Siman 281

Even though a person has the authority to do with his property as he wishes and to give them to whomever he desires, this is when he gives them with the language of a gift through a kinyan, and when he is a shekhiv mera even without a kinyan. However, with the language of inheritance, such as if he says, "So-and-so shall inherit from me," he has said nothing, for the language of inheritance is not the language of a gift; rather, it is the statute of the Torah for one who is fit to inherit from him. But for one who is not fit to inherit from him, this is nothing more than mere words. In what case does this apply? When he spoke regarding one who is not fit to inherit from him at all, such as if he had sons and said, "My daughter shall inherit from me," or if his heirs were his daughters and he said, "My brother shall inherit from me." But if he increased for one of his heirs—for example, if he had two sons and said, "So-and-so my son shall inherit everything" or "shall inherit three parts"—his words stand, as it is said: "And it shall be on the day he causes his sons to inherit," which implies explicitly that he causes them to inherit through his speech. And if it were not within his power to add to one and diminish from another, he would not be the one causing the inheritance, but rather the Torah would be causing them to inherit; rather, certainly the Torah gave him authority to add and to diminish. And so the Torah said: regarding those to whom this inheritance pertains, the one causing the inheritance has the authority to add to one of the heirs and to diminish from another, or to give everything to one and transfer the other from his inheritance. However, even this is specifically when he says the matter explicitly, such as if he says, "So-and-so shall inherit half my property and the rest of the sons the other half," his words stand. But if he said, "So-and-so my son shall not inherit except such-and-such," or if he said, "Reuven my son shall inherit his portion and the portion of Shimon," or if he said, "Shimon shall not inherit, only Reuven," he has said nothing, as the reason will be explained. And know that according to what I wrote in siman 5, section 10, according to the opinion of the Rambam, he specifically requires a beit din and during the day when he increases for one of the heirs and diminishes for another; see there.

The reason is because the language of inheritance regarding a father bequeathing to his sons is like the language of a gift regarding another, where one must give the gift to the one he wishes to give it to. However, if he says, "I am not giving the gift to Reuven but to Shimon," the gift is not established for Shimon through this as long as he does not say, "I am giving this gift to Shimon." Similarly, if it is known that his desire is to give Reuven and Shimon a gift of one hundred maneh, if he says to Reuven, "I am giving only twenty maneh," Shimon does not acquire the remaining eighty through this speech as long as he does not say, "Shimon shall acquire eighty maneh." And similarly, when he says, "Reuven shall acquire fifty maneh that I am giving him and also the fifty of Shimon," Reuven does not acquire the second fifty since he himself says that they belong to Shimon. And granted that Shimon will not acquire through this speech, nevertheless, Reuven also does not acquire [as mentioned above regarding the reason for the matter; and it can be said that this is the intent of the Tur who wrote that it is not within his power etc., and examine it closely].

And even though it is not similar at all to a gift, for since the Torah gave him permission to bequeath to whomever he desires, if so, when he says "my son so-and-so shall not inherit except for such-and-such," the remainder of the inheritance automatically remains for the other; however, it is true that he has permission to bequeath much to whomever he desires, and automatically it is uprooted from the other heir, but it did not give him permission to uproot from the other heir his portion and that based on this the other shall acquire. For he cannot say "my son so-and-so shall not inherit from me," for he inherits from him against his will, and he is making a condition against that which is written in the Torah, and his condition is void. And even though in a matter of money his condition is valid, as is written in Even HaEzer siman 38, this is when the second party waives it to him, but the son certainly does not consent to this [Bava Batra 126b]. And even if he is silent, this is not a waiver, but rather he does not wish to distress his father [Rashbam]. And even if he should waive it, his waiver is nothing during the lifetime of the father, for a matter that has not yet come into his hand, he does not have the ability to sell or to waive [Nimukei Yosef].

