Siman 27

Kiddushin of money, how so? He gives her, in the presence of two kosher witnesses who are not related to him nor to each other, a coin or the equivalent of money, and it must be no less than a perutah, which is the weight of silver of half a barleycorn. The witnesses must see how he gives into her hand the money or the equivalent of money and says to her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me," or "Behold, you are betrothed to me," or "Behold, you are mine as a wife," and likewise in any language whose meaning is certainly kiddushin in that place, provided that she understands that it is a language of kiddushin. The Rambam wrote in chapter 3 that he says to her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this," and such is our custom to say, "Behold, you are consecrated to me with this ring according to the law of Moses and Israel," and this is for the enhancement of the kiddushin; but ex post facto, if he did not say "with this" or "with this ring" – it does not impede at all, and the Tur did not write this language at all. But if he did not say "to me" but rather "Behold, you are consecrated" without specification – she is certainly not consecrated, for it is not evident to whom he is consecrating her, and "handles" that are not evident are not considered "handles," for "to me" means to be for me, and "consecrated" is a language of hekdesh, that she is forbidden to the whole world like hekdesh for my sake, and this is like one who says, "Behold, you are consecrated and forbidden to the whole world for my sake"; but without "to me," he is not consecrating her to himself. All this is when he consecrates her suddenly without preparation, but if they prepared themselves for kiddushin – even if he did not say "to me," it does not impede; for example, in our countries where the kiddushin is under the chuppah, it is considered "handles" that are evident that he is consecrating her to himself, for it is no worse than if he spoke with her regarding matters of kiddushin and consecrated her immediately – even with silence she is consecrated, as will be explained, and all the more so in such a case, and more will be explained regarding this in section 27, see there.

In our countries, the simple custom is to betroth with a ring of silver or of gold, and we designate specific witnesses to see the kiddushin, and it is proper to do so since there are many relatives present at the time of the chuppah, and he says to her in their presence, "Behold, you are betrothed to me with this ring according to the law of Moses and Israel," and the witnesses see when he places the ring on her finger. And for a ring of kiddushin, there is a proper reason for this in the hidden wisdom. And that which they say "according to the law of Moses and Israel," this has a foundation in the Gemara, as they said in several places: anyone who betrothes, he betrothes based on the understanding of the rabbis.

There are those who say that one should not initially betroth with a coin, and the reason is like the fact that one does not acquire through chalifin with a coin because his mind is on the form, for the importance of a coin is due to the form, and it is prone to being nullified when the king decrees to make a different form, and regarding kiddushin we should also say that the mind of the woman is on the form, and there is no reason for this at all, for behold we learn kiddushin of silver from the expression of "taking" as has been written, and the essence of "taking" is with a coin, and what does it matter to her if the form is nullified or not – ultimately it is the equivalent of silver, and regarding chalifin it is different because we require a specific object similar to a shoe, and besides that it is explicitly proven in the Shas and the poskim that there is no one who is concerned for this, furthermore from the perspective of logic it is not acceptable at all, and it is already the custom to betroth also with a coin when there is no ring and there is no one who would hesitate about this. And one does not betroth with a loan or with a promissory note, and the details of the laws will be explained in siman 28 with the help of Heaven. And so too there is one who wavers to say that in this time there is no importance to a perutah at all, and we have already explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 190 that Heaven forbid to say so, and all the measurements of the sages were received until Moses from Sinai, and also now there is some importance to a perutah as I wrote there.

It is the custom that he betrothes her with his right hand and places the ring on a finger of her right hand, and that there should be no chatzitzah between the hands and the ring; therefore, if they are wearing gloves—they should remove them. However, all of this is not an absolute requirement but rather for beautification and a sign of blessing, for even if he placed it into her lap or into her domain—she is betrothed. The early authorities wrote that he should show the ring to the witnesses and the rabbi asks them if it is worth a perutah and they say "yes," but it is not the custom to do so; however, the witnesses must certainly be careful to see how he places the ring on her finger, and this is according to the strict law, for the witnesses must see the object with which he betrothes her, as written in siman 42 regarding one who betrothes with an object prepared before us. It is the custom to place the ring on the finger adjacent to the thumb, but according to the law there is no insistence on this.

The Rishonim wrote that if he betrothed her with land, she is betrothed, and all the more so with that which is attached to the land [Ran]. This is the primary view, for this too is the equivalent of money, and regarding kiddushin we do not require that the object come into her hand at the time of the kiddushin, for even with "give a maneh to so-and-so" she is betrothed, as was written in siman 28. And that which the witnesses must see that with which he betrothes her, this is when he betrothes her with an object prepared before them; but when he betrothes her with an object that is not before them, just as she does not need to see it at the time of the act, so too they do not need to see it. And that which will be explained in siman 32 regarding kiddushin of a shetar, that there is a dispute among the poskim whether she is betrothed with a shetar written on that which is attached to the land, this is because we learn kiddushin of a shetar from "and she departs and she becomes," and just as a get is invalid on that which is attached, so too the shetar of kiddushin, but not regarding kiddushin of money. And there is one of the Rishonim who wished to say that one may not betroth with that which is attached to the land, but all our teachers did not agree with him [ibid.]. There is clear proof for this from the Tosefta of Kiddushin [chapter 4], as it was taught: One who betrothes with an asherah, she is not betrothed because it is forbidden for benefit; this implies explicitly that with an ordinary tree she is betrothed [and so it appears in Tosafot 5a, s.v. sheken, see there].

It is a simple matter that kiddushin must be with the woman's consent; however, the fulfillment of a condition in kiddushin may be effective even against one's will. For example, if he said to her, "Behold, you are betrothed to me on the condition that I give you two hundred zuz," and he gave them to her—she is betrothed against her will [Ran, chapter Mi SheAchazo]. For regarding a gift, giving against one's will is not considered giving, but regarding the repayment of a debt, it is considered giving; and regarding the fulfillment of a condition, which resembles both a debt and a gift, we also establish that it is considered giving [as the words of Rava, Gittin 75a]. Similarly, regarding a get, when he said to her, "Behold, this is your get on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz," and she gave them to him—it is a get against his will [ibid. in the name of the Gaon]. And some say it is a case of uncertain kiddushin, for we are in doubt whether it is considered giving or not [Rashba, ibid.], and similarly regarding a get [ibid.]. And regarding a get, it will be explained in siman 163 that the opinion of the Rambam is also that it is a legal uncertainty, and if so, in kiddushin it is also an uncertainty. And some say that to the Rambam it was certain that it is considered giving, but he was stringent regarding a get due to the gravity of a married woman, and if she married she does not leave [the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 8 of Hilkhot Gerushin]; if so, in kiddushin she is certainly betrothed, except that one should be stringent if she also received kiddushin from another to require a get from him ab initio. And the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur there is that it is an uncertainty.

