Siman 154

The sages taught in the Mishnah (at the end of the chapter HaMadir): And these are the ones whom we compel to divorce (with the permission of the government): one afflicted with shechin, which is a leper (the Rambam), and one who is very repulsive and malodorous to the point that the woman is unable to tolerate him (Knesset HaGedolah). And if the doctors are divided as to whether he is such a leper or not, if the majority of them agree that he is, we compel him to divorce (ibid.). And likewise if he is a ba'al polypus, who has a foul odor of the mouth or a foul odor of the nose, and likewise if he had lesions in his mouth and emits a foul discharge, we compel him to divorce (ibid.). And likewise one who has the French disease, called in our language "venerous," and the doctors agree that cohabitation wastes him away—meaning that his flesh dissolves like "his flesh shall rot" (Zechariah 14:12)—and likewise when he has a strong stench or is very repulsive such that the woman is unable to tolerate it, we compel him to divorce (see there in Knesset HaGedolah). And all these are when the doctors say that it is impossible for him to be healed; but if he says that he was healed and she does not believe him, it appears that they should inquire of the doctors (and there he wrote that one should have a doubt regarding this, but I do not know what doubt pertains to a matter that can be clarified by doctors).

And so we learned there that there are those whom they compel due to their craft, for she is able to say "I cannot tolerate this." And these are they: one who gathers dog excrement, for there are places where they prepare hides with it and there are those who soak clothes in it for a day or two before their laundering; and likewise when he is a tanner who processes hides, or if his craft is to cut copper from its source, meaning to extract the copper from its source in the earth, for all of these are crafts that smell foul and not every person can tolerate this. But regarding other types of crafts, even the most degraded, a woman does not have the power to protest against her husband, even if she is of distinguished lineage, and as our Sages, of blessed memory, said: Skin a carcass in the marketplace and do not say "I am a priest" or "I am a great man" (Pesachim 113a).

And there is a doubt whether, if his occupation is cleaning latrines, she has the power to compel him to divorce her. It would seem that it is an a fortiori argument from dog excrement, for human excrement is more malodorous, as is proven in Orach Chaim siman 79, section 4; see there. Or, perhaps specifically regarding dog excrement, which he gathers into one place in order to perform work with them, we compel him; but one who cleans latrines, who carries it away and casts it off, we do not compel him. And it requires further study for the law.

In all these cases where they compel them to divorce, they also give the women their ketubah, but they do not have the additional ketubah, for he granted the addition of his own volition and did not grant it with the intention that she would be divorced from him against his will and take his money (Beit Shmuel, subsection 1). And some say that regarding one afflicted with boils, if it existed before he married her—since in this case we do not allow her to be with him together for his own benefit even if she desires it, as will be explained, and consequently she is able to compel him to divorce her—he is obligated to give also the addition, for he knew of this and himself desired to be damaged in his property (ibid.). And it appears that this is specifically when he knew clearly that this is from the boils such that cohabitation is difficult for him and we do not allow them to be together without witnesses, but if he did not know clearly of this, he does not need to give the addition.

In all these matters, we do not compel him to divorce her except when she claims a divorce; however, if she desired to dwell with her husband, we do not protest against her. And even when she claims a divorce, we do not compel him unless the matter occurred after she married him, or even if it existed beforehand but she did not know of it. But when he was previously in this illness or in this trade and she knew, we do not compel him to divorce her, for she considered and accepted it. And she is unable to say, "I thought I could accept it, but in truth I am unable to accept it," for we also say to her: even if the truth is as you say, nevertheless, how is it in our power to compel him to divorce you? Behold, it is a coerced get, since you knew and considered and accepted it. Except in the case of one afflicted with shechin, even if it existed beforehand and she considered and accepted it; and furthermore, even if he stipulated with her that she would be with him together, and even if she says now, "Leave me be and I will dwell with him," we do not allow her. And all the more so when he subsequently became afflicted with shechin and her desire is to be with him, we do not allow them, for in all other cases when we compel it is for her benefit, but regarding one afflicted with shechin, his benefit in separation is greater than her benefit, because intercourse weakens him and dissolves him and pieces of flesh will fall from him. Therefore, we protest against them being together, unless she says, "I will dwell with him with witnesses so that he shall not come upon me," and in this we listen to her. And consequently, since we do not allow them to join together and she requests a get, we compel him to divorce her and to give her her ketubah, as I wrote in the previous section.

And some say that regarding all matters she is able to say, "I thought that I could accept it, but now I cannot accept it," and they compel him to divorce, unless he stipulated with her beforehand: "Know that my work is such and such," or "I have bad breath," and the like, and she accepted the condition upon herself. In that case, they do not compel him, for it is impossible to compel him since there was a condition regarding this. But in an ordinary case, even though she knew of this, she can nevertheless say, "Now I am unable to accept it" (Ran at the end of the chapter HaMadir in the name of some say, and this is the opinion of the Rashba). Consequently, since there is a dispute in the matter, it is impossible to compel him. It is a great principle regarding the compulsion of a get that whenever there is a dispute regarding the compulsion, we follow the stringent view so that it should not be a coerced get according to those who hold that we do not compel. Therefore, this opinion was not brought in the Shulchan Aruch; see there and see what I wrote in section 63.

One whose husband had bad breath or a nasal odor or was a collector of dog dung or the like, and he died and she fell before his brother for yibum, and he has that same blemish that was in her husband, the sages said in the Mishnah (ibid.) that she can say: "I was able to accept your brother, but I am not able to accept you," and they compel him to perform chalitzah and give her her ketubah. And one should not ask, according to the previous opinion, what novelty there is in this—for even to her husband she could have said "I thought [I could endure it]" as written there, and all the more so regarding the yabam, whom she never thought of or accepted at all. For it can be said that, on the contrary, there is a greater novelty regarding the yabam than regarding the husband; for granted, regarding the husband, she is able to say "I thought my nature would endure this and now I see that I was mistaken," but since she already endured it from her husband and we see that her nature endures this, why should the choice against the yabam now be in her hand regarding a matter that the Torah imposed upon her, when we are witnesses that by her nature she is able to endure it? Nevertheless, the sages said that she is able to say so, because she can say: "My husband I loved, and my nature endured it, but the yabam I do not love, and therefore even my nature cannot endure it" (it appears to me).

One who urinates in bed at night and does not realize it, and she says that she cannot tolerate it, we do not compel him to divorce, and we do not compel her to remain with him (Knesset HaGedolah in the name of the Radbaz). And so too in any place where there is a doubt and we do not compel him to divorce, nevertheless we also do not compel her to remain with him, and she is not considered a moredet (see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 2). And so it appears to me regarding other blemishes or deficiencies where according to the law we do not compel him, nevertheless we also do not compel her, and it is no worse than one who says "he is repulsive to me" as in siman 77, and we conduct ourselves with her according to all the laws explained there. And this is only regarding something that truly many people are unable to tolerate; but a broken arm or a broken leg or if one of his eyes was blinded, she is considered a moredet, as will be explained, for this is not a repulsive thing.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4: A man in whom defects developed after he married, even if his hand or his foot was severed or his eye was blinded, and his wife did not want to dwell with him, we do not compel him to divorce her and give the ketubah; rather, if she wants, she shall dwell, and if she does not want, her law is like the law of a moredet. Thus far his words. And it appears to me that this is specifically regarding defects such as these which the mind can tolerate, but regarding a matter that there are people who cannot tolerate it due to the repulsiveness, her law is not like a moredet.

And even regarding the amputation of a hand or a foot, the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur is that this specifically applies when he was amputated in one hand and one foot, or blinded in one eye; but if both his hands or both his feet were amputated, or he was blinded in both his eyes, we compel him to divorce, for such a person is not fit for anything and is like one who has passed and ceased from the world. And so it appears is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in section 4 (and see the Gra, subsection 16, who disagrees on this). And this is specifically when it occurred to him afterwards, but if he was so beforehand, it depends on the dispute in section 6 (Beit Shmuel, subsection 8). And it is possible that in this case everyone agrees that she cannot say, "I thought I would be able to accept it and now I am unable," for this is not a repulsive thing, and the deficiency from this was not hidden from her. Nevertheless, her law is not like a moredet (ibid.).

