Siman 248

Our Rabbis, of blessed memory, said [Bava Batra 137a] that one who says, "My property is yours, and after you to so-and-so, and after him to so-and-so"—if the first dies, the second acquires it; if the second dies, the third acquires it. If the second died during the lifetime of the first, the property belongs to the heirs of the first. And such is the law of the third with the second: when he dies during the lifetime of the second, the property belongs to the heirs of the second. They, of blessed memory, further said that initially it is forbidden for the first to sell them, but if he sold them, his sale is valid and the second has nothing. And such is the law when they are in the hand of the second against the third. And the explanation of the matters is that the expression "after him" means after his death, as it is written: "Who can tell a man what shall be after him under the sun." And this giver gave in this manner: that all the days of the first, he shall eat and use the property, both the body of the object and the fruit. And this is not a "kinyan perot" which is not considered like a "kinyan haguf," but rather he gave him the body and the fruit, and he may do with it all his desire, only that what remains after him shall be for the second, and likewise what remains from the second shall be for the third. Therefore, if the first sold them, the second has nothing, for since he gave him the body and the fruit for all the days of his life, what he did is done. However, initially it is forbidden to sell, for he transgresses the intent of the giver. And all the more so is it forbidden for another person to give him counsel that he should sell them. And our Sages, of blessed memory, said that one who gives him this counsel is called "wicked," for even though the seller himself is not called "wicked" because he acts for his own benefit—rather he only transgresses the intent of the giver and has not acted properly—but the other is "wicked," for a person does not sin when it is not for his own benefit [Sma]. Therefore, if the second died during the lifetime of the first, the property belongs to the heirs of the first, because the third only merits after the death of the second, and the second only merits after the death of the first; it turns out that the third does not merit from the first but rather from the second. And since the second, when he died during the lifetime of the first, never merited, therefore the third also does not merit, and automatically they remain in the hand of the heirs of the first. And likewise regarding the third, when he died during the lifetime of the second, they remain in the hand of the heirs of the second.

Our sages, of blessed memory, further said that when the first is fit to inherit him, the second has nothing, for an inheritance has no interruption. For example, if he said, "I bequeath such-and-such field to Reuven my son, and after him to Shimon my son," since Reuven is his heir according to the Torah, even though during his lifetime he could have given it to whomever he wished, nevertheless, since he bequeathed it to him, there is no interruption in an inheritance. For specifically regarding a gift can a person make conditions as he desires, but as for the heir, once he has received it through the language of inheritance, it is his forever. Therefore, it is not only if he used the language of inheritance for all of them that the second has nothing, but even if he spoke with the language of a gift, "My property is to you, and after you to so-and-so," since he is fit to inherit him, this is not the language of a gift but rather the language of inheritance, and an inheritance has no interruption. And this is specifically regarding a shekhiv mera, for when a person is ill he bequeaths his property, therefore we judge it as the language of inheritance. But a healthy person who said, "My property is to you, and after you to so-and-so," even if he is fit to inherit him, the law is as in section 1, for regarding a healthy person this is the language of a gift. And not only that, but even if he spoke with the language of inheritance it is nothing, for a healthy person cannot give using the language of inheritance [ibid.].

And so wrote the Rambam in the twelfth chapter of Zechiyah, that whenever one says, "My property is to so-and-so, and after him to so-and-so," the second has only what the first left over. And if the first was fit to inherit him, such as if he were a son among the sons, the second has nothing, for any language of a gift to an heir is like the language of inheritance, and inheritance has no cessation, even though he said, "and after him to so-and-so." However, a healthy person who gave a gift in this manner and wrote to him, "My property is to you, and after you to so-and-so," the second has only what the first left over, even if the first was fit to inherit him. Thus far his words.