However, according to what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in the name of the Rashba in siman 143, one must distinguish between gittin and kiddushin. For even if we say that a giving against one's will is considered a giving—this means that the giver has fulfilled his obligation and acquired that which is in his hand. Therefore, the woman who has the get in her hand and gave him the two hundred zuz has fulfilled her condition and acquired the get in her hand. The same applies to one who swears to give his fellow a gift; he gives it to him against his will and is exempt. But that it should be considered a giving regarding those to whom he gave against their will—no, for it is impossible for a person to grant acquisition to others against their will. Therefore, if she says, "Give me a maneh and I will be betrothed to you," and the other person swore to give to her and gave to her against her will—the other person has fulfilled his obligation regarding the oath, but she is not betrothed. Thus far his words.

And according to this, there is one who says that regarding kiddushin, in any case she is not betrothed through a giving against her will, for regarding her, a giving against her will is not considered a receipt. However, in truth, this has no relevance to a condition in kiddushin, for certainly regarding the essence of the kiddushin it is not considered a receipt when the giving is against her will, but when the kiddushin is effected through another matter and the giving of the money is only a condition where he said "on condition that I give you two hundred zuz," since he gave it to her, even against her will, he has fulfilled his condition and the kiddushin are established if we say that a giving against one's will is considered a giving. And there is one who wished to distinguish between when he spoke and when she spoke—and there is no basis for these words. [And so wrote the Makneh and the Avnei Miluim, and proof for this is from the Rashba himself, who later wrote as the law regarding a condition of kiddushin and equated it to divorce, see there.]

And even with a condition, if he said, "on condition that I give you two hundred zuz," and he gave her the equivalent value and against her will—there is no doubt here at all, for since he deviated from silver to the equivalent value and also against her will, it is not a giving [Beit Shmuel in the name of the Maharit]. And even though even without "against her will," when he deviates from the thing he stipulated it is not a giving, as I wrote in siman 143 regarding a get, nevertheless, without "against her will," if she consented to the other thing, some say it is a giving, as I wrote there; but against her will in such a case, it is not a giving. And there is one who is in doubt, saying that even against her will and with a deviation, it is a case of doubtful kiddushin [Beit Shmuel], and so is the primary view, that it is a case of doubtful kiddushin [and also the Maharit did not write that it is certainly not kiddushin, see there]. And in siman 143 more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven.

And so there is one who says that even with a condition and without a change, sometimes they are not kiddushin when he gave against her will, such as when he did not say "on the condition" but rather "behold you are betrothed to me if I give you two hundred zuz," for specifically with "on the condition" which is like "from now" and the kiddushin take effect beforehand and the two hundred is for the fulfillment of the condition, it is correctly a doubt whether giving against her will is considered giving or not; but with "if I give," where the kiddushin take effect only at the time of the giving of the money, they are not kiddushin against her will, as was written in section 7 [Makneh]—and these are words of reason, for even though regarding a get even with "if" it is a doubt whether it is like "from now" or not, as was written in siman 144, this is because the date proves that she was divorced then at the time of the writing of the get, but in kiddushin it is not like "from now," as was written in siman 38, see there; and according to this, it is possible to say that this is specifically when he betrothed her with money or with intercourse and said to her "behold you are betrothed to me if I give you two hundred zuz," but if he betrothed her with a shetar and a date is written in it, it is a doubt of kiddushin just as with "on the condition," but in siman 32 it will be explained that a date in kiddushin is nothing.

And know, that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in siman 143 wrote in the name of his teacher that for the one who holds that giving against one's will is considered giving—even if the recipient did not accept them, it is considered giving; and for the one who holds it is not considered giving—against one's will, this is nothing. However, when the recipient accepted them, even if they coerced him to accept, according to everyone it is considered giving. And according to this, the entire law of a doubtful kiddushin that we explained regarding giving against one's will is only when the recipient did not accept them, but if she accepted them, it is certain kiddushin even if the acceptance was against her will; and there are those who disagree with him on this. And it appears to me that even according to the opinion of his teacher, this is only regarding a condition of "on the condition," but regarding a condition of "if," and all the more so when she says "give me a maneh and I will be betrothed to you"—it is not kiddushin even if she accepted if the acceptance was against her will, for how is it possible to betroth a woman against her will? And "on the condition" is different, for the kiddushin have already taken effect and this is nothing other than the fulfillment of the condition. [And from Rashi, Arachin 32a, s.v. "against her will, for she cast it into his house etc." and from Tosafot, Gittin 75a, s.v. "from the implication" at the end of the passage, it implies like those who disagree with his teacher, see there and examine carefully].

We have already written in section 1 that she must understand that this is the language of kiddushin, and if she does not understand, it is nothing, for a woman is only betrothed with her consent; however, she is not believed to say that she did not understand, and all the more so if it is the accustomed language, such as "Behold, you are consecrated to me," for it is likely that she knows. Nevertheless, if she says that she did not understand, it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, and if we know clearly that she did not understand, there is no kiddushin here at all [see Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel, subsection 5]. And this matter depends on the context; if the matter occurred without preparation, it is possible that she did not understand, and this matter depends on the assessment of the beit din according to the context. And all this is when he did not speak with her initially regarding the business of kiddushin, but if she spoke with him initially and he gave her an object for kiddushin, even if we knew that she did not understand, she is betrothed, for even if he gave it in silence she is betrothed, as will be explained.