The Rosh wrote in a Responsum (Klal 43, Siman 3): And regarding that which she claims, that her husband is insane and foolishness is added to him day by day, and she asks that he divorce her, etc., and her father was poor and due to his distress married her to him, and she thought she could accept it but she cannot accept it, etc., and Reuven responds: You recognized it in him beforehand and you thought and accepted; also, he is not insane, but rather he is not expert in the ways of the world, etc. I do not see matters for which it would be appropriate to compel him regarding them to divorce, for one may not add to what our sages, of blessed memory, enumerated, etc. Therefore, one should not compel him to divorce, but she should appease him so that he divorces, or she should accept him and be sustained from his properties. Thus far his words. And it implies explicitly that one also does not compel her to be with him, and automatically when she is not with him, he is not required to give her maintenance, for it is a simple matter that there is no maintenance for a wife except when she dwells with her husband (and in the Shulchan Aruch it is in section 5).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 5: One who is an epileptic, some say that it is not a defect and we do not compel him to divorce for this, and nevertheless we do not compel her to be with him since she comes with a claim; and some say that it is a defect in a man and we compel him to divorce. Thus far his words. And since there is a dispute among the poskim, we do not compel. And it implies that there is no distinction between one who is an epileptic from time to time or an epileptic without a fixed time. And even though regarding a woman everyone holds that it is a defect, as was written in siman 115, one can distinguish that a woman is satisfied with any [husband] (Mordechai and the Hagahot Ashri). And there are matters that are the opposite, and it requires further study (see there and in the Beit Shmuel, subsection 9). And it is obvious that if it is a type of epilepsy where intercourse is a danger to him or to her, that we compel him to divorce (see Beit Shmuel ibid.). And know that all these compulsions are not with words alone, for "with words a servant will not be corrected," but rather we compel with all types of compulsion that it is possible to do. And in section 63, more will be explained regarding this.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8: If it is known that the man desires to go to another land, they shall adjure him that he not go, or they shall compel him that before he goes he shall divorce her for a time. Thus far his words. That is to say, he shall divorce her with a condition: "If I have not come from now until such-and-such a time," if he does not want to divorce completely without a condition. And we do not compel him regarding the get, for we only compel regarding what the Sages, of blessed memory, stated explicitly, and this is not found in the Gemara. Rather, we compel him not to go to another land, and she is not obligated to follow him, as was written in siman 75. And if because of this compulsion he is forced to give a get, this is not a coerced get, for we do not compel him regarding the get; rather, he gives the get of his own accord in order to be saved from the other compulsion (the Gra, subsection 48). And we have already explained this in siman 134, section 25; see there.

He further wrote in section 9: If the matter is known that he is not permitted to remain in the place where he married her due to danger to life, they compel him to divorce her, for she is not required to follow him. Thus far his words. The intention is not that they compel him regarding the get, for Heaven forbid to do so, but rather they compel him not to abandon her, and consequently he himself, in order to be saved from this, agrees to divorce her, and as I have written, this is not considered compulsion (ibid.). And all these matters are done only when it has been clarified to the beit din that this is how his situation stands, and they do not rely on her words alone without clarification. And likewise, if he made a condition with her at the time of marriage that she would follow him to a certain country, she is obligated to go, and if not, she leaves without a ketubah.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: And there are those who say that if he changed, we compel him by means of the secular courts to divorce, provided that he nullifies [the protest] at the time of the get. Thus far his words. Meaning, that the secular courts shall say and compel him to obey the law of Israel regarding the matter of the get, and like the matter explained in siman 134, see there; and provided that he nullifies all protests at the time of the get as is written there. And such is the primary law, and such is the simple custom. And that which he wrote further, that there are those who disagree and say that we do not compel, or regarding others who transgress the law etc., the intention is not regarding one who changed completely, as is understood. And even regarding this he wrote that if he sins against her, such as if he feeds her a forbidden thing, or if he transgresses that which he obligated himself toward her not to distress her and not to strike her, or if he vows and does not fulfill so that his children die for the sin of vows, as our sages of blessed memory said (Shabbat 32b). Thus far his words. And even though this is not found explicitly in the Gemara, it can be said that it is an a fortiori argument: for if for physical distress such as bad breath we compel, all the more so regarding the life of the soul when he feeds her a forbidden thing; and similarly when he distresses her and strikes her, it is worse than bad breath; and when his children die, it is obvious that it is worse than bad breath, for the pain is beyond measure, and this is the whole of man. And although in the Gemara there are other sins for which children die according to the opinions of the Tannaim, see there, nevertheless for all of them we do not compel since it is a dispute, and this opinion that it is for the sin of vows is primary to the halacha as appears there (and as is evident from Ketubot 72a). Furthermore, there is one who holds there that she herself dies for this sin, see there.

He further wrote that one who is a shepherd of harlots and his wife complains against him, if there is testimony in the matter that they saw him with adulterers or if he confessed, some say that we compel him to divorce. However, because they bring children to him, there is no concern, as perhaps they are lying about him. Thus far his words. And even though regarding other transgressions when they do not affect her we do not compel him to divorce, nevertheless, regarding a shepherd of harlots we compel, for it certainly affects her regarding her conjugal rights, as a shepherd of harlots finds the permitted loathsome and "stolen waters are sweet" to him, and certainly he is loathsome to her. And it is possible that there is also danger in the matter. And it is not only necessary according to the opinion of the Rambam, who holds that in a case of "he is loathsome to me" we compel to divorce, but even those who disagree regarding "he is loathsome to me" would admit in such a case. For it is explained in the Gemara that regarding one who rebels against intimacy we compel, and all the more so regarding a shepherd of harlots, which is worse, as is understood. And all this is when the matter has been clarified with absolute clarity.

He further wrote in section 3 that a man who is accustomed to become angry and cast his wife out of his house constantly, we compel him to divorce, because through this he sometimes does not provide sustenance and separates from her regarding intimacy more than her appointed time, and he is like one who rebels against providing sustenance and intimacy. Thus far his words. And so the Rashba ruled. And consequently, we do not hasten to divorce, for even regarding one who is prohibited by a vow, it was explained in siman 70 and siman 77 how to act, and all the more so in such a case; rather, the intention is that first we castigate him according to what the beit din sees fit, and if it does not avail, we compel him to divorce. However, in the Responsa of the Rashba (693), it implies that since he is accustomed to this, it is impossible to stand with him in law and judgment, and we compel him immediately; see there. Nevertheless, it is as I wrote, that until he becomes accustomed to this, we presumably do not remain silent regarding it, and consequently, when it does not avail and he is accustomed to this, then law and judgment no longer avail.

He further wrote: A man who strikes his wife, a transgression is in his hand like one who strikes his fellow. If he is accustomed to this, it is within the power of the beit din to discipline him and lash him with all types of chastisement and coercion, and to adjure him that he shall not do so again. If he does not obey the words of the beit din, some say that they coerce him to divorce, provided that they warn him first once or twice, for it is not the way of the children of Israel to strike their wives, and this is a deed of Egyptians. All this is when he initiates, but if she curses him without cause or disparages his father and mother, and he rebuked her with words and she does not heed him, some say that it is permitted to strike her, and some say that even a bad wife is forbidden to strike. The first opinion is primary. If it is not known who is the cause, the husband is not believed to say that she is the one who initiates, for all women are in the presumption of fitness, and they place others between them to see from whom this evil comes. If she curses him without cause, she leaves without a ketubah; and it appears to me specifically when she is accustomed to this and after a warning, as I have written above in siman 115. If she went from his house and borrowed and ate, if she leaves because he struck her constantly, he is obligated to pay, as I have written above in siman 70. Thus far his words. The general rule in these matters, even in our times when we do not have the power to establish the laws of the religion on their foundation, nevertheless we look into and strive to make peace between a man and his wife. If we see that it is impossible to make peace between them, we strive for a get, that they should divorce one another of their own good will, and so we conduct ourselves.

A man and his wife who are quarreling, and they understand that the cause of this is a man or a woman who is in their house or in their neighborhood, such as her mother-in-law or her sister-in-law or an enemy of hers and the like, the obligation is incumbent upon the beit din to remove them from their house and their neighborhood. The husband cannot say, "I will not remove them because of my wife," and we do not listen to him, for you have no greater obligation than that which the husband is obligated to honor and cherish his wife and not to cause her pain. Thus ruled the early authorities (see Be'er HaGolah, letter 10, what he wrote in the name of the Mahariw):

The Tur wrote: One who says, "I will not sustain and I will not provide," or who does not want to cohabit, they compel him and he must divorce immediately and give the ketubah if she so desires. Thus far his words. However, the Rif and the Rambam in chapter 12 of Ishut ruled that they compel him to provide sustenance, for rather than compelling him to divorce, it is better to compel him to give her sustenance. And so they ruled in the Shulchan Aruch, section 3. But the Rosh and the Tur hold that a woman is ashamed to come to beit din every time to claim her sustenance, and "a person does not dwell with a serpent in one basket." And so ruled the Halakhot Gedolot. And the two opinions are in the Gemara (at the end of chapter HaMadir). And the Rosh, of blessed memory, cited from the Yerushalmi (Gittin chapter 9, halakha 9) which rules accordingly, and so it is stated there: If because of a bad odor they compel, because of life itself, is it not all the more so? Thus far his words. And it appears to me that the Rif and the Rambam, of blessed memory, were not concerned for this since in our Gemara it is stated with a language of wonderment regarding the one who says that they compel to divorce, see there. Furthermore, it appears that the Yerushalmi also holds so, for after this it is stated there in the Yerushalmi: Rabbi Yassa in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: One who says, "I will not sustain and I will not provide," they say to him, "Either sustain and provide or release." Thus far his words. Behold, even afterward they warn him that he should provide, and not that they compel him immediately to divorce. And one cannot say that this is only after his statement when he has not yet performed an act of not providing for her, for this is a simple matter, as a mere statement is nothing, and a person is prone to threaten and not act. However, the truth appears to me that all the opinions do not disagree on the law, for certainly it is a wondrous thing to say that immediately on the first occasion when he did not give her sustenance, they would immediately and instantly compel him to divorce. And the matter is simple: that they observe and chastise him and speak to him words of persuasion, and if he persists in his rebellion, they compel him to divorce. And the intention of the Rif and the Rambam was not that they should always compel him to provide, but rather at the beginning of his rebellion they try a few times to compel him to provide, and if it does not help, they compel to divorce. And also the intention of the Rosh is simple, that they do not compel to divorce on the first occasion. And also in the Gemara they do not disagree, but only that it wondered at the language which says: One who says, "I will not sustain and I will not provide," shall divorce and give the ketubah, which implies immediately; for it is not so, but rather initially we compel him to provide, and when it does not help, we compel him to divorce. And this is the intention of the Yerushalmi as well (so it appears to me).

