Siman 334

Extinguishing and kindling are among the primary categories of labor, and they were in the Mishkan, as they kindled fire for the casting of the vessels of the Mishkan, and extinguishing was when they extinguished coals to make embers needed for the melting of the gold and the silver. And regarding a derivative of kindling, the Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 12: One who heats iron in order to temper it in water—this is a derivative of kindling and he is liable. And a derivative of extinguishing it is, for so the polishers of iron heat the iron until it becomes an ember, and extinguish it in water in order to harden it, and this is "tempering," for one who does it is liable due to extinguishing; see there. And in chapter 9, law 6, the Rambam wrote: One who heats metal until it becomes an ember—this is a derivative of cooking; see there, and the Ra'avad disputed him on this. But his words are correct, for heating in order to temper it does not kindle it until it is an ember, and therefore it is a derivative of kindling, but in heating it until it becomes an ember—this is a derivative of cooking, like cooking where it is cooked until it softens completely. And the Ra'avad holds that tempering is of rabbinic origin, but the Rambam holds that tempering is forbidden by the Torah, for so implies the plain meaning of the sugya in Shabbat (41a). And even though in Yoma (34b) it says: "tempering is of rabbinic origin," the Ramban already answered that there in Yoma, regarding the iron bar that they would cast into the mikveh of the Kohen Gadol, there is no tempering at all (see Maggid Mishneh), and also Rashi and Tosafot hold like the Rambam; see there.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): "One who kindles any amount is liable, provided that he needs the ash. But if he kindled by way of destruction, he is exempt, because he is a destroyer. One who kindles the grain stack of his fellow or burns his dwelling is liable even though he is destroying, for his intention is to take revenge on his enemy, and his mind has been put at ease and his anger subsided; thus it is like one who rends [garments] over his dead or in his anger, who is liable, or like one who wounds his fellow during a quarrel, for all these are 'repairing' in the view of their evil inclination. Similarly, one who lights a lamp or wood, whether to warm himself or to provide light, is liable." Thus far his words. We have already written in siman 316, section 26, that this ruling which holds him liable for his intention to take revenge follows his own view, which holds one liable for a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah. However, according to the poskim who hold that for a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah one is exempt, in this case too he is exempt, for he does not need the essence of the melakhah. Furthermore, we explained that several of the Rishonim disagreed with him, for even according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds one liable for [a melakhah] she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah, he exempts in such a case, as according to the conclusion of the Gemara it is not so, see there; and we there reconciled the opinion of the Rambam regarding this, see there.

And also regarding that which he obligates for one who needs the ash, it is only according to his view that one is obligated for a labor not needed for its own sake, for according to Rabbi Shimon, even when one needs the ash, it is a labor not needed for its own sake. However, against this there is a reasoning that according to Rabbi Shimon one is obligated even when one does not need the ash, because he holds that one who acts destructively in the act of kindling is obligated, and Rabbi Yehuda holds that he is exempt, for in this their views are reversed. And in siman 316, section 27 and section 28 and section 29, we explained regarding this that according to Rashi it is indeed so, that according to Rabbi Shimon one is obligated in all manners. But the Tosafot disagree on this, for they hold that even according to Rabbi Shimon one requires some degree of improvement: either for the purpose of a mitzvah or when one needs its ash; see there.

And regarding extinguishing, the Rambam wrote in chapter 1, law 7: "Anyone who performs a labor on Shabbat, even though he does not need it for the sake of the labor itself—is liable for it. How so: Behold, one who extinguished a lamp because he needs the oil or the wick so that it is not lost or so that it does not burn, or so that the earthenware of the lamp does not crack, because extinguishing is a labor and he intended to extinguish even though he does not need the extinguishing itself…—behold, this one is liable." Thus far his words. But most of the poskim rule like Rabbi Shimon, that a labor that is not needed for its own sake—one is exempt, and one is not liable for extinguishing except when one extinguishes the wick in order to singe it, for by means of the extinguishing it burns better than if they had not extinguished it, and as it was in the Mishkan where they extinguished to make coals (Shabbat 31b and Tosafot ibid.). But other forms of extinguishing are not needed for the sake of the extinguishing itself, and they are exempt according to the Torah.

And at the beginning of chapter 12 he wrote: "One who extinguishes any amount is liable, whether one extinguishes a lamp or one extinguishes a coal of wood. But one who extinguishes a coal of metal is exempt, and if he intended to temper it, he is liable, for so the sharpeners of iron do: they heat the iron until it becomes a coal and extinguish it in water in order to harden it, and this is 'tempering' for which one who performs it is liable, and it is a derivative of 'extinguishing.' And it is permitted to extinguish a coal of metal in a public domain so that the public will not be harmed by it." Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad and the Remakh wondered about him: since he holds one liable for a labor not needed for its own sake and holds one liable for tempering, why is he exempt in the case of a coal of metal? Behold, he perforce tempers it, and even though he does not intend to, behold it is a pesik reisha. And the Maggid Mishneh answered: that when he does not intend, it is not a labor at all; since he does not want to make a vessel from it, it is nothing, see there. And it appears that this is like the reasoning of the author of the Arukh which the Rishonim cited, that a pesik reisha that is not pleasing to him is not a pesik reisha, and we brought this in siman 242 (but according to the words of the Tosafot 102a, starting with "De'avid," this is only according to Rabbi Shimon and not according to Rabbi Yehuda, see there).

