Siman 120

A woman is not divorced except through writing, as it is written: "And he shall write for her a scroll of severance, and place it in her hand, and send her from his house"—that he should write in a script that he is releasing her and permitting her to all, and he places it in her hand and says to her that he is permitting her through it. This is what is called a get (Tur). Get is a term for a document, and all documents are called gittin in the Aramaic language. "A scroll of severance" we translate as "a get of release." It is not necessary for us to specify "a woman's get" because in most places where it teaches "get" without qualification, it refers to a woman's get (Tosafot at the beginning of Gittin, and so wrote the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah, chapter 2; see also Tosafot Yom Tov).

Regarding the explanation of "and he shall write for her a scroll of severance," the Tannaim in the Gemara, R. Meir and R. Eleazar, disagreed. For R. Meir holds that the witnesses of the signature effect the severance, and R. Eleazar holds that the witnesses of the delivery effect the severance. The explanation of the matter is that R. Meir holds that "and he shall write for her" refers to the signature, for the essence of the document is the signatures (Rashi 3b), as it is written in Jeremiah (32): "and I wrote in the scroll and sealed and called witnesses." Therefore, all the laws required for a get, such as lishmah and the disqualification of being attached to the ground, refer to the signatures of the witnesses, and regarding the writing of the get we are not meticulous at all whether it was written lishmah or while attached. And thus R. Meir used to say: even if one found a get written and cast in the rubbish heap, and signed it for his sake and for her sake and gave it to her, it is kosher (ibid.). It follows that according to R. Meir, a get that does not have witnesses signed upon it, even if it was delivered in the presence of witnesses, is not a get at all. However, even according to R. Meir, there are some of our teachers who hold that witnesses of delivery are required at the time of giving the get into the woman's hand, for there is no matter of ervah established by fewer than two (Tosafot 4a s.v. de-kayma lan and the Rosh chapter 9, section 7). In practice, there is no legal ramification in this, for we do not rule like R. Meir, as will be explained.

And R. Eliezer holds that "and he shall write for her" refers to the writing of the get, that when he writes the get, he or the scribe according to his instruction, shall write the get for his sake and for her sake and on a detached object; and all the disqualifications of a get apply to its writing and not to the signing of the witnesses. And there is no need at all for signing witnesses according to the Torah, and it was an enactment of the sages that witnesses should sign on the get for the sake of the order of the world, lest the delivery witnesses die or go to a province overseas and the husband will contest it, saying "I did not divorce her." Therefore, the rabbis enacted signing witnesses (36a), for since there are signing witnesses, he will not be able to contest. And one should not ask: since according to R. Eliezer a get is invalid without delivery witnesses, the husband will still contest it, saying that he delivered it to her without delivery witnesses? For it is not so, since once there are signing witnesses, we assume that it was presumably done in a valid manner (Tosafot and the Rosh ibid.). And so R. Eliezer would say: even if there are no witnesses on it, but he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses, it is valid, for the witnesses only sign on the get for the sake of the order of the world (86a). And that which is written in Jeremiah, "and write in a scroll and sign," it comes to teach us good advice (Rashi 36a), so that we should not need to bring the delivery witnesses. And the halakha was decided according to R. Eliezer, for we hold that the halakha follows R. Eliezer regarding gittin (4a). However, even regarding the view of R. Eliezer, our teachers the Rishonim disagreed, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

The opinion of Rashi, Tosafot, the Meor, the Rosh (chapter 9, section 7), and the Tur in siman 133 is that a get without eidut mesirah is not a get at all, even if the witnesses signed it for his sake and for her sake, for there is no matter of ervah established by fewer than two witnesses (and even according to Rabbi Meir it is so, as I have written). Therefore, according to Rabbi Elazar, even though the "writing" mentioned in the verse refers to the writing, and eidut mesirah is not written in the Torah, nevertheless, without witnesses it is nothing; for the Torah decreed in every matter of prohibition that "by the word of two witnesses shall a matter be established." We have explained this with the help of Heaven in Choshen Mishpat at the beginning of siman 241; see there. The Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 1, law 10, explained this, and this is his wording: And from where do we know that he must give it to her in the presence of witnesses? Behold it says, "by the word of two witnesses or three witnesses shall a matter be established," and it is impossible that today she should be an ervah and one who cohabits with her would be liable to death by beit din, and tomorrow she would be permitted without witnesses, etc. Thus far his words.

And one should not ask according to this, for behold we have learned (chapter 6) that according to the Torah, if he wrote in his own handwriting and there are no witnesses upon it—neither signing witnesses nor delivery witnesses—the offspring is kosher, and how is she permitted without witnesses at all? For the Rashba, of blessed memory, already wrote in Kiddushin (65b), and this is his wording: For there, this is the reason, because the Merciful One included it in gitin like monetary matters, since it is written "and he shall write for her," which implies that anything he wrote for her in his own handwriting, she is divorced, and it is a complete legal document like a document in monetary matters. Thus far his words. And we explained in Choshen Mishpat there the underlying reasoning, that in monetary matters the admission of a litigant is like one hundred witnesses, because he does not cause a loss to others; that is to say, a person may do with his money whatever he wishes. And regarding a get as well, the matter of the get depends only on the husband alone, for he can divorce her against her will, and therefore his handwriting is like one hundred witnesses and like the admission of a litigant in monetary matters; see there.

Our teachers further wrote that even after the enactment they instituted that witnesses should sign on the get, nevertheless, one may ab initio give a get with only witnesses of delivery without any witnesses of signature at all. And that which they instituted that witnesses should sign, the enactment was not that without witnesses of signature it should be disqualified by rabbinic law or that one is obligated to do so ab initio; rather, they instituted and taught to do so so that there would be no need for witnesses of delivery. But if one wishes ab initio to rely on witnesses of delivery, he may rely on them. And so Rashi explained (the Rosh, chapter 4, siman 12).

But the Rif and the Rambam in chapter 1 have another approach in all of this, and the Ra'avad, the Ramban (in Sefer HaZekhut), the Rashba, and the Ran, of blessed memory (in chapter 9), agreed to this. For the Rif, of blessed memory, there lengthily proved that even according to Rabbi Eleazar, the intent is not that only witnesses of delivery effect the severance, but rather that witnesses of delivery also effect the severance, and ab initio one must do it with witnesses of delivery. However, even if witnesses only signed on the get and he delivered it to her privately, the get is valid since there are witnesses signed upon it, just as according to Rabbi Meir. For they hold that according to Rabbi Meir there is no need at all for witnesses of delivery, unlike what was written in section 2, and Rabbi Eleazar added that it is also valid with witnesses of delivery alone; however, it is also valid with witnesses of signature alone. And the reason the sages did not say that according to Rabbi Eleazar "even" witnesses of delivery effect the severance is because, in truth, the validity of witnesses of signature according to Rabbi Eleazar is not similar to that of Rabbi Meir. For according to Rabbi Meir it is valid even if the get was not written lishmah, as we explained, whereas according to Rabbi Eleazar, when it was not written lishmah it is completely invalid. And the essence of their dispute depends on this: that according to Rabbi Eleazar, the "and he shall write" of the verse refers to the writing of the get, and according to Rabbi Meir it refers to the signature of the witnesses. However, we say that even according to Rabbi Eleazar, if the witnesses signed themselves on the get and signed lishmah, we consider these witnesses as if they are witnesses of delivery (and see the Ran ibid.).

And one should not ask according to this approach how it is possible to permit a matter of ervah without witnesses, for the Rambam himself wrote so, as I wrote in section 4. However, the answer is that we consider the witnesses signed on the get as if they were standing there at the time of delivery; and since there are witnesses to the essence of the matter, and the get emerges from her hand with these witnesses, and it is known that the husband delivered it to her, they are found to be as if they themselves are testifying to the delivery (Ran ibid.). And it should not be difficult for you that the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the third chapter of Hilkhot Edut that our acceptance of testimony in a document is only midirabbanan, but from the Torah it must be "from their mouths" and not "from their writing," for we have already explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 28 section 17 and in siman 29 section 1 that this is only regarding documents of evidence, such as a loan document, and not regarding documents of acquisition, and certainly not regarding gittin and kiddushin, for the Torah commanded to divorce only with a get; when witnesses are signed on it, it is as if they are testifying before us. And one who betroths with a document is also so, for "becoming" is equated to "leaving" regarding kiddushin of a document, as I wrote in siman 32 section 3; see there.

And one must ask a great question according to this view: for we have established that according to Rabbi Eleazar that "witnesses of delivery effect the severance," one may write a get even on something that can be forged, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 4, law 2, and in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch siman 124. It is understandable according to the previous view, that without witnesses of delivery it is impossible for it to be a get at all, it is well that when she comes to marry she must bring the witnesses of delivery, and if there is a forgery they will recognize it (Rashi 22b). But according to this view, that even according to Rabbi Eleazar we rely on the witnesses of signature, how is it permitted to write on something that can be forged? Behold, according to Rabbi Meir it is forbidden, as is written there in the Gemara. However, in truth, the Rambam, of blessed memory, there rectified this, as he wrote: And they may write on something that can be forged, provided that they give it to her in the presence of witnesses of delivery. Thus far his words. And his intention is that if we rely only on the witnesses of signature, it is certainly forbidden to write on something that can be forged (see Chelkat Mechokek siman 124, subsection 2). And you should know that it is so, for even according to the first view, after the enactment that they should sign on the get and she does not need to bring witnesses of delivery when she comes to marry, why is it kosher on something that can be forged? Rather, it is certain that when it is written on something that can be forged, when she comes to marry we do not permit her if the witnesses of delivery are not before us. and this is what the Tur wrote there: Even though it is something that can be forged, it is kosher, etc., provided that the witnesses of delivery are before us. Thus far his words. And it will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 124, see there.

On the contrary, the primary proof of the Rif, of blessed memory, is from this enactment that witnesses should sign on the get so that she would not need to bring the witnesses of delivery. For if we say that without witnesses of delivery it is not a get at all, what is the benefit of this enactment? Who says that he gave it to her in the presence of witnesses of delivery? And that which we wrote in section 3, that the reason is that we rely on the signing witnesses that they certainly acted properly, it is still difficult, for the signing witnesses are also not before us. And if you say that without witnesses of delivery they would not have signed their names to the get, it is impossible to say so, for we established that we write a get for a man even though his wife is not with him, and still, who testifies that he did not give it to her without witnesses of delivery? (Ramban and Ran). And according to the first view, one must say the reason is that even without this one must ask: why do we write for a man without his wife? Let us fear lest he write in Nisan and not give it until Tishrei, and it would be a predated get and invalid. Rather, one must say that we established that a person does not bring forward misfortune upon himself, and certainly he will give it to her on that very day (Tosafot Bava Batra 167a). And if so, according to this, this is also settled, for since he does not bring forward misfortune upon himself, certainly he gave it to her according to the law in the presence of witnesses of delivery, for everyone knows that there is no matter of ervah with fewer than two. And perhaps you will say that if so, why do we need the enactment of signing witnesses? For based on the reason we explained, we should have permitted it even without signing witnesses. It can be said that certainly if we knew that the husband wrote this get and gave it to her, we would say so; but since there are no witnesses here at all, we say that she herself wrote it or commanded it to be written. And when there are signed witnesses, we do not fear this, because the witnesses would not sign without the command of the husband. And when the get is in the husband's handwriting, from the Torah it is certainly kosher, but rabbinically it is invalid, and if she married she must leave, for this is among the three invalid gittin, and only the offspring is kosher, but if she married she must leave (86a). (And the proof of the Rif from "the writing of a scribe and a witness," why is it invalid? Is it worse than no witnesses at all? He wrote himself in the name of a Gaon that it is like "forged from within," and also our teacher Ephraim, his student, disagreed with him as the Me'or wrote. However, that which the Ra'ah questioned from the fact that they did not say "even witnesses of delivery effect the severance," we have answered well in section 7 with the help of Heaven, and delve into it).