The Rambam, of blessed memory, (ibid.) and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that if the beit din is unable to compel him to provide sustenance, such as when he has nothing with which to provide and does not wish to be hired to earn and provide, if she desires, they compel him to divorce immediately and give the ketubah. And such is the law for one who does not wish to engage in tashmish. Thus far the wording of the Shulchan Aruch. And if he does not have the means to give the ketubah, the ketubah shall remain a debt upon him until he attains the means (Rambam). And regarding compulsion, tashmish and sustenance are equal; however, regarding the specific laws of a mored, there is a distinction between them regarding adding to her ketubah, as was written in siman 77 (Beit Shmuel, subsection 7). And there is a doubt when he gives her sustenance, but less than what he eats himself, whether they compel him to divorce because of this or not. And it appears that they do not compel him to divorce, but rather one must chastise him and rebuke him, for this is a wicked, cruel act, until he returns from his way, and to make him understand that she rises with him and does not descend with him.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (Yevamot 64a): If one married a woman and remained with her for ten years and she did not give birth, he is not permitted to desist. And it is stated there in a Baraita: If one married a woman and remained with her for ten years and she did not give birth, he shall divorce her and give the ketubah, for perhaps he did not merit to be built up through her. Even though there is no proof for the matter, there is a remembrance for the matter: "At the end of ten years of Abram's dwelling in the land of Canaan," to teach you that dwelling outside of the land does not count for him toward the total. Therefore, if he fell ill or she fell ill, or both of them were incarcerated in a beit ha'asurim, they do not count for him toward the total. Thus far his words.

The explanation of these matters is that for the fulfillment of the mitzvah of peru u-revu, the sages estimated that a woman who has not given birth for ten years while she was with her husband is unlikely to give birth further. Therefore, the obligation is incumbent upon him either to divorce her and marry another, or to marry another in addition to her (Nimukei Yosef) in a place where it is permitted to marry two wives, and the choice is in his hand. She cannot say to him, "Why must you divorce me? Take another for yourself," because he can say to her that as long as I do not divorce you, they will not give me another (ibid.), for most women do not agree that the husband should have two wives because they are rivals to one another. Therefore, the Tanna was precise to say "he is not permitted to desist," meaning he should do one of these two things. And so as not to err that the intention is only that he should marry another and not divorce her, the Baraita explained explicitly that the authority is in his hand to divorce and give the ketubah. This applies specifically if she did not give birth at all, but if she gave birth even to one child, even though the mitzvah of peru u-revu is a male and a female, nevertheless we are not concerned with it (ibid.). There is one who says that as long as he does not have a male and a female he is obligated to divorce, but it is not so (Rashba and Nimukei Yosef).

The Tanna brought proof from Abraham, who waited with Sarah ten years in the land of Canaan and afterward married Hagar. And why was Abraham not concerned about this while he was outside the land, for he remained with her much longer than ten years and did not marry another? Because he knew that he was barren and would only merit to be built up in the Land of Israel, as the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to him: "Go forth from your land... and I will make you into a great nation." Therefore, when he remained ten years in the Land of Israel and Sarah did not bear for him, he was concerned about this and married Hagar. And that which the Tanna says, that dwelling outside the land does not count toward the number, the intention is not for everyone, for if so, you have nullified this law outside the land; yet procreation is an obligation of the person and its obligation is in every place (ibid.). Furthermore, the majority of the world procreates outside the land, and shall we attribute the matter to the punishment of being outside the land because of one in a thousand (the Rosh)? Furthermore, it is explicitly proven in the Gemara there that the Amoraim who were in Babylonia practiced this law; see there (ibid.). Rather, it refers only to Abraham, for he was not concerned about this outside the land because he knew that he had to ascend to the Land of Israel.

And in truth, some say that a person who is accustomed to dwelling in the Land and left for outside the Land, the dwelling outside the Land does not count toward the number for him (the Rashba in the name of the Ra'avad), and so it is implied in the Yerushalmi. And some say further that one who stayed with his wife outside the Land and came to the Land of Israel, the dwelling outside the Land does not count for him, and he counts ten years from the day of his dwelling in the Land of Israel, for perhaps the merit of the Land will stand for them (ibid.). And regarding this, we have not found among the poskim explicitly that they would disagree with this. And in any case, it is agreed upon by all our teachers that this law applies in every place and at all times. And in the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, positive commandment 49, there is a wondrous matter regarding this, and this is his wording: It is implied that if he stayed ten years even outside the Land he must divorce, and so ruled our teacher Moshe and Rav Alfas. However, I saw in the Yerushalmi: Rabbi Ami in the name of Resh Lakish: "At the end of ten years etc." — exclude the years he spent outside the Land; and it was taught likewise: if he became ill or she became ill or if he went to the provinces of the sea, they do not count. Thus far his words. And I do not know his intention, for behold, even in our Shas it is stated so, as I have written, and it requires further study (see there in the Maharo'sh).

And the explanation of the matters that the baraita stated, "therefore if he became ill etc.," meaning that just as for Avraham, he was not fit to father children and he attributed it to this, it follows that we attribute this occurrence to any possible cause. And if so, also when he or she became ill, even though they engaged in relations during the entire time, nevertheless we attribute the lack of pregnancy to his illness or her illness. And similarly, when they were incarcerated in a beit ha'asurim, even though they engaged in relations there, nevertheless we attribute the prevention of pregnancy to the anxiety of the beit ha'asurim. But the intention is not when they did not engage in relations at all, for if so, this would not be a novelty at all (the Rosh). And therefore it says that both of them were incarcerated, for if only one was incarcerated, it is obvious, since they were not together and did not engage in relations, that this is not part of the calculation. However, from the language of the Yerushalmi that we cited in the previous section, it does not imply this.

And the reason for the matter, that we rely on all these concerns to cancel the mitzvah of procreation, is that in truth it is a great stringency that the sages imposed upon him to divorce her. For in all the mitzvot, a person is not obligated to do more than the command of the Holy One, Blessed be He, and in this mitzvah the Holy One, Blessed be He, commanded us in His Torah to marry a woman in order to beget children. Since he married a woman who is not a known barren woman or an aylonit, and she is fit to give birth, what more is there for him to do? For these are the secrets of the Merciful One as to why he does not beget. However, because of the greatness of the mitzvah of procreation, the sages imposed upon him to test himself with another woman, perhaps he will be built up through her. Therefore, they limited the time for this to ten years, and also if there is any pretext upon which we can hang the lack of birth, we rely even on a slight pretext.

And this is what our Sages, of blessed memory, said: "He must divorce her and give her the ketubah, perhaps he did not merit to be built up through her." This means that even though we could attribute it to him being unfit to father children—for if he said, "I know within myself that I am unfit to father children," it is obvious that we do not compel him to marry another, and so it is proven in the Shas there (where they said that they became barren from the lectures of Rav Huna), that a person is believed regarding himself when we see that he is not acting in a rebellious manner (Nimukei Yosef there)—if so, why do we not attribute it to him being unfit to father children? Rather, because of the greatness of the mitzvah, as long as it has not been clarified for him that he is not capable of fathering children, we do not attribute it to him but rather to her. And if it is difficult: for in any case, if we attribute it to her, why should he give her a ketubah? And even when there is a doubt in the matter, how can she extract money based on a doubt? To this the Tanna says that we attribute it neither to him nor to her, but rather "perhaps he did not merit to be built up through her," meaning to say that both are fit to father children, but when joined together they are not fit. And this is not like extracting money based on a doubt, for the majority of women are fit to give birth, and we do not see in her signs of a barren woman or an ailonit, and she is the presumptive holder of the ketubah; therefore, he gives her her ketubah. And see in section 30.

If he did not wish to listen to us, we compel him to divorce, as with all mitzvot where we compel. And even if she says that the prevention is from him, such as if she says that he does not "shoot like an arrow" and the like, we do not listen to her, and we compel him to marry another (Beit Shmuel, subsection 23); for specifically if he himself says that he is not fit to father children, then we do not compel, as I have written. And even if he said, "I will not have relations with her, and behold I will dwell with her in the presence of witnesses so that I do not remain in seclusion with her"—meaning that automatically I will be forced to marry another—we do not listen to him, whether she said so, or whether he said so, or whether both of them said so; rather, he must divorce her and marry another who is fit to give birth (Gemara, end of chapter HaMadir). And the reason is that according to the majority, as long as she is bound to him, they will not give him another (the Rosh and the Ran there). And that which we wrote in section 23, that the choice is in his hand to marry another and not divorce her, certainly it is so; if he married another, why should we compel him to divorce her? Even here we say that we do not rely on his words in this matter because of the reason that has been explained, that perhaps they will not give him another. And we have already written that all this is when he has not fathered children at all, but if he has surviving offspring, even if he does not have a male and a female such that he has not yet fulfilled procreation, we do not compel him to divorce. And even if he has only a daughter alone. And in siman 1 it was explained that in this time we are not accustomed to compel at all; see there.