And in my humble opinion, it appears that if such were his intention, he should not have been so cryptic; rather, this is the explanation: that to temper, one requires much water until the iron is hardened and tempered. For although the initial water extinguishes it, nevertheless, the water itself becomes heated due to the great heat, and one subsequently requires a rinsing of water over the initial water to cool them. And this is what it says: "One who extinguishes a coal of metal is exempt," because with metal, extinguishing is not applicable, as Rashi wrote (42a, s.v. "Gachelet"). And if he intended to temper—meaning, he poured much water until it was tempered—he is liable. And it is explicitly explained in the Gemara (41b) that for tempering there is a specific measure, and for warming there is no measure, see there. And the matter is understood, for to extinguish is like warming, as even when they are lukewarm they will extinguish (and there it deals with a vessel, however the matter is the same as is understood, and examine this closely).

He further wrote: "A fire that broke out on Shabbat, one who extinguishes it because of loss of property is liable, for loss of property does not override Shabbat, only loss of life; therefore, people should exit so that they do not die, and they should let the fire rage even if it burns the entire province" thus far his words. And that which he wrote that the one who extinguishes is liable, this is according to his reasoning that a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah is liable. But according to the opinion of most poskim that a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah is exempt—there is no Torah liability here, only a rabbinic prohibition. And this is what the Ra'avad wrote in the glosses, and this is his wording: "There is no liability here according to Rabbi Shimon, because he does not need its charcoal" thus far his words. That is to say, for us, as we hold like Rabbi Shimon, there is no liability for extinguishing except when one needs to produce charcoal, and in extinguishing a fire, one certainly does not need charcoal.

One must scrutinize what the Rambam is teaching us in this law, for he already explained that anyone who extinguishes is liable, and if it is to inform us that the loss of life overrides Shabbat, he also already explained in the second chapter that even a doubt of pikuach nefesh overrides Shabbat. And it appears to me that he is teaching us a great law, for since before this he wrote that one may extinguish a coal of metal in a public domain so that the public will not be harmed by it, as a rabbinic prohibition was permitted for the sake of public harm as has been written, and generally in fires the flames and coals roll into the public domain and there is public harm in this if they do not extinguish the fire, and I would have said that it is permitted to extinguish—he teaches us that it is not so, for in extinguishing a fire there is a Torah prohibition, and it was only permitted in a case of pikuach nefesh and not in a case of mere harm, for only regarding a coal of metal is there no extinguishing from the Torah, but not regarding a coal of wood, because he holds like Rabbi Yehuda that one is liable for a labor not needed for its own sake, as has been written.

Therefore, in truth, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch at the end of this siman wrote: "A coal placed in a location where many may be harmed by it—one may extinguish it, whether it is of metal or whether it is of wood, but the Rambam forbids it in the case of wood." Thus far their words. And their reasoning is because most of the poskim hold like Rabbi Shimon, that a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah is exempt, and it is only a rabbinic prohibition and was permitted for the sake of preventing harm to the public, and the halakhah is according to this opinion (Eliyah Rabbah), and the Tur did not mention the opinion of the Rambam at all, see there. And according to this, it seems in my humble opinion that there is a further permission in this time, in addition to the permissions that will be explained at the end of this siman regarding extinguishing fires in this time on Shabbat: for since now the houses are built on the boundary of the reshut ha-rabim, unlike in the time of the Gemara when the houses were inside the courtyard and the houses were not adjacent to the reshut ha-rabim, but now the houses are adjacent to the reshut ha-rabim, and consequently from the fire many coals without number fall into the reshut ha-rabim, and we hold that one may extinguish a coal in the reshut ha-rabim even of wood for the sake of preventing harm to the public. And it is a known matter that if we were to come to extinguish every coal in the place where it fell, it would be impossible in any way, because the wind scatters them to many places without measure, and we would not suffice to finish them all. Therefore, for the sake of preventing harm to the public, there is permission to extinguish the fire itself, in order to prevent harm to the public, and further other reasons will be explained with the help of Heaven at the end of this siman.

But for the sake of monetary loss, even a rabbinic prohibition was not permitted; and not only that, but even in a situation where there is no prohibition at all—they did not permit saving as much as one can save, but only enough for the food of three meals. And the reason was stated by our sages, of blessed memory (117b), on the Mishnah that one may save three meals, and it asks: Since he is laboring in a permitted manner, with an object permitted for carrying and into a courtyard with an eruv (Rashi), let us save more. And Rava answered: Since a person is anxious over his money, if you permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it. And Rashi explained: If you permit him to begin such extensive saving, since he is anxious, he will forget the Shabbat and come to extinguish it; see there.

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 23, law 20: "If a fire broke out in a courtyard on Shabbat—one may not rescue everything that is in the courtyard to another courtyard in that same mavoi even if they made an eruv, as a decree lest he extinguish the fire in order to rescue, because a person is anxious over his property. Therefore, they decreed that he may only rescue food that he needs for that Shabbat, and vessels that he needs to use on Shabbat, and garments that he can wear, so that he will despair of everything else and will not come to extinguish. And if they did not make an eruv—he may not rescue even his food and his vessels. And what does he rescue for his food: if a fire broke out on the night of Shabbat—one rescues food for three meals, what is fit for a person for a person and what is fit for an animal for an animal. If it broke out in the morning—one rescues food for two meals; in the afternoon—one rescues food for one meal." Thus far his words. And this is all before the meal, and he may rescue the meals that he needs for Shabbat for all the members of his household; behold, they were very stringent in this.

