Siman 340

Me'amer is among the primary categories of labor, and its meaning is that one gathers detached produce into one place, for this is of the labors of produce: to collect them into one place and make them into bundles, sheaves, and stacks. And its measure, the Rambam wrote in chapter 8, law 5: "One who gathers food: if for human consumption—its measure is like a dried fig; if he gathered for an animal—its measure is like the full mouth of a kid; and if for fuel—its measure is enough to cook a dried fig's worth of a hen's egg." And there is no gathering except with the products of the soil; therefore, one who gathers salt from a salt-pan—meaning, who piles salt from water-evaporation pools, where he draws water from the sea into a trench and the sun burns them and they become salt—there is no primary category of labor of me'amer in this, because they are not products of the soil (Gemara 73a, see there, for the halacha is like Abaye and not like Rabbah, and the Ramakh objected to the Rambam because he reads "Rava," see there in the Kesef Mishneh).

The derivatives of me'amer, the Rambam wrote there: "One who gathers pressed figs and makes a circle from them, or who threaded figs and inserted the rope into them until they were gathered into one body — this is a derivative of me'amer and he is liable, and so too anything similar to this." Thus far his words. And it is simple that when one gathers any type of vegetable in a garden into one place, and similarly types of fruit when one gathers them detached into one place, such as apples and all types of tree fruit — it is the primary category of the labor of me'amer. And one must warn those who sit in orchards that they should not gather two fruits into one place on Shabbat, and this prohibition is completely hidden from the eyes of the masses. Therefore, one must inform them that there is a prohibition of stoning in this, and one who does so unintentionally is liable for a chatat, and me'amer was in the Mishkan as I wrote in section 10, see there, and see in section 8.

And in the Yerushalmi in the chapter "Klal Gadol" it is stated: "What is the sub-category of gathering... one who spreads out dates or raisins from the basket into the vessel—is liable on account of gathering; as long as he touches the food—he is liable on account of gathering; with the peel—he is liable on account of threshing," see there. And we learned from this that when one spreads out fruits and his intention is that the fruits should be together—he is liable on account of gathering, but if the intention is to remove their peel—the liability is on account of threshing. And it is obvious that gathering is only relevant to grain and fruits that have not been baked and have not been cooked and also have not been ground, for they are still as if they were harvested or plucked; for if it were not so, it would be forbidden on Shabbat to place several loaves of bread in one place, or to place several types of fruit one next to the other. Rather, it is certain that the prohibition is only in their collection from the field and from the gardens and from the trees and not when they are in the house, and all the more so after grinding and baking and cooking, and see in section 8.

Gozzez is a primary labor, and this is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 9, law 7: "One who shears wool or hair, whether from a domestic animal or from a wild animal, whether from the living or from the dead, even from their hide – is liable. What is its measure: enough to spin from it a thread whose length is like a double sit, and how much is a sit: enough to stretch from the thumb of the hand to the first finger when one opens between them with all his strength, and it is approximately two-thirds of a zeret. One who plucks a wing-feather from a bird – this is a derivative of gozzez. One who spins the wool from the living animal – is exempt, for this is not the way of shearing, and this is not the way of combing, and this is not the way of spinning" thus far his words. And we have already explained in siman 336, section 35, that specifically one who shears from the dead animal is liable, but plucking is not the same as shearing regarding an animal, see there.

And know that the Rambam ruled regarding one who shears: the measure of the double width of a sit, and he did not write another measure. However, in the Yerushalmi in the chapter of "Klall Gadol" it says: that if his intent is for spinning—it is according to this measure, but when his intent is for weaving—he is liable for the measure of a sit. And afterward it asks what the law is for one who shears without specification, and concludes leniently that he requires the double measure, see there. And it can be said that the Rambam is dealing with one who shears without specification, but for one who shears for weaving—he is liable for the measure of a sit. And perforce one must say so, for behold we learned in the Mishnah (105b) that for one who spins, the measure is the double width of a sit, and for one who weaves, the measure is a sit; if so, automatically regarding one who shears it is also so, for if it is for spinning, its measure is like the measure of spinning, and if it is for weaving, its measure is like the measure of weaving, but it is certainly as I have written. And shearing was in the Mishkan, as I have written in section 10.