And also according to the first opinion, one must ask, for in the Gemara we say that even according to R. Eliezer, who holds that witnesses to the signing are not required, nevertheless, if disqualified witnesses signed it or if they signed not for its sake, it is like "forged from within" and is disqualified, and so we rule. What concern is there in this? Granted that regarding those disqualified for testimony there is a concern lest the delivery also be in their presence (Rashi 10a, s.v. "admits"), but regarding "not for its sake," what concern is relevant to this, since there must necessarily be witnesses to the delivery? And according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam it is well, for there is a concern that we might rely on the witnesses to the signing alone. But according to the first opinion it is difficult. And one must say that we decree regarding the signing on account of the writing, for if they do not perform the signings for its sake, they will say that the writing also does not require "for its sake" (Tosafot 4a, s.v. "admits"). And from the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, chapter 1, law 17, and chapter 3, law 8, it is clarified that "forged from within" does not require any reason that there be a mishap through this, but rather this is like an essential disqualification; for we rule like the Sages that even with distinct names it is disqualified, since in the essence of their signing there is something not according to the laws of a get. (And regarding distancing the witnesses from the text, he validates there because the disqualification is not in the essence of the signings. And from his words there in law 18, it is proven that he does not hold the reasoning of the Tosafot, for even the concern we wrote, that we should fear we will rely on the witnesses to the signing alone, he does not hold, and certainly this; see there. And know that from Gittin 86b, "Who is the Tanna? R. Yochanan said it is not like R. Eliezer etc. they do not know etc." it requires further study according to the opinion of the Rif, for according to his opinion, even according to R. Eliezer one can rely on the witnesses to the signing. And it is possible to say that this is what Abaye answers, see there; and it means to say that it is impossible to say that it requires giving for its sake since it is possible to rely also on the witnesses to the signing; and delve into this.)

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 2: That which is stated in the Torah, "and he shall write for her a scroll of severance and place it in her hand," whether he writes it with his own hand or tells another to write it for him, and whether he places it in her hand or tells another to give it to her; "and he shall write" was only stated to inform that she is not divorced except through writing, and "and he shall give" so that she does not take it herself. Thus far his words. And the matter is simple in the Mishnah and Gemara that the husband does not need to write it himself, but rather the scribe can also write (7b) by the command of the husband, for it is impossible to say that the intention of the Torah is that the husband himself specifically must write, since in the entire Torah a person's agent is like himself. Furthermore, in this verse it is written, "and he shall send her from his house," and we derive from this that the husband may appoint an agent (beginning of chapter 2 of Kiddushin); and even though this refers to the giving of the get, where we also derive regarding the woman that she may appoint an agent and we also derive that an agent may appoint an agent, and regarding the writing of the get the scribe must hear from his mouth specifically as will be explained, nevertheless it is no worse than any agency in the Torah. And even according to the one who holds that agency is not required for the writing, for "and he shall write" does not refer to the husband but rather to the scribe, and the requirement that he must say to the scribe "write" and to the witnesses "sign" is not because of agency but because when the husband does not command it, it is not considered "for her sake" but is considered "unspecified" and is invalid (Tosafot 22b, s.v. "ve-ha"), one should not ask from where we know to say so, that it does not refer to the husband, for there is also proof for this from the Torah. For every place where it is written "and he shall write," it does not mean that he must write, but rather that it should be written and extant. Behold, it is written regarding mezuzah, "and you shall write them upon the doorposts of your house"; shall we say that every individual of Israel is obligated to write his own mezuzah? Rather, the scribe writes. And a great proof beyond this: behold, in Parashat Ki Tavo it is written, "And Moses and the elders of Israel commanded the people, saying... and you shall set up for yourself large stones... and you shall write upon them all the words of this Torah," etc. Did every individual of Israel write upon the stones? Rather, since they wrote by the command of Moses our teacher and the community of Israel, even if individuals among them wrote, it is called as if they all wrote. And so too here, when the scribe writes by the command of the husband, it is called as if the husband wrote it. And one should not ask why regarding the writing of a mezuzah the scribe writes on his own without the command of the homeowner, whereas regarding a get a command is required; this is because we require writing "for his sake" and "for her sake," and without his command it is not considered "for her sake," as has been explained. (And regarding the stones, it appears from Joshua 8 that he wrote them, and the entire Torah Moses our teacher himself wrote, and therefore it is stated "write for yourself," etc., meaning you and not another; and at the end of Beshalach where it is written "write this as a memorial," etc., and "for yourself" is not written, it is because there it also hints at the deed of Amalek in the Prophets and the deed of Haman in Esther, as is found in the Mekhilta and Megillah 7a. And look closely into this.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 1: The get must be written by the husband or his agent. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that we require agency in the writing of the get, for "and he shall write" refers to the husband. This also appears explicitly from his words in his great work in siman 123, see there. This is also implied by the Tur there, who wrote that he should write it or his agent, see there. According to this, that which the Tur wrote at the beginning of this siman, "and this get must be written by the husband or he shall command a scribe to write it," thus far his words, his intention is also by way of the law of agency.

But there are some of our teachers who wrote explicitly that agency is not required for the writing (Rashba page 22b and the Ran there), for "and he shall write" does not refer to the husband but rather to the scribe; and that which is forbidden for him to write without the command of the husband is because without his command it is not considered "for her sake," since a woman does not stand for divorce. There is a proof for this from the beginning of Zevachim, where it is explained there that if we were to say that a woman stands for divorce, it would be valid when the scribe wrote it even without the command of the husband (Rashba). However, since she does not stand for divorce, without the command of the husband it is not considered "for her sake" even if he intends for his name and for her name, for this is not a superior intention without his command (ibid.). Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, are as if in doubt regarding this, for in one place they wrote that we require agency for the writing (9b s.v. "Even though") and in one place they wrote two opinions regarding this (22b s.v. "And this"). The Rosh, of blessed memory (ibid.), also brought the two opinions; nevertheless, his conclusion appears to be that we require agency, see there. In the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, there is no definitive proof, see there (and from his words in chapter 3, halacha 16, it is explained that agency is not required, see there and examine carefully). Between these two opinions there is a practical legal difference, and it will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 123, see there. There is also a dispute among the Rishonim whether we require those who are "subject to the laws of divorce" for the writing of the get, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven.

It further appears to me that there is a practical difference between these two opinions regarding the get of a cheresh. For our teacher Yeruham wrote a different version for the get of a cheresh than for ordinary gittin; for in ordinary gittin the husband speaks for himself, but in the get of a cheresh the beit din are the ones who speak, as will be explained in siman 121. And there are those who understood his words to mean that they write the get like all other gittin, and the version of Rabbeinu Yeruham is an addition to all other gittin, as was written there (Beit Shmuel ibid. subsection 9 and Tzemach Tzedek siman 68 in the name of the Tosafot Yom Tov). However, many disagree with this and hold that this is the version of the get of a cheresh and nothing more (Shevut Yaakov siman 123 and other great authorities). And so it is explicitly clear from the words of Rabbeinu Yeruham that this is from the enactment of the Geonim, see there. And it appears to me that certainly if the writing of the get requires shlichut, it is impossible in the get of a cheresh for the sofer to write like all other gittin, for a cheresh cannot appoint a shaliach; and of necessity the beit din must write based on his gesturing, and a rabbinic get comes and removes a rabbinic kiddushin. But if it does not require shlichut but rather the command of the husband, the sofer can well write based on his gesturing just as based on the command of a person of sound senses. And there is no reason at all to say that even if shlichut is required for the writing, the cheresh can appoint a shaliach for his get which is rabbinic—as there is one who wished to say so—for this is no reason at all. And in the entire Shas and the poskim it is explicitly implied that one who is not capable of shlichut cannot appoint a shaliach even in rabbinic matters (and so it is explicitly clear from Tosafot Gittin 64b, s.v. "sha'ani," see there; and the words of the Beit Shmuel there who wrote this reasoning are astonishing, and examine this well).

It appears to me that even according to the poskim who hold that shlichut is not required for the writing of the get, nevertheless, when he commands the sofer to write, this was in the legal category of shlichut. They only said that he may also command one who is not fit for shlichut, as will be explained in siman 123, or if the husband is not fit to appoint a shaliach, as in the previous law. But in a case where it is appropriate, he becomes a shaliach, for even in any appointment of shlichut one does not need to say to the shaliach, "I hereby make you a shaliach for such and such," but rather he says to him, "Go and do." And behold, regarding terumah it is shlichut when he says, "Anyone who wishes to separate terumah may come and separate it" (Nedarim 36b), even though regarding terumah it is impossible without shlichut. (And what the Ran wrote there, that is regarding Nedarim because he does not designate him specifically, as the Tosafot wrote in Gittin 66a and the commentator there). And from the Tur himself there is clear proof for this, for he requires shlichut for the writing of the get as he wrote in siman 123, and nevertheless he wrote here, "or he shall command the sofer to write it"; hear from this that by means of the command he becomes a shaliach. Therefore, in all get arrangements where the husband says to the sofer, "Write a get for me, etc.," it is in the legal category of shlichut. Therefore the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in siman 154 in the order of the get did not mention shlichut there, for this and that are one and the same. And that which is explained there in section 97 regarding the shlichut of the get, that he should say to him, "I hereby appoint you to be my shaliach to deliver the get, etc.," this is in order to inform him that he is making him a shaliach for delivery, as is written there in section 25; see there.

Since the husband must write the get, either he or his agent, it follows that the parchment, the ink, and the quill must be his, and he must also pay the scribe's fee. Thus we learned in a Mishnah (Bava Batra 167a) that the husband pays the scribe's fee. Nevertheless, the Sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid. 168a) that nowadays we do not do this; rather, the woman pays the scribe's fee. This is a rabbinic enactment for the benefit of agunot, lest he refuse to pay the scribe's fee and leave her an agunah. Therefore, they enacted that she should pay the scribe, and the Sages (Gittin 20a) transferred ownership of that money from her to him, and it is as if he gave it to him, for the property of the beit din is ownerless (Rashi) (and what is written "perhaps" the truth is so, as the Ramban and the Ran wrote there). This is what we learned there in the Mishnah (22b): A woman may write her own get and transfer it to the husband, and he then gives it back to her for the divorce (Rashi). From the wording of the Rambam in chapter 2, law 4, who wrote: "And the woman pays the scribe's fee in every place," thus far his words, it implies that after the enactment, regarding all those who give gittin, it is necessary that she pay the scribe's fee. However, in the Seder HaGet of the Rosh which the Tur cited at the end of siman 154, he wrote that the husband should pay the scribe's fee, and if the woman paid, the get is valid, thus far his words. One learns from this that even after the enactment, we tell the husband ab initio to pay the scribe's fee, and if he does not want to pay and the woman paid, it is valid, for the Sages transferred ownership of that money to him so that she would not become an agunah (Beit Yosef). This is also clear from the Semag, who wrote that they permitted the woman to pay the scribe's fee (and so wrote the Hagahot Maimoniot in the name of Sefer HaTerumah). In truth, the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, are puzzling, for could it be that if the Sages enacted that the get is valid even with her payment, it would be an obligation to do so? Therefore, it appears to me that the Rambam's intention is also this, and that which he wrote "that the woman pays the scribe's fee" means that she is permitted to pay. A proof for this is that the Tur also wrote in this siman: "And because of the enactment for agunot, the Sages enacted that the woman should pay the fee of the scribe and transfer it to the husband," thus far his words. Perforce, his intention is not that they must do so, as is proven from the Seder HaGet that he wrote in siman 154 as I mentioned, but rather his intention is that she is permitted to do so, and such is the intention of the Rambam, of blessed memory. That which the Rambam wrote "in every place," this is its explanation: so that you should not say that since the Sages permitted it only because of the enactment for agunot, this applies only in a place where there is a concern of becoming an agunah, such as when he wants to go to a distant land and she requests the get, but in a place where there is no such concern, the Sages did not permit it; to this he says that in every place she is able to pay the scribe's fee after the enactment (and the Beit Yosef and the Gra in subsection 5 took the words of the Rambam literally and created a dispute between him and the Rosh, but it does not appear so to me, as I have written).

From the language of the Shas and the poskim that we have cited, it is explicitly proven that when the woman pays the fee, she does not need to now formally transfer the fee to the husband, but rather the Rabbis transferred it to him. And such is the language of the Shulchan Aruch in section 1, who wrote: The sages ordained that the woman pays the scribe's fee and they transferred it to the husband. Thus far his words. However, the language of the Tur that we have cited requires further study in this matter, for he wrote: that the woman shall pay the scribe's fee and transfer it to the husband. Thus far his words. It is implied from his language that she must now formally transfer it to him (and the Perishah wrote that it is not meant precisely, and it requires further study).

