Siman 273

We hold that there is no kiddush except in the place of a meal, that one should recite kiddush in the place where he eats and not in another place, as it is written: "And you shall call the Shabbat a delight"—in the place where you call the calling of Shabbat, that you sanctify it, there shall be the delight of the meal. (The Rif and Rashbam 100a). And also the kiddush of the day, even though it does not mention Shabbat—nevertheless it comes for the honor of Shabbat; and furthermore, it is logical, since kiddush was established over wine, as it was taught: "Remember it over wine"—presumably it was established over the wine that is at the time of the meal, which is significant. (Rashbam ibid.). And automatically the same law applies to other beverages, as it is not the way of a significant person to drink without eating. (Chullin 4b). And it is simple that just as one must eat in the place of the kiddush—likewise he should not extend a long time after the kiddush before the meal, so that there will not be a great interruption between them, for if he interrupts a long time—the meal is not recognizable as being for the sake of the kiddush; however, for a short time—there is no concern. And so too he should not walk a great distance to the marketplace after the kiddush, but a short walk to the courtyard—there is no concern, and see what will be explained in section 4.

There are three divisions regarding kiddush in the place of the meal: In one room from corner to corner is called the place of the meal, and it is not only necessary if he recited kiddush in this corner with the intent to eat in the other corner, but even if he intended at the time of kiddush to eat in the corner where he recited kiddush and afterwards decided to eat in the other corner, it is perfectly fine. (See Magen Avraham subsection 1, and his words are puzzling as the Gara wrote, and examine it closely). And even if it is a large hall, we have no concern with it, for this is not called a change of place, as is written in siman 178. Thus ruled the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, and even though the opinion of the Mordechai in Arvei Pesachim is that even from corner to corner his intent must be at the time of kiddush to eat in the other corner, we do not rule accordingly. And the same law applies from the house to the sukkah, when another room does not intervene—it is considered like from corner to corner, since it is a temporary dwelling, it is nullified to the house and is considered like from corner to corner. And the partition between the house and the sukkah is not considered a partition that intervenes, since it is only because of the mitzvah of sukkah. And some say further, that as long as he sees his place from the place of kiddush to the place of eating, even from room to room when they see from one to the other, and likewise even from the house to the courtyard when they see from one to the other, and even if he sees part of the place, and even if he sees only through a window and not through a doorway—it is like from corner to corner. And one may rely on these opinions in practice, and also above in siman 178 it is so, see there.

And the second classification: in one building from room to room where they do not see from one to the other, or from a house to an upper story or from an upper story to a house. If he intended at the time of the kiddush to eat in the second place—it is permitted, and if he did not intend—it is forbidden, and so it is above in siman 178, see there. And it appears to me that as long as they are in one building, even though there is a hallway separating them—it is called "from room to room." And the third classification: in two buildings from house to house—it is not effective even if he intended at the time of the kiddush to eat in the second house, and he is obligated to eat at least a kezayit of mezonot in the place of the kiddush, and if not—he must recite kiddush in the place of the meal a second time. And so too from room to room or from a house to an upper story, when his intention at the time of the kiddush was not to eat in the other room but rather in that same room, and afterward he changed his mind to eat in the second room—he must return and recite kiddush, and the same law applies to an unspecified case, when he did not explicitly intend to eat in the second room. (And that which they wrote in the Shulchan Aruch in section 2: "If he recited kiddush on condition to eat there etc."—it is not meant precisely, for the same law applies to an unspecified case, and if he recited kiddush and did not eat anything—he has not fulfilled the obligation of kiddush at all.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3 that one must eat in the place of kiddush immediately, or that it was his intention to eat there immediately; but without this, even in the place of kiddush, he does not fulfill his obligation. And if it was his intention not to eat there immediately, but he reconsidered and ate—he has fulfilled his obligation. Thus far his words. This means that we follow the lenient path in both cases: if it was his intention to eat immediately, even though due to some cause it was drawn out for a long time, he has fulfilled his obligation. And likewise the opposite: if it was his intention not to eat immediately or to eat in another place, but he reconsidered and ate immediately and in the place where he made kiddush, he has also fulfilled his obligation; unless it was not his intention to eat immediately and he did not eat immediately, for then he has not fulfilled his obligation. And it appears to me that "immediately" does not mean literally instantly without a moment's interruption, but rather that he should not draw out a long time. And the term "immediately" is not literal, as is explained in Gittin (27b) that there is some duration of time that is not extensive, see there, and as I wrote in section 1. And there is clear proof for this, for it has been explained that when one makes kiddush in the house on condition to eat in the upper chamber, it is considered "in the place of the meal," yet this requires some short time to ascend to the upper chamber. Rather, certainly the intention is not literally immediately, for the Torah was not given to the ministering angels, and generally after kiddush one changes clothes; rather, the intention is that he should not delay an extensive time. (And that which the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 5 in the name of the Maharil, that there is no difference between a short time and a long time, see there—the intention is also a very long time versus a short time, meaning not so long. And also that which the Magen Avraham wrote: if he left his place in the meantime, he must make kiddush a second time, see there—this refers also to an extensive departure to the marketplace, but not a departure to the courtyard or the street adjacent to the house. And I have seen one who did not interpret it so, but it does not seem correct to me, and from the words of the Shiurei Knesset HaGedolah there is proof for my words, see there and examine it carefully.)