One who removes his fingernails, or his hair, or his mustache, or his beard—this is a derivative of shearing and he is liable. This is provided that he removes them with an implement, but if he removed them with his hand: whether for himself or for another—he is exempt. And this liability with an implement applies when he needs the hair or the fingernails. But when he does not need them—it is a labor not needed for its own sake and he is exempt, according to the poskim who rule like Rabbi Shimon (Magen Avraham, subsection 1), while the Rambam rules like Rabbi Yehuda, as has been written many times. And one who removes his hair with an implement, how much must he remove to be liable: two hairs, and if he picked white hairs from among black ones—he is liable even for one. And this matter is forbidden even on a weekday, because of "a man shall not wear a woman's garment." And a woman who forgot to remove her fingernails at the time of immersion before the Shabbat, it was explained in Yoreh Deah siman 198, see there, and the law of a fingernail that mostly detached was explained above in siman 328, section 41, see there.

The Rambam wrote there: "And so too, one who cuts a wart from his body, whether by hand or with a tool – he is exempt, whether for himself or for another. And it is permitted to cut a wart in the Mikdash by hand but not with a tool, and if it was dry – he may cut it even with a tool and perform the service" Thus far his words. And the Maggid Mishneh wondered about him regarding that which he exempted one who cuts with a tool, for at the end of Eruvin it is explicitly proven that a moist wart has the same law as a fingernail, that with a tool one is liable, see there, and so Rashi explained there (103a) that with a tool it is a primary category of labor. Furthermore, if with a tool it is only a shevut, why did they not permit it in the Mikdash just as by hand, for by hand there is also a shevut, as all the measurements that were explained regarding hair are only for liability for a sin offering, but by rabbinic law even a minimal amount is forbidden, even by hand, and despite all this they permitted it in the Mikdash, and if so, with a tool as well. And it seems clear that there is a printing error in the Rambam, for in the entire sugya there it is explicitly explained that with a tool it is a Torah prohibition, see there.

There is a great principle to know, that in all the avot melakhot and in their measures and their details, where in such a case one is liable and in such a case one is exempt, this is only an exemption from the Torah, but according to the rabbis—it is forbidden. For it is a great principle regarding Shabbat: all exemptions of Shabbat are "exempt but forbidden," except in a place where they said "permitted." Therefore, also regarding me'amer, where it was explained that there is no gathering except for products of the soil and not regarding salt, as I wrote in section 1, the intention is not that with salt it is permitted, but rather that with salt one is exempt but it is forbidden. This is what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9: "It is forbidden to collect salt from the salt pans, for it is similar to me'amer etc." see there, and the prohibition is rabbinic. However, in that which we wrote in section 3—it is permitted ab initio, as the Kesef Mishneh wrote there in the name of the Ramakh regarding the law of one who collects pressed figs and makes a circle from them, that he is liable for me'amer. This is his wording: "And specifically when he collected them from the place where they fell from the tree, but if he collected them in the house—no, as we say in Beitzah etc." Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tosafot in Beitzah (31a, s.v. 'min', see there), that me'amer is only relevant in the place where they grow, see there. And regarding the measures that were explained in me'amer and in gozez—even in less than their measure it is forbidden, like every half-measure which is forbidden even from the Torah, and all the more so from the rabbis, and so too in all the avot melakhot that have been explained and that will be explained. (The Magen Avraham in sub-section 17 raised a difficulty regarding this case of piercing figs etc., why should he not be liable for boneh just as in curdling cheese. But this is not a comparison, for curdled cheese has its form changed from before the curdling to after it, like in building from wood into a house, but it is not so with figs. And perhaps the intention of his answer is also thus, but there is no starting point for this difficulty.)