And it has already been explained that if there is a reason to attribute the lack of birth, we attribute it to the reason and count ten years from the day the reason passed. And all the more so when he was not in his home for a period of time, for it is not part of the count. And similarly, when they had children and they died, we count ten years from the day they died. And similarly, if she miscarried a fetus, even within forty days, we count ten years from the day she miscarried. And only if she miscarried three consecutive times is she established as one who miscarries, and he is obligated to divorce her and marry another, and he shall give her a ketubah. And he cannot say, "Why should I give you a ketubah, for behold, you are established as one who miscarries," for she can say that he did not merit to be built up through her. Therefore, she is also permitted to marry another. And the reason we attribute it to him not meriting to be built up through her, and we do not say the opposite—that she did not merit to be built up through him—is because we see that this is a matter of punishment from Heaven. And it is reasonable to say regarding him that he is punished such that he cannot fulfill the mitzvah, whereas she is not commanded in p'ru u'rvu, and it is not so relevant to say that they punish her in this (Yevamot 64b). And even though it is certainly a punishment for her as well, for every woman desires children, nevertheless, his punishment is greater than her punishment, and therefore we attribute it to him and not to her (if she miscarries three times, even before ten years, he shall send her out).

If there is a contradiction between him and her, where according to his words he is not yet obligated to divorce her and according to her words he is obligated to divorce her—for example, he says she miscarried within the ten years and it is necessary to count from the time she miscarried, and she says she did not miscarry—she is believed. And thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said: that if she had miscarried, she would not have established herself as a barren woman, and we learn from this that she is speaking the truth. And similarly, if he says she miscarried only twice and she says she miscarried three times, she is believed, for if it were not according to her words, she would not have established herself as a woman who miscarries. And since according to her words he must divorce her and give her a ketubah, and he contradicts her with a certain claim, this is like all monetary claims, and she must swear a shevuat hesset that she did not miscarry, or that she miscarried three times, for through this claim he will be obligated to give her a ketubah. And even though she is not currently claiming the ketubah, nevertheless, this is similar to a borrower who says the time for payment has not yet arrived, where the lender must swear regarding a loan with a document, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 73. And even though in every place where the lender swears and takes he must swear a severe oath, nevertheless, regarding the contradiction of the time alone, a hesset is sufficient (Sma ibid. subsection 12). And even though the Sages believed her regarding the law itself for the reason that was explained, nevertheless, regarding the ketubah she must swear since he contradicts her; and granted that she has the presumption that we wrote, we do not follow the majority in matters of money, and certainly not a presumption.

And that which we said, that the reason she is believed is because she did not establish herself as a barren woman, is not specifically when she says explicitly "I am barren," but rather since she says "I did not miscarry within ten [years]" and the world considers the absence of childbirth within ten years as barrenness—even though we permit her to marry another and attribute the absence of childbirth to him, that he did not merit to be built up through her—nevertheless, in the mouths of the world she is established as barren, and who knows if she will find someone who will marry her. Therefore, she is believed even when she does not say explicitly "I am barren" (Yam Shel Shlomo, Yevamot chapter 6, Sefer Mitzvot Gadol). However, from the commentary of Rashi there it implies somewhat that it is specifically when she says "I am barren," for he explained regarding what they said in the Gemara there: she says "I did not miscarry, but rather I am barren." Thus far his words. And that which was explained, that specifically with three times is she established as one who miscarries—even though regarding marrying a third after ten years she is established as barren even with two, as will be explained—nevertheless, regarding one who miscarries it is not so, because there are many women who miscarry at the beginning of their pregnancy (Nimukei Yosef). And some say that even regarding one who miscarries she is established with two, but we do not rule accordingly, for so ruled most of the Rishonim, and so it implies in the Shas there (see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 27).

And this is why we are not concerned that perhaps she set her eyes on another and would not be believed, as in the case of one who says "I am impure to you" or "Heaven is between me and you," where we are concerned that perhaps she set her eyes on another as taught at the end of Nedarim; because here it was after ten years that she did not give birth. And in the case of one who miscarries three times, we are also not concerned for this, since according to his words as well, she miscarries. And some say that specifically when the beit din compelled him to divorce, but he excuses himself saying she miscarried within the ten years, then when she says "I did not miscarry but rather I am barren," she is believed (Nimukei Yosef and Yam Shel Shlomo). And similarly regarding the one who miscarries, it deals also with a case where they compelled him to divorce and he excuses himself saying she only miscarried twice, then when she says "I miscarried three times," she is believed. But otherwise she is not believed because we are concerned that perhaps she set her eyes on another. And it is implied from their words that even after ten years we are concerned that she set her eyes on another, and similarly when we know that in any case she miscarries. And this requires further study, for seemingly since there is evidence for the matter, we should not have been concerned for this (and so it appears in Tosafot there 65a, s.v. "she-beino le-veina," and see Beit Shmuel subsection 29). And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven.

And there is a question regarding this: why should he not be believed with a migo, for if he wanted, he could have said, "I know of myself that I am not fit to father children," in which case we do not compel him to divorce, as written in section 29? And there is one who answered that since even according to his words she miscarried twice, and we see that he is fit to father children, we no longer believe him when he says that he became impaired afterward (Nimukei Yosef). And granted that if he said so he is believed, nevertheless this is not a migo. However, this applies to one who miscarries, but in a case where she stayed ten years and did not give birth, when he says that she did not miscarry at all, why should he not be believed with this migo (Beit Shmuel, subsection 30)? And there is one who says that this also refers to a case where he fathered a child once (ibid.), but it is a forced explanation, for if so, the Gemara and the poskim should have said that only in this matter is she believed. Therefore, it appears that this is not a migo at all, for just as she is believed because she does not establish herself as a barren woman, so too he has no migo for this reason, as it is not pleasing to him to establish himself as a barren man; and granted that if he said so he is believed, nevertheless he has no migo (ibid.). Furthermore, it appears that it was obvious to the Gemara that her chazakah is a strong chazakah, and we do not say migo in the place of a strong chazakah, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 82 in the rules of migo, letter 2; see there.

If one remained with his wife ten years and divorced her because she did not give birth, she is permitted to marry a second husband for the reason we have written: that we attribute it to him not having merit to be built up through her, and not because she is barren. And if she remained with him also ten years and did not give birth, her law with him is as the law with the first. And if the second divorced her, she shall not marry a third anymore, for with two times there is a chazaka that she is not fit to give birth. And even though regarding matters of money there is no chazaka in less than three times, nevertheless regarding this matter, with two times there is a chazaka, and only regarding a miscarriage is the law as in matters of money for the reason we explained in section 32. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said in Yevamot (64b), see there. And the reason appears to me to be that regarding a matter that departs from the norm of other people, a chazaka of two times alone is sufficient; only regarding matters of money is it impossible with less than three times in any case (see there and examine closely). And there are further reasons for this (see the Rif and the Yam Shel Shlomo, and it requires further study):

And if she married a third, we compel him to divorce her immediately, and she has no ketubah unless he recognized her condition and married her on this condition, for then he is obligated to give her her ketubah, as he has caused his own loss. Regarding the matter of compelling the divorce, if he has another wife or if he has already fulfilled the commandment of procreation, we do not compel him to divorce, for all these laws apply when he has not yet fulfilled procreation. Therefore, this third husband, when he has fulfilled procreation and married her, even if he did not recognize her condition, she has a ketubah when he wishes to divorce her (Beit Shmuel). And one should not ask: since regarding monetary matters there is no chazakah in fewer than three times as has been written, why does she not have a ketubah from the third when he divorces her before she has remained with him ten years? For even though one could distinguish between extracting money and seeking to retain what is in one's possession, nevertheless, it does not imply so, as is proven from the Gemara, for we say plainly that regarding monetary matters there is no chazakah in fewer than three. For in truth, it can be said that here there is another reason: since we compel him to divorce when he has not fulfilled procreation and does not have another wife, and he did not recognize her condition, behold, his purchase is a mistaken purchase, and it follows automatically that she has no ketubah (Tosafot ibid. 65a, s.v. tetzei).

Since it has been explained that regarding a prohibition it is a chazakah after two times, and for this reason she does not receive a ketubah from the third, as has been written, there is a question regarding this: why does she receive a ketubah from the second when he remained with her ten years and she did not give birth? For behold, now she is established as a barren woman, and the second should also say to her, "Behold, my purchase was a mistaken purchase and I will not give you a ketubah." For it can be said that since she was married to him permissibly, and all the first ten years she was his complete wife, it follows that afterwards when we compel him to divorce her, he is obligated to give her her ketubah, for behold, for ten years she was his complete wife. This is not the case with the third, whose purchase is entirely mistaken, for behold, we compel him to remove her immediately (I learned this from the words of the Nimukei Yosef). And so it is implied in the Yerushalmi, and further regarding this will be explained shortly (see Tosafot, starting with "Niset").