What is called "fit to inherit him" is not specifically that the first is fit and the second is not fit, but rather even if the second is also fit, such as a son among sons, a daughter among daughters, or a brother among brothers when they are the heirs, and he wrote to one of them a portion of his properties or all of his properties in a manner where there is no concern of guardianship as was explained in siman 246—since he is relevant to this inheritance and it is within the power of the testator to bequeath to whomever of the heirs he desires, it is called "fit to inherit him" and this has no cessation. However, a daughter among sons or a brother among daughters is called "not fit to inherit him," for since he has those who precede him in inheritance, this person does not have the status of an heir. And in a case where it has no cessation, even if he said "after you to the hekdesh," it is nothing. All this is when he spoke with the language of "after you," or if he said "and if you die, these properties shall belong to so-and-so or to the hekdesh." But if he gave for a fixed time, such as if he said "my properties are yours for ten years and afterwards they shall belong to so-and-so," or if he said "my house shall be yours as long as you dwell in it, and after you leave the house, the house shall belong to so-and-so," then after the time or after he leaves the house, it belongs to so-and-so. And in one who gives for a time, the first cannot sell, and if he sold, the second removes it from the hand of the buyers. And some say that it is like "my properties are yours and after you to so-and-so," for within the time, the body and the fruits are his and what he has done is done [Ktzot HaChoshen in the name of the Ramban]. But if he said "as long as you dwell in it," certainly his sale is a sale [as is implied in the Teshuvot HaGeonim in the Beit Yosef]. And if he said plainly "after my son dies the properties shall belong to so-and-so," we do not say regarding this that "inheritance has no cessation" [Netivot HaMishpat], since he did not say "my properties are yours and after you to so-and-so." Nevertheless, if he sold them, they are sold [it appears to me]. And some say that even in such a case, since the first is fit to inherit him, it has no cessation [see in the Beit Yosef].

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote that whenever one says "my property is for you and after you for so-and-so," and the first was fit to inherit him, and he specified and said, "I am not giving it to you by way of inheritance, which has no cessation, but rather as a gift, and I have caused it to cease," the second acquires what the first left over. Therefore, if he gave the money through a third party, or if he said, "give my sons a shekel every Shabbat, and I am not giving it to them by way of inheritance, and the remainder of the property after their death shall be for so-and-so," they are given only a shekel even if it does not suffice for them. Thus far his words. And he holds that when he commanded to give them such-and-such not on account of inheritance, and when he gave to a third party even though he did not say that he is not giving on account of inheritance, this does not have the law of inheritance such that it would have no cessation. And this will be further explained with the help of Heaven in siman 253. And if he gave to one who is fit to inherit him on a condition, and also said "and after him to so-and-so," and the condition was not fulfilled, this does not have the law of inheritance and the entire gift is void [the Rosh in a responsum].

That which has been explained, that if the first preceded and sold them, they are sold—in what case does this apply? When he sold or gave a gift to others, and even if he gave them to the assets themselves, such as where the gift was slaves and he emancipated them; and even though he committed a prohibition, nevertheless, what he did is done. And so too, even if he prohibited them from benefit, such as where the gift was garments and he made them shrouds for a corpse, which are prohibited from benefit; and even if he increased the shrouds for the corpse more than necessary, in which there is a slight prohibition as he violates "do not destroy," as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 349, nevertheless, what he did is done. But if he sold them to one of his heirs or gave them to him as a gift, he has done nothing, for certainly in this case the intent of the giver was for a restriction, that it should not be effective; for if not so, he said to him in vain "and after you to so-and-so," since the recipient would certainly give them to his heirs. But regarding selling to others, he did not suspect that he would violate his intent in this, and therefore his intent was not for a restriction in this, for even without this he did not suspect him; and therefore if he transgressed and did so, what he did is done [the Maggid Mishneh]. And furthermore, his heirs are considered like himself, and just as after his death he cannot restrict for himself, so too he cannot give them to his heirs. And so too, if the first gave them as a gift of a shekhiv mera, even to others, it is nothing, for a gift of a shekhiv mera only effects acquisition after death, and when he dies, the "after you" precedes him to merit them, for he acquires when the first is a gosses because the giver who said "and after you to so-and-so" intended that when the first no longer needs them, the second shall immediately merit, and during a person's death-throes he needs nothing. And even if they were to take effect at the same moment, namely a moment after his death, we must fulfill the command of the giver more than the command of the first who did not act properly. And so too, some say when the first said "from today if I do not retract," the "after you" also merits, since this one can retract all the days of his life, and it turns out that the acquisition is after his death, the "after you" has already preceded him [Ketzot HaChoshen]. And some say that even though the first cannot give them as a gift of a shekhiv mera, nevertheless, if he removed the gift from his hand and delivered it to a trustee, the recipient acquires, for he merited it immediately when he delivered them to the trustee [Shach]; and all the more so when he delivered it into his hand, even if he said he should acquire them as a gift of a shekhiv mera.

