Siman 175

It is a rabbinic commandment that when one sells land, a house, or a shop, if the neighbor (metzaran) wishes to purchase it, he takes precedence over any other person when he pays the price that another would pay. They based this on the verse, "And you shall do that which is right and good in the eyes of Hashem," for the Blessed Name desires that human beings act with one another in a right and good manner, and you have no greater "right and good" than this; since the seller suffers no loss, the neighbor should take precedence over any other person. The sages strengthened this law such that even if he sold it to another, his sale is nothing, and he must give it to the owner of the neighboring property. Furthermore, the Sages, of blessed memory, said that this purchaser is considered like the agent of the neighbor for all matters, and the witnesses of the purchaser's kinyan shall write a deed in the name of the neighbor, and no other kinyan is necessary. If it increased in value afterwards, he only needs to pay him according to what he purchased it for; and if it decreased in value, he must also take it according to what he purchased it for if he desires it, because the purchaser is considered like his agent. For the primary obligation of "right and good" lies upon the purchaser, as he could have purchased elsewhere. If the purchaser repaired it and improved it, his law is like one who "descends with permission," whose hand is on the top, as written in siman 375. This is specifically if he repaired it before the neighbor laid claim to it, but if he repaired it afterwards, he is like one who "descends without permission," whose hand is on the bottom, as written there; for once he laid claim, he removed him from his agency and he should not have acted without his permission. If he damaged anything in it, or uprooted plantings from it and the like, the neighbor deducts from the money paid to the purchaser. Even if he damaged it before the neighbor came, since he is like his agent, he can say to him: "I sent you to improve and not to harm." However, regarding the produce that the purchaser consumed: that which he consumed after the neighbor came with the money to remove him, he pays to the neighbor; but what he consumed previously, he does not need to pay. It is not similar to damage, for once he damaged it, it is not worth what the purchaser paid for it, which is not the case with the consumption of produce, for produce is always consumed, and whoever possesses it now shall consume its produce [Sma]. If the purchaser borrowed money before the neighbor came, the lien of the creditor does not take effect on this field, and he does not seize it from the neighbor, even if the neighbor already gave his money to the purchaser. Certainly, when he has not yet given the money, he can receive the money for his debt from the funds that the neighbor prepared to give to the purchaser [ibid.]. The primary law of the obligation of metzarut is upon the purchaser, as will be explained. One should not raise a difficulty regarding the core law of metzarut: why should the seller not have the authority to retract and say, "I only sold to this purchaser and not so that the neighbor should take it from him, and therefore I retract from the sale"? For it can be said that these are "matters of the heart," and they are not "matters"; for since by law there is metzarut, it is as if he sold it to the agent of the neighbor. Only if he stipulated explicitly, "on condition that the neighbor does not take it," then if the neighbor wishes to purchase it, the sale is void and it returns to the seller as before.

Therefore, one who sells a field to another—whether he sold it himself, or sold it through his agent, or the beit din sold it—the neighbor of this field has the authority to give the money that the buyer paid for it to the buyer and remove him from the field. Even if the buyer was a Torah scholar and a neighbor to the seller's house and a relative, and the neighbor of the field is an ignoramus and his dwelling is far from the seller's house and he is not related to him, nevertheless, he removes the buyer from this field. And even if the seller says, "If so, I will not sell it at all," this is nothing, as has been written; and furthermore, he is practicing deception so that it remains in the hand of the buyer. And if at the time of his sale he made the acquisition dependent on this, it returns to him, as has been written, but in any event it shall not remain in the hand of the buyer; and if afterwards it is in the hand of the buyer, the neighbor shall take it from his hand if he wishes. And all this is when there is no loss to the seller through the neighbor's purchase, such as when he agrees to all the details of the buyer, for if not so, it is not "upright and good" that a loss should reach the seller through his status as a neighbor, and he does not take precedence, and the transaction remains established in the hand of the buyer [Sma]. And more will be explained regarding this.

If the buyer acquired it for a maneh and it is worth two hundred, if the seller would have given it thus to any person, such as if he sold it due to financial pressure, the metzran only gives him a maneh. But if he would not have given it thus to another, but only to this buyer because of his love for him, he must give the buyer two hundred, and the seller does not have the ability to take the profit from the buyer. And if the buyer claims that the seller would not have given it at this price to another, and the metzran says that he would have given it thus to another, it is upon the metzran to bring proof. And if he does not bring proof, he loses, because the buyer is the holder of the property, and the burden of proof is on the claimant. And even though we consider him like the agent of the metzran, nevertheless, since it is not the way of the world to sell for less than its value, it appears that the claim of the buyer is close to the truth. Furthermore, the essence of the right of the metzran is because of "upright and good," and as long as he does not bring proof for this, there is no "upright and good" here, for perhaps the buyer is telling the truth and it is not of the "upright and good" that he should lose by way of his metzranut. And so too in any similar case, such as if he extended the time of payment for him: if he would have done so also for another, such as if he sold it because of its poor quality, then the metzran also does not give the money to the buyer until the time that was set for him, if the metzran is a secure person or if the seller wants to accept him as secure. But if the seller did so only because of the benefit of this buyer, the metzran must give it to the buyer immediately, even though he will not give it to the seller until the time that was set for him. And if the buyer claims that only for him did he extend the time, and the metzran says not so, it is upon the metzran to bring proof [Tur]. And if the seller speaks according to the words of the metzran, he is believed; and if he speaks according to the words of the buyer, it is upon the metzran to bring proof to contradict the buyer and the seller [it appears to me]. And it appears to me that in everything where it is upon the metzran to bring proof that it is according to his words, if he wishes to administer a shevuat hesset to the buyer that it is as the buyer says, he does not have the ability, for behold he has no certain claim for this oath, for what does he know of what was in the heart of the seller, unless witnesses heard explicitly from the seller according to his words.

If the buyer purchased it for two hundred and it is only worth a maneh, the bar mizar and the buyer do not have the power to void the sale with the claim that since he is like his agent, he can say, "I sent you to improve matters and not to cause harm," and the sale is void; for in truth, he is not his actual agent, and sometimes a person purchases land for more than its value, as Chazal said: there is no ona'ah for lands. And that which we say that he is like his agent is because of "the right and the good," and since the seller would lose through this, it is not "right and good." Therefore, if the bar mizar desires it, he must give two hundred. And if the bar mizar claimed that they made a conspiracy between them, and he is only taking a maneh from him but they made a conspiracy to extract two hundred from him, the buyer takes an oath with a sacred object and takes two hundred, according to the law of "one who swears and takes," for he swears with a sacred object. And it is close to being believed because it is unlikely that the buyer would pay much more than its value, and since the bar mizar makes a certain claim, he administers the oath to him. But when he does not make a certain claim, he cannot administer the oath to him [Beit Yosef and Shach]. And if there were witnesses there that he gave two hundred, and the bar mizar claims that it was a matter of trust between the buyer and the seller and he knows that he only took it for a maneh, we do not pay heed to his words since there are witnesses. Therefore, first he gives him money according to the testimony of the witnesses and removes the buyer from the field, and afterwards he has the power to administer an oath of hesset to him as with all claims, and he swears to him that he truly took it for two hundred.

Even if the buyer did not purchase it but rather collected it for his debt, the metzran likewise takes it from him, for collecting a debt is no better than a buyer, and the metzran pays him his debt. Not only that, but even if the field is not worth the amount of the debt, the metzran only needs to give him according to the appraisal of this field. There are those who disagree regarding this, for this is only when the borrower died and the creditor had nothing to collect from the orphans besides this field; certainly, we do not follow his debt since he had nothing else from which to collect. However, when the borrower is alive and there was property from which to collect, but he consented to this field for his entire debt, why should he be worse off than a buyer who bought something worth a maneh for two hundred? For if the metzran himself had bought it from the seller, and the creditor had collected it from him for the debt of the seller, the creditor would have been able to say, "To me it is worth my entire debt," as written in siman 115. All the more so when he comes to take it only by reason of metzranut. And in section 51 it will be explained that an appraisal returns even from the metzran when the beit din collected it; see there. [Sma and Shach; and what is written regarding the difference whether the promissory note exists or not requires further study].