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 18: If she stayed with the third husband ten years and did not give birth, if she had not collected the ketubah from the first husbands, she shall not collect it; and if she collected it, she shall not return it. Thus far his words. And the reason for this is that they can say to her: "Behold, the matter has been revealed that you are a barren woman." And if she collected it, she shall not return it, because she can say: "Now I have become impaired, but with you, though I did not give birth, I was fit, and you did not merit to be built up through me." But that she should extract payment from them with this claim is impossible, since they are the possessors and it is impossible for her to clarify her claim. And even though according to what I wrote in the previous section, behold, she married them permissibly, and why should they not pay her the ketubah? For one can say that the reason we wrote only avails in a place where the presumption has not yet been completely clarified, meaning she was not established as such three times, but only two times; for although regarding the prohibition we are stringent, nevertheless regarding her ketubah she extracts it from them, since she married permissibly and can still say: "You did not merit to be built up through me, and not that I am a barren woman." And since she dwelt under them for ten years, she is entitled to a ketubah. This is not the case when her barrenness was clarified with absolute clarity through three times, with ten years for each time; it is obvious that they can say to her that according to what has now been revealed, the matter is revealed that our transaction was a mistaken transaction, for everyone knows that a man marries a woman only to beget children, and therefore she has no ketubah. And in truth, when she collected it she does not return it also because she can say: "Now I have become impaired," since she collected it legally at the time of the act. And one should not ask that if so, the first two will always say: "We will not give you a ketubah until you marry a third and remain with him ten years and the matter is clarified if you are entitled to it from us or not," for we never find that when the obligation is currently clear, the debtor may say: "I will wait a duration of many years and perhaps it will be clarified that I am not obligated." And furthermore, she can say: "It is not my will to marry at all," and it will never be clarified.

When she marries a third and he divorces her without a ketubah as has been explained, and afterward she marries a fourth and gives birth, she cannot collect a ketubah from the third with the claim that "it has been revealed that I am not barren, and only you did not merit to be built up through me in the first years," because he can say to her that she has now been healed and not previously. For the general principle of the matter is that whenever at the time of the act, according to the depth of the law, he is exempt from her ketubah for whatever reason it may be, even if afterward it appears that the reason was not so, we find every justification that we have to say that at the time of the judgment the reason was true. And so too the opposite, for if not so, no law would ever be sustained. And so too the third cannot disqualify her and say, "Had I known that you are a mother of children I would not have divorced you, and I divorced you in error," because she can also say, "Now I have been healed" (Gemara ibid.). And one should not ask how we may rely on this in a matter of prohibition, for in truth it is only a mere rejection to answer him if he should protest; but the primary reason is that we are witnesses that the third, when he divorced her, divorced her in any event (Rashi), even if she should give birth afterward, for he divorces her out of doubt. For on account of a mere presumption that she ceased from giving birth, there is no complete sign here, and when he divorced her, even on the condition that she might give birth he divorced her, and it is not within his power to protest. Therefore, the sages, of blessed memory, did not require saying to them at the time of the get that they should know that one who divorces for this reason may never take her back, as they required regarding vows, and an aylonit, and one who brings forth an evil name, as has been explained above in siman 10, see there. For there, there is a proven assessment as to why he divorces her, and they were concerned for disqualification and required informing them; but here it is a slight assessment and a mere sign, and everyone knows that he divorces her in any event and he will not be able to disqualify her (Nimukei Yosef).

It has already been explained in siman 1 that a woman is not commanded regarding pru u'rvu, and she is also not commanded regarding "He created it to be inhabited," rather she is included in the general category of "inhabited," but the mitzvah is not upon her, as was written there in section 4; see there. Therefore, a woman who comes to beit din and says, "My husband does not father children because he is sterile," and the matter is clarified by his own admission or by doctors that it is so, and she is not lying, nevertheless they say to her: "Go your way," and you do not have the power to compel him to give a get and ketubah, for you are not commanded regarding pru u'rvu (Yevamot end of chapter 6). It is somewhat implied from the commentary of Rashi there that when she requests a get without a ketubah, they compel him to give it. Similarly, if she says, "Even though I am not commanded regarding pru u'rvu, nevertheless it is my desire to have a child so that I will have someone to lean upon in my old age," and she does not yet have any son or daughter, neither from him nor from another, her claim is a valid claim, and they compel him to divorce her and to give her a ketubah. Similarly, even if she does not claim this but only says that he is unable to live with her in the way of all the earth, and "he leans upon his house but it does not stand" because he lacks the strength of men, and she requests her visitation and her onah, and he does not deny it, or she clarifies this through doctors, they also compel him to divorce her and to give her her ketubah (see Be'er Sheva subsection 18). This is no worse than one afflicted with boils, whom they compel to divorce her because he is not permitted to have relations with a woman. And it appears to me that with this claim, even if she already has sons and daughters, she can compel him to divorce her and give a ketubah, since it is difficult for her to be without tashmish, and "more than the man desires to marry, the woman desires to be married" (and in Ketubot 64b it is regarding the matter of pain as Rashi explained there, and not regarding the matter of desire; and examine this carefully). And also within ten years her claim is a valid claim, since he does not deny it.

And if in this matter there is a denial between him and her, where he says that the prevention of procreation is from her and she says that the prevention is from him, and it is impossible to clarify, the sages, of blessed memory, spoke in this language (Yevamot 65a): He said from her and she said from him; Rabbi Ami said she is believed, for in matters that are between him and her she is believed. What is the reason? She is certain regarding "shooting like an arrow" and that he does not inseminate, and he is not certain. Consequently, her claim is like a certain claim and his claim is like an uncertain claim, and thus the sages, of blessed memory, established that the woman senses this more than the man. And one should not say why we do not fear that she set her eyes on another; there are some of our teachers who wrote that this refers to after he stayed with her ten years and she did not give birth (Tosafot ibid.). And so wrote the Tur, that in such a case this concern is not relevant since there is proof for the matter, not like the opinion of the "there are those who say" in section 33, see there. And if it is difficult, for if so, even without this we compel him, one can say that this refers to where he has children from another woman, for in such a case we do not compel him as has been explained, and only when she comes by way of a claim of support for her old age, for then we compel if he admits to this as I have written, and even if he does not admit, she is believed for the reason that she is certain (ibid.).

And there are some of our teachers who wrote that the dispute is only regarding the ketubah, but regarding the divorce, beit din compels him, such as when he tarried ten years and has no children and he only wants her to lose her ketubah with his claim that she is not fit to give birth and his purchase was a mistaken purchase, and she contradicts him and says that the prevention is from him, and she is believed and he is obligated to give her a ketubah. And this is the method of the Rif, of blessed memory. And the reason she is believed is that since she claims with certainty, and by law she has a ketubah, it is not within his power to make her lose it with his claim of "perhaps" (Nimukei Yosef). And it implies somewhat that if she married a third and by law she has no ketubah as has been written, she is not able to extract a ketubah from him with her claim of certainty. And some say that even in such a case she is believed (Rivam in Tosafot ibid.). And even though we hold in Choshen Mishpat siman 75 that in a case of "certainty and perhaps" we establish the money in the possession of the defendant, nevertheless regarding a ketubah in such a case where he married her, it can be said that her "certainty" is effective, and it requires further study. And according to several poskim it is not so.

And according to what has been explained, that the reason she is believed is because she knows regarding "shooting like an arrow" and he does not know, and it is a case of "certain and uncertain," then automatically when the claim is "certain and certain"—such as if she says he lacks virility or that he does not cohabit with her in the manner of all the earth, and he contradicts her—she is not believed. And even though at the end of Nedarim it says the opposite—that in what he knows as well as she, and she claims, she is believed because she would not embolden herself before her husband, and in what he does not know, such as "shooting like an arrow," she is not believed—the reason is simple: for there she comes to remove herself from her husband, and he does not wish to divorce her, and likewise the beit din does not compel him since it is within ten years. In this, certainly in a matter where he cannot contradict her, she is not believed to remove herself against his will, for in this she would embolden herself; but in what he knows as well as she and she contradicts him, she presumably speaks the truth, for there is a presumption that she does not embolden herself in a matter where he knows she is lying. But here, he comes to divorce her, or by way of the beit din who compel him since it is after ten years, and she does not desire to leave, and the dispute is only regarding the ketubah; and certainly "certain and uncertain" is preferable to "certain and certain" as in every monetary claim (Ramban and Ran, end of Nedarim). However, this is only according to the resolution in the previous section, and not according to the resolution in section 41 that we wrote, that here too she comes to remove herself from him as written there. However, even this is well-settled, for just as we are in doubt if it is in her power to release herself from him when it is within ten years and we suspect she is lying because she set her eyes on another, certainly the logic is that in what he does not know as well as she, it is easier for her to embolden herself more than in a matter he knows as well as she. But here, where the departure from him is as if clarified to us because it is after ten years as written there, and nothing remains except regarding the ketubah, it is like every monetary claim where "certain and uncertain" is preferable to "certain and certain" (and see Teshuvot Maimoni to Hilkhot Ishut, siman 6, and examine it closely).