The Tur wrote: It must be written by the husband, etc., and even if his agent wrote it, it must belong to the husband. Therefore, the scribe must give the ink and the parchment to the husband as a gift prior to the writing, and the husband shall pay his fee; however, due to the enactment for agunot, the sages enacted that the woman shall pay the fee of the scribe. Thus far his words. And the Rosh wrote similarly in Seder HaGet: The scribe shall give the parchment and the ink as a gift to the husband, for we require "and he shall write and he shall give," that the get shall be his, and the husband shall pay the scribe's fee; but if the woman gave it, the get is kosher. Thus far his words. The explanation of these matters: Even though the rabbis transferred ownership to him of her money that she gives to the scribe for his fee, and consequently the parchment and the ink are included in the money, nevertheless the scribe must transfer ownership of the parchment and the ink to him. And even if he himself pays the scribe, he must transfer the ink and the parchment to him as a gift, for with the money he gave to the scribe, the parchment and the ink are not acquired by him, as money does not acquire movables and a meshikhah is required. And how does he transfer ownership to him? The scribe places the parchment and the ink into the hand of the husband and says to him, "I give this to you as a gift," and the husband lifts them a tefach in order to acquire them through hagbahah (Darkhei Moshe). And it appears to me that he must lift them three tefachim, for in Choshen Mishpat siman 198 there are two opinions regarding hagbahah, see there, for some say one must lift three tefachim so that it leaves the status of lavud. And that which the Tur and the Rosh wrote, that he should give them to him as a gift, is not literal, for likewise he can transfer ownership of them via sale, as he takes money for this; rather, they took a definitive case because sometimes the scribe takes only for his labor and gives the parchment and the ink for free. And so too if he writes for free, for certainly he has the right to write for free and there is no prohibition in this, as he can say "behold I am as if I have received payment" (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 2), and then of necessity he must give them only as a gift.

And one should not ask that since the sages granted him her money for the sake of the fitness of the get, they automatically also granted him the parchment and the ink, since without this the get is not fit. This cannot be said, for the enactment of our sages of blessed memory was only regarding the payment for the scribe's labor and not for the parchment and the ink, for it is explicitly proven in the Shas (21a) that that which we learned in the Mishnah, "the woman writes her get," also refers to the parchment, see there (for the Shas brought this regarding a tablet, and so wrote the Tosafot there 20b, starting with the words "a woman," see there at the end of the passage). For it can be said that our sages of blessed memory only enacted that her giving should be like his giving, and since even in his giving of the money the scribe must transfer the parchment and the ink to him, her giving is no better than his giving. And why would our sages of blessed memory enact that it should be as if the scribe transferred the parchment and the ink to him? Behold, there is no hindrance to the get such that it would not be given, for the scribe is able to transfer it, and there is no concern of iggun in this. Furthermore, it is possible to say according to a precision of the wording of the Tur and the Rosh that certainly in a case where she gives the scribe's fee according to the enactment of our sages of blessed memory, there is no need for the transfer of the parchment and the ink, for our sages of blessed memory enacted a complete enactment so as not to require any further acquisition in this. But in a case where he gives the scribe's fee, where there is no enactment of the sages here, it is necessary that the scribe transfer the parchment and the ink to him, for money does not effect an acquisition, as I have written. And according to this, what they wrote—that the scribe should give the parchment and the ink as a gift to the husband—only refers to their subsequent words that the husband must give the scribe's fee, and not to what they wrote afterward regarding the enactment of our sages of blessed memory that she should give. However, all the great later authorities did not understand their words in this way, and in every case one must transfer them. And so it implies, for if not so, they should have explained it thus, as it is not the way of the poskim to leave matters obscure but rather to explain. Therefore, one must say like the first justification.

And there is still a great question to be asked regarding this: why do we still require the acquisition of the parchment and the ink, for is the scribe not the agent of the husband? For even according to the poskim who do not require agency in the writing of the get, we explained in section 16 that by his command he becomes an agent; and all the more so since the Rosh and the Tur hold that agency is required, as I wrote in section 14, and a person's agent is like himself. If so, when the scribe provides the parchment and the ink by virtue of his agency, it is as if the husband provides them. And this is explicitly proven in Hoshen Mishpat siman 183, that when one sends an agent to buy him something and the agent buys it with his own money, the object is acquired by the sender even though he did not transfer the money to him by way of acquisition; see there. And the reason is that whatever the agent does is like the action of the sender. Furthermore, above in siman 35 section 3, it was explained that when one sends an agent to betroth a woman and did not hand over to him money for the kiddushin, but rather told him to betroth her with any money he desires, he cannot appoint an agent in his place because "words cannot be handed over to an agent"; see there. Behold, it is explicit that when the agent gives the kiddushin money from his own, it is considered as belonging to the sender. And behold, the kiddushin money must belong to the husband just like the parchment and the ink of the get, and nevertheless we say that what the agent gave is as if he himself gave it.

However, the explanation of the matter is this: certainly where the husband makes him an agent to complete the entire matter, such as one who says to three people, "Write and give a get to my wife," even if they write from their own materials, they stand in his place, and a person's agent is like himself. But if the matter is not completed by this agent, such as one who tells a scribe to write the get and the delivery will be performed by another, or the husband himself will deliver it to her, he is not an agent for all matters like the husband himself and does not stand in his place except for what he took upon himself, which is only to write the get, and not that he should acquire for him the parchment and the ink by virtue of his agency unless he grants it to him explicitly. And this is what we learned (66a): One who was cast into a pit and said, "Anyone who hears his voice shall write a get for his wife," those who hear shall write and give without any formal act of acquisition, for in the case of one cast into a pit, when he said "write," it is like "give," as will be explained; and since he made them agents to complete the matter, they stand in his place.

And this is what the Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah: One who says to witnesses, "Write a get and give it to my wife," they do not need to transfer ownership of the paper to him before the writing. Rather, even though they write on their own [paper] and give it to her, since they act as his agents, from the moment they give it to her as the agent of the husband, it is as if they gave it to the husband and then the husband gave it to the wife. For since he transfers ownership to the wife through his agency, he transfers it to the husband to divorce her with it, and it turns out that the husband's acquisition and the wife's divorce occur simultaneously. Thus far his words. And he explained the matter: that since he made him an agent to deliver it to her, and at the time of delivery his agent is like himself, it is as if the husband delivered it to her; automatically, it is considered as if he then transferred it to the husband, and his acquisition and the divorce occur simultaneously. But when he is not an agent for the delivery of the get, this reasoning does not apply.

However, according to this, the husband does not acquire the parchment until the time of the giving, and it turns out that at the time of the writing, the parchment was not his. Yet the Tur and the Rosh require it to be transferred to the husband prior to the writing. It is possible they wrote this as a preference, that it is better to transfer it prior to the writing, but if he transferred it to him after the writing, it is also kosher, for the primary requirement is that at the time of the giving it must be his, as indeed some hold (the Beit Yosef wrote this in the name of the Ramban, that when the parchment is hers, there is no need to transfer it to him prior to the writing, but rather prior to the giving). The Levush also wrote thus, and this is his wording: If they wrote it first and afterwards gave it to him, it is also kosher, but it is better to give it to the husband first so that the scribe does not forget to give it to the husband afterwards. Thus far his words. (And according to the Ramah, there is no need to distinguish between the completion of the act and a partial act as I wrote in section 22, but rather because in the giving to the woman, it is like his receiving it to acquire it for the husband, and the husband gives it to her, for his agent is like himself; and the Derishah wrote thus. However, from the language of the Mordechai at the end of the chapter "Hatakebel" in the name of our teacher, Yoel, it appears to me as I wrote, see there carefully. The Bach wrote that the opinion of our teacher, Yoel, is like the Ramah. And what the Bach wrote, that regarding the primary giving of the parchment and the ink, after the fact, even according to the Rosh and the Tur it is not a hindrance, requires great scrutiny, and it does not imply thus. The Beit Shmuel and the later authorities also did not adopt this view, and the Levush wrote thus as well.)

And like the words of the Rosh and the Tur, so wrote several of the poskim. This is the wording of the Mordechai in the laws of get: The klaf, the ink, and the quill must belong to the husband, and he shall deliver them to the scribe; and if he does not have them, others should purchase them for the husband, for we require "and he shall write... and he shall give." And the law is the same if the scribe wrote it on his own klaf by the command of the husband, that it is kosher, provided that he gives it to him afterward to be his, etc. But nevertheless, it is much better to give it to the husband first, lest the scribe forget to give it to the husband afterward as a gift. And if the quill belongs to others, it is not disqualified by this, for the owner of the quill has no objection regarding this, since nothing remains of the quill in the get at all, as remains of the ink. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Sefer HaTerumah and the Hagahot Maimoni in chapter 3, and they wrote that regarding the quill there is no concern at all. Also the Tur and the Rosh did not mention the quill. And it results that according to the system of these, our teachers, even ex post facto it is an impediment if the scribe did not transfer ownership of the klaf and the ink to the husband at the very least before the giving of the get; and ab initio he should transfer ownership to him before the writing of the get. And there are those who are meticulous ab initio even regarding the quill, but ex post facto there is no impediment regarding the quill.

But the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention at all the transfer of ownership of the klaf and the ink, and also at the beginning of the laws of divorce where he wrote the matters that are essential to the get, he did not mention at all that the klaf and the ink must belong to the husband. It is also difficult to say that by mentioning in the second chapter that the woman pays the scribe's fee, he holds that the scribe's fee also includes the klaf and the ink; for even if this is the truth, nevertheless, he should have mentioned that the klaf and the ink must belong to the husband, such as if the scribe writes for free. Therefore, it appears to me that he holds like the reasoning we wrote in section 21, that since the scribe is his agent, it follows that one's agent is like himself, and even if he did not transfer ownership of the klaf and the ink to him, it is as his own; see there. Or, it is possible that the matter was simple in his eyes that everything must be his own and he did not need to mention this, and he also holds that everything is included in the scribe's fee as I wrote. And such is the opinion of the Ramban and the Ran, of blessed memory, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

This is the wording of the Ramban, of blessed memory, regarding what the sages said, that she pays the scribe and the sages transferred ownership to him: And learn from this that the ink, the parchment, and the quill are all from the scribe, and thus the get is valid and there is no cause for concern, for he sells everything to the husband for that coin which she gives to the scribe for the get—whether the parchment, the ink, or his exertion and labor—and the sages transferred ownership to the husband. And it is not like the words of the pedantic ones who literally transfer everything to the husband; rather, the sages transferred them to him, and even though he did not perform a meshikhah at all, it is valid, etc., for that which is written "and he shall write" means by his hand or by his agent, and to exclude her or her agent. Therefore, since the sages transferred the scribe's money to the husband, and this is not "and she shall write," it is valid, for he becomes the husband's hireling and agent through this coin. However, if everything belonged to the woman, even though we learned "the woman may write her own get," perhaps she must literally transfer ownership of the get itself to the husband, for the sages only instituted for him the scribe's money, etc., but they did not institute her property for the husband, etc. And so it appears from the words of Rashi, that she must literally give it to the husband or to his agent in order for him to acquire it. However, she may write with her own materials and transfer ownership, and she does not need to transfer ownership at the outset, for regarding the writing, he is the agent of the husband when he says "write," and we read regarding it "and he shall write," and regarding "and he shall give," we require it to be his; therefore, she transfers the get to him, written and signed, and he divorces her with it. Thus Rashi, of blessed memory, explained. Thus far the words of the Ramban, of blessed memory (brought in the Beit Yosef).

This is the wording of the Ran, of blessed memory (in the second chapter): We learn that the husband does not need to provide the parchment of his own, nor the ink and the quill from the outset, as some authors have written in the "Tikkunei Gittin." Rather, with that zuz that the sages granted him, the scribe acquires the parchment and effects acquisition for the husband, for he is like his agent and effects acquisition for him. However, if the parchment is hers, some have written that the husband or his agent must effect acquisition of it, for the scribe cannot effect acquisition for him with that which is hers, etc. But others say that it is not necessary, for with those monies that she gives to the scribe, the sages granted the husband the parchment, the ink, and the labor and toil of the scribe. Nevertheless, when she herself writes the get, in such a case the sages did not institute this, etc. Thus far his words.

