Siman 242

The holy Shabbat is the great sign between the Holy One, Blessed be He, and His people Israel, as it is written: "For it is a sign between Me and you, to know that I am Hashem Who sanctifies you." That is to say: even though Shabbat is a remembrance of the act of creation, "For in six days Hashem made the heavens and the earth, and on the seventh day He rested and was refreshed," and therefore "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because on it He rested" etc., as is written regarding the act of creation. And if so, it pertains to all creatures of the world, and it is not similar to the festivals, which are a remembrance of the exodus from Egypt, in which the rest of the nations have no connection, as they did not go out from Egypt. But in the act of creation, all were created. Nevertheless, the Holy One, Blessed be He, did not give the holiness of Shabbat except to Israel alone. And this is "to know that I am Hashem Who sanctifies you," meaning, that you are holy to Me, as it is written: "You shall be holy," and therefore I gave you the holiness of Shabbat. And Shabbat and Israel are the purpose of creation. (And this is what we say: "And You did not give it" etc. "to the nations of the lands, nor did You grant it as an inheritance" etc., meaning: even though there is apparently a connection for everyone in this. And this is what they said in the first chapter of Shabbat: "I have a good gift in My treasure house and Shabbat is its name, go and tell Israel" etc., meaning: even though it is possible to give it to all creatures; and examine this carefully).

The holiness of Shabbat is above all holinesses, and its blessing is above all blessings, and therefore it was sanctified and blessed from the beginning of creation, as it is written: "And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it." And it is the source of blessing for all the days of the week. Therefore, Israel was commanded regarding Shabbat in seven parshiot in the Torah: in Beshalach, Yitro, Mishpatim, Ki Tisa, Vayakhel, Emor, and Va'etchanan, to indicate that all seven days of the week are dependent upon Shabbat. Therefore, we mention Shabbat every day, as we say in the song of the day: "the first day of the Shabbat" and "the second day of the Shabbat," and so with all of them.

Shabbat is the essence of faith in the Holy One, blessed be He, who created His world in six days, and on the seventh day rested and was refreshed. Anyone who does not observe Shabbat has no faith. Therefore, our Sages, of blessed memory, throughout the Shas, compared one who profanes Shabbat to an idolater. Anyone who profanes the Shabbat is like one who denies the entire Torah. Therefore, immediately upon Israel's departure from Egypt, they were commanded regarding Shabbat in Parashat Beshalach, even before the giving of the Torah, because the Exodus from Egypt is testimony to His providence, may He be blessed, in His world, to reward the doers of good and the opposite for the doers of evil, such as the Egyptians and their like. It is also testimony to His ability, may He be blessed, to change nature, such as the plagues of Egypt, the splitting of the Red Sea, and the falling of the manna, the quail, and the well. If they do not admit that the Holy One, blessed be He, created His world, they deny all these things. Therefore, He gave them the Shabbat immediately upon their departure from Egypt. Thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said that Shabbat and laws were commanded at Marah, which was the first encampment after the splitting of the Red Sea, as is explained in the Torah. Indeed, we see on the first Shabbat that certain people profaned the Shabbat and went out to gather the manna, and the Holy One, blessed be He, said: "How long do you refuse to keep My commandments and My laws?" Thus He stated explicitly that Shabbat is the totality of the entire Torah and the mitzvot. (Therefore, at the end of Ki Tissa it is written: "The festival of matzot you shall keep," and afterwards: "Six days you shall work and on the seventh day you shall rest," and in the entire Torah, Shabbat precedes the festivals, as it is frequent and sanctified. Rather, it is to teach that for the festival of matzot—it is necessary to keep Shabbat, and if there is no Shabbat, there is no Pesach and there is no Torah).

And the prophets, when they rebuked Israel for violating the Torah, rebuked specifically for the desecration of the Sabbaths on their own; it says: "Happy is the man who does this" etc. "who keeps the Sabbath from desecrating it, and keeps his hand from doing any evil" (Isaiah 56:2), meaning to say, that the merit of keeping the Sabbath will cause him not to do any evil. And it further says: "Everyone who keeps the Sabbath from desecrating it, and those who hold fast to My covenant," meaning to say, the covenant of the Torah. Behold, it is explicit that one who desecrates the Sabbath, behold, he violates the covenant of the Torah.

Jeremiah said: "Thus said Hashem: Guard yourselves for the sake of your souls and do not carry a burden on the Sabbath day, and do not take a burden out of your houses on the Sabbath day, and you shall do no labor, and you shall sanctify the Sabbath day," etc., "And it shall be if you diligently listen to Me," etc. "Then there shall enter the gates of this city kings and princes," etc., "But if you do not listen to Me to sanctify the Sabbath day and not to carry a burden," etc. "Then I will kindle a fire in its gates, and it shall devour the palaces of Jerusalem, and it shall not be extinguished." Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said in Shabbat that in a place where desecration of Shabbat is common, there fire is common. And Ezekiel said: "And they rebelled against Me," etc., "My Sabbaths they desecrated, and I said I would pour out My wrath," etc., "Because they did not perform My laws and they despised My statutes and My Sabbaths they desecrated," etc. Therefore, a Jewish man must set his heart toward the guarding of the holy Shabbat, and to accept it while it is yet broad daylight, and not close to sunset, for because of this many of the masses, women, and the common people light candles after sunset. And behold, regarding the prohibition of chametz on the eve of Pesach after midday, which is only a negative commandment, nevertheless the sages made a distancing of about two hours; and our sages, of blessed memory, explained the reason in Pesachim, because chametz is handed over to everyone. And it is a kal vachomer, the son of a son of a kal vachomer, regarding the desecration of Shabbat, which is a prohibition of skilah, and is handed over to all the children of Israel, children and women, that one must distance the lighting of the candles very, very much before sunset. And all the more so that the rav of the city and the G-d-fearing are obligated to precede it by much, so that the masses of the people who do not precede it by so much, nevertheless will not come to the point of desecration of Shabbat. This is not the case if they themselves light close to sunset, for the masses will light after sunset, as we have heard so we have seen in several places. And the previous generations would precede much in the acceptance of Shabbat, as is explained in Terumat HaDeshen (siman 1), that after the prayer and after the meal they went to stroll, and it was then sunset, see there. (And the Shelah in his siddur before the acceptance of Shabbat explains, that one who says "A Psalm, a song for the Sabbath day" after sunset—brings great danger, see there where he explained this in his great holiness and wisdom).

And the reward for guarding Shabbat is very great, as the prophets and our sages, of blessed memory, explained. And they said: Anyone who delights in the Shabbat is given an inheritance without boundaries, and is saved from the subjugation of kingdoms, and is granted the requests of his heart (Shabbat 118a). And the delight of Shabbat is a commandment of the prophets, as it is written: "And you shall call the Shabbat a delight" (Isaiah 58:13). And all agree regarding Shabbat that we require "for you" (Pesachim 68b), as it is written: "And you shall call the Shabbat a delight." And we will further explain this with the help of Heaven in section 42.