Therefore, the formulations we have explained are not effective, since he did not explicitly state that "so-and-so my son shall inherit such-and-such from me," but rather it was understood by implication regarding the second son, that he removed him from inheriting his portion. And he does not have the power to remove him, for he is stipulating against that which is written in the Torah. And regarding that which the Torah gave him permission to increase for the other or to give him everything, he did not state this explicitly. Therefore, if he said, "Reuven my son shall inherit such-and-such from me," or "he shall inherit all my property and Shimon shall not inherit," or if he said, "Shimon shall not inherit from me and Reuven shall inherit everything," his words are sustained. For granted that what he said regarding Shimon "shall not inherit" is nothing, nevertheless, in that which he said "Reuven shall inherit," his words are sustained, and automatically Shimon is removed. And he did not make the inheritance of Reuven dependent upon the removal of the inheritance of Shimon, and what he said regarding Shimon is as if he had not said it. And if he said regarding an ordinary son that he should take a double portion, whether he takes from property due to be received as if it were already possessed or not, some say that he does not take from property due to be received for the second portion since he expressed it in the language of primogeniture, and there are those who disagree on this [ibid.]. And if there is also a firstborn, the firstborn takes a double portion first, and afterwards, from the remainder, this ordinary son also takes a double portion, and the rest the other heirs divide [ibid.].

And all this is regarding the simple sons, but regarding the portion of the firstborn, the Torah decreed in this verse, "on the day he causes his sons to inherit," that he cannot favor, meaning that he cannot diminish anything from his portion to bequeath to any person, and even to one of the brothers [the Tur and Nimukei Yosef, and the wording of the Shulchan Aruch in section 4 requires further study]. Therefore, he is obligated to leave for the firstborn his double portion unless he gives all his property as a gift, as will be explained. And also regarding the simple sons, most of our teachers agreed that this is only regarding a shechiv mera, but if he was healthy, he cannot add or diminish for any of the heirs using the language of inheritance, unless he gives it as a gift with a kinyan to whomever he wishes, for the verse "on the day he causes to inherit" deals with a shechiv mera, as this is the time that a person causes his property to be inherited. And even though there are those who disagree on this, nevertheless, this is the primary ruling, for so ruled the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch.

This is the wording of the Rambam in the sixth chapter of Nachalot: A person cannot bequeath to one who is not fit to inherit him, nor can he uproot the inheritance from the heir, even though this is a monetary matter, because it is stated in the portion of Nachalot, "And it shall be unto the children of Israel a statute of judgment," to say that this statute is not changed and a condition is not effective regarding it [in the language of inheritance]. Whether he commanded while he was healthy or whether he was a shekhiv mera, whether orally or in writing, it is not effective. Therefore, one who says, "So-and-so my firstborn son shall not take a double portion," or "So-and-so my son shall not inherit with his brothers," has said nothing. "So-and-so shall inherit me" in a case where he has a daughter, or "My daughter shall inherit me" in a case where he has a son, he has said nothing, and so too anything similar to this. However, if he had many heirs, such as many sons or brothers or daughters, and he said while he was a shekhiv mera, "So-and-so my brother shall inherit me from among my brothers," or "So-and-so my daughter shall inherit me from among my daughters," his words are sustained, whether he spoke orally or wrote in writing. But if he said, "So-and-so my son shall inherit me alone," if he spoke orally his words are sustained, but if he wrote all his property to his son, he has only made him an apotropos. Thus far his words. And according to what I wrote in siman 246, according to the opinion of those who disagree with him, there is no difference whether the heirs are sons or daughters or brothers, for in all of them, if he wrote all the property to one of them in the language of a gift, he has only made him an apotropos, and if he wrote in the language of inheritance, even regarding his son, it belongs to him entirely. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, follows his reasoning as I wrote there.

And he wrote further: If one said, "My son, so-and-so, shall inherit half of my property and my other sons the other half," his words stand. But if he said, "The firstborn shall inherit like an ordinary son," or if he said, "He shall not inherit a double portion with his brothers," he has said nothing, as it is stated: "He may not prefer." Thus far his words. And it must be said that his intention is that even if he said, "My son, so-and-so, shall inherit all my property" or "half my property," as long as the portion of the firstborn is diminished, his words are of no effect. For if it were not so, there would be no distinction between a firstborn and an ordinary son, and the principle of "increased for one and decreased for another" or giving all his property to one would only be effective when he has no firstborn. But when he has a firstborn, his words are void [the Maggid Mishneh]. And not only that, but even regarding the ordinary sons his words are void, since they are void regarding the firstborn. However, there are those who disagree on this, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: That in any case where he has a firstborn and ordinary sons, and he increased for one of the ordinary sons using the language of inheritance—for example, if he said, "My son, so-and-so, shall inherit such-and-such"—he has said nothing. And some say that the distribution of the ordinary sons stands, and they collect from all of them according to the proportion and complete the portion for the firstborn. Thus far his words. Because in this matter, the firstborn is with the brothers like the law of a creditor, who takes from them according to the proportion that their father gives to them [Tur].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that even in a place where they are accustomed that the firstborn does not take a double portion, one should not follow the custom since it is against Torah law. Thus far his words. However, a waiver is effective; and even though it was explained in siman 241 that the language of waiver is only effective regarding money when it is in the hand of the one to whom it was waived, nevertheless, it has already been explained in siman 278, section 17, that regarding the portion of the firstborn, the language of waiver is effective.

