Siman 325

It is permitted to invite a non-Jew on Shabbat to eat with him at his table, even though on Yom Tov it is forbidden to invite him unless he came on his own, as written in siman 512; this is because on Yom Tov we fear that he will increase the cooking for his sake, but on Shabbat he only invites him for what was prepared from yesterday, and there is no concern of melakhah. And if it is because of exertion—it is permitted for the sake of the ways of peace (see the Ran chapter 7 regarding giving food, what he wrote in the name of the Ra'avad, and it requires further study).

It is permitted to give bread to a non-Jewish poor person standing in a courtyard, for it is a mitzvah upon us to sustain their poor. And even though there is a concern that he will carry it out to the reshut harabim, and it will be found that the object of an Israelite was moved on Shabbat from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim, nevertheless, he does not give it to him on the condition that he carry it out, for in such a case it is forbidden, as is explained in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 1, Halacha 8): One may not give to a non-Jew on the condition that he go out; if he took it and went out—one is not responsible for him. And since he went out of his own accord, we have no concern with it, for now it is his and not the Israelite's, and when he gave it to him, he could have eaten it here in the courtyard. Therefore, if it is known that he will not eat it here, or if he gave him a large amount that is impossible to eat here, or an object that is not for eating and he will perforce carry it out from here—it is forbidden to give it to him on Shabbat.

For it has already been explained in siman 246, section 6, that on Shabbat itself it is forbidden to lend any vessel to a non-Jew, and the Rambam in chapter 6 explained the reason: that when he exits the house of the Israelite, they will say that he sold it to him on Shabbat; and according to this, even in a city that has an eruv, it is forbidden. However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote there the reason: that the observer will think that the Israelite commanded him to take it out on Shabbat; and according to this, the prohibition is only in a city that does not have an eruv, and there we explained why he rejected the reason of the Rambam, see there. And for this reason, that which he ruled here in section 1, that even if the non-Jew is standing in his courtyard, and even if the objects belong to the non-Jew—it is forbidden to hand them to him when he takes them to carry out, because the observer will think that the objects belong to the Israelite, see there; that is to say, they will suspect him of having commanded him to carry it out on Shabbat, and this is in a city that is not provided with an eruv. And for this, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that even if he designated a place for him while it was still day—one should be stringent. Thus far his words. And this is due to the reason of suspicion, as I have written. And also what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, that even regarding food, when the non-Jew stands outside and extends his hand inside, where it is known that he will take it out—it is forbidden to give it to him, it is all due to the reason that they will say he gave it to him to carry it out. And even without this, there is a prohibition when he gives it into his hand, for he performs an akirah in a reshut hayachid, and the non-Jew performs a hanachah in a reshut harabim. And there is one who is stringent that even if he is standing in his courtyard, he should not give it into his hand due to the reason that perhaps he will take it out immediately to the reshut harabim, and it will turn out that the Israelite performed an akirah (Magen Avraham, subsection 2). But it is not so, for there is no akirah here on the part of the Israelite at all, for when the non-Jew uproots himself to go from the courtyard, he performs the akirah and not the Israelite (Eliyah Rabbah), for the uprooting of his body is like the uprooting of an object.

And there is one who wrote that when the object belongs to a non-Jew, it is only forbidden when the non-Jew stands outside and stretched his hand inside and the Israelite delivered the object to him, for one who sees that the Israelite is giving it to him will assume that the object belongs to the Israelite. And it is not specifically delivering it to him, for this is anyway forbidden due to the act of lifting, but even when the non-Jew takes it from the hand of the Israelite, for then the non-Jew also performs the lifting, and it is forbidden for the reason of appearances as I have written. But when the non-Jew stands in the courtyard—it is permitted to give him his own object, for the one who sees the non-Jew leaving his courtyard will say that this is the non-Jew's object, as is the truth, and it is only forbidden with an object belonging to an Israelite (Magen Avraham, subsection 4). And when the object was collateral to an Israelite—it is forbidden even if he designated a place for the object while it was still day, for rental does not acquire and the Israelite's authority has not been removed from it; however, if he declared it ownerless while it was still day—it seems to me that it is permitted. And all these matters are in a place where there is no eruv, but when there is an eruv—it is obvious that it is permitted, and even in a place where there is no eruv it is possible to permit it for us as we do not have a reshut harabim (Taz, subsection 1). And he should place the object before him and he will take it, and he should not deliver it into his hand, because of lifting which is also forbidden ab initio in a karmelit, and it appears that such is the custom.