From these matters it is explained that when she pays the scribe's fee, if the scribe purchases the parchment, no kinyan is necessary, for he is like her agent and acquires it for her. If the parchment belonged to the scribe previously, according to the opinion of the Ran, a kinyan is necessary, for a thing that is in a person's possession cannot transfer to the possession of another except through a transfer of title and not by himself. Some say that even in this case no kinyan is necessary because the sages transferred it to him, and this is the opinion of the Ramban as has been written. Consequently, if the husband pays the scribe's fee and the parchment previously belonged to the scribe, according to everyone a kinyan is necessary, for in this case there was no enactment of the sages. If the scribe purchases the parchment now, no kinyan is necessary, for he is like his agent and acquires it for him. When the woman provides the parchment, she must transfer title to him at the very least before the giving. In this, the Ramban and the Ran disagree with the Rosh and the Tur and the rest of the poskim; for according to the Rosh and the Tur, the scribe's fee that the sages transferred to him does not avail to acquire the parchment and the ink, and therefore in every case it is necessary to transfer title to the husband. According to the Ramban and the Ran, the transfer of the parchment and the ink is also included in this, and they likewise disagree when he pays the fee.

And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 1: The get must be written by the husband or his agent, and even if his agent writes it, it must belong to the husband. Therefore, the custom is that when the husband is present, the scribe gives him the parchment and the ink as a gift prior to the writing, and some say even the quill and the other writing utensils, and the husband pays his fee. And for the sake of the enactment of the agunot, the sages enacted that the woman pays the scribe's fee and they transfer ownership of it to the husband. Thus far their words. From the fact that they wrote "therefore the custom is," they made this dependent on what is customary, and also this is only when the husband is present. But if he is not present, such as if he is in a rush to go to the provinces overseas and said to three people, "write and give a get," or if he was cast into a pit and said, "write a get and give it to my wife," there is no need for a transfer of ownership (Chelkat Mechokek). This implies explicitly that they hold like the opinion of the Ramban that we cited, that the transfer of ownership is not an absolute requirement, for within the scribe's fee it is included and is effective also for the transfer of the parchment and the ink, and it is only that they were accustomed to transfer ownership to fulfill the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur.

And there is a question regarding this, for since in a case where it is not common they did not require an acquisition at all, even though there is no scribe's fee there, and perforce one must say that the reason is as the Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah, that wherever he is an agent for the giving of the get, an acquisition is not required as has been written. If so, they hold according to the reasoning of the Tur and not like the Ramban. However, in truth, perforce even the Ramban admits to this reasoning, for the Ramban himself wrote a proof from one who was cast into a pit that an acquisition is not required, see there. And there is one who wrote that the Ramban does not hold of the reasoning of the Ramah (Beit Shmuel, subsection 2), but it is not clear, for the Ramban himself brought this proof. Therefore, the acquisition of the parchment and the ink was not mentioned in the Shulchan Aruch except when the woman writes, as is written in siman 123, for in this everyone agrees as has been written. And so too if the scribe writes for free, certainly an acquisition is required, and they did not mention this because it is simple—for by what would he acquire it if not by way of an acquisition? Or perhaps they hold as I wrote regarding the opinion of the Rambam, that an acquisition is never required except when she writes, for even if he writes for free, nevertheless his agent is like himself, as has been written in section 26 (and all the words of the Beit Shmuel in subsection 2 require further study, and the Torat Gittin of the Gaon of Lissa already wondered at him).

And there are those who asked, according to what we wrote that when the paper belongs to her, according to all opinions he must transfer ownership of it to her, and it has been explained that the transfer of ownership is effective even after the writing, yet it is lacking the transfer of ownership between the writing and the giving; and we should have invalidated it just as we invalidate in a case where it was severed from the attached growth between the writing and the giving, as will be explained, because it is lacking severing (Ran on the Mishnah "A woman writes her get"). And they answered that specifically severing, which is a deficiency of action in the body of the get, invalidates, and not a transfer of ownership, which is not in the body of the get (ibid. and it requires further study from Chullin 135a, and it can be settled). And furthermore, the Torah only excluded something that is impossible to exist at the time of the giving, such as that which is attached, for if at the time of the giving it is severed, it would be "pick up your get from the ground," whereas a transfer of ownership can occur at the very time of the giving (Tumat Yasharim):

If one stole paper or parchment and wrote a get upon it and gave it to her, it is valid even before despair, for he has acquired it through a change of name and a change of action, and he is only liable for the value to the victim of the theft, and the get remains by law in her hand. This is not a change that returns to its original state when the writing is erased; even with parchment where it is possible to erase, nevertheless it is called "erased parchment" (see Mahaneh Ephraim, section 4). However, if he stole a written get—for example, if he commanded a scribe to write a get for him on the scribe's parchment and hired him for such and such, and when he wrote it he stole it from him and did not pay him, and he divorced with it—she is not divorced, for there is no change here. This is specifically before despair, but if he gave it to her after despair, it appears to me that she is divorced, for when it comes into her hand it is despair and a change of domain. And even though before she received it the get was not his, nevertheless the acquisition and the get come as one. In practice, one should deliberate on this.

If the scribe gave him the get willingly and agreed with him that he would pay him after some time, even if he did not pay him, the get is not stolen in his hand, for he gave him the get willingly and he only owes him money (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 5). And if he gave him the get on the condition that he pay him immediately and he did not pay him, certainly the get is stolen in his hand (ibid.). And there is one who wishes to say that even if he set a time for payment, she should not marry until he pays him or the time passes and the scribe is not insistent; for if not so, there is a concern lest the scribe will "go in and out for the money" and the transaction will be voided retroactively when he does not pay him, and it will turn out that the get is not his. And it will not avail that she agrees to pay the scribe, for if the get is to be hers, she must transfer it to him, as the sages did not institute a transfer for her property, as has been explained (Tuv Gittin). And there are those who disagree with this, for it was explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 190 that regarding one who sells his field because of its poor quality, even when he "goes in and out for the money," the transaction is not voided; and you have no seller because of poor quality like parchment upon which a get is written, which is of no use to the scribe at all, therefore the acquisition is not voided because of this (Pitchei Teshuva in the name of Gidulei Terumah). Furthermore, it was explained there that if he established it as a loan, the acquisition is finalized even if he "goes in and out for the money," and therefore if he said "the meshikha shall acquire for you and the money shall be a loan with you," he acquires immediately, see there. And if so, here regarding a get, where the scribe knows that he must deliver it to his wife and the get must necessarily belong to the husband, certainly his intent is to transfer it immediately (it appears to me) and the money shall remain upon him as a loan. Nevertheless, in practice, one must certainly be careful to pay the scribe immediately. And it appears to me to be a simple matter that even if at first he did not acquire the get, such as if it were stolen in his hand as I wrote, if afterward he paid for the get and it became his, he can take the get from the hand of the woman and return to deliver it to her before witnesses, and she will be divorced then.

There is one who wrote that regarding what was explained concerning one who robbed a written get and did not pay him, that it is considered robbery in his hand—sometimes even if he paid him it is considered robbery, such as if he robbed him against his will, and then even if he paid him it is considered robbery. And even though we hold that if they hung him and he sold, his sale is a sale, this is when he says "I desire," but not when he did not say "I desire," as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 205 (Beit Meir). However, in truth, you do not find this law regarding a get, for if he robbed paper from him and he wrote the get upon it, behold he has acquired it through a change, as has been explained. And if he robbed a written get, in any case how was it written? If it was not written by the command of the husband, behold it is invalid without this, for it is not lishmah. And if it was written by the command of the husband, behold the scribe consented to be his agent for the writing of the get, and automatically when he paid him according to what he hired him for, it becomes his. Unless we say that afterwards the scribe retracted his agency and wants to withhold the get for himself to cover the mouth of his flask, and also when he did not transfer the paper to the husband before the writing of the get; and it requires further study.

And all this is when the scribe wrote with his own parchment and ink, but if the parchment and ink belonged to the husband and he hired the scribe for his writing and he wrote the get and [the husband] snatched it from his hand and did not pay him, it depends on the dispute explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 306 regarding whether a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel or not. This is a legal doubt as written there (Ginnat Veradim). And some say that regarding the writing of a get, "a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel" is not applicable; for just as we say (Bava Kamma 99a) regarding wool and dyes that if the wool and dyes belong to the owner, the craftsman is merely taking the wage for his dyeing, as the improvement is only from the dyes and not from the craftsman who dyed it (Rashba ibid.), so too regarding a get, when the paper and ink belong to the husband, the scribe has no involvement in the improvement of the vessel, for the ink is what improves it and not the craftsman. If so, even according to the one who holds that a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel, in a get he does not acquire (Tuv Gittin). According to this, if the ink belongs to the scribe, the improvement of the vessel would be applicable even in this. However, it is possible to say that in a get this is not applicable at all, for "a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel" is only applicable if the improvement is equal for everyone, such as with wood to make a vessel from them or wool to dye, for it is an improvement for the whole world; but in a get, where the improvement is only for the husband of this woman and not for another, how is "a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel" applicable? What is his acquisition if not to cover the mouth of his flask? And behold, this improvement existed even without the writing. Nevertheless, regarding the law, it requires further study and one must deliberate on this.

However, regarding the signatures of the witnesses, certainly "a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel" is not applicable. Therefore, if he hired them for such-and-such an amount for the signatures and they signed but he did not give them the money, there is no concern in this even according to the first opinion. The reason is that while it is permissible for the scribe to take payment for his writing, it is forbidden for the witnesses to take payment for the testimony; the permission is due to payment for idleness or for other reasons that will be explained in siman 130, and this is not related to the essence of the get (Geta Pashut). However, one could say that although it is forbidden to take payment for testimony, perhaps for signing so that it shall endure for many days it is possible that it is permitted; and this requires further study, for regarding a get there is no need for the get to endure for many days (Atzei Teruz and it appears to me as I wrote, and look closely). However, according to what I wrote, "a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel" is not applicable at all to a get for the reasons explained in the previous section.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (Bava Batra 167a): They may write a get for a man even if his wife is not with him, for they write and sign it for him, and he may divorce his wife with it when he wishes; and even though his wife is not with him at the time they give him the written and signed get, for we do not require her consent since she can be divorced against her will (Rashbam). According to this, after the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom Meor HaGolah that it is forbidden to divorce against her will, they do not write a get for a man when his wife does not agree to the get, and such is the custom in all the dispersions of Israel; and those who write and sign without the knowledge of the woman, they penalize them. However, when the man has distanced himself far from his wife and anchored her, if the beit din in the man's location knows clearly that his intention is to anchor her, it is a mitzvah upon them to endeavor that he send a get via a messenger to the beit din in the woman's location, and the beit din calls the woman, and if she consents to receive it, they tell the messenger to deliver it to her. Or, when he is overseas where it is difficult to send a messenger, and they have already practiced sending a get via the post and he appoints a messenger who resides in the woman's location and makes him a messenger not in his presence—as will be explained at length in siman 141—the beit din also arranges the get and sends it via the post to the beit din in the woman's location, and when she consents to receive it, the messenger delivers it to her, and so they have practiced (it appears to me).

And one must ask, according to the law of the Shas that one may write for the husband without his wife being with him even when both are in the same city, why do we not fear that he will give her the get after some time and it will be predated, and a predated get is invalid? The answer to this is that we do not fear this, for we established that a person does not bring misfortune upon himself before its time (Tosafot ibid.), and presumably his intention is to give it to her immediately. Furthermore, a get that is given in public and requires witnesses of delivery generates a rumor that she was divorced after the time of the writing (Tosafot Bava Metzia 19a. And the words of the Nimukei Yosef in Bava Batra ibid. require great scrutiny, see there; however, according to what the Nimukei Yosef wrote in Bava Metzia there, his words can be settled, but such is not the opinion of the Tosafot in Bava Metzia there, s.v. "Eimat," see there and examine carefully).