And know that in all these matters, there are perplexing things in the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, in the fifteenth chapter of Ishut, for he wrote there, and this is his wording: If he married a woman and she remained with him ten years and did not give birth, he shall send her out and give the ketubah, or he shall marry a woman capable of giving birth, etc. If she remained ten years and did not give birth, and his semen shoots like an arrow, the presumption is that the illness is from her, and she shall go out without a ketubah, etc. And if it does not shoot like an arrow, the presumption is that the illness is from him alone, and he shall send her out and give the ketubah, etc. If he says the child was withheld because of her, and she says it was withheld because of him since it does not shoot like an arrow, she is believed, etc. And if she said, "I do not know if it is from him or from me," she does not have the principal of the ketubah; leave the money in the possession of its owners until she claims with certainty that it does not shoot like an arrow. And why is she believed? Because she feels whether it shoots like an arrow or does not shoot like an arrow, and he does not feel. Thus far his words.

He further wrote: A woman who comes to demand that her husband divorce her after ten years because she has not given birth, and she says that he does not "shoot like an arrow," we listen to her; even though she is not commanded in procreation, she needs children for her old age, and we compel him to release her, and he shall give the principal of the ketubah alone, etc. Thus far his words. And afterwards in law 15 he wrote: A woman who comes to beit din and said, "My husband is unable to engage in relations in the manner of all the earth, relations that produce offspring, or he does not shoot like an arrow," the judges shall make a compromise and say to her, "It is proper that you conduct yourself with your husband until you have waited ten years and do not give birth, and afterwards you may sue," and they roll the matter along with her, but they do not compel her to remain nor do they judge her with the law of a rebel woman, but rather they prolong this matter until they make a compromise. Thus far his words. And this is from the Mishnah at the end of Nedarim.

And behold, according to his words, even regarding the first husband where he stayed ten years, that they compel him to divorce her and give her a ketubah, this is specifically when the impediment is from him or when she says that the impediment is from him. But if there is only a doubt in the matter, she does not have a ketubah. And according to this, one must ask: how do you find a case where they compel him to divorce and give a ketubah? If it was clarified or she says that the impediment is from him, why would they compel him to divorce her? Behold, he is not fit to father children. And if it was not clarified, behold, she does not have a ketubah (Lechem Mishneh in the name of Rabbi Y. ibn Lev). And in truth, the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, disagreed with him, for regarding the first and second [husband] she has a ketubah in any event. And it must be said that the Rambam holds that although she is believed to say that he does not "shoot like an arrow" regarding the collection of her ketubah, nevertheless, regarding his prohibition, that they should not compel him to divorce and fulfill the mitzvah of p'ru u'rvu, she is not believed (ibid.). And it is difficult to say so, for if so, his law applies only when she says [so], and from the arrangement of his wording it implies that even if it is known that he does not "shoot like an arrow," he must divorce and give the ketubah, for he wrote so explicitly before the law of "she says," as I have written.

Therefore, it appears to me that the Rambam holds that even when it has been clarified that he does not shoot like an arrow and is obligated to give her a ketubah, nevertheless we say that he did not merit to be built up through her, and when he takes another wife the matter will be rectified; therefore, we compel him to divorce her. And if she married a third husband, even if he also does not shoot like an arrow, nevertheless she shall leave without a ketubah, as he wrote there later, see there, because her fortune caused it and she was established by way of three men that anyone who comes upon her does not shoot like an arrow (and with this the difficulty of the Tosafot at the end of the chapter "HaMadir" and in Yevamot 64a, starting with the words "He shall divorce," is answered; and let us say that in this the Amora'im disagree: when it has been clarified that he does not shoot like an arrow, whether we compel him to divorce, and the one who holds that we do not compel establishes the Mishnah when it has not been clarified, and nevertheless he is obligated to give her ketubah according to the opinion of all the poskim, and examine this carefully).

And regarding that which he wrote, that when she claims after ten years to be divorced and says that he does not "shoot like an arrow," we listen to her and compel him to divorce and to give the ketubah, thus far his words; one should not ask why we must wait for her claim, for should we not compel him to divorce from his side? For it can be said simply, such as in a case where he has another wife or has already fulfilled pru u'rvu. However, it is explained in the Gemara that this is specifically when she says, "I desire a staff for my hand and a spade for my burial," but without this, we say to her, "Go, you are not commanded." Yet from his words, it is clear that we compel him as a matter of course, and the beit din does not say to her, "Go, you are not commanded." And it appears to me that he holds that certainly, as a matter of course, such is her intention—that her desire is for children to rely upon in the time of her old age—and we do not attribute it to say that she is mistaken and thinks she is commanded in pru u'rvu. And so it implies explicitly in the Yerushalmi at the end of the sixth chapter of Yevamot, where it is stated there that if she comes to marry, we listen to her words, see there (even though it could be said that the Yerushalmi is dealing with a case where she has no husband at all, yet it does not imply so, and so wrote the Korban HaEdah and the Pnei Moshe, see there). And in the Gemara, where they sought from her to investigate the matter if she knows she is not commanded in pru u'rvu, it was because they grasped from her words that she did not know, as is implied there from the wife of Rav Chiyya who asked him if a woman is commanded in pru u'rvu. And certainly the Rambam admits that if we understand that she claims to be divorced because of the mitzvah, we inform her that she is not commanded in pru u'rvu; but as a matter of course, why should we attribute it to say that she does not know? For the matter is revealed and known to all that a woman is not commanded in pru u'rvu, and as a matter of course she comes because of the claim of support for her old age (and this is what is said in the Gemara, "perhaps in a case where she comes because of a claim," this is the explanation: and it refers back to the above, that it is not because the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka, see there, but rather to say that she knows the law and as a matter of course comes because of a claim; and delve into this).

And when do we listen to her words? After ten years. However, within ten years, we negotiate with her and request of her to endure. Nevertheless, if she does not desire this, we do not judge her with the law of a moredet. This is the final Mishnah in Nedarim. And it appears to me that this is only when she says that he does not "shoot like an arrow" and the matter has not been clarified; but if he admits or it was clarified that he does not "shoot like an arrow," even within ten years we compel him when she sues to be divorced. And it is possible that even if she does not sue, we compel him from his side to fulfill procreation as has been written, for perhaps with another woman he will be rectified. And that which was explained, that only when he has stayed ten years do we compel, certainly it is so that within ten years we do not attend to the matter, but when we know of this, perhaps we compel even within ten years by the law. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that in every case we wait until ten years, for perhaps the matter will be rectified, and so it implies from the plain wording of the poskim (and in section 59 it will be explained according to the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, that we compel, see there).

All of this is according to the approach of the Rif, the Rambam, and the Tosafot. However, in truth, there are some of our teachers who hold that even within ten years, when she says "Heaven is between me and you" that he does not shoot like an arrow or that he is unable to come upon her in the way of all the earth, we compel him to divorce and to give her a ketubah. They only distinguish between whether she mentioned the ketubah or did not mention it; for if she claimed her ketubah, she is not believed and we do not listen to her words, but if she did not mention the ketubah, we compel him. For when she mentions the ketubah, we suspect her of lying and that her only desire is to extract the ketubah. They compared this matter to what was written in siman 17 regarding a woman who said "my husband died," that she is believed, but when she claims the ketubah, she is not believed (and with this they distinguish between that of Yevamot and that of the end of Nedarim; and this is the approach of the Tosafot at the end of Nedarim and the Tosafot at the end of the sixth chapter of Yevamot s.v. "Ki," and the Responsa of the Rosh siman 43, and the Responsa of Maimoni siman 6, see there, for there it is explicitly proven that we are dealing with immediately after the marriage, see there).