Even in a place where it is forbidden to give to him, if the non-Jew is violent or if it is for the sake of the ways of peace—it is permitted to give to him, only he must be careful not to give from hand to hand, because of the removal. And likewise it is permitted to send to him by means of a non-Jewish messenger, and the same law applies for the purpose of a mitzvah, such as to remove chametz from his house—it is permitted. And know that this law is written in the Tosafot (19a, starting with "notnin" in the Tosafot Yeshanim there), and he concluded with this: "Since we do not have a reshut harabim," and it implies explicitly that in a reshut harabim it is forbidden even in these cases, and so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book. And if so, it is a wonder why he left his words unexplained in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2, and it requires further study.

It has already been explained that even if the object belonged to the non-Jew, such as a pledge—it is forbidden for the reasons that have been explained. However, when he comes to exchange his pledge for another and can go out with it by way of a garment—it is permitted, for it is not noticeable at all, as just as he came in the garment upon him, so too he goes out in the garment upon him. And there is also no prohibition in this due to commerce, for there is no commerce in this, as he does not speak with him regarding how much is owed, but rather he requests of the Israelite: 'Exchange this for me with the other that is placed with you,' and it is also permitted for an Israelite to do so, to exchange his pledge on Shabbat if the Israelite needs to wear it on Shabbat. And it is good that the non-Jew should take the pledge himself and place another in its stead and the Israelite should not touch it, so that it should not appear like commerce; however, if the pledge is placed in a location that is not revealed and it is necessary that the Israelite bring it—it is also permitted, and he shall bring it here and the non-Jew shall strip off the garment upon him and take this one, and the Israelite shall put away the garment that he left, but he must be careful not to speak any calculation with him. And so too if the non-Jew comes on Shabbat and leaves his money and takes his pledge and the Israelite does not speak anything with him—he does not need to protest him, for he is doing nothing, provided that he does not calculate any calculation with him, for calculation is certainly a complete prohibition. (See Magen Avraham subsection 8 who disputed the Sma who permitted being a guarantor on Shabbat, and we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 131 section 6, and also the Taz and the Urim VeTumim there disputed the Sma, see there)

The Tur wrote: "Bread of a non-Jew that was baked on Shabbat—Rabbenu Tam forbids it, for perhaps it was ground today and it is found to be muktzeh, as during twilight it was not fit; and in the Sefer HaTerumot he wrote arguments for prohibition and for permission. And my master, my father, of blessed memory, wrote: And it seems to me to permit it, for even if it were flour or dough during twilight—it would not be muktzeh, since its completion is by the hand of man. And the grinding and the baking do not prohibit it, since it is for the sake of the non-Jew" thus far his words. And based on this, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4: "Bread that a non-Jew baked for himself on Shabbat—there are those who prohibit and there are those who permit, and in a time of pressing need or for the purpose of a seudat mitzvah, such as a brit milah or for the purpose of the blessing of HaMotzi, one may rely on those who permit" thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote: "But it is forbidden to give him money on Erev Shabbat so that he will give him the bread on Shabbat, for then he acts with the Israelite in mind" thus far his words. And it must be said that this non-Jew is a baker, and in a place where they eat the bread of a baker as written in Yoreh Deah siman 112, for if it were the bread of a householder there is no permission as written there (see Taz subsection 3). And it implies that for the law they decided in favor of permission, but when it is not a time of pressing need they were concerned for the words of Rabbenu Tam. And in truth, the words of Rabbenu Tam are not understood—why was he concerned for the grinding more than the kneading and the baking? Furthermore, how is this different from all the labors when a non-Jew performed them for himself, an Israelite may use it as will be explained? And the commentators toiled much over this.

And it appears that Rabbeinu Tam follows his reasoning in this, that nolad is forbidden on Shabbat, as is written in siman 308, and he holds according to the opinion of the Ba'al HaHalachot Gedolot brought by the Tosafot (Avodah Zarah 66b, s.v. 'Amar') that grinding is considered nolad; see there. And according to this, he correctly said "perhaps it was ground today," meaning it is muktzeh of nolad, and since it was set aside during twilight, it is set aside for the entire day, for in this too we hold according to Rabbi Yehuda as is written there (see the Bach who wrote this). And according to this, in the view of most of the poskim that even regarding nolad we hold according to Rabbi Shimon, and also there are those who disagree with the Ba'al HaHalachot Gedolot and hold that grinding is not considered nolad as the Tosafot wrote there, therefore for us, regarding the law, our teachers the authors of the Shulchan Aruch correctly ruled for permissibility, and they permitted it for the sake of a mitzvah or in a time of pressing need.