One of our teachers wrote that this matter—that the father cannot take from the בכור his portion to give to his other sons—this is when the בכור is alive, as it is written: "He may not give the right of the firstborn... in the presence of the son of the hated one," and the expression "in the presence of" implies when he is alive. However, when the בכור died during his lifetime and the sons of the בכור take his portion, the grandfather can say, "So-and-so my son shall inherit such-and-such, and my grandsons, the sons of the בכור, shall inherit such-and-such." However, we have not found any of the early authorities who mention this; also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this at all. Therefore, it is a minority opinion. [However, that which they questioned from the Midrash in Bamidbar on "in the presence of Aaron their father," where Rabbi Chiya bar Abba maintains that it means at his death, is not a difficulty at all, for the explanation is when he was not yet buried, as in a field, and as it concludes: "Aaron died, Eleazar served," meaning immediately before burial, as it is written in the Sifrei that he donned the garments of the Kohen Gadol; and it was said that perhaps he was appointed as a deputy, whose law is like a Kohen Gadol, as is found in Horayot].

When he bequeaths to a simple heir more than his portion, it is effective only for the property that he possesses now, but not for the property that will come to him until his death, for he cannot bequeath except for that which is held in his hand and not for that which has not yet come into the world [Netivot HaMishpat]. And the verse implies this: "And it shall be on the day that he causes his sons to inherit that which he shall have," and not that which he does not have now. And similarly, he cannot bequeath to a fetus that has not yet come into the world. And there is one who wishes to say that he also cannot bequeath a loan, since it is not subject to acquisition by a healthy person; and even though it is subject to the gift of a shekhiv mera, nevertheless, to bequeath to one of the heirs more than his portion is not within his power [ibid.]. And there are those who disagree, for what is the connection between one and the other? For behold, it is his, and the Torah gave him permission to bequeath his property to whichever of the heirs he desires, and behold, a loan is included in his property [Chatam Sofer]. And so it appears primary, for certainly in this matter there is no distinction between that which is held and that which is prospective, for behold, it is not written "that which is found with him" as it is regarding the firstborn.

This [ruling] that he increased [the portion] for one of the heirs, he may retract it just as with a gift of a shekhiv mera [Nimukei Yosef], and even if the heir seized [the property], it appears to me that it is of no avail, for the taking effect of the inheritance is only after death, and what benefit is there in his seizure?

Some say that "increased for one and decreased for another" is only effective when he distributes all of his property, but when he distributes only part of his property it is not effective; for if it were not so, we would find the transfer of partial property through mere speech without any kinyan, and it does not imply this in the Shas [ibid. in the name of the Ritva]. And even though we certainly find this regarding one who commands due to death, and inheritance is like one who commands due to death, nevertheless, since we do not find this explicitly in the Shas, it is possible that only when he distributes all of his property is the law thus. And the verse implies this, as it is written: "that which he has," which implies that he is bequeathing all that he has.

