Siman 30

From the Torah, all testimony requires inquiry and investigation, and the tradition has come that there are seven investigations equal in all testimony. We derive this from verses, as it is written regarding capital cases, "And you shall inquire and investigate and ask well," and it is further written, "And it be told to you and you have heard and inquired well," and it is further written, "And the judges shall inquire well"—behold, there are seven. And these are they: that they shall say when the incident occurred—in which shemittah, in which year, in which month, on which day of the month, on which day of the week, at which hour, and in which place. And it is written, "One law shall be for you," from which we learn that in all types of judgment one must investigate all the investigations. And even if one of the witnesses says regarding one of these seven investigations, "I do not know," the entire testimony is void. However, our sages, of blessed memory, ordained that in monetary cases inquiry and investigation are not required to such an extent, for when we require many investigations, the testimony will not be accepted in most instances, as it is common that one of the witnesses will forget one of the investigations, and there would be a locking of the door before borrowers and before merchants. Therefore, they ordained that in common monetary cases they should not require much inquiry and investigation. Nevertheless, if it happened that the witnesses contradicted one another in the investigations, such as if one said the incident occurred on Sunday and the second says on Monday, their testimony is void. But when they said, "We do not remember," their testimony stands. And if the judge understands that the case is fraudulent, he must investigate and inquire much. And regarding the matter of a prohibition, whether it requires inquiry and investigation, it was explained in Even HaEzer siman 11, 17, and 42; see there.

And there are furthermore, besides the drishot and chakirot, bedikot to examine them, such as asking them what type of coins they were and what type of merchandise it was. And there are distinctions in this: regarding what pertains to the essence of the matter, such as the seven chakirot that were explained, or drishot in the essence of the transaction, such as what type of merchandise it was—if the witnesses contradicted one another, their testimony is void, and the defendant does not even require an oath. But in other bedikot, such as where this one said the coins were black and this one said they were white, yet in the sum of the money they are equal, the testimony is not void, for it is the way of the world to err in such a thing and this is not a contradiction. And all the more so regarding bedikot that do not pertain at all to the matter, such as where this one says the act was in the first room and this one says in the second room, and it is possible to see from this room to that room—for if not so, it would be a contradiction of a chakira of place—or where this one says the litigant was wearing such garments and this one says other garments, and similar things that do not pertain to the transaction at all; for when they contradict one another, and even if the litigant contradicts them, their testimony stands. And regarding black and white coins, when they contradict the litigant, or if he only claimed black or white, whereby he automatically contradicts one of the witnesses, there is a dispute among the poskim whether their testimony stands or not. And the opinion of the Tur and our teacher, the Rema, is that specifically when he claims both of them, the black and the white; but when he claims black or white, behold, one of the witnesses is contradicted by the litigant, and it is not similar to them contradicting one another. Therefore, when he claims two manehs, one black and one white, even though the two witnesses only testified about a maneh, nevertheless we obligate him for a maneh [Sma]. And bedikot that do not pertain at all to the essence of the thing, such as a black purse and a white purse, or regarding the presumption of ownership of a field in siman 141, where this one said he consumed wheat and this one said barley, the litigant does not need to say both [Netivot HaMishpat]; for specifically regarding a black and white maneh, since it is common to be precise regarding the essence of the coins, in this we say that even though when the witnesses contradict one another it is not a contradiction, nevertheless when the litigant contradicts them or one of them, it is not testimony. But in other matters, there is no distinction between the witnesses contradicting one another and the contradiction of the litigant. And many disagree regarding a black and white maneh as well, for since the reason is because error is common in this, if so, what difference is there to me between their contradiction of one another or of the litigant? And thus agreed the Gra, of blessed memory. And also regarding a contradiction from room to room, some say that even if they do not see from this room to that room, it is not called a contradiction, as this is not two places and error is common in this [and so it appears from Nimukei Yosef there, see there].

If one witness says he loaned him a maneh and one says he loaned him two hundred at that same time, if the plaintiff claims two hundred, they join together, for two hundred includes a maneh, and it turns out that there are two witnesses regarding the maneh. But if he only claims a maneh, they do not join, for the one who testifies regarding two hundred is contradicted by the litigant himself, and only one witness remains. However, when he claims two hundred, the witness who testifies regarding a maneh is not considered contradicted by him, for behold, two hundred includes a maneh [so it appears to me]. And if they testify regarding different times, where this one says, "I saw that he loaned him a maneh in Nisan," and this one says, "I saw that he loaned him two hundred in Iyar," and the plaintiff claims both the maneh and the two hundred, it is simple that they join to obligate him a maneh, for in monetary laws we do not require that they testify that they saw the act as one, as will be explained. And where he does not claim both claims, according to everyone they do not join, for the one is contradicted by the litigant regarding the essence of the matter, and it is not similar to a black or white maneh.

If this one says it was such-and-such merchandise and this one says it was such-and-such merchandise, if the types of merchandise are not distant from one another, such that there are many who err between one and the other, their testimony is upheld, and we say that one of them erred, and we obligate the defendant for the lesser of the types of merchandise. And so too in other matters, the beit din must understand the proximity or distance of one from the other. And so too regarding types of coins, such as between black and white as has been explained, for in this an error is easily made. But with types of merchandise distant from one another, such as where this one says wine and this one says oil, their testimony is void, as it is a complete contradiction in the essence of the testimony. And if the claim was not for the merchandise itself but for the value of the merchandise, and the witnesses contradict one another—where one says, "In my presence he admitted to him that he owes him money for a barrel of wine," and the second says that he admitted to him that he owes him for a barrel of oil, and the oil costs more than the wine—its law is like a maneh and two hundred as has been explained, and he must pay him the value of a barrel of wine. And whether the claimant must claim both depends on the dispute that was explained regarding a black and white maneh. And it appears that this depends on the understanding of the judges: for if they understand that there was room for error, such as if they spoke of these two types, their testimony is upheld and we say that one of them erred in his hearing; but if there was no room for error, their testimony is void. And so too in all matters.

Let it not be a wonder in your eyes that sometimes, even with contradicted testimony, we labor to uphold their testimony as has been written, for it is a great principle in testimony that in any place where we are able to reconcile the words of the witnesses so that they do not contradict one another, we reconcile their words. And behold, even in capital cases the sages, of blessed memory, said that when this one says the event occurred on the second of the month and this one says on the third, their testimony is valid, and we say that the second did not know that the previous month was full and imagined that it was the third of the month. And even though you have no greater mitzvah than the saving of lives, and we should have said that their testimony is contradicted, nevertheless, since they aligned their testimony in all matters, we do not have the power to void their testimony [Rashi, Pesachim 11b]. And the reason is because there are many people who err regarding the intercalation of the month, we say that one of them also erred [Sanhedrin 69a].