If he was speaking with a woman regarding matters of kiddushin, and in the midst of the conversation he stood and gave her money or the equivalent of money in the presence of witnesses and she accepted it—it is certainly kiddushin, for he certainly gave them for the sake of kiddushin and she accepted them for the sake of kiddushin. And even though matters of the heart are not considered matters, this is not a matter of the heart, and it is comparable to one who says "Behold, you are betrothed to me," since they are occupied with the matter of kiddushin. And all the more so if he said a term of kiddushin and she does not understand that term, it is kiddushin since his speech is not required at all. The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 3: If he was speaking with the woman regarding matters of kiddushin and she consented, and he stood and betrothed her and did not specify and said nothing to her but rather gave into her hand or cohabited—since they are occupied with the matter, it is sufficient and there is no need to specify. Thus far his words. And he added the words "and she consented"—meaning that she said "yes" [Kesef Mishneh], but if she remained silent it is not effective; however, this is not implied by all the poskim [Beit Shmuel]. Nevertheless, the intent of the Rambam is also not necessarily that she must say yes, for what benefit is her speech in kiddushin when he is the one who must say that he is betrothing her? Rather, his main intent is that we know she consented to the matter of kiddushin that he spoke with her about. And in this all the poskim agree [see Beit Shmuel] that if we did not know she consented prior to her acceptance of the kiddushin, what benefit is her acceptance? Perhaps she did not accept them for the sake of kiddushin, and in any case this is not certain kiddushin but rather a doubt [it appears to me]. And even regarding one who cohabited, granted that it is evident she consented to kiddushin, nevertheless, if we did not see in her evident matters that she consented when he spoke with her, one should not make them certain kiddushin but rather a doubt, for perhaps she intended for mere zenut, as they did not say in every case that a person does not make his cohabitation a cohabitation of zenut, as I wrote in chapter 10 of Hilkhot Gerushin, law 19, and all the more so regarding a woman whose mind is light [it appears to me].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: There are those who say that we do not require that they be speaking of that exact matter, but rather that they are speaking from matter to matter within the same subject, which is to say that they are not speaking of kiddushin but only of the needs of their pairing. Thus far his words. And this opinion is implied in the Yerushalmi, chapter 4 of Ma'aser Sheni. As for the halacha, one should be stringent like both opinions, and if she extended her hand and received kiddushin from another—she requires a get from both of them. Most of the poskim agreed with the first opinion, as this is implied by the sugya of the Shas [6a], and it is the opinion of the Rif, the Rambam, and the Rosh. [And according to the "there are those who say," it must be said that Shmuel and Rav Ashi intended "from matter to matter," and the dispute of the Tannaim refers to Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Elazar bar Shimon holds like Rabbi Yossi, as the Gra wrote in subsection 11].

He further wrote that there are those who say we do not require that they speak with her, but rather as long as they speak in her presence it is sufficient. Thus far his words. And his meaning is that he speaks with others in her presence regarding the matter of the kiddushin and she remains silent, and during the course of the conversation he gave her something and she accepted it – it is kiddushin, and we say that she consented. However, from the wording of the Rambam that we wrote in section 13, even according to what we wrote that his intention was not specifically that she said "yes," nevertheless we require that we know clearly that she consented, and in such a case certainly all the poskim agree as is written there. And these "those who say" hold that even if we have no knowledge from her that she consented, since she remained entirely silent – her acceptance testifies that she consented. However, as a matter of law, one should rule stringently that it is a case of doubtful kiddushin [and what he wrote that this is implied by the Tur requires further study, for behold he wrote previously "with her," see there; and see in the Hagahot Mordechai at the end of Gittin that they disagreed on this; and the intention of the respondent is that if so, he could also ask in a good language, for perhaps she is believed to say that she did not understand, according to the opinion of the Maggid Mishneh cited in the Beit Shmuel, subsection 5, and the difficulty of the Gra in subsection 13 is answered; and also what he wrote in subsection 11 from the Tosefta chapter 2, the version before us is not like the Yerushalmi, see there and examine carefully].

There are those who are uncertain regarding one who proposed marriage beforehand and afterwards gave her money and said nothing, whether this is also considered like one who is speaking regarding matters of kiddushin or not. And it appears to me that this is the dispute of the Rishonim regarding the concern of sivlonot; for the one who holds that the concern of sivlonot is that we concern ourselves that with these sivlonot he betrothed her via a messenger, necessarily holds that proposing is like speaking with her regarding matters of her kiddushin. And the one who holds that the concern of sivlonot is that he betrothed her beforehand, there is no necessity for this. See Rashi 50b, starting with "we concern ourselves with sivlonot, one who proposed etc." and the Tosafot wrote "and if he proposed, what of it etc.", see there.

One must be in doubt regarding this matter, that he spoke with her about matters of kiddushin and then arose and betrothed her in silence, which is a certain kiddushin: whether this is specifically when he spoke with her about matters of kiddushin before the witnesses, but if he spoke with her privately, even though the giving of the kiddushin was before witnesses, nevertheless, since he said nothing at the time of the giving, the witnesses do not know for what purpose he gave it to her, whether for the sake of kiddushin or for the sake of a gift, and it is like one who betroths without witnesses; or perhaps since they saw the giving of the kiddushin, it is sufficient. And behold, regarding kiddushin of a document or intercourse, it seems simple that it is not necessary for the witnesses to hear when they spoke about matters of kiddushin, for even if they did not hear, they see the document and what is written in it, "Behold you are betrothed to me," and likewise when they secluded themselves before them. But regarding kiddushin of money, one must be in doubt—and it requires further study for the law. [And from the gifts according to the explanation of Rashi there is no proof, for there the witnesses knew that she was his betrothed, and from several responsa it appears that if the witnesses did not know what the giving was, it is as if it were without witnesses, and it requires further study].

If he said to her, "Behold you are my wife," "Behold you are my betrothed," "Behold you are acquired to me," "Behold you are my fiancée," "Behold you are mine," "Behold you are in my domain," "Behold you are my purchase" – she is מקודשת if she understood his words. And if she says that she did not understand – she is believed, and some are concerned for a doubt of kiddushin; and see what I wrote in section 12. However, the man is not believed to say that he did not intend for the sake of kiddushin, since these expressions are certainly expressions of kiddushin. However, regarding the doubtful expressions that will be explained, he is also believed to say that he did not intend for the sake of kiddushin but for work. And there is one who hesitates to say that even regarding the certain expressions he is believed, as a stringency, to say that he did not intend for the sake of kiddushin – but the primary view is like the first opinion. Nevertheless, if she received kiddushin from another as well – she requires a get from the second as well, merely as a stringency. And when he says that he intended for the sake of kiddushin and she also says that she understood that it was for the sake of kiddushin, even though the witnesses do not know that she understood – nevertheless, it is certain kiddushin. And this is not like one who performs kiddushin without witnesses, since they heard the expression of kiddushin and know that the one performing the kiddushin intended for the sake of kiddushin, even though they did not know if she understood; for behold, the essence of the kiddushin is from the side of the one performing the kiddushin, and she in her heart also intended for kiddushin. And it is simple that if they spoke previously regarding the matters of kiddushin, it is certain kiddushin in every case, even when she did not understand that this is an expression of kiddushin, for even silence is sufficient as has been explained. And there is no difference regarding these expressions whether he said them in the Holy Tongue or in a secular tongue.