Menafeitz is among the primary categories of labor, and what is menafeitz: that one beat and separated wool or flax that was stuck together, and this means that he struck it with a stick or combed it with a comb, and in our language it is called "treplin." This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 9, law 12: "One who beats wool or flax or crimson wool and the like—is liable. And what is its measure: enough to spin from it one thread whose length is four tefachim. And one who beats sinews until they become like wool in order to spin them—this is a derivative of menafeitz and he is liable." Thus far his words. And in the Yerushalmi of Klal Gadol it is stated: "One who beats fibers, palm leaves, or reeds—is liable on account of menafeitz," meaning that one who beats fibers that grow around the palm tree or palm leaves or reeds, which is a long grass, and his intention is to make them thin in order to weave them—is liable on account of menafeitz. And in the Yerushalmi the version is "menafes," and it was in the Mishkan as will be explained.

Spinning is a primary category of labor, and it was in the Mishkan as it is written: "spun the goats' hair." And also combing was in the Mishkan, for the flax and the wool that were needed for the work of the Mishkan necessarily required that they be combed, and likewise shearing was in the Mishkan, for they sheared wool from the sheep for the needs of the Mishkan. And gathering was also present in the planting of the dyes, for when they grew they gathered them to one place. And its measure we learned in the Mishnah (105b): as much as the double width of a sit. And according to the Rambam it is four tefachim, and this is his wording in chapter 9, law 15: "One who spins a length of four tefachim from any material that is spun is liable, whether one spins wool or flax or down or hair or sinews or anything similar to them. One who makes felt—this is a derivative of spinning and he is liable, provided that he felts something from which it is possible to spin a thread of four tefachim in length of medium thickness." Thus far his words.

The Ra'avad disagreed with him, and this is his wording: "I do not recognize spinning in the making of felt, because he takes whitened and combed wool and spreads it upon a cloth, and places flocking upon flocking until it becomes thick, and moistens it with water and rolls it with the cloth and tightens it until it joins and hardens and becomes felt. And if he calls this joining 'spinning' I do not know, and it appears more that it is like curdling, which is a derivative of building, and its measure I do not know. And perhaps in length and width like those braids that the daughters of the poor make upon their foreheads." Thus far his words. And it seems to me that in the Yerushalmi of the chapter "Klal Gadol" it is explicitly like the Rambam, as it says there: "One who makes ropes, one who makes a mamzor—is liable on account of spinning." And mamzor appears to be a mizran, as we learned in chapter 19 of Kelim: "The mizran that extends from the bed, any amount," and it is explained in the Aruch under the entry 'mizran': that it is a wool cloth that important people place on their beds beneath all the bedding, and in the foreign tongue tapita, and in the Ishmaelite tongue mizar, see there. And it is translated there in our language as kobretz, and some call it kaviar, and this is felt, for felt is beaten wool without spinning and weaving as the Bartenura wrote at the end of Kilayim, and in our language feltz.

One who stretches the warp is a primary category of labor, and what is stretching the warp: that he stretches the warp threads on the weaver's loom from the upper beam to the lower beam. This is the wording of the Rambam there, law 17: "The way of weavers is that they first stretch the threads across the length of the curtain and its width, and two hold it, one from here and one from here, and one strikes with a rod upon the threads and arranges them one next to the other until it is entirely made into warp without woof. And the stretching of the threads in the manner of weavers is the stretching of the web, and this one who stretches is called the stretcher of the warp, and when they fold it and he begins to insert the warp into the woof he is called a weaver, and the stretcher of the warp is liable, and it is a labor from the primary categories of labor. And the one who strikes upon the threads until they separate and he arranges them—this is a derivative of stretching the warp. And what is its measure: from when he arranges a width of two fingers." Thus far his words, and it was in the Mishkan in the work of the linen and the tekhelet for the curtains.

And in the Yerushalmi in the chapter of "Klal Gadol": "One who makes a kuntran, a sieve, or a mat—is liable on account of warping." A sieve and a mat are known, and a kuntran is a type of sack made of reeds; when one performs with them the labor of the warp that has been explained—he is liable on account of warping. "That woman when she weaves in a frame—on account of the warp," and this is when she places the warp into the holes. "One who makes baskets when he weaves—on account of warping," this refers to one who makes baskets from reeds and fibers; when he begins to make a braid around the basket at its edges—he is liable on account of warping. "One who weaves beds of milin lengthwise—on account of warping," for he makes beds from a type of wood called milin, and when he begins to weave them lengthwise, as the wood is soft and stretches, it is like the labor of wool and linen.