But after ten years, I have not found any opinion among the Rishonim who would hold that she is not believed even when she claims her ketubah. Therefore, I am astonished by the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 6, who wrote that when she claims her ketubah she is not believed even after ten years, see there. Furthermore, I am astonished, for in the Gemara at the end of the sixth chapter of Yevamot it is explicitly stated otherwise. And thus it is stated there: A certain woman came before Rabbi Ami and said to him, "Give me my ketubah." He said to her, "Go, you are not commanded [to procreate]." She said to him, "In her old age, what will become of this woman?" He said, "In a case such as this, we certainly compel, etc." See there. And behold, it is explicit that she claimed her ketubah, and nevertheless, when she comes by way of a claim of support for her old age, we compel him. And it was after ten years, as is proven from the Rif and the Rambam, of blessed memory. And what is clarified to me from their words is that they have another system in this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

The opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is to distinguish between one claim and another: that regarding the claim of "shooting like an arrow," within ten years we do not listen to her at all, and even after ten years when she sues for her ketubah she is not believed, and these are their words in section 6. And regarding the claim that he lacks virility and he contradicts her, we listen to her even within ten years, and only when she sues for her ketubah is she not believed, and these are their words in section 7, see there. And one could say that after ten years, even when suing for her ketubah she is believed. And their reasoning is simple: for with "shooting like an arrow," since he does not know, we say that she is emboldened to lie, which is not the case with the claim of virility. And according to their words, it must be said that the incident of Rabbi Ami that we cited was regarding a claim of virility and after ten years.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 6: A woman who sues for a get on the claim that she is not fit to be built up from him, we do not listen to her. But if she claimed that she desires to give birth so that she will have a son to lean upon, and she does not already have any son (and the same applies to a daughter), and she says that he is the cause because he does not shoot like an arrow, if she tarried with him ten years and did not conceive, and she does not sue for her ketubah so that we would suspect she is suing for a get in order to collect her ketubah, and also the suit for the get cannot be attributed to any other thing, we listen to her, even if he has children from another woman, for perhaps he became impaired afterward. And we compel him to divorce, and he shall give a maneh or two hundred, but not the tosefet. And he shall give her dowry, that which she brought in to him. And he may impose a cherem stam regarding what she claims of a matter that she does not know with certainty, and afterward he shall give the ketubah. Thus far his words. And behold, the beginning of his words is according to the system of the Rambam, of blessed memory, that it is specifically when she says that he is the cause. But that which he wrote, "and she does not sue for her ketubah," is not according to his system as I have written. And that which he wrote that she does not have the tosefet, so too wrote the Rambam, and he explained the reason: that he did not write the tosefet for her on the condition that she should leave of her own will and take it. Thus far his words. Therefore, her dowry that she brought in, he must give to her, and also the addition of a third upon the dowry, some say that he gives to her. But presents and gifts that the husband gave to her at the time of the engagement, he shall not give to her. And gifts that others gave to her, whether from the side of the husband or from her side, there is a dispute whether he shall give to her or not (Knesset HaGedolah and see Be'er Heitev subsection 16). And it appears to me that what they gave from his side, he shall not give to her, and what they gave from her side, he shall give to her.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, completely omitted what the Rambam wrote there, that when it is clarified that he does not shoot like an arrow and we compel him to divorce her, he does not give her the ketubah, but she has the tosefet. And he explained the reason: so that she should not be inferior to an aylonit whom he did not recognize, who has the tosefet, see there. And it is true that there are those who disagree with him regarding an aylonit; nevertheless, he himself ruled in siman 116 regarding an aylonit like the Rambam. He also omitted what the Rambam wrote, that if it is clarified that he does shoot like an arrow, he gives her the ketubah and tosefet. And it is possible that because it is obvious, he did not need to explain. Furthermore, it appears more likely that he holds that in such a case we do not compel him to divorce her at all, and so it appears primary for the halachah. And regarding the previous law, he relied on what he wrote in siman 116 regarding an aylonit, and it is a kal vachomer from there, as is understood.

He further wrote: If he said, "I will marry another woman in addition to her and test myself," we listen to him. If the second one gives birth, the first departs without a ketubah; if not, he must divorce both and give a ketubah, or marry a third if it is possible for him to maintain their support. And there is one who says that if the second also says that he does not shoot like an arrow, he must divorce both and give a ketubah. In any case, if it is known that he is sterile and she comes with a claim, he must divorce immediately. Thus far his words. Behold, the Tur and the Nimukei Yosef wrote according to the first opinion. Even though it is not explicitly explained in the Gemara that the first loses her ketubah through this—and in the Gemara it is only regarding the matter that she does not have the power to protest his marrying another in addition to her, see there—nevertheless, logic dictates so. It is also proven from the Rambam, since he ruled that when it is clarified that he shoots like an arrow she loses her ketubah, all the more so when he has fathered a child with another woman. One should not ask: behold, the reason is explained in the Gemara "perhaps he did not merit to be built up through her," and if so, what does she care if he shoots like an arrow or if the second bore him a child? For it can be said that this reason applies only when she makes a claim and not when the matter has been clarified, for how could she extract money from him with such a slight claim in a case where it has been clarified that the delay is from her.

And that which he wrote, "or he shall marry a third if it is possible for him to sustain them," the matter is simple, for even with the second he must be able to sustain them as is proven in the Gemara; rather, it comes to teach us that the power is in his hand to withhold the ketubah from both of them and to test himself with a third. The reason is as we have already explained, that regarding monetary matters it is not a chazakah in fewer than three times. And in this, the "there is one who says" disagrees and holds that when the second also says that he does not "shoot like an arrow," he does not have the power to withhold them until the third, since regarding a prohibition it is a chazakah in two times and he is obligated to divorce them, and consequently he is liable for their ketubah. And if the second must also wait ten years, there are two opinions in the Tur, see there (and see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 15 and the Gra subsection 32, and that which appears correct in my humble opinion I have written in the explanation of the words of the Shulchan Aruch, and delve into this):

And that which was said, that if it is known that he is sterile he must divorce immediately when she comes with a claim, even though from the words of the Rif and the Rambam it is implied that before ten years we do not attend to her, this is all when his sterility has not been clarified. And even though it was clarified that he does not "shoot like an arrow," this is not a "sterile person," and the proof is that the Rambam calls this an illness, and the way of an illness is to be healed; whereas a "sterile person" is a different matter, who is not fit to procreate at all. And even though the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote at the end of the sixth chapter of Yevamot, and this is his wording: And we do not fear that perhaps she set her eyes on another, for it is dealing with a case where we know of him that he is sterile and he stayed ten years; thus far his words. And it is implied that without ten years, even though he is sterile, we do not attend to her. It must be said that his intention was that he does not "shoot like an arrow" and the like, and not a literal sterile person. And the proof for this is that the Tur also rules accordingly, and how could he not mention the opinion of his father, the Rosh, of blessed memory? Furthermore, this is against straightforward logic, for how can we rely on a miracle that a sterile person will procreate? Rather, certainly the Rosh, of blessed memory, was not precise in his wording since he was dealing with the matter of "shooting like an arrow." And so it is explicitly implied in the Responsa of the Rosh, Klal 43, Siman 6, see there, that he did not mention ten years and ruled that we compel him, see there. (And see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 16 and the Gra subsection 33, and it appears to me as I have written; and for the law, the Gra also wrote that such is the primary ruling like the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, see there and examine it closely):

And know that after this section, our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: And the same law applies if she waited ten years and did not give birth and she comes with a claim, that we compel him to divorce her and give the ketubah; and there, it is of no avail what he says, "I will check myself with another woman," for in any case the first woman has not lost her ketubah since she was not established as barren through three men. And that which she must claim that he does not "shoot like an arrow" is when it is known that he already had children, for then we attribute the cause to her unless she claims that he does not "shoot like an arrow," or regarding the third husband where she has already been established as such; so it appears to be the reasoning of the Tur, and it is the conclusion of the Tosafot and the Ashri. Thus far his words. And the commentators have already wondered at him, for this is exactly the opposite of the words of the Mechaber (see Be'er Heitiv subsection 17 and the Gra subsection 35).

In my humble opinion, it appears that his words are clear and refer to what the author wrote, "And there is one who says that if the second wife also says that he does not shoot like an arrow, he must divorce both and give the ketubah; and in any case, if it is known that he is sterile and she comes with a claim, he must divorce immediately." Regarding this, he says "and the same law applies etc.," and he means to say that the "one who says" actually disagrees with the first opinion, which is the opinion of the Rambam, from whose words it appears that before ten years we do not listen to her in any case. Our teacher, the Rema, does not distinguish between "he does not shoot like an arrow" and being truly sterile, unlike the reasoning we wrote in section 57. Furthermore, even after ten years, she must say that he does not shoot like an arrow. But the "one who says" holds that when it is known that he is sterile and she comes with a claim, he must divorce immediately; therefore, if it is known that he does not shoot like an arrow, even within ten years we compel him to divorce and give the ketubah. And the same law applies after ten years: when she comes with a claim, even if she did not claim that he does not shoot like an arrow, we compel him to divorce and give the ketubah, and it does not avail him to say "I will check myself with another woman." In the Gemara, they only said this regarding the permission to marry another woman, or that the Gemara is dealing with within ten years. And that which is implied in the Gemara—that she says the delay is from him and he says it is from her, implying that it refers to the previous sugya of one who waited ten years, which shows that even after ten years she must say the delay is from him—that is when he already has children and it is evident that the delay is from her; then she must say that the delay is from him and that he became impaired after he fathered children, as the Tosafot and the Rosh wrote there. He learned this from the words of the Tur who wrote, and this is his wording: If he comes to divorce her within ten years without a ketubah, and he says she is the cause and she says he is the cause because he does not shoot like an arrow, she is believed etc. Thus far his words. Behold, according to the words of the Tur, the Gemara is dealing with within ten years. And even though the Tur only spoke of when he comes to divorce her without a ketubah and not when she is extricating herself from him, as was written there, nevertheless, in any case he holds that the sugya is dealing with within ten years. And our teacher, the Rema, holds the halakhah is like the Tosafot there, who wrote plainly that after ten years she does not need the claim of "shooting like an arrow" unless he already has children. And so too he holds like what the Tosafot wrote there in the third resolution, that the first two wives have a ketubah in any case, and only the third must claim so. The Rosh also cited all the words of the Tosafot there, and this is why he wrote that this is the conclusion of the Tosafot and the Rosh, unlike the Rambam, of blessed memory. And so indeed appears to be the reasoning of the Tur at the beginning of this siman, even though his conclusion is not so. Therefore, he was precise and wrote that the reasoning of the Tur is so, and the conclusion of the Tosafot and the Rosh, but the conclusion of the Tur is not so. The Tur writes there at the end only the words of the Ramah, and even though he disagrees with him somewhat, nevertheless, in the main matter he is not like what he wrote previously at the beginning of the siman, see there carefully. And with this, all his words are explained.

