Siman 336

Sowing is a primary labor, and it was in the Mishkan because they sowed the herbs that were needed for the anointing oil and to dye the tekhelet. Whether one sows seeds, grain, or vegetables, or one who plants trees, or sinks a branch into the ground, or grafts, or prunes—which means cutting some branches so that they will grow—all of these are primary labors and are a single primary labor, except that this is with seeds and this is with trees, and it is a single matter because each of these intends to make something grow, and this is the matter of sowing. And in the Yerushalmi of the chapter "Klal Gadol" it says: Anything that brings the fruit to ripeness (grows it) is liable on account of sowing: one who plants, sinks a branch, grafts, trims, prunes, lops, dungs, thins, dusts, smokes, removes worms, cuts, anoints, waters, pierces, or makes "houses," and anything that is for the purpose of bringing the fruit to ripeness is liable on account of sowing. Thus far its words. And all these things are regarding trees, as is explained in Tractate Shevi'it.

Derivatives of sowing: One who waters plants and trees on Shabbat—it is a derivative of sowing or planting. Likewise, one who soaks wheat and barley and the like in water—this is a derivative of sowing and he is liable (the Rambam, chapter 8). And what is its measure: One who sows any amount—is liable, and likewise regarding one who plants and in all of them. Likewise, one who soaks wheat and barley in any amount—is liable (ibid.), for even regarding the matter of carrying out, we learned in the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter HaMatznia: "For seed... and he carried it out—he is liable for any amount," and all the more so regarding sowing itself. And even though regarding plowing the Shas asks (103a) on that which we learned: One who plows any amount—is liable, for what is it fit, and as will be explained; however, regarding sowing this question is not relevant, for a single seed is fit for sowing, and likewise regarding plantings and all things.

Plowing is a primary category of labor, and there is no distinction between plowing before sowing and plowing after sowing, such as in the Land of Israel where the ground is hard and after sowing they must plow a second time, and this too is plowing (Gemara 73b). And it says in the Yerushalmi in the chapter "A Great Principle": What plowing was there in the Mishkan? That they would plow to plant herbs. And whether one plows, or one digs, or one makes a trench—all of them are one labor (Gemara ibid.). And each of them is a primary category of labor, for they are all one matter to loosen the earth (Rashi), and each of them is a digging in the ground (the Rambam ibid.).

The derivatives of plowing: The Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 8: "One who weeds at the roots of trees, or one who clips herbs, or one who prunes shoots in order to beautify the ground—this is a derivative of plowing. So too, one who levels the surface of the field, such as one who lowered a mound and flattened it or filled a valley—is liable for plowing, and so too one who levels pits." And in the Yerushalmi there: Rabbi Chiya taught: One who digs, or makes a trench, or drives a stake—these are derivatives of plowing; but in the Gemara it implies that this is a primary category, as I have written. It further says in the Yerushalmi: Anything that is for the benefit of the ground—one is liable for plowing: One who digs, one who makes a trench, one who drives a stake, one who folds a flock, one who hoes, one who fertilizes, one who sweeps, one who sprinkles, one who breaks up clods, one who clears forests, one who cuts small trees in the woods so that they may thicken and grow, one who ignites a fire in a thicket of reeds to clear them so they do not hinder the plow, and so too in a grove of palms where one clears the bad palms from the grove so they do not hinder plowing, a water channel that prepares its sides for sowing, meaning one who repairs the sides, one who clears stones, one who builds steps in the ground itself, one who fills the hollows beneath the olives, and one who makes circular trenches for vines, and anything that is for the benefit of the ground—is liable for plowing. Thus far his words.

The measure for plowing, we learned in a Mishnah (103a): "One who plows—any amount," and it says in the Gemara: "For what is it fit? For a seed of a gourd," to sow within it a fiber of a gourd (Rashi), and similarly regarding the Mishkan, for it was fit for one stalk of dyes, see there. And in the Yerushalmi there it says: "How much must he plow to be liable? Rabbi Mattaniah said: enough to plant a leek; Rabbi Acha said: enough to plant the 'male' part of a wheat grain," see there, and this is also any amount, and its explanation is that it clarifies for what it is fit, as in our Gemara. And the "male" part of a wheat grain is the head of the wheat that does not have a crack, and a leek is also a small seed. And so too regarding all its subcategories, it is also any amount, as we learned in the Mishnah there: "One who weeds, one who prunes, and one who cuts, any amount—he is liable; one who gathers wood or one who gathers grass: if to improve [the ground]—any amount," and so wrote the Rambam there regarding one who levels the surface of the field, one who fills a valley, and one who levels pits, that their measure is any amount, see there.

Harvesting is a primary labor, and it was in the Mishkan, as they would harvest the herbs. One who harvests grain or legumes, or one who vintages grapes, or one who harvests dates, or one who harvests olives, or one who gathers figs—all of these are one primary labor, for each of them intends to uproot something from its place of growth, and anyone who uproots something from its place of growth is liable on account of harvesting. A derivative of harvesting is plucking by hand, for harvesting is with a sickle or a knife, and when one plucks with his hands or with any other thing, it is a derivative of harvesting and he is liable.