And another general rule the Sages, of blessed memory, stated regarding monetary laws is that even if the witnesses did not see the act as one, they join together. And not only this, but even if by necessity they are two separate acts, since according to the testimony of both of them such a sum reaches him, he is liable based on them. However, in this case we require that the claimant claim both claims, for if not so, behold one of the witnesses is contradicted by him. And according to this rule, we have learned that they join together a loan after a loan, and all the more so an admission after a loan or after an admission, as it is possible that it is one act. And similarly, they join a loan after an admission. How so? Reuven testified that the defendant borrowed a maneh from the claimant in Nisan, and Shimon testified that he heard from the defendant who gave a complete admission to the claimant in Iyar that he owes him a maneh; we say that it is one maneh, and he admitted to him in Iyar regarding what he borrowed from him in Nisan, and we do not require that he claim two manehs from him. And similarly regarding an admission after an admission, where this one testifies that he heard the admission from him in Nisan and this one heard the admission in Iyar; he admitted to one maneh and went back and admitted again. And even regarding a loan after an admission, there is one who says that he does not need to claim both, for it is all one maneh, and he admitted to him before he lent to him because he was promising him that he would lend to him afterwards [Sma]. But regarding a loan after a loan, where this one testifies that he saw that he lent to him in Nisan and this one testifies that he saw that he lent to him in Iyar, even though they join together to make him liable, nevertheless we require that he claim both loans, for if not so, behold one of them is contradicted by him. And even if he does not explicitly claim the maneh of Nisan and the maneh of Iyar, but rather claims two manehs without specification and says that he does not remember when the loans were, they also join together [ibid.]. And if the contradiction was regarding one day of the days of the month, this is not a contradiction at all, as I wrote in section 5, and he does not need to claim two manehs. And if he only claims from him the maneh of Nisan and this second one testifies about a maneh of Iyar, or vice versa, there remains for him only one witness, and he obligates the defendant to swear a biblical oath to contradict the witness; and we do not say that since the second one contradicts him he should not even be obligated in an oath, for this is not a contradiction, as a contradiction would be if the second one were to say "he did not borrow in Nisan but rather in Iyar," or contradicted him entirely that he did not borrow at all. But in such a case it is not called a contradiction, rather we simply do not obligate him since they do not testify about one time. And from what has been explained we have learned that all the more so their testimony joins together if they testified about one time, only that they were not together in one standing, as this one saw the act from his house and this one saw from his house; and this is "special testimony," for even though in capital laws they do not join together as will be explained, nevertheless in monetary laws they join together. And similarly regarding testimony of a forbidden matter they join together in such a case. And regarding the matter of witnesses of kiddushin, it was explained in Even HaEzer siman 42.

There is one who says that this matter, that a loan after a loan combine, applies when the defendant did not swear a shvuat haseit to deny the witness regarding the first loan; but when he has sworn, the witnesses no longer combine witness to witness. And even though if the second witness were testifying about the first loan, we would combine him with the first and we would not pay heed to his oath—and on the contrary, he would be disqualified from testimony and oath through this, as is written in siman 87—nevertheless, when he testifies about another loan and does not assist the first witness regarding the first loan, he is not combined with him after the oath. And there are those who disagree on this, and from the perspective of logic, the first opinion appears primary, and so it appears from siman 34. [And one should not raise a difficulty that if so, in Bava Kamma 106a, let the verse be established in such a case; for it can be said that if the verse came for this purpose, then even in a case where he assists the first it would also be so, as it appeared to Rava, and such is the implication of the plain meaning of the verse; rather, it certainly comes for another exposition, and delve into this.]

Since it has been explained that loan after loan combine, accordingly, when one sues his fellow for a sum of money and brings many witnesses who testify regarding various sums at different times, and in the gathering of all that they testify the sum he sues for is gathered—for example, he sues for one thousand and five hundred gold coins and brought five witnesses: the first testified that he lent him 100 in Nisan, the second testified that he lent him 200 in Iyar, the third testified that he lent him 300 in Sivan, the fourth testified that he lent him 400 in Tammuz, and the fifth testified that he lent him 500 in Av, which is one thousand and five hundred—he is not obligated to pay him the entire sum, for there are not two witnesses for the entire sum. Rather, he pays him seven hundred and swears a Torah oath regarding the eighth hundred, and by means of a gilgul he swears regarding the remaining seven hundred. And the reason is that we combine the fourth witness regarding the 400 with the fifth witness regarding the 500, as both of them testify regarding 400, and he pays them. And then we combine the 100 that remained from the 500 with one 100 from the third witness regarding the 300, and he pays another 100. And then we combine the 200 that remained from the third with the 200 of the second, as both of them agree on these 200, and he pays them. And the first witness remains alone, and he swears against him as he is a single witness to contradict him, and by means of a gilgul he shall swear regarding the rest. But if he were not obligated in an oath regarding the testimony of the first witness, he would not be obligated in an oath regarding what remains from these previous ones, even though there remains from them 700 upon which there is only one witness; for through their combination we made 700, and regarding the remaining 700 there was only one each, nevertheless he is not obligated in an oath regarding them. For since by their word he paid half, they do not have the power to bring him further to an oath, for a witness who obligates money cannot also obligate an oath [Sma]. And the reason for this is, it is not necessary to say in this which has been explained that certainly one should not obligate him in an oath, for regarding every witness that you wish to obligate him in an oath, he will say: "Have I not paid everything that he testified against me?" For example, when we combined the 200 of the second and the 200 of the third and we obligated him to pay 200, he has paid according to the claim of one of the witnesses. And so too regarding the third 100 of the third that we combined with the fifth 100 of the fifth and we obligated him 100, and so too when we combined the 400 of the fourth with 400 of the fifth and we obligated him to pay 400. Rather, even if one testified against him regarding a maneh and one regarding two hundred, and we obligated him a maneh, and there is still cause to obligate him in an oath regarding the remaining maneh from the one of the two hundred, nevertheless one should not obligate him. For how shall he swear to contradict him, when he paid half by his hand? And should we say that he shall swear to contradict him for half of his testimony, does he not contradict him entirely? And furthermore, the oath of a single witness we derive from "a single witness shall not rise up against a man for any iniquity or for any sin," but he does rise for an oath; automatically we hear from this that specifically one who does not rise for anything except for an oath, but this witness whose testimony was established for half of it, he has risen for the iniquity of the theft that he wished to steal from him, and he shall not rise for an oath [so it appears to me].