The laws of Shabbat are numerous and deep. Our teachers, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, despite their great length, nevertheless wrote only what is forbidden and what is permitted, but they did not write the primary categories of melachot and their subcategories, the obligations of Torah law and rabbinic law, and the general roots of the melachot of Shabbat. The Rambam, of blessed memory, explained everything, and for the completion of this holy work, it is our desire to also explain a bit of this, and the differences that exist between the opinion of the Rambam and several of our teachers, Rashi and Tosafot and others of the Rishonim, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

This is the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 1 of Shabbat: Resting on the seventh day from labor is a positive commandment, as it is said (Exodus 20:9): "and on the seventh day you shall rest." And anyone who performs labor on it has nullified a positive commandment and transgressed a negative commandment, as it is said: "you shall not do any labor." And what is he liable for the performance of labor? If he performed it of his own will intentionally, he is liable for kareth. And if there were witnesses and a warning, he is stoned. And if he performed it inadvertently, he is liable for a chatat. And every place where it is said regarding Shabbat "exempt," he is exempt according to the Torah, but it is forbidden according to the Rabbis. And thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said at the beginning of Shabbat: All exemptions of Shabbat are exempt but forbidden, except for these three etc., unless it is said "permitted," or "he is not liable for anything." And in a case of exempt but forbidden, when he has transgressed and acted, they strike him with a makkat mardut.

At the beginning of Parashat Vayakhel (Exodus 35:1) it is written: "And Moses assembled" etc., "These are the things that Hashem commanded to do them, six days shall work be done and on the seventh day it shall be holy for you" etc. And its explanation is that he commanded them concerning the work of the Mishkan, and that on Shabbat it is forbidden to perform the work of the Mishkan, as is explained in the Mekhilta. From this comes the tradition of our sages, of blessed memory, to learn great principles and foundations regarding the labor of Shabbat; for since the matter of Shabbat was juxtaposed with the work of the Mishkan, we learned all the labors of Shabbat from the labors that were in the Mishkan. And so the sages taught (Shabbat 49b): One is only liable for labor the likes of which was in the Mishkan. They sowed, and you shall not sow; and sowing was in the Mishkan for the sowing of dyes (Rashi). They reaped, and you shall not reap, etc. From this we learned the thirty-nine primary categories of labor on Shabbat, as will be explained, because these labors were the significant ones in the Mishkan (beginning of Bava Kamma). And even though there are several of the primary categories of labor that are similar to one another, such as winnowing, selecting, and sifting, for all of them are to clarify the food from the waste, except that the clarification is not in the same manner, for winnowing is by wind, selecting is by his hands, and sifting is with a sieve. Nevertheless, since all of them were among the significant labors in the Mishkan, we call them primary categories; and the rest of the labors that are similar to the primary categories, we call them derivative categories (ibid. and Shabbat 73b).

And if you should ask: what practical difference is there between an av and a toldah? For one is liable for stoning and karet for both of them, and a chatat for an unintentional act. However, there is a great practical difference in this, for if one performed two melachot, if one is an av and the other is its toldah, he is only liable for one chatat. But when they are two avot, or if it is a toldah of a different av, he is liable for two chatat offerings. And so wrote the Rambam in chapter 7 (halacha 7), see there. And according to the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot (Shabbat 73b s.v. 'mishum zorea'), there is a reasoning that there is a distinction regarding the matter of warning, that one must warn regarding the toldah specifically on account of the av. And if so, there is a great practical difference between an av and a toldah. And so it is implied in Shabbat. However, the Tosafot themselves were in doubt about this, and it can be said that even if they warned on account of the toldah, he is also liable. But this is obvious, that if they warned regarding the toldah on account of another toldah, even though it is from the same av, it is not a warning, unless they warned regarding the toldah itself that he intends to perform, or regarding its av. And according to this, one must know what is called an av and what is called a toldah.

Which are the primary categories of labor? Thus the sages taught in the Mishnah of "The Great Principle": The primary categories of labor are forty minus one. One who sows, and one who plows, and one who reaps, and one who gathers, and one who threshes, and one who winnows, and one who selects, and one who grinds, and one who sifts, and one who kneads, and one who bakes, one who shears wool, and one who whitens it, and one who combs it, and one who dyes it, and one who spins, and one who warps, and one who makes two loops, and one who weaves two threads, and one who separates two threads, one who ties, and one who unties, one who sews two stitches, one who tears in order to sew two stitches, one who traps a deer, one who slaughters it, and one who skins it, one who salts it, and one who tans it, and one who scrapes it, and one who cuts it, one who writes two letters, and one who erases in order to write two letters, one who builds and one who demolishes, one who extinguishes and one who kindles, one who strikes with a hammer, one who carries from domain to domain; behold these are the primary categories of labor, etc. And it is stated in the Gemara (Shabbat 75b): Salting and tanning are one, and they are not divided into two primary categories. And there is another primary category, and it is scoring; see there. And this is not a deficiency in the Mishnah, for in truth the explanation of "one who tans it" is such, as it is stated in the Yerushalmi, and this is its wording: What tanning was there in the Mishkan? That they would score the skins in order to even the sides; see there (and in our Gemara which says "remove" etc., it is also possible to say so, and examine it closely).

And behold, since the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention the melakhot in their particulars, and it is impossible for us to change the simanim of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, we therefore saw fit to attach these melakhot in detail, each melakha to the siman that has some relevance to it. And there we shall explain with the help of Heaven the avot and their toldot. And we shall note the simanim where they are mentioned: sowing, plowing, and reaping in siman 336. Gathering, shearing, bleaching, combing, spinning, warping, making two loops, weaving, separating, writing, and erasing in siman 340. Winnowing, selecting, and sifting in siman 319. Kneading and grinding, and skinning the hide, tanning it, smoothing it, cutting it, and marking it in siman 321. Baking and slaughtering in siman 318. Threshing, laundering, and dyeing in siman 320. Tying and untying, sewing and tearing in siman 317. And trapping in siman 316. Building, demolishing, and striking with a hammer in siman 313. Extinguishing and kindling in siman 334. Carrying from domain to domain in siman 301.

And behold, every av has many toldot. And in the Yerushalmi there they said, that Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish investigated the avot melakhot for a long time, and found for every av melakha thirty-nine toldot, see there. And the Rambam wrote in chapter 7 (halakha 5): The toldah is the labor that is similar to the av from these avot. How so? One who cuts a vegetable into small pieces in order to cook it, behold he is liable, for it is a toldah of grinding, as the grinder takes one body and divides it into many bodies, and anyone who does something similar to this, behold it is a toldah of a grinder. Thus far his words. And the details of this law will be explained in siman 319, that this is only regarding a vegetable that is not eaten raw, see there. And he wrote further, that for each and every melakha there are toldot in this manner. And from the essence of the labor one must understand to which av it belongs, as is clear to one who understands. And one only needs to know the definitions of the avot, and with the help of Heaven we will mention when we come to any of the melakhot what its definition is.