The Rambam wrote there: "Therefore, a bundle upon which grass grew, and dodder that grew on a thorn-bush, and grass that grew on top of a barrel—one who plucks from them is liable, for this is their place of growth. But one who plucks from a pot that is not perforated is exempt, because this is not its place of growth. And a pot perforated enough for a small root is like the earth, and one who plucks is liable." Thus far his words. For this is the measure for the susceptibility of seeds to ritual impurity, as is explained at the end of the chapter "HaMatzni'a," see there. And know that there is reason to doubt whether there is a practical difference between a pot made of wood and one made of earthenware, for in Menachot (84b) regarding the matter of bikkurim there is a distinction between them; for according to Rashi, one of earthenware does not require a perforation, and according to Rabbeinu Tam, one of wood does not require a perforation, and the non-perforated is like the perforated, see there. And a tree that one planted in a vessel, regarding the matter of orlah—the non-perforated is always like the perforated, because a tree penetrates, as it is stated in the Jerusalem Talmud, the first chapter of Orlah, and as the Rambam wrote in the tenth chapter of Ma'aser Sheni, see there; and if so, also regarding the matter of Shabbat, one who plucks from there is liable. And in the second chapter of Uktzin we learned: "A cucumber that one planted in a pot and it grew and extended outside the pot—it is pure," meaning that even if the pot is not perforated, nevertheless, that which extended outside the pot into the airspace of the earth is considered attached, see there; and what is the law regarding the matter of Shabbat when one plucked from there, whether he is liable or not, and it requires further study. However, in practice there is no difference, for even from a pot that is not perforated it is forbidden to pluck on Shabbat, for so we learned (95a): "One who plucks from a perforated pot is liable, and from one that is not perforated is exempt," and all exemptions of Shabbat are "exempt but forbidden," and so the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled (see the Beit Yosef and Mishneh LaMelech, second chapter of Bikkurim, and they did not remark how it is regarding the matter of Shabbat).

The measure for harvesting is like a dried fig, according to the measures of food regarding carrying as written in siman 301. And it is stated in the Gemara (73b): One who prunes the branches of a vine so that they will grow more and also needs the wood—is liable for two, one on account of harvesting and one on account of planting. But if he does not need the wood—he is only liable on account of planting. And even according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own sake, and if so even if he does not need the wood he should be liable on account of harvesting, however when he does not need the wood it is not called harvesting at all (Tosafot ibid.). And proof for this is from the words of the Rambam there, who wrote this law that one who prunes and needs the wood is liable for two, see there, and he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor not needed for its own sake. Therefore it appears to me to the contrary: when he needs the wood and his intention is not for the vine to grow more—he is liable for two, and it is not necessary to say according to Rabbi Yehuda, but even according to Rabbi Shimon, for it is a pesik reisha and it is pleasing to him.

They further said there: One who cuts alfalfa—which is fodder that is harvested and grows back—is liable for two, one on account of harvesting and one on account of planting. And one who trims beet—which is a type of vegetable—is liable for two, on account of harvesting and on account of sowing. And here they did not say that he must need the fodder or the beet. And so the Rambam wrote there: "Any seed whose harvesting causes it to sprout and grow, such as alfalfa and beet, one who harvests it unintentionally is liable for two sin offerings, etc." Thus far his words. And it appears that even if he does not need the fodder or the beet now, nevertheless, since he performed the manner of their harvesting, he is liable even according to Rabbi Shimon, for the reason that has been explained. And it is not similar to trees, for when one prunes and does not need the wood, there is no element of harvesting in this at all, which is not the case with seeds and vegetables. And the reason is that ordinary wood for fuel is from trees that do not produce fruit, as is known, and therefore when one harvests from a fruit-bearing tree, he must intend it for the sake of the wood. But grain and vegetables, their manner is in harvesting and they also improve their growth, and therefore in any case he is liable.

The Rambam wrote there: A mound of earth upon which grass grew, if one lifted it from the ground and placed it upon pegs—he is liable for the category of tulesh. If it was upon pegs and he placed it on the ground—he is liable for the category of zorea. Figs that dried on their stalks, and similarly a tree whose fruits dried upon it, one who plucks from them on Shabbat—is liable, even though they are considered as if uprooted regarding the matter of tumah. Thus far his words. And according to Rashi and Tosafot at the end of the chapter "Hamotzi Yayin," regarding this mound it is only a rabbinic prohibition, see there (see Maggid Mishneh, Kesef Mishneh, and Lechem Mishneh). He further wrote: "One who plucks chicory or one who prunes branches, if for human consumption—its measure is like a dried fig, and if for an animal—its measure is like a kid's mouthful, and if for fuel—its measure is enough to cook an egg." Thus far his words. For chicory is a type of vegetable and branches are a type of reeds, for while they are soft they are for human consumption, if they hardened slightly they are intended for an animal, and if they dried they are intended for fuel (Rashi 103a).

