Siman 42

It is forbidden to change the tefillin of the head to make it for the hand, because the sanctity of the head tefillin is greater than that of the hand. For in the head tefillin, there is a shin on the body of the beit, which is not the case with the hand tefillin. Furthermore, of the name "Shaddai," the majority is on the head tefillin: the shin and the dalet, while on the hand tefillin there is only the yod. And it is forbidden to change from a stringent sanctity to a light sanctity. Even to take a strap from the head tefillin to place it on the hand tefillin is forbidden for this reason. However, it is permitted to make a hand tefillin into a head tefillin, for one elevates in matters of sanctity. And he shall make for it four houses, as I wrote in siman 32.

And this is specifically when he has already donned them. But new ones that he has not yet donned—it is permitted to make from those of the head for those of the hand, for we maintain: "Designation is not a substantial matter." And how shall he do it? He patches over them one leather cover and they appear as one compartment, as I wrote there. And so too if he inserted a new strap into an old one of the head, and had not yet worn the strap—it is permitted to take it and place it on one of the hand. And so too if he stipulated from the beginning that he would have the ability to change them—it is also permitted to change them, even from those of the head to those of the hand. And for every matter a stipulation is effective, such as with parchments that are made for the sake of a sefer Torah, tefillin, and mezuzot; when he stipulates regarding them—he can make from them mundane matters, such as writing on them gittin and the like. And all this is when he specifies. But in an unspecified case—it is not like a stipulation (Taz, subsection 1). And nevertheless, if it appears according to the context that such was his intention—it is as if he stipulated explicitly (ibid.). For in truth, he does not specifically need a stipulation with his mouth, and it is sufficient when he thought in his heart. And therefore the custom among the scribes is that they use some of the parchments also for optional matters, for since they have become accustomed to this—it is as if they stipulated (ibid.).

There is one who is uncertain when the strap is severed near the knot, whether it is permitted to flip its second end upward and make the knot in it, and the location of the knot would be below in the wrappings on the arm and the finger (Magen Avraham, subsection 3). And there is one who permits (Eliyah Rabbah). And in my humble opinion, it appears that regarding the actual location of the knot of the dalet and the yod—it is certainly forbidden to change. And it is a fortiori from tefillin shel rosh, which one may not make into shel yad because of the shin that is on it. And all the more so regarding the actual letter of the Name, that it is forbidden to change it into a plain strap. But aside from the location of the knot, it appears to me that there is no concern whether it is above or below, for it is all one holiness. And there is no "above" or "below" in this, for all of it is wrapped on the arm or hangs from the shel rosh. And what does it matter to me if it is near the house or not? (And it is not similar to the planks in the Mishkan that the Magen Avraham brought in subsection 3, for there one side is near the ground and it is not respectful compared to the upper side, which is not the case here. And it appears to me that even the Magen Avraham's primary uncertainty was only regarding the location of the knot, see there and in the Sha'arei Teshuvah. Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

The Rambam wrote in chapter four, law 9: A vessel that one prepared to place tefillin in, and placed them in it—it has become sanctified, and it is forbidden to use it for mundane matters. If he prepared it but did not place them in it, or if he placed them in it temporarily and did not prepare it—it has not become sanctified, and it remains mundane as it was. Thus far his words. And it appears to me from the precision of his wording that specifically with a temporary placement it does not become sanctified without preparation, but with a permanent placement—it becomes sanctified even without preparation, for the permanent use also effects the preparation. And it is explained in the Gemara (Berakhot 23b) regarding what it said, that if one tied them in it but did not designate it—it is not holy. Rather, this refers to where he tied them in it in a temporary manner. And there is room to doubt according to this as to what extent is called "temporary." And it appears to me that with three days it is called "permanence." And it appears to me that if he said at the time of its use that he is not doing this for permanence, even if he used it for many days it does not become holy, for a condition is effective as I have written. And this is like a condition that he is not sanctifying it absolutely.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 3 wrote: A scarf that one designated to wrap tefillin in forever, and he wrapped tefillin in it one time – it is forbidden to wrap coins in it. Thus far his words. And he was precise to say "forever," meaning: for certainly if he designated it without specification to wrap tefillin in it, it is as if it were forever, but if he specified that he is not sanctifying it for this forever – it is as if he made a condition and it is permitted. And therefore our teacher, the Rema, wrote on this that if he made a condition regarding it from the beginning in any manner – it is permitted. Thus far his words. That is to say: that he requires explicit speech that it is not forever, and then even if he used it many times – it is not holy. And there is reason to doubt if he designated it, and another came and placed tefillin in it, whether it became sanctified. And it appears in my humble opinion from the language of the Shas and the poskim that it is specifically when he himself used it and not another. And so it will be explained in section 10.

