Siman 31

Two groups of witnesses who contradict one another with a complete contradiction—for example, where two say that on such-and-such a day Reuven borrowed a maneh from Shimon, and two say that on that same day their hands did not move from the hand of the lender or the borrower and the matter never occurred—this testimony is nothing. Even an oath is not required of the defendant, since there are two witnesses supporting him. For another testimony, both groups are valid and we extract money based on their word. It is not relevant to say "place the money in the possession of its owner" because there is a doubt in their testimony, for we have no doubt at all and we do not have the power to disqualify them. For witnesses are not disqualified except through hazamah by the decree of the Torah, and not through contradiction, as I wrote in siman 38, or when they testify about them regarding a transgression, but not through the contradiction of this testimony. And even though this testimony is invalid, and similarly when the two groups testify on one matter regarding one man it is impossible to uphold both of them, as will be explained, for of necessity one of them is lying; nevertheless, each group alone, when it testifies, we establish them in their status of fitness and say that the other was the one lying, and we accept the testimony of each of the groups on its own. However, when one from this group and one from that group come to testify, we do not accept their testimony, for one of them is certainly disqualified. And even an oath is not required of the defendant, for since one of them is disqualified, it is like a relative or a disqualified person was found among them, whose testimony is void, as I wrote in siman 36, and this one remains as if without witnesses at all, and the defendant only needs to swear a hesset [Sma]. Similarly, two witnesses who contradict one another with a complete contradiction are disqualified from testifying together in another testimony [Shach]. And even though each one is only contradicted by one witness, nevertheless, perforce one of them is testifying falsely. And this law is like two who contradict one another, where each one joins for another testimony [and so it is clearly evident from Rashi, Shevuot 48a, s.v. "mai lav" etc.: each of them is fit to testify with another witness etc. Thus far his words. And he did not explain that they are fit together; learn from this that in such a case even according to the Rif it is disqualified, and from the Gemara itself this is proven, for if not so, what is the challenge to Rav Chuna? And this is the intent of the Gra in subsection 1. And so it is explained from Tosafot, Rosh Hashanah 24b, s.v. "aval," for if not so, what is their difficulty with Rav Chuna? And the words of the Tumim and the Netivot are wonders to me and require further study. And from the Rambam, chapter 12 of Hilkhot Gerushin, there is no proof, for in that which they agree their testimony stands, as I wrote in section 2. And the Ran would not hold so; and delve into this]:

If the two sets of witnesses do not contradict one another with a complete contradiction, but rather these say a black maneh and those say a white maneh, or the contradiction is in the sum of the money, we establish their testimony according to the lesser of them, for this is not called a complete contradiction as people are prone to err in this. And in this case, it is not required that the claimant claim both, for specifically in siman 30, section 2, regarding two witnesses, we required this, but regarding two sets, one does not need the joining of the other [Sma]. And likewise for another testimony, one from this set and one from that set are kosher. And likewise, even when they contradict one another with a complete contradiction, only that there remains one matter in this testimony in which they are all equal—for example, regarding the chazakah of land, where two testify that Reuven consumed its years of chazakah and two testify that Shimon consumed it these years, if they all testify that it was in the land of Reuven's ancestors, we establish their testimony in this and maintain the land in the chazakah of Reuven [Beit Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham]. And likewise, regarding two witnesses who contradict one another with a complete contradiction, we establish their testimony in that which they are equal—for example, a woman who is in the status of being unmarried, and two witnesses came and said she is a married woman, and one says she was divorced and one says she was not divorced, since both testify that she is a married woman, we establish her in the status of a married woman [Ketubot 23a, "both of them regarding a married woman etc." and as the Rambam wrote in chapter 12 of Gerushin, and examine it closely]. And there are those who disagree in this, for since there are no kosher witnesses here, we nullify their entire testimony [as is apparent from the Ran there who raised this difficulty, and it is brought in the Shach, subsection 1, and what I wrote in the previous section]. [And I found in the Shita Mekubetzet there in the name of the Rashba and his students who wrote as I wrote according to the opinion of the Rambam, that in what they did not contradict, we establish their testimony; and according to this, the Ran is a lone opinion against them, and all this is not like the Tumim].