A person may recite kiddush for others, whether men or women, whether adults or minors, even though he does not eat with them here, and for himself the kiddush here does not count—nevertheless, for them it is a place of a meal and they fulfill their obligation with his kiddush. For thus we hold, that regarding all mitzvot—a person can fulfill the obligation for others, even though he has already fulfilled it or he has not yet fulfilled it. And it is not similar to a blessing over pleasures, where he cannot fulfill the obligation for others unless he also partakes with them, for a mitzvah is different; since the duty of the mitzvah to fulfill it is incumbent upon the listeners—all Israel are guarantors for one another, and one fulfills the obligation for his fellow even when the one fulfilling it does not need this now. Therefore, it is not only that he can perform kiddush on their behalf, but even the blessing of 'borei peri hagafen' of kiddush he may recite for them. And even though without the kiddush he would not be able to recite the blessing over wine for others if he did not partake with them, nevertheless, since it is for kiddush—it is like the blessing of the mitzvah itself, and he can fulfill their obligation even though he does not partake. And the same law applies to the kiddush of the day for Shacharit, he may do so, even though there is only the blessing there—nevertheless, it is called kiddush and is a blessing of the mitzvot. And the same law applies when the kiddush is over bread—he may recite kiddush for them and recite 'hamotzi' for them, and they drink the wine or eat the bread. But for the other meals of Shabbat—he cannot recite 'hamotzi' for them if he does not eat with them, for even though it is a mitzvah—nevertheless, its essence is a blessing over pleasures. (Taz, subsection 3)

And it is simple that this is when they themselves are unable to perform kiddush. However, when they are able to perform kiddush themselves—he should not perform kiddush for them when he does not fulfill his obligation through this kiddush. But if he also requires this kiddush—it is better that he perform kiddush and fulfill the obligation for everyone than if each one were to perform kiddush for himself, even though each one is able to perform kiddush for himself, because of "in the multitude of people is the King's glory" (Berakhot 53a), and as I wrote in siman 298, see there, and such is the custom in many places. And there are places where each one performs kiddush for himself, and it is not proper to do so, and one should prevent them from this and teach them that there is a greater mitzvah when one performs kiddush for everyone, and he intends to fulfill their obligation and they intend to fulfill their obligation, provided that they hear the kiddush from beginning to end and answer "Amen." And they should not answer "Baruch Hu u'varuch Shemo," for this is an interruption and one does not fulfill the obligation of the berakhah.

And if one recited kiddush in his house, and his neighbor who is in the other house heard the kiddush and intended to fulfill his obligation with it, and the one reciting kiddush intended to fulfill the neighbor's obligation—the neighbor has fulfilled the obligation of kiddush. And even though for the one reciting kiddush this is not the place of the meal, nevertheless for his neighbor it is the place of the meal, and the hearing is as if the kiddush were here. But if the neighbor hears the kiddush in the house of the one reciting kiddush—he cannot go to his own house to eat there if they are truly two separate houses, for he did not hear it in the place of the meal, unless they were two rooms in one house, for in such a case his intention is effective as has been explained, but not in two truly separate houses. And it is not similar to if he heard it in his own house—where he fulfilled the obligation, for since hearing is like speaking, he has heard in the place of the meal and established himself for this in the place of his meal to hear the kiddush. This is not the case when he heard in the house of the one reciting kiddush—where it is not effective. (So it appears to me, and the words of the Sha'arei Teshuva, subsection 1, are not clear to me, and perhaps his intention is also thus, see there.)