And one should not say that this is only according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a labor not needed for its own sake carries liability, and therefore they were stringent lest he come to extinguish and violate a Torah prohibition, and thus the Rambam, who ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, wrote this law, but not according to Rabbi Shimon. For it is not so, as the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch rule like Rabbi Shimon, and nevertheless they wrote this law like the Rambam. And they are compelled to this, for it is Rava who says this reasoning: that since a person is anxious over his property, he will come to extinguish it, as has been written, and Rava holds at the beginning of the chapter "Notel" like Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor not needed for its own sake, see there. And even though there are cases where the sages permitted a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of monetary loss, as it is stated in Ketubot (60a): "A gutter pipe that became blocked with husks—one may crush them with his foot privately on Shabbat. What is the reason: it is repairing in an unusual manner," and because of loss they permitted it, see there, this is because the matter is done privately, and not regarding the extinguishing of a fire which is in public (Ran in the chapter "Chaviyot," see there carefully). And if other examples are found where they permitted, it is all in private.

However, regarding the primary reasoning stated by the Shas, that "if you permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it," we have great questions. For behold, regarding a corpse they said the opposite (44a): that they permitted saving a corpse from a fire, because since a person is distraught over his deceased, if you do not permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it. The Tosafot there answered: "Because one does not grieve over his property as he does over his deceased; and if you permit it to him, since he will be preoccupied with saving it, he will forget that today is Shabbat and will come to extinguish it inadvertently. But over his deceased he grieves exceedingly, and if you do not permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it intentionally." Thus far their words. But in truth, even regarding property we find in the Gemara the opposite reasoning, and that is in the chapter "Bameh Ishah" (Shabbat 65b) regarding the matter of trickery to fasten a garment over a nut to carry it out on Shabbat, and it says there: It is a question according to the one who says we use trickery in a fire to wear all that one can wear, because in a fire, if you do not permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it, see there; behold, it is exactly the opposite. And so too in the same topic itself, in the sugya of "one saves three meals," in the Mishnah where one may make a partition with any vessels, whether full or empty, so that the fire does not pass, and Rabbi Yosei forbids new earthenware vessels because they burst and extinguish. And it says there in the Gemara (120b) that the reason of Rabbi Yosei is that even though indirect action is permitted, nevertheless, if you permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it, see there. And the Rabbis disagree with him, and the halacha is like the Rabbis; behold, they were not concerned with this reasoning that "if you permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it." And if so, why are we concerned here? And so too at the beginning of the chapter "Mi SheHechshich" it says: The Rabbis established that a person does not restrain himself regarding his property; if you do not permit it to him, he will come to carry it four amot in the public domain, see there; behold, even regarding property we say the opposite reasoning.

And in truth, regarding the essence of this reasoning—when is one more prone to sin, if we permit it to him or if we do not permit it to him—this is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis in the first chapter of Pesachim (11a) regarding the matter of a firstborn animal seized by a blood-congestion: even if it will die, one may not let its blood, these are the words of Rabbi Yehuda. And the Sages say: he may let blood, provided that he does not inflict a blemish upon it. And the Gemara says there: that Rabbi Yehuda holds that since a person is anxious over his property, if you permit it to him in a place where one does not inflict a blemish, he will come to do it in a place where one does inflict a blemish. And the Rabbis hold the opposite: all the more so, if you do not permit it to him at all, he will come to do it in a place where one inflicts a blemish, since once he transgresses your words, he will no longer be careful. But when you permit it to him in a place where one does not inflict a blemish, he will not transgress your words and will do it in this place (Rashi); behold, they disagreed on this very reasoning. And the halacha is like the Rabbis, as we say: "if you do not permit it to him, it is worse," as in the case of death. If so, how do we rule here regarding a fire the opposite? However, since the Gemara did not say regarding this statement of Rava, "Let us say it is like a dispute of Tannaim," as is the way of the Gemara everywhere, we learn from this that here everyone agrees, and the reason is hidden from us.

And it appears in my humble opinion that Rashi, of blessed memory, in the sweetness of his language, rectified all of this, as he wrote regarding this statement of Rava: If you permit him to begin with the rescue to such an extent, see there. And the matter is thus: for certainly in monetary matters, when the sages forbade an Israelite man from engaging in rescue, he will not transgress the words of the sages and will justify upon himself the Heavenly decree. However, this is only if he does not engage much in the rescue, but when he engages much in the rescue permissibly, it follows that from the preoccupation he will forget about Shabbat and will rescue through a prohibition. Therefore, on the contrary, it is necessary to permit him everything that is within our power to permit, for if we do not permit him, it is much worse, and he will forget and extinguish. But when we permit him, he is not so agitated, since he knows that he can rescue permissibly. And it emerges that the reasoning is thus, for certainly there are facets to this side and that side, but for the halacha it is thus: that if he does not begin at all with the rescue, certainly it is better that we close the path to him entirely, but if he begins with the rescue—the second path is better, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

Therefore, we only permitted him food for three meals, as this is not called "saving," for it is a minor matter and does not involve confusion or panic; therefore, they closed the path for him from beginning to save, as Rashi explained. This is not the case regarding making a partition with vessels so that the fire does not pass, for you permit him all vessels, as it did not seem proper to the sages to close the path for him so that he would not prevent the fire from passing. If so, naturally, when you forbid him new earthenware vessels while he is occupied with other vessels, and when they do not suffice for him and he is preoccupied and panicked, he will extinguish it entirely; but when you permit it to him, he will not panic and will not extinguish. And so too regarding the artifice with garments, since you are forced to permit him all his garments, naturally, if you do not permit him more, he will panic and extinguish, as I have written. And so too regarding one for whom it grew dark on the way and his purse is in his hand, for he is necessarily holding his purse while it is still day, and you will not influence him to perform an action with his hands to throw it away; therefore, they sought a way of permission. And so too regarding that firstborn animal seized by a blood-congesting illness, for he is occupied with its healing by standing it in water and searching for a non-Jewish craftsman, as is written in siman 332 that this is permitted to him, see there; if so, when we close the path for him, he will panic and act with a prohibition. According to this, that which some have forbidden saving even by means of a non-Jew, as will be explained, also works well; for seemingly it is puzzling, but according to our words it works well, for they did this intentionally in order to distance him from preoccupation, as has been explained.