One who sells on condition, whether the seller stipulated or the buyer stipulated, and the metzran wishes to receive it according to those same conditions that they stipulated, nevertheless the holder of the right of metzranut cannot remove him until the conditions are fulfilled and the buyer acquires the land, and afterwards he may remove him. The reason is because the seller can say, "Perhaps the conditions will not be fulfilled and the sale will be voided, so how can you compel me to sell to you now?" This specifically applies if it is a general condition that does not pertain to the benefit of the seller, such as "if you go to such-and-such a place" and the like, where it is possible that it will not be fulfilled at all. But a condition that is for his benefit, such as "on condition that you give me a maneh after a period of time" or "on condition that you speak on my behalf to the ruler" and similar cases—if the metzran is unable to do this, his metzranut is completely voided. And if it is also in his power to do this, the metzran can say, "I will fulfill it immediately and the field is mine," and the seller cannot say, "The sale is not yet finalized," for since the condition is for the benefit of the seller and he wishes to fulfill it immediately, what does the seller care? And a condition that is for the benefit of the buyer is not considered at all, since he has no right to purchase in the place of the metzran, what concern is his condition to us? [It appears so to me, and so it seems from the Sma, subsection 18; and see the Netivot HaMishpat].

If the sold field had four neighbors from its four sides, their standing is all equal regarding it, and they shall divide it diagonally so that each one receives a portion adjacent to his own field. And if there were five neighbors—three from three sides and two on the fourth—those two are considered as one, and they take between the two of them one portion of the portions that the three take. In what case does this apply? When they all came as one. But if one of the neighbors preceded them and purchased it from the seller, or if he removed the buyer, he alone has acquired it; and even if this neighbor was on the smallest side, he alone has acquired it. The reason is that the primary obligation of "the right and the good" is incumbent upon the buyer, as has been written, and since the buyer himself is a neighbor, there is no difference whether he is a large neighbor or a small neighbor, and there is no "right and good" regarding him that he should give also to the other neighbors. However, initially, the seller or the buyer should sell to all of them together, for a bit of "the right and the good" is also incumbent upon the seller, and he must do what is right and good for all the neighbors. But post facto, his sale is a valid sale even to one of them. And some disagree and hold that even initially he may sell to one of them, for since he sells to a neighbor, he has indeed performed "the right and the good." And some say that according to the first opinion, if they all came together to buy and he sold to one of them, the others may remove their portion [Netivot HaMishpat]. And certainly if one of them preceded to buy it and the others claim that they also wanted to buy it, and the seller would have consented to sell to everyone, but this one threatened them to harm them in some matter and it was in his power to do so, and they have witnesses to this—when they remove their duress, they can remove him from their portion according to all opinions, for anything due to duress is nothing. And even though a person is prone to threaten and not act, nevertheless, since they were prevented due to their fear, we judge as if it has not yet been sold, and since the seller consents to everyone, they divide it among themselves [so it seems to me to explain the words of our teacher, the Rema, in section 11, for if not so, his words are astonishing; and examine this carefully]. And all this is when all the neighbors are in the city, but if some of the neighbors are in the city and came, and some of them are not in the city, those who are here may buy from the seller or remove the buyer even initially, and it is theirs alone, for it is not "right and good" that they should wait until the arrival of the other neighbors.

And so, if there were many partners on one side of the sold field, each one of them can remove the buyer or purchase it from the seller. And if they are all in the city and all of them wish to purchase, they shall all purchase. And if one of them preceded and purchased, or removed the buyer, he has acquired it and the rest of the partners cannot protest, as I wrote in section 7. Furthermore, even if there was on one side of the sold field a field shared by two, and on the other side there was a field belonging to another person, and one of the partners purchased it, the owner of the field on the other side cannot say to this one who purchased it: "I am a certain neighbor and you are a doubtful one, for perhaps your portion will fall on the other side when you divide." Rather, he is considered certain like him, since he currently has a portion in the entire field, and since he preceded, he has acquired it. And so, if another man who is not a neighbor at all purchased this field, one of the neighbors can remove him even though he has a partner, and the buyer cannot say to him: "Perhaps your portion will fall on the other side and your partner does not wish to purchase it." And so, if the sold field belonged to two and one of them sold his portion to another and his partner does not wish to purchase it, the neighbor of that field removes him, and the buyer cannot say: "Since the portion I purchased is not defined, perhaps my portion will fall not on the side of your field," for since he is currently a neighbor, he can remove him.

The metzran who comes to remove the buyer removes him from the entire field. And if his desire is to remove him from half the field, the buyer may say to him: "Either remove me from all of it or leave me with all of it." And even if he bought this field from two people and he comes to remove him from the half he bought from one, he cannot remove him unless he removes him from all of it or leaves him with all of it, for it is not "upright and good" that the buyer should remain with half a field. And if two people bought the field, the metzran may remove both of them, or remove one and leave the second, for the one being removed has no claim since he is being removed from his entire portion, and what does he care what he waives to the second? And even regarding one buyer, this applies specifically to one field; but if he bought two fields, the metzran may remove him from one and leave him with one, and he has no claim that he must remove him from both, since he remains with one entire field. And he cannot say, "If so, I am a metzran like you," because he can say to him, "Behold, at the time you bought, you were not a metzran." Therefore, if he bought the two fields one after the other and his desire is to remove him from the second and not from the first, there is one who says that he cannot, because the buyer says to him that "at the time I bought, I was already a metzran by virtue of the first" [Netivot HaMishpat]. And in my humble opinion, it appears that he can remove him, since the buyer's entire claim of metzranut is by virtue of the first, and since he has the power to remove him from it as well, how can the buyer merit by its cause?

A bar metzra who comes to remove the buyer, and before he removed him, the bar metzra sold his adjacent field, he has lost his right. Furthermore, the one who bought from him does not have the law of a bar metzra, for this buyer acquired the field before he came to buy the one adjacent to it. And in this case, one cannot say "whatever the first sold to the second includes every right that would come into his hand," for since the law of metzranut is only because of "upright and good," and this buyer did nothing against the "upright and good" regarding both of them: for regarding the bar metzra, since he sold his field, what does he care? And regarding the one who bought from him, did he not precede him?

Since the essence of metzranut is because of "the right and the good," therefore, if there is any aspect of loss to the seller, the law of metzranut is nullified, for it is not right and good to cause loss to the seller. Therefore, if the metzran does not have ready money and the buyer brought ready money, even if the metzran said "I will exert myself and bring money after some time," he is not obligated to wait, and the metzran has lost his right. And if he said "I will go and bring money today," if he is a man of means or it is within his power to obtain a loan, they wait for him until he goes and brings the money. But if according to the eyes of the beit din this is merely a delay, as he is not a man of means and is not secure, they do not listen to him, for perhaps in the meantime the buyer will retract and we will cause loss to the seller. And there is one who says that even in such a case where he is not a man of means and is not secure, they only do not listen to him when he knew of the sale, and since he did not prepare himself with the money, the law of metzran is nullified for him; but if before his coming to beit din or to the seller he did not know at all of this sale, or even if he knew but did not know the amount of the purchase, and now when he comes he says "I will go and bring money," they wait for him, for how do we know that he does not have money? Perhaps he feigns poverty but has great wealth, and that which he did not prepare until now was because he did not know the purchase price. And they only wait for him for the amount of time it takes to go to his house and bring the money to the beit din or to the seller, and more than this they do not wait for him, for when he does not have it in his house he will not obtain it through a loan since he is not a man of means and secure. However, if the beit din understands that he can obtain it through a loan, they wait for him a few hours [it appears to me]. And know that regarding all the matters where we nullify his metzranut because of the benefit of the seller, if the seller says that he is not particular about this, the right of the metzran remains in its full force.

And so, even if both of them brought money, if the purchaser's money is better than the neighbor's and more valuable in trade, or if it is more readily spent than the neighbor's, or if the neighbor's money is bundled and sealed such that there is no permission to open them until the owner of the money arrives and he is not in the city, while the purchaser's money is open, the right of the neighbor is void. For in a matter where there is a loss to the seller, they did not institute the law of mצרנות when the seller is particular about this. And so too regarding the purchaser: if he comes to remove him and the purchaser has already paid the seller, the neighbor cannot remove him with money of lesser value than his own such that he would have to suffer a loss through them. But if he will have no loss, only a bit of effort, such as if they are not quite as current, he can remove him. For specifically regarding the seller did they say this, because the obligation of "the good and the right" is not cast upon him so much, since if he wishes, he need not sell it at all; which is not the case regarding the purchaser [Sma and Taz].