And know that all that has been explained is only when he spoke with the language of inheritance, but with the language of a gift, in all matters his words stand, as I wrote in section 1. And even regarding the portion of the firstborn, for it is within a person's authority to give his money to whomever he wishes, even to a daughter among sons and even to a stranger. And not only this, but even if he also spoke with the language of inheritance, since he also spoke with the language of a gift, it is effective, whether he wrote the language of the gift first or whether he wrote it at the end; for example, "such-and-such field shall be given to so-and-so and he shall inherit it," or "so-and-so shall inherit such-and-such field and it shall be given to him." And even if he wrote the language of inheritance at the beginning and the end, if he only wrote the language of a gift in the middle, it is effective; for example, if he wrote "so-and-so shall inherit such-and-such field and it shall be given to him and he shall inherit it." And even if he gave to one person two fields and wrote regarding one the language of inheritance and regarding the second the language of a gift; for example, if he wrote "such-and-such field shall be given to so-and-so and he shall inherit such-and-such field," or "so-and-so shall inherit such-and-such field and such-and-such field shall be given to him." Or if he gave to two people one field and wrote "half of such-and-such field shall be given to so-and-so and so-and-so shall inherit the second half," it is effective, and even if he paused between one and the other more than the time of a speech. But two fields and two people is not effective unless he spoke within the time of a speech from one to the other, for then the language of the gift of this one is effective for the language of inheritance of that one. And if he paused the time of a speech, it is necessary that the language of the gift be mixed with both of them, that he should say "so-and-so and so-and-so shall inherit such-and-such field and such-and-such field which I gave to them as a gift and they shall inherit them." And the same law applies to three people or more. And the reason is that whenever there is the language of a gift, we are not concerned with the language of inheritance, for it appears explicitly that his intention is for a gift alone. Regarding two people and two fields, if they are not in one speech, it is impossible to learn from one to the other. And some say that even within the time of a speech, when he said "so-and-so shall inherit such-and-such field, such-and-such field shall be given to so-and-so," it is not effective for the inheritance before it unless he said "and shall be given" with a connecting vav. And even with one person and one field, it is not effective without a connecting vav [Nimukei Yosef], as it is like a separate matter. And likewise if he said the gift first, he must say regarding the inheritance with a vav, for it is the same reason. And in all this, there is no difference between speaking and writing [it appears to me].

The expression "he shall take possession of the properties," when he said it, is an expression of gift. And even if he also said an expression of inheritance, the expression "he shall take possession" is effective to nullify the expression of inheritance, just like the expression of gift that has been explained [Sma]. And similarly, the expression "they shall divide" is an expression of gift. But "I leave" is an expression of inheritance [Shach]. And that which was written in siman 253, that it is an expression of gift, is not precise, but rather it means that one acquires through this, as it is written, "and they leave their abundance to their babes." And when he divided all his properties to others with an expression of gift, even though he did not leave anything for the heirs and the spirit of the sages is not pleased with him, nevertheless his words stand and what he did is done. And this is specifically when he died from that illness, according to the law of a gift of a shekhiv mera in siman 250. And when he gave all his properties, and in a gift of part with a kinyan, he cannot retract, as was written there.

An incident occurred involving one who had nephews from his sisters and a nephew from his brother, and the latter was his heir. He gave a gift to the son of one sister and wrote that with this gift he removed all portion and right of his inheritance, and then he died. The Rashba ruled that nevertheless he inherits him, since he did not say explicitly that he gives the rest of his properties to his sisters' sons; it is like one who stipulates against that which is written in the Torah, and his condition is void. And an incident occurred involving one who gave a gift to his wife, and it was within her power to give it to whomever she desired, and she wrote in a deed that she gave it to "the one who is fit to inherit him." She had a daughter from this husband, and the husband had a son from another woman. The Rashba ruled that the son acquired it; even though according to the assessment of intent her intention was for the daughter, since the son is not hers, nevertheless, "fit to inherit him" refers only to the son. The assessment of intent is not so strong as the assessments in siman 246, and matters of the heart are not matters. Furthermore, the son collects immediately, for even during his father's lifetime he is called "fit to inherit him," and she, after all, gave it to the one fit to inherit him as a gift immediately, and the acquisition is the deed [as is evident in the Darchei Moshe, note 3].

An incident occurred involving four unmarried sisters who had a brother who did not behave properly, and they wished to divert their inheritance from him so that he would not inherit from them. What did they do? They wrote a deed stating that each one gives all her property to her three sisters, and they imagined that through this he would not inherit from them. The Rosh ruled that they did nothing, for there is no gift here at all, as all the money returned to being owned by the four of them as at the beginning. However, if the gifts were one hour before their death—for example, if each one wrote, "I give to my sisters from today and one hour before my death"—the brother does not inherit except after the death of the last one. For each one did not give except before her death, and then there remains for the one who is alive her portion and the portion of her sisters, for such was presumably their intention. It turns out that when the first one died, it remained in the hands of the three; when the second died, it remained in the hands of the two; when the third died, it remained in the hands of the fourth; and when she also died, the brother or his heirs inherit. This applies when they all gave at one time to one another, but if it is written in the deed that they gave one after the other—that the first gave to her three sisters, and afterwards the second gave, and afterwards the third, and afterwards the fourth—there is a different calculation in this, and whoever was earlier returned and acquired through the fact that they returned and gave to them.