According to what has been explained, it is possible that a person would be liable for thirty-nine sin offerings on Shabbat, when he inadvertently transgresses all the melakhot, and no more, because all the melakhot in the world are included in these thirty-nine melakhot, and regarding the av and the toldah it has already been explained that he is only liable for one. And from where did we learn that one is liable for each av melakhah individually? Thus said our sages, of blessed memory (Shabbat 70a), for it is written: "You shall not kindle a fire," and behold, kindling was included in all the melakhot. And why was it singled out? To teach you the division of melakhot, that just as one is liable for kindling individually, since it was singled out, so too for each and every melakhah. For this is one of the thirteen principles, that anything that was included in a general rule and was singled out from the general rule, it was not singled out to teach about itself, but to teach about the entire general rule. And so wrote the Rambam in chapter 7 (halakhah 2) of Shegagot, see there. (And it must be said that we do not hold like that of Issi at the beginning of our tractate, who said that there is one melakhah of the thirty-nine melakhot for which one is not liable for a sin offering, see there. And the reason is, that since Rava said (Shabbat 69a) regarding the Mishnah of avot melakhot, that if one performed them all in one lapse of awareness—he is liable for each and every one, we do not concern ourselves with Issi, and certainly Rava knew that the sages disagree with Issi, and delve into this).

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 2 of Shegagot: "A person is not liable for a chatat for his unwitting transgression until he is unwitting from beginning to end. But if he was unwitting at the beginning and intentional at the end, or intentional at the beginning and unwitting at the end, he is exempt. How so? For example, one who carried an object from domain to domain on Shabbat. If he performed the lifting intentionally and the setting down unwittingly, or if he performed the lifting unwittingly and the setting down intentionally, he is exempt, until he performs the lifting unwittingly and the setting down unwittingly. And so too with anything similar to this." Thus far his words. And if his beginning and his end were unwitting, even though in the middle he was intentional—he is liable for a chatat. And this is clearly implied in Shabbat (102a in the resolution of Rav Ashi, see there). And know, that this is not specifically regarding carrying, where it was in his power not to complete the labor, but even regarding throwing, where after it left his hand it was not in his power to bring it back, nevertheless, if he remembered before it came to rest—he is exempt from a chatat. And so it is explicitly stated in Shabbat ibid. And I wonder about the Rambam, why he did not illustrate this law with throwing, especially since the wording of the Mishnah there is so, and it requires further study. And it appears in my humble opinion, that the Rambam intentionally changed from the wording of the Mishnah, because the Yerushalmi actually holds one liable in throwing, for the reason that it is not in his power to bring it back (and this is the wording of the Yerushalmi Shabbat chapter 11 halacha 6: "Thus is the Mishnah, and he acted intentionally. And it is difficult, if one shot an arrow to kill a person, and they warned him, and he recanted, is it anything etc.?" See there. And the commentators explained with a strange explanation, see there. And the truth is that in the Yerushalmi version of the Mishnah the text in the Mishnah is: One who throws and remembers before it leaves his hand, see there. And this is what it says, 'Thus is the Mishnah and he acted intentionally,' meaning, that this is the text, that he was intentional before it left his hand, and therefore when he threw, it was with intent and he is exempt from a chatat; for if not so, but rather like the text of the Bavli, it is difficult, why should he be exempt? Behold it is not in his power to bring it back! Therefore the Rambam, to distance himself from dispute, wrote the language of carrying, and examine this well). (And in the laws of Shegagot we wrote another answer, see there).

He further wrote: "If one committed a transgression, and knows that it is a negative commandment, but does not know that one is liable for kareth for it—this is an unintentional act and he brings a chatat. But if he knew that it involves kareth, and was unintentional regarding the sacrifice and did not know whether one is liable for a sacrifice for it or not—this is a willful act, for being unintentional regarding a sacrifice is not considered unintentional regarding transgressions for which one is liable for kareth," thus far his words. But regarding a transgression that does not involve kareth but only malkut, if he acted willfully regarding the negative commandment, this is not an unintentional act, and they administer malkut to him. And behold, regarding Shabbat there is one matter that involves a negative commandment and not kareth, and that is mechamer after one's animal. Nevertheless, even if he did so willfully he is exempt from malkut, because the negative commandment is from the verse "you shall not do any labor, you..." etc. "and your animal" etc., and in this negative commandment death is also included if he performed labor himself, and any negative commandment that was given as a warning for death by a beit din, one does not receive malkut for it. And this is explained in the Shas in several places, for the reason that this negative commandment was not given for malkut but for death. And so the Rambam ruled at the beginning of the first chapter of Shabbat, see there. And all the more so that if it was unintentional he is exempt from a sacrifice, for a sacrifice is only when there is kareth for the willful act and not for a prohibition of malkut (see Tosafot Shabbat 154a, starting with "In a negative commandment").

And know, that regarding an unintentional violation of Shabbat there are two things. That is to say, for example, if one reaped on Shabbat, and he knew that today is Shabbat, but he thought that reaping is permitted on Shabbat; or if he knew that reaping is forbidden on Shabbat, but he did not know that today is Shabbat. It follows that the liability for the death penalty is only when he knew that today is Shabbat, and that reaping is forbidden on Shabbat, for which one is liable for the death penalty. And behold, ostensibly it is all the same whether he acted intentionally regarding Shabbat and unintentionally regarding the melakhah, or intentionally regarding the melakhah and unintentionally regarding Shabbat. But in truth it is not so, for if he knew that today is Shabbat, and he performed many melakhot because he did not know they were forbidden, he is liable for each and every melakhah, if they are from separate avot. But when he knew that the melakhot were forbidden, but he did not know that today is Shabbat, he is only liable for one chatat. And the reason is simple, for the liability for a chatat is for the unintentional act. And when he was unintentional regarding Shabbat, it is one unintentional act; but when he was unintentional regarding the melakhot, there are many unintentional acts, for he was unintentional regarding this melakhah and regarding that melakhah, etc. And so the sages taught in the Mishnah of "Kelal Gadol," and so the Rambam ruled in chapter 7 of Shegagot. And so too if he was unintentional regarding Shabbat, and also unintentional regarding the melakhot, he is only liable for one chatat. And the reason is because the unintentional act regarding Shabbat is the primary factor (Tosafot, Shabbat 70b, s.v. 'Amar'). And although in other transgressions there are also two types of unintentional acts, nevertheless, they have one law.