All this that has been explained is when they testify regarding different times and do not contradict one another. However, when they testify regarding one time and contradict one another—where this one says he borrowed a maneh from him on such-and-such a day, and the second says, "Not so, but rather two hundred," and the third says, "Not so, but rather three hundred," and the fourth says, "Not so, but rather four hundred," and the fifth says, "Not so, but rather five hundred," and the claimant claims five hundred or more—the law of the defendant is that he pays two hundred and no more. For behold, the first and the second testify that he did not borrow more than two hundred from him, and even though the third, fourth, and fifth testify to more than two hundred, nevertheless, two are like a hundred. And he is not even obligated to take an oath regarding the claim of the three witnesses, since two witnesses assist him. But he pays two hundred because of the second and third witnesses, and the first witness is not believed when he testifies that no more than a maneh is due to him, for a single witness in the presence of two is nothing. And if all the witnesses testified without specification—that they did not say it was at different times, and they also did not say it was at one time—we judge as if they testified regarding one time and contradict one another. And even though we explained that as much as we are able to reconcile their words so that they are not like those who contradict one another, we judge to settle them, as written in section 5, nevertheless, here, since regardless, regarding the sum of the money they contradict one another, we no longer judge to equalize their words. For according to what was written there, the primary reason is that since they are equal in their testimony in all details, we do not have the power to nullify their testimony; but here, regardless, their words are not equal, and automatically we judge their testimony to be lenient for the defendant, for the burden of proof is upon the claimant [so it appears to me, and see the Taz].

And just as loan after loan combine, so too repayment after repayment combine. How so? Reuven claims two hundred from Shimon based on a deed, and Shimon claims "I paid you," and one witness testifies that he paid him a maneh in Nisan, and the second testifies that he paid him a maneh in Iyar; if the deed was written before the time of the first repayment, the witnesses combine and he deducts a maneh for him. And even if the deed was made on the fifteenth of Nisan and the witness testifies that on that same day he paid him [our teacher, the Beit Yosef], and even though there is a presumption that a person does not pay within his term, and certainly not on the day of his loan, nevertheless regarding witnesses we do not say this presumption, and even one witness is superior to a presumption [as it appears to me to learn from this law]. And so too admission after admission and admission after repayment combine, and the lender cannot say "they are sitrai," meaning that it is for another debt; and the details of this law were explained in siman 58, see there. But repayment after admission do not combine, even though regarding a loan they combine even in such a case as I wrote in section 6; there, because "the borrower is a servant to the lender," we say that he admitted to him based on his promise to lend to him afterwards, but regarding repayment it is impossible that he would admit to him before the repayment [Sma]. And so too if the borrower himself says that he only paid him a maneh, their testimony does not combine since he contradicts one of them, and the lender shall take an oath of the sages against the witness whom the borrower does not contradict, and he collects his entire deed [ibid.].

And just as in loans witness joins with witness, so too in other matters; even though they do not testify in one manner, nevertheless, since the subject of the matter is one, they join together. For example, regarding land, where one says, "In my presence, Shimon purchased this land," and one says, "In my presence, Shimon took possession of this land," they join with one another and we establish it in the hand of Shimon. And from this you shall judge for all matters in this way. And this is specifically when they testify regarding one time, but if they testify regarding different times, it was explained in siman 240 that even with two deeds, the second nullified the first, and all the more so we do not join witness with witness. However, regarding a chazakah when the second testifies that they do not join, this is when he testified that he then performed a chazakah to purchase it at another time, for then they do not join. But if he testifies that he saw him in possession of this land, they join, for he does not contradict the purchase of the time of the first witness. And there is one who says that even regarding acquisitions that occurred at two different times they join, for specifically with two deeds the second nullified the first, for why did he have to write the second deed? But with two acquisitions, it is possible that because he did not have the first witnesses to write him a deed from the first time, he was forced to perform another new acquisition, and this is not a nullification of the first [Netivot HaMishpat]. And this requires further study [see Darkhei Moshe, letter 3].

And that which we explained, that they join together witness to witness, it has already been explained that this is when one does not contradict the other. But if one of them contradicts the other, such that he says to him, "You have spoken a lie, for at the time you say he gave or sold, his hand did not move from mine and I did not see that he gave," there is nothing in their words. However, when he says, "I did not see this thing," it is not called a contradiction, for perhaps this one saw and this one did not see, since he does not say that his hand did not move from his. And when there is another witness regarding another time, they join one to another; for if regarding that same time there is another witness, it is simple that there is nothing in the words of the contradictor, even when saying "his hand did not move from mine," for one in the place of two is nothing. And even if the first says, "In my presence and in your presence he gave to him," and this one says, "I did not see," it is not a contradiction, for we say that the first imagined that the second also saw, and in truth he did not see. And the dayan must understand well in these matters what is a contradiction and what is not a contradiction.

And just as regarding the observation of the testimony it is not necessary that both see as one, so too to testify before a beit din it is not necessary that both testify as one in the beit din; rather, even if one testifies today and the second tomorrow, their testimony joins together in monetary laws. And not only this, but even if both did not testify in one beit din, but rather this one testified before this beit din and the second testified before another beit din, the beit din comes to the other beit din and they join the testimony not in the presence of the witnesses. And specifically the entire beit din, but part of this beit din and part of the second beit din do not join together to become a new beit din, since they only heard from one witness, and now also when they hear from one another from part of the beit din, it is like a witness from the mouth of a witness. And all the more so other people who heard the matter in the courts shall not testify before a beit din to rule based on their testimony, since they only heard from the mouth of one witness, it is like a witness from the mouth of a witness when they testify now before a beit din that they heard thus from the witness. But two witnesses who testified in a beit din as one, others can testify that thus the testimony was received in the beit din, for they do not testify about the hearing of the witnesses but rather about the act of the beit din. And all the more so two witnesses who testified in three courts, where one from each beit din gathers and they join to become a new beit din to judge based on what they heard, because they are judging based on the act of each beit din. But with one witness who testified, the concept of an act of beit din does not apply to this, for one witness is nothing to create an act of beit din through him, and they only testify about what they heard from his mouth, and it is a witness from the mouth of a witness [Acharonim]. And according to this, a document in which only one witness is signed and it was burned, the witnesses cannot testify that thus it was written in the document, for since only one witness is signed upon it, the name of a document is not upon it, and their testimony is that one witness testified by his signature that such and such was the event, and this is a witness from the mouth of a witness [Netivot HaMishpat]. But in a document in which two are signed, when they testify, they do not testify about their testimony but rather testify that thus it was written in the document. The general rule of the matter: regarding an act of beit din or regarding a document they can testify, for they testify about what the beit din judged or about what was written in the document, and this is only with two witnesses and not with one witness. And there is reason to doubt what I wrote, that when one testified before this beit din and one in another beit din, that the beit din comes to the other beit din and they judge this, and specifically the entire beit din as I wrote—if each one testified before a single expert, such as before the rabbi of the city, if they can join together or if it is like a witness from the mouth of a witness; and it requires further study for the law.

