Siman 9

It is written, "You shall not take a bribe," and it is impossible to say that the prohibition is not to take a bribe to pervert the judgment, for regarding this several prohibitions were stated independently: "You shall not pervert justice," "You shall not recognize faces," "You shall not pervert the justice of your destitute in his dispute." Rather, it is certain that the Torah forbade receiving a bribe even to acquit the innocent and to convict the guilty. Therefore, one must be very, very careful regarding the receiving of a bribe, and if he took it, he is obligated to return it when the giver claims it from him; and to fulfill his duty toward Heaven, he is obligated to return it even if the giver does not claim it from him. The giver may claim it from him even after a long time, as long as he did not explicitly forgive it [Shevut Yaakov]. And it is not specifically a judge who is forbidden from receiving a bribe, but even all those appointed and all those who engage in public needs, even though their laws are not Torah law, they are forbidden from perverting the matter because of love or hatred, and all the more so through the taking of a bribe. And it is not specifically a bribe of money that is forbidden, but even a bribe of words, such as greeting the judge first if he was not accustomed to doing so previously; and similarly, to perform some service for him is forbidden if he was not accustomed to doing so previously—even a small service is forbidden. And to give a bribe to a star-worshipping judge, if he gives it so that he perverts the judgment, he violates "before a blind person do not place a stumbling block," for just as there is a prohibition upon the judge to receive a bribe, likewise there is a prohibition upon the giver, and the children of Noah were commanded concerning laws. However, if he wants to pervert the judgment unjustly toward the other side, and one gives to him so that he does not pervert the judgment, it is permitted [Chatam Sofer].

A judge who needs to borrow vessels from his neighbors and is accustomed to doing so, and he has nothing to lend them, is disqualified from judging them. However, if he has something to lend them, even if he has not yet lent them anything, it is permitted; for since he has something to lend them, this does not fall under the category of bribery, and this is the way of neighbors. Similarly, if that which he borrows from them is not because he needs the vessels for his use, but rather he does so in order to show them importance, and it is an honor for them when he borrows from them, it is permitted. And that which he is disqualified for borrowing vessels when he has nothing to lend them, this is specifically when he is accustomed to this constantly; but if he borrows only occasionally, there is no concern in this.

If the plaintiff preceded and sent a gift to the dayan before he summoned the defendant to the beit din, if it is his way to periodically send a gift to the dayan and to provide him benefit, the defendant cannot disqualify him because of this, even if it was a publicized matter that he has a case; for behold, it appears that he did not send it to him on account of the case, but rather to provide him benefit according to his constant way. And if the dayan feels within himself that his mind has become biased toward this person, he must refrain from the case. And even if his mind did not become biased because of this, but he feels that the plaintiff sent him his gift now for the sake of the case that he has, he is disqualified from sitting in this judgment by law [Bach]. And after the judgment, when he argued in favor of one of the litigants and he sent him a gift because he argued in his favor, it is forbidden for him to receive it, unless this is due to the dayan by law.

In the times of the ancients, they were accustomed to establish a fund in the city for the beit din to allocate money for their livelihood, and they would collect it at the beginning of the year or at its end. There is no concern in this regarding the law of bribery or payment for judgment, for it is an obligation upon Israel to support their judges and their scholars. Also, if there are donations or general consecrations where the giver did not specify a particular charity, they take from this for the judges and the scholars. It is better to collect from the beginning of the year so that it will be prepared for them, so that they will not need to flatter or show gratitude to any person. Alternatively, they arrange from some source of income to give them a fixed wage every single week, and so they are accustomed.

Any judge, even if he does not take a bribe, but who sits and increases the wages for the scribes and for the attendants, behold he is included among those who turn after lucre, and the sons of Samuel the righteous were punished for this; and the community shall see to it that they also have a fixed amount.