Even though it has been explained that one who performs a primary labor along with the derivative labors of that same primary labor is only liable for one sin-offering, nevertheless, this applies within the same Shabbat; but if he performed the primary labor on this Shabbat, and performed the derivative labor or even the primary labor itself on a second Shabbat—he is liable for two sin-offerings. And it is not only necessary to state this if he performed both of them with intentionality regarding Shabbat but with ignorance regarding the labors, for since the ignorance pertains to the labor, behold they are two separate ignorances, as each and every Shabbat is like a different entity. And just as one who cohabits with two menstruant women in one lapse of awareness is liable for two, for the reason that each body is a matter unto itself, so too here each Shabbat is a matter unto itself. Rather, even if he performed them with ignorance regarding Shabbat but with intentionality regarding the labors, such that now it is a single ignorance regarding all the Shabbats—namely, that it was hidden from him that today is Shabbat—nevertheless, he is liable for each and every Shabbat. And the reason is that it is impossible that he would not become aware during the week that it had been Shabbat, and if so, each and every Shabbat is a separate ignorance, as they are like two separate lapses of awareness. And thus they, of blessed memory, said in Keritot 16b, that the days between Shabbat and Shabbat constitute knowledge to divide, see there. And so the Rambam ruled there, see there.

Even though there are distinctions between an oversight regarding the labor and an oversight regarding the Shabbat, as has been explained, nevertheless, if one performed a single labor twice on one Shabbat, and the first time he knew that today is Shabbat but erred regarding the labor, and afterward he forgot that today is Shabbat but knew that this labor is forbidden, and he performed it again due to an oversight regarding the Shabbat, nevertheless, if he became aware of both of them, he brings one chatat. And even though the lapse of the second is somewhat distinct from the first, ultimately it is one lapse (Rashi, Shabbat 71a, s.v. "Ketzira," see there). And similarly, even though it has been explained that in any event for each and every Shabbat one is liable for a chatat for each one, nevertheless, a child who was taken captive among the gentiles and did not know the concept of Shabbat at all, or one from whom it was completely forgotten that there is a Shabbat in the world, and he performed many labors on many Shabbats, he is only liable for one chatat, because in all of them it is a single oversight, as he did not know the concept of Shabbat at all. And so the sages taught in the Mishnah of "Klall Gadol," and so the Rambam ruled there, see there in chapter 2 (and he ruled according to Rav and Shmuel in Shabbat 68b, and not like Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and see there in the Kesef Mishneh. And seemingly, according to the rules of the Talmud, he should have ruled like Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish, and it requires some further study).

And from the fact that the labor of Shabbat was juxtaposed with the labor of the Mishkan, the tradition came to our sages, of blessed memory, to learn as well that we specifically require "purposeful labor" regarding the labors of Shabbat, just as in the Mishkan. And upon this depend great rules and principles. Namely, that he must intend for this labor that he is performing; but if he does not intend for it at all, such as if he intended to throw two cubits, which is permitted, and he threw four cubits, he is exempt (Bava Kamma 26b). And similarly, if a stone was resting in his lap, and it fell from his lap and caused a wound to a living creature, he is exempt (ibid.), since he did not intend for this labor at all, even though for several matters one is liable even without intent, such as for damages and other matters (ibid.). For in the Mishkan, every labor that they performed—they planned to perform it, as it is written in Vayakhel (Exodus 35:32-33): "To devise plans" etc. "to work in all purposeful labor."

And for this reason it is well known throughout Tractate Shabbat that regarding a matter that is unintentional, it is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, for according to Rabbi Shimon—it is permitted ab initio, and according to Rabbi Yehuda, even though it is forbidden ab initio, it is only by rabbinic decree. And regarding other prohibitions, Rabbi Yehuda holds that it is forbidden by Torah law (Tosafot Shabbat 41b s.v. 'miham'). And even according to Rabbi Shimon, who holds that also regarding other prohibitions it is permitted by Torah law, as is proven in Pesachim and in Shabbat, nevertheless there are matters where even in an unintentional case one is liable, such as damages and those liable for exile (Bava Kamma 26b). And from the words of the Rambam, chapter 10 of Kilayim, law 18, it is implied that he ruled that also regarding kilayim one is liable, even in an unintentional case (and see there in the Kesef Mishneh and examine carefully).

And likewise it is included in the category of "thoughtful labor," for we require specifically the labor of a craftsman's deed, as it was in the Mishkan, the labor of a carver and a designer. But anything that is not a deed of craftsmanship is not called "labor" on Shabbat (Beitzah 13b, Rashi s.v. "Ella"). Therefore, one who sets up a heap of grain on Shabbat, if there is no other labor involved—he is not liable by Torah law (ibid.), it is only forbidden by rabbinic law due to weekday activities and due to muktzeh. And for this reason, also regarding a knot, which is among the primary categories of labor—he is only liable for a knot of a craftsman's deed, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 10 (halacha 1) of Shabbat, and it will be explained in siman 317, and all is for the reason that we require thoughtful labor.

Therefore, those who act destructively are exempt, unless one destroyed in order to repair. But one who only destroys, such as one who tears down a building not in order to build it—is exempt according to the Torah, for the reason that this is not a "thoughtful labor" (melekhet makhshevet), as in the Mishkan all labors were for repair and not for destruction. Similarly, a labor that is not needed for its own sake, according to the one who exempts as will be explained, is also due to the reason of melekhet makhshevet (Chagigah 10b), and as our teachers the authors of the Tosafot wrote in Shabbat (94a, s.v. "Rabbi Shimon," and also according to Rashi it must be so, see there and examine closely). And the one who obligates does so because he holds that this is called melekhet makhshevet. For this reason, also one who is occupied with a permitted labor and a prohibited labor resulted from his hand, such as if he intended to cut that which is detached and he cut that which is attached—is also exempt for the reason of melekhet makhshevet. And even if he intended a prohibited labor, but did not perform it with this one but with another, such as if he intended to cut this attached item and cut another—he is also exempt for this reason (Tosafot Shabbat 72b s.v. "Intended," see there). However, in this there are those who disagree, as will be explained. And similarly, if he intended to perform this labor and afterwards another labor, and it resulted in the reverse—he is also exempt for this reason, as it was not performed as he thought, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 1, law 11, see there. And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in section 27.

And know, that I found one matter where this requirement of melachet machshevet is a stringency, and that is that one who winnows grain with the wind is liable, and it is among the primary melachot. And even though the wind performs the primary action of the melachah, and in such a case even regarding damages one is exempt, nevertheless—on Shabbat one is liable, because this is melachet machshevet, for such is the way of winnowing and his intent was fulfilled, as it is pleasing to him that the wind assists him (Bava Kamma 60a).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 1, law 8: "Anyone who intends to perform a specific labor and a different labor was performed for him which he did not intend—he is exempt for it, because his thought was not realized, etc. And it is a kal vachomer if he intended a light prohibition and a severe prohibition was performed, etc. If he intended to do a permitted thing and did another thing, such as intending to cut that which is detached and he cut that which is attached—he is not liable for anything, and so too anything similar to this," thus far his words. And this case of intending to cut that which is detached and he cut that which is attached is in the Gemara (Shabbat 72b). According to the commentary of Rashi, the meaning is that he intended to cut this cucumber which is detached, and he cut another cucumber which is attached. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, raised a difficulty regarding this, for in such a case, even if he intended to cut this attached item and he cut another attached item—he is also exempt, as is explained in Keritot, that if he intended to pluck this fig and he plucked another fig he is exempt, for the reason that his thought was not realized, and this is not "thoughtful labor." And why specifically mention cutting the detached, where he did not intend a prohibition at all? Even if he intended a prohibition, he is exempt! Rather, certainly "intending to cut the detached and he cut the attached" means that he cut the cucumber he desired, but he thought it was detached and it was found to be attached. And he is exempt due to the status of "mitasek," for he was occupied with a permitted matter and a prohibition resulted in his hand; see there carefully.