A witness and a judge do not join together to testify before another beit din regarding the matter that this one testified about and this one judged, to be considered as two witnesses, because their testimony is not equal; for the judge does not testify regarding the act, but rather regarding the acceptance of the testimony, and the witness testifies regarding the essence of the act, and their testimony is not of one type. And even if this witness, when he testified before a beit din, this judge was among the beit din, they do not join together because of the reason that has been explained. And likewise, the judge cannot judge in this case with this witness [Tur], for a witness cannot become a judge.

One witness in writing who testifies in a document that Reuven borrowed a maneh from Shimon, and one witness testifies this orally regarding that same time and that same amount, they join together to obligate him to pay. However, they do not have the power to create a loan by document, for it is not a document unless two are signed on it. Therefore, if the oral witness testifies, "I performed a kinyan from his hand regarding this, but the lender has not yet come to request that I write a document for him," the two of them join together to make it a loan by document, for an unspecified kinyan is intended for writing, and he cannot say "I paid." This was further explained in siman 51, see there. [And that which was said, "that same time and that same amount," is regarding this matter, for regarding oral testimony, loan after loan joins together as I have written].

It is written, "By the mouth of two witnesses... shall a matter be established," and the tradition has come: "a matter," and not "half a matter." For example, regarding witnesses who testified that so-and-so brought two hairs, each one must testify that he saw two hairs on him. But if one testifies that he saw one hair on his back and the second testifies that he saw one hair on his stomach—even if two testified that they saw one hair on his back and two others testified that they saw one hair on his stomach—this is nothing, for they testified regarding half a matter, as one hair is nothing. However, if one testified that he saw two hairs on his back and the second regarding two hairs on his stomach, their testimony joins together. And even though they do not testify regarding the same location, nevertheless, since each one testifies regarding two hairs, behold both of them testify that this man is an adult. And that which was explained in siman 145 regarding the matter of three years of chazakah—that even if two testify regarding the first year, two regarding the second year, and two regarding the third, their testimony joins together, and yet it is half a matter since less than three years is not a chazakah—it is not comparable. For there, the years are necessarily separate and it is impossible to see all three years as one. Furthermore, testimony regarding one year is effective for the produce, as I wrote there, and therefore it is considered a complete matter, which is not the case with two hairs. And from this you shall judge for all matters of testimony what is called a complete matter and what is called half a matter; and if a portion of the testimony is effective for some matter, it is not called half a matter, as I wrote. And this was further explained in siman 38, section 24; see there. And for capital laws, the two witnesses must see the two hairs in one location.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 14 that testimony through knowledge without seeing will be explained in siman 90, for there is one who says that it constitutes testimony. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters is that it is an established halacha in our hands that we do not follow the estimation of the witnesses, neither in civil laws nor in capital laws, as is written in siman 408; see there. And that which was explained in siman 246, that we follow an estimation, that is when the act is clear to the judges and they judge the estimation of the giver; but to judge the act based on an estimation of the witnesses as to how the act occurred, we do not judge [Maharik, Shoresh 129]. And this, that we follow testimony of knowledge or seeing, is also like that of siman 246. This law was explained in siman 79: when witnesses testified that Reuven counted out money to Shimon but they did not know the manner of the giving, if Shimon denied it, he is liable to pay; and this is seeing without knowledge. And knowledge without seeing is when they heard that he admitted to him [Shevuot 32a], and there the beit din judges based on the estimation of the denial of the litigant and not based on the estimation of the witnesses. And in siman 90, where we judge based on the estimation of the witnesses, in truth it is an enactment of the sages regarding one who was robbed or injured, who swear and take, as is written there, and not by the strict law. And the "one who says" there, that he takes without an oath, is in a place where the matter is clear to the witnesses and it is like knowledge and seeing, as is written there in section 9; see there. And I wonder at our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote that there is one who says that knowledge without seeing constitutes testimony; I do not know who disagrees with this, and it is an explicit Gemara in Shevuot there, and this is that of siman 79. [And that of siman 90, its source is from the Ramah in the Tur there, section 24, and he did not write this reason at all; it requires further study.] And the explanation of the matter is as I have written; and see what I have written in siman 408 with the help of Heaven.

There is no distinction in monetary matters between a matter that is likely to be revealed or not, for a single witness is not believed even in a matter that is likely to be revealed. And even though in a matter of prohibition he is believed in such a case, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 314 and in Even HaEzer siman 17 and in the Rambam chapter 3 of Kiddush HaChodesh law 14 [and Rashi Yevamot 77a], nevertheless in monetary matters he is not believed. And the reason is that granted, in a matter of prohibition where the testimony is only based on credibility, and therefore even relatives are fit to testify, a single witness is properly believed in a matter that is likely to be revealed, for he certainly will not lie about this. But in monetary matters, it is a decree of the Torah that only by the mouth of two fit witnesses shall a matter be established, and not by relatives even if they are completely righteous. Therefore, regarding a single witness as well, even though he certainly would not lie in a matter that is likely to be revealed, nevertheless it is a decree of the Torah that he is not believed. And the same applies to laws of lashes and capital cases and all types of punishments. And regarding that which was explained in this siman, that we join one witness to another witness if one did a matter before witnesses upon such-and-such a condition and went back and stipulated before other witnesses another condition, and it is in a manner where it is in his power to choose whichever condition he desires—whether one of the first witnesses and one of the latter witnesses join together to testify that there was a condition in this matter—it was explained in Even HaEzer siman 144, see there.