There are expressions that are doubtful whether they are a language of kiddushin or not, such as if he said to her, "Behold, you are designated (meyuedet) to me," for with a Hebrew maidservant this is a language of kiddushin; and similarly if he said to her, "Behold, you are singled out (meyuchedet) to me," or "Behold, you are my help (ezrati)," or "opposite me (negdi)" from the expression "I will make him a helper opposite him," or "my rib (tzalati)," or "my closed one (segurati)," or "under me (tachtai)," as these expressions were mentioned regarding the marriage of Adam, as it is written: "And the L-rd G-d built the rib... and closed up the flesh under it" (Genesis 2:22). And similarly if he said, "my restrained one (atzurati)," meaning that she should be restrained with him together, or "my seized one (tefusati)" — behold, she is betrothed in doubt, for all these expressions can also be interpreted in other ways, that she should be a helper to him in his household affairs. And when is it a doubt of kiddushin? When he spoke with her initially regarding the matters of kiddushin, for then it can be said that he intended for kiddushin, or that he retracted from the matter of kiddushin and is appeasing her for household work. But if he did not speak with her beforehand regarding the matters of kiddushin — these expressions are nothing, for she certainly did not know what he was saying; therefore, even if he intended for kiddushin, it is nothing. Therefore, if she also said that she intended to be betrothed with this expression — it is a doubt of kiddushin. And some say that when they were not occupied beforehand with matters of kiddushin, even if both said they intended for the sake of kiddushin, it is nothing, for specifically when speaking of the matters of kiddushin, where silence is also effective, in that case it is effective if they say they intended for the sake of kiddushin and they are not expressions of retraction from kiddushin, but to be betrothed with these expressions is impossible. And even if he spoke with her regarding the matters of kiddushin, if he says that he intended for work and not for kiddushin — he is believed.

One who says, "Behold, you are my charufah," it is also a case of safek kiddushin, for regarding a shifchah charufah it is written, "and she is a maidservant betrothed [necherefet] to a man" (Leviticus 19:20); so it is explained from the sugya of the Shas. The Rambam ruled that it is a valid expression, and they wrote that he had a different version in the Gemara, and furthermore, according to what we maintain—that this verse of shifchah charufah deals with one who is half-maidservant and half-free woman as written in chapter 4—it follows that even for a free woman it is an expression of kiddushin. And even though "designated for me" is a safek, this is because there the term designation [yi'ud] means an invitation, as proven in Jeremiah, and it is borrowed for the language of kiddushin; but the expression "necherefet" has no similar instance in Scripture, and Onkelos translated it as "appropriated to a man," and it is close to being from the expression "risked [cheref] his life to die" (Judges 5:18), for she has abandoned herself to this man, and this is closer to the matter of kiddushin. However, regarding the law, we maintain stringently like the opinion of most poskim, and so our teacher, the Rema, ruled that it is a safek kiddushin.

The Rashba wrote in a responsum: If he said to her, "Behold, you are my married-one" [neshuati] – it is not like one who says, "Behold, you are my wife," for we have not heard the term "married" [neshuah] regarding kiddushin, as she is not a neshuah until she has relations or until she enters the huppah; and our teacher, the Rema, cited him. All the Aharonim agreed that in any event, this terminology is superior to all the uncertain terminologies that have been explained, and it is certainly a case of uncertain kiddushin even if he had not been speaking with her regarding matters of kiddushin, and when they had been speaking regarding matters of kiddushin – this terminology constitutes certain kiddushin. [And regarding a document – see the Makneh].

If he gave her money or the equivalent of money and said to her, "Behold you are my beloved," or "I am giving to you for the sake of love and affection" – we are concerned for kiddushin, for perhaps he said that he gives to her so that there should be between them love and affection of matrimony, and it is no less than the expressions "designated for me" and "set aside for me," and it is possible that it is superior to them, for even if they did not speak initially of the matter of kiddushin she requires a get; however, from the wording of our teacher, the Rema, it does not imply so. Nevertheless, it is simple that if they said they intended for kiddushin, she requires a get. And if they spoke initially about the matters of kiddushin and he said to her this expression, it appears that it is certain kiddushin. And there is one who distinguishes that if he said "that there shall be love" between them – it is certain kiddushin, but if he said "for the sake of love" – it is only a doubt of kiddushin, for its meaning is for the sake of love from before. And according to this, also if he said "Behold you are my beloved" – it is a doubt of kiddushin. See the gloss on the Gra, subsection 18, and the Rema, one can say his intention is where he did not speak and he compares it to "designated" when he did speak, and according to this, in law she requires a get in any case as I have written; and nevertheless, if they say that they did not intend at all for kiddushin but rather for licentiousness, it is possible that they are believed, and delve into this.

Regarding ambiguous expressions, our teacher, the Rema, wrote: There are those who say that even though these expressions are not effective if he did not speak with her concerning the matters of kiddushin, nevertheless, if she says that she received it for the sake of kiddushin, it is a case of safek kiddushin; and even if he gave it to her in silence and said nothing at all, and he and she say that they intended it for the sake of kiddushin—it is kiddushin. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that regarding ambiguous expressions, the matter depends on her, and if she says that she intended for kiddushin, even if he says he did not intend so, he is not believed. There are those who disagree on this and hold that he is also believed if he says he did not intend for kiddushin, even though she says she did intend. And if both of them and also the witnesses say they intended for the sake of kiddushin—nevertheless, it is only safek kiddushin to require her to have a get, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them. And there is one from whose words it is implied that if the witnesses also testify that they intended for the sake of kiddushin, it is certain kiddushin when they spoke previously concerning the matters of kiddushin, and when they were not occupied with matters of kiddushin, they are not even safek kiddushin even if they intended for the sake of kiddushin, but it is not so.