It is stated in the Yerushalmi there: "One who shears sponge, gum, or coral—is liable on account of reaping and on account of planting." These are types of trees, and it did not specify that it is only when he needs the wood. According to this, it disagrees with our Shas, and the halacha is not so; or perhaps these are types of trees that stand for fuel, and it is like the grain that we explained, where one is liable in any case. And it is not specifically for fuel, for the law is the same if the way of shearing them is for another purpose, also so, as is understood. It further says there: "One who shears coriander, leeks, celery...—is liable on account of reaping and on account of sowing," and these are types of vegetables, and it is simple that this is similar to alfalfa. It further says there: "One who places a perforated pot on top of a perforated pot—is liable on account of reaping and on account of sowing," because the bottom one is blocked and ceases its growth, and the top one grows from the ground; and from this there is some proof for the approach of the Rambam in the previous section. And one who reaps a sycamore beam—is liable on account of reaping and on account of sowing, for it stands for building and is like alfalfa. And one who smooths it—is liable on account of makeh b'patish, meaning that he smooths and levels it so that it will be fit for building, and this is the completion of its labor.

It says further there: "One who traps a fish and anything that you separate from its life—is liable on account of harvesting," see there. And this is a novel matter, and also the Rambam did not mention this, and if so, in every trapping of fish one should be liable for two. And the commentators explained that it was already trapped from the eve of Shabbat and was in a vessel of water, and he is not liable on account of trapping but rather on account of uprooting a thing from its place of growth. And this too is not understood, for he should have been liable on account of taking a soul, and as was written in truth in siman 316, see there. And I found in truth in the Chiddushei HaRashba, chapter Shemonah Sheratzim, that this Yerushalmi is not according to the approach of our Shas, see there. And in the Gemara (107b): "One who reached his hand into the womb of an animal and detached the fetus in its womb—is liable on account of uprooting a thing from its place of growth," and ostensibly it is by reason of harvesting. But the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 11 counted it among the liabilities of taking a soul, see there, and so wrote the Rashba there in the name of the Ramban, of blessed memory, and that the intent of the Gemara is also thus, meaning that he separates it from its life and is liable on account of taking a soul, see there.

The sages decreed not to climb a tree on Shabbat and Yom Tov and not to make any use of it while it is attached to the ground, whether the tree is moist or whether it is dry. And one may not suspend oneself from it, a decree lest one climb and pluck. And even though in Eruvin (100b) it is explained that with a dry tree there is no Torah prohibition of plucking, and even the fruits upon it when it is dry, Rashi explained there that there is no Torah prohibition of plucking them. And that which the Rambam wrote, which we cited in section 10: that a tree whose fruits have dried, one who plucks from them on Shabbat is liable, and so it is explicit in the Gemara in Chullin (127b), this is when the fruits have dried but not the tree, and since the tree draws nourishment from the ground, one is liable for plucking their fruits. But when the tree itself has dried, it is then entirely like that which is detached. (And one must look into the Magen Avraham, subsection 1, who established a dispute between Rashi and the Rambam, see there, and the Machatzit HaShekel elaborated, see there, and there is no need for this. And in truth, the wording of the Gemara there is: "figs that shriveled on their stalks," and one could say specifically shriveled and not dried, and so it appears from the words of the Ra'avad in chapter 2 of Tum'at Ochlin, see there, but the Rambam does not distinguish. However, that of Eruvin is a different matter as I wrote, and so wrote the Tosafot in Shabbat 150b, starting with the words "In that which is attached," that with that which is dry there is no prohibition of plucking, and that of Chullin is specifically shriveled and not dried like the opinion of the Ra'avad, see there and examine carefully.)

And perhaps you will ask that if so, in truth, why did they forbid climbing or using a withered tree? However, regarding this they said in Eruvin ibid. that in the rainy season it is certainly forbidden, as one cannot distinguish between moist and withered, and also in the summer months there is a concern that he might break wood from it, meaning the branches, for this is forbidden by the Torah even when detached due to the category of "cutter," and even if its branches fell off, the rabbis did not differentiate (Magen Avraham ibid.). And one should not ask why they forbade using a tree while it is permitted to walk upon grass, as will be explained, for they are not similar; for one will not pluck grass by hand, as they have no fruit, and the prohibition is lest they be plucked through the course of his walking, which is an unintended act, whereas with a tree we are concerned lest he pluck with his hands, and they forbade all trees, even a non-fruit-bearing tree, for the rabbis did not differentiate, and I have not found any of the poskim who speak of this. (And see Yerushalmi chapter 5 of Beitzah halacha 2, and there is a difference between the explanation of the Korban HaEdah and the explanation of the Pnei Moshe, see there and examine carefully).