Specifically a sale or a gift removes it from the hand of the one who follows, but an encumbrance does not remove it. For example, if the first one borrowed money and encumbered them, even if he made them an apotiki, or if he was liable for a ketubah and the creditors or the wife came to beit din to collect them from these properties—even though the first one is alive and if he were to sell them his sale would be a sale—nevertheless, beit din does not collect them from the body of the properties, but rather from the produce for all the days of the life of the first one. And the reason is that since he can remove them with money, they have not yet fully acquired them, and automatically when he dies, the one who follows acquires them. And if the first one died and the creditors and the wife came to collect them, they do not collect even the produce for them, but rather they belong to the one who follows, for after his death he no longer has anything. And an apotiki does not help, or even if he designated these properties for his wife in her ketubah. And so it appears to be the primary view, even though there are those who disagree on this. And this is specifically when beit din collects for them, but if the borrower himself gave them over, what he did is done, for it is like a sale [Netivot HaMishpat]. And even though an appraisal returns when he removes them with money, as is written in siman 103, and it is not like a complete sale, this is regarding an appraisal of beit din and not when the borrower himself gave them over [ibid.].

Regarding that which has been explained, that inheritance has no cessation, this is specifically when the sick person made the testament according to the laws of Israel. However, if he made it through the secular courts and wrote, "my property is to you, and after you to so-and-so," and the first is fit to inherit him, and they later came to adjudicate in a beit din, we do not say that inheritance has no cessation. And even though regarding the laws of inheritance we follow the law, as was written in siman 369, nevertheless, since he made the testament in the secular courts and in their language, when he wrote "and after you to so-and-so," the intention is even when the first is fit to inherit him and there is a cessation according to their language; if so, perforce the intention of the testator was not for the sake of inheritance but only for the sake of a gift [Sma ibid.]. However, many disagree with this, for it does not depend on the intention of the testator; for behold, even when he made it in a beit din, he desired to make it as a gift and to cause it to cease, yet the Torah decreed that it has no cessation. If so, there is no difference in which place he made the testament, unless he wrote explicitly that he is not giving by way of inheritance, for then even in our laws it is so, as was written in section 5. And such is the primary ruling in law.

All these matters—that if the first sold, it is sold—are only stated when he says "and after you to so-and-so" and did not say "from today." However, if he said to him "and after you from today to so-and-so" and the first sold, the second removes them from the hand of the buyers; for since he said "from now," perforce he only gave the first the usufruct, and the body of the property he gave from now to the second, and how can the first sell them? And likewise, if the second died during the lifetime of the first, they shall give them to the heirs of the second after the death of the first, for the second already acquired the body of the property. And if they are three, where he said "and after you from today to so-and-so, and after him from today to so-and-so," the first and second only acquired the usufruct, and the third acquired the body of the property from today and the usufruct after the death of the second. And specifically when they came into the hand of the second, for behold, the third only acquires from the hand of the second; therefore, if the second died during the lifetime of the first, the properties shall return to the heirs of the giver, for the third did not acquire, and the first has nothing but the usufruct [ibid.].

And some say that when one says "from now," even if the first is fit to inherit him, we do not say regarding this that an inheritance has no interruption, since he only gave him the fruit. And there are those who disagree and hold that regarding the matter of an inheritance having no interruption, there is no difference whether he said "from today" to "after you" or did not say it. And they likewise disagree with that which has been explained, that with "from now" his sale is not a sale [so it is in the Rashba brought by the Beit Yosef], for this opinion holds that even though he said "from now," nevertheless for all the days of the life of the first, he gave him the body and the fruit, and the statement "from now" is not proof that the body does not belong to the one prior to him. For behold, if he gave to three and said regarding the second "from now," and even so he does not have the body as has been explained, if so, the statement "from now" is no proof for this. Nevertheless, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that the first opinion appears primary [and in Bava Batra 125a, Rava holds that "after you" is like "from now," and it holds there on 133a that an inheritance has no interruption; it must be said that it is not like "from now" except when the second is fit to inherit him and not the first, like that case of the grandmother there, and examine this]. And there is one who says that even according to the latter opinion, nevertheless regarding the matter of sale they admit that the first has no power to sell with "from now" [Sma subsection 22, and this is according to the Rashbam there].