And there is reason to be in doubt whether the hazmanah must be specifically through an action, meaning that he sews a pouch for the sake of tefillin, but if he took a pouch and says, "Behold, I am designating it for tefillin" – it is not effective unless he repaired something in it. Or perhaps mere speech is sufficient. And I found that there is a dispute of the Rishonim in this: the Ria"z and his grandfather, our teacher Isaiah the First, as the Shiltei Gibborim wrote in the third chapter of Berakhot on the Rif (page 17a, letter 5), and this is his wording: My teacher, my grandfather the Rabbi, distinguishes regarding hazmanah between land and movable property, for land does not have hazmanah through speech..., but movable property has hazmanah through speech... And so too if he said regarding a scarf: "Let this scarf be for tefillin" – this is hazmanah even through speech alone. And if he tied tefillin in it even temporarily – it is forbidden to tie his money in it... But it seems to me that there is no distinction in this between land and movable property. Rather, even movable property does not have hazmanah through speech but only through an action... And so too a scarf for tefillin, if he made any repair in it for the need of tefillin – this is hazmanah. And if he tied tefillin in it even temporarily – this is forbidden. But if he designated it through speech alone – this is not hazmanah, and if he tied tefillin in it temporarily – it is permitted. And if he designated it to place tefillin in it permanently, and placed tefillin in it – you have no greater hazmanah than this... Thus far his words.

It emerges that even according to the opinion of the Riaz, speech is effective if he designated it to place tefillin in it permanently. And according to his words regarding designation by means of an action, even if he did not designate it permanently—it is a designation. And it is a great wonder: for if he did not designate it permanently, what kind of designation is it? Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote explicitly that it must be specifically "permanently," as I wrote in section 5. And it is a forced interpretation to say that his intention was only when the designation was by speech alone, for if so, he should have specified, and certainly he spoke regarding every type of designation. And from the perspective of logic it is so, for without "permanently," it is like a mere condition. And it must be said that the Riaz holds that a condition is not effective. And it requires further study, for in Menachot (34b) regarding the matter of changing from a tefillah of the head to one of the hand, that if he made a condition upon them from the outset—it is permitted, see there. And it is possible that he holds that specifically for a lighter sanctity a condition is effective, but not to remove it to mundane status entirely. But all the poskim did not differentiate in this.

And behold, our teachers the Tosafists in Sanhedrin (48a, starting with the words "Netano") wrote regarding the opinion of our teacher Isaiah the First that designation via speech is effective if he took it in his hand and designated it for this purpose. This is their wording there: And it must be said that a designation of speech alone is not effective unless he took it and said, "This shall be for the deceased and for the book." And that which it mentions the weaver—is not specifically so, but rather because of the novelty of Rava, that even so it is permitted. Thus far their words. And according to this, for the halacha we certainly follow the opinion of our teachers the Tosafists.

And know that there is one who wrote that if one made a bag for the sake of tefillin, even if he bound [tefillin] in it with the intent to remove them—it is forbidden. And the same law applies if there was a bag and he added something to it for the sake of tefillin, and bound [tefillin] in it with the intent to remove them—it is forbidden until he removes what he innovated. And if he bound in it one time with the intent to bind in it forever, even if he did not designate it—it is forbidden (Magen Avraham subsection 5), and as has been explained in Yoreh Deah siman 364 regarding a corpse. And the Gemara in Sanhedrin (48a) compares this to that, see there. And there is a doubt if also with preparation by speech, when he said "this shall be to bind tefillin in it," the law is such that even if he bound in it with the intent to remove them it is forbidden? Or perhaps only with preparation by means of an action it does not avail with the intent to remove them? And likewise there is this doubt also regarding a corpse in Yoreh Deah ibid. And from the language of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch there it is slightly implied that specifically by means of an action do we say so. And it requires further study for the law.