And it can further be said regarding the reasoning of Rabbeinu Tam, when we scrutinize that which the Rosh wrote, that this is not muktzeh because its completion is in the hands of man. And his intention is that since a man can prepare it—namely, to grind, knead, and bake—and behold, fruit that was detached from the tree, it was also in the hands of man to detach them; why then do we say that this is similar to dried figs and raisins, which he pushed away with his own hands since he did not detach them while it was still day (Rashi, Beitzah 24b)? If so, let us say the same regarding bread, and what difference is there in this? And it must be said that the logic is as follows: detaching is a simple matter, and he could have detached them while it was still day and did not detach them; presumably he removed his mind from them and pushed them away with his hands, for if his mind were upon them, he should have detached them. This is not the case with other types of muktzeh such as bread, which requires great preparation: grinding, kneading, and baking. It can be said that he did not remove his mind from it, and that which he did not do while it was still day was because he did not yet find an opportune time for this, and as soon as he finds an opportune time, he will do it. Therefore, when the non-Jew baked, the bread is permitted, for he did not remove his mind from it, and this is the reasoning of the Rosh (see Beit Yosef and Derishah, and according to what I have written, everything is well-settled; and examine this carefully).

But Rabbeinu Tam holds that this is called an active displacement like the picking of fruit, since he did not begin while it was yet day. Therefore, if it was actually ground while it was yet day—it is not similar to the picking of fruit, for he had already begun to engage in this. Consequently, when the non-Jew kneads and bakes—there is no muktzeh here, for his mind was set upon this; whereas if even the grinding was not while it was yet day, it is exactly similar to the picking of fruit. And this is what the Tur says regarding the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam who forbids it, lest it was ground today and is like dried figs and raisins, for had it been ground yesterday he would not have removed his mind from it, and it is permitted when the non-Jew baked it. And there is no difference in all this whether the Israelite ground it while it was yet day or whether the non-Jew ground it while it was yet day, for we follow the matter itself, that if it was ground while it was yet day it is not similar to the picking of fruit, and if it was not ground it is similar (so it appears in my humble opinion, and see Beit Yosef and Derisha).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 5: "A non-Jew who caught fish or gathered fruit for himself—they are forbidden to an Israelite, and even if it is a doubt whether he gathered them or caught them today—they are forbidden on that day. But in the evening—they are permitted immediately, even if it is certain that he gathered them and caught them today. If he gathered and caught for the sake of an Israelite or for the sake of an Israelite and a non-Jew—one must wait in the evening for the time it takes to perform the action. If it is a doubt whether he gathered them for the sake of an Israelite, or if it is known that he gathered them for the sake of an Israelite but it is not known if they were gathered today or not—they are forbidden on that day, and in the evening for the time it takes to perform the action, and some say that in the evening it is permitted immediately." Thus far his words, and it is necessary to clarify the reasons for these laws.

Even though any melacha that a non-Jew performs for himself is permitted for an Israelite to use, why did they forbid the trapping of fish and the gathering of fruits? The Tur wrote: "A non-Jew who trapped fish or gathered fruit or baked bread and cooked for himself, the Sefer HaMitzvot wrote: Some permit it like other melachot he performs for himself, and some forbid it like fallen fruit, for regarding a food item they were more stringent, etc." Thus far his words. For us, it is impossible to say this reason, for if so, why do we permit bread that he baked for himself as has been explained? And there is one who says the reason is because of what is written below in siman 507, lest he go up and pluck (Magen Avraham, subsection 12). And I wonder, for that is there when the fruit fell on its own, as it is stated at the beginning of Beitzah, but regarding what a non-Jew did for himself, we have not found anywhere this decree of lest he go up and pluck. Rather, one can only say that regarding a food item they were more stringent as I wrote, and this logic was also written by the Tosafot in one place (Shabbat 122a, s.v. 'mishtamesh'), who wrote regarding that candle that the non-Jew lit for himself that the Israelite may use its light, why do we not decree lest he light, as we decree regarding fallen fruit lest he pluck, and regarding liquids that flowed lest he squeeze, because they are easy to do and a person is eager for them since they are a food item, etc. Thus far his words. And the primary reason is because of a food item like the reason brought by the Tur, for because of ease alone, there is nothing easier than lighting a candle. And behold, according to this reason, we should also forbid bread as I wrote. And there is one who wrote the reason is because trapping fish and gathering fruit do not seem to people like melacha, and there is reason to decree lest he do it with his own hands (Taz, subsection 4). And these are wondering words, for behold they permitted when he filled water for himself as will be explained, and this certainly does not look like melacha and nevertheless they permitted it. (And the Taz himself rejected this, see there, for he brought the Tosafot in Shabbat. And we have already written that if so, bread also, although one could say their intention is that two things are required: ease of the melacha and the desire for food, but this is not necessary as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And furthermore it is difficult to me, for if so, why did they not forbid drinking water after him when he filled from a public domain, for this is very easy and when a person is thirsty he desires to drink, and delve into this.)