According to what I wrote in section 1, it is explained that when one creditor has two shetarot against one debtor, where one set of witnesses is signed on one and the other set on the second shetar, and one shetar is for a maneh and the second for two hundred, if he produces them together, he only collects the shetar of a maneh. For since one of them is invalid, the holder of the shetar is at a disadvantage, and we take the shetar of two hundred from him and tear it. However, the defendant must take a biblical oath that he only owes him a maneh, for what he pays of the maneh based on the witnesses of the one shetar is judged like one who admits to a portion of the claim, as I wrote in siman 75 [and see the Taz]. And the witnesses signed on the shetar of two hundred are not believed to invalidate it and say that he swore falsely, for since they invalidated their own shetar, we no longer accept their testimony in this matter [Netivot HaMishpat]. And if the creditor produced only one shetar, he collects it, and when he later produces the second shetar, he collects that too; and even in one beit din he can collect. And this is according to what I wrote, that each set is valid on its own. And some say that in one beit din he cannot collect the second shetar, only in a different beit din, for in one beit din one set is considered invalid. And according to this view, when the creditor comes to collect with his first shetar, the debtor can adjure the creditor if he has another shetar from him signed by the second set. Therefore, if the creditor is clever, he burns the smaller shetar, and then even when he admits to him that he had another shetar in his possession, he collects with the shetar he produces now, since the other is not present [Sma].

And two creditors who each have a deed against one debtor, and each group of witnesses is signed on one deed, and the debtor denies both of them—this one swears and takes, and that one swears and takes. And even if "trustworthiness" is written in them, they must swear, for since one of them is disqualified, but because they are two creditors, we do not have the power to disqualify them; but in any event, without an oath, how shall they take, since the debtor cries out that it is a lie? And if the debtor does not claim anything, we do not administer an oath to them, even if "trustworthiness" is not written in the deeds [it appears to me]. And if they sold the two deeds to one person, their law is like one creditor and one debtor as has been explained, since it is now in the hand of one [Netivot HaMishpat]. And it is not relevant in this case to say that they sold him all of their rights in a matter where one of them is a lie. And even if he now returns the deeds to them, both shall not collect, since the lie has been established in beit din [it appears to me].

One creditor who produced two documents against two debtors—if he produced them as one and both of them deny the debt, each of the debtors shall swear a shevuat hesset and be exempt. Since one of them is certainly invalid and he produced them as one, we do not have the power to collect them. And if one of the debtors admits that his document is true, the creditor collects from him from unencumbered property but not from encumbered property, for it is not within his power to obligate the purchasers by his admission [Levush]. And all the more so he is not believed to establish the witnesses of the second document as certain liars and to disqualify their testimony for the future. However, the second debtor is exempt from an oath, for how can he make him swear? Behold, it is certain that he is only entitled to collect one document, and he has already collected it based on the admission of this second one. And if at first the creditor produced only one document, he collects with it even from encumbered property. And if he afterwards produced the second, he collects with it as well from encumbered property, according to the principle that was explained in section 1. And even if he produced them in one beit din, and even according to the "there are those who say" in section 3 that regarding one creditor and one debtor he does not collect in one beit din, they agree regarding two debtors [Sma], for each one is a matter unto itself and they do not belong to one another. And there is room to doubt in a case where it was explained in this siman a distinction between producing them as one or one after the other: if he produced them one after the other and the beit din ruled to collect both, and he came afterwards with the two documents along with the ruling to collect them—do we say that since he now comes with both of them together he is only to collect one, or perhaps since the beit din already ruled to collect both, we follow the ruling [Netivot HaMishpat]? And it appears to me that he collects both [and there is proof from the "two paths," and delve into this].

One who brought witnesses and they were contradicted, and afterward he brought others and they were also contradicted, and afterward he brought witnesses and they were not contradicted, we accept them. We do not say that since we see that this man is seeking out disqualified witnesses, perhaps these are also disqualified; for while it is true that he is established as one who seeks out lying witnesses, these men testifying now are not established as disqualified, and it is impossible for us to establish them as disqualified. However, regarding the authentication of a document, if two came and said that he requested of them to forge this document for him, we no longer authenticate the document even if two testify and say they recognize the signatures of those signed on this document, because we suspect that he forged them himself. This is unless the signed witnesses themselves came and say that this is their handwriting, and we do not suspect that he would forge to such an extent that they themselves would err regarding their own signature. And there are those who disagree even in this, for perhaps he forged to such an extent that they themselves err in this, unless they testify that they remember that they signed on this document. And it was further explained in siman 63, see there.