One who takes payment to judge, not as a bribe but as wages like other labors, even so all the judgments he judged are void, unless those known judgments in which he did not take payment are upheld and valid. For this is not like a wicked person whose every judgment is disqualified, such as one who accepts a bribe, for according to Torah law there is not such a great prohibition in this, but rather the sages penalized him so that his judgments would be void [Sma], as it is not the honor of the law to take payment for it as in other labors. And similarly, we do not disqualify retroactively all the judgments he judged and fear that perhaps he also took payment for them then, for we say it is only now that his status has been compromised [Netivot HaMishpat]. And regarding that which has spread, that both parties give a small amount to the judges before they tell them the judgment or the compromise, it appears that from ancient times this was a communal enactment, and they are able to enact that they shall not judge until both parties give, for this is their livelihood; and when they accept a Rav or a dayan, it is as if they stipulated thus with the community since the custom is so [Netivot HaMishpat]. And as for payment for a compromise, it is simple that it is always permitted to take from both parties equally [Shach].

If the judge takes only payment for his lost time, it is permitted, provided that it is evident to all that he takes only payment for his lost time, such as if he has a known labor to perform at the time he must judge. He says to the two litigants: "Give me the wage for the labor of that work from which I will be idle," provided that he receives from both of them equally. And this is specifically when he stipulated with them beforehand; but if he did not stipulate beforehand and afterwards requests from them payment for his lost time, they do not need to give it, for they can say to him: "Had you told us beforehand, we would have gone to another judge" [Taz]. And if his lost time is not evident, such as if he does not have a known labor but says, "Perhaps some purchase of merchandise or brokerage and the like will happen to come my way," and for this reason he requests payment, it is forbidden. But when they request him to travel to some place to judge, he may take payment for his travel as much as he wishes, for this is not payment for the judgment. And so it is regarding testimony, as written in siman 34, section 26. And according to what is written there, even when they request the judge to go to another house to judge there, he may take payment for his exertion for his walking there. And according to what has been explained, there are three distinctions in this law: for if he is engaged in some business at the time they came before him for judgment, it is permitted for him ab initio to take payment for his lost time; and if he is not engaged then, but only says that his desire is now to engage in the business that he has and therefore they should give him payment for his lost time, the matter is unseemly if this hour is not known as one in which he needs to engage in his business, but nevertheless it is permitted for him to stipulate with them; and if he has no business at all but only says "perhaps a business matter will happen to come my way," it is forbidden [Sma].

This rule that we have stated applies to dayanim who are not permanent in the city, but regarding permanent dayanim who were appointed for this and this is their livelihood, they are permitted ab initio to take from both parties equally, and such is the custom [Urim VeTumim and Netivot HaMishpat] as I wrote in section 6, for it is as if they stipulated this with the community.

A judge should not allow an ignorant student to sit before him at the time of judgment, lest he engage in discussion with him and divert him from the path of truth, and regarding this it is stated: "Keep far from a false matter."

A student sitting before his teacher who sees a merit for the poor man, while the teacher wishes to find him liable, the student is obligated to teach the merit according to his opinion. If he remains silent, he violates "distance yourself from a false matter." And it is not specifically for a poor man, for the same law applies if the merit is for a wealthy man and the judge wishes to find him liable; he must teach the merit according to his opinion. That which the Sages, of blessed memory, said "merit for the poor man" is a greater novelty, so that the student should not say: although according to the law he has a merit, nevertheless my teacher understands that the truth is with the wealthy man, for how could the wealthy man sue the poor man falsely? Even so, it is forbidden for him to remain silent [Rashal and Urim VeTumim].

A student sitting before his teacher who sees that his teacher is erring in a judgment should not say, "I will remain silent until he finishes the judgment, and then I will demolish it and rebuild it so that it will be called by my name," for this is also included in "keep far from a false matter." Rather, he should say to him immediately in a respectful manner: "My teacher, thus and such you taught me."

There is a matter that the world treats as permitted, yet it is a great prohibition, a prohibition that involves the acceptance of bribery, causing the public to stumble, dispute, and the desecration of the Name of Heaven, for which there is no end to the punishment. This occurs when it is necessary to select a leader for some matter of the city's affairs according to the permission of the government, and they strive to appoint their relatives or their friends, or due to hatred of the other party. Even though they know within themselves that the man they desire is not as fit for this as the other, they strive to increase votes for the one they want. And even though they say that the one they want is good and fit, and they entice the masses, nevertheless, before the Knower of Secrets it is revealed that he has an ulterior motive in this. They cause the city to stumble, and such matters have cast down many victims. Therefore, a person must be very, very careful in this.