But the truth of the reason was written by Rashi in Beitzah (24b), and the Rosh brought this there, as did the Tosafot at the beginning of Beitzah. This is the wording of Rashi: "And even according to Rabbi Shimon there is muktzeh regarding dried figs and raisins, and that which is attached is considered like dried figs and raisins; since he did not gather them yesterday, he removed them from his mind, and you shall not differentiate regarding that which is attached between his own and that of a non-Jew." Thus far his words. And this is the reason also regarding trapping, but regarding bread this reason is not applicable, as we explained in section 9. And simply put, it is not similar to bread, for the wheat or the flour exists in the world and is detached and he can make use of it, and he did not remove it from his mind; which is not the case for fruits attached to a tree and fish that were submerged in the river. Therefore, all the melachot that the non-Jew performed for himself—an Israelite is permitted to make use of it, for all the melachot are similar to bread which existed in the world, such as a candle or if he made a ramp to descend, for the essence of the candle and the essence of the wood or the stone from which the ramp was made existed in the world and were detached, and it is not applicable to say regarding them "he removed them from his mind," and furthermore, for he does not move them. And similarly, the water in the well existed in the world, and he could have descended into the pit and drank; which is not the case for attached fruits and fish in the river, for he removed them from his mind.

And they did not require waiting for the time it takes to prepare them on the conclusion of Shabbat except when he performed the action for the sake of the Israelite, for then there is a concern lest he tell him to do it, and furthermore so that he should not benefit from Shabbat labor at all in a matter done for his sake, which is not the case in a matter that was not done for his sake (see Tosafot Beitzah 24b, s.v. "V'la'erev"). And even in a case of doubt regarding muktzeh, namely that there is a doubt if they were gathered today or trapped today—it is also forbidden; even though it is a rabbinic doubt, they were stringent because it is a matter that has permitted means of resolution (the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 2 of the Laws of Yom Tov, halacha 7). And the Rashba, of blessed memory, has another reason for this, and it will be explained in siman 497. And so too in a case of doubt if he gathered them for his sake—we are stringent even regarding the time it takes to prepare them, for the reason that has been explained. And there are those who are lenient regarding the time it takes to prepare them, for one should not be so stringent. And if the non-Jew brought it to his house, we say that he certainly gathered them for him and this is not a doubt (Magen Avraham, subsection 13), and this is when he brought it as a gift, but when he brought it to sell—it is a doubt.

An item that does not involve a concern of tzida or being attached to the ground, or where it is known that they were caught or detached yesterday and were only brought from outside the techum, if the non-Jew brought it for himself—it is permitted to an Israelite even on Shabbat, whether for handling or for eating or drinking. However, if he brought it for an Israelite, that Israelite for whom he brought it is forbidden from eating them on Shabbat, so that he does not tell him to bring them; but another Israelite is permitted to eat them on Shabbat. And consequently, regarding handling, it is permitted even to that Israelite, for it is impossible for them to be muktzeh since they are permitted to another Israelite. And in the evening, one must wait the amount of time it takes to perform the action, so that he does not profit if he tells a non-Jew to bring on his behalf. And some say that one must wait on Sunday the amount of time it takes to perform the action, and the night of Motzaei Shabbat does not count toward the calculation because it is not the way to bring from afar at night, and this is an extra stringency (Magen Avraham, subsection 18, in the name of Yam Shel Shlomo). And the measure of "the amount of time it takes to perform the action" is according to the measure of the duration of the bringing; for if he brought them by riding on a horse, where the duration is less than one who walks on foot—he shall wait thus and no more, and if he went on foot—he shall wait according to the measure of his walking. And some say that regarding an item brought from outside the techum—there is no need at all to wait the amount of time it takes to perform the action, for this only applies to a melacha of the Torah that was performed. And know that if it was brought in a ship—it is permitted, for there is no "outside the techum" in a ship. However, if they were on land during twilight—it is forbidden to take them out beyond four amot, as will be explained in siman 405. And when two items were brought before two Israelites—both are forbidden, and it is forbidden to exchange what was brought for Reuven so that Shimon eats it and what was for Shimon for Reuven (Magen Avraham, subsection 16). And it appears to me that this is when the one who brought it was one non-Jew, but if this one brought for Reuven and that one for Shimon—they are permitted to exchange. And know that the members of a person's household have the same status as himself, such that if it is forbidden to him—it is forbidden to the members of his household as well, and the guests, if he has any—are considered like others and are permitted, as written in siman 515, see there.

Below in siman 401 it will be explained that an object that comes from outside the techum is forbidden to be moved outside of four amot, except within a city that is surrounded by a wall and surrounded for habitation, meaning it was settled with houses and afterwards surrounded by a wall. Ordinary towns are surrounded for habitation, and ordinary fortresses are not surrounded for habitation, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven. Therefore, fruits that came from outside the techum for his own sake, which are permitted for an Israelite to eat as I have written, one must be careful not to take them out of their four amot, except in a city surrounded for habitation (see Magen Avraham subsection 19 who took issue with the Beit Yosef, and if God wills it, there it will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven).