Therefore, if the neighbor is not in the city, such as if he is in another city, or if he is in the city but is ill and it is necessary to wait until he recovers from his illness, or if he is still a minor, the seller may sell and the buyer may buy. And if after some time he arrives from his journey, or the ill person recovers, or the minor reaches majority, he cannot remove him. For if you say so, no person would be able to sell his lands, as a buyer would not be found, since the buyer would always fear that perhaps after some time the neighbor will come and remove me; and you have no greater locking of the door for the sale of lands than this. Therefore, the law of metzranut applies only when the neighbor is before us and his money is prepared, as has been explained. Nevertheless, some say that a person should fulfill "do not be called evil when it is within your power to be good," such that the seller should go to beit din and inform them that his desire is to sell such-and-such land, and they should inform the relatives and friends of the neighbor that if they wish to buy on his behalf, they should come and buy and pay money—and not that they should buy on condition of the neighbor's consent, for in such a case the seller need not wait, but rather they must buy absolutely, whether he consents or does not consent, and they must give the cash [Netivot HaMishpat]. And according to all opinions, if the relative or friend of the neighbor comes and says, "Behold, I stand in his place and I am giving cash on his behalf and I will buy for him absolutely," even though he has no power of attorney or authorization from him, one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence, and he stands in his place for all the laws of his metzranut. However, when the neighbor is here and does not wish to buy, and his relatives and friends wish to buy on his behalf, we do not heed their words, since he himself has no desire for it. And even if he says, "I do not care if they buy or if they do not buy, and I am not protesting their buying," nevertheless, since he himself does not care, the power of his metzranut is nullified [it appears to me].

A husband regarding his wife’s property has the law of metzranut, such that if she has land from nichsei melog from which he consumes the fruit, and they come to sell land adjacent to the nichsei melog, the husband can remove the buyer for he is a neighbor; and even if they performed a kinyan from her hand that she waived to the buyer, this is nothing, for the husband is the owner, as a husband regarding his wife’s property is considered like a buyer. And likewise a slave regarding his master’s property or regarding his own property has no standing, for what a slave acquires, his master acquires. And likewise the opposite: if they wish to remove the buyer and the husband and the master do not wish to, the buyer is not removed. And if the husband and the master are not in the city, the wife and the slave can remove the buyer when they purchase with ready money, whether the husband and the master consent or whether they do not consent, as I wrote in section 13 [Netivot HaMishpat]. And if they did so, that they removed the buyer, and afterwards the husband and the master came, if they wish, they uphold through them what they did, and if they do not wish, they shall not uphold it, and it returns to the buyer if the buyer so desires.

In exchange, the law of metzranut does not apply, such as if one exchanged a courtyard for a courtyard, or for a field, or for a vineyard. Since the exchange is land for land, and the seller specifically desires that land for which he is exchanging, it is not "upright and good" to prevent him from this. Similarly, the buyer is only willing to exchange his land for this specific land. This is the primary law, even though there is one who says that if the metzran wants to give the buyer another vineyard or field as good as his, the law is with the metzran; the halacha is not so. However, if he exchanged land for an animal or for movable property, the law of metzranut is not nullified, for movable property and animals can be purchased everywhere and at any time. Therefore, we appraise the value of that animal or movable property, and the metzran gives it to him and removes him. The buyer cannot say, "Give me my animal or my movable property," and since the seller does not want to give them, I am forced to remain with the land, for it is a deception. And so, in any place where the judge sees a deception, he is obligated to nullify the deception so as not to uproot the power of the metzran. Furthermore, it is possible to compel the seller to return the animal and the movable property to him. Even if we say that we do not have the power to compel him to this because the "good and upright" is not incumbent upon him to such a degree, and he can say, "I specifically desire these of the buyer," nevertheless, we can compel the buyer to this [as is evident in the Rambam, chapter 13 of Neighbors, and in the Shulchan Aruch, section 24, that we do not compel the seller; see there].

And so too if they performed another artifice to circumvent the power of the mtzran, such as if the seller previously gave the buyer a small amount of land as a gift—and regarding a gift there is no law of mtzranut, as will be explained—and afterwards sold him land adjacent to this one so that he himself would be a mtzran, and according to appearances he sold him this land at a high price until he absorbed the gift into it, the mtzran can remove him. And so too if he previously sold him a small amount of land in the middle of his fields where there is no mtzran, and afterwards sold him adjacent to it so that he himself would be a mtzran, we see: if it was by way of artifice, the mtzran removes him, and if not, he cannot remove him. And how do we clarify? We see: if that which he sold him previously is not equal in its quality to the land he sold him last, such that one of them is better or worse than its fellow, it is possible that there is no artifice in this and the mtzran cannot remove him, for perhaps initially he only wanted to buy land like this which is in the middle of his fields. But if they are equal, the artifice is evident, for why did he not buy them previously as one? And even if we say that previously he did not want to buy much, why did he choose to buy what is in the middle of the fields? And even if the mtzran remained silent initially when he bought the small amount, he did not lose his right, for as long as he did not buy adjacent to his border, he had no reason to cry out. And nevertheless, what he bought previously in the middle of his fields, the transaction is established, and the buyer or the seller cannot retract it; and they cannot say that since you are adjudicating a law of artifice in this, the transaction is automatically void, for we only adjudicate a law of artifice in this against the mtzran. And in any place where it is possible to suspect artifice and a ruse to circumvent the power of the mtzran and it is impossible to ascertain the artifice, the beit din imposes an oath upon them if there is artifice in the matter.

And so too, if there are witnesses that the buyer threatened the neighbor with something that he has the power to use to harm him so that he would not contest the purchase, he may remove him when the duress passes. And so too, if the buyer acted with cunning where there were many neighbors and he bought the right of one of them with a kinyan, behold, he has done nothing, and the others may remove him. We do not say that he stands in the place of the neighbor, for since in any event he is not a neighbor, he must act with "upright and good" toward the other neighbors. But with one neighbor, if he waived his right to the buyer in the manner that will be explained, he has lost his right.

How so? For example, if the buyer came and consulted with the metzran and said to him, "Behold, so-and-so your neighbor wants to sell me this field; shall I go and purchase it from him?" and he said to him, "Go and purchase," he has not nullified his right, because he can say, "I was jesting with you in order to establish it at a proper price, for had I approached the seller, he would have raised the price for me because he knows that I desire it very much" [Rashi]. Therefore, he can remove the buyer after he has purchased it, unless they performed a kinyan from him, for then he has lost his right. And even though this is like a mere kinyan devarim, for what is he transferring to him? Nevertheless, the kinyan is effective, for he cannot say "I was jesting with you," and he has removed himself from his right of metzranut. And we consider the metzran as if he has a right and a bit of a kinyan in the body of the sold land, and he removes that right through the kinyan. Therefore, since the essence of the kinyan is to reveal that he waived his right with a whole heart, there is one who says that if he said before witnesses, "Be you witnesses for me that I have removed myself from this field," nothing more is needed, meaning to say, "I have removed myself as is the law with a kinyan." And just as with all monetary admissions, when one admits before witnesses and says "you are my witnesses" it is effective, so too in this matter a complete admission is also effective. And similarly, if the buyer came to the metzran and said to him, "I will go and purchase it for myself and afterwards I will sell it to you" [Sma], and the metzran said to him, "I do not want this land," some say that the buyer acquired it immediately through his speech, for in this case he cannot say that his intention was so that the seller would not raise the price, since he wanted to purchase it for himself and afterwards sell it to him. And since we consider the buyer as the agent of the metzran, behold, he does not become his agent against his will, and the buyer acquired it. And it is similar to one who enters the field of his fellow without permission in a field that is intended for planting, where he is like his agent, as written in siman 375, and when he said "I do not want it," he does not become his agent against his will [the Gra]. And if the seller swore to sell to Reuven, and the metzran came to remove him, and the seller said, "If so, I will not sell it at all," there is one who says that since there was not yet a kinyan in the matter, the seller can retract and keep it for himself [Shach]. And it appears that even after the kinyan he can retract, for you have no greater kinyan in error than this, for the kinyan was because of his oath, and since the oath did not take effect—for he only swore to sell it to this person—and we are witnesses that he performed the kinyan because of the oath, it follows that the kinyan is also void [as above].