If one climbed a tree on Shabbat—they penalized him such that he may not descend until it is dark, if he climbed intentionally. But if he climbed unintentionally—it is permitted to descend. And if he climbed on the eve of Shabbat, even intentionally and even if his intention was to sit there on Shabbat, nevertheless, since he climbed while it was still day—they did not penalize him, and he may descend. And some say that this is specifically when he climbed with the intention to descend while it was still day, but when he climbed with the intention to sit there on Shabbat—they penalized him just as with one who climbed on Shabbat. And in the Yerushalmi of Beitzah there it says why they did not penalize him regarding an animal in this way, meaning when one climbs upon an animal on Shabbat or Yom Tov that he should not descend from it all day as they penalized regarding a tree, because a person is commanded regarding the rest of his animal by the Torah, and it turns out that every moment he violates a Torah commandment, which is not the case with a tree; see there.

And when do we say that if it was unintentional or on the eve of Shabbat he may descend? In the case of a person for whom it is difficult to sit upon the tree all of Shabbat. But if he placed an object upon the tree—it is forbidden to take it from there on Shabbat even if he placed it while it was still day, and not because of a penalty, but because at the time of its taking he makes use of that which is attached to the ground, and therefore why should we care if it remains upon the tree until the conclusion of Shabbat. But the Rosh wrote in the fifth chapter of Shabbat (end of siman 2): That taking from a tree or from animals is not called making use of that which is attached to the ground, see there, and the proof is from what is written in siman 317 that it is permitted to tie a rope to the mouth of a cow, see there. And according to the first opinion there is no proof from there, for it is not the way of a beast's usage in such a manner, but a tree, its way of usage is to take from it and to place upon it. (Magen Avraham subsection 2, and see there what he questioned against the Rosh from siman 628, and it is not a difficulty at all, for the Tosafot already wrote in Shabbat 154b, beginning with the words "Two," that in the case of a sukkah it deals with one that is high and he is unable to go up to it if he does not make use of the tree, and as the Korban Netanel wrote there. And as for what he questioned from Eruvin 33b—and it will be explained at the end of this siman—that regarding a basket hanging on a tree it is forbidden even to take from the basket and all the more so from the tree, it seems to me that it is not a difficulty at all, for there when he needs to take from the depth of the basket he must necessarily lean upon the sides of the tree, and in such a case it is certainly forbidden, but in a mere taking from a tree it is possible that it is permitted, and see Tosafot Eruvin ibid. beginning with the words "And Rabbi," who wrote that the eruv is at the bottom of the basket, and delve into this.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that all this applies to a tree and its like, but soft reeds that are like greens—it is permitted to use them even though they are attached to the ground, for it is not forbidden to use greens. Thus far his words. And there are those who disagreed with him, and wrote that since the Rambam wrote that one may not use that which is attached, it implies any attached thing, even greens (Bach and Taz, subsection 4). And their words are astonishing, for it was explicitly explained above in siman 312 that regarding greens they did not decree as they did with a tree; see there. And that which will be explained in siman 409, that with a soft reed that is easy to snap it is forbidden to place the eruv there, this is certainly so, for a soft reed that has hardened certainly carries the concern that perhaps one will snap it, as is explained in Eruvin (34b); but with those that are truly soft—it is permitted. And so wrote the Rashba in the book Avodat HaKodesh, and this is his wording: "It appears to me that reeds that are prone to harden—even in their softness they are like a tree and forbidden. But the reeds that grow in a marsh which never harden—they are permitted like grass, whether large or small." See there (and so wrote the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 3, and the Tosefet Shabbat, subsection 4).

Since the sages forbade the use of a tree, even a tree that was cut down, if three tefachim of the root remain from the ground—it has the status of a tree and it is forbidden to use it. Now, I have not found this law explicitly, only that it appears so to me, for since it will be explained that up to three tefachim the name of "tree" is upon it even with the root alone without branches, if so, even if he cut it down, what of it, since there are still three tefachim. Even though one could distinguish that what will be explained is when the tree is in its entirety, for then the root is also forbidden, which is not the case when he cut it down completely; nevertheless, it does not seem proper to distinguish in this way. And in any case, it appears that this is when he cut it down so that it would grow further, for then the name of "tree" is upon it when three tefachim remain; but if he cut it down completely, even when three tefachim remain—it is merely wood, and the name of "tree" is nullified from it (so it appears in my humble opinion, and I have not found a source for this law).

We learned in a Mishnah in Eruvin (99b): "If its roots are three tefachim higher than the ground, one may not sit upon them." From the commentary of Rashi, it is implied that this refers to any tree, meaning that the primary prohibition is regarding the branches, lest one pluck, and therefore when the branches begin close to the ground, the prohibition applies to the whole of it. However, if the branches begin at the height of the tree at a height of three from the root, it is forbidden to use, and in less than this, it is permitted; see there. And from our teacher Yehonatan, it is explained that this is the explanation: for example, where a root emerges from the side of the tree as is common in old trees, and if it is three tefachim high, its law is like the tree itself, and less than this it is considered like the ground; however, regarding the root of the tree itself, it is possible according to this explanation that it is forbidden to use even in less than three tefachim. Nevertheless, according to the explanation of Rashi, it is permitted when there are no branches there. And cabbage stalks are also like the roots of a tree, and if they are three tefachim high from the ground, it is forbidden to use them or their leaves (Yam Shel Shelomo).