How so? For example, if all their money was 108 zuz, each one is entitled to 27 zuz. If the first gave her 27 to the three, each of the three is entitled to 36 zuz and the first has nothing. If the second then gave her 36 to the three, the first is entitled to 12 zuz, and the third and fourth each have 48 zuz, and the second has nothing. If the third then gave her 48 to the three, the first has 28 zuz, the second 16, and the fourth 64, and the third has nothing. If the fourth then gave her 64 to the three, it turns out the first has 49 and a third zuz, the second 37 and a third, the third 21 and a third, and the fourth has nothing. And when the three sisters died, even though the fourth did not die, the brother takes everything because the fourth has nothing. And when one of the three dies, the brother shall take according to the calculation that was specified: from the first he inherits 49 and a third, from the second 37 and a third, and from the third 21 and a third.

And why do we not follow the assessment of intent, since we know that their entire desire was to smuggle it away from the brother? Because in every place where we follow an assessment of intent, we nullify this act and the matter remains as it was at first, such as in siman 246, where one heard that his son died and wrote his property to others, and afterwards his son arrived, for his gift is nullified and the property remains as before in the hand of the father. But here, they did not do anything that contains a smuggling, for even according to what they did, the brother also inherits them. If so, what assessment of intent is relevant in this? And even if we nullify their gifts, will he not also inherit them? Thus we are left only with matters of the heart, and they are not matters that can uproot a Torah inheritance.

One who writes to his daughter that she should take after his death like half the portion of a male, as written in Even HaEzer siman 90, its law is like a standard inheritance, and creditors and the ketubah precede this gift. Even the "tenth of the assets" for the daughter explained there in siman 113 precedes this gift; for even though it is a gift, and a creditor does not collect from a gift of movable property that was given, nevertheless, since the gift is after his death and they established it like an inheritance—for he called this a "shtar of half a male"—its law is exactly like an inheritance. Just as the heirs pay their father's debts, the ketubah, and the tenth of the assets, so too it falls upon her to pay. Also regarding this matter, its law is like an inheritance: that the giver may sell all his assets all the days of his life, even though he wrote to her "from today and after death." For regarding other gifts in such a case, he may not sell the body of the land but only the usufruct, as written in siman 257; nevertheless, since they established it like an inheritance, its law is like an inheritance. That which he wrote "from today and after death" is because after death it is not in his power to give to her, but the intention is not that she should take the body of the land from today, since he did not write a sum to her that she should take such and such, but rather that she should take like half a male [Mordechai]. And that which is written in Even HaEzer there, that if they wrote land to her during his lifetime and usufruct after death, the husband inherits her—implying it is like all gifts—this is because he wrote to her a specific land, and explicitly wrote the body of the land from his lifetime and the usufruct after death. And even when he wrote without specification "from today and after death," its meaning is so, since he gave specific land. Nevertheless, regarding this matter its law is like a gift and not like an inheritance: that she only takes from assets that he possessed at the time of giving the shtar of half a male; according to the value of the inheritance that would have reached one of the males then, she takes half, but not from what he will have afterwards, for a person cannot transfer ownership of something that has not yet come into the world. For in truth it is a gift, as it is not in his power to make her an heir when he has sons, as has been explained, and certainly while he is healthy; they only established this gift like an inheritance such that this gift has all the stringencies of an inheritance. Further details were explained there.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: However, it seems to me that regarding what we are accustomed to now, to write a debt contract for one's daughter and to stipulate that if he gives his daughter a half-male share he shall be exempt from the debt, he must give her from everything he possesses, for the debt is the primary thing; therefore, they must fulfill his stipulation or they shall pay the debt, and such is the custom. Thus far his words. Nevertheless, in this matter its law is like an inheritance, such that a creditor and a ketubah collect first from his property. And even though she is also a creditor, nevertheless, since he is exempt from the debt through the half-male share, its essence regarding the precedence of a creditor and a ketubah is like an inheritance [Sma]. And even regarding debts from after this time there is a law of precedence, for we are witnesses that his primary intention is to have her inherit like a half-male share, and he only made the debt contract regarding property that comes afterwards, for the heirs would be able to say that at the time he gave her the half-male contract he only had a small amount of property, and therefore he gave her a debt contract; but the essence of the matter is nothing other than like an inheritance [and the difficulty of the Taz is answered]. Nevertheless, it seems to me that regarding the collection of a creditor, the property of the heirs is considered unencumbered property against her debt contract, and as long as there is enough to collect from the heirs, they do not collect from her. And more than this, one of the great authorities ruled in an actual case that the daughter collected the half-male share contract, and after several years a creditor of the father came to collect and did not find any of the heirs' property because they had lost the property, and he ruled that he has no right to collect from what she collected, since she left him that from which to collect and he caused his own loss [Maharamal].