How were the inquiry and investigation conducted in capital cases during the time the Beit HaMikdash existed? The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the first chapter of Laws of Testimony: It is a positive commandment to investigate the witnesses and inquire of them and to multiply questioning, and they are precise with them and move them from matter to matter during the time of questioning so that they might become silent or retract if there is a flaw in their testimony, as it is said, "Then you shall inquire, and investigate, and ask diligently." And the judges must be careful during the investigation of the witnesses lest from within [the questioning] they learn to lie. And with seven inquiries they examine them: In which seven-year cycle? In which year? In which month? On which day of the month? On which day of the week? At which hour of the day? And in which place? Even if they said "today he killed" or "yesterday he killed," they ask them: In which seven-year cycle? In which year? In which month? On which day of the month? In which day? In which hour? And included in the inquiries beyond the seven that are equal in all cases: if they testified against him that he worshipped idols, they ask them what he worshipped and with which service he worshipped; if they testified that he desecrated the Shabbat, they ask them which labor he performed and how he performed it; if they testified that he ate on Yom Kippur, they ask them which food he ate and how much he ate; if they testified that he killed a person, they ask them with what he killed him; and so too anything similar to this is included in the inquiries. Thus far his words. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, is of the opinion that that which the sages of blessed memory counted as only seven inquiries refers to the time and the place which are equal in all testimony, but regarding every specific transgression there are additional matters that are called inquiries and not examinations, and their law is like inquiries, such that if one of them said "I do not know," their testimony is void [Lechem Mishneh]. Furthermore, it appears to me that certainly the inquiries are only seven as the sages of blessed memory said, and that which they investigate regarding the essence of the testimony is called "drishah," as it is written, "And the judges shall investigate [vedarshu] diligently, and behold the witness is a false witness etc.," for everything that is in the essence of the matter is called "drishah," as it is written, "And the goat of the sin-offering Moses diligently sought [darosh darash] etc.," and like "until your brother seeks [derosh] it etc.," and like "Seek [dirshu] the Lord while He may be found," meaning seek the essence of the service of God. And "chakirah" is called investigating from the side into the depth of the matter through which the matter will become known, and not regarding the essence of the thing, as it is written, "Behold this, we have investigated [chakarnuha] it, so it is etc.," and like "Who does great things beyond investigation [cheker]," and like "Can you find the investigation [hacheker] of God?" and "to every limit he investigates [choker]." And "she'elah" is called a matter that is not at all in the depth of the matter but only questions from the side. And to this it intended, since it is written, "And you shall inquire [vedarashta], and investigate [vechakarta], and ask [vesha'alta] diligently," therefore they inquire [dorshin] into the body of the transgression, and investigate [chokrin] from the side into the depth of the matter through the inquiries of time and place, and ask [sho'alin] general questions to examine them. And "drishot" and "chakirot" have one law, and "she'elot" are not a hindrance. And even though from these expressions we derive the seven inquiries, nevertheless, no verse departs from its plain meaning. And this appears to be the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, throughout that entire chapter; see there.

He wrote further: The inquiries and investigations are the matters that are the essence of the testimony, and through them he is convicted or acquitted. These are the intent of the act that he performed, the specification of the time, and the specification of the place, through which the witnesses may be proven conspirators or not proven conspirators; for we cannot prove the witnesses to be conspirators until they specify the time and the place. Furthermore, one increases the examination of the witnesses in matters that are not the essence of the testimony and upon which it does not depend, and these are called examinations. And anyone who increases examinations, behold, this is praiseworthy. How are these examinations conducted? Behold, if they testified against him that he killed, and they were inquired of with the seven inquiries that we enumerated—which are the specification of the time and the specification of the place—and they were investigated regarding the intent of the act and they specified the vessel with which he killed him, one examines them further and says to them: What was the slain person or the killer wearing, white garments or black? Was the dust of the earth upon which he was killed white or red? These and similar matters are the examinations. It happened that the witnesses said, "He killed him in such-and-such a place under the fig tree," and they examined the witnesses and said to them, "Were its figs black or white? Were the stems of those figs long or short?" And anyone who increases examinations and similar matters, behold, this is praiseworthy. Thus far his words.

He further wrote in chapter 2: What is the difference between hakirot and drishot and bedikot? In hakirot and drishot, if one aligned his testimony and the second says "I do not know," their testimony is void. But in bedikot, even if both say "we do not know," their testimony stands. And when they contradict one another, even in bedikot, their testimony is void. How so? They testified that he killed so-and-so, and the first said when he was investigated: "In such-and-such a week, in such-and-such a year, in such-and-such a month, on such-and-such a day of the month, on the fourth day of the week, at six hours of the day, in such-and-such a place he killed him." And similarly when they inquired with what he killed him, he said that he killed him with a sword. And similarly the second witness aligned his testimony in everything except for the hours, as he said "I do not know at what hour of the day it was," or if he aligned the hours and said "I do not know with what he killed him, and I did not discern the vessel that was in his hand," behold, their testimony is void. But if they aligned everything, and the judges said to them, "Were his clothes black or white?" and they said "We do not know, and we did not pay attention to these matters which have no substance," behold, their testimony stands. If one said "He was wearing black clothes" and the second said "Not so, rather he was wearing white," behold, their testimony is void; it is as if one said "on the fourth day of the week" and the second "on the fifth," for there is no testimony here. Or if one said "He killed him with a sword" and the second said "with a spear," for there is no testimony here, as it is said: "the matter is certain," and since they contradicted one another in any of the matters, this is not "certain." Thus far his words. And some say that even if they do not know with what he killed him, their testimony stands, for this is like bedikot; for in hakirot the sages, of blessed memory, stated the reason that their testimony is void is because it is testimony that you cannot subject to hazamah [Pesachim 12b], and this applies only to time and place. However, the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, is as I wrote: that drishot are superior to hakirot, for drishot are regarding the essence of the matter. And specifically for hakirot we required the reason that "you cannot subject it to hazamah," for without this they would be like bedikot; but for drishot regarding the essence of the matter, we did not require this reason, and it is obvious that their testimony is void. [And the Mishnah that "they would examine" only distinguishes between hakirot and bedikot, but between drishot and bedikot the distinction is simple as I wrote; and in the Mishnah there all of them are explained, see there. And therefore in the Tosefta of Sanhedrin chapter 9, which mentions only hakirot and drishot and not bedikot, it does not mention any difference, see there well and examine closely].