One who makes two heddles—it is a primary category of labor. And this is also during the time of weaving, when one made or fixed two rings or two loops, into which one inserts one thread into each ring or loop. And it appears that the liability is both for the making of the heddles themselves (see Lechem Mishneh), and for inserting two threads into them. This is the wording of the Rambam there, law 16: "One who makes two heddles is liable. One who makes a sifter, or a sieve, or a basket, or a net, or who weaves a bed with ropes—this is a derivative of making heddles, and once he makes two meshes in any of these, he is liable. And so too, anyone who makes two heddles in an object that is made with meshes such as these is liable." Thus far his words. And it was in the Mishkan during the weaving of the curtains and the hangings. And in the Yerushalmi there: "This woman when she places before her—on account of making heddles," meaning when she places the threads into the holes before her. "One who makes *milin kankaltin*—on account of making heddles," and this refers to wood named *milin* that one makes during its weaving like small chambers—he is liable on account of making heddles. It further says there: "Two heddles in one *chaf* and two *chafin* in one heddle." And it appears that this is the explanation: that this liability applies whether one inserts two heddles, which is two threads, into one *chaf*, meaning in one mesh of the heddle meshes, or two *chafin* in one heddle, which is one thread that one inserts into this mesh and its other end into another mesh—he is liable (and see there in Korban HaEidah and Pnei Moshe).

Weaving is a primary category of labor, and it is called weaving from the moment one inserts the warp into the woof. It is obvious that it was in the Mishkan, as they wove the curtains and the hangings. Regarding its measure, the Rambam wrote there in law 18: "One who weaves two threads across a width of two fingers is liable, whether he wove them at the beginning or whether part of the garment was already woven and he wove upon the woven part, its measure is two threads. And if he wove one thread and completed the garment with it, he is liable. If he wove at the edge of the curtain two threads across the width of three heddles, he is liable; to what is this comparable: to one who weaves a small belt across the width of three heddles." Thus far his words. That is to say, even though it does not have two fingers, since this is like a small garment in its own right, he is liable for the measure of two heddles. And know that the measure the Rambam wrote regarding weaving across a width of two fingers is seemingly difficult, for in the Mishnah (105b) we learned: that for one who weaves two threads, the measure is the full span of a sit, and since the Rambam himself wrote regarding spinning that it is the full width of a double sit, which is four handbreadths as I wrote in section 10, if so, the full span of a sit is two handbreadths, and how can he obligate for two fingers? However, the opinion of the Rambam, since it did not say "the full width of a sit" but rather "the full span of a sit," is that it is a different measure of two fingers (Maggid Mishneh). But Rashi, of blessed memory, did not explain it so, but rather that it is half the measure of spinning; see there.

The derivative of weaving: the Rambam wrote there (Halacha 19): "One who thins the threads and separates them at the time of weaving—this is a derivative of weaving; and similarly, one who braids strands—this is a derivative of weaving. And its measure: from when he makes a braid the length of two fingers." Thus far his words. And according to Rashi, it requires two handbreadths; and in the Yerushalmi: even one who makes an object from wood called milin, which is soft—is liable for weaving at the time he inserts the width over the length, see there.

One who separates is also a primary category of labor, and what is one who separates: one who removes the weft threads from upon the warp threads or the warp from upon the weft for the purpose of weaving (the Bartenura). Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote in the Mishnah of the primary categories of labor, and this is his wording: "Separating – detaching; sometimes there is too much in two threads and he detaches from them and thins them for a purpose." Thus far his words. And the Rambam wrote in chapter 9: "One who separates two threads is liable, and separating is dividing the weave, whether he removed the weft from the warp or removed the warp from upon the weft—this is separating and he is liable. And this is provided that he is not acting destructively but intends to improve, in the manner done by those who mend very light garments, who separate and afterward mend and return to weave the threads they separated until the two garments or the two tears become one. And one who undoes a braid to improve—this is a derivative of separating, and its measure is like the measure of separating." Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad explained there that separating is an expression of cutting, that he cuts two threads, for after he completed his weaving, he cuts the woven part from the remainder that is in the loom. And even if he only cut two threads from it—he is liable for this cutting. Thus far his words. And according to all the explanations, it was certainly in the Mishkan, since it pertains to the labor of weaving.