When writing a get for a man, even though his wife is with him, the witnesses must recognize that this man's name is such-and-such and this woman's name is such-and-such, and that this woman is the wife of this man; and also the names of his father and her father they must know to be so (Kessef Mishneh chapter 2, halacha 3). And the reason for this is because we concern ourselves that perhaps he is another man and his desire is to collect a ketubah for some woman (Rashbam). And even if they recognize the man, if they do not recognize the woman, we concern ourselves that perhaps this is not his wife but rather the wife of another whose name is like his name, and he will give the get to the wife of the other so that she may collect a ketubah (Tosafot). But regarding the prohibition, there is no concern that he will give the get to the wife of the other and permit her unlawfully, for the witnesses of delivery must recognize them at the time of the giving (ibid.). And why do we need recognition at the time of the writing? Rather, certainly regarding this there is no concern, and the other will divorce her with a valid get, but after she collects her ketubah, he will deliver this get to her and she will collect the ketubah a second time, for we establish that if she produced a get and does not have a ketubah with her, she collects her ketubah, as I wrote in siman 100. Therefore, even though they recognize them, if they do not recognize their names, we concern ourselves that perhaps they swapped their names, and we do not rely on writing based on the assumption that we will ask afterwards (Beit Yosef); rather, they must recognize them before the writing.

Some say that the scribe also needs to recognize them, for he must hear from the husband's mouth and write for his sake and for her sake; therefore, he must initially recognize them before he writes (Chelkat Mechokek). And so wrote the Rambam in chapter 2, law 3, see there. And such is the primary ruling, for we established according to Rabbi Eliezer that the primary element is the writing (the Gra).

When his wife is not with him, they must know that he has a wife whose name is such-and-such, for if not so, there is still a concern that he might write to another woman whose husband's name is the same as his name, as has been written (Beit Shmuel). And know that in all this, it is even when another whose name is the same as his name has not been established here in the city; nevertheless, we concern ourselves that perhaps there is one (there). And if another whose name is the same as his name has been established in the city, it is possible that they must investigate the wife of the second one, perhaps her name is also the same as the name of the wife of this one, and then there is a different law in this. And thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid.) that when there are two in the city whose names and the names of their wives are identical, neither of them may divorce except in the presence of his fellow, for we concern ourselves that perhaps he will write a get and bring it to the wife of his fellow and divorce her on his behalf (see there in Tosafot, starting with "And let us concern"). And it will be explained in siman 136 with the help of Heaven.

This concern regarding identification is only rabbinic, for from the Torah we do not concern ourselves with all of this. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said (Gittin 66a) that in a time of danger, such as when one is close to death, or cast into a pit, or sitting in prison and being sent to distant places, and similar cases to these, they write and give even though they do not identify, for they do not delay the get because of this. And it appears to me that, nevertheless, after the giving of the get to her, they clarify everything that is within the power to clarify; for granted that they do not delay the writing of the get and its giving because of the concern of iggun, but afterwards, why should they not clarify when it is within the power to clarify? However, if even afterwards it is not within the power to clarify, they do not leave her in iggun because of this, and they permit her to marry (it appears to me).

Since this concern is only of rabbinic origin, therefore, ex post facto, if they wrote and signed without recognition, if it was later clarified that this is the man and his wife whose names are such and such, we do not say that since they did not recognize them at the time of writing it is not "for her sake"; rather, there is no disqualification in this and it is valid ex post facto (Chelkat Mechokek, subsection 8). And it is possible that even if this was not clarified later, nevertheless, since we see in the hand of a woman a get that is in her hand and her name and her husband's name are like the names written in the get, we do not prevent her from marrying; for since it is impossible to clarify now, you have no greater "time of danger" than this, that she would remain an agunah forever (Tuv Gittin). And it is not similar to where two people were established in the city whose names and their wives' names are identical, which will be explained in siman 136, where even ex post facto it is a hindrance until she brings proof that she was divorced in the presence of the other; for there, there is an additional concern that perhaps the other one wrote it and cast it away to be lost and the wife of this one found it (Rashi 24b). And this concern is a Torah-level concern (Tuv Gittin), for so it is implied in the Gemara (Yevamot 116a) that in a matter where a person is careful, we do not concern ourselves with it falling, but in a matter where he is not careful, we do concern ourselves, see there. Furthermore, even if we say that this is not a Torah-level concern, nevertheless, it is considered as having a flaw before us when there is another couple whose names are identical to this couple. But in an ordinary case where this is only a mere concern, one could say that even ex post facto it is not a hindrance. However, from the silence of the wording of the poskim, it is implied that they do not permit without recognition; for in any event, it must be clarified that the witnesses of delivery knew that this is the man and his wife and their names are such and such. For granted that in a "time of danger" the sages permitted even giving without recognition, but when it is not a "time of danger," they do not permit even ex post facto. And so it is proper to rule, and we are not lenient regarding the prohibition of a married woman even in a rabbinic matter (it appears to me).

Since it is of rabbinic origin, complete testimony is not required regarding identification, and it is sufficient even by the word of one witness, and even by the word of a woman or a relative. For since it is a matter that is destined to be revealed, we do not act stringently regarding testimony for identification which is rabbinic. So too the Sages, of blessed memory, said (Yevamot 39b) regarding identification for chalitzah, and it will be explained in siman 169. Also, the agent is believed; even though he is an interested party as he receives payment for his agency, nevertheless, for the reason that it is a matter destined to be revealed, he is believed (Beit Shmuel). And whenever they have been established in the city for thirty days as husband and wife and that their names are such and such, we do not concern ourselves with them further and we testify based on this. And regarding the father's name, it is customary to write it based on his own word, and so too the name of her father, even if they were not established by the names of the fathers for thirty days (ibid.). And some say that also regarding the names of the fathers, it is necessary to be established for thirty days (see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 10, what he wrote in the name of the Beit Yosef). And as for this leniency regarding the names of the fathers to write based on their own word, there is no correct reason to distinguish in the matter. And it is possible that since after the fact it is valid even without the names of the fathers—even though if one changed it, it is disqualified—nevertheless, we do not act stringently in this. Furthermore, if the fathers did not reside here, it is often difficult to search for testimony regarding this, and it is like a place of danger; therefore, we rely upon them alone. And there is one who says that specifically when he gives her the get in our presence and we know that this is his wife, we rely on the names of the fathers based on their own word, but if he does not divorce her in our presence, we do not rely on him regarding identification of the father's name (Tuv Gittin). And these are words of reason, for regarding his name alone, it is like two people established in one city, for how many Yosefs are there in the marketplace? Therefore, testimony is required regarding the father's name, and we do not rely on him alone.

The scribe shall not write it and the witnesses shall not sign it until the husband tells them to write and to sign, for without his command it is not lishmah, and all the more so according to those who hold that we require agency in the writing. And ab initio he should say to the scribe in the presence of the witnesses, and say to the witnesses: "Hear what I am commanding him" (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 11). And it is simple that one need not be concerned for this post facto (ibid.). Also, in the Seder HaGet that will be explained in siman 154, this is not found. And the reason why it is necessary ab initio appears to me because according to Rabbi Meir, that the witnesses of the signature effect the severance and the primary element is the witnesses who sign on the get, they must certainly know that the get was written by the command of the husband. And even though according to Rabbi Meir we do not require writing lishmah at all, nevertheless, since we rule like Rabbi Eleazar that the witnesses of delivery effect the severance and the primary element is the writing of the get, and the sages also ordained that the witnesses should sign on the get as has been explained, therefore we are stringent ab initio like both of them. And post facto it is not a hindrance since according to both Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Eleazar this is not required, and it is only a mere stringency that they were accustomed to be more stringent regarding gittin than the law requires, as is proven in the Gemara (see Tosafot 72b s.v. Hachi, and 84a s.v. Mistabra, and 85b s.v. Af Al Gav; and in the Rosh chapter 9, section 4, because we are concerned for an erring beit din, see there; and Rashi, of blessed memory, 85b s.v. Min, wrote another reason for this, so that the matter should emerge in a permitted manner and a reputation of invalidity should not emerge, see there; and see the Ran at the end of chapter 7).

When the husband tells them to write and sign, the scribe himself whom he commanded shall write, and the witnesses whom he commanded shall sign themselves, and they do not have the power to tell others to write and sign. And even if he said to a great beit din, "Give a get to my wife," they shall write and sign themselves and shall not command others. And all the more so when he said to them, "Write and give," it is forbidden for them to appoint agents in their place. And even though we establish that an agent may appoint an agent even when the dispatcher did not tell him to appoint an agent in his place, nevertheless, regarding the writing and signing of the get, it is impossible to appoint an agent, for we establish that "words cannot be handed over to an agent" (29a and the end of chapter HaTikabel). And the explanation of the matter is that a matter involving an action, such as one who gives a get to an agent to deliver it to his wife, the agent can appoint another agent in his place; but since the dispatcher handed over to him only words, there is no power in words to be repeatedly handed over to another (Rashi). And this disqualification is from the Torah, and if he gave his wife such a get where he commanded a scribe to write and witnesses to sign, and they commanded others, and the others wrote and signed and handed the get to the husband and he gave it to his wife, the get is null from the Torah. So ruled the Rambam in chapter 2, law 5, and he concluded with his reasoning: "For one wrote it whom the husband did not tell to write it." Thus far his words. Meaning, this is not "lishmah." And it is likewise explained from the Shas and all the poskim that this is a disqualification from the Torah. And if they wrote it themselves and commanded others to sign, the get is not null but rather disqualified by rabbinic enactment, and its law is like disqualified witnesses who signed on the get, as was explained in siman 130, that it is disqualified but not null (Beit Shmuel, subsection 7), for we establish like Rabbi Eleazar that the essence is the writing. And if the husband said to a beit din, "Write," and they commanded another to write and they signed themselves, it is a matter of doubt for us in the Shas (end of chapter HaTikabel) whether his intent in saying "Write" was regarding the writing of the get, and they who commanded to write it is a case of "words that cannot be handed over to an agent" and the get is null; or perhaps his intent was regarding the signatures, that they should sign themselves, and regarding the writing it is as if he said, "Tell another and he shall write," the law of which will be explained before us, for according to several poskim this is only a rabbinic disqualification, as will be explained with the help of Heaven (ibid.), and some hold that it is a doubt, as will be explained.

It appears to me that even if the husband gave the scribe parchment and ink and said to him, "Write a get for my wife," and the scribe commanded another and he wrote it, the get is also void, for this too is "words." For even though he handed him parchment and ink, which is not "words," nevertheless, that which he said to him, "Write," is "words." Furthermore, there are those among the Rishonim who wrote that whenever the matter is not completed by the agent, it is considered "words" and cannot be handed over to an agent. For agency for the delivery of the get is the completion of the matter, but the writing is considered "words" because the matter is not completed until the delivery of the get (Mordechai ibid. in the name of Sefer HaChokhmah). And see what I wrote in siman 141, section 117, regarding the explanation of "words" according to the opinion of the Ittur.

If the husband said to two or three: "Tell the scribe to write and the witnesses to sign," it is clarified from the sugya of the Shas at the end of the chapter "HaTikabel," and several of our teachers wrote likewise, that in this case the principle "words cannot be handed over to a messenger" does not apply. For he did not hand over "words" to them; rather, the husband himself is making the scribe and the witnesses messengers in their absence, and a person can appoint a messenger not in the presence of the messenger (the Ramban, the Rashba, and the Ran there). According to the Torah it is a valid get, and it is not to be disqualified on the grounds that the husband told these people that they should tell the scribe and the witnesses, making it like "a witness from the mouth of a witness." For this is no comparison at all; "a witness from the mouth of a witness" is called such when witnesses testify that they heard from others that Reuven borrowed a maneh from Shimon, where the testimony was not handed over to these who are testifying, but rather the testimony was handed over to the first ones. But here, the primary testimony was only handed over to the scribe and the witnesses, and the first ones are merely the messengers of the husband to command them to make a get (Tosafot 67a, beginning with "Amru").