In what case are these words said? When the waiver occurred before the buyer purchased. However, after he purchased, even without a kinyan and without speech, if the metzran performed a recognizable act indicating that he waived to him—for example, if he assisted the buyer in his work, or rented this land from him, or saw him building or tearing down any amount, or used it and did not protest against him and did not challenge—even though he is still within the time appropriate for removal according to what will be explained, this is a complete waiver, and he can no longer remove him. For a waiver does not require a kinyan, and behold, he has nothing in the land such that one could say a waiver would not be effective without a kinyan; for he has only his right of metzranut, and since he waived, he lost his right.

And so, even before the buyer's purchase, specifically the buyer requires a kinyan or a complete admission, but the seller does not require anything. For example, if the seller consulted with his metzran and sought to sell to him for the same price that he later sold to the buyer, and he said to him, "Go and sell it to another, for I do not want it," he has lost his right. For since the seller revealed the transaction to him and he did not want it, he does not need to wait even one hour. But if he did not reveal the transaction to him, he has not lost his right, for he can say, "I was forced to permit him to sell to another in order to know the transaction, so that it would not cost me too much." And for what reason is the power of the seller greater in this than the power of the buyer? Because the essence of "the right and the good" is upon the buyer. Furthermore, it is no worse than one who says, "I will exert myself and bring money," where the seller does not need to wait, as I wrote in section 11; and all the more so when he rejects him after the telling of the transaction, that he does not need to wait for him [our teacher, the Beit Yosef].

And how much time is within the ability of the metzran to protest after the buyer has purchased? If he purchased it in private, he does not lose his right until the sale becomes publicized to the people of the city and the buyer has taken possession of the land. And then, if the metzran delayed the amount of time it takes to go and bring money and summon him to beit din, and he did not summon him, he has lost his right, for we say he certainly waived it to him. And if he was unable to come due to an accident, or if he was very preoccupied with his business [it appears to me], he does not lose his right. And so too if he was silent due to an error, such as if regarding this sold field the metzran had a claim against the seller that it was his, and he thought that the sale money would reach him, and afterwards it became clear that he erred in this and he comes to remove the buyer, the law is with him; for his silence is not proof of his waiver, since he thought the money would reach him, he thought and accepted, and when it became known to him that it is not so, he is first to buy it. And so too if it became known to him during days when the beit din does not sit and he was silent until the time passed, he does not lose his right, for he can say that he was silent because there was no beit din before him [Shach]. And whenever it is known that he knew of the sale and was silent, and it appears that he was not concerned for this, he has lost his right even if proclamations were not made regarding the sale [Beit Yosef]. And if the buyer says that he already knew and was silent and waived, and the metzran says that he did not know, he swears a hesset oath that he did not know and takes it from him. And even though in section 3 it was explained that in a case of denial the metzran must bring proof, it is different here, for it is a very common thing that he did not know, and it is difficult for the buyer to know clearly that he waived; therefore, he swears and takes [it appears to me].

And so too, there are times when they did not institute metzranut at all, such as when the seller had many properties in several places and sold all of them to one person; the owner of a border from one field of his fields cannot remove the buyer from that field, for the buyer purchased all of them and the seller was forced to sell him this field as well. And even if the metzran also wants to purchase all of his properties, he cannot remove him. And the reason is because this is an uncommon matter, that a person should purchase all properties in scattered locations; therefore, when one happens to want to purchase them, he does not have to inform the metzran of one field, for perhaps in the meantime the buyer will retract, and this is not "upright and good" to cause a loss to the seller [Tur]. And therefore, even if every field has a bar metzra, they cannot protest because of this reason.

And so our Sages, of blessed memory, said that when one sells it to the original owners, it is not subject to the law of bar metzra. For example, Reuven who bought a field from Shimon and then sold it back to him, the metzran cannot remove him; for just as selling to a metzran is "upright and good," so too to the original owners, as every person desires to return to his inheritance. And the same applies if he sold it to the son of the owners, the metzran cannot remove him, for he is like his father regarding this matter. And there is one who disagrees on this, [asking] what right does the son have in this? And the same applies to one who sells land to his son, the metzran cannot remove him, for it is certainly "upright and good" that it should go from father to son and not to another, as it is written: "In place of your fathers shall be your sons" [Shach]. And it is possible that the same applies to his daughter and his son-in-law. And this fact that the metzran cannot remove the original owners is only ex post facto, but initially, if the metzran and the original owners both came to buy, the metzran takes precedence. And the proof is that the metzran's power is greater than his, for behold, the metzran removes [the field] from a buyer, whereas for the original owners this enactment was not established. And even initially, he does not have the power to prevent the seller from selling it to another; only ex post facto, if he sold it to the original owners, the metzran cannot remove it from their hand. And this too is specifically when he himself sold it to him, but if he is a third party—for example, Reuven sold to Shimon, and Shimon to Levi, and Levi then sold it back to Reuven—the metzran removes him, for he is only called "original owners" from the one that this seller bought it from, for if not so, there is no end to the matter [ibid.].

And so too, when the seller needed to sell with urgency, the law of bar metzra does not apply to it, for it is not "upright and good" that he should wait for him in a place where he is urgent to sell. For example, one who sells a field that is notoriously poor in order to buy a fine field, or one who sold a field far from the city in order to buy a nearby field, or if he needed to move his residence to another place and was anxious to secure a place there, and if he were to delay he would lose his matter there and sold his house or his field that is here—in all these, his neighbor cannot remove the buyer [ibid.], for perhaps in the meantime, until the neighbor is informed, he will lose his matter that he needs to secure.

And so too, if one sold in order to pay the king's tax, or if one sold for the needs of burial for one of the members of his household, or for the sustenance of the wife and the daughters, the law of metzranut does not apply to them. And some say that the same applies for his own sustenance or for his daughter's dowry. And even if he borrowed previously for the sake of these matters and afterwards sold land to pay the creditors, the law of metzranut does not apply to it. And so too, if his friend was moved of his own accord to lend to him to pay a tax and he sold afterwards to pay him, there is no law of metzranut in this; for because these are urgent matters, the seller has no time to wait for the metzran. And even initially, when the metzran and another come to buy, whoever comes first merits. And even though in this there is no delay at all, nevertheless, the law of metzranut is completely nullified in this. And there are those who disagree in this, for since they came as one, why should the law of metzranut be nullified since there is no loss to the seller? And in one who sells for the sake of business, the law of metzranut applies, for if not so, the law of metzranut would be completely nullified, as most sales are for business. And although every person is urgent for business, nevertheless, the urgency is not so great that there would be no time to inform the metzran.

If the buyer claimed and said, "The seller sold it to me because of the tax," and the bar-metzra says, "You are claiming a falsehood to nullify my right," the burden of proof is upon the bar-metzra to bring evidence. If he did not bring evidence, the buyer shall swear a hesset oath and be exempt, for the buyer is considered the possessor. Even though we consider him like the agent of the bar-metzra, this is only when his status as a bar-metzra has been established; but as long as it has not been established, it is in the possession of the buyer, as I wrote in section 3. And some say that even when the buyer claims perhaps it was sold for the tax or the like, the bar-metzra must also bring evidence [Sma]. And there are those who disagree with this [Shach], and such is the primary ruling, for since the bar-metzra is certain, the buyer cannot nullify his status as a bar-metzra through a doubt [Netivot HaMishpat].