One who gave his daughter a shtar chatzi zachar according to the custom, and upon his death he did not leave males but only females, one of the great authorities ruled that she does not take her debt first; rather, they all divide equally. For we are witnesses that his obligating himself was only because he thought he would have sons and she would not inherit from him by Torah law, and therefore he gave to her. But had he known that he would not have sons and his daughters would inherit from him, he certainly would not have given to her, and we follow a strong assessment such as this. And even though there are those among the great authorities who hesitated regarding this, nevertheless, this appears to be the primary ruling. However, if the shtar chov is more than the portion of the inheritance due to her, it is possible that she takes the entire debt in any case, and see the following section [and the Tzemach Tzedek ruled this way as a matter of course, and in my humble opinion, it requires further study].

In siman 247 it was explained that one who gives a gift to his daughter after his death, and the daughter died during his lifetime, her heirs have nothing, for he said "to her" and not "to her heirs." However, when he wrote a shtar chov with a condition as we have written, he is certainly obligated to give to her heirs, for in any event, since the condition was not fulfilled, the shtar chov remains in its force. And it is customary to write in the shtar chatzi zachar "to her and to her heirs who issue from her loins," for then her sons inherit her. And if he wrote "to her and to those who issue from her loins," her sons and daughters take equally, since he did not write "her heirs who issue from her loins." And this is specifically when she died first; but if the father died first and afterwards she died, only the sons inherit her, for since she already acquired this, the daughters have no portion in it [Ktzot HaChoshen]. And also, even when she died first, this applies only to offspring who were in the world at the time of the gift, but for her offspring born afterwards, a person cannot transfer ownership to something that has not yet come into the world, and consequently only her sons inherit this by law of inheritance [ibid.]. And there are those who disagree on this, for behold, our shtar chatzi zachar is that he obligates himself to his daughter for such and such an amount, and stipulates that if his heirs give to those who issue from her loins such and such, he is exempt from the debt; and as for a condition, one can certainly stipulate regarding something that has not yet come into the world [Netivot HaMishpat]. And such is the primary ruling in law. However, if the portion of the inheritance from the chatzi zachar is more than the debt for which he obligated himself to her, and the heirs wish to settle the debt and not the inheritance, certainly only her sons inherit her [ibid.].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: If he stipulated that his daughter should have no portion in books, and he lent money against books as collateral, a creditor does not acquire a mashkon, and therefore the daughter has a portion in them; but if the books were forfeited into his hand, the daughter has no portion in them. Thus far his words. And this is specifically when he took the mashkon at the time of his loan, but if he took the mashkon not at the time of his loan, where according to the Torah one acquires the mashkon even without it being forfeited, the daughter has no portion in this [Shach]. And there are those who disagree on this. And from this we learned that when he stipulated in a shetar chatzi zachar to exclude a certain thing from her portion, and he lent money against this thing, she does not take a portion, for nevertheless it belongs to him. And it is possible that even if the thing was forfeited into the hand of the lender, she has no portion in the money he took in exchange for them, for since he did not want to give her a portion in this thing, it is possible that everything that comes by virtue of this is like the thing itself [and from books there is no proof, for in that case his intention was that in any books he might acquire she should have no portion; and examine this closely].