The Tosafot and the poskim wrote in the name of Rabbeinu Tam: Since that which the sages forbade regarding rescue was due to the reason of panic—that because they are preoccupied with the rescue they will forget about Shabbat and extinguish—this only applies to the house in which the fire is located, where the confusion is great. However, in a house adjacent to that house in which the fire is located, where they are only afraid that the fire will reach them, they may rescue whatever they wish, for regarding them it is not relevant to say they will forget about Shabbat, as the panic is not so great for them. And some say that this was only permitted in another chatzer, but other houses in the chatzer have the same law as the house in which the fire is located (Bach). And the reasoning is thus: for in the entire chatzer the panic is great, and there is concern for forgetting Shabbat, which is not the case in another chatzer; and so it is implied from the wording of the Tosafot, see there (at the beginning of the chapter "Kol Kitvei," where they wrote: "Rabbeinu Tam says... when a fire broke out in that house or in that chatzer...", meaning in that chatzer even in another house).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 2: There are those who permit moving money and items that are muktzeh in order to save them from fire or from oppressors who come to steal them, for in a place of loss one need not be concerned with the prohibition of muktzeh; and there are those who prohibit. And even to tell a non-Jew to move merchandise that will be damaged by rain, there is one who prohibits. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters: For the Tur brought in the name of Sefer HaTerumah that they permitted the prohibition of muktzeh because of financial loss, such as in a fire or to save from theft, just as we find regarding one for whom it grew dark on the way that it is permitted to move his money, for in a place of loss they did not establish the prohibition of muktzeh. And therefore the neighbors, of whom it was explained that they may save whatever they wish—they may save even money and other muktzeh items. And that which they prohibited in the house where the fire is located even permitted items, this is because of the concern lest he come to extinguish as has been explained, but in the other houses where there is no such concern as I have written—it is permitted to save even items that are muktzeh.

And even according to this opinion, it is only to save into a courtyard that is incorporated in an eruv, but to one that is not incorporated—they did not permit it, and all the more so to a karmelit. And regarding this we learned: One may save the case of a book with the book even though there is money inside them, but money without a book—it is forbidden (Beit Yosef in the name of Sefer HaTerumah). And even though they permitted the prohibition of muktzeh, nevertheless the prohibition of carrying to a courtyard that is not incorporated is more severe. And even though regarding a corpse they were more stringent with the prohibition of muktzeh than with the prohibition of carrying out, as I wrote above in siman 311, this is because for the prohibition of muktzeh there is a remedy by means of a loaf of bread or a child (and this is the intent of Rashi 94b, s.v. 'le'afokei', see there). And that which they permitted carrying out a corpse to a karmelit there is because the honor of the deceased is more severe than money. And that which was explained in siman 267, that one who forgot a purse in a courtyard they did not permit muktzeh for him, this is because he was negligent in forgetting. But in a fire or under duress where he was not negligent at all, they permitted the prohibition of muktzeh for him, and this is the opinion of Sefer HaTerumah, the Semag, and the Semak.

The Tur disagrees with this, and this is the "some who prohibit." The Tur wrote the reason: that which they permitted for one for whom it grew dark on the way to carry the muktzeh less than four amot at a time, this is so that he will not come to a Torah prohibition by carrying four amot in a reshu ha-rabim. But regarding those under duress there is no such concern, for he is afraid to take them out because of them, and furthermore even if he takes them out, for us there is no Torah prohibition since we do not have a reshu ha-rabim. And similarly regarding a fire there is no concern of extinguishing, since it is in another house; see there. And the Tur could also have said regarding a fire that we have no concern of extinguishing, for even in extinguishing there is no Torah prohibition according to what he ruled like Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor not needed for its own sake, and I wonder why he did not write this. And the great Acharonim agreed with the ruling of the Sefer HaTerumah (Bach and Magen Avraham, subsection 3), for in truth, is it only regarding carrying out that there are no Torah concerns? For he could dig in the ground and hide them and similar to this (ibid.).

And even according to the Sefer HaTerumot, it is only in the case of bandits or a fire, because the matter is frantic and one might stumble into a Torah prohibition. But if rain fell upon merchandise that is muktzeh—it is forbidden according to all opinions to do anything by means of an Israelite, for in this the panic is not so great that we should fear he will come to a Torah prohibition. Rather, by means of a non-Jew it is permitted, as I wrote above in siman 307, that for merchandise that will be damaged it is permitted to call a non-Jew; see there. And the Tur wrote that even to tell a non-Jew to move merchandise that will be damaged due to rain, there is one who forbids it, and above in siman 307 where we permitted it, we also did not permit telling him explicitly that he should rescue it, but rather to call him and he will see on his own, or to say: "Whoever rescues will not lose," as I wrote there, and there we explained with the help of Heaven; see there.

And behold, according to what we have explained, even the permission of the Sefer HaTerumot is only regarding houses adjacent to the fire in another courtyard, and not regarding the house in which the fire is located, for in that house they only permitted three meals, and certainly not other things. However, there are those who explain that the intention of the Sefer HaTerumot is even regarding the house in which the fire is located; and even though they only permitted food for three meals, that is regarding simple things where there is no concern that he will act intentionally to desecrate Shabbat, but rather the concern is due to forgetting Shabbat, and therefore they did not permit him to rescue much. But regarding money and precious objects, where there is a concern that he will desecrate intentionally because a person does not restrain himself over his property—as in the case of one for whom it grew dark on the way—on the contrary, they permitted it to him so that he should not come to a Torah prohibition. And with this reasoning, one can resolve the contradictions that we brought in section 13. (This reasoning is in the Beit Yosef in the name of the Ri Aboab, for so it is implied from the Ran, and in the Taz subsection 2, see there; and the Bach rejected it with both hands. And there is doubt whether one may rely on this opinion, but we are accustomed to act according to this opinion.)