However, it is explained there in the Shas that there is a rabbinic disqualification in this regarding another reason. For behold, if the scribe signs himself as a witness on the get with one other witness, when we say that the get is valid, it necessarily follows that "say to them to say" is disqualified. For if we say it is valid, a ruinous mishap could result from this, such that the get would be void according to the Torah. Specifically, this is when he says to two or to three: "Say to the scribe that he should write, and to so-and-so and so-and-so that they should sign," and they might feel ashamed before the scribe that the husband did not designate him as a witness. It is possible that because of the shame, they will tell the scribe that the husband commanded them that he should sign himself as a witness with one of the two witnesses. Since the husband did not command so, the get would be void according to the Torah. But if we say that it is forbidden for the scribe to sign himself as a witness, then this concern no longer exists, and "say to them to say" is valid. Therefore, these two matters each depend on the other: for if "say to them to say" is valid, then "scribe and witness signed" is disqualified because of this concern that has been explained; and if "say to them to say" is disqualified, then "scribe and witness signed" is valid (Ran). It emerges that regarding these two laws, it is impossible to validate both of them, for if one is valid, it necessarily follows that the second must be disqualified.

And since the Rif and the Rambam in chapter 9, law 27, ruled that "the scribe signed as a witness" is valid, they therefore ruled that "he says 'tell them'" is invalid. Our teachers' opinion on this will be further explained before us. And there are some of our teachers who hold that "the scribe signed as a witness" is invalid, as the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in siman 130, and according to this, they should have validated "he says 'tell them'." Nevertheless, the Rosh wrote (chapter 9, halacha 6) in the name of our teacher Isaac the Elder, the author of the Tosafot, to invalidate both of them, and this is not a case of two stringencies that contradict one another; for certainly, if the law of "the scribe signed as a witness" were clarified to us as invalid, we would say so, but in truth this law has not been clarified, and it is invalid due to doubt. Therefore, it is proper to be stringent in both laws, and due to doubt, both are invalid. This appears to be the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, who wrote in siman 130, section 18: "One must be careful that the scribe does not sign as a witness because there are those who invalidate it." Thus far his words. And in this siman, section 4, they wrote that if he divorced her by means of "he says 'tell them'," it is a case of a doubtful divorce; see there. According to this, if these two laws occurred in one get—"the scribe signed as a witness" and "he says 'tell them'"—whichever way you look at it, the get is invalid. And if he gave two gittin, one by means of "he says 'tell them'" and one with "the scribe signed as a witness," whichever way you look at it, one of them is valid according to this view. And in siman 130, more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven, and also regarding "he says 'tell them'," it will be further explained before us.

This is the wording of the Rif, of blessed memory (ibid.): If he said to two, "Write a get and give it to my wife," and they said to a scribe and he wrote it, and they signed it, she must leave. And even if he said, "Tell the scribe and let him write, and to the witnesses and let them sign," the get is void. For we learned in the following chapter: If they said to him, "Shall we write a get for your wife?" and he said to them, "Write," and they said to a scribe and he wrote, etc., the get is void until he says to the scribe, "Write," and to the witnesses, "Sign." And Rava Ashi concluded that the entire matter follows Rabbi Yose, and it is stated as a "not only" case, etc.; not only where he did not say "tell," but even if he said "tell," it is not valid. Thus far his words. It is explicitly explained from his words that he equates the law of "he said tell" to "he did not say tell." If so, he does not hold that "he said tell" is a rabbinic invalidation due to a decree regarding "the signature of a scribe and a witness," for regarding a rabbinic invalidation, if she received kiddushin from another, the kiddushin take effect and the offspring is not a mamzer, as is written in siman 150, and also if she married she does not leave, as is written there. How then could he equate the law of "he said tell" to "he did not say tell"? Furthermore, since he ruled that the get is void, and so we learned in the Mishnah according to the establishment of Rav Ashi—and the Rambam, of blessed memory, already established the principle for us in chapter 10 that "void" means from the Torah—it must be that the Rif holds that Rav Ashi ruled in the entire matter like Rabbi Yose. And Rabbi Yose does not distinguish between "he said tell" and "he did not say tell," and even in "he said tell," Rabbi Yose holds that it is "words," and "words" cannot be handed over to an agent (and so wrote the Ran and the Yam Shel Shlomo at the end of the chapter "HaTikabel," that Rabbi Yose holds so, see there). For just as in "he did not say tell" we say that it is "words," that there is no power in words to be handed over to another—even though in every agency an agent can appoint an agent, nevertheless in "words" it is not so—here too in "he said tell" we say that "words" cannot be handed over to an agent, for there is no power in the hand of the principal to hand over words to another by means of an agent. And Rav Ashi disagrees with the sugya at the end of the chapter "HaTikabel" which maintains that in "he said tell," "words" is not applicable. And the Rif ruled like Rav Ashi because he is later, and also the Mishnah that he brought is after "HaTikabel," and it was a dispute and afterwards an anonymous ruling, and the halacha follows the anonymous ruling. And since this Tanna gave us an anonymous ruling like Rabbi Yose, we establish the law like him, and even in "he said tell" the get is void from the Torah for the reason of "words," and this law is not dependent on "the signature of a scribe and a witness." And so ruled the Ba'al HaHalachot Gedolot and our teacher Chananel, as the Rishonim, of blessed memory, wrote.

And also the opinion of the Rambam appears explicitly so, for he wrote in chapter 2, halacha 6: If he said to two or to three, "Tell the scribe and let him write a get for my wife, and tell the witnesses and let them sign," and they told the scribe and he wrote, and to the witnesses and they signed; or if he said to two, "Tell the scribe and let him write a get for my wife, and you sign," behold this is a pasul get, and we deliberate much on this matter because it is close to being a void get. Thus far his words. And it appears to me, in my humble opinion, clear that the Rambam also holds like the Rif, that even in a case of "tell [them] to tell," the rule of "words" applies, as is proven explicitly from his words in chapter 4 of Gift concerning the matter of a gift, where he wrote there: A gift is like a get, for a person cannot hand over "words" to a messenger. How so? If he said to three, "Tell so-and-so and so-and-so that they should write and sign a deed of gift and give it to so-and-so," this is nothing, etc. Thus far his words. And if it should enter your mind that he holds that in "tell [them] to tell" the rule of "words" does not apply, and in a get it is pasul only due to the decree of "the scribe signs and a witness," this would have no relevance in monetary laws—as indeed the Tur in Choshen Mishpat, siman 244, ruled so, that in a gift where he said "tell [them] to tell," the gift is established, see there. Rather, it is certain that he holds the primary law is like the Rif, that even in "tell [them] to tell" the rule of "words" applies and the get is void according to the Torah. However, due to the severity of the prohibition of a married woman, he also concerned himself with the sugya at the end of chapter "Ha-itkabel," which holds that the rule of "words" does not apply in "tell [them] to tell" and the disqualification is only rabbinic due to the decree of "the scribe signs and a witness." Therefore, we follow the stringency that even if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get. But the primary [law] he holds is like the sugya of "Mi She-achazo" according to Rav Ashi, who ruled like Rabbi Yose. And so it is explained from the words of the Hagahot Maimoni there, and this is his wording: Behold, he ruled entirely like Rabbi Yose, etc., because "words" cannot be handed over to a messenger, etc., and even in "tell [them] to tell," etc. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Maggid Mishneh there, and this is his wording: It appears from this that according to Rabbi Yose, even if he said "tell [them] to tell," it is not a get, for "words" cannot be handed over to a messenger, and we say behold the get is void, etc. Thus far his words. And many of the great ones labored over the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory (see Kesef Mishneh and what he wrote in the name of the Radak and the Maharam Alashkar). And in my humble opinion, there is no doubt in the matter, and he holds like the Rif; and see what I wrote in Choshen Mishpat there and in our book, Or Layesharim, siman 82.

The Ramban and the Rashba, of blessed memory, (ibid.) also hold that when saying "tell [them]," the get is void according to the Torah, but for a different reason and not because of the reason of "words." For they hold that when saying "tell [them]," it is not called "words." Rather, the reason is that since regarding a get we require "for her sake" and we also require "and he shall write for her"—meaning that the husband shall write it for her—the scribe and the witnesses are unable to write and sign unless they heard it from the mouth of the husband himself. And he cannot make them his agents not in their presence, for even though in all matters a person can appoint an agent not in the presence of the agent, nevertheless, regarding a get, where it is required "for her sake" and it is upon the husband to write it, he does not have the power to appoint an agent not in his presence. And it follows that according to this opinion, not only when saying "tell [them]" is the get void, but even if the husband says before a beit din, "I hereby appoint so-and-so the scribe to write a get for my wife, and so-and-so and so-and-so to sign," it is of no use at all. And they (the Ran and the Ra'ah) challenged this opinion: If so, from where does the Gemara know that Rabbi Yose holds "words" cannot be handed over to an agent? Perhaps he holds that in all matters they can be handed over, and a get is different because of the reason that was explained. And they further challenged: If so, how does the Gemara there validate "say to [them]" according to the Torah and only [invalidate it] because of a decree? Granted that in this case "words" is not applicable, but nevertheless, it should be void because of the reason that was explained. And they further challenged: How is it possible to say so? Behold, regarding "words," Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yose disagreed there, for Rabbi Meir holds that they can be handed over and Rabbi Yose holds that they cannot be handed over, and the halacha was decided like Rabbi Yose. And if so, according to Rabbi Meir, perforce he does not hold the reason that was explained, for behold, he validates even without saying "tell [them]." And if so, from where do we know that Rabbi Yose holds the reason that was explained, for he only disagreed with him because of the reason of "words"? And how is it possible for us to disagree with Rabbi Meir regarding that which we have not found a disputant? And furthermore, the core of the matter is astonishing: Is it because we require "for her sake" that he is unable to appoint an agent not in his presence?

And it appears to me regarding their intent that this is the explanation: Certainly, the one who holds that words may be handed over to a messenger and there is no distinction between a messenger for an action and a messenger for words, and speech is as strong as an action, it is also strong regarding this matter—that he may appoint him not in his presence. But the Rif, who distinguishes in agency and holds that a messenger for words is not as strong as a messenger for an action, consequently holds that even regarding this matter the power of a messenger for words is not sufficient to appoint him not in his presence. And even though in other messengers for words it is possible that he can appoint him not in his presence, nevertheless, regarding a get with respect to writing, where we require "for her sake" and the husband must write it, a messenger for words in a get is not strong enough to take effect not in his presence to make it "for her sake" and like the writing of the husband. And even according to the Rif, not everyone holds this, for certainly that sugya at the end of "HaTikabel" does not hold this reasoning, as they validate by Torah law one who says "tell them," rather Rav Ashi in the seventh chapter holds this. And they explain that what the Rif compared "he said 'tell them'" to "he did not say 'tell them'" is not because of the rule of "words," but because of this reasoning, and all is according to the Rif (so it appears to me).

And there are some of our teachers who hold another approach in this, that certainly regarding one who says "say," the issue of "words" and invalidity does not apply. For "saying to say" is due to the decree of "the scribe signs and a witness," however, this invalidity is only in an ordinary case when he says "say to so-and-so that he should write and to so-and-so and so-and-so that they should sign." But in a case where he says "I appoint as a messenger for the writing of the get scribe so-and-so, and for the witnesses of the signing so-and-so and so-and-so, and you tell them that I have appointed them for this," it is valid even ab initio. For a person can appoint a messenger not in his presence, and there is no decree here of "the scribe signs and a witness" such that we should fear that because of the embarrassment of the scribe they would have him sign as a witness against the command of the husband. For certainly they would not do so to increase mamzerim in Israel because of a concern for the embarrassment of the scribe, as everyone knows that a change from the command of the husband is not a get. And that which we feared in a case of "say to say" is that whenever he spoke to them thus, they would err in this, thinking that the husband turned the matter over to them to change his agency according to their will, and that which he said to them "and to so-and-so and so-and-so and they shall sign" is only like showing them the place; for if not so, why did he make it dependent on their speaking? He should have said "I appoint them." But when he truly appoints them, they will not come to err (the Ran and the Ra'ah ibid., and the Ra'ah is even more lenient and distinguishes between when he says "from your own knowledge" and when he specifies, but the Ran rejected this, see there). (And it can be said that where he appointed them as messengers, even the Rif and the Rambam admit that this is not "words," and so wrote the Yam Shel Shlomo, and it requires further study. However, according to the Ramban and the Rashba it is not a get as I have written, and the Radakh in House 3 wrote that from the Rambam it is proven that appointing not in his presence is not effective, see there, and his words are not at all compelling, see there).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 2, law 16: One who became mute, yet his mind is sound, and they said to him, "Shall we write a get for your wife?" and he nodded his head, they examine him three times intermittently; if he said to them "no" for no and "yes" for yes, these people shall write and give. And they must examine him very well, lest his mind has become unsettled. So too, if he wrote with his hand, "Write and give a get to my wife," these people write and give to her, if his mind was settled upon him, for the law of one who became mute is not like the law of the cheresh. Thus far his words. And he means to say that regarding one who was of sound senses and subsequently became a cheresh, where the kiddushin are from the Torah, the sages did not permit relying on his writing because a cheresh lacks da'at. However, one who became mute—meaning an alem who hears but does not speak—he is like one of sound senses in all his matters, and we only need to ascertain his intent; his writing is effective. And it implies that certainly a person of entirely sound senses who wrote in his own handwriting, "Write a get for my wife," it is like speech. And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven.