Sometimes even regarding investigations, the two witnesses contradict one another and their testimony remains valid, such as when one witness says the incident occurred on Wednesday, the third of the month, and the second says the incident occurred on Wednesday, the second of the month; since they agreed upon the day, it is evident that one of them erred regarding the intercalation of the previous month, as was written in section 5. In what case does this apply? Until the middle of the month. But after the middle of the month, such as when this one says on the sixteenth of the month and this one says on the seventeenth of the month, even though both of them agreed upon the day of the week, their testimony is void, for after the middle of the month everyone is expert in when Rosh Chodesh occurred. And before the middle of the month, the beit din does not need to ask the witnesses if both of them knew of the intercalation; and even though if it became known to us that they knew, their testimony would be void, nevertheless, since they agreed upon the day of the week, it is clear that one of them erred regarding the previous intercalation, for most people err in this [Tosafot ibid. 11b]. And if one says on the third of the month and one says on the fifth, their testimony is void.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: If one witness said at the second hour of the day and the second says at the third hour, their testimony stands, for it is the way of people to err by one hour. But if one said at the third hour and the second says at the fifth, their testimony is void. If one said before sunrise and one says at sunrise, their testimony is void even though it is one hour, for the matter is recognizable to all; and likewise if they differed regarding its setting. Thus far his words. And his intention is not that a person only errs by one hour and no more, for if so, even if one said at the third hour and the second said slightly after the fourth hour, their testimony would also be void. Furthermore, in the Gemara there we say that a person errs by two hours minus a bit, for if not so, how do we sustain their testimony when one says at the second hour and the second says at the third? Perhaps this one who says at the second hour intends the beginning of the second hour and the second intends the end of the third hour; and at the very least we should examine them as to their intention, for regarding this the reasoning we explained in the previous section does not apply. Rather, certainly even if they say so, people also err in this, and it is impossible to void their testimony because of this. However, that which the Rambam wrote, that it is the way of people to err by one hour, means from the second hour to the third, or from the third to the fourth, and the error is even from the beginning of the second to the end of the third [Kesef Mishneh]. And one should not say that if so, why do we void their testimony when one says at three and one says at five—let us examine them, perhaps one of them says in the middle of the hour and one says at the end, and there is only an interval of an hour and a half between them, and we should sustain their testimony? For the truth is that certainly if we examined them and it was found that this one said at the end of three and this one said in the middle of five, their testimony stands; but ab initio we are not to examine them to sustain their testimony and execute a person [Tosafot ibid.], for since according to their external words they contradict one another, the beit din is not to seek out his liability. And it appears to me that in monetary laws, if it occurred that the beit din examined them regarding the hours and this one said at three and this one at five, the beit din is obligated to investigate, and if it is found that one said in the middle of the hour as I have written, we sustain their testimony.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: If there were many witnesses, and two of them aligned their testimony in the inquiries and investigations, and the third says "I do not know," the testimony is established by the two and he is executed. But if he contradicted the two of them, even in the examinations, their testimony is void. Thus far his words. And they raised a difficulty against him: for according to what he wrote in chapter 5, that if one is found to be a relative or disqualified, even among three witnesses their testimony is void, if so, when the third says regarding the inquiries "I do not know," their testimony should be void, as the Gemara [Sanhedrin 41b] compares them to one another. And from the words of the Tosafot there, it is indeed clarified that according to what we hold regarding a relative or disqualified person that their testimony is void, in this case too their testimony is void. And it appears to my humble opinion that the Rambam, of blessed memory, distinguishes between them with a correct reasoning: for "I do not know" is not a disqualification at all, and the proof is that in the examinations it is not an obstacle, as has been written; but a relative or disqualified person is a complete disqualification. And the give-and-take in the Gemara is whether to compare them to one another or not, and the conclusion is that we do not compare them to one another [and that which it says there "according to whom? according to Rabbi Akiva," it means to say that it is similar to the ruling of Rabbi Akiva; and according to Rava who says "according to whom? not according to Rabbi Akiva," it means to say that it is not similar to the ruling of Rabbi Akiva. And perforce one must say so, according to what he wrote in the Commentary on the Mishnah in the first chapter of Makkot, that there is no one who disagrees with Rabbi Akiva at all, it is not relevant to say "not according to Rabbi Akiva," rather one must say as I have written, and delve into it].

All witnesses for capital cases or lashes must warn the transgressor, and if they did not warn him, he is not punished even if he is a talmid chacham and knows the law, for perhaps he had some aspect of inadvertence. And how do they warn him? They say to him: "Desist," or "Do not do this, for this is a transgression and you will be liable for death or lashes." If he desisted, he is exempt. Similarly, if he remained silent or if he nodded his head, and even if he said "I know," he is exempt until he surrenders himself to death or to lashes and says, "On this condition I am acting," and afterwards he is executed or lashed. And he must transgress immediately following the warning, within the time of a speech (toch k'dei dibbur), but after the time of a speech he requires another warning, for perhaps he forgot. The warning does not specifically need to come from the witnesses; even if a woman or a slave warned him, or if he heard the voice of the one warning even if he did not see him, and even if the victim himself warned him, it is a valid warning. All these matters came by tradition until they are a law given to Moses at Sinai. And if all this did not occur, the earthly beit din does not judge him, and his judgment is handed over to Heaven like all those liable for karem, positive commandments, and negative commandments that do not carry lashes, for the punishment in the world of truth is a thousand times harder than the earthly punishment, similar to the stars which from below appear very small but above their size is very great. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 12 of Sanhedrin that when witnesses come to beit din and say, "We saw that this person committed such-and-such a transgression," the beit din says to them: "Do you recognize him? Did you warn him?" And if they said, "We do not recognize him," or "We are in doubt," or "We did not warn him" as has been explained, behold, he is exempt from the judgment of beit din.