However, from the words of the Rambam it appears explicitly like Rashi, and so the commentators agreed that from his words later on it is explained, that when one intended for this attached item and there resulted in his hand another attached item, if there is no difference between this one and that one—he is indeed liable, for this is called "thoughtful labor." The Ra'avad disagreed with him from that passage in Keritot. But the Rambam rejected that passage in Keritot because of the sugya in Shabbat (Lechem Mishneh). Furthermore, it appears in my humble opinion, that even the sugya in Keritot according to the conclusion holds so (for certainly at first the Gemara thought like Tosafot and the Ra'avad, and established that case of "intended to pluck figs and plucked grapes," which implies that with "figs and figs" he is liable, because he forgot "plucking" from his heart. But Rava, who said there afterward: "the difference between them is 'to be first'," holds that with "figs and figs" he is liable if there is no difference between them, and "to be first" is worse, since he did not do as he thought. And therefore, even in one who intended to throw four and threw eight—he is also exempt, because it did not result as he thought, as there is a change in this. But a fig and a fig when there is no difference between them—this is not a change, and this is the system of Rashi and the Rambam, and examine it well).

And he wrote further: "If he intended to gather black figs and gathered white ones, or if he intended to gather figs and afterwards grapes, and the matter was reversed and he gathered grapes first and afterwards figs—he is exempt. Even though he gathered everything he intended, since he did not gather in the order he intended—he is exempt, for he acted without intention, as the Torah only prohibited purposeful labor. If there were two candles before him, burning or extinguished, and he intended to extinguish this one and extinguished that one, or to light this one and lit that one—he is liable, for he performed the type of labor he intended to perform. To what is this comparable? To one who intended to gather this fig and gathered another fig, etc. But if he intended to light the first and extinguish the second after it, and the matter was reversed and he extinguished the first and afterwards lit the second after it—he is exempt. If he extinguished this one and lit that one in a single breath—he is liable, for even though he did not precede, he did not delay, and so too anything similar to this. And anyone who performs labor as a mitasek and did not intend it—he is exempt," thus far his words. (And he intended that which they said in Shabbat, ibid. 72b: If he intended to lift something detached and cut something attached, he is exempt. And the Ra'avad and the Ramban and the Maggid Mishneh raised an outcry against him regarding what he wrote that if he intended to gather this fig and gathered another he is liable, for in Keritot it is established specifically when he forgot the gathering from his heart, see there. But according to what I have written it works out well, for Rava does not hold so. And this is also the method of Rashi. And 'to precede' is worse, for the change is recognizable and it is not purposeful labor; and as long as the change is not recognizable, it is called purposeful labor, and everything works out well, and examine it closely). (And that which Rashi wrote in Keritot ibid. 20a, at the end of the heading beginning 'To precede': "But in a case of a mere mitasek, where he only intended for one and did not do it, and did its fellow—everyone agrees he is exempt," thus far his words—this refers to black and white ones, for Rabbi Yehuda holds that this is one name, as he wrote earlier in the heading beginning 'With two names', see there. Furthermore, for according to Rabbi Shimon Shezuri and Rabbi Shimon it is certainly so as the Rambam ruled, see there, and who is to say that the halacha is not like them against Rabbi Yehuda, for they are many? And as the plain meaning of the sugya in Shabbat ibid. proves. And proof that we do not require it to be exactly as he intended when there is no change is from 'a single breath' where he is liable as it says there; granted that he did not precede, but he also did not delay, see there. And it is difficult, for in any case, this is not according to his intention to precede! Rather, certainly since the change is not recognizable, it is not called a change and it is purposeful labor, and examine it closely).

It has already been explained that an unintentional act and a labor not required for its own sake are a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon throughout the entire Shas, for Rabbi Yehuda holds that an unintentional act is forbidden by rabbinic law, and a labor not required for its own sake—one is liable for a sin offering, for it is a complete labor. And Rabbi Shimon holds that an unintentional act is permitted ab initio, and a labor not required for its own sake—one is exempt by Torah law, for it is not a "thoughtful labor" as was in the Mishkan, for in the Mishkan when they performed a labor they required the essence of the labor and its purpose, but it is forbidden by rabbinic law. (And Rabbi Yehuda considers it a thoughtful labor. And one may say regarding his reasoning, that certainly in the Mishkan there was extinguishing so that the excess of the fire would not burn the spices, and this is a labor not required for its own sake. And Rabbi Shimon holds that in the Mishkan they were certainly careful not to increase the fire more than necessary, as the Tosafot wrote in Shabbat 94b, starting with the words "Rabbi Shimon," see there, and there was no extinguishing except to make charcoal, and this is required for its own sake, as the Tosafot wrote in Shabbat 31b, starting with the words "and one who destroys," see there).

Regarding the law, behold, in the matter of an unintended act, the Shas ruled explicitly like Rabbi Shimon, who says: "And now that we hold like Rabbi Shimon, it is permitted even ab initio" (Shabbat 95a). However, regarding a labor not needed for its own sake, the halakha was not explicitly decided. Our teachers the authors of the Tosafot, and the Ra'avad, and the Ramban, and the Rashba, all of them ruled like Rabbi Shimon even regarding a labor not needed for its own sake. First, because Rava at the beginning of the chapter "Notel" holds like Rabbi Shimon; and furthermore, because at the end of Shabbat we say that in all of Shabbat the halakha is like Rabbi Shimon. But the Rambam in chapter 1, law 7, ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, and it appears the opinion of the Rif is also such (Maggid Mishneh). And their reasoning is that according to the rules of the Shas, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon—the halakha is like Rabbi Yehuda. And even though Rava holds like Rabbi Shimon, nevertheless there are Amoraim who hold like Rabbi Yehuda. Furthermore, in the Mishnah (Shabbat 93b), our holy teacher established in the Mishnah that for [carrying] the deceased in a bed one is liable, like Rabbi Yehuda, and he stated it anonymously in the plural. And that which they said that in all of Shabbat the halakha is like Rabbi Shimon, there it only refers to matters of muktzeh, see there. (However, according to the Yerushalmi Shabbat chapter 2, law 5, that Rabbi Yossi also holds like Rabbi Shimon—certainly the halakha is like Rabbi Yossi over Rabbi Yehuda. And in our Shas (Shabbat 31b), there is a dispute regarding Rabbi Yossi as to whom he holds like, see there. And in the Yerushalmi Shabbat chapter 9, law 6, it implies explicitly that we hold like Rabbi Shimon, see there and examine carefully).