Writing and erasing are among the primary categories of labor, and one who erases is not liable unless he erases in order to write, but one who erases in order to destroy is exempt but it is forbidden. And its measure is: two letters, and so we learned in the Mishnah (104a): "One who writes two letters in one lapse of awareness is liable." And it was in the Mishkan, for they would mark on the planks of the Mishkan to know which was its partner (Mishnah 103a), because they would dismantle it and when they would erect it they would not switch the order of the planks, they would write letters on the planks as a sign, see there (for according to the first Tanna it was perforce letters, and according to Rabbi Yosei they were markings, and examine this closely).

And their derivatives, the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 11: "Marking is a derivative of writing. How so? One who marks marks and forms on a wall, or with red lead and the like, in the manner that painters mark—he is liable on account of writing. And similarly, one who erases the marking for the purpose of improvement—this is a derivative of erasing and he is liable." Thus far his words. And know that in the Mishnah (103a) we learned: "One who writes two letters is liable... Rabbi Yosei says: They only made one liable for two letters on account of marking, etc." And Rashi explained that even if he did not write but merely made two simple marks, he is liable; see there. And since the Rambam wrote that marking is a derivative, learn from this that the halakhah is not according to Rabbi Yosei, for according to Rabbi Yosei it would be a primary category. Furthermore, according to Rabbi Yosei, why did he require marks of forms, for even a simple mark is liable? And so wrote the Rambam and the Bartenura in the commentary on the Mishnah, that the halakhah is not according to Rabbi Yosei; see there. However, in the Yerushalmi it implies that the halakhah is according to Rabbi Yosei; see there (see in the Pnei Moshe in the Mareh HaPanim who wrote that the Rambam ruled according to Rabbi Yosei, but it is not a primary category, and his proof is from the fact that he makes one liable for marks; see there. And his words are puzzling, for this refers to a mark of a form and not a plain mark, and furthermore, in the commentary on the Mishnah he wrote that the halakhah is not according to Rabbi Yosei; rather, it is certainly as I have written, and examine this closely).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 11, law 9: "One who writes two letters is liable; one who erases writing in order to write two letters in the place of the erasure is liable. One who writes one large letter like two is exempt; if he erased one large letter and there is in its place enough to write two, he is liable. If he wrote one letter and completed the book with it, he is liable. One who writes in order to damage the hide is liable, for his liability is not for the place of the writing but for the writing, but one who erases in order to damage is exempt. If ink fell upon a book and he erased it, or if wax fell upon a tablet and he erased it, if there is in its place enough to write two letters, he is liable." Thus far his words.

And that which he wrote: "Ink fell upon a book etc.", the intention is that ink fell not upon the writing but upon blank parchment or paper, and similarly wax upon a blank notebook. This is the wording of the Rosh in the chapter "Klal Gadol" (siman 9): "One who writes one large letter like two—is exempt; one who erases...—is liable, and this is a stringency in erasing more than in writing. And this is the reason: for sometimes a mistake was written in the Mishkan upon one plank, and one erases in order to write another in its place. And by law it would have been appropriate to obligate even for erasing one letter in order to write another letter in its place, except that it is not appropriate to obligate for the intent of writing more than for the writing itself. And it appears that one is not liable for erasing a blot of ink even to write several letters, for there was nothing in the Mishkan except the erasing of letters in order to write in its place. And after I wrote this from logical reasoning, and also from that which was taught in the Baraita: 'erased one letter', I saw in the Tosefta and it is written therein: 'Ink fell upon a book and he erased it, wax upon the notebook and he erased it, if there is in its place enough to write two letters—he is liable.' And the reason is not clear to us, and it can be said that this is the reason: that the letter which was written in error is considered as if it is non-existent, and the primary liability is because of the intent of writing, and therefore even a blot of ink as well. And that which was taught in the Baraita: 'erased a large letter', was because it taught: 'wrote one large letter'" thus far his words, and so it should be explained in the words of the Rambam. And that which he wrote previously: "erased a letter etc.", is not precise, for regarding erasing we do not require a letter, and one should add to the reason because this is "thoughtful labor," when he erases the ink that is upon the paper in order to write upon it.