And if the witnesses said, "We warned him according to the law and we recognize him," the beit din intimidates them. And how do they intimidate regarding capital cases? They say to them: Perhaps you say based on estimation that he committed this transgression because the matter is clear to you, but you did not see it yourselves. For example, regarding the killing of a person, that you saw this one running after his fellow into a ruin, and you ran after him and found a sword in his hand with blood dripping and the slain person is convulsing, and therefore it is clear to you that he killed him—this is nothing regarding testimony, since you did not see the killing with your actual eyes. And so too regarding forbidden relations, when they saw the seclusion but did not see in the manner of adultery, this is nothing. And so too regarding the desecration of Shabbat, when they warned him not to light a fire on Shabbat and he lit it, but they did not see when he lit it, but rather they previously saw that it was dark in this place and immediately following the warning light was seen with him and no one else was with him—even though it is clear that he committed the transgression, nevertheless this is nothing regarding testimony in beit din. And so too they say to them: Perhaps you heard from a trustworthy person who saw the transgression himself—your testimony is also nothing, for it is a witness from the mouth of a witness. Or perhaps you do not know that we will ultimately examine you with inquiry and investigation? Know that capital cases are not like monetary cases. In monetary cases, a person gives his money and it is atoned for him; in capital cases, his blood and the blood of his descendants are suspended upon him until the end of the world, for regarding Cain it was said, "The voice of your brother's bloods cry out"—his blood and the blood of his descendants. Therefore, man was created alone in the world to teach that anyone who destroys one soul from the world, it is reckoned to him as if he destroyed an entire world, and anyone who sustains one soul in the world, it is reckoned to him as if he sustained an entire world. And perhaps you will say, "If so, what do we need this trouble for? We will not testify at all even when we actually saw"—it is not so, for if you saw and warned him, the obligation is upon you to testify before us, and behold it is said, "And he is a witness, or saw or knew, if he does not tell then he shall bear his iniquity." And perhaps you will say, "What do we need to be liable for the blood of this one, that he should be killed through us?" On the contrary, it is a merit if you are testifying the truth, as it is written, "And when the wicked perish there is song." If they stood by their words, they bring in the greatest among them alone and examine him with inquiry and investigation as has been explained. And if his testimony is found to be consistent, they bring in the second one alone and examine him like the first. And even if there were a hundred witnesses, they examine all of them with inquiry and investigation. And afterwards they increase examining them with cross-examinations. Only regarding one who blasphemes the Name, they do not examine except the first witness who shall say what he heard explicitly, and he says it, and the beit din stands on their feet and rends their garments, and the second witness does not say it explicitly, but rather says, "I too am like him," and so too the third and the fourth, and even up to a hundred. And they examine them in the presence of one another, for if not so, he would not be able to say "I too am like him." And in truth, according to the law of the Torah, in all types of testimony it is sufficient that the second says "I too am like him," only that in capital cases and in other testimonies the rabbis were stringent to examine each one individually, and regarding a blasphemer, because of the honor of Heaven, they established it according to the original law [Sanhedrin 60a].

When all the words of the witnesses are found to be consistent, the Sanhedrin opens for the perpetrator of the transgression with merit, as has been explained in siman 18, and they say to him: "If you did not sin, do not fear their words." And in the Yerushalmi it is explained that the opening for merit is that they say: "Is it possible that this person killed a soul?" And the Sanhedrin deliberates the entire day; if they found merit for him, they acquitted him, and if not, they do not conclude the judgment for liability today, but rather they delay the judgment until the next day, as it is said: "righteousness lodged in it." And they bind the liable person in prison so that he does not flee. And all night the Sanhedrin pair off in pairs and minimize food and do not drink wine, and they discuss the matter all night, each one with his pair, regarding the matter of this transgression; if he was a murderer, they discuss the section of the murderer, and if he was one who uncovered nakedness, in the section of nakedness [Tosefta chapter 9]. And the next day they rise early to the beit din and the attendants call each one of the beit din by his name, and he responds; if he was among those who acquit, he responds: "I was one who acquits, and now also I acquit," and they accept him. And if he responds: "I was one who acquits, and now I convict," they do not accept him [ibid.], for it has already been explained in siman 18 that until the actual conclusion of the judgment, they do not allow one to change from merit to liability, see there. And the one who convicts, if he says: "I was one who convicts, and now also I convict," they do not protest against him and they accept him, and certainly if he says: "now I acquit." And if they forgot their reasons that they stated, each one according to his judgment, the scribes of the judges remind them, for it has already been explained in siman 1 that for every Sanhedrin there were two scribes of the judges, and they write the reasons of those who acquit and the reasons of those who convict. And they begin his judgment; if they found merit for him, they acquitted him, and if they needed to add judges, such as when one says "I do not know," they add. And if those who convict were in the majority by two opinions, they take him out to be executed according to his liability in one of the four deaths of beit din. And the place of execution was outside the beit din and far from the beit din so that the beit din should not appear as murderers, as it is written: "Bring forth the one who cursed to the outside of the camp." And the measure of the distance from the beit din was not explained in the Gemara, and Rashi explained: "somewhat far." And the Rambam wrote that it appears to him based on reasoning that it was six mil away, like it was between the beit din of Moses our teacher, which was before the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, and the camp of Israel. And when they take him out from the beit din to die, one stands at the entrance of the beit din with scarves in his hand, and the horse with a rider is far from him, and a herald goes out before him: "So-and-so is going out to be executed with such-and-such a death because he committed such-and-such a transgression in such-and-such a place at such-and-such a time, and so-and-so and so-and-so are his witnesses; whoever knows merit for him, let him come and teach concerning him." If one said: "I have something to teach for his merit," this one waves the scarves in his hand, which is like a flag, and the rider on the horse runs and brings the defendant back to the beit din, and they hear the merit; if there is substance in it, they acquit him, and if not, he returns and goes out to be executed. And if he himself said: "I have something to teach for my own merit," even if there is no substance in his words, they bring him back twice, for perhaps due to fear his arguments were blocked, and when he returns to the beit din his mind will be settled and he will state a reason. And if they brought him back and no substance was found in his words, they take him out a third time. If he said on the third time: "I have something to teach for my own merit," if there is substance in his words, they bring him back even many times; therefore, they hand over to him two Torah scholars who hear his words on the way; if there is substance in his words, they bring him back, and if not, they do not bring him back. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote that his witnesses are the ones who kill him in any death for which he is liable [chapter 13 of Sanhedrin], and a murderer whose witnesses did not kill him, they are obligated to put him to death by the hand of any person. Thus far his words. And it appears that the Rambam, of blessed memory, learned it from stoning, as it is written regarding it: "the hand of the witnesses shall be upon him first," etc., and he learned from this for all those liable for the deaths of beit din. And I wonder, for in chapter 1 of Murderer he ruled that it is a mitzvah for the blood redeemer to kill the murderer. And see what I have written with the help of Heaven in siman 425, section 2.

When he arrives within ten amot of the place of execution, they say to him: "Confess," for such is the way of all those who are executed, they confess; and everyone who confesses has a portion in the World to Come. And anyone who is ill must say a viduy before his death, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 338. And if he does not know how to confess, they say to him: "Say, may my death be an atonement for all my iniquities." And even if he knows within himself that they testified falsely against him, he should confess thus. And after the viduy, they give him to drink a grain of frankincense in a cup of wine so that his mind will be confounded and he will become intoxicated and not feel the pain, and afterward they execute him with the death penalty for which he was liable. And this wine and the frankincense, and the stone with which he is stoned, or the sword with which he is executed, or the scarf with which they strangle him, and the tree upon which one liable for stoning for blasphemy or idol worship is hanged, and the scarves with which they wave as has been explained, and the horse that runs to save him—all come from the public funds and not from the property of the one being executed, even though there are things that come for his benefit. And whoever wishes to volunteer may come and volunteer, for there is no obligation that it must specifically be from public funds. Even though the execution of the liable person is a benefit to the collective, as it is written: "And you shall purge the innocent blood from Israel, and it shall be well with you," for through transgressors the curse rules in the world, as the prophet said [Hosea 4]: "Swearing and lying, etc., therefore the land shall mourn, and everyone who dwells therein shall languish," nevertheless, this is not like sacrifices where we require specifically from public funds [so it seems to me to explain, for if not so, what is it coming to teach us].