And what is a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah? For example, when one performs a prohibited melakhah, but does not need it for the purpose of the prohibition, but rather for another purpose. For example, one who digs a pit, and the prohibition is the digging, but he does not need the pit at all, but rather needs the earth. And "tzerikhah le-gufah" is when he needs the pit, to hide something in it or to use it. And similarly, one who extinguishes a lamp, and the melakhah is the extinguishing. If he needs it for the purpose of extinguishing, namely to create a coal—it is called "tzerikhah le-gufah." But if he does not need the coal, but rather to spare the oil or the wick or the vessel—it is called "einah tzerikhah le-gufah." And similarly, one who carries a thorn four amot in the reshut ha-rabim, and the melakhah is the carrying, and he does not need this, but rather removes it from its place so that the public will not be harmed by it, or extinguishes a coal so that the public will not be harmed by it—it is "einah tzerikhah le-gufah." And similarly, one who traps a snake so that it will not bite him, for the melakhah is the trapping, and he does not need the trapping at all, and similarly anything of this sort, whereas in the Mishkan, when they performed the melakhah they needed it for the purpose of the melakhah. (And Rashi also holds thus. And that which he wrote in the Mishnah regarding "the corpse on a bed," this is his wording: "for it is a melakhah that he only needs to remove from upon himself, and by his will it did not come to him" (Shabbat 93b s.v. 've-Rabbi Shimon') see there, this is nothing but an explanation, meaning: that for the purpose of the melakhah he does not need it, and it was not his will for this. And the Tosafot (page 94a) s.v. 'R. Shimon' who were exacting with him, were only exacting regarding his wording, but the intent is clear, and examine it well).

And know, that it is well-known throughout the entire Shas, that even though a matter that is unintentional — even according to Rabbi Yehuda is only a rabbinic prohibition, and according to Rabbi Shimon is permitted l'chatchila, and such is the halacha as we have written — nevertheless, this is in a matter where it is possible that the melacha will be performed and possible that it will not be performed. But in a matter where the melacha will necessarily be performed, even Rabbi Shimon admits that one is liable according to the Torah, and so they said in the Shas in several places: Rabbi Shimon admits in a case of "cut off its head and will it not die?" This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 1, law 5: "Matters that are permitted to be done on Shabbat, and at the time of their performance it is possible that a melacha will be performed because of them and possible that it will not be performed, if he did not intend for that melacha — it is permitted. How so? A person may drag a bed, chair, or bench and the like on Shabbat, provided that he does not intend to dig a furrow in the ground at the time of their dragging. Therefore, if they dug the ground — he need not be concerned by this, because he did not intend, etc. But if he performed an action, and a melacha was performed because of it which will certainly be performed because of that action, even though he did not intend for it — he is liable, for the matter is known that it is impossible that that melacha will not be performed. How so? If one needs the head of a bird for a child to play with, and he cut off its head on Shabbat, even though his ultimate purpose is not the killing of the bird alone — he is liable, for the matter is known that it is impossible to cut off the head of a living creature and it live, but rather death comes because of it, and so too anything similar to this," thus far his words.

And there is a great question regarding this, for how is it possible to be liable according to Rabbi Shimon for a pesik reisha? Since he does not intend for it, it is obvious that he does not need its purpose, and if so, it is at the very least a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah! And from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot in Shabbat (41a, s.v. 'miham') and Yoma (34b) and Keritot (2a), it appears that this is the explanation: that any pesik reisha where we are witnesses that it is pleasing to him—he is liable even though he does not intend for this, and against his will it is as if he intends for this. And anything where we are witnesses that it is not pleasing to him in this, meaning that it makes no difference—it is like a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah. And according to the method of the Arukh (in Tosafot 103a), any pesik reisha that is not pleasing to him—it is permitted even ab initio, see there. However, Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote explicitly (75a, s.v. 'tefi') that Rabbi Shimon admits in a matter where he does not care if it happens or not, unless he specifically wants the opposite, that this melakhah should not be performed, see there.

And behold, we found that the son of the Rambam was asked regarding this, and he responded in the name of the Rambam with this wording: "The difference between a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah and a pesik reisha: regarding a pesik reisha - he does not intend for the melakhah at all, but rather it is an inevitable act, such as one who closed the entrance of his house and a deer was there, for he did not intend for the guarding of the deer, but rather the melakhah is performed inevitably. However, a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah - he intends for the essence of the melakhah, but he does not intend for its purpose (Kessef Mishneh chapter 1, halakhah 7). And the giants of the world struggled with his meaning, and I have not seen regarding this words that settle upon the heart.

In my humble opinion, it appears that the matter is so. For example, regarding the matter of mitzvot, there are poskim who hold they require kavvanah, and there are poskim who hold that even when one does not intend, he has fulfilled the obligation, as it is like one who intends. Nevertheless, if he intends not to fulfill the obligation—everyone agrees that he does not fulfill it. So too it is regarding the melakhot of Shabbat, for certainly we require that when he performs the forbidden melakhah he intends for it, yet the intention is not a prerequisite, for if so, he could perform all the melakhot and say that he does not intend for this. Rather, certainly even when he performs it without any intention for the melakhah at all, since he performs it in the manner of the melakhah, what does the absence of his intention avail? For behold, his intention is necessarily realized! And this is the matter of a pesik reisha. But if he truly intends for the melakhah, but performs it for another purpose, it is like a mitzvah when he intended not to fulfill the obligation, and here too it is not applicable to say that it is like one who intends, for he certainly intends, but he intends for another purpose and not for the essence of the prohibition of the melakhah. Therefore, regarding the trapping of a deer, where he does not intend for anything, and similarly the head of a bird for the amusement of a child, he does not intend for anything. This is not the case for one who digs a pit and needs only its earth, for he certainly intends for the digging, but for the sake of another purpose, namely for the purpose of the earth. But in the trapping of a deer—he does not intend for trapping at all, and similarly in the head of a bird for the amusement of a child—he does not intend for killing at all, and it is even worse, for behold, the melakhah is performed against his will, and it is as if he intends. (And there is one who says that regarding a pesik reisha, anything that he is forced to do by way of a pesik reisha—it is forbidden, and in that which he is not forced by way of a pesik reisha—then it is permitted even in a pesik reisha. So wrote the Shiltei Gibborim in the chapter "HaOreg" section 3, see there, and see there in the Ran and Rashba).