Regarding that which he wrote, that if he did not speak with her about matters of kiddushin and gave to her in silence, and both say that they intended for the sake of kiddushin, that it is kiddushin—the Acharonim agreed that it is only a doubt of kiddushin. For how is it possible to say when they did not speak at all and he gave to her in silence that it should be certain kiddushin? For behold, this is like matters of the heart, and the mind is more inclined to say that it is not even a doubt of kiddushin. In practice, it is difficult to release them without a get, and all the more so if according to the understanding of the witnesses as well it was for the sake of kiddushin. Similarly, if there was already consent between them and he gave to her afterwards in silence—it is to be compared to sivlonot. And if she consented to be betrothed but they disagreed on details such as the dowry or other matters, and she stood and was betrothed in silence—it is also a doubt of kiddushin.

He further wrote that in a case where there was no kiddushin, even if he later returns and says to her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me," he must take the money from her and give it to her for the purpose of kiddushin. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters: for example, where they ceased speaking of the matter of kiddushin entirely and he gave it to her in silence and they did not intend it for the sake of kiddushin, or with doubtful expressions and they had not spoken at all previously regarding the business of kiddushin, and after he gave it to her he said to her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me" – he must take it from her and give it to her, and the first giving is not sufficient to make it certain kiddushin. And it is not similar to what will be explained in siman 31 regarding the matter of appraisal where he does not need to return and take it from her – it is different there, for behold, he gave it to her for kiddushin, but it required an appraisal, therefore the kiddushin took effect previously, as with the money of a deposit which will be explained in siman 28, that if he consecrated her with his deposit that is in her hand and she said "yes," behold she is consecrated even if he did not take it from her, for behold, the money is his. But here, that which he gave her previously, she can say that she received it for the sake of a gift. And so too it is not similar to a get which will be explained in siman 136, that he does not need to take it from her, for regarding a get it is not relevant to say the matter of a gift. And even though we hold that ordinarily when a person gives something to his fellow we do not say that he gave it as a gift but rather as a deposit, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 373, and if so, even if she did not receive it previously for the sake of kiddushin, nevertheless she cannot say "gift" but rather "deposit," and with a deposit one does not need to take it from her as I have written, nevertheless this is not a universal rule. And our teacher, the Rema, follows his reasoning in Choshen Mishpat siman 146, section 18, regarding one who gave the purchase price for land twice, the seller can say that the second time he gave it to him for the sake of a gift. And behold, there too the later authorities questioned him; however, in our work there, section 21, we explained his reasoning, that because he can say that after the first acquisition the seller bought the field back from him and afterwards the buyer took it from him and these are the purchase funds, therefore he can also say that he gave it to him for the sake of a gift, for he would not give it as a deposit lest he say that he bought it from him a second time after he had taken it back from him, see there. And therefore here too she is believed to say "it is a gift," for he would not give it to her as a deposit for the reason that she might say "you received them for the sake of kiddushin." And according to this, according to the approach of our teacher, the Rema, which we explained in section 24, that even if they did not speak at all and he gave it to her in silence, if they intended it for kiddushin it is kiddushin, see there; according to this, even in such a case it is not effective to be certain kiddushin when he did not return and take it from her, for the reason that has been explained. And know that according to what I have written, the law is true and all that the great later authorities questioned him on works out well. However, this is certain, that she requires a get from him, for it does not leave the realm of doubt [see the Gra, subsection 21, who also settled it, and the Chelkat Mechokek there questioned him, and according to our words everything works out well, and examine it].

Furthermore, for we maintain regarding one who betrothes his sister that the money is a gift, and the reason is that regarding his sister we say that because of her closeness he gave her a gift [the Rosh, first chapter of Bava Metzia, section 39], and here too, since he had already spoken with her regarding the matter of kiddushin and likewise when he spoke ambiguous expressions, and in any case there is a closeness with her and there is love between them, we certainly say that he gave her a gift just as with his sister [and see Lechem Mishneh, chapter 6 of Zechiyah, halacha 20]. Furthermore, it appears to me that if she said, "I received them for kiddushin," even if he does not admit to her—nevertheless the money does not return; and even though in siman 50 it will be explained that in any place where it is not kiddushin the money returns, nevertheless it was explained there that in a place where she requires a get the money does not return [see Beit Shmuel ibid. subsection 5], and here it appears that if she says that she knows that he also intended for the sake of kiddushin, in any case she requires a get, and according to this we are witnesses that he would not give her a deposit lest she claim so, and see what I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 356, section 7 [and examine carefully].

It has already been explained in section 1 that if he said, "Behold, you are consecrated," and did not say "to me"—it is not kiddushin, for "handles" that are not evident are not considered "handles," and when he does not say "to me," it is not evident to whom he is consecrating her. We rule similarly regarding nedarim in Yoreh Deah siman 206, see there, and such is the primary law. However, there are some of our teachers who were stringent to require her to have a get [Hagahot Mordechai, end of Gittin]. Their reasoning is that since regarding a get the Gemara [85b] inquired whether one must write, "And this shall be for you from me a document of dismissal," so that it be implied that he is divorcing her with this get and there will be evident "handles," or if it is not necessary, and the matter was not resolved; if so, in kiddushin in such a case it is also a legal doubt. The first opinion holds that they are not comparable, for in a get, even if he did not write "and this," it is evident that he is divorcing her because a person does not divorce his fellow's wife; but in kiddushin, it is possible that he is consecrating her to another [Tosafot Kiddushin 5b]. It is simple that if he was speaking with her previously concerning the matters of her kiddushin, she is certainly consecrated, for in such a case there are evident "handles" that he is consecrating her. All the more so if they made preparations for the matter, such as the wedding festivities of a groom and bride, she is consecrated, as I wrote in section 1, see there. [See Beit Shmuel subsection 14, that in a place where there is an additional flaw one need not be concerned for the disagreeing opinions, but the Gra in subsection 23 was very concerned for this opinion, see there].