If these roots were protruding at a height of three tefachim and then return and bend down to below three, coming from above and descending below: in the place where they are three high – they are forbidden, and in the place where they are not three high – they are permitted. If they were three tefachim high, but from one side it is level with the ground, in that the earth is high on that side – it is forbidden to use even on the side level with the ground, for since from three of its directions it is three tefachim high, this side is nullified to its three sides. But if from two sides it is three tefachim high and from two sides it is level with the ground – it is permitted (Magen Avraham, subsection 4) on the two that are level with the ground. And know that even if it is entirely level with the ground, only that beneath it there is a cavity of three tefachim within the earth – this also has the law of a tree, for what does it matter to me if the cavity is from above or within the earth. And regarding the sides as well: that if from three directions there is a cavity and from the fourth side there is no cavity – it is forbidden there as well, and with two directions it is permitted there as I have written.

It is permitted to walk upon grass on Shabbat, for they only decreed regarding a tree, and we are not concerned that perhaps through the course of his walking he will pluck one of the grasses, because it is not a certainty that they will be plucked; therefore, even if they are plucked, it is a "davar she'ein mitkavein" and is permitted. And there is no distinction between when the grasses are long or short, or between one who walks in shoes and one who walks barefoot, or between one who walks in his usual manner and one who walks at a run. I have seen one who is stringent regarding one who walks at a run and when the grasses are large, but we should not innovate prohibitions from our own minds, for since our Sages, of blessed memory, said that it is not a "pesik reisha," in any case it is not a "pesik reisha," and the senses testify to this (and the Biur Halacha wishes to innovate because of the puzzling matter found in the Smag, but we are not responsible for this).

But to pour water on herbs—it is a Torah prohibition, for through this they grow and it is a subcategory of sowing, as one who waters seeds is liable (beginning of Moed Katan). Therefore, those who guard in gardens must be careful not to wash their hands over the herbs, and therefore they should not eat there on Shabbat and Yom Tov, as they will need to wash their hands over the herbs, and it is a Torah prohibition, even though he does not intend it, for it is a pesik reisha. And if it is because of a pesik reisha that is not pleasing to him, behold there are opinions regarding this as I wrote in siman 242, and furthermore, who is to say that it is not pleasing to him; therefore, one must warn them about this very, very much. But it is permitted to cast urine upon them or other liquids that do not cause growth, and it is proper to refrain even from other liquids (Magen Avraham, subsection 7), for who is to say they do not cause growth. And also regarding urine, I saw one who wrote that now they say based on experience that they are good for fertilizing the ground (Tiferet Yisrael in the introduction to Seder Moed); however, in any event, one should refrain from eating in gardens, for it is difficult that water should not come there, and one who is careful in this, the merit of Shabbat will protect him.

And so too one must be careful not to throw seeds in a place where rain falls, for they will eventually sprout; and if he throws them for chickens, he should only throw an amount that they will eat on that day or for two days, for sprouting occurs on the third day. However, if he threw them in a place where people's feet tread—it is permitted, because they will not eventually sprout. And a stone upon which grasses grew, or grasses that grew on the handle of a vessel from the moisture of the vessel—they are considered as attached to the ground, and one who plucks them is liable on account of harvesting, as I wrote in section 7, see there. And this is not comparable to an unperforated flowerpot where one is exempt according to the Torah, for the way of sowing is not there except through the effort of human beings, but here they grow on their own. And grasses that one stuck into the dust while it was still day so that they would remain moist—it is permitted to grasp the leaves and remove them, and even though the dust falls from them, it is a lateral movement for the sake of a permitted matter, and it is permitted as I wrote in siman 311. And this is specifically when they did not take root and also when he placed them he did not intend for sowing but for concealment, for when he intended for sowing it is forbidden.

It has already been explained that by rabbinic decree it is forbidden to pluck even from a flowerpot that is not perforated and from any vessel whatsoever, and it is also forbidden to take a flowerpot that is not perforated from the ground and place it upon pegs, or conversely to take it from the pegs and place it upon the ground, whether it is of wood or of earthenware. We have already explained the reason in section 7, for one of them, even if it is not perforated, its law is like one that is perforated regarding several matters; see there. However, a branch of a tree that was severed—meaning it was detached from the tree and has fruit on it—it is permitted to pluck the fruit from them on Shabbat, for they are considered as if plucked. Specifically the wood is forbidden to pluck, for it would be "cutting," but the fruit have no connection to the branch except when it is attached to the tree; and so we eat grapes and several types of cherries that are held by small branches, as is known (Chullin 124b). Also, the issue of "extracting" does not apply to this, for that is only with ears of grain or nuts in their green husks where the food is placed within them, and not with fruit hanging on branches, and it is a matter unto itself (and one must look into the Taz, subsection 8, who remarked on this, and perhaps he also intended this in his answer, but his wording is difficult; see there).

