laws, it wrote in brief at the end of "Re'eh": "You shall not eat chametz with it, and se'or shall not be seen to you," and it mentioned both of them, and the prohibition of eating and the prohibition of "bal yera'eh." And that which in the Gemara and in the Mechilta they preceded "shall not be seen" before "shall not be found," even though "shall not be found" is written first, yet this is the way of "not only this, but even that": "shall not be seen" even "shall not be found." And with this we have explained with the help of Heaven all the laws of bal yera'eh. Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

And behold, in section 18 we explained two reasons why they required a bedikah: one, lest he not perform bitul properly; and the second, lest he come to eat it. And one should not ask regarding this reason: if so, why did they not concern themselves with this regarding other prohibitions? For it is not comparable, as with chametz, since they do not separate from it the entire year—there is more reason for concern. Furthermore: since the Torah was stringent regarding chametz to transgress regarding it "bal yera'eh"—therefore the sages were more concerned with this (Tosafot at the beginning of Pesachim). And there is a practical difference between the reasons: for according to the reason that they do not separate—one must also check for chametz that one does not transgress "bal yera'eh" for, such as nuksheh and mixtures, according to the one who holds so, as will be explained in siman 442. But according to the reason because one transgresses "bal yera'eh," and likewise according to the previous reason lest he not perform bitul properly—he only needs to check for chametz that one transgresses "bal yera'eh" for. However, in the Gemara (10b) it is explicitly proven that there is reason to concern oneself with eating, see there, and therefore the primary ruling is that every type of chametz requires bedikah. Yet one could say that they were only concerned with chametz for which one is liable for karet, and not for chametz that involves only a mere negative commandment. And that which we say in Yevamot (82a) that there is no difference between a negative prohibition and a karet prohibition—Rashi already explained (ibid. 119a) that this is regarding a matter of doubt. But regarding a rabbinic distancing—it is well to say that for karet they made a distancing, and not for a negative commandment, see there in Rashi who explicitly explained so.

When is the time for the bedikah? The sages taught in the Mishnah: On the night of the fourteenth, one searches for chametz by the light of a candle. They explained the reason in the Gemara: For even though the prohibition begins from midday, and if so, it would have been sufficient to search in the morning like the "zealots who precede in the performance of mitzvot," as it is written: "And Abraham rose early in the morning" – and not on the night before. However, the reason is because the light of a candle is good for searching. And even though according to this, could he not search at any time he wishes during the night, why did they require it at the beginning of the night? Because at that time people are found in their homes, as they come from their business to their homes to pray Maariv and to eat, and it is a fixed time for the bedikah (see Taz, subsection 1).

The Ra'avad, of blessed memory, inferred from the expression "light" that the bedikah must be while there is still a bit of light, which is at the beginning of the night, but not during bein hashemashot (Chok Yaakov subsection 1 and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 5). And some say that the time of bedikah is before the emergence of the stars (Bach and Magen Avraham subsection 5), but the primary view is like the first opinion (Mekor Chaim subsection 1, and so wrote the Taz subsection 5, and so wrote the Ra'avad himself in the book Temim De'im). Therefore, at the beginning of the night of the fourteenth of Nisan – one performs bedikah for chametz by the light of a candle, in holes and in crevices, and in all places where it is common to bring chametz.

Every person should be careful not to begin any labor at the end of the thirteenth day, which is to say half an hour before nightfall (Magen Avraham, subsection 3). And similarly, it is forbidden to eat a meal until one checks. However, tasting fruit or a kebeitzah of bread is permitted (ibid.). And this refers to bread over which one recites the blessing "mezonot." But to wash his hands and eat bread over which he recites the blessing "hamotzi" is forbidden even for a kezayit. And even that over which one recites "mezonot" is only permitted up to a kebeitzah, for it is considered a snack regarding sukkah. But more than a kebeitzah is forbidden. And this is only regarding bread, but fruit and other foods—one may eat more. And all the more so regarding drinking, for all of them are called a snack regarding sukkah. And similarly, it is forbidden to enter a bathhouse, and for all things that are forbidden before mincha, as I have written in siman 232.