And similarly, if he betrothed one woman with a complete betrothal and said to another woman in her presence, "Behold you are betrothed," and did not say "to me" – it is a complete betrothal to require her a get according to all opinions, for this is like "proven handles," as just as he betrothed the first to himself, so too the second. This is like what we find regarding nezirut, where one who says "I shall be" while a nazir passes before him, it is as if he said "I shall be a nazir." Nevertheless, if she received betrothal from another, she requires a get from both of them, and it is not similar to nezirut; for regarding betrothal, one could say the opposite: since he betrothed one woman to himself, he did not betroth the second to himself, for it is not the way of people to take two women even in a place where the decree of Rabbeinu Gershom, of blessed memory, did not spread. And similarly, if he betrothed one woman and gave her two perutot and said to her, "Behold you are betrothed to me," and said to another woman in her presence, "And you" – it is a legal doubt whether there is a "handle" for betrothal and it is as if he said to her, "And you also shall be betrothed to me," or there is no "handle" for betrothal and it is as if he said to her, "You shall see the betrothal of the first." [Nedarim 6b, and see what I wrote in siman 36, section 15].

When he did not say "to me" and both of them say that they intended for kiddushin – one must be stringent and require her to have a get. And so too, if there was a shiddukhin between them, they are as "evident handles" and it is kiddushin, though there are those who disagree on this, and therefore it is a case of uncertain kiddushin. And if she knew beforehand that his intention was to betroth her, it is as one who is speaking with her regarding matters of kiddushin. And if he was speaking with her regarding matters of kiddushin in the presence of witnesses and went out to seek other witnesses to betroth her in their presence – the matter was interrupted and there are no "evident handles" here; but if he said to the witnesses in her presence, "It is not my desire to betroth her in your presence and behold I am going to bring other witnesses to betroth her," it is "evident handles." And if the witnesses said that they spoke in their presence regarding matters of kiddushin, and the man and the woman deny them – the witnesses are believed, and so too the reverse. However, in any case she requires a get, for since according to their words when they say they spoke regarding matters of kiddushin they certainly intended for kiddushin, and in such a case even if they did not speak regarding matters of kiddushin she requires a get as I have written, and the witnesses, regarding that which they testified before a beit din, cannot retract their words, for once he has told, he cannot retract and tell again, as I have written in Choshen Mishpat siman 29, and there are several detailed laws regarding this, see there. And if the witnesses deny the judges – there is a dispute of the poskim regarding this, and in Choshen Mishpat siman 23 it is explained that the judges are believed, for they are more precise, see there.

There is one who says that if, when he gave her the money, he said to her, "Behold I am giving it to you for the purpose of kiddushin," it is as if he said "to me," for it is not called "hands that are not proving" except in one who begins the speech but does not finish it, and it is not proven from the beginning of the speech what his intention was—which is the meaning of the term "hands," being the language of a handle, the gripping of the matter—such as one who says "Behold you are consecrated" and did not say "to me." But this one who said "Behold I am giving it to you for the purpose of kiddushin," it appears from his wording that he is the one consecrating and she is the one being consecrated, and even though this wording could also be interpreted that he is an agent for another or that she received it on behalf of another, nevertheless we say that a person does not leave a mitzvah that is incumbent upon him and perform it for others. For the primary reason that in the absence of "to me" it is not kiddushin is because his speech is lacking, for since he mentioned "you," he should have also mentioned "to me"; but here, he mentioned himself by saying "Behold I" and mentioned her as well by saying "to you." However, there is one who wrote regarding Reuven who said to Rachel, "Behold I am giving you this for kiddushin," that this is not "proving hands," for perhaps she received it for the sake of another or he gave it on behalf of another, for it is only called "proving hands" when it is proven from within the wording that this man is consecrating this woman to himself—and such is the primary ruling, that it is only a doubt of kiddushin. On the contrary, this is worse than when he does not say "to me," for in the absence of "to me," at least it is proven that this woman is being consecrated, only it is not proven if it is to this man or if he consecrated her on behalf of another; but here, even this is not clarified. Furthermore, the first opinion was not clear to him as a matter of law that it is certainly kiddushin, but rather he said there that she should not be released without a get. See there in the Rivash and in the Chelkat Mechokek, subsection 14. And if he said "I am giving to you for kiddushin"—some say it is nothing, for one could say that he is giving for the needs of kiddushin and is not consecrating with this; and some say that this is certain kiddushin like saying "to me." In any case, it does not escape from doubt and she requires a get, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them. And if he said "Take this for kiddushin for your daughter" or "upon your daughter"—it is nothing since he did not say "I am giving to you," and some are stringent in this. And if he said "I am giving to you in the kiddushin of your daughter"—it is "proving hands."

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that one must say to her a phrasing that indicates the future, such as saying "behold they are kiddushin" or "they shall be kiddushin," but if he said "they are kiddushin" alone—it is nothing. Thus far his words. And it is not specifically a phrasing of the future, for even a phrasing of the present is good, as "behold they are kiddushin" is a phrasing of the present, and the essence of kiddushin is in the present, for behold he is betrothing her now, and this is the very formula of kiddushin when he says "behold you are betrothed to me"; rather, he comes to exclude a phrasing of the past. And even though regarding a sale or a gift it is explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 245 that it is effective, this is by reason of admission as is written there, and therefore there even a phrasing of the past is sometimes effective, such as "I have given such-and-such a field to so-and-so," see there; but regarding kiddushin, when he betroths her now with a ring or a coin or the equivalent of money before witnesses, an admission regarding the past is not applicable. Furthermore, there, only the admission of the giver or the seller is effective, but the admission of the buyer or the recipient is not effective, and in kiddushin the man stands in the place of the recipient and the buyer, as he acquires her, as it is written: "When a man takes a wife." And that which he wrote that "they are kiddushin" is nothing—his intention is when he says "this money is kiddushin," for without this it is no phrasing at all; and even though this phrasing is also a phrasing of the present, nevertheless this phrasing is a present tense that indicates the past in the manner of an admission, but "behold they are kiddushin" is like a present tense that indicates the future, and so it is regarding the nullification of a get in siman 141, see there.

And some say that since "kiddushin" is a holy tongue expression that forbids her to everyone like "hekdesh," and just as there is no difference between saying "this loaf is hekdesh" and saying "it shall be hekdesh," so too there is no difference between saying "this money shall be kiddushin to you from me" and saying "they are kiddushin to you from me," but in truth this is not a comparison. For certainly if the sanctity were to take effect upon the money as it takes effect upon the loaf, it would be a good expression; but in truth the sanctity is upon the woman, not upon the money, and "this loaf is hekdesh" is similar to saying "you are mekudeshet to me," for this indicates that she shall be mekudeshet just as the loaf shall be hekdesh. And in saying "they are kiddushin to you," it indicates that the money shall be sanctified, but when he says "behold they are kiddushin," it is as if he says that this money shall be for the purpose of kiddushin. And some say that if he said "you are mekudeshet to me" without "behold," it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, and it is simple that if he was speaking about the matters of kiddushin, it is always kiddushin.