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said in Ketubot (60a): Regarding a pipe that pours water from the roof, in which straw and grass have accumulated and are clogging it and obstructing its flow, such that its water exits and spreads across the roof and drips into the house, one may crush them with his feet in private. Since the repair is performed by means of a change—meaning, he does not repair it with his hands but rather with his feet—the Rabbis permitted it for him in a case of financial loss, for there is no concern here of a Torah labor but merely a general repair of rabbinic origin, and therefore in a case of financial loss they did not decree. But in a case where there is no financial loss, such as when it does not drip into the house—it is forbidden. And even though anything that they forbade due to the appearance of the eye is forbidden even in the innermost chambers, this applies to something where the prohibition is from the Torah, and not to something whose prohibition is rabbinic (Taz, subsection 9).

Since we decree lest one climb and pluck, therefore any fruit intended for eating that has a pleasant fragrance—it is forbidden to smell it while it is still attached to the tree, lest one pluck it and eat it, or bite it with one's mouth, for this too is like plucking. There is one who wishes to say that biting with one's mouth does not involve a Torah prohibition but rather a rabbinic one, because this is not the typical manner of plucking (Magen Avraham, subsection 11), but it seems to me that this is plucking according to the Torah, for this is the manner of eating, and the plucking occurs automatically. (Also the Tevuot Shor in Bechor Shor disagreed with him, and so Rashi wrote explicitly in Sukkah 37b. And the Machatzit HaShekel struggled with this, see there, but who forced him to this? And how many transgressors relied on this? And it is clear without any shadow of a doubt that one who eats from that which is attached performs a primary category of labor. See Menachot 70a, and one can distinguish that it is specifically by bending down, and delve into this.)

Therefore they said (Sukkah 37b): Hadas while attached—it is permitted to smell it, because it is intended only for smelling and not for eating, and for the scent it is actually better when it is attached, as its scent wafts more, and therefore there is no reason to decree lest one pluck it. But an etrog or an apple—it is forbidden to smell it while attached, for since they are intended for eating, we fear lest one sever it or bite it with his mouth to eat it.

We have already written the words of the Rambam in section 2, who ruled that one who soaks wheat and barley and the like in water—it is a derivative of sowing, and he is liable for any amount; and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote likewise in section 11. And it is obvious that this refers to placing them in water so that they soak there for several days, for so implies the language of "soaking." Therefore, the Rambam at the end of chapter 8 wrote: One who places sesame seeds or flaxseeds in water is liable on account of kneading, since they mix and cling to one another. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote likewise in siman 340. And they were precise to say "one who places," meaning by mere placing, because they immediately cling to one another, and this is not the case with wheat and barley, as is found in Zevachim (94b). But when we would obligate him on account of sowing—for this several days are required so that the seeds sprout, and therefore they wrote the language of "soaking." But when one places wheat and barley in water for the consumption of animals—they are not included in this at all. (And with this, that which they questioned the Rambam from Zevachim ibid. is settled well, where it says: "If so, wheat and barley also," which implies explicitly that he is exempt, see Magen Avraham sub-section 12 and the Gra sub-section 12. And he added to question that if so, even with flaxseed he should be liable for two: on account of kneading and sowing, see there. And there are those who answered that the truth is so, and it does not deal there with sowing, see Chayei Adam in Nishmat Adam klal 11, and the difficulty is apparent. And according to what I wrote it is settled well, for there, by throwing for a short time, he is only liable on account of kneading, and delve into this.)

According to what has been explained, one must be careful not to place any type of grain or seeds into water where they will remain for several days, as this involves the primary category of labor of zorea. This is certainly true for one who places barley to make malts from them, as this is a complete primary category of labor. Consequently, if he places them so that they remain there for several days, he is liable immediately upon placing them, as with all labors of Shabbat that we explained in siman 242. However, if he went back and removed them immediately from the water, he is exempt, just as with one who places bread in an oven and takes it immediately from the oven, as written in siman 318. And seeds that stick to one another are completely forbidden because of lisha; but to place wheat and barley and anything that does not stick before his animal is permitted, since it is for immediate use as has been explained. So too, raisins and other dried fruits may be placed in water on Shabbat, and it is only forbidden to place them there for the purpose of pickling so that they stand for many days, for this is like one who pickles preserves (Pri Megadim), and it is only permitted to eat them immediately or after a short while.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 11: "It is permitted to place tree branches in water on Shabbat, provided that they do not have flowers or roses which open from the moisture of the water." Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: Tree branches that stood in water from before Shabbat so that they would not wither, and were removed from the water on Shabbat or before Shabbat—one may return them to that same water, but it is forbidden to add to the water. And certainly one may not replace it with other water, and it is an explicit Mishnah in Sukkah (42a) regarding the lulav, see there; and Rashi explained the reason, that it is a burden to prepare a vessel, see there. And when they have flowers or roses—they are forbidden in any case when he places them to remain there, and there is in this the category of zorea, for the flowers and roses open and grow. And certainly it is forbidden to pour water on Shabbat into the vessels where branches stand, which are called "vazanes," and it is a primary category of labor of zorea, whether they are perforated or not perforated, for it is simple that one who performs zorea is liable even in a pot that is not perforated, and it is not similar to detaching, for every type of zorea is a primary category of labor.