If it is a doubt whether it was brought from outside the techum or if it was brought for the sake of an Israelite—it is forbidden for the reason that has been explained, as it is a matter that will become permitted. And one does not need to wait on Saturday night for the time it takes to prepare them, for one should not be so stringent in a case of doubt. And when does a doubt apply regarding a non-Jew: when he does not dwell with him in the city, or when he dwells in the city but these fruits are not found in the city. But when he dwells in the city and the fruits are found in the city—one should not create a doubt that perhaps they came from outside the city. And it is not specifically in the city, for the same law applies if he dwells within the techum. And even if he has two houses, one within the techum and one outside the techum, we attribute it to having come from within the techum. And even though there are those who hesitate regarding this, as this too is a doubt, nevertheless one should not be stringent in this, and it is permitted to eat even for the one for whom it was brought.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (122a): "A non-Jew who lit a lamp, an Israelite may use its light; if he drew water to water his animal, an Israelite may water after him; if he made a ramp to descend upon, an Israelite may descend after him. It happened that Rabban Gamliel and the elders were arriving on a ship, and a non-Jew made a ramp to descend upon, and Rabban Gamliel and the elders descended after him." And in the Baraita there, regarding the gathering of grass and the filling of water, it is taught: "In what case are these matters stated? When he does not know him; but if he knows him, it is forbidden, lest he increase [the labor] for the sake of the Israelite." And it asks: But Rabban Gamliel, [the non-Jew] knew him, so how did he descend upon the ramp? Abaye answered: It was not in his presence; that is to say, if he performed the labor not in his presence, it is permitted even if he knows him, for how could he increase for his sake since he does not see the Israelite at all? And Rava answers: You may even say it was in his presence; "a lamp for one is a lamp for a hundred," that is to say, the incident of Rabban Gamliel was with a ramp, and the concern "lest he increase for his sake" is not relevant to this. And certainly Abaye also holds this, but Abaye thought that if it were in the presence of Rabban Gamliel, certainly the entirety of his making it would have been only for the sake of Rabban Gamliel, who was the Nasi (Tosafot). But Rava was not concerned for this, because since he also needed it, he acted for his own sake.

The Rashba and the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote that Rava also holds the reasoning of Abaye, that when not in his presence, even if he recognizes him, there is no concern that perhaps he will increase for his sake even in a matter where it is possible to increase, such as grass and water; rather, Rava says that regarding a ramp it is permitted even in his presence, see there. The Maggid Mishneh in chapter 6, law 3, also wrote thus, and this is his wording: And certainly even if he recognizes him, as long as it is not in his presence so that there is no concern that perhaps he will increase for his sake—it is permitted, like Abaye; and it is possible that this is included in the words of our teacher, that whenever there is no concern that perhaps he will act for the sake of the Israelite—it is permitted, see there. And I have a proof for this from the wording of the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah, who wrote, and this is his wording: "And know that when there is a non-Jew and an Israelite and he knows him and recognizes him—it is forbidden for him to water his animal after him, because due to his recognition perhaps he will increase in the drawing of the water for his sake." Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote "when there is a non-Jew and an Israelite," meaning when they are together. And the wording of the Mishnah also proves thus, from that which we learned: "waters after him," "feeds after him," "descends after him." And what is the expression "after him"? Rather, this expression is used when they are standing together, and initially this one acts and after him the second one acts; for if not so, it should have said: "if he filled water to water his animal—it is permitted for an Israelite to water his animal." And according to this, it seems in my humble opinion clear that the Rif, the Rambam, and the Rosh, who did not write this explicitly, did so because since they transcribed the wording of the Mishnah, it automatically indicates that they are together, and this is the intention of the Maggid Mishneh. And it appears that in the eyes of our teachers the Rashba and the Ran, of blessed memory, the matter was simply so, for if not so, they would not have ruled the halacha against the Rif and the Rambam, and at the very least they should have mentioned that the Rif and the Rambam do not hold thus and rejected their words, especially since the Ran is a commentator on the words of the Rif. Rather, it was simple in their eyes that they do not disagree on this (see Rashi on the expression "after him").