And the Tur also wrote thus: "One who erases a blot of ink that is upon the parchment or wax that is upon the writing tablet, if there is in its place enough to write two letters – he is liable," and such is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 3. And certainly even if there is not in its place enough to write two letters - it is forbidden by rabbinic law, and therefore one must be careful when wax drips upon the book that one should not remove it, even if it only dripped upon one letter or the space of one letter. And if it dripped upon two letters or upon the space of two letters - he is liable for a chatat (Bach and Taz and Magen Avraham, subsection 4). And there are those who hesitate regarding this law, and also above in siman 143 this was explained; nevertheless, the primary ruling is that on Shabbat it is a complete prohibition to remove wax that fell upon the letters. And similarly when the pages are stuck together with wax in the place of the letters - it is forbidden to separate them (Pri Megadim), and one must be very careful in this, for one can easily come to a prohibition (and see Magen Avraham, subsection 18).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3: That it is forbidden to break a cake upon which something like letters are written, even though he intends only for eating, for it constitutes erasing. Thus far his words. And even though it is not for the purpose of writing, nevertheless there is a rabbinic prohibition in this. And according to this, even with mere drawings one should forbid, yet the world is not careful in this. And perhaps because all the drawings or letters that they make on types of sweets are from the dough itself or from the spices, and in this certainly the name of writing does not apply, for it is also food and is completely permitted (see Magen Avraham subsection 6 who wrote so in the name of the Knesset HaGedolah), and the intention of our teacher, the Rema, is when the letters are written with ink or with dye. And so too if he wrote the letters with honey mixed with water—there is also no concern. And there is one who permits completely even with writing from other things (Dagul Mervavah), because the name of writing does not apply to this at all, and it is destructive and in an unusual manner and there is no prohibition in it. And the source of the law of our teacher, the Rema, refers to when they wrote it as a segulah, that the child should eat it to become wise, for such was their custom (ibid.). And nevertheless, it is good to give the place of the letters to a child since it issued from the mouth of our teacher, the Rema, but from the essential law there is no prohibition in this (also the Taz subsection 2 permits in this, see there). And so too there is one who forbids opening a book where letters are written on the edges of the pages, for when he opens it, it is like erasing (Levush), and they disagreed with him (ibid.). And so wrote our teacher, the Rema, in a responsum (siman 119), that since it is made to open and close—there is in this neither erasing nor writing and it is nothing, and this is like a door that is always opened and closed, where there is no concern of building or tearing down, and here too there is no concern of writing or erasing.

One who writes a double letter twice and it is a single name, such as resh-resh, tav-tav, gimmel-gimmel, dalet-dalet, shin-shin, samekh-samekh, chet-chet, and the like – is liable. However, two identical letters that do not have the intent of a word – he is exempt (Maggid Mishneh, Halacha 10). And one who writes in any script and in any language – is liable, and even with two types of pigments; so we learned in the Mishnah there. Rashi explained: even one in ink and one in red paint, and the Rashba wrote in the name of the Gaon that it refers to the forms of the letters, such as if he made inverted letters like the inverted nuns in the passage of "And it came to pass when the Ark traveled," for as long as it has the form of a letter, even if it is inverted – he is liable.

One who writes a single letter near writing, meaning that next to a letter already written he placed a second letter near it, and one who writes over writing, where he passed the quill over letters already written—is exempt, because he did not innovate anything. And specifically when the writing was of ink, for then whether he passed the second writing with ink or with dye he is exempt, for he has degraded it. But if the first writing was of dye and he passed ink over it—he is liable for two: one on account of erasing, for he erased the dye, and one on account of writing, for he improved it, as ink is superior to dye. But when he passed dye over it, even a different type of dye—he is exempt, for there is neither erasing here, since the dye remains, nor writing, since it was written previously (and in any event, with dye over ink he is not liable on account of erasing, since there is writing, rather he has degraded it. And with ink over dye, since he is liable for writing—he is also liable for erasing, and with dye over ink it is a destructive act, so it is explained in Gittin 19b).