And so it is explained from the sugya of the Shas (71a) that speech specifically is not required for a get, and even though regarding the testimony of witnesses we require specifically speech, this is due to a decree of the Torah, as it is written "by the mouth of two witnesses," and we expound "from their mouths and not from their writing." But in other matters, writing is like speech (ibid.). And there is proof from the get itself that we do not require speech, for they permitted it through a nod of the head, as has been written. And there is further proof, for regarding testimony it is written "if he does not tell," and nevertheless, were it not for the verse "from their mouths and not from their writing," I would have validated writing even for testimony; it follows that writing is called "telling." And even though we exclude a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman from chalitzah because they are not capable of "and he shall say" and "and she shall say" (Yevamot 104b), saying certainly is only by mouth (Tosafot Gittin ibid.). Furthermore, regarding chalitzah it is written "and she shall answer," and we learn (Sotah 32a) from "and the Levites shall answer" that it must be in the Holy Tongue, and from this we also understand that it must be by mouth like with the Levites (ibid.). According to this, it is possible that even "saying" could have been in writing, and therefore regarding a get, where neither "speech" nor "saying" is written, it is certain that we require only his knowledge and his will, and writing is sufficient.

But the Tur wrote: The scribe shall not write and the witnesses shall not sign until they hear from his mouth; and even if he is a deaf-mute, even if he hears but does not speak, or even if he is of sound senses and wrote to them in his own handwriting that they should write and sign, they shall not do so until they hear from his mouth. Thus far his words. And so wrote several of our teachers: the Rosh, and the Rashba, and the Ran, and the Mordechai, and the Ba'al HaTerumot, and the Semag, and the Semak, and the Hagahot Maimoniot (Beit Yosef). And so it is explicitly stated in the Tosefta of Gittin (chapter 2). This is its wording: If a scribe wrote for her sake and witnesses signed for her sake, even though they wrote it and signed it and gave it to her, it is invalid until he says to the scribe "write" and to the witnesses "sign." Not only that, but even if he wrote in his own handwriting to the scribe "write" and to the witnesses "sign," even though they wrote it and signed it and gave it to her, it is invalid until they hear his voice as he says to the scribe "write" and to the witnesses "sign." Thus far its words. And the Tosefta is not dealing with a deaf-mute, and it must be said that it holds like that which was stated in the Gemara (72a) that one must hear his voice, to exclude the one who holds that a deaf-mute who can communicate through writing is effective; [this exclusion] is not specifically [for a deaf-mute], for the same law applies to one of sound senses, and a mute is not effective. And that which nodding is effective, as the Tur wrote in siman 121 and it is an explicit Mishnah, the Rosh wrote (HaTikabel section 19) that it is possible that nodding is superior because he demonstrates with his body; alternatively, if he became mute such that it is impossible otherwise, they were lenient regarding him for the sake of the ordinance of agunot. Thus far his words. And behold, according to the first excuse, it is possible that from the Torah writing is not effective, and according to the second excuse, it is effective from the Torah and only the Rabbis decreed regarding this. And according to this, in a case where he became mute, it is possible that writing is also effective. However, from the Tur it is clarified that the first excuse is primary, and so wrote the Rashba there, that nodding is superior to handwriting and that it is so explicitly stated in the Yerushalmi that nodding is like a voice (Beit Yosef).

However, regarding the opinion of the Rambam, it is possible to say that only in one who became mute does handwriting avail, and not in a fully healthy person, and for the reason that the Rabbis did not decree in a case where it is impossible for him to speak with his mouth. And so it is somewhat implied from the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in the Shulchan Aruch, section 5, for after he wrote the opinion of most of the poskim that handwriting does not avail whether in a healthy person or in one who became mute, he wrote: And there are those who permit one who became mute to write and to sign based on his handwriting, etc. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Rambam, and so wrote one of the poskim (Beit Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham). And even though in his great book he wrote that this does not seem so to him, for if so, he should have specified, and on the contrary, since he permits in one who became mute, all the more so in a fully healthy person, see there; nevertheless, it is possible that in the Shulchan Aruch he was concerned for this since it is not explicit in the words of the Rambam (and see Mishneh LaMelech there, and examine it well). And it is possible that he was concerned for the Tosefta that we brought, and he holds that the Tosefta only invalidates in a fully healthy person because it is within his power to speak, and this requires further study.

And in my humble opinion, it appears for another reason to distinguish between one who became mute and a fully hearing person; for certainly, a hearing person standing before us, his writing is better than one who became mute. However, this matter cannot be practically applicable, for why should he write? Behold, he can speak! And the law of a hearing person is only needed for practice when he is in a distant place and writes to a certain scribe in a certain place that he should write, and to certain witnesses that they should sign. And since he is not before us, it is rightly inferior to one who became mute standing before us; for this one who stands before us and writes and delivers his writing to the scribe and witnesses, it is rightly like speech, since they see one another and understand what his intention is. But the hearing person who is in a distant place and they read his writing, granted that they recognize that this is his handwriting, nevertheless, they do not see him and he does not deliver his writing into their hands, and how can it be like speech? And so it appears to me from a precise reading of the wording of Rashi, of blessed memory (71a, s.v. "A deaf-mute etc. and delivered to them etc."). And with this reasoning, it is well-settled why the Rambam did not write the law of writing regarding a fully hearing person, because you do not find it; for if he stands before us, why do we need his writing? Let him speak with his mouth! And if he is not before us, it is certainly inferior to one who became mute. And according to this, we must interpret the Tosefta that the prohibition is because he is not before us, for it deals with a fully hearing person who writes because he is in a distant place. And that which it concludes, "until they hear his voice," means that he should be in close proximity, and automatically that he should speak; for perforce "his voice" is not literal, for behold, even with a nod of the head it is sufficient for one who became mute, but rather because it deals with a fully hearing person, and why do we need a nod of the head since he can speak? And perforce they must hear his voice. And with this reasoning, it is also well-settled why a nod of the head is superior to writing; for certainly, from the perspective of logic, writing is superior to a nod of the head, for in writing his intention is more clarified and there is no doubt in his intention, as several of the Rishonim wrote (the Ittur, and see the Beit Yosef). Rather, certainly in one who became mute it is more superior, whereas in a fully hearing person it is inferior because he is not before us. But I have not found in any posek this distinction, and it requires further study, for from the perspective of logic it is correct.

And it is further explicitly explained from the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, that writing is superior to nodding, for regarding nodding he required examination three times, while regarding writing he did not mention examination. The reason is simple: with writing, there is no doubt regarding his intent, whereas with nodding, there is doubt. And that which he mentioned "give" regarding writing and not regarding nodding is because with writing he can write "write and give," whereas with nodding, everything is a nod. Certainly, when they ask him, "Shall we write a get for your wife?" they mention to him to write and to give, and the Gemara and the poskim did not need to mention this. Or, perhaps it is similar to one cast into a pit, where it is not necessary to mention "give." However, there are those who wrote that regarding the writing of one who became mute, if we validate it, it requires examination three times as with nodding (Beit Yosef in the name of the Ran). But from the words of the Rambam it is implied as I have written (and so it is explicitly implied from his words at the beginning of chapter 29 of Laws of Sales, see there).

And regarding that which the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention one who speaks but does not hear, whereas in the Gemara they have the same law—one who became mute, which is one who hears but does not speak, and one who speaks but does not hear, and both of them have the status of those with full senses for all their matters—the poskim labored over this. In my humble opinion, the reason seems simple: it is not relevant to mention the law of nodding and writing regarding one who speaks but does not hear, since he is able to speak, what use have we for his nodding or his writing? He shall surely speak. And when we need to ask him something, we can ask him via nodding or writing, but he himself is surely able to speak. And this is the very same reason that he did not mention writing regarding one with full senses, as I wrote in section 61. And know that what the Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 29 of Hilkhot Mekhirah regarding one who speaks but does not hear, that he sells and buys movable property through gesturing like a total cheresh—it should not be difficult for you as to why he should not speak as I wrote regarding a get. For they are certainly not comparable; for in buying and selling, where he must hear the transaction, they must necessarily speak together through gesturing. But regarding a get, the husband does not need to hear anything from the scribe and the witnesses, and they need to hear from him; if so, what use have we for his gesturing? Let him speak with his mouth. (And see there in the Maggid Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh).

According to this, as a matter of law regarding a completely healthy person who sends his handwriting to command a certain person to write and certain people to sign, we have not found an explicit permission. It goes without saying according to the opinion of the Tur, the Rosh, the Rashba, the Ran, the Mordechai, Baal HaTerumot, the Smag, the Smak, and the Hagahot Maimoniot, and also Rabbeinu Tam holds so, and so it is explicit in the Tosefta that it is invalid. Rather, even according to the opinion of the Rambam and the Baal HaIttur, it is not explicit in their words that it is valid for a healthy person; only our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, wrote that according to their words it is valid for a healthy person. We have already written in section 61 what there is to doubt in this. Nevertheless, I have seen in the responsa of the great later authorities that in a case of great iggun they permitted by way of writing (Shevut Yaakov siman 114 and 115) when she would remain an agunah if not in this manner. It is possible that they hold that even those who invalidate it, this is only rabbinic, for from the Torah it is certainly valid, as is proven from the discussion of the Shas as I wrote in section 58. Also, the second discussion (72a) only says this to exclude a complete cheresh for whom it is not effective. Also the Tosefta, since it was not brought in the Shas, we are not concerned for it in a case of iggun. And that which they brought from the Yerushalmi is also not explicitly clear, for it is true that it distinguishes between writing and nodding because nodding is like a voice, but at the end of the discussion in the Yerushalmi (first chapter of Terumot, halacha 1, and in HaMitkabel) it implies explicitly that for a completely healthy person, if only we knew that he truly commands in his writing to write a get for him, they write it. For it says there: Rabbi Yose bar Bun said, we are dealing with a healthy person, why is it not a get? And he answers: I say he is occupied with his documents. Thus far his words. And it can be explained that this is what he means: for behold, previously he brought the Tosefta that we brought, and also previously he distinguishes in one who became mute between writing and nodding, and this is what he asks: behold, the Tosefta deals with a healthy person, and why is it invalid by way of his writing? It makes sense for one who became mute, who is not fit for speech, it can well be said that his writing is not like speech since he has no speech itself; but for a healthy person who is fit for speech, what is the difference between speech and writing? Furthermore, for one who became mute, it is possible that one cannot rely on his writing because perhaps he is not of full and settled mind, but for a healthy person, what do we have to fear? And he answers that even for a healthy person, I say he is occupied with his documents, meaning that he did not write this truly to do so, but merely as one occupied without intent, like a person occupied with his deeds and papers without precision. (The Pnei Moshe explains in another way, that it refers to nodding, and his explanation is difficult, and the Korban HaEdah explained as I have written). In my opinion, this is a great support when it is impossible in another way. Since our teachers who invalidate it are certainly only rabbinic, and from the Rambam and the Ittur, according to the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, they explicitly permitted it, and from the discussion of our Shas it is also proven so, and as we explained the Yerushalmi also, its conclusion is that only because of the concern of being "occupied" is it so. Therefore, if through an exchange of letters we knew that his intent was truly to write a get for her, one should be lenient in a case of great iggun, especially since several great ones in the generations before us have already ruled so. However, now that the people of Israel are scattered to all ends of the earth, and it is rare that three of the children of Israel would not be found near him, it is better that he command there in his place to write a get and sign and send it by way of the post office, for the permission has already spread in our times to send a get by way of the post office, as will be explained in siman 141. And when this remedy exists, it is obvious that one should not permit by way of his handwriting, and Heaven forbid to permit this since many of our teachers invalidate in such a case, and there are those who wish to say that it is even a Torah invalidation; it is obvious that one should not permit in this time. (That which the Tur wrote even regarding a cheresh and even regarding a healthy person, the Beit Yosef wrote that for the Tosefta it is more proper to validate for a cheresh, but as a matter of law it is more proper to validate for a healthy person, see there).