If there is a doubt regarding the essential status of the metzranut, the purchaser is not removed except through clear proof brought by the owner of the boundary. Therefore, if the purchaser claimed and said to the boundary-neighbor: "You are a robber regarding this field," or "You are a sharecropper for this field and you are not a boundary-neighbor," the boundary-neighbor must bring proof that this land is in his possession, and so too in any similar case. And the purchaser does not even require an oath, since he can claim thus—that he must clarify his metzranut—and as long as he does not clarify it, the land remains in the possession of the purchaser [Sma]. And there are those who disagree on this, for while it is true that he can claim thus even in a case of doubt, nevertheless, when he claims with certainty, he must swear [Shach]. And if the boundary-neighbor brought proof that he has held possession of it for three years and no protest against him was heard, he is the possessor and he is a boundary-neighbor [Netivot HaMishpat]. And in any place where the poskim are divided whether he is a boundary-neighbor or not, we do not remove it from the hand of the purchaser since he is the possessor. However, ab initio, one should sell to the boundary-neighbor, and only ex post facto, when the purchaser has bought it, we do not remove him due to doubt; but ab initio, why should the seller sell to another, since this one has at least a doubtful right in the sold field, and the one who wants to buy it has no right in it at all? And one who is a sharecropper in a field, and he is of the "ancestral sharecroppers" who is established as a sharecropper in this field forever, also from his ancestors, and he purchased a field adjacent to it, the owner of his field in which he is a sharecropper cannot remove him. An ancestral sharecropper is like a partner regarding the owner of the field, as he cannot remove him [Shach]. But a lessor removes a lessee, and similarly, a mortgagor removes the creditor, since it is in his power to remove him when the time concludes, he is not considered like a partner; but an ancestral sharecropper, he cannot remove him from his sharecropping [Rashbam 46b]. And whether the lessee or the creditor is called a boundary-neighbor regarding another will be further explained in this siman.

If the mtzran removed the buyer and afterwards it became known that it did not belong to the mtzran at all, such as if it was stolen in his hand or held in sharecropping, the buyer has the upper hand: if he wishes, he holds onto his money; if he wishes, he returns the money to the mtzran and returns to his purchase. The buyer is obligated to pay him for all the fruits he consumed, as it is considered his from the time the buyer purchased it. And if the victim of the theft into whose hand the land has now come, or the owners of the sharecropping, wish to remove the buyer by the law of dina d'bar metzra, we see: if they knew at the time of the sale to the buyer and it was in their power to inform the beit din at the time they removed the thief or the sharecropper from the field and they did not inform, they no longer have the power to remove him, for they have waived their mtzranut. But if they did not know of this beforehand, even though they came after they removed the thief from the buyer, they did not nullify their mtzranut by this. And in the laws of mashkanta it will be further explained that the mtzran cannot remove if the holder of the mashkanta purchased it from the mortgagor.

Since the primary obligation of "the right and the good" is placed upon the buyer—for why should he buy from the neighbor, let him buy elsewhere, as has been written—therefore the Sages, of blessed memory, said that one who sells to a woman or to minor orphans, they are not subject to the law of bar metzra, for they are not capable of exerting themselves to buy elsewhere, and it is not of "the right and the good" to push them away. Similarly, a tumtum and an hermaphrodite, because they are of doubtful status as a woman, the neighbor does not remove them. And specifically minor orphans, but adult orphans, or minors who are not orphans who have their own money and buy for themselves, they are subject to bar metzra, for their father can exert himself on their behalf, and adult orphans can buy elsewhere themselves. But minor orphans, even if there is an apotropos, and even if the neighbor is also an orphan or a woman, they are not subject to the law of bar metzra [Shach]. And similarly regarding a woman, the law is so.

And the woman of whom we said that the law of bar metzra does not apply to her, this is specifically when she is a widow or a divorcee, or even if she has a husband, provided it is known that she possesses funds over which her husband has no authority, and therefore he will not exert effort on her behalf, and in a manner where there is no concern that she is acting craftily and purchasing for her husband while saying "I am purchasing for myself." Therefore, as long as it is not known that she has funds over which the husband has no authority, the law of bar metzra applies to her. And if it is known that she has such funds, and she and her husband purchased a field together, just as they cannot remove her from her portion, so too they do not remove him from his portion as well, since they purchased it in one transaction and she is like one established in her portion, his hand is as her hand, and it turns out that he himself is like a metzran [the Gra]. And some say that this is only when he consumes the produce from her portion, for then he is like a metzran [Rivash siman 369]. And it appears to me that even according to this opinion, if the beit din sees that through the cancellation of the husband's acquisition, the woman's acquisition will be cancelled, even if he does not consume the produce, they do not have the power to remove him. And specifically a metzran cannot remove a woman or orphans, but one who is also a partner with the seller in this land, and one sold his portion to a woman or to orphans, the second partner can remove them, for a partner takes precedence over a metzran, as will be explained. And if he is currently a renter of this land or it is mortgaged to him, it depends on the opinions that will be explained with the help of Heaven.

There are those who say that just as if the buyer is a minor orphan or a woman, the law of bar metzra does not apply to them, so too if the seller is a minor orphan or a woman, the law of bar metzra does not apply to them; for when they sell to another, the neighbor does not expropriate it from them. And it is an a fortiori argument: for it has already been explained that the primary obligation of the law of bar metzra falls upon the buyer, and nevertheless it is not imposed upon a minor orphan or a woman, and certainly so when they are sellers. However, there are those who disagree on this and hold that when they are sellers, the law of bar metzra applies to them. The reason is that to purchase land is not common and involves much effort, and it is not their way to exert such effort; therefore, the sages removed the law of bar metzra from them. But to sell land is easy to sell and there are many leapers, and if we apply the law of bar metzra to them, they will not lose by this; therefore, the law of bar metzra applies to them. And if the minor is a neighbor and lacks the mental capacity to claim the argument of bar metzra, if the beit din sees that it is to his benefit if he purchases this land, they shall remove the buyer and purchase it on his behalf, or when there are other neighbors, they shall take a portion for him along with all the neighbors. And in everything that has been explained where the law of bar metzra does not apply, even if the neighbor has damage of sight from this house that is sold, he cannot remove him [Shach]. And regarding the matter of the damage, let the law pierce the mountain between them; if according to the law he is able to close up his window, let him close it, and if not, let him not close it.

A partner's power is greater than that of a bar metzran when he is a partner in this land. How so? Brothers who inherited land or partners who bought land, and one of them sold his portion to another, the brother or the partner removes him. And even if the buyer is a metzran, they remove him, for the metzran is only a metzran, while they are metzranim and partners. And just as the metzran removes a buyer because of "the right and the good," so too they remove him because of "the right and the good," for you have no "right and good" greater than this. And even if the buyers are a woman or an orphan, they remove them. And even if there were many brothers or many partners, and one of them sold his portion before they divided, one of them can remove the buyer. The buyer does not have the power to say, "Who is to say that when you divide, your portion will fall next to this portion and you will be a metzran? Perhaps your portion will fall far from my portion," for in any event, since he is now a partner in all of it, he can remove him [Sma]. And partners and brothers who have divided are not subject to the law of partners after the division [Ketzot HaChoshen there, end of subsection 6].

The power of partnership is so great that even if he is not his partner in this land, but rather is a partner with him in business dealings, there is no law of bar metzra regarding him. Therefore, one who sells to his partner in business transactions, he has acquired it and the bar metzra cannot remove him. Similarly, other partners do not take a portion with him. And if he has a partner in this land, it appears to me that he can remove him, for since his power is greater than that of the bar metzra, all the more so is his power greater than a partner in business transactions. And that which we said, that the bar metzra cannot remove the partner, this is specifically if he preceded and purchased; but if the bar metzra preceded and purchased, the partner cannot remove him unless he is a partner in the land [ibid.]. And if both came as one, he should sell to the bar metzra and not to his partner in business transactions [as mentioned above, for according to Rashi in Bava Metzia 108b, the explanation is specifically a partner in the land; and although we rule like the Geonim, nevertheless, since according to Rashi it is not so and even according to the Geonim the matter is balanced, therefore he should sell ab initio to the bar metzra].

And similarly, a mashkanta is not subject to the law of bar metzra. Therefore, one who pledges his field and afterwards sells it to the one in whose hand it is pledged, the neighbor cannot remove him. But if the pledgor sells it to another, even if he is not a neighbor, the lender cannot take it from his hand, for his power was only strengthened so that the neighbor should not push him out, but he is not truly like a neighbor. And some say that his power is strengthened even over a neighbor, for even if the neighbor bought it, the lender can remove him, and his law is like a partner in the land; for that is why it is called a mashkanta, for he dwells near it and is occupied with it. Our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly. And this is specifically when there was no deception in the loan to circumvent the power of the neighbor, but if there was deception in this, they nullify his cunning and give it to the neighbor.