And know that the Geonim innovated a great innovation regarding this matter of kiddush in the place of a meal, and they said that if one drank the cup of kiddush, a full revi'it—it is considered like the place of a meal. And if you should ask that if so, how can you find a case of not in the place of a meal, the answer is, for example, where he drank only a melo lugmav, or alternatively, where this one drank a little and that one drank a little. This is the wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 5: "The Geonim wrote: This matter that there is no kiddush except in the place of a meal, even if he ate a small amount (mezonot) or drank a cup of wine for which he is obligated in a blessing—he has fulfilled the obligation of kiddush in the place of a meal, and he finishes his meal in another place. And specifically if he ate bread or drank wine, but if he ate fruit—no." Thus far his words. And it is simple that one requires a kezayit of bread, and the bread is from the types of mezonot, and such is the simple custom among us regarding the morning kiddush of Shabbat. And it is better to eat the full Shabbat meal immediately, for this is the primary fulfillment of kiddush in the place of a meal.

And based on this, our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: "And according to this, it would be permitted for the mohel and the sandak to drink from the cup of the milah on Shabbat morning if they drink the required measure, but the custom is to give it to a child." Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote similarly in his great book; see there. And from their words it is explicitly clear that the intention of the Geonim refers to drinking the cup of kiddush in its entirety, namely a revi'it. But the Levush wrote that the intention of the Geonim is to drink a revi'it in addition to the cup of kiddush, and the commentators on the Shulchan Aruch agreed with him. (Taz subsection 4, and Bach, and so it appears in Magen Avraham subsection 12, and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 8). And one of the great authorities lengthily rejected their words (Ohev Oz) and concluded that with the cup of kiddush, when one drank a revi'it—he has fulfilled the obligation, for anything that requires a final blessing is considered a significant drinking, and we apply to this "and you shall call the Shabbat a delight." And in truth, it is not understood what the difference is between one cup and two cups, for either way: if he fulfills the obligation with the wine of kiddush in the place of a meal—he fulfills it with one, and if not—what benefit is the second? For this is just as there is no difference between one kezayit of bread and two kezayitim, and so too it is here; and one who relies on the Geonim according to the understanding of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, has lost nothing. (And the Rav Zal followed the later authorities, but in my humble opinion it appears as I have written.)

Some say that one only recites kiddush by the light of the candle, and the reason is that since lighting the candle on Shabbat is an obligation for the sake of the honor of Shabbat, and the essence of Shabbat is the kiddush—if so, the kiddush must naturally be by the light of the candle. And some say that kiddush is not dependent on the candle, and if he enjoys himself more in the courtyard because of the air or because of the flies—he recites kiddush in the courtyard and eats there, even though he does not see the candle, for the candles were commanded for pleasure and not for distress. And this is more reasonable, provided that he is careful that there be large candles or much oil so that they burn into the night, for if they are extinguished while it is still day—the blessing over the candle is in vain, as I wrote above in siman 163, for the candles are for the pleasure of Shabbat, not only for eating but for light, so that they do not stumble in their walking in the dark, and so that they may use the space expansively, and this is when the light continues also into the night, as is understood. And specifically when he suffers greatly to eat in the place of the candles, but otherwise—it is proper and a mitzvah to eat in the place of the candles. (See Magen Avraham, subsection 14, that regarding the kiddush of the synagogue which is only a custom—one does not fulfill the obligation with it unless he intended to fulfill it for him, see there. And this requires further study, for is the custom contrary to the law? For the custom is to fulfill the kiddush according to the law for the reasons that have been explained, and an ordinary shliach tzibbur intends to fulfill the obligation, and therefore if there is someone who eats in the beit midrash or near it—why should he not rely on the kiddush of the shliach tzibbur? And it seems to me that such is the custom.)