In all labors of Shabbat there are measures, and each one will be explained in its place. A half-measure is forbidden by the Torah, as with all Torah prohibitions, except that one is not lashed for a half-measure. And all the more so that one is not put to death and does not bring a sacrifice for a half-measure, but nevertheless its prohibition is from the Torah (Rashi 74a, s.v. "ve-chi"). However, regarding the prohibition of hotza'ah there is a difference: for in hotza'ah from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim, which involves an akirah and a hanachah, if one performed an akirah without a hanachah or a hanachah without an akirah—there is no Torah prohibition in this, but there is a rabbinic prohibition in this, and this is explicit in the first Mishnah of Shabbat and in the Gemara there. And regarding carrying four amot in a reshut harabim, it is proven throughout Shabbat that for less than four amot, it is permitted to carry even rabbinically. And it must be understood why regarding the prohibition of hotza'ah there is no Torah prohibition of a half-measure. And it can be said, that since the reason for a half-measure is because it is "fit to be combined," as is written at the beginning of the final chapter of Yoma (74a), and regarding hotza'ah this is not applicable, for when one carried from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim, granted that the akirah is fit to be combined when he performs hanachah, but hanachah is not fit to be combined as is understood, and since there is no Torah prohibition of a half-measure regarding hanachah—consequently the prohibition of a half-measure was not stated regarding hotza'ah. And nevertheless they prohibited it rabbinically, because through akirah one can come to a liability of a chatat, and so the Shas calls it at the beginning of our tractate, see there. And regarding one who carries two amot in a reshut harabim and stood, it is no longer fit to be combined, for the hanachah of his body is like the hanachah of an object, and therefore even rabbinically they did not prohibit a half-measure. (And in Tosefta Beitzah chapter 4 halacha 2 it implies explicitly that a half-measure on Shabbat is forbidden only rabbinically, see there, and it requires great study. And it must be said that it is not precise, and according to what we will write at the beginning of siman 243).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 1, law 16: "Any labor that an individual is capable of performing alone, and two performed it in partnership, whether this one performed part of it and that one performed part of it etc., or whether both of them performed it as one from beginning to end—these are exempt. But if neither of them is capable of performing it alone until they join together etc.—both are liable, and there is one measure for both of them. If one had the strength to carry out this beam alone, and the second is not capable of carrying it out alone, and both of them partnered and carried it out: this first one who is capable is liable, and the second is a supporter, and a supporter is not liable for anything, and so too anything similar to this." Thus far his words.

He further wrote: "All who act destructively are exempt. How so? If one wounded an animal or a person in a destructive manner, and similarly if one tore garments and burnt them or broke vessels in a destructive manner—behold, he is exempt." Thus far his words. And by rabbinic decree it is forbidden, for all exemptions of Shabbat are "exempt but forbidden," as has been explained. And he was precise to say "in a destructive manner," for behold we find that one who wounds is liable, as we learned in the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter "Eight Creeping Things" (Shabbat 107a), and as the Rambam wrote in chapter 8 (halacha 9), see there. Rather, there it is not in a destructive manner, such as where his intention was to catch them thereby. And similarly regarding tearing not in a destructive manner, such as one who tears for his dead, or one who tears in anger and through the tearing his anger is appeased, the Rambam ruled in chapter 10 (halacha 10) that he is liable, see there, for he follows his own reasoning, as he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor that is not needed for its own sake. But according to most of the poskim, who rule like Rabbi Shimon—he is exempt even in such a case, and this is explicit in the Gemara (Shabbat 105b), see there.

He further wrote: "One who digs a pit and needs only its earth—this is a destroyer and is exempt, even though he performed a labor, since his intention is to destroy—he is exempt." Thus far his words. This was also necessary according to his view, for according to the view of most of the poskim, he is exempt in any case, as it is a labor not needed for its own sake. And know, that in the Gemara (Shabbat 73b) it is proven that specifically in a house is he a destroyer and not in a field. However, this is certainly not literal, but rather it is the way of the matter, and therefore since he wrote "and his intention is to destroy," it is automatically so, for in a place where his intention is not to destroy, he is liable according to his view (and see Maggid Mishneh and Kesef Mishneh).

He further wrote: "Anyone who destroys in order to repair is liable. How so? One who demolished in order to build in its place, or erased in order to write in the place he erased, or dug a pit in order to build foundations within it, and anything similar to this—is liable, and their measure is like the measure of one who repairs." Thus far his words. And behold, in the Gemara (Shabbat 31b) it is explicitly implied that this is only according to Rabbi Yehuda, who deems one liable for a labor that is not needed for its own sake. But according to Rabbi Shimon, even in the case of demolishing in order to build in its place—one is not liable, unless he repairs the second building through the demolition more than if there had never been a building there at all, such as one who ignites wood and extinguishes it to make charcoal; see there. And behold, for the Rambam it works well, as he rules according to Rabbi Yehuda. Nevertheless, even according to Rabbi Shimon it is necessary to say so, for behold, demolishing in order to build is among the primary categories of labor, and in this case it is impossible to find that it would be repaired through the demolition more than if there had never been a building there at all. And it must be said that in such a case—even according to Rabbi Shimon one is liable. And even though this is like a labor that is not needed for its own sake as is understood, nevertheless, even in the Mishkan there was certainly demolishing in order to build, and therefore one is liable (Tosafot ibid. s.v. 've-soter'). And behold, we have explained a little of the many rules and principles of the laws of Shabbat with the help of Heaven; give to a wise man and he will become yet wiser.

Since the Torah blessed and sanctified the Sabbath day, it is therefore an obligation upon every man of Israel to honor this holy day and to delight in it, as the prophet said (Isaiah 58:13): "And you shall call the Sabbath a delight, the holy of Hashem, honored." This is the wording of the Rambam in the Rambam, Laws of Shabbat, chapter 30 (halacha 1): "Four things were stated regarding Shabbat: two from the Torah and two from the words of the Scribes, and they are explained by the prophets. Those in the Torah are 'Remember' and 'Observe'; and those explained by the prophets are honor and delight, etc. What is honor? This is what the sages said (Shabbat 25b), that it is a mitzvah for a person to wash his face, hands, and feet in hot water on Erev Shabbat in honor of the Shabbat, and he wraps himself in tzitzit, and sits with gravity and waits to welcome the presence of the Shabbat like one who goes out to meet the king. And the early sages used to gather their students on Erev Shabbat, wrap themselves, and say: 'Come, let us go out to meet the Shabbat Queen.'" Thus far his words. And now we gather in synagogues and study halls and say five psalms, from "Come, let us sing" (Psalms 95:1) until after "Hashem reigns, the nations tremble," because these songs are about the future to come, when one will say to his fellow: "Come, let us sing to Hashem" (Radak), and then "Hashem reigns," meaning that the verse will be fulfilled which is written (Zechariah 14:9): "On that day Hashem shall be one and His name one." And because Shabbat is a hint to that time, a day that is entirely Shabbat, and then we will sing to Hashem a new song; for all the songs [shira] are in the feminine form, but the song [shir] of the future is in the masculine form, as is found in the Midrashim, therefore we say these psalms. We also say the psalm of seven voices (Psalms 29), because it also hints at the seventh millennium, a day that is entirely Shabbat, and then "Hashem sat at the flood, and Hashem sits as King forever," and then "He will bless His people with peace"; and Shabbat is a semblance of the World to Come, and therefore we say it. And they are six psalms, corresponding to the six days of the week, all of which draw their influence from Shabbat, for it is the source of blessing. Afterward, we say the song "Lecha Dodi toward the bride," and at its end, we turn our faces to the west and say: "Come in peace, crown of her husband, come bride, come bride," and we say this while standing. This is like the early sages, who used to say: "Come, let us go out to meet the Shabbat Queen." Afterward, we say "A psalm, a song for the Sabbath day" (Psalms 92:1), and this is the essence of Kabbalat Shabbat (and the holy Shelah wrote in his prayer book that they should be careful to say "A psalm, a song for the Sabbath day" before sunset, for if not, the damaging spirits created on Erev Shabbat at twilight awaken from their place to cause harm, see there and examine it closely).