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, rejected the words of the Maggid Mishneh and the Ran with the claim that the Rif and the Rambam did not mention this statement of Abaye, and based on this he established his words in his pure Shulchan and did not mention that the Rashba also wrote according to their words, as did the Ra'avan, of blessed memory. And I wonder, since it is clear that the Rashba and the Ran did not understand the opposite in the words of the Rif and the Rambam from the fact that they did not mention them as I wrote and for the reasons we explained, why our teacher, the Beit Yosef, disagreed with them (and also the Magen Avraham, subsection 28, inclines toward this, see there). And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, cited a Tosefta that is according to his words, and this is in chapter 14, which is the Baraita that the Gemara cited. And it concludes there: "But if he recognizes him—behold, this is forbidden, because he habituates him and does with him for another Shabbat," see there. And since the concern is for the coming Shabbat, it follows that even not in his presence this concern is relevant (and the Magen Avraham there was pressed on this). And in my humble opinion, it seems that since the Gemara cited this Tosefta and did not cite the end of its words, and did not mention in the entire sugya a concern for the coming Shabbat, it proves on the contrary that the Gemara was not concerned for this. And also in the explanation of the Tosefta, it seems to me that on the contrary, its intention is that the Israelite is together with him, and just as he does on this Shabbat, so he will do with him on the other Shabbat. And its intention is that although for this time one should not forbid due to the concern that he will increase for his sake, nevertheless, there is a concern that he will do so also in the future and it will be a permanent corruption. But all this is when they are together, as is proven by the wording "with him."

I have elaborated on this because it is the custom of many of Israel who go to their non-Jewish acquaintances on Shabbat to drink hot water, and they are close and know one another, and according to the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, they are performing a prohibition. Therefore, we explained that since four pillars of the world permitted this, we have someone upon whom to rely, especially regarding a rabbinic concern, and therefore our custom is well-settled, since the non-Jew prepares the hot water not in the presence of the Israelite. However, even according to our teacher, the Beit Yosef, the custom can be justified, for with a muliar which is called a "samovar," the concern "lest he increase for his sake" is not applicable, as we wrote this reasoning regarding when it was set for a sick person in siman 318, section 16, and the concern we wrote there that he might increase the herb called "tea" is not applicable here, since only one or two Israelites drink with him, he will not increase it, as I wrote there.

A gentile who drew water for his animal, and the pit stands in a public domain and the pit itself is a private domain, and he drew the water from the pit which is a private domain and brought it out to the public domain, since he drew it for himself—it is permitted for an Israelite to use them and give them to his animal. Provided that he is not an acquaintance of his, for there is no concern that perhaps he will increase for his sake. And according to what we explained, even with an acquaintance, the prohibition is only when he drew them in his presence. And if he drew them for the sake of the Israelite's animal—the water is forbidden for all types of use even to another Israelite, for anything where a Torah prohibition was performed for the sake of an Israelite—it is forbidden to every Israelite. But if the pit stands in a karmelit and he drew from the pit to the karmelit for the sake of an Israelite—it is not forbidden except to the one for whom he drew it, but to another Israelite—it is permitted, as in the case of bringing from outside the techum which was explained in section 15.

There is one of the great ones among our teachers who said that since the Sages, of blessed memory, said "to water his animal," one may infer from this that it is specifically for his animal that it is forbidden when he filled it for the sake of the Israelite, because he could not have brought the animal into the pit to water it, and consequently the removal from the private domain to the public domain was a benefit for it. However, if the gentile filled water for the sake of the drinking of the Israelite himself—it is permitted for the Israelite to drink them, because even without his removing them to the public domain, the Israelite could have descended into the pit and drunk. And since he has no benefit from the fact that he removed them to the public domain, it is impossible for us to forbid him the water that was permitted to him, and he did not need their removal to the public domain at all. And also regarding the law of gathering grass that has been explained, that if it is for the sake of an Israelite—it is forbidden, yet the Israelite could also have stood his animal upon the grass; rather, it also deals with a case where he could not have stood it there, such as where a river separates between them or the like, but otherwise—it is permitted (Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot ibid. s.v. 'mashkeh' and the Ri disagrees, see there). And it is obvious that it is specifically when he could have obtained that water and that grass that it is permitted according to this opinion, but if he could not have obtained these, even though he could have obtained other water and other grass—it is forbidden, for ultimately regarding these a prohibition was performed for his sake (Magen Avraham subsection 24), unlike the one who is lenient even in this according to this opinion.

And behold, according to this opinion, all the more so if the non-Jew brought a food item or a drink for the Jew via a karmelit, and the Jew was able to go there and eat and drink—that it is permitted even for the Jew for whom the non-Jew brought it to eat it and drink it for the reason that has been explained. This is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 10: "And there are those who are lenient and say that even if it was brought for the sake of a Jew via a public domain—it is permitted to drink from them, since it is possible to go there and drink, and there are those who permit it even ab initio, and so they were accustomed to tell a non-Jew even ab initio to bring beer or other things via a karmelit or without an eruv. And even though one should be stringent in the matter, nevertheless, one should not protest against those who are lenient for the sake of Shabbat and in a time of pressing need, for behold, one may be lenient regarding telling a non-Jew for a need, as I wrote in siman 307, and all the more so in such a case." Thus far his words.