And if at the beginning of the mashkanta the metzran comes to protest and say, "I will lend to you," because perhaps your intention is to act with deception and sell to the lender, he cannot prevent him, for he may say, "It is more comfortable for me to borrow from him than to borrow from you." And if it appears to the dayan that there is deception in this, they inform the lender that if it remains in his hand permanently, they will expropriate it from him and hand it over to the bar metzra, and through this the truth will be revealed.

The holder of a mashkon is only called a metzran regarding the mortgaged field itself and not regarding a field adjacent to it. Therefore, if a field adjacent to the mashkon is sold, if the lender wishes to purchase it, the borrower may prevent him if he so desires because he is the metzran; and certainly when the borrower wishes to purchase it, the lender cannot prevent him. If the borrower does not desire to purchase it and another who is not a metzran purchased it, the lender cannot remove it from his possession. If the lender acted first and purchased it, a metzran can expropriate it from him, even a metzran other than the borrower. And there are those who disagree and hold that the lender has the status of a full metzran even regarding the field adjacent to it, and our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly. Therefore, if another who is not a metzran acted first and purchased it, the lender may remove him; and certainly when he purchased it himself, another metzran cannot remove him. And there are those who say that specifically in this regard is his power superior, that a metzran cannot remove him when he purchased it, but when another acted first and purchased it, he cannot remove him even according to this opinion [Sma and Taz]. And the borrower can remove the lender according to all opinions.

And that which we explained, that regarding the matter of the mortgaged field itself the creditor is called a complete bar metzra, there is no difference whether the borrower is an Israelite or not. For even though regarding an Egyptian there is no law of bar metzra, as will be explained, nevertheless, since it is in the possession of the creditor, another may not purchase it. Therefore, one who lends to a non-Jew on his field or on his house, and another came and purchased it, the creditor removes him. And if a bar metzran purchased it, it depends on the two opinions in section 34, and according to the decision of our teacher, the Rema, there, he removes even a bar metzran, and specifically when there was no deception in the matter, as he wrote there.

One who lends against a house but did not lend against the cellar beneath it has no connection to the cellar. If he purchased the cellar from the borrower, the metzran may remove him. According to the "some say" in section 36, that one is also called a metzran regarding an adjacent field, it follows that he is also a metzran for the cellar [Taz], not like the one who disagrees in this [whose source is from the Nimukei Yosef and who holds like the first opinion, see there]. And know that regarding any mashkanta, even if the lender does not dwell in it and does not consume the fruits, nevertheless, it has every law of a mashkanta that has been explained. There is no difference between whether he took it as a mashkanta at the time of his loan or not at the time of his loan, for since it was given as a mashkanta to him, he is its metzran [Chatam Sofer].

As has been explained regarding the dispute over a mashkanta, so too there is a dispute among the poskim regarding a rental, whether concerning the same field or the house that is rented, or concerning that which is adjacent to it. For some say that there is no law of metzranut at all regarding a rental in respect to the house and the field adjacent to it, and if he sold it to the renter, the metzran can remove it from his hand, and certainly if another purchased it, the renter cannot remove it from his hand. And some say that it is certain that if another purchased it, the renter cannot remove it from his hand [Sma], but if the renter preceded and purchased it, the metzran cannot remove it from his hand. And regarding that house or field which he rented, if he sold it even to another, the renter cannot remove it from his hand according to the first opinion; and according to the latter opinion, even if the metzran purchased it, the renter can remove it from his hand, and certainly when another purchased it, for a renter's power is greater than a metzran's, like the holder of a mashkanta. But when the renter preceded and purchased the house in which he lived as a rental, or the field that he rented, even according to the first opinion, the metzran cannot remove it from his hand. And since our teacher, the Rema, decided regarding a mashkanta according to the latter opinion, that he has more power in this house than the metzran, and for that which is adjacent to it, he has the law of a metzran such that the other metzran cannot remove it from his hand, certainly in a rental the law is so, for a rental for its day is a sale; and since he lived in the house or worked in the field, his power is greater than a mashkanta, for so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book, that a renter's power is greater than a mashkanta. And all this is regarding other people, but regarding the lessor himself, certainly the lessor has more power in the field or house adjacent than the renter, and even if the renter preceded and purchased it, if the lessor wants, he may remove it from his hand. And in section 41 these laws will be further explained, see there.

And so too there is this dispute regarding the matter of the rental itself, for if Reuven wants to rent out his house and the metzran comes and says "I want to rent it," according to the first opinion his words are of no consequence, and according to the latter opinion the law is with him, for a rental for a day is a sale, and since we establish the law according to the latter opinion, the law is with the metzran. However, this is specifically if the number of his household members is not more than the one who wants to rent it, but if the number of his household members is greater, the landlord can say "I do not wish to rent it to those with many household members so that they do not damage my house," or if he has another valid pretext that the metzran is not good for him to rent to, the metzran cannot compel him. For even regarding a sale it has been explained that when there is a disadvantage to the seller, the law of metzranut is void, and all the more so regarding rental. And if one dwells in a house under rental and at the conclusion of the term another comes to rent it, and the first says that he takes precedence because he is a metzran since he rented it until now, his claim is good even according to the first opinion and he must rent it to him for the future [Taz]. And this too is specifically when his household members are not more numerous than this one who comes to rent it now, but otherwise the law of metzranut does not apply to this. For the renter himself is not permitted to rent it to one whose household members are more numerous than his own, as written in siman 317, and all the more so he cannot claim a claim of metzran in such a case [Ktzot HaChoshen]. And so too if the landlord shows before a beit din a valid pretext as to why he does not desire him, the law of metzranut is void, and it is an a fortiori argument from a sale as has been written. And some say further that when the term of his rental has already concluded and the landlord has not yet reached an agreement with him for the future, he may rent it to whomever he wishes even though he still dwells in it, for since the term of his rental concluded, he is like any other person; and specifically when the term has not yet concluded and another comes to rent it can he claim a claim of bar metzra, but not when the term has concluded [Netivot HaMishpat in the name of the Beit Yosef]. And this requires further study as to the practical law.

And regarding that which we explained in section 39, that concerning the same house in which the renter dwells, if he sold it even to the metzran the renter may remove it from his hand, there is one who disagrees with this and holds that the law of metzranut does not apply to a rental at all [Rashal in a Responsum]. And he holds that even if the lessor sold it to another who is not a bar metzra, the renter cannot remove it from his hand, and we do not say "a rental for its day is a sale" except regarding usage, but not that the body of the property is his. And he ruled this as practical halacha. And one of the great authorities decided according to this opinion only ab initio, that when he comes to sell it, the renter precedes another, and the metzran precedes the renter; but if the renter preceded and purchased it, the metzran cannot remove it from his hand, for he may say "kim li" that the law of bar metzra applies to a rental [Shevut Yaakov]. However, according to the decision of our teacher, the Rema, that the law of bar metzra applies to a mortgage, and according to what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that a rental is superior to a mortgage, certainly one should rule that the law of metzranut applies to a rental. Nevertheless, it is difficult to remove it from the hand of the buyer according to what was written in section 27, that in a dispute of the poskim, the burden of proof is upon the metzran. However, a dayan who removed it from the hand of the buyer and handed it over to the renter is not dismissed, since according to our teachers the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, the law is so. And know that there is no law of metzranut in chazakot regarding that which is adjacent to it; for example, one who has a chazaka to dwell in this house or to sit in this shop, there is no law of bar metzra in this regarding the shop or the house adjacent to it. Therefore, when the one adjacent to it sells his chazaka, he may sell it to whomever he wishes, and the holder of the chazaka at his side cannot protest against him according to all opinions. But regarding that same shop or that same house itself, if it is sold permanently, certainly the holder of the chazaka precedes even a bar metzra according to all opinions, for this is superior to a mortgage and a rental, as it is like his own property because of his chazaka [and what the Shach wrote in sub-section 61, this refers to the adjacent property, and so he wrote in Responsa Divrei Rivot siman 99, and so wrote the Knesset HaGedolah siman 140 section 15, and it was brought in Meirat Einayim there]. And that which will be explained in section 59 regarding those who lend together in a shop, that this is like movables and the law of bar metzra does not apply to it at all, this is because the business is only lending and he cannot conduct another business in it; but in a shop of chazaka where he conducts any merchandise he wishes, certainly regarding itself he is a bar metzra even against the bar metzra [it appears to me].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: If there were a house and a shop one on top of the other and he rented them to two people, and afterwards he came to sell them, each one is a metzran for his own and for that which he dwells in. Thus far his words. And even if his fellow purchased his portion, the second may remove him [Shach]. And two who rented a field or a house or a shop in partnership, and one of them wants to rent his portion to another and the second wants to merit it by the law of metzranut, the law is with him according to all opinions, for certainly in such a case there is the law of metzranut. He further wrote regarding Reuven who had land from which he pays a tax to Shimon of such and such per year, and Shimon sold the tax to Levi, and Reuven says that he is a metzran and he has precedence to purchase the tax: if Shimon sold a permanent sale, the law is with Reuven; and if he only sold for fixed years, it is nothing more than one who sells a mere debt, for which there is no law of metzranut. Thus far his words. For when he sells for a time it is like movable property, but when he sells permanently it is like land, and since the body of it is his, certainly "the right and the good" applies to this [the Gra].