All these matters are stated only when he said, "My property is for you, and after you for so-and-so." But if he said, "And after you for me," or "for my heirs," if the first sold them, the giver or his heirs remove them from the hand of the purchasers when the first dies, for certainly he gave him only the fruit and not the body of the property. And specifically regarding another do we say that even though the will of the giver was that he should leave the body of the property for the second, and that the first should not violate his intent, nevertheless, he acquired the body of the property also for the first, for this is not stronger for him than that. But regarding himself and his heirs, certainly he acquired only the fruit. And even if he did not say at all "and after you for me" or "for my heirs," but rather said, "My property is given to you all the days of your life," he has in them only fruit, and if he sold them, the giver or his heirs remove them from the hand of the purchaser immediately when the recipient dies.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7: If one said, "After you, to my heirs," and he had a daughter and she died during the lifetime of the recipient and left offspring, the offspring stand in her place; but if she has no offspring, other heirs do not stand in her place unless he said, "From now, to my heirs," for then the daughter acquired it during her lifetime. Thus far his words. And they raised a difficulty against him, for behold, regarding a reservation for himself or for his heirs, he only transferred the usufruct to him, as has been written; if so, even without "from now" it is considered as "from now," for the principal never left his domain or the domain of his heirs. And it appears to me that he holds that certainly if he said with this wording, "After you, to me or to my heirs," he did not give the first person anything but the usufruct and reserved the principal for himself, and if he dies, the heirs who exist then will stand in his place. But when he said only "After you, to my heirs," it is impossible to say that he reserved the principal from now for himself and for his heirs, for if so, he should have said "After you, to me," and automatically when he dies his heirs would stand in his place, or at least he should have said "After you, to me or to my heirs," and its meaning would be: "to me" if I am alive then, and "to my heirs" if I am not alive. But when he said only "After you, to my heirs," the heirs do not come by virtue of his power, and even if he himself is alive then, it would also not return to him but only to the heirs. And this is exactly like one who says, "And after you, to so-and-so," for what difference is it to me if he says "And after you, to so-and-so" or if he says "And after you, to my heirs" who are his sons or his daughters. And according to the core law, it should have been that if the heir dies during the lifetime of the first, the law of "the second died during the lifetime of the first" applies; however, because he mentioned at least the term "heir," we say that his intention was such that her offspring and her offspring's offspring are like her, as they were his heirs then. But other heirs, such as brothers, and certainly her husband, who at the time of the gift are not referred to at all by the name "heirs of the giver," they have nothing. And therefore he wrote further that if he said, "My property to so-and-so and after him to my heirs," and he had one daughter at the time of the gift and afterwards sons were born to him, some say the daughter acquired them, for his intention was only for the heirs he had at the time of the gift. So it appears to me. Thus far his words. And this is for the reason we explained, that his intention was not for an inheritance that comes from his power, but for those referred to as his heirs at the time of the gift, and not because of his power but because such was his will, and it is like "After you, to so-and-so." [And with this, the difficulty of the Beit Shmuel in Even HaEzer siman 90, subsection 13 is also settled, as well as all the fine points of the Ktzot HaChoshen and the Netivot Mishpat, and this is the intention of the Tur as well, and he does not disagree with the Rambam, and the difficulty of the Beit Yosef and the difficulty of the Ran that he cited are settled; and they interpret the case of the grandmother in Bava Batra 125b according to the version of the Rashbam and not entirely according to his explanation; and the Gemara which required the reason that the husband does not inherit because it is "prospective property" and does not say it is because he is not of her offspring, is because she was married at the time of the gift and he is called the heir; and delve into this].