We have already written that one may rescue three meals for each member of his household, and there is one who wrote in this wording: "It seems to me that even if he rescued much bread, each member of his household is permitted to rescue, each one, sustenance for three meals, for they permitted three meals for each individual" (Magen Avraham, subsection 4). And it seems to me that this is only when he rescued much not for the sake of the members of his household but for himself, and he transgressed the regulation of the sages; but when he rescued for the sake of the members of his household, why should we permit them to rescue for themselves, for he has already rescued on their behalf. And they said in the Gemara there that if he rescued coarse bread, that is, thick bread, he may afterwards rescue clean bread. But if he rescued clean bread—it is forbidden to afterwards rescue coarse bread. And so too if he rescued meat he may rescue fish, and similarly with other foods, and regarding drink he may prepare for the entire day.

One may rescue from Yom Kippur for Shabbat if Yom Kippur falls on the eve of Shabbat, but not from Shabbat for Yom Kippur if Yom Kippur falls on Sunday, because the eating of Yom Kippur is at night, and he can prepare then. Now, this law is not found among us, for Yom Kippur does not fall on either the eve of Shabbat or on Sunday, and this could only occur during the time when they would sanctify the month based on sighting; however, there is a practical application even for us when Yom Kippur falls on Thursday, and one knows that on the eve of Shabbat he will obtain nothing, for he is permitted to rescue for Shabbat (Magen Avraham, subsection 6). And from Yom Kippur for the conclusion of Yom Kippur, one may rescue one meal. And one may rescue for a sick person, an elderly person, or a gluttonous person according to the measure of an average person, for we do not follow his personal nature but rather the majority of the world. (And the reason they did not permit rescuing from Shabbat for the conclusion of Yom Kippur is because they did not want the exertion of Shabbat for the conclusion of Yom Kippur, whereas for Yom Kippur it is the common way of the matter.)

And this matter, that one may only rescue food for three meals, this is specifically when he rescues it in two vessels. But when he rescues it in one vessel—he may rescue even a great deal, for it is all one load and one exertion, and there is no concern in this that he will forget about Shabbat and come to extinguish. And not only that, but even if he had many vessels full of food, and he spread out his garment and emptied from the vessels into the garment and rescued them all—it is also permitted, since they are carried in one load, and they are all in one vessel, namely, in the garment. But to place the vessels in the garment and carry them together—is forbidden, since they are in separate vessels, they are considered as several loads.

It is permitted to rescue all his utensils needed for the meals, and likewise cups and pitchers needed for his drinking for the entire day. And he may clothe himself in all that he can wear and take them out and undress, and return and clothe himself and rescue and undress, and return and clothe himself. Regarding food, they did not permit doing so several times and each time taking three meals, due to the concern of extinguishing as we have written. However, regarding the wearing of garments, this concern does not exist, for since you only permitted it to him by way of wearing, he will naturally remember that today is Shabbat and will not come to extinguish (Taz, subsection 5 in the name of the Rashba). However, even regarding wearing, there is one who says that they only permitted him a single time to be wearing and taking out, for so it implies from the wording of the Rambam, see there (Beit Yosef).

And he says to others: "Come and rescue for yourselves," meaning that it shall be for yourselves, and each one rescues food for three meals and they wear whatever they are able to wear. And as is clarified from the Shas (120a), there are three levels regarding those who rescue: One who wishes to retain it entirely for himself, it is within his power to retain it, since he said "rescue for yourselves," he has rendered them ownerless. But had he not said so, it would not be within his power to retain it, for this is not like one who rescues from a river, or from a troop, or from a fire, for the owners were able to rescue them through a non-Jew or through others who would not take it for themselves (Magen Avraham, subsection 11), and it is called "rescuing from a fire" when he rescues them from the fire itself, where there was no time to rescue. However, one who is a pious man who waives his own rights, does not benefit from this at all, and returns them to the owners without any payment of reward, and they do not even take payment for their exertion, as it appears like Shabbat wages. However, there is a middle path for a man who is God-fearing, and he does not want to retain them entirely, knowing that this statement "rescue for yourselves" was out of necessity and not of his own will, and nevertheless he does not want to exert himself for nothing—he returns it to the owners and takes his wages. And this is not Shabbat wages, for it is entirely his according to the law (Rashi), and furthermore, from the outset they did not intend that they should take wages (ibid.). Therefore, if he returned them—he cannot afterwards request his wages against the will of the owners, for the owners will say to him: "Behold, you handed it over to me, and presumably you rescued it to return it to me, and you did not act with the intention of hire." However, if the owners give to them for their exertion—they may receive it, and so it is clarified from the words of the Rambam, see there. (So it appears in my humble opinion and so it is explicit from the Machatzit HaShekel, and the Magen Avraham, subsection 13, distinguishes between rescuing through a prohibition and rescuing through a permitted act, and compares this to that of Choshen Mishpat siman 183, and this is not a comparison as the Eliyah Rabbah wrote. And that which the Rambam wrote as the reason why this is not Shabbat wages, because there is no labor or prohibition there, see there, this is not the primary reason, for the primary reason is according to the explanation of Rashi. Rather, this is the explanation: that had there been labor and a prohibition, we would not permit him to receive wages, for who requested this of him, and delve into this).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 10: "Any rescue we have mentioned is only to another courtyard that is incorporated, but not to one that is not incorporated." Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: "And there are those who are lenient even to one that is not incorporated." Thus far his words. And they did not explain their words, for there is certainly no opinion that permits rescuing food, drink, and vessels to a courtyard that is not incorporated; rather, it certainly refers to the garments he wears, as our teacher, the Rema, understood that the first opinion forbids even the wearing of garments to one that is not incorporated, and so the commentators understood (Bach, and Taz subsection 7, and Magen Avraham subsection 14). And it must be said regarding their reasoning: that even though it is by way of wearing, nevertheless, since this is by way of rescue—they did not permit it to one that is not incorporated. And it is a wonder to say so, for that which we learned in the Mishnah there: "And he wears all that he can wear" does not refer to the preceding, to the rescue to an incorporated courtyard, for specifically regarding food, drink, and vessels that he carries in his hands is it called rescue, but this is called wearing, for since he is clothed in them, their rescue is not recognizable at all.