One who buys from an Egyptian or from a Sadducee or a Cuthean, the bar mitsra cannot remove him, for he can say to him: "I have done you a favor by driving him away from your boundary." And even if he went back and leased it to this seller, nevertheless, he has removed him from the body of the land [Beit Yosef]. And similarly, if one sold land to these, the bar mitsra cannot protest against the seller, for it has already been explained that the primary law is incumbent upon the buyer, and regarding these, the obligation of "the upright and the good" does not apply; and consequently, there is also no obligation upon the seller. Only in this regard, that he sells to these and it is possible that some harm will reach his neighbor from this, he must accept upon himself every accidental damage that comes from them to the neighbor. And even with one who leases to these, the law is so. And if he does not want to accept, they place him under a ban until he accepts it upon himself. And if they caused him some damage of sight, or the opposite, that they blocked up his established window and the like, the seller or the lessor is obligated to pay him according to the assessment that the experts assess. And if damage came to him during the lifetime of the seller and he died, the son is obligated to pay from his father's inheritance, for his father had already become obligated and his properties became liened. But if the damage came to him after the death of the seller, some say that they did not penalize his son after him, as with several penalties where they did not penalize the son for his father. And similarly, even in his lifetime, they do not collect from properties that he sold [it appears to me]. And also from him they do not collect except when he accepted upon himself every accidental damage that arises because of him; but if he did not accept it upon himself and an accidental damage occurred to the neighbor from them, some say that he is exempt from paying by the authority of beit din, and his obligation is only by the laws of Heaven, like all indirect causation of damages. And our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly.

There was an incident in the days of the Geonim regarding one who sold his house to a Cuthean in an alleyway, and the residents of the alleyway came and claimed against him that the Cuthean damaged them and coerced them, and they have no testimony in this matter. They ruled that since the seller is unable to swear—for he does not know that he did not damage them, and an ordinary Cuthean is a coercer—there is reason for their claim. Therefore, they shall swear regarding what they lost and he is liable to pay; and it must be said that he accepted responsibility upon himself as has been written. And if one purchased from a Cuthean a house that is next to an Israelite, he may lease it to a Cuthean but not sell it to him [Shach]. And the reason is that to sell it is not within his power without accepting responsibility for damage, since in any event it is now owned by an Israelite; but to be stringent upon him not to lease it is not within our power, since previously it belonged entirely to the Cuthean, it is sufficient that he shall not sell it to him [it appears to me].

In what case is this said, that he must accept upon himself every mishap that arises because of him? When he is able to sell it to an Israelite for the sum of money that the gentile is giving, provided the gentile does not raise the price significantly more than its value [Sma]. However, if an Israelite is not found who wants to give this purchase price, he is not obligated to sell for less to an Israelite, and so too regarding rental the law is thus. And if the beit din sees that the gentile intends to buy or to rent in order to cause harm to the neighbor, they do not allow him to do so.

One who purchases adjacent to a gentile, for example, where Reuven purchased a house from Levi and the boundary of Shimon for that house is to its south, and on the northern side of that house a gentile dwells, such that this house that he purchased stands in the middle between the house of Shimon and the house of the gentile—some say that Shimon cannot remove Reuven by the law of bar metzra because Reuven can say to him: "I am a shield for you from the gentile, for if you had purchased it, you would have been a neighbor to him, and I saved you from this." Furthermore, buyers are not common next to a gentile, and perhaps you also did not want to purchase it, and there would have been a loss to the seller; and whenever there is a loss to the seller, the law of bar metzra does not apply, as the [Gra] wrote. And some say that these arguments are not sufficient, for buyers are common, and you did not do me a favor because it is my will to purchase it; and since the seller and the buyer are Israelites, the obligation of bar metzra applies to them.

From that which has been explained, that regarding a woman and orphaned minors the law of bar metzra does not apply to them, there are some of our teachers who learned from this that if the buyer does not have a house or a field and the time is difficult for him, and the metzran only needs it for general expansion, that the law of bar metzra does not apply to this. For since the entire essence of the law of bar metzra is because of "the right and the good," it is not right and good that this person who is hard-pressed should not take it because of the expansion of the metzran, just as we say regarding a woman and an orphan that it is not their way to exert themselves, that the law of bar metzra does not apply to them. However, there are some of our teachers who disagree on this, for it is not comparable to a woman and an orphan, since it is not their way to exert themselves, what can they do? But regarding ordinary people who have the ability to exert themselves and find in another place, the sages did not differentiate; for if not so, all the laws of metzranut would be nullified, and every buyer would prove that he is hard-pressed and compelled to this. And so it appears primary for the law. Nevertheless, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that from the words of the Maharam of Rothenburg and the words of Rabbeinu Yerucham, it appears like the first opinion, and this matter depends on the assessment of the beit din. And he wrote further that specifically when the buyer is from the city and cannot find a house in another place, but otherwise, the metzran precedes everyone. Thus far his words.

One who gives a gift to his fellow, it is not subject to the law of bar metzra, and even if the metzran wants to pay him and purchase it from the recipient, he cannot compel him. For the giver did not want to sell it, and if he were not giving it to this person, he would not have sold it to him, and they have lost nothing. There is no "upright and good" in this, for he gave a gift to this person because of his love or because of a favor he did for him, and the giver wants it to remain in the hand of the recipient of the gift to be a remembrance for him, and if he sells it, he will forget the favor. Therefore, there is no "upright and good" to compel him to sell it to him. And if it is written in the deed of gift that the giver accepted responsibility upon himself, it is subject to the law of metzranut, for they certainly practiced deception in the matter to uproot the power of the metzran, and he certainly sold it to him. And even with an oath he is not believed, for it is not the way to accept responsibility in the giving of a gift. Therefore, he removes him and gives him according to the assessment of the experts. And if the recipient says, "So it is, that I purchased it and we practiced deception in the matter, and for such and such I purchased it," he swears with a sacred object and takes from the metzran like the law of an agent. And specifically if he claims a price that is fit to be paid for it or slightly more, and some say that for a fit price he does not need to swear [see Sma]. But if he said regarding that which is worth a maneh, "I purchased it for two hundred," he is not believed even with an oath, since we see that they practiced deception in this [Levush]. But if it was written in the deed of gift, "And I accepted responsibility for this gift upon myself, that if it is taken from his hand I will give him two hundred zuz," this is proof that the truth is so, and the metzran gives him two hundred and removes him even though it is only worth a maneh. And nevertheless, the metzran can adjure him, for perhaps this itself was a conspiracy between them so that if it becomes known to the metzran he will take two hundred from him, and the giver trusted him that he would only take a maneh from him. And even though in an open sale in such a case he does not need to swear, nevertheless, since they practiced deception, they are to be suspected of this [it appears to me].

And some say further that even one who purchased an adjacent land and gave it to another as a gift, the neighbor cannot remove him; for granted that regarding the purchaser there is "upright and good," nevertheless, since he did not retain it for himself but gave it as a gift to another and without responsibility, such that there is no deception in this and the beit din does not see deception in this, and regarding the recipient of the gift there is no "upright and good" to cause him loss, therefore the law of bar metzra does not apply here. It is only upon the beit din to see if there is no deception in this. And even though regarding any gift that does not have responsibility one need not scrutinize further, nevertheless, a matter such as this which is uncommon—to buy a field and hand it over as a gift—they must scrutinize further. And some disagree with the essence of this law and hold that the neighbor removes it from their hand and pays according to its value; and if the purchaser wishes to give this person a gift, let him give him the money or purchase in another place. And the reason is that the power of the recipient of the gift is no better than the one who gives it to him, who purchased it and is subject to the law of bar metzra. And our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly.