It is stated in Chullin (13a) that a katan possesses action but does not possess intention. Therefore, a matter that is forbidden through designation alone, such as the body of the sanctity as will be explained—the designation of a katan is nothing. However, if he designated an object for the sake of sanctity, and placed the sanctity within it—it is forbidden, for he indeed possesses action (ibid. subsection 4). According to this, even a designation that is performed through an action is possessed by a katan. And it is simple that a person does not forbid an object that is not his (ibid.). Therefore, if Reuven designated it, and Shimon came and placed the sanctity within it—it is not forbidden, as I wrote in section 5. And all the more so that the designation of another is nothing. Nevertheless, it appears that if another designated it, and the owners agreed to his designation, and they placed a matter of sanctity within it, even if the other placed it with the consent of the owners—it is also forbidden, for he is like his agent. And if they stole a garment and made from it a pouch for tefillin—he acquires it through a change of action and they have forbidden it (ibid.).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3 that parchment processed for the sake of tefillin—it is forbidden to write secular matters upon it, for designation in this manner for the body of sanctity itself—is a significant act. Thus far his words. That is to say: that which we say "designation is not a significant act"—this is when it is not for the body of sanctity itself but rather for an object that serves the sanctity, such as a pouch for tefillin and the like. But regarding the body of sanctity itself—designation is a significant act, as we derive from the broken-necked heifer which was forbidden through mere designation, because it is the body of sanctity itself. And this matter is explained in Sanhedrin ibid.

But according to this there is a great question: for if so, how did we rule that it is permitted to make a shel yad from a shel rosh among new ones, because "designation is not a substantial act"? For the batim are the essence of the holiness, and this law is explicit in Menachot (34b). And it must be said that regarding changing from a stringent holiness to a lenient holiness—it is permitted through designation alone even in the essence of the holiness. This is not the case for removing it from holiness entirely—it is forbidden even through designation alone in the essence of the holiness. And regarding the straps, they wrote that they are not called "the essence of the holiness" but rather "an accessory of holiness" (ibid. subsection 6). However, some say that even in the essence of the holiness, designation does not forbid it until one performs an action upon the essence of the holiness, such as with parchment that one begins to write upon, and then it is forbidden to write secular matters upon it, even if he made a condition regarding it. For a condition is not effective for the essence of the holiness to use it for secular purposes while it is in its holiness (the HaGr"z). But for accessories of holiness—a condition is effective according to all opinions even while they are in their holiness, as will be explained in siman 154, provided that one does not use it for a degrading use as I wrote in siman 151. And for the law, it appears like the first opinion, since our teacher, the Rema, ruled so. (And the HaGr"z wrote that the primary view is like the "some say".)

Everything that has been explained is regarding tashmishei kedushah. However, regarding tashmishei mitzvah, such as tzitzit, shofar, etrog, lulav, Ner Chanukah, and the like, which are a mitzvah and not kedushah—and even though during the time of their mitzvah there is a kedushah upon them—this is not actual kedushah but rather muktzeh due to a mitzvah, and it is forbidden to use them during the time of their mitzvah. But after the mitzvah has been performed, one may use them for mundane purposes, even if the mitzvah was performed with them many times, and one does not require a condition at all. Therefore, a vessel designated for an etrog—it is permitted to use the vessel for mundane matters after Sukkot, and so too anything similar to this. (Magen Avraham, subsection 6. And that which he wrote that even for a matter of kedushah a condition is effective to use it for mundane purposes, see there—this is when there was no designation, as I wrote in section 4. But when there was designation, a condition is not effective, as he himself wrote in subsection 5, and as he wrote in section 9, see there carefully. Examine it and you will find it simple.)