He further wrote that if one said, "My property is for you, and after you for your heirs," some say that it is as if he said, "and after you for Ploni," and if his heirs died during the life of the recipient, the heirs of his heirs take nothing unless he said, "and after you for your heirs from now." Thus far his words. And in this too they rejected his words from what he himself wrote earlier, that the offspring of her offspring stands in her place, and they also rejected them from the Shas there, where the opposite is explained—that only the husband does not inherit, but her other heirs do inherit [for so it is regarding the grandmother according to the version of the Rif]. And it appears to me that his words are true, for in this that he added "the heirs," he diminished the power of the recipient, for even without this, his heirs inherit after him; rather, certainly this is what he meant: only his heirs and not the heirs of his heirs. And that which has been explained, that the offspring of his offspring is like his offspring, this applies to his own heirs, but regarding the heirs of the recipient, we estimate his intent that he gave only to the heirs and not to the heirs of heirs. And in the Gemara there, that "heirs" includes also heirs of heirs except for a husband, it is because the Gemara there holds that "after you" is like "from now," and nevertheless regarding the husband it is called "prospective" (ra'uy), for it holds that "from now" has the same law as without "from now," as I wrote in section 10, and therefore it is "prospective" [Nimukei Yosef]. But since we rule that "after you" is not like "from now," it belongs to his heirs specifically and not to the heirs of his heirs. Furthermore, in the Gemara it deals with one who gave his property to his mother and after her to her heirs, who are relatives of the giver; in this we estimate his intent that he also intended for the offspring of her offspring. But when the recipient is not among the relatives of the giver, his intent is for his heirs specifically, for from where do we have the authority to add to his words? And regarding his own offspring it is different, for all offspring of his offspring are like his offspring, as they are his descendants. He further wrote: specifically when he said "after you to your heirs," but what they write in contracts "to you and to your heirs" is nothing but for the improvement of the document (shufra d'shtra). Thus far his words. And on the contrary, it strengthened the power of the recipient so that he may do with it all his desire, to sell it and to give it as his own. And he wrote further that there are those who disagree, and it is the Rosh in a responsum brought in the Tur, section 14, and his intention is that the Rosh holds that even when he said "from now," the heirs of his heirs do not take, since he was particular to write "to his heirs," the intention was only to his heirs and not to the heirs of his heirs. And the Rosh holds as I wrote in section 12 [according to the version of the Rashbam], but in "after you to your heirs" where there is no closeness at all, he did not give to the heirs of his heirs even when he said "from now."

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9: One who says, "My property is for my mother, and after her for her heirs," and she had a married daughter, and the daughter died during the lifetime of her husband and during the lifetime of her mother, the husband does not inherit that property because it is "prospective" for his wife, and the woman did not acquire them until after she died. But if the daughter left a son or a daughter, they would inherit the property, for the implication of "her heirs" includes even the heirs of her heirs. However, if he had said, "When the old woman dies, they are for her daughter from now," the husband would inherit them after the death of his wife. Thus far his words. For he precedes all her heirs regarding property "held" by his wife. [This law is the case in the Gemara that we brought in section 13.] And according to what we explained in section 13 [regarding the "furthermore" resolution], it is possible that our teacher, the Rema, also agrees with this law. [And before us in the Rambam, chapter 12 of Laws of Gifts, the version is like the Rashbam, and it is possible that in the Shulchan Aruch it should also be so, and therefore masculine language was written regarding the daughter, and the version "if her father" is settled.]

Any shekhiv mera who said to an unmarried woman, "My property is yours, and after you, to so-and-so," and did not say "from today," and she arose and married, the property belongs to the husband, and the "after you" recipient does not extract it from him. For we hold that a husband's legal status regarding his wife's property is like that of a buyer, and since if the first party sold it, it is sold, it is as if she sold it to her husband. However, if he said this to her while she was married and she died, the "after you" recipient extracts it from the hand of the husband; for since he granted her the property and said to her "and after you to so-and-so," it is as if he explicitly said "to so-and-so and not to your husband." Therefore, if she sold this property while under her husband and died, the property remains in the hand of the buyer. And in Even HaEzer siman 91, more of this was explained; see there.

Reuven who gave a gift to Levi and stipulated with him a certain condition, and that if he violates the condition the properties shall belong to Shimon from now, and afterwards Shimon gave every right that he has in this gift to Levi from now and died—even though Levi violated the condition, nevertheless he acquired them through the power of Shimon. And even if Levi violated it after Shimon gave it to him, and it turns out that at the time Shimon gave it to him it did not yet belong to Shimon, nevertheless, since he violated it afterwards, Shimon acquired it retroactively since he said "from now," and automatically his giving to Levi is a valid giving. And a case occurred with Reuven who lent money to his sons Shimon, Levi, and Yehuda, and they mortgaged their houses to their father, and the father died; and before they divided the inheritance, Shimon wrote to Levi a deed of gift for his portion of the inheritance, and Levi stood and claimed this debt from Shimon. Shimon argued: Since our father died, the lien of this deed is forgiven from upon me. And the Rashba, of blessed memory, ruled that the law is with Shimon, because at the completion of the father's death, he acquired that which he owed to his father and his lien was forgiven even before the division. And Reuven who wrote a house to his son and to his wife and wrote that they may only collect both of them together, and afterwards one of them died—whether the second can collect was explained in siman 77; see there.