And I have seen that they understood this to be the opinion of the Rambam and the Tur, but I say that from the Rambam it is explicitly proven otherwise, for he wrote: "Therefore they decreed that one may only rescue food that he needs for the Shabbat, and vessels that he needs to use on Shabbat, and garments that he can wear... and if they did not make an eruv—even his food and his vessels he may not rescue." Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote explicitly "his food and his vessels" and did not mention "his garments," from which one may infer that his garments are permitted even to an area that is not incorporated by an eruv. And also the Tur, who wrote: "And one may only rescue to a courtyard that is incorporated by an eruv," does not refer to garments, which are not described with the language of "rescuing," and also the intention of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, is such, for he did not mention this in his great work. And it is simple that not in the manner of clothing it is forbidden even with garments and with anything (Magen Avraham there). And in the Sefer HaTerumah he wrote explicitly that garments are permitted even to an area that is not incorporated by an eruv (and all the words of the Bach require further study, see there).

The Tur wrote that the author of the Sefer HaTerumah wrote that all the saving we mentioned, where more than this one is not permitted to save, this refers to a courtyard and an alleyway adjacent to a public domain and which are also not roofed, for they resemble a public domain; and because of this, they do not permit even if they made an eruv except to save food for three meals and the vessels needed for Shabbat. But to save to a house in the courtyard of his fellow where they made an eruv—he may take out everything he desires, and even in a courtyard it is only to the courtyard of his fellow, but to his own courtyard where an eruv is not required—he may take out everything he desires. And the Tur disagrees with him, for since the reason is so that he will not be preoccupied with saving and come to extinguish, if so, what difference is it to me if it is a house in the courtyard of his fellow and what difference is it to me if it is the courtyard of his fellow, and likewise what difference is it to me if it is his courtyard and what difference is it to me if it is the courtyard of his fellow. And there is one who says that regarding his own courtyard the Tur does not disagree, for since this is adjacent to his house, there is no preoccupation here and he will not come to extinguish (Taz, subsection 8). And the reason of the Sefer HaTerumah who permitted to the house of his fellow, it seems to me that since you permitted it to him in a house and not in a courtyard, he has a distinction and will not come to extinguish, and as the reason was written regarding garments that he can change many times, as written in section 26. (And as for what the Taz questioned the Sefer HaTerumah from Rav Huna, see there, in truth the Sefer HaTerumah would rule like Rabbi Abba, who makes a distinction between this courtyard and another courtyard, and as the Eliyah Rabbah wrote in subsection 8, for so it is explained in the Sefer HaTerumah that he ruled in practice like Rabbi Abba, and also the Semag and the Semak and the Mordechai ruled like the Sefer HaTerumah.)

The sages taught in the Mishnah: "All sacred writings may be rescued from a fire," meaning even to a courtyard for which they did not make an eruv. Provided that one carries them through an alleyway that has three partitions and a lechi, but without a lechi it is forbidden. And know that in the Yerushalmi it says that according to Rava, since a labor not needed for its own sake is exempt by Torah law, one may even extinguish the fire for the sake of rescuing sacred writings, for there is no matter of shevut that stands in the face of sacred writings. The poskim wrote that since this was not mentioned in our Gemara, it implies that it holds that even according to Rava it is forbidden to extinguish, and it was only permitted to move them to a courtyard that is not joined by an eruv.

It is known that by Torah law, the Oral Matters are forbidden to be written, and also Written Matters do not possess sanctity unless they are written in Ashurit and in the Holy Tongue. Therefore, if they were written in another script or in another language—one does not rescue them from a fire even to a courtyard where they have made an eruv. And even on a weekday it is forbidden to read from them; rather, one leaves them and they perish on their own (the Rambam there). But if they were written with sam or sikra, even though it is not a permanent writing, since they are written in Ashurit and in the Holy Tongue—one rescues them from a fire. And the margins of books, those above and those below, and those between one parashah and another, and those between one page and another, and those at the beginning of the book and those at the end of the book—one does not rescue them. And likewise the blessings and the amulets, even though they contain letters of the Name and many matters of Torah—one does not rescue them from a fire (ibid.).

A Sefer Torah from which one can collect eighty-five letters from within complete words—meaning, if the collection of letters is not from complete words, it is nothing; however, if one can collect eighty-five letters from complete words, such that the sum of these letters is within the total of the words—one rescues them from a fire. And why is this sum required: corresponding to the parsha of "Vayehi Binsoa HaAron," which is like a book unto itself, and therefore it contains the inverted nuns and contains eighty-five letters, and therefore this number is considered like a complete book regarding the matter of rescuing from a fire. And even if among the words are Aramaic words, such as "Yegar Sahaduta"—one likewise rescues them. And even a parsha from which one cannot collect this sum but which contains Azkarot, which are the holy Names—one likewise rescues them; therefore, the parsha of "Vayehi Binsoa," even though it is missing words, since it contains Names—one rescues them from a fire. And certainly if they wrote halachot and aggadot, it is forbidden to rescue them, since it is forbidden to write them at all.