And his words are not understandable at all, for even according to this opinion, the permission is only when the non-Jew brought it on his own, for then there is no prohibition upon the Israelite since he did not need this, as has been written; but to say initially to the non-Jew that he should bring it to him—who permitted this? And also in his book Darkhei Moshe, he himself wrote so, see there. And it appears to me that he intended here the words of the Hagahot Maimoniyot (Chapter 10, letter 5), who wrote that Rabbeinu Tam permitted saying to a Cuthite: "Bring a burning candle," for this is only a prohibition of muktzeh, and through tilting or indirect handling the Israelite himself could have done it. And since there is a side of permission for the Israelite himself, we are not concerned if the non-Jew did it in a prohibited manner, see there (and the Magen Avraham brought this in siman 276, subsection 11). And if so, here too, since there is a side of permission for the Israelite to go there and drink, we are not concerned if the non-Jew acts in a prohibited manner regarding a rabbinic prohibition. And afterward he says: "Even though one should be stringent in the matter," because this is not a complete comparison, for there, when he says to the non-Jew: "Bring the candle," he can surely bring it through indirect handling, and the prohibition is not explicit in his words, which is not the case here when he tells him to bring it, for he is telling him to bring it through a karmelit. And nevertheless, one should not protest against those who are lenient, for in this we can combine another permission explained in siman 307, that telling a non-Jew is permitted regarding a rabbinic prohibition for the sake of a slight illness or a mitzvah or when there is a great need for it, see there; and here, when he tells him to bring beer, he has a need for it, and particularly for the honor of Shabbat, and therefore one should not protest against those who practice leniency. And nevertheless, one who guards his soul should distance himself from this permission. (According to what I have written, the difficulty of the Taz, subsection 10, and the wonderment of the Magen Avraham, subsection 25, are answered, see there. And what he wrote, that to give him money on Shabbat is forbidden—it appears that there is a printing error in this, for what is he coming to teach us? Rather, it must be said: "that to give money etc.," meaning that even if the non-Jew pays from his own—it is forbidden, for this is literally buying and selling through his agent, the non-Jew, and examine this carefully.)

If a non-Jew gathered herbs for the sake of his animal, having plucked them from that which is attached—an Israelite may feed his animal after him. It has already been explained in the previous siman, section 12, that when one stands his animal over muktzeh, it is forbidden to stand over it, lest he move the muktzeh and place it in its mouth; rather, he should stand a bit at a distance, only to block the path so that it does not turn away from here, for the herbs are muktzeh since the non-Jew plucked them today. It has also already been explained that this applies when he does not know him, but if he knows him—it is forbidden, and according to what we have explained, this is only in his presence (and so wrote the Magen Avraham, subsection 28). And so it is with anything where there is reason to fear lest he increase for his sake, it is forbidden if he knows him; but a matter where there is no reason to fear lest he increase for his sake, such as a candle that the non-Jew lit for himself or he made a ramp to descend upon it and the like, for in these cases when he did it for himself—even if he knows him and even in his presence, it is permitted.

Even if he does not know him, if he says explicitly that he is doing it for the sake of the Israelite, or even if he does not say so explicitly but his actions prove that he did it for the sake of the Israelite—such as if he lit the lamp and went away, not using its light at all while the Israelite was there, or even if he was not there but it is clearly evident that he lit it for him—it is forbidden for any Israelite to use its light. And similarly, in that which we permitted regarding one who knows him not in his presence, if the non-Jew knows that the Israelite needs this (Magen Avraham subsection 28), it is forbidden when it is visually apparent that he increased it for him. And know that regarding one who knows him, which we forbade, there is no need for the time it takes to perform the action after the conclusion of Shabbat (ibid.).

If the non-Jew performed [the labor] for himself and for the Israelite in a matter that requires two people more than one, such as filling water or gathering grass—it is obvious that it is forbidden. However, regarding a candle or a ramp, there is one who says that it is also forbidden (Magen Avraham siman 276, subsection 6), but we explained there that it is permitted, and that the Rashba wrote so. And in the Yerushalmi at the end of the sixteenth chapter there is a discussion regarding this, and in the conclusion there are different versions; see there. (See Magen Avraham subsection 28 who elaborated on the reason of the Tosefta, that the concern is for the following Shabbat; if so, even regarding a candle there is reason for concern, and he was forced to distinguish; see there. And we have already explained in section 20 that the Shas does not hold like this [ruling] of the Tosefta, and also the Tosefta is dealing specifically in the presence of the Israelite, and according to this, indeed according to the Tosefta the law would be so even regarding a candle. However, according to the Shas we are not concerned at all for the following Shabbat, which was not mentioned in the entire sugya; and examine this closely.)