And even to study is forbidden once the time for the bedikah has arrived, but not before the time. And in this it is not similar to eating, for even regarding the evening prayer the law is such, as is explained in Berakhot (4b). And even if he has a fixed time to study—he shall not study until he performs the bedikah. And there is one who says that even to study is forbidden a half hour beforehand, and it is not similar to the evening prayer (Taz, subsection 2). And it is not the primary view, for how is it possible to forbid the study of Torah before the arrival of the time (Chok Yaakov, subsection 5, and Magen Avraham, subsection 6). And that which the Rambam wrote at the beginning of the second chapter, that they do not establish a midrash at the end of the thirteenth day, and likewise the sage—he shall not begin to read at this time, lest he be drawn out and be prevented from the bedikah of chametz at the beginning of its time. Thus far his words. The intention is not that ordinary study is forbidden before its time, for if so, he should have said concisely that it is forbidden to study at the end of the thirteenth day. Rather, this is its explanation: study for which one prepares oneself for a long time—is forbidden. And this is the establishing of a midrash, where they study in public and debate with one another, for this is for a long time. And likewise the sage who teaches students—it is forbidden, for this is for a long time. But to study in solitude—there is no prohibition except when the time has arrived. (And the Gr"z in section 5 wrote like the Taz, and it appears that this is because they understood the words of the Rambam so. But according to what I have written—on the contrary, there is proof to the opposite, and one should not be idle from the study of Torah except when the time has arrived. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

There is one who wrote that those people who say a matter of halacha in the beit knesset after the prayer – they are permitted to say the lesson. For specifically one who learns in his house is forbidden, as he is not compelled to rise from his place. But this person will certainly go to his house. And specifically a matter of halacha without pilpul, but with pilpul – it is forbidden to engage even if he is not in his house, for in this there is certainly a concern lest he come to be drawn out (Magen Avraham, subsection 5). And in my humble opinion, it appears that this is against the words of the Rambam that we brought, for this is the "establishing of a midrash" that the Rambam forbids. And one must say that the Rambam – his intention was in his house and not in the beit midrash. But it does not imply so, for the language "establishing of a midrash" refers to the beit midrash. (And the Rambam, it appears to me, was precise from the language of the Shas 4a: This Torah scholar should not open... And why did it not say plainly that it is forbidden to learn? Rather, this is the establishing of a midrash, or the lecture of the sage before students, for in this there is a concern of being drawn out.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that if one began to study while it was still day—he does not need to interrupt. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who say he must interrupt, and so it appears to me to be the primary view. Thus far his words. And even though when one began permissibly—even regarding optional matters he does not stop, as I wrote in siman 235; nevertheless, regarding the study of Torah, which has no end or limit, and for which "completion" is not applicable, and he will perforce need to interrupt, therefore he should interrupt now (Chayei Adam). And according to this, it appears in my humble opinion that they do not disagree at all. For certainly according to the law he does not need to interrupt, by a kal vachomer from optional matters regarding Mincha. However, on the contrary, optional matters have a completion, and words of Torah have no completion, and he will perforce interrupt. Therefore, if he needs to finish until the chapter, or to finish the matter—it appears in my humble opinion that all agree he does not need to interrupt.

And if he began to study once its time arrived—certainly he must stop, for he began in a state of prohibition. And if he began a voluntary matter while it was yet day, in a state of permission—some say that he must stop (Magen Avraham, subsection 6). And even though regarding Mincha he does not stop, this is because it is frequent, and we do not fear that he will forget. This is not the case with bedikat chametz, which is once a year—we fear that he will forget (Bach). And even though regarding lulav we also maintain that if they began they do not stop, as I wrote in siman 652—it is not comparable. For lulav is at least seven days in the year. Furthermore: the time for lulav is all day, whereas for bedikat chametz its primary time is at the beginning of the night (M"Ch). Furthermore: lulav is a momentary handling and he has fulfilled his obligation, and there is no concern for he will certainly do so, which is not the case with bedikat chametz. Nevertheless, there is one who says that he does not need to stop, just as with Mincha (Ch"Y). And it seems to me that he should tell his wife or another person to remind him to perform bedikat chametz, and then he may finish what he began. For even without this, there is one who says that if he appoints someone to remind him to check—it is permitted for any matter (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 8, and M"K Ch, subsection 8). Therefore, in such a case—it is simple that one may rely on this.

And one who did not pray Arvit with the congregation – some say that he should search, and afterwards he should pray; unless he is accustomed to pray with ten in the beit knesset – he should pray first, because it is a burden to gather them afterwards. And one who always prays Arvit in his home – he should search and afterwards he should pray (Magen Avraham, subsection 5). But some say that Arvit prayer always takes precedence (Chayei Adam), and such is the primary ruling (Mekor Chayim, subsection 6). For the enactment was never to search before Arvit prayer.