And all of this was in their time, but nowadays when they permitted writing laws and aggadot and the entire Oral Torah because of "it is a time to act for Hashem," for if not so, Torah would have already been forgotten from Israel, Heaven forbid—one rescues all holy books from a fire. Nevertheless, the Written Torah takes precedence for rescue, and similarly a Sefer Torah takes precedence over other books, and even if they are written in any language, and even if they are written with sam and sikra, and even if they are written not in Ashurit, because not everyone is able to write Ashurit. And similarly, printed holy books are rescued, and similarly prayer books and the established formula of blessings, whether in manuscript or in print, are rescued. And even a translation that they wrote as scripture, such as "Yegar Sahaduta" which they wrote in the Holy Tongue, and similarly "Thus shall you say to them" in Jeremiah, and similarly the Holy Tongue which they wrote as a translation or in another language that those people are proficient in. And specifically when it was written and printed for the sake of sanctity and not for another intention, for those, even on a weekday, one does not rescue.

There is one who says that since the Megillat Esther does not contain Divine Names, if it is not written according to its law in Ashurit script on klaf and with ink—it possesses no sanctity to be saved from a fire. However, this is not understood, for since nowadays it was permitted to be read and written even in any language, why should they not save it from a fire? Therefore, it appears that we save it even if written on paper and not in the Holy Tongue, but not when it was written with sam or sikra, for behold, ink is available and one is able to write with ink; and so it appears primary for the law (Magen Avraham, subsection 18). And amulets that contain verses—we do not save them from a fire, because they do not possess sanctity, and they are not made for reading such that the reason of "it is a time to act for Hashem" would be relevant to them. And some say that we do save them, for since permission was granted to write because of "it is a time to act," there is also permission to write amulets (Turei Zahav, subsection 12), and the primary view is like the first opinion (Magen Avraham).

And one may rescue the case of a scroll with the scroll, even though there is money inside it, and similarly the case of tefillin with the tefillin, and similarly other sacred writings. And he is not obligated to shake out the money, for because of the honor of the sanctity which is a need of the Most High, we perform along with it the rescue of money which is a human need, even from a house in which there is a fire, and even to a courtyard that is not incorporated in an eruv. And even if he placed tefillin in a pouch full of money—he may rescue it from the fire or from thieves and robbers, to a place where he can rescue the tefillin. And there is one who says that this is specifically when he placed them there from the eve of Shabbat, but on Shabbat when he placed them for the sake of rescue—it is not effective. And in truth there is no dispute here, for on the eve of Shabbat it is permitted even if he placed them for the sake of rescue, and on Shabbat when he placed them for the sake of rescue everyone agrees that it is forbidden, and when he did not place them for the sake of rescue—it is certainly permitted. (Magen Avraham subsection 20 and Taz subsection 13, and one must look further into the Taz who wrote that this is in a house in which there is a fire, for in another house muktzeh is permitted even regarding the money itself, see there, and yet there is a practical difference regarding rescue to a courtyard that is not incorporated in an eruv, for on their own it is forbidden and by means of tefillin it is permitted, and examine this carefully).

There are those who permit rescuing a saddlebag full of money by means of a loaf of bread or an infant, even in a place where it is forbidden to rescue money, such as from a house in which a fire broke out, and as I wrote in section 18; nevertheless, by means of a loaf or an infant—it is permitted, and even to place them initially now in order to rescue, and even if the money is much more significant than the loaf. And even though they said that they only permitted a loaf or an infant for a corpse alone, nevertheless, in the case of a fire they permitted it, and specifically to a private domain, but not to a courtyard that is not incorporated in an eruv, and certainly not to a karmelit. And this law is not according to the opinion in section 22, which holds that muktzeh was permitted even for a house in which a fire broke out, see there, for according to that opinion there is no need for a loaf and an infant. And it has already been explained that books may be rescued even to a courtyard that is not incorporated in an eruv and to an alleyway where they did not partner, provided that it has three partitions with a lechi.

And they wrote in the name of a Gaon that it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to rescue books even by way of a public domain, for you have no shevut of speech that stands before the holy scriptures. And everything that is permitted to rescue from a fire—it is permitted to rescue from water and from other things that destroy. And it has already been explained that the margins of books—one does not rescue them from a fire, for they possess no sanctity. Therefore, the binders cut the margins and discard them, but when they have already studied from them—it is forbidden to cut an old margin, and the early authorities established a punishment for this (Magen Avraham, subsection 24), even though one does not rescue them from a fire. And it is obvious that the books of heretics and apostates and books of idolatry for which they wrote holy scriptures—that one does not rescue them from a fire even though they contain Names, and even on a weekday it is forbidden to read from them and one burns them together with the Names.

It is written: "You shall not do any labor," it is doing that is forbidden, but causing it is permitted (120b). Therefore, it is permitted to make a partition with vessels full of water before a fire, even with new vessels that will certainly burst and the water will extinguish the fire, for this is nothing more than causing it and is permitted in a case of loss. All the more so that a chest which the fire has caught—one may spread a goat skin from its one side so that it does not burn, for here he does not even cause extinguishing, but rather he does not allow the fire to go further from here. And so too a garment which the fire has caught—he spreads it out and covers himself with it, and if it is extinguished, it is extinguished and he need not be concerned, for this also is nothing more than causing it, as he is not occupied with its extinguishing. Therefore, there is one who says that it is necessary that he should not intend for this, meaning that he should not do an action for this, and that is that he should run and jump and move here and there so that it will be extinguished, but rather he covers himself with it in his usual manner (Magen Avraham, subsection 25). And so too a Sefer Torah which the fire has caught, he spreads it out and reads from it, and if it is extinguished, it is extinguished (Gemara ibid.). And it is permitted to overturn a bowl over a candle so that it does not catch the beam, as has been written in siman 277.