The Rosh in the Responsa (Kelal 2, Siman 4) innovated that the matter of a non-perforated pot only applies to a vessel that one carries, such as a pot and the like, but regarding a fixed thing, such as a roof that was filled with soil and one planted within it—one who plucks from it is liable. He brought proof from a Mishnah in Ma'asrot, chapter 5: "Onions that took root in an attic—they became pure from becoming impure," consequently they are considered attached. They questioned him, for the Rash brought the Yerushalmi that this is only regarding the matter of impurity which the Torah expanded, and not for all matters. Some have answered (Tosafot Yom Tov and Magen Avraham, subsection 14) that the Yerushalmi says there it is because he does not desire their taking root, but if he desires their taking root, for all matters it is like attached. I wonder at this, for the Yerushalmi explicitly rejects this, see there, as it says that regarding the matter of Shabbat there is no distinction. However, the Rambam in chapter 1 of Ma'asrot ruled also regarding the matter of ma'aser that it is like attached, because he holds that that which the Yerushalmi says, that only regarding the matter of impurity is it considered like attached, this is not the halacha. For it is Rabbi Shimon who holds thus, that the Torah expanded regarding the purity of seeds, and also in our Gemara in Shabbat (95b) it is stated so, as it says there: "For all matters Rabbi Shimon treats it as detached," and it is different regarding the matter of impurity as the Torah expanded regarding the purity of seeds, etc., see there. But the Rabbis do not make a distinction, and for all matters they treat it as attached, and this is also the opinion of the Rosh (Pri Megadim ibid.).

And we have already brought the words of the Rambam that figs which dried on their stems, meaning on their branches, and similarly a tree whose fruits dried upon it—one who detaches from them on Shabbat is liable, even though they are like detached items regarding the matter of tumah. And we explained in section 13 that this is when the fruit dried but not the essence of the tree, for if the essence of the tree dried, there is no Torah prohibition of detaching in this. And that which the Rambam wrote "figs" on their own is because the Rambam is known to preserve the language of the Shas, and in the Gemara (Chullin 127b) only figs were mentioned; see there. And so as not to err that only regarding figs is the law so, he therefore wrote: "and similarly a tree," meaning that all trees are equal in this law. And dried grasses—they are certainly considered as detached (Magen Avraham ibid.).

There are those who say that one must be careful with a garment made from the skin of an animal not to pluck hair from it, as there is a liability of a chatat offering in this, for so it is stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter Kelal Gadol: "One who plucks from a dead animal is liable, for its plucking is its shearing." Furthermore, one must be careful not to pluck from his own skin with his hand or in other places, for it is like that which is attached to the ground, and so it is implied at the beginning of Sanhedrin that a person is like the ground (Taz, subsection 10). According to this, one must be careful in the winter when wearing fox skins called fuchs or sable or all types of animal hairs called futterwerk, and likewise with hats made of hair, not to pluck even a single hair, and one is liable for a chatat offering, and if done intentionally, stoning. Likewise, regarding loose skin around the fingernails, one should not pluck them, for it is like plucking from that which is attached and one is liable for a chatat offering.

And I wonder about the first law; aside from the fact that from the perspective of logic, just as regarding detaching from the ground the obligation is only while it is attached, so too detaching from living creatures is only while they are alive. Furthermore, this matter is explicit in the Mishnah of the primary categories of labor: "The one who scrapes," and Rashi explained that he scrapes the hair off the hide. And so wrote the Rambam in chapter 11, law 5: "What is scraping: This is one who removes hair or wool from upon the hide after death, until the surface of the hide is smoothed." Thus far his words. And if it should enter your mind that one who detaches hair from the hide of a dead animal is liable because of detaching, behold, even for one hair he should be liable, and why do we require "until it is smoothed." And one cannot say that for smoothing he is liable for two, for he should have clarified this. And more than this is explicit in the Gemara (74b): "Our Rabbis taught: One who detaches the wing-feather and trims it and plucks its down—is liable for three sin offerings: detaching on account of shearing, trimming on account of cutting to measure, plucking down on account of scraping." And this is its explanation: that one who detaches a wing-feather from a living creature while it is alive—is liable on account of detaching, and after he detached it, if he trimmed it and plucked its down—he is liable on account of cutting to measure and scraping, and not on account of detaching.