Once his verdict has been finalized on the following day, it is forbidden to delay him further until the next day, for this is "affliction of the verdict"; rather, they execute him on that day. However, it appears to me that if the matter extended until after sunset, perforce they leave him for the next day, for they do not judge capital cases at night. And so too for those liable for malkot, for in all matters malkot is equal to death regarding inquiry and interrogation and in the finalization of the verdict, that it should not be at night. And if the one liable for death was a woman and she is pregnant, they do not wait for her until she gives birth, and we do not say "how can we destroy a soul for nothing," because as long as the fetus has not emerged into the air of the world, it is not a soul, as I wrote in siman 425. But when she has sat upon the birth-stool, even after the finalization of her verdict, they wait for her until she gives birth [Tosafot Arachin 7a], for since it has uprooted from its place to emerge into the air of the world, it is like another body, and we are not concerned for the "affliction of the verdict" for her, even if it is delayed several days. And it appears that if she sat upon the birth-stool before the finalization of her verdict, they do not finalize her verdict until she gives birth [and this is the intention of Rashi, of blessed memory, there, and he does not disagree with Tosafot, see there and examine it carefully]. And when she is not sitting upon the birth-stool and they execute her, they strike her opposite the womb so that the fetus dies first, and she does not come to a state of disgrace if it emerges after her death, for the Torah is concerned even for the dignity of the souls of the wicked. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 12 of Sanhedrin that a woman who is executed, it is permitted to benefit from her hair, and so he ruled at the end of the laws of mourning regarding all the dead, that it is permitted to benefit from their hair. And the Tur in Yoreh Deah siman 349 disagrees on this, see there [and the Rambam explains there like Rashi, that according to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak the hair is not forbidden because it is not included in "death," and our teacher the Beit Yosef wondered there about this, and the Lechem Mishneh elaborated, see there, and the matter is simple as I have written]. And one who went out to be executed and his sacrifice was already slaughtered, they do not execute him until they sprinkle for him from the blood of his sin-offering and the blood of his guilt-offering, and it is not like a sin-offering or guilt-offering whose owners died, which go to death or to grazing [Rashi ibid.], and all the more so an olah, shelamim, and todah. And if his verdict was finalized and the sacrifice was not yet slaughtered, they do not wait for him until they offer his sacrifice for him, even though he is obligated to bring his sacrifice, because they do not afflict his verdict.

Disjoined testimony, which is valid in civil laws, is invalid in capital laws. For example, if one saw him at the time of the transgression from this window and the other from that window, they do not join together, for it is necessary that both of them see as one. And if the witnesses saw one another, even though they are in separate places, they join together. And even if the witnesses themselves did not see one another, but the one who warned the transgressor saw the two witnesses and the witnesses saw him, according to the Rambam, of blessed memory; and according to Rashi and Tosafot [Makkot 6b], one of these is sufficient, either that the one who warns saw the witnesses or that the witnesses saw him. And even though according to this it turns out his execution is based on one person when the one who warns says that he saw the witnesses, in truth the one who warns requires witnesses for this, that he saw them [Tosafot ibid.]. And there is further what is called disjoined testimony even when the two witnesses saw from one place, but at the time that this one saw, that one did not see; for example, even if both of them stood in one place and one of them put his head out of the window and saw him committing the transgression and one warns him, and he brought his head back in and the second witness put his head out and saw him transgressing; and even though the one who warns saw both of them, nevertheless, since he did not see them at one time, it does not avail to join them.

And since special testimony does not combine in capital cases, therefore, if there were two sets of special witnesses—where two witnesses saw him from one place and two others from another place, and these did not see those, and also the warner did not see them—behold, they are like two sets of witnesses for all matters. And if one of them is found to be a relative or disqualified, the testimony is established by the second set. But if these saw those, even if one from each set saw the other, they become one testimony and are disqualified. And so too regarding the matter of hazamah, for we hold that witnesses do not become zomemim until they are all proven zomemim. And with two sets of witnesses, if one is found to be zomemim, the judgment is finalized based on the second set and he is executed, and also the set proven zomemim, as I wrote in siman 38; see there. [And all these matters are not relevant in this time at all, and everything is conducted according to the law of the land, for the law of the land is the law].

A single witness is not effective for anything, neither in capital cases nor in monetary cases, and only obligates an oath for the one who contradicts him, as it is written: "A single witness shall not rise against a man for any iniquity or for any sin," and we expound that for iniquity and for sin he does not rise, but he does rise for an oath. And this is a Torah oath to contradict the witness, as I wrote in siman 87. And aside from two matters, the Torah believed a single witness: regarding a sotah, when there are witnesses of warning and seclusion, a single witness is believed to say that she was defiled so that she does not drink the bitter waters; and regarding the eglah arufah, when a single witness says that he knows the killer, they do not break the neck of the heifer, as I wrote in siman 425. And in this too there is a reason for the matter, for since there are grounds for the matter—in sotah the witnesses of warning and the witnesses of seclusion, and in eglah arufah the slain person who was found—therefore [the Torah] believed even a single witness. And also to testify for a woman that her husband died, he is believed because it is a matter that is likely to be revealed, and there are further reasons for this as I wrote in Even HaEzer siman 17. And regarding all prohibitions, a single witness is believed in a matter that is in his power [to rectify], even if there is a status of prohibition, for behold, the Torah believed every man of Israel who says that he separated terumah from this pile and that this animal was slaughtered properly. And in a matter where there is no status of prohibition, he is believed even in what is not in his power, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 127. And only in capital cases and lashes and to extract money is a single witness not believed, as I wrote. And a witness from the mouth of a witness is not valid except for the testimony of a woman and for a firstborn when he says that a blemish fell upon it, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 314. And every place where a single witness is effective, a woman and an ineligible person are also valid, except for a witness who obligates an oath; and the reason is that a single witness does not rise for an oath unless, if another were to join him, we would obligate him for money. And know that two witnesses and three witnesses and more are equal in law regarding the matter of one being found to be a relative or ineligible, that their testimony is void, as I wrote in siman 36, and regarding the matter of hazamah in siman 38.