If one said to ten men, "Write a get for my wife," one writes on behalf of all of them, for his intention was not that all of them should write, as this is not the way of people; rather, his intention was that from these ten men, whoever wishes shall be his agent to write a get for him. And there is one who says that if two wrote the get or more, this one a little and that one a little, the get is invalid, since it is written "and he shall write," in the singular (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 16). And even though in the Gemara (26b) it is explicitly proven that one may write the formulaic part of the get and the second may write the essential part of the get, it is possible to say that regarding the formulaic part we are not particular, but if two wrote the essential part, it is invalid (Beit Shmuel subsection 9). However, in truth it is impossible to say so, for "and he shall write" is in the singular, and behold, according to Rabbi Meir, "and he shall write" refers to the signatures, and perforce they are two, and nevertheless it is written in the singular (Turei Zahav). Furthermore, how is it possible to write in the plural? For the primary obligation is upon the husband, and upon him it says "and he shall write"; but if he commands the scribe, he becomes like his agent, and why should he not appoint two agents or more? Furthermore, the language of the Shas (end of chapter HaMitkabel) regarding this law, stating "one writes on behalf of all of them," implies it comes to teach a permission, that we do not require all of them to write. Nevertheless, regarding the law, the matter requires further study since the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch invalidate it.

Even if he said, "all of you write," his intention is not that all of them should write, but rather his intention is that all of them should be present at the time of the writing; therefore, one of the ten writes in the presence of all of them. However, when he did not say "all of you write," the presence of all of them is not required (Beit Shmuel). And one should not ask: if we say that two or more are permitted to write one get, why do we not say that his intention was according to its plain meaning, that all of them should write a little bit? For in truth, we do not attribute to a person an intention to perform an act of madness; rather, we attribute to him that he wanted all of them to be present at the time of the writing in order to publicize the matters. Furthermore, even according to the one who disqualifies in a case where two wrote, he certainly admits that regarding the tofes it is kosher, as I have written; if so, we would still say that all of them should write the tofes a little bit. Rather, it is certainly impossible to say so. And regarding the signatures, when he said only "write" or "all of you write," the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book is that they should not sign, since he did not mention signing (and so wrote the Bach and the Yam Shel Shlomo, chapter 6, section 16). However, there are those who disagree on this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 9, law 26: If one said to ten people, "Write a get for my wife," one writes on behalf of all of them. If he said, "All of you write," one of them writes in the presence of all of them. Thus far his words. And afterwards he wrote: If he said to ten people, "Write a get, sign it, and give it to my wife," one of them writes, two sign, and one of them gives it to her, etc. If he said to them, "All of you sign," all of them sign. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 8. And it is forbidden for one of the witnesses to write the get; even though according to the opinion of the Rambam a signature of a scribe and a witness is valid, nevertheless there are those who disqualify it, as written in siman 130. However, to deliver the get to her, even the scribe can be an agent (Beit Shmuel, subsection 10). And similarly, one of the witnesses can be an agent to bring the get to her. However, it appears that this is specifically when the agent does not need to say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," such as when the get and the authorization are authenticated, as will be explained in siman 142. But when he needs to say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," it is not proper for them to be agents; for when the scribe is the agent, he cannot say "In my presence it was written" but rather "I wrote it and in my presence it was signed," and when one of the witnesses is the agent, he will need to say "I signed," and this is not according to the enactment of the sages (Tuv Gittin). Nevertheless, it is possible to say that there is no concern in this, for certainly this is not called changing the formula established by the sages, as the language of the sages was established generally for when the agent is another man, and why should it be diminished when the writer or the witness is the agent and says "I wrote" or "I signed"? However, regarding a witness, it certainly appears that it is forbidden, as the sages of blessed memory said (15b): Either entirely through the authentication of the get or entirely through the enactment of the sages. See there in Tosafot, and it will be explained in siman 142 with the help of Heaven.

And according to the words of the Rambam and the Tur that we have written, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that whenever he did not say "write and sign" but only "write," they are not to sign. And that which the sages taught in the Mishnah (66b): If he said to ten, "Write and give a get to my wife," one writes and two sign; "All of you write," one writes and all of them sign, see there—it is a truncated phrasing and deals with a case where he also said "sign" (and so wrote the Bach and the Yam Shel Shelomo). And that which we learned in the Baraita there: If he said to ten, "Write," one writes on behalf of all of them; "All of you write," one writes in the presence of all of them, see there—it does not refer to our Mishnah and is a separate law, and they are not to sign since he did not mention the signatures. And in the Mishnah, which deals according to their words with a case where he said "write and sign," when he said "all of you," it is not necessary to write in the presence of all of them, but rather that all of them sign; or perhaps, since he said "all of you write and sign," the writing also must be in the presence of all of them. And the Rambam only deals with one who says "all of you sign."

But there are some of our teachers from whose words it is understood that the Mishnah and the Baraita are one (Ran), for in saying "write a get for my wife," the signing is also included in this. Furthermore, the great later authorities wondered at this, for in several places in the Shas it is proven that in saying "write," his intention is also for the signatures; and besides this, it is a great strain to say that the wording of the Mishnah is truncated (Beit Shmuel subsection 11, and Mishneh LaMelech chapter 2 halacha 2, and Pri Chadash, and Get Pashut). And there is one who says that when he says "write and give," certainly his intention is also to sign, and they must specifically sign; and when he said only "give," they can give only by means of witnesses of delivery; and if he said only "write," they have only to write and not to sign (Get Pashut and Tuv Gittin). And there is one who says that it is clear from many proofs that even in "write" alone, the signatures are also included (Pri Chadash, but the Be'er Mayim rejected his words and decided according to the opinion of the Get Pashut and Tuv Gittin). And they wrote that the Rambam himself was not precise in this in all places, as there are places where he explained "write and sign" and there are places where he wrote only "write" and his intention is also for the signatures (and see Pri Chadash). And nevertheless, in practice, it is difficult to be lenient against the plain meaning of the wording of the Rambam and the Tur and against three giants of the world who agreed so; therefore, one should be stringent in this in every case according to both opinions (so it appears to me).

If he said to ten, "Write and sign a get for my wife," and he enumerated them by their names, "Reuven, Shimon, Levi, etc.," whether he enumerated all ten or whether he enumerated some of them, its law is like "all of you," and all ten are required to sign. And even when he enumerated some of them, we say that his intention was for all of them, but the matter was too burdensome for him to enumerate them all; so it appears from the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, there. However, from the words of Rashi, of blessed memory, and the Ran, of blessed memory (at the end of chapter HaTikabel), it is explained that when he enumerated some of them, none are required to sign except those enumerated alone. It is also explained from the Sugya of the Shas there that this is because of a doubt, see there. But from the Rambam it is explained that its law is entirely like "all of you," such that if they did not all sign, the get is void, and this is against the Sugya of the Shas (Ran there). However, in the Yerushalmi it is explained like the words of the Rambam. The Rif omitted all of this, and it requires further study (ibid.), for according to our Gemara she would be doubtfully divorced. And it is a simple matter that in any place where it is like "all of you" regarding the writing, one must write in the presence of all of them. And so we learned in the Mishnah, that regarding "all of you," when one of them dies before he signed or before the writing, the get is void, for his words were not fulfilled; and more will be explained regarding this.

The Tur wrote: If he said, "All of you sign," they all sign it, and the two who sign it first are for the sake of witnesses and the rest are for the sake of a condition. Therefore, if the rest were disqualified or if they signed, this one today and this one tomorrow, even over ten days, it is kosher. If one died before he signed, this is invalid. If one of the first two was disqualified, this is invalid. And specifically when he signed before the others signed, but if the others signed below first and afterwards the disqualified one signed above, this is kosher based on the lower ones who are qualified. And the Ramah wrote: Ab initio, a relative or a disqualified person should not sign with them, even if he signs at the end, and even if the first two signed on the same day and the relative or disqualified person afterwards. And if he signed ex post facto after two qualified ones signed, it is kosher, provided that those two signed on the same day. And if he said "all of you" for the sake of witnesses, it is not validated until they are all qualified and signed on the same day. Thus far his words. And there are some of our teachers who hold that even in an unspecified case of "all of you," they are all also for the sake of witnesses, and they must all be qualified and sign on that day (as they rule like Resh Lakish 18b because Ribal holds so, see there). And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that one should be stringent like this view; and this is regarding the matter of a relative or a disqualified person, one should certainly be stringent as it is a Torah disqualification, but regarding the matter of the rest signing not on the same day, it is possible that one may be lenient (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 26) as a predated disqualification is only rabbinic. And know that according to the first view, that the rest are for the sake of a condition, one should validate even if the eight signed after she received the get, according to the law of every condition that is fulfilled after the giving, and she may marry ab initio. And even if they signed after she married another, even though she must certainly leave her husband whom she married in prohibition since the get only takes effect at the time of the fulfillment of the condition, nevertheless the get is kosher and she shall be divorced from him and may marry another (ibid. subsection 22). And also regarding what was written that regarding the matter of the rest signing not on the same day one may be lenient, there is one who hesitates about this; even though this is only rabbinic, nevertheless since the great Rishonim (Behag, and Ba'al HaIttur, and Tosafot, and Rashba, and Rabbeinu Yerucham) rule that they are all for the sake of witnesses, it is impossible to be lenient even in a rabbinic matter (Beit Shmuel subsection 17). And even according to the first view, nevertheless each one of them must sign in the presence of all of them, for the witnesses of a get do not sign except in each other's presence, as written in siman 130. And according to this, that which we wrote in the previous section, that if one of them died before the signing the get is void, the same applies if he died even after the signing before they all signed, because the remaining ones will not sign in the presence of this one who died. However, this is not a void get but rather a rabbinic disqualification, for the fact that they do not sign without each other in a get is rabbinic, as written there (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 23). However, some say that this is only ab initio, but ex post facto it is kosher even when they signed not in each other's presence (ibid. in the name of the Ran). And so there are those who hold that those who are for the sake of a condition do not need to sign in the presence of those who are for the sake of testimony (Beit Shmuel subsection 15 in the name of the Ra'avad and the Ramban, see there). And according to this, the get is not disqualified unless one of them died before he signed, but if he signed and died, it is kosher (Chelkat Mechokek). And there are further different views for the one who holds that the eight are only for the sake of a condition, to distinguish in a case where the disqualified ones signed from above or from below; but one should not elaborate on this since according to the primary law one should be stringent like the poskim who hold that they are all for the sake of witnesses, and no relative or disqualified person should sign himself in any place whatsoever, and when he signed, the get is disqualified, and therefore there is no practical halachic difference in this (and Noda BiYehuda who elaborated on this, and in Beit Shmuel subsection 14 and in Choshen Mishpat siman 45).

By the enactment of the sages, when one commands many people to write a get for him, or to sign, or to deliver it to his wife, he must explicitly say: "Each one of you may write a get for my wife." And similarly regarding the signatures, he should say: "Any two of you may sign a get for my wife." And regarding the delivery of the get, he should say: "Each one of you may deliver a get for my wife" (end of chapter HaTikabel). The reason is so that no mishap occurs; for if he were to say, "All of you write," or "sign," or "deliver," they would all be required to sign, and the writing and delivery would need to be in the presence of all of them, which is likely to lead to a stumbling block. Therefore, they enacted thus. And even though even in an unspecified case, if he said to ten people "write," one writes—and similarly regarding signatures, two sign, and regarding delivery, one delivers—since he did not say "all of you," as has been explained; nevertheless, the sages enacted as an extra precaution that he should state his words explicitly (148). However, even after the enactment, if he said "all of you sign," it is pasul if they did not all sign, and this is simple (Beit Shmuel).