From all that has been explained, one must cry out against some of the wealthy who keep a non-Jewish manservant or maidservant in their home who sets up the samovar on Shabbat, with their vain claims that the non-Jew drinks as well, and his primary intent is for himself and not for the Israelite. This is an audacity toward Heaven, as they come to deceive Hashem, as it were; and who does not know that even if the intent of the manservant or maidservant is for themselves, nevertheless, their primary intent is for the sake of the members of the Israelite's household, just as it is during all the days of the week. And there are those who teach them to say the lie that their intent is for themselves; and furthermore, even if it were so, we certainly fear lest he increase for his sake, and it is obvious that he requires more of the herb called tea, and it is a complete prohibition and they desecrate Shabbat, and their sin is too great to bear. And there are those who increase vanity by saying that nowadays everyone is considered ill regarding hot water, and it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to set up the machine. May the mouth of those who speak lies be stopped; for can one not do so from the eve of Shabbat and set it in the oven or in the tiles, as all of Israel does? And should we permit the desecration of the holy Shabbat because there is not as fine a taste in this as in the hot water from the machine? Let it not be such in Israel, for their sin is too great to bear, and upon one who refrains from this, a blessing shall come.

If the non-Jew acts on his own accord, such as if he filled water from a private domain to a public domain and watered the animal of the Israelite, or plucked grass and fed it—the Israelite is not obligated to prevent him from this. However, if he is accustomed to this and uses artifice, saying that he fills and plucks for himself and afterwards waters and feeds the animal of the Israelite—it is forbidden, for specifically in an incidental case one need not protest a matter where the person of the Israelite does not benefit from it, such as with a candle where it is forbidden to use its light, but regarding his animal what does he care; nevertheless, when he is accustomed to this—he is like his agent and it is forbidden. (See Magen Avraham subsection 30 who understood that the Mordechai disagrees with the Rosh, but in my humble opinion both of them intended the same thing, for when the artifice is even from the non-Jew, we automatically suspect that this is through the artifice of the Israelite, and delve into this.)

If a non-Jew made a coffin or a grave on Shabbat for himself, meaning for his relative, and afterward it transpired that there was no need for the burial—an Israelite is permitted to be buried in it if the place is fit for an Israelite burial, and likewise regarding the coffin. But if he made it for an Israelite—he may never be buried in it. And even though regarding other labors, when performed for an Israelite, it is permitted to use it on Saturday night, regarding a grave and a coffin, which is a public matter—it is forbidden forever. And likewise, regarding all public matters, the prohibition is forever. And this is specifically when the grave is in public and the coffin is upon it, such that everyone knows it was made for a specific Israelite, and it is a disgrace that he should be buried in a publicized grave for which Shabbat was desecrated. But if it is in private—it is permitted in the evening after waiting the time it takes to be made. And even when it is in public, the prohibition is only for that Israelite for whom it was made, and it is forbidden to him and to the members of his household. But for another Israelite—it is permitted, provided that he waits the time it takes to be made. And even though the other should not have had to wait the time it takes to be made, for the reason is so that he will not tell him to perform the labor, and this is not applicable to another, nevertheless, they did not distinguish in a matter in which a complete labor was performed for an Israelite. See above, siman 244.

A non-Jew who brought flutes on Shabbat to lament a deceased person with them: if he brought them for an Israelite—neither he nor others may lament with them until he waits in the evening for the amount of time it takes to perform the action, and this means the amount of time it takes to arrive from a nearby place outside the techum, and this is when a Torah prohibition was performed with them, such as if they were brought via a public domain. But if the prohibition is only due to being outside the techum: for others—it is permitted immediately as has been explained, and even for himself there are those who say he does not need to wait for the amount of time it takes to perform the action, as I wrote in section 15. And if he brought them via a well-known place—they are forbidden to him forever, as with a grave. And if he knew with certainty that they were brought from a specific distant place—he must wait until the amount of time it takes to bring them from that place. And even if it is an item found in a nearby place, nevertheless, since these arrived from afar, he must wait until the amount of time it takes to bring them from that place (Beit Yosef). And there are those who say that when they were not brought via a public domain, even he is permitted to use them in the evening immediately, and does not need to wait for the amount of time it takes to perform the action according to all opinions. And it is not similar to a food item that comes from outside the techum where there are those who say he must wait for the amount of time it takes to perform the action, because in this case the benefit is not great, therefore they did not require waiting for the amount of time it takes to perform the action (Magen Avraham subsection 34 and see Turei Zahav subsection 15). And know that regarding all labors where one must wait for the amount of time it takes to perform the action, it is even if the Israelite commanded the non-Jew to perform it for him, for it is impossible to forbid more than this (Magen Avraham subsection 32). And regarding flutes, when there is a doubt whether they were brought from within the techum, we are concerned that perhaps they were brought from outside the techum as in section 17, and everything that was explained there applies here as well.