And from the honor of the Shabbat, that one should wear clean garments, and the weekday clothing should not be like the Shabbat clothing. And if he has nothing to change into, he lets his garment hang down (Shabbat 113a), that is to say, he lets his clothes hang downward so that they appear long, which is the manner of the wealthy who sit in their homes and do not need to lift their clothes from the ground for the sake of labor, and it is the honor of Shabbat (Rashi). And from the enactment of Ezra, that the people should wash their clothes on the fifth day for the sake of the honor of Shabbat (Bava Kamma 82a), and they should not wait until the eve of Shabbat, so that the eve of Shabbat will be free for the preparation of Shabbat (Shitta Mekubetzet). And now all of Israel change the shirt for Shabbat, and they change additional garments, and also the hat, to distinguish the honor of Shabbat, and they go to the bathhouse for the sake of the honor of Shabbat. And many also immerse in the mikvah, to purify themselves for the sanctity of Shabbat. And everything that they do for the honor of the Shabbat Queen, its reward is very great.

The Rambam wrote (ibid. halakha 7): "What is oneg? This is what the sages said, that one must prepare a very rich dish and a spiced drink for Shabbat, everything according to a person's wealth. And anyone who increases Shabbat expenditures and good and many foods—this is praiseworthy. And if his hand cannot afford it, even if he only made a boiled dish and the like for the sake of the honor of Shabbat, this is oneg Shabbat, and he is not obligated to distress himself and ask of others in order to increase food on Shabbat. The early sages said (Shabbat 118a): Make your Shabbat like a weekday and do not be dependent on people," Thus far his words.

And behold, regarding that which he wrote, that the sages said to prepare a dish that is very fatty, this is not found. And in the Gemara (Shabbat 118a) it is stated: With what does one delight it? With a dish of beets, and large fish, and heads of garlic; see there. Rather, the Rambam holds that certainly this is not meant specifically, and if he does not like fish, what shall he do? Rather, the main thing is the dish that is beloved to him, and let it be very fatty, for such is the way of the wealthy. And the Gemara mentioned [these] according to what was in their days, for these dishes were beloved to them. And there are those even now who are meticulous regarding fish, to have it at every Shabbat meal, and there is a hidden reason for this. And one should not have fewer than two dishes (Magen Avraham, subsection 1).

And regarding that which he wrote that one does not need to ask from others, even though at the beginning of the second chapter of Beitzah they said that all of a person's sustenance is fixed for him from Rosh Hashanah, except for the expenses of Shabbat and Yom Tov, for if he adds—they add for him, and they said there that the Holy One, Blessed be He, says: "Borrow on My account and I shall repay." However, this is all for one who has some business, and therefore even though he currently has nothing—he may borrow and hope to Hashem that he will profit and repay. But one who has no business at all, regarding him they said: "Make your Shabbat like a weekday and do not be dependent on people." And the Rambam, who wrote that one does not need to ask from others, either his intention was to request a gift, or if his intention was the language of borrowing, it deals with such a case. And regarding this they said in Shabbat there: even a small thing and for the honor of Shabbat—behold, this is delight, see there. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 1: "Even one who is dependent on others, if he has a little of his own—he must exert himself to honor the Shabbat. And they did not say 'Make your Shabbat like a weekday' etc., except for one for whom the time is extremely pressed. Therefore he must minimize on other days in order to honor the Shabbat," thus far his words. And he holds that one who is entirely dependent on people, meaning that his livelihood is from the city fund or the soup kitchen—this person requires nothing. But if he also earns a little himself—regarding this they said: even a small thing, and he minimizes on other days and leaves over for Shabbat. (See Taz and Magen Avraham. And regarding what the Magen Avraham wrote concerning the third meal, the main point is that even the poor person must eat, like the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah. And that which they said that one borrows with interest for the purpose of the Shabbat meal, this is according to a permission, such as from a gentile, or with a shetar iska. And the commentator on the Yerushalmi in Moed Katan chapter 2, end of halacha 3, wrote regarding rabbinic interest, see there, and it is a great leniency, and the clarified view is as I have written, and so wrote the Pri Megadim. And the novelty is that it is proper to do so for the sake of the mitzvah) (And see Pesachim 112b, and it requires further study, and examine it well).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: "It is the custom to knead the amount required for challah in the house, to make from them breads for performing the breaking of bread upon them on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and this is part of the honor of Shabbat and Yom Tov and one should not change," thus far his words. And also in order to fulfill the mitzvah of challah which is incumbent upon the woman, for this is among her mitzvot, because she caused the loss of the challah of the world, which is Adam the first man, whom she caused to sin, as it is brought in the Midrash (Rashi, Shabbat 32a, s.v. 'Harei'ni'). And it is one of the three transgressions that cause women to die, as we learned in the Mishnah in Shabbat. And all the more so those who eat the bread of non-Jews during all the weekdays—that they must eat kosher bread on Shabbat (see Magen Avraham, subsection 4). He further wrote: "There are those who wrote that in some places they are accustomed to eat a filling called pashtida on Shabbat night, in memory of the manna which was covered above and below. But I have not seen reason to be concerned for this," thus far his words. And the pashtida is like our kreplach, which is covered with dough above and below, and meat is in between. And it is brought in the Gemara at the beginning of the second chapter of Beitzah, that Shammai would eat all his days for the honor of Shabbat. If he found a fine animal—he would say: This is for Shabbat. If he found another finer than it—he would set aside the second and eat the first, see there. And how good it is if one sets aside good food for Shabbat, for through this one always remembers the Shabbat day and honors it. (See the Magen Avraham who wrote, that if they inflate the price of fish, it is proper to enact that they should not buy fish, see there).