And so too, one who intends to write a chet and wrote two zayins, and so too in similar cases with other letters—he is exempt. And so too if he wrote one letter on the ground and one letter on a beam, for they are not joined with one another. And so too on two walls or on two pages of a notebook that are distant from one another—he is exempt. But if he wrote them on two walls of a corner or on two pages of a notebook, this one at its end and that one at its beginning, and it turns out they are adjacent to one another—he is liable. And know that there is no difference in writing between writing on paper and parchment or on wood or on any object; since the writing is discernible and enduring—he is liable.

It is stated in the Gemara (104b): "If one wrote one letter in Tverya and one letter in Tzippori, he is liable; it is writing, but it lacks proximity." Rashi explained (starting with the words 'lacks'): that he wrote one letter on the edge of this tablet in Tverya, and one on the edge of the second tablet in Tzippori, and when they bring them together, the letters will be adjacent to one another. However, the Rambam there (Halacha 12) wrote, and this is his wording: "If one took a parchment or the like and wrote one letter upon it in this province, and went on that same day and wrote one letter in another province on another scroll, he is liable; for when he brings them together they are read with one another, and they do not lack an action for their proximity." Thus far his words. And according to his opinion, with soft paper or thin parchment, even if they are distant from one another, he can fold the paper and bring them together; so wrote the Maggid Mishneh. And in my humble opinion, I do not know why we should not also explain the Rambam according to the explanation of Rashi, and his intention was that he wrote on the edges of the parchment.

One who writes a single letter, even though a complete word is read from it—is exempt. How so: for example, if one wrote a mem and everyone reads it as "ma'aser," or if one wrote it in place of a number such as forty—he is exempt. One who emends a single letter and made it into two, for example, if he divided the roof of a chet and it became two zayins—is liable, and so too anything similar to this. And likewise, if through the emendation of a single letter with a small action the book was corrected, for example, if it was necessary to write a resh and a dalet was written, and he removed the crown of the dalet and made it a resh—he is liable (Gemara), since this is the correction of the book and it is like completing the book (Rashi), as was explained in section 20, see there.

One who writes with his left hand or with the back of his hand, with his foot, with his mouth, or with his elbow—meaning the joints of his hands—is exempt, for this is not the manner of those who write. Similarly, a left-handed person who wrote with his right hand, which is for him like the left hand of any other person, is exempt; and if he wrote with his left hand, he is liable. One who is proficient with both hands equally and wrote, whether with his right or with his left, is liable. And it was taught in the Tosefta: "A minor holds the quill and an adult holds his hand and writes—he is liable. An adult holds the quill and a minor holds his hand and writes—he is exempt," for the primary factor is the one who is writing and not the holding of the quill (and similarly regarding an unintentional act, see there in chapter 12).