In several responsa, incidents were brought—and so it has occurred in our time—concerning mischievous boys who play with maidens and, by way of play and jest, betroth them, for it is impossible to clarify whether their intent was only for play, or if sometimes he truly desires to betroth her and extract money from her father, and she does not have the presence of mind to throw back in his face what he gave her. If there are doubts regarding the kiddushin, such as regarding the language with which he betrothed her, or the doubt is regarding another matter of this type—one should not apply to this all the stringencies that are applied to kiddushin, so that the daughters of Israel should not be abandoned. Therefore, if in the opinion of the majority of the poskim the kiddushin do not take effect, even though there is a minority of the poskim who are stringent in this—one must follow the majority and invalidate the kiddushin. According to this, one should not permit this based on an individual, but rather based on three eminent rabbis who know the sources of the opinions and the reasons, and thus conducted themselves all the greats of the generations before us.

It is written, "When a man takes a wife," which teaches that kiddushin is that he takes her to himself and says to her, "Behold, you are consecrated to me," but not that he takes himself to her, such as if he says to her, "Behold, I am your man," "Behold, I am your husband," or "Behold, I am your betrothed." There is no room for concern here, for the husband is the acquirer and not the acquired. Therefore, even if he spoke with her regarding the matters of kiddushin—this is nothing, for it is worse than silence since he corrupted with his speech. Some are stringent when he spoke with her regarding the matters of kiddushin, and some say that it is complete kiddushin, for specifically to be consecrated with this language is impossible, but it is no worse than silence—and one should be stringent and require her to have a get. The opinion of the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch is like the first opinion. And if he said both expressions together—"Behold, you are my wife and behold, I am your man"—it appears to me that it is complete kiddushin, for immediately when he said "Behold, you are my wife" she is consecrated, and the rest of the things he says are nothing but words of affection. There is one who says that it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, because the Torah insisted that he be the one acquiring her, and here he is acquiring her and he is transferring himself to her—but this is not clear, for certainly if he first said "Behold, I am your man" and afterwards says "Behold, you are my wife" it is a doubtful kiddushin, but in the reverse they are certain kiddushin. For behold, in kiddushin, even within the time of a continuous utterance, he cannot retract, and even though some say this is only for stringency, nevertheless, this is when he retracts from the kiddushin, but when he adds to the language of kiddushin it is certain kiddushin. Furthermore, the opinion of many of the poskim is that even for leniency we say so, that within the time of a continuous utterance in kiddushin is like after the time of a continuous utterance. See what I wrote in siman 49. But if he said only "Behold, I am your man," even if he consecrated her with a document and it is written therein "Behold, you are consecrated to me"—it is not kiddushin, as with a get which will be explained in siman 141.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: If one gave money to another and said to him, "Behold you are my father-in-law," and did not say, "Your daughter is betrothed to me" – there is nothing in this. Thus far his words. For the Torah said, "When a man takes a woman," that the taking must be to the woman and not to her father, and according to this, it is similar to one who says, "Behold I am your husband," which is not effective even when he spoke with her regarding matters of kiddushin, as has been written. And there are those who say it is not similar, for in saying, "Behold I am your husband," he transgressed the command of the Torah, but in saying, "Behold you are my father-in-law," he spoke by way of an allusion that he should acquire his daughter, except that it is not a clear expression; therefore, even if he did not speak with her regarding matters of kiddushin, one must be concerned and act stringently, and all the more so if he spoke regarding matters of kiddushin [Chelkat Mechokek, and see the Gra, subsection 31].

If she gave him the kiddushin money and she said, "Behold I am sanctified to you," "Behold I am betrothed to you," "Behold I am to you as a wife" – she is not sanctified, as it is written, "When a man takes a woman," and not that a woman shall be taken by a man. And even though she stands as the seller in a sale, and behold, the seller says, "My field is sold to you," nevertheless, regarding kiddushin it is a decree of the Torah that he must take her and not that she shall sell herself to him, for this is not a sale but rather the sanctity of the union; and likewise, he must give the money, for he is the one who takes her. And if he gave her the money and she said, "Behold I am sanctified to you," even though it is not certain kiddushin, nevertheless it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, for it can be said that the Torah was only particular that he should take her with his money, but regarding the speech there is no particularity as to who says it, and behold, if we compare it to a purchase, it is upon the seller to speak as has been written. And according to several of the poskim, by Torah law these are not kiddushin at all, and only by rabbinic law do we concern ourselves with the kiddushin to require her to have a get [the Rif], for by Torah law his speech is specifically required [the Ran], but from the words of the Rambam it is clear that it is a doubt of Torah law. However, it can be said that even if by Torah law it is a doubtful kiddushin, she does not require a get by Torah law, for in every doubt of Torah law we are required by Torah law to establish the matter upon its status quo, and if so, she is in the status quo of an unmarried woman [ibid.], and the get is only by rabbinic law. However, this matter does not appear so from all the poskim [see there], and the reason seems to me to be that even by Torah law it is impossible to release her without a get, for granted that as long as she does not become sanctified to another we establish her in the status quo of an unmarried woman, but when she receives kiddushin from another, she is forbidden by Torah law to marry him because of the doubt of the first kiddushin; for how can we nullify the kiddushin because of her status quo? After all, ultimately she has left her status quo, whether from the first kiddushin or from the second kiddushin [it seems to me].

And there are times when "he gave and she spoke" results in certain kiddushin, such as when they were occupied with that matter, for then no speech is necessary at all, as even silence is effective as has been written, and all the more so her speech does not ruin it. And it is not similar to the doubtful expressions in section 19 where even when speaking about the matter of kiddushin they are only doubtful kiddushin, for there it is because one can say he wants her for work as has been written there; but when she spoke an expression of certain kiddushin, how did she ruin it with her speech? For it is no worse than silence. And so too even if they were not occupied with the matter of kiddushin at all, and when she said "Behold I am betrothed to you" he answered after her "Yes" — it is certain kiddushin, for in several matters "Yes" is like the speech itself, such as in nezirut and in oaths. And there is one who says that one should be stringent regarding "Yes" when they did not speak about the matter of kiddushin, that it should only be doubtful kiddushin, because there is a "Yes" that is like a "No" as has been written in Choshen Mishpat siman 421, but the matters are not related, for certainly a plain "Yes" is according to its literal meaning of "Yes," and there it is because the context proves it, and all the more so according to the explanation of Rashi there, and see the Beit Shmuel. Furthermore, there are those who explained that the reason why in "he gave and she spoke" they are doubtful kiddushin is that perhaps in his silence he agreed to her words and it is "silence is like admission," and all the more so when he explicitly says "Yes," and such is the opinion of most of the poskim.