And even if we interpret "one who plucks the wing after death," and so wrote the Ran in the chapter "Klal Gadol," nevertheless this is regarding a bird and not regarding an animal. And so it is explicitly stated in Bekhorot (25a) that plucking is not the same as shearing, and only regarding a bird is one liable for plucking, for such is its way, but not regarding an animal, see there. And so ruled the Rambam in chapter 1 of Me'ilah, that plucking is not the same as shearing, see there. And the Yerushalmi that he cited, that one who plucks from a dead animal is liable because its plucking is its shearing—in the Yerushalmi "animal" is not present, and it refers to a bird. And so it is stated in the Yerushalmi: that it questions Reish Lakish, who exempts one for plucking in consecrated items, yet he himself said one who plucks a wing from a bird is liable on account of shearing. And it answers that they are not comparable, for in a bird where there is no shearing, its plucking is its shearing, which is not the case in an animal. Know that it is so, for it was taught: "If he plucked from the dead one—he is liable, its plucking is its shearing." Thus far his words. And the commentators explained that "plucked from the dead one" means even in an animal he is liable, see there; and I wonder at this from that which we wrote regarding scraping. Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that it refers to a bird, and this is its explanation: Know that plucking is not the same as shearing, for we have learned that even plucking after death makes one liable, and after death there is certainly no reason to say regarding an animal that plucking is shearing. And even though one who shears is liable even after death, for so we learned in the Tosefta and so ruled the Rambam in chapter 9, halacha 7, that one who shears wool or hair from an animal or a beast, whether from the living or from the dead, is liable, see there; nevertheless, to say even after death that plucking is shearing is unreasonable, and only in a bird where there is no shearing is there reason to say so, because in a bird plucking is shearing, and shearing applies even after death. But plucking is only from the living, as with a tree while attached, and after death it is similar to that which is detached. (So it appears in my humble opinion, and the Rambam in chapter 9 ruled that one who plucks a wing from a bird—this is a derivative of shearing, and in chapter 11 he ruled: one who smooths a feather—this is a derivative of scraping, and so it is explicit in the Gemara 74b and as I have written. But on account of plucking he is not liable, and also in the Yerushalmi there it is so, see there; and if after death he is liable for plucking, how can he be liable on account of scraping? And it would be a contradiction, and it requires great study.)

We learned in a mishna in Uktzin (chapter 3, mishna 8): "A branch of a fig tree that was broken but is still attached by its bark, if it is able to live—it is tahor, for it is considered as attached. And if not—it is tamei, for it is as if it were detached." And we learned from this mishna regarding the matter of Shabbat as well, that regarding a broken branch: if it is only attached in part, such that it is certainly able to live—one who detaches from it on Shabbat is liable. And so too with all types of vegetables and seeds, even if they were separated from the ground, if a minority of it is still attached—one who detaches it is liable. And so too regarding hanging pieces of skin and flesh on a person that we wrote of in section 33, even if the majority is separated, since a portion is still attached—it is as if the whole is attached, and so it is proven from the case of a fingernail in Shabbat (94b) see there, and it will be explained in siman 340 with the help of Heaven.

Just as it is forbidden to use a tree, so too it is forbidden to use the sides of a tree, but the sides of sides are permitted. Therefore, it is forbidden to lean a ladder against the sides of a tree and ascend it, for when he ascends it, he is using the sides. However, if there is a peg driven into the tree on its sides, it is permitted to lean a ladder against the peg and ascend it, for the peg is considered the sides and the ladder is the sides of sides. Similarly, if he drove a peg into it and hung a basket on the peg, the peg is called the sides and the basket the sides of sides. It is permitted to take an object from the basket, but the basket itself is forbidden to be taken from the peg, for he is using the peg, which is the sides. If the basket is hanging from the tree itself, it is forbidden to take from the basket, for it itself is the sides. Sometimes even when it is hanging from a peg it is forbidden, such as when the opening of the basket is narrow, and when he takes an object from the basket and presses his hand there he shakes the tree—it is forbidden (Magen Avraham subsection 15 from the sugya in Eruvin 33b). It is stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter 5 of Beitzah: that to lean against a healthy tree is permitted, for this is not use but merely touching, and it was never forbidden, just as with muktzeh touching was not forbidden. But with a tree that is weak, it is forbidden, for by leaning he will shake it, and he is found to be using the tree. And just as it is forbidden to use a tree, so too it is forbidden to use animals, and likewise sides are forbidden and sides of sides are permitted, and this has already been explained in siman 305, see there (and there are those who say that "healthy" and "weak" refer to the person, and it will be explained in siman 339).

Even though it is forbidden to use a tree due to the reason of "lest one climb and pluck," nevertheless, regarding a pit, we do not decree "lest one uproot the ground" during his ascent or descent. Therefore, a pit—even one hundred cubits deep—it is permitted to descend into it and to ascend. And the reason: because it is not as easy to uproot the ground as it is easy to pluck from a tree, and in the meantime, he will remember that today is Shabbat. This is not the case with plucking, which occurs in a single moment; we fear that he will forget about Shabbat and pluck (see Rashi, Eruvin 100a, s.v. "bor," where it implies that there is no concern at all regarding a pit except for the exertion alone; see there and examine carefully).