One who gives a gift and says, "The movables that I have, I give to so-and-so," he takes all his functional vessels, but not wheat and barley and merchandise and the like; for even though they are movables, nevertheless, in the common language of people they are not called movables, only functional vessels. And if he said, "All my movables I give to so-and-so," he takes everything except for a Sefer Torah and books, which are not included in a general statement [Shach]. And slaves are included in movables in the common language of people, but not the lower millstone; even though fundamentally it is movable, nevertheless, since it is attached to the ground and it is not the way to move it after it has been fixed in the ground, and also at the time they wish to pick it, they pick it in its place. This is not the case for the upper millstone, for when they come to pick it they move it from its place, so it is included in movables [Sma]. And our millstones, it is obvious that they are like land, and small hand-mills, it is obvious that they are like movables. And if he said, "Everything that moves," he takes even the lower millstone and the like, for "everything that moves" implies everything that is possible to move, and certainly a Sefer Torah and books [it appears to me]. And if he gave books as a gift, a Sefer Torah is not included according to the common language of people, and certainly books are not included in a Sefer Torah [it appears to me].

If one said, "My nechasim are to so-and-so," he takes all the movables and all the lands, and clothes, and slaves, and birds, and animals, and books, and tefillin. However, regarding a Sefer Torah, there is a doubt in the Gemara whether it is included in nechasim or not. Therefore, if the recipient seized it, we do not remove it from his hand. This is not only according to the opinion of the poskim who hold that in a doubt of the Gemara seizure is effective, but even according to the poskim who hold that seizure is not effective; nevertheless, in this case where the doubt is not in the law but in the language of people—how it is—and when Eliyahu comes and says that such is the language, the matter will be clarified [see Yevamot 41b], and any doubt that is destined to be clarified, in the place where the money is found, it shall remain in his hand [as mentioned above from the Sma, subsection 41]. And there is one who says that this is only according to the opinion of the Rambam that seizure is effective in a legal doubt [the Gra]. And I wonder, for if so, why did our teacher, the Rema, not gloss that there are those who say seizure is not effective, as he glossed in many places? Furthermore, the Tur also wrote that seizure is effective. And there is one who wishes to say that an oral loan is not included in nechasim, but it does not seem so to me. And money is also included in nechasim [Bava Batra 150b]. And a loan secured by a document will be explained in section 21.

If one said to give a woman her garments, all garments are included, whether weekday garments or those of Shabbat and Yom Tov, and all types of garments are included in this: a tunic and socks, and also all types of garments, small and large, all are included in garments. However, a garment that is not yet sewn is not included in garments; but those that are sewn, even if she has not yet worn them, they are included. And ornaments are not included in garments. And know that everything that is the work of a weaver is included in a garment [Shabbat 63b], and everything of silver and gold and other metals that is made not by means of weaving is an ornament. And for a thing that is half weaving and half ornament, we follow its majority [so it appears to me, and see there].

One who writes to his fellow that he has given him four amot of land and, incidental to them (agav), all the movable property that he possesses, whether gold and silver or all other vessels great and small, and garments of linen, wool, and silk, and everything called money and everything called property—he has not acquired lands, even though they are included in "property," because land is not acquired through agav; nor slaves, because we maintain in siman 202 that one who performed a chazakah on lands has not acquired slaves; nor a Sefer Torah. Therefore, if he wishes to transfer land and slaves to him, they should transfer them through another kinyan, and for a Sefer Torah, he should specify it explicitly.

It happened that one gave to his fellow all his properties, movable goods together with land, and did not leave for his heirs except for five gold coins, and he had promissory notes. The Rosh ruled that if it was a gift of a shekhiv mera and a command on account of death, where he acquires without a kinyan even with a remainder, as will be explained, he acquires the notes, for they are included in "properties," and there is no need for writing and delivery, for the words of a shekhiv mera are considered as written and delivered. However, if it was a gift of a healthy person, or by a shekhiv mera in a manner that requires a kinyan, he does not acquire without writing and delivery, and they shall return to the heirs. And even if the recipient himself was indebted to the giver by a note, he must pay his heirs, for since he did not forgive him the debt but rather transferred the notes to him, and since he did not acquire the note, the debt also was not forgiven.