And in a case where she gave the money to him and he said, "Behold, you are consecrated to me" – there is no consecration here at all. It is not similar to where he gave and she spoke, which is a doubt, for there one may doubt that perhaps we say silence is like admission or that the Torah was only particular regarding the giving; and if the stringency is rabbinic, it is because it is similar to a transaction where the buyer gives the money and the seller says, "My field is sold to you." But the opposite, where she gave, there is no doubt here at all. And even though one of the Rishonim was stringent even in this [the Bahag], nevertheless, the poskim all do not hold so, for so it is explicitly proven in the Shas [5b]. Nevertheless, there are some of the Acharonim who were concerned for his opinion to require her to have a get [see Bach and Chelkat Mechokek].

However, sometimes in a case where she gave and he spoke it constitutes complete kiddushin, such as if he is an important man and she derives honor from the fact that he accepted the gift from her, and this benefit is worth a perutah – it is properly considered as if he gave and he spoke, for he has given her a perutah's worth of benefit through his acceptance from her. For the general rule of kiddushin is that it is not specifically money or the equivalent of money, but rather anything he does for her that is worth a perutah, just as he betrothes her with the benefit of the forgiveness of a loan, as will be explained in siman 28, and so too here he betrothes her with the benefit of his acceptance from her.

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 5, law 22: If she said to him, "Take this dinar as a gift and I shall be betrothed to you," and he took it and said to her, "Behold you are betrothed to me through this benefit that I have received a gift from you" – if he is a person of stature, behold she is betrothed, for she derives benefit from his deriving pleasure from her, and through this benefit she has transferred herself to him. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that in an ordinary case where she gave and he spoke – it is nothing even if he is a person of stature, for if she did not specify that she is giving it to him as a gift, then ordinarily she is giving it for kiddushin and this is not effective. Therefore, she must specify that she is giving it to him as a gift and that through this she desires that he betroth her, and he clarifies his words that he betroths her through the benefit of receiving this gift. It is implied from his wording that if any one of these is missing, it is not kiddushin. However, the Tur wrote: If she gave and he said, "Behold you are betrothed to me through that which I received from you" – if he is a person of stature she is betrothed, for she benefits from his receiving a gift from her as if he gave her the value of a perutah. Thus far his words. It is clear from this that she does not need to say anything, and he also does not need to clarify "through this benefit that I received a gift from you," but rather ordinarily "through that which I received from you," and such is the opinion of many of our teachers. And there is one who hesitated regarding this, for if so, when she remained silent, who says that her desire was for kiddushin? And if so, this is only a case of doubtful kiddushin even if he spoke with her initially regarding the matters of kiddushin [see Beit Shmuel, subsection 25]. Likewise, from the wording of the Gemara [7a] it is clear that it deals with a case where she said, "Take this maneh and I shall be betrothed to you," see there. Also, regarding the opinion of the Rambam, it must be understood: since she said that she would be betrothed to him and he said to her "through this benefit that I received from you," it is literally a case of "he gave and he spoke," so what novelty is there in this? And it appears to me that what the Rambam wrote, that she should say "Take this dinar and I shall be betrothed to you" – his intention is not that she must say this at the time of the act, for behold her speaking is nothing; rather, it is effective in that it is an admission from her that it is her desire to be betrothed to him based on this giving. And if so, if there is an indication of intent regarding this even from before, it is effective, such as if they arranged a match between them and the discussion between them was that he would betroth her based on her giving to him. And in this, certainly even the Tur admits that if there is no indication of intent here for kiddushin and she gave him a dinar ordinarily, what does it matter what he says to her? Behold, her intent in this was not for kiddushin at all. They only disagree in that the Tur holds it is sufficient when he says to her, "Behold you are betrothed to me through that which I received from you," whereas the Rambam holds that with this it is not sufficient to be certain kiddushin, for behold, according to this wording it implies that he betroths her with his receipt from her, and the Torah said that he must give to her and not she to him. But the Tur holds that even in an ordinary case, this is its meaning: that through the benefit of his receipt he betroths her, and this is the value of a perutah if he is a person of stature [and see Turei Zahav].

And what is called an "important man" requires the investigation of a sage to determine who is not important enough to permit her without a get. According to reason, it appears that when she considers him important and accepts for the sake of honor his acceptance from her, there is no man who is not important. However, from the words of the Rambam, who requires that he say "Be betrothed to me through the benefit of my acceptance from you" and she had said previously "Take this and I will be betrothed to you," and nevertheless he requires that he be an important man, it is proven that it does not avail that she considers him important [unlike the Atzmot Yosef cited in the Ba'er Heitev, subsection 29]. And there are some of our teachers who explained that an "important man" is called one who is not accustomed to receiving gifts [Rashi], and certainly it is impossible to release her without a get as long as it has not been clarified that this man is not in the category of an important man at all. And there is one who wishes to say that specifically where she gave him a dinar does this law apply, and not with a perutah, but it is not logical at all to distinguish between one and the other [and as Abaye challenged on page 11a from the daughters of Rabbi Yannai].

There is one who wishes to say that since in a case where he gave and she spoke, if they were occupied with the matter of kiddushin she is betrothed, for it is as if he spoke; and if so, also in a case where she gave and she spoke and they were occupied with that same matter, it is as if she gave and he spoke, and if so, if he is a distinguished man, she should be betrothed to him. But it is not so, for the fact that when they are occupied with that same matter she is betrothed when he gave and she spoke is not because this is as if he spoke, but rather the reason is that behold, even with silence it is kiddushin; however, when she gave and he spoke to a distinguished man, behold, it specifically requires speech, both according to the Rambam and according to the Tur, as has been written. And the measure of the money of kiddushin has already been explained, that it is a perutah or the value of a perutah, and more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in siman 31.