The writer is not liable until he writes with a substance that leaves a lasting mark, such as ink, soot, red lead, gum, copperas, and the like, and he must write upon something on which the writing is sustained, such as hide, parchment, paper, wood, and the like. But one who writes with a substance whose mark does not last, such as liquids or fruit juices, or if he wrote with ink and the like upon vegetable leaves or upon anything that is not lasting—he is exempt; and he is not liable until he writes with a lasting substance upon a lasting surface. Similarly, the eraser is not liable until he erases lasting writing from a lasting surface (the Rambam ibid.). One who writes upon his flesh is liable, because it is hide, and even though the warmth of his flesh causes the writing to fade after a time, this is similar to writing that was erased. But one who scratches the form of writing upon his flesh is exempt. One who tears into hide in the form of writing is liable on account of writing, but one who marks upon hide in the form of writing is exempt; so wrote the Rambam ibid., and this is from the Tosefta (chapter 12). However, in the Tosefta before us, the version is reversed: that for marking one is liable and for tearing one is exempt. But the primary version is like the version of the Rambam, for so it is in the Yerushalmi, chapter 12, halacha 4, see there. And it is stated there in the Tosefta: "If one wrote two dots and another came and completed them and made them into two letters—the latter is liable," see there.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 4: "One must be careful not to write with his finger on the table with liquids or with ash, but it is permitted to trace in the air like letters." Thus far their words. That is to say, even though with something that is not lasting one is exempt, as has been written, nevertheless it is forbidden ab initio; but in the air it is nothing at all, since it is not discernible at all. And similarly, one who moves his finger on a dry table—it is also permitted for this reason (Taz, subsection 3). And to trace on the windows at a time when they are moist from dampness—it is forbidden, as it is like [writing] on the table with liquids.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 5: "It is permitted to make a mark with a fingernail as one marks for a sign, for this is not something that is lasting." Thus far his words. And even though it is initially forbidden even with something that is not lasting, as I have written, this refers to the writing of letters and not to a mere mark, for we have already written in section 19 that the halacha does not follow Rabbi Yossi who holds one liable even for a mark; see there. And there is one who labored over this (the Taz, subsection 4, who raises a difficulty from the mark mentioned in the Mishnah), and it is clear as I have written, and therefore regarding a mark it is sufficient to forbid only in something that is lasting. However, some say that specifically on parchment it is not lasting, but on paper it is lasting and forbidden (Magen Avraham, subsection 10, in the name of the Rashal), and there is one who forbids even on parchment (the Bach), and his reasoning is because of that ruling of Rabbi Yossi. And we have already written that the halacha does not follow him, and therefore the main point is like the previous opinion, that on parchment it is permitted and on paper it is forbidden, but the marking of letters even on parchment is forbidden (Levush). And writing with a lead pen which is called a bleifeder—one is liable by the Torah.

And know that there are those who wish to say that foreign script does not carry a Torah prohibition, and we have already written in siman 306 that Heaven forbid one should say so, and the Rambam explicitly wrote that one is liable for any script, as has been written. And it is implied in Gittin (20a) that if one inserts silver letters onto a garment it is called writing, and if so, it is possible that it is forbidden to do so on Shabbat (Magen Avraham ibid.). However, in truth, one who examines there will see that on the contrary, it is explained from there that it is not writing (and the Machatzit HaShekel struggled greatly and did not succeed, see there carefully).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 6: "A sewing thread that has become loose—it is forbidden to pull it tight, because of sewing. And those who tighten garments around their arms by means of the thread that they pull and it tightens—it is forbidden to pull it, unless the holes are somewhat wide and prepared with sewing and in a circle." Thus far his words, for if not so, it is like sewing. But when they are prepared, even if the thread is inserted in a perforated needle—it is permitted (ibid. subsection 13). And this is when they tighten them every day, but if sometimes they leave them thus for several days—it is forbidden to tighten them on Shabbat (ibid. subsection 12), for it is like a permanent knot. And a needle that became bent, even slightly—it is forbidden to straighten it on Shabbat (ibid. subsection 11), for it is fixing a vessel. And stuffing that fell out of a pillow—it is permitted to return them, but it is forbidden to put them initially into the pillow, for now he makes it a vessel, and furthermore because we fear perhaps he will sew (ibid. subsection 14). And all the laws of sewing and knotting we explained in siman 317, see there (and also the law of one who glues papers together which is in the Shulchan Aruch section 14 we explained there).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 11: "Even though one may place sesame seeds and nuts into honey—he may not beat them with his hand; and one who places flaxseed or sesame seeds and the like into water—is liable on account of kneading, because they mix and cling to one another." Thus far his words. The first law we explained in siman 319, section 39, and the second law we explained in siman 336, section 28; see there. He further wrote in section 13: "One may not break a shard and one may not tear paper, because it is like fixing a vessel." Thus far his words, and this is from the Rambam, chapter 23, law 6; see there. And I am wondered what relevance this has to Shabbat, for this is a Mishnah in Beitzah (32b): "One may not break etc.", and Rashi explained: "When roasting fish etc.", and so wrote the Rambam in chapter 4 of Yom Tov, law 8: "One may not break a shard and one may not cut paper to roast upon them"; see there. And what relevance is this to Shabbat? For on Shabbat, any breaking and any cutting is forbidden, and this requires great investigation.