And even though causing extinction is permitted, nevertheless some say that a garment which caught fire is forbidden to place liquids upon it not in the location of the fire, so that when the fire reaches the liquids it will be extinguished, because causing extinction was only permitted by means of an interruption, such as with pots full of water, but not without an interruption, for this appears clearly like extinction (see Tosafot at the end of Kirah). And some permit it, because this too is called causing extinction. And some permit it with all liquids except for water, for the reason of laundering which is a derivative of bleaching, and so it appears to be the primary view.

An Akum who comes to extinguish a fire, the Israelite does not need to protest his action, for he acts for his own sake. And even though he knows that the Israelite is pleased by this, nevertheless, he acts for his own will and for his own benefit, as he knows that he will not lose out. And it is not similar to the lighting of a candle for the sake of the Israelite in siman 276, where it is forbidden for the Israelite to benefit from the light; that is because his physical person benefits from it. But a minor who comes to extinguish—we do not allow him and one must protest his action, for he acts according to the mind of his father or according to the mind of one older than him, and even the employee of an Israelite, the law is like any other non-Jew.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said (121a): "In the case of a fire, they permitted saying: 'Whoever extinguishes will not lose,'" meaning that he stands among non-Jews and says in their language: "Whoever extinguishes will not lose." And even though it appears like they are his agents, nevertheless, since he did not command them explicitly, they are not considered his agents, as in the case of one forbidden by a vow from receiving benefit, who may say: "Whoever feeds will not lose" (Ketubot, beginning of the chapter "HaMadir"). And even if the non-Jew is not present here, he may call him to come and say this to him, even though he will certainly extinguish when he comes. And so too regarding anything similar to this involving sudden damage, such as if a wine barrel cracked—he may call a non-Jew even though he will certainly fix it, for truly according to the opinion of most poskim like Rabbi Shimon that a labor not needed for its own sake is exempt, we should have permitted explicitly telling a non-Jew to extinguish, as it is a shvut d'shvut in a case of great loss. However, they nevertheless forbade it because a person is anxious over his property, and if you permit it to him in this manner, he will come to extinguish it himself due to the distress, as he will forget about Shabbat as has been written; therefore, at any rate, in such a manner as calling him or saying: "Whoever extinguishes will not lose," or both together—the sages did not see fit to forbid. And it is simple that sacred books come first in rescue before other things, and a corpse precedes even sacred writings, and this is even on a weekday.

And one should not ask, after it has been explained that it is forbidden to extinguish a fire on Shabbat, and even rescue was forbidden as a decree lest one come to extinguish, and even to explicitly tell a non-Jew to extinguish is forbidden, if so, what is the basis for the custom among us to extinguish a fire on Shabbat. However, our predecessors explained this matter, that among us, every fire is considered a danger to life, and therefore, on the contrary, it is an obligation upon us to extinguish, and even when the fire is at the home of a non-Jew. This matter is explained in the great Or Zarua, and in the Mordechai in the chapter "Kol Kitvei," and in the Hagahot Ashri in the fourth chapter of Eruvin, and in the Terumat HaDeshen siman 58, and our teacher, the Rema, cited them briefly (and in section 9 we wrote another correct permit, see there).

This is his wording: "And all the laws mentioned regarding the laws of fire: these matters applied in their days, but in this time, because there is a concern of danger to life, the early and later authorities, of blessed memory, wrote that it is permitted to extinguish their fire on Shabbat, because there is danger to life in it, and one who is diligent is praiseworthy. Nevertheless, everything is according to the matter: if they were certainly secure that there would be no danger in the matter—it is forbidden to extinguish, but in a concern of doubtful danger—it is permitted to extinguish, even if the fire is in the houses of non-Jews, and so we practice. And specifically to extinguish the fire, for it is a labor not needed for its own sake and there is danger if he does not extinguish, but it is forbidden to desecrate Shabbat in order to save property. And if he transgressed and desecrated—he must fast forty days, Monday Thursday Monday, and he shall not drink wine and shall not eat meat, and he shall give in place of a sin offering eighteen pshutim to charity. And if he wishes to redeem the fast, he shall give for each day twelve pshutim to charity." Thus far his words. And that which he wrote that he shall not eat meat, his intention is for the night following the fast.

And this requirement for teshuva applies when one desecrated Shabbat, even with a rabbinic prohibition; however, for the extinguishing itself, since we consider this a danger—there is no need for teshuva. On the contrary, we prevent him from this so that they do not become negligent in rescue, for in our many sins we see in many fires that souls are burned. And for the moving of muktzeh there is no need for teshuva (She'elat Teshuvah in the name of the Dagan Mermesh), for it has already been explained that they permitted muktzeh in a case of financial loss. And it is stated in the Gemara (12b) regarding one who stumbled on Shabbat by tilting a lamp, and he wrote in his notebook: that when the Beit HaMikdash is built he must bring a chatat, see there. And the measure of the coins of the peshutim we do not know today, and we are accustomed to consider this a peruta, and the peruta is one-sixth of the kopek coin of our country Russia, and eighteen peshutim is three kopeks. And we have no correct tradition in this, and regarding the coins mentioned in the books, we do not know what they are. (And nevertheless, every God-fearing person should contemplate well upon the holy Shabbat for it is holy, and not to be lenient in trivial matters, and delve into this.)