They further wrote in section 7, and this is their wording: If she claims he lacks the potency to come upon her and requests a get, and he denies her, some say she is believed even if she did not wait ten years, and we compel him to divorce immediately, but he does not give her a ketubah. And if he divorces her of his own accord without compulsion, he gives her a ketubah. And some say that even though he can have intercourse with another woman, he must give this one the ketubah, since he cannot come upon her, she can say "I submitted myself to you, and what more can I do for you?" In what case does this apply? When she does not claim her ketubah; but if she claims her ketubah, she is not believed, and we do not even compel him to divorce. Thus far their words. And we have already written in section 52 that their opinion is to distinguish between the claim of "shooting like an arrow," since he does not know, she is believed, and specifically after ten years. And according to the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, after ten years there is no need at all for the claim that he does not "shoot like an arrow," as I have written, and he must give her a ketubah according to the law of "certain and uncertain." But regarding the claim of potency, it is exactly the opposite: regarding the ketubah she is never believed since he denies her with certainty, and it is "certain and certain." But regarding compelling him to divorce without a ketubah, we compel him immediately after the marriage and there is no need for ten years, because since she denies him to his face in a matter that he knows, there is a presumption that she would not be so brazen in the presence of her husband (and this is the distinction between the sugya in Yevamot and the end of Nedarim, and examine this carefully). However, to extract money through a claim of presumption is impossible, for the presumption of money is superior even to a majority, and certainly to a presumption. Therefore, when she claims a ketubah, we suspect her of lying entirely, that she only came to extract money. And the opinion of the "some say" is not explicitly clarified in the Rishonim, and only our teacher, the Beit Yosef, brought this in his great book in the name of Orchot Chaim, see there. And his reason seems to me to be that since in the Gemara they said "perhaps he did not merit to be built up through her," the explanation is that even though it was clarified that he could be built up through another, nevertheless he must give her her ketubah, see there. And know that this opinion to distinguish between the claim of "shooting like an arrow" and the claim of potency is against the words of the Rambam, chapter 15 of Ishut, law 15, who equates the two claims together, see there (and this depends on the explanation of "Heaven is between me and you" at the end of Nedarim, see there in the Gemara and in the Yerushalmi, and examine this carefully).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7 that there are those who say that in this time, when there are brazen women, she is not believed; nevertheless, in a place where there are justifications and assessments that she is speaking the truth, she is believed. And if it can be attributed that he cannot have relations with her because her womb is narrow, or she is a virgin whom he cannot have relations with because of the softness of his years and his weakness, we attribute it to this and do not compel him to divorce. And there are those who say that even in a place where we do not compel him, nevertheless, we do not compel her to be reconciled with him, and we do not judge her with the law of a moredet; rather, we prolong the matter until they reach a compromise or until ten years pass and she does not give birth. Thus far his words. And it is clearly implied that after ten years, even nowadays, we compel, whether due to the nullification of the mitzvah of procreation or when she comes with the claim of support for her old age. And so one should rule. And it is true that nowadays compulsion is not applicable as we do not have the authority, as is known; nevertheless, it is a great mitzvah to strive in this matter so that he shall divorce her. For behold, many of the Rishonim hold that the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom, of blessed memory, does not apply to this, even if the custom is to the contrary, as wrote the Nimukei Yosef and the Ritva, of blessed memory, at the end of the sixth chapter of Yevamot, see there, and see what I wrote in siman 1.

He further wrote: And the same law applies if he betrothed a woman and she is forbidden to marry him or another, we compel him to divorce. Thus far his words. His intention is regarding betrothals that are not suitable for intimacy, such as if he betrothed one of two sisters, for we hold that they are valid betrothals as was written in siman 41, and these sisters are forbidden both to him and to others, and it is obvious that we compel him to divorce them; or as was written in the Responsa of the Rashba when he said "your two daughters to my two sons" and the like (the Gra, subsection 46; and the Levush and the Be'er HaGolah labored in vain over his intention, and that which the Responsa of the Rosh is cited is an error, and the second law is in the Responsa of the Rosh). He further wrote: If she claims that her husband does not lie with her and does not come upon her, her law is like the law of one who claims he lacks the strength of men. Thus far his words. And it is simple, for in this too it is known if she is lying or not. And it is a clear matter that anyone who marries a woman in transgression, even a rabbinic prohibition such as secondary degrees of forbidden relations, we compel him with all types of compulsions to divorce her. And regarding the ketubah, it was explained in siman 116, see there.

Regarding all matters of compulsion that have been explained in this siman, there is a dispute among the Rishonim whether it refers only to compulsion through words or to actual compulsion such as lashings and the like. This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 21: All those of whom they said "they must divorce," we compel even with whips. And some say that anyone regarding whom it was not explicitly stated in the Talmud "we compel to divorce," but rather only "he shall divorce," we do not compel with whips; rather, the sages say to him, "the sages have obligated you to divorce, and if you do not divorce, it is permitted to call you a transgressor." And since there is a dispute of the great authorities, it is proper to be stringent not to compel with whips so that the get should not be coerced. However, if he has a wife in a state of transgression, all agree we compel with whips. And anywhere we do not compel with whips, we do not place him under a ban either (in ancient times, but now it is forbidden by the law of the land). Nevertheless, they can decree upon all Israel (with the permission of the government) not to do him any favor, or to trade with him, or to circumcise his sons, or to bury [his dead] until he divorces. And with any severity that the beit din desires, they may be stringent in such a case, provided that they do not place him under a ban (as this is like total compulsion). But one who does not fulfill the obligation of onah, they may place him under a ban or excommunicate him (in ancient times, as mentioned above) so that he shall fulfill onah or divorce, for this is not compulsion (regarding the get) but rather to fulfill his onah; and so too anything similar to this. Likewise, one who divorced his wife with a valid get and some rumor emerged against the get, it is permitted to compel him to give another get. And in any place where there is a dispute whether we compel or not, even though we do not compel to divorce, nevertheless we compel him to give her ketubah immediately, and likewise the dowry she brought in to him. Thus far their words. But not the additional amount, nor the gifts he gave her.

They further wrote in section 22 that it is necessary to impose a prohibition upon all those standing at the time of the giving of the get that they should not cast aspersions on the get, and they mention that Rabbeinu Tam decreed in an assembly with his students against anyone who casts aspersions on a get that was given. Thus far his words. And such is the custom in all the dispersions of Israel, and the text of the enactment is found in the Mordechai at the end of Gittin; see there. And all this is only regarding casting aspersions in a general sense, but a Torah scholar into whose hand the get comes, or who heard of the get and has a reservation regarding it, Heaven forbid that he should remain silent; on the contrary, he is obligated to ask the arranging Rav for his reason and rationale. And if after the deliberation they agree that another get is required, they endeavor to obtain another get, and all the responsa of the giants of Israel are full of such matters.

They further wrote in section 23: if the husband swore to give a get, it is good that they should first release him from his oath so that it should not appear like duress, but he may give a security if he wishes, and see above siman 134, section 4. And in a get where the law is reversed, there is no need to ask if he swore or vowed since he is required to divorce by law; however, they ask him if he divorces of his own will, and they likewise ask his wife. Thus far their words. And so is the common custom. And all the more so if he swore not to divorce, that they certainly must release him according to the one who holds "if he did it, it is not effective." And so we are accustomed in the arrangement of the get. And even though according to the depth of the law this is not included in "if he did it, it is not effective," and also regarding the primary halachic ruling there is doubt whether it is effective or not, nevertheless, who would stick his head into doubts regarding a get? For even regarding one who swore to divorce, it can be said that anything a person does of his own will is not duress, as written in siman 134, and as the Rosh wrote in the third chapter of Nedarim and the Mordechai in the third chapter of Shevuot, and even so, they release him; and all the more so regarding one who swore not to divorce.

They further wrote in section 24: One who took upon himself the naziritehood of Samson in order to divorce his wife is permitted to divorce, and it is not considered a divorce under duress. It is good to divorce her with two gittin and give them to her one after the other. Thus far his words. And the reason that this is not duress is because he is able to fulfill his vow and not divorce her; this is explicitly proven from an explicit Mishnah in Gittin (45a), see there. And that which they said, that it is good to divorce her with two gittin, is because the naziritehood of Samson has no annulment, and if so, it appears somewhat as if he is forced, and it is not similar to other vows which have annulment. Therefore, it is good to have two gittin: one to fulfill his vow and the second for a complete get (Taz). With the help of Heaven, the Laws of Gittin are completed.