And so there are those who say that if the buyer died before the metzran removed him, he cannot remove the heirs, since they themselves did not act against "the right and the good." And there are those who disagree even in this, for their power is no greater than their testator from whose power they come, and our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly. And even according to the first opinion, if the heir sold it to another, or the recipient of the gift from the buyer sold it to another, the metzran comes and removes the buyer; for since it did not remain with the heir or the recipient of the gift, and its beginning and its end is a purchase, there is in this "the right and the good" to establish it in the hand of the metzran, and the buyer shall go and purchase in another place. And all the more so if the first buyer sold it to a second buyer. But if the owner of the land himself gave it as a gift to someone, and this recipient sold it to another, there is no law of bar metzra in it even according to the latter opinion, since he comes from the power of the recipient of the gift, in which there is no law of metzranut [it appears to me].

It has already been explained in section 5 that even if a creditor of the landowner collected it for his debt, the metzran may remove him, and there is no difference whether the beit din appraised it for him for his debt or whether the debtor gave it to him of his own will. However, as I wrote in siman 103, that an appraisal always returns from the creditor to the debtor, therefore the metzran's power is also no better than the creditor himself, and if the one whose land was seized desires to give the money he owed for his debt, his field shall return to him forever. And if one purchased land and the metzran came and removed him, and afterwards a creditor of the seller came and seized it from him, some say that the metzran returns and takes from the purchaser, and the purchaser returns to the seller, and the guarantee of the metzran is upon the purchaser; for if the metzran had not taken it from him, the creditor would have taken it from the purchaser and he would have returned to the seller, and therefore even now it is so, and the metzran shall not lose his right in this. And this is specifically when the seller has the means to pay and the only difference is in the exertion, but when the seller does not have the means to pay, it is not according to the law that the purchaser should lose after the metzran took it from him [Beit Yosef]. And many disagree with this and hold that even if the seller has the means to pay, the metzran has no legal claim against the purchaser at all, but rather against the seller, for it has already been explained that the purchaser is like the agent of the metzran, and how can he return to the agent to collect from him? And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that this appears to be the primary view, like the opinion of those who disagree.

One who consecrates land for the poor or for other charity is not subject to the law of bar metzra. And even if the neighbor wishes to exchange it and give them other land better than this, he does not have the power to do so, for the one who consecrates it desires that there remain for him an eternal memorial from his land that he consecrated. And if the field adjacent to the neighbor was ownerless, such as fields of the king and ministers whose desire is that people take them and pay tax from them every year, and another came and took possession of it, if a field like it can be found in another place that is ownerless and with such a tax, the neighbor can remove him and accept the tax upon himself from it, and he is no better than a purchaser. But if he cannot find a field like this and with such a tax, he cannot remove him even if the neighbor wishes to pay him its entire value, since he took possession of it permissibly; and who prevented the neighbor from acquiring it until now? And even if it is possible to find one like it and with such a tax, if it is at a distance, he is not obligated to exert himself, for we require exactly like it in all details; and since there is none like it, there is no law of bar metzra regarding ownerless property [Sma and Netivot HaMishpat].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 22: There is one who says that a metzran cannot appoint another person in his place to remove the buyer through the law of bar metzra, except where he granted him ownership in the original land from which he is claiming. And this matter, that we do not remove the buyer, is specifically regarding removing it from the buyer; however, to stand in the place of the bar metzra to prepare the money for the buyer in its time, even if he sent it through a messenger whom he appointed before witnesses, he stands in his place. Thus far his words. And the explanation of the matters appears to be as has been explained in siman 122, that any power of attorney in which it is not written "go, litigate, and extract for yourself," the defendant can say, "you are not my litigant." And now, what shall this metzran do if he wishes to authorize another to take it on his behalf from the buyer? For if he writes to him thus, "go, litigate, acquire, and extract for yourself," it turns out that this field will remain with the authorized agent, and he is not a metzran—so how can he remove the buyer? And if we say that he should also grant him ownership of his field, by virtue of which he is a metzran, has it not been explained in section 10 that one who buys from a metzran cannot remove the buyer? For this reason, he says that he should grant him ownership of a portion of his field, and likewise write to him regarding the field for which he is making him an authorized agent, "go, litigate, and extract for yourself a portion of it," for it was explained there that since he can litigate over a portion of it, he can litigate over all of it. In this manner, he shall claim from the buyer, and he cannot say to him, "you are not my litigant," for he has a portion in both fields. And he also cannot say to him, "you are a buyer from a metzran," for a portion remains also for the metzran in both fields, and it turns out that he removes him by the power of the bar metzra who sent him. And this is specifically to litigate with him; but if the metzran himself stood in judgment with the buyer, and only to prepare money in its time, he may send even through a mere messenger. [So it appears to me in my humble opinion is its explanation, and I wonder at the later authorities who did not understand it so; and it appears that the Gra understood it so in subsection 60, and this is from the Ramah; and even though he holds there that one does not need "incidental to land," nevertheless "go and litigate" is required, as is written in Bava Kamma 70. And see Shach subsection 19].

One whom a homeowner made an agent to sell his field or his house, even though the agent himself is a neighbor, he is not permitted to buy, as is written in siman 185, for any agent cannot buy for himself, as it will never enter the possession of the buyer since he is the agent of the seller, as the Tur wrote there. And consequently, he is forced to sell to others, and since he himself sold, he cannot remove the buyer, for behold, he himself sold it, and you have no greater waiver than this. And so too, if the neighbor signed on the deed of sale as a witness, he cannot remove the buyer, for with his signature he waived, and as is written in siman 147 regarding one who contests the field and is signed as a witness [see Sma subsection 26 and it requires further study, and that which the Tur wrote "like a guardian" was written as a comparison of the law and not like the reason there, and delve into this].

Our sages, of blessed memory, said [Bava Metzia 108b] that if the bar metzra comes to displace the purchaser who bought land adjacent to his boundary, if the purchaser wants to build houses on it and the bar metzra only wants to sow it, the law of bar metzra does not apply to this, and the purchaser acquires it for the sake of the settlement of the land, for the building of houses is a greater settlement than sowing. And whenever there is a withholding of benefit from others in this, it is not "right and good." And there is one who says that if the bar metzra wants to plant it with trees, he can displace him, for the planting of trees is considered settlement like houses, as is written in Orach Chaim siman 358, that seeds nullify the status of a dwelling and trees do not nullify it, see there. And furthermore, trees are more permanent than houses, for they are rooted and stand always in the ground, and planting is more significant than houses [Tur]. And specifically trees that produce fruit, and not barren trees.

Who is a bar metzra? Not specifically when there is no separation at all between his field and the one being sold, but even if there is a slight separation, such as if a row of palms separates them—and these are palms crowded and close to one another until they appear as if lying upon one another—or if a high and strong building separates them, or a pit, or a large stone, or a small mountain and the like. We see: if he can bring even one furrow through the separating object until the two fields are joined, this person is his bar metzra and he may remove the buyer. And if not, he may not remove him, since he cannot make them into one field. And so too regarding the metzranut of houses and shops: if they are close to one another until it is within his power to make them into one courtyard, they have the law of a bar metzra, and if not, they do not. And there are those who say that a pit is not a separation at all, even if it is large, for he can fill it with earth [Sma and Atzeret Tzevi in section 53].

Our sages, of blessed memory, said [ibid.] regarding land belonging to one person and houses belonging to another, the owner of the land can prevent the owner of the houses [from selling to others], but the owner of the houses cannot prevent the owner of the land. And so too regarding land and trees, they also said that the owner of the land can prevent the owner of the trees if he sells them to another because he is a bar metzra; but if the owner of the land sold, his sale is valid and the owner of the trees cannot prevent him. And so too, the owner of the house does not prevent the owner of the land when he sells his land to another. And our teachers disagreed regarding this: the opinion of the Rambam is that this is specifically when the owner of the house and the owner of the trees have no right in the land at all, even for a time, and at any time the owner of the land wishes he can say to the owner of the house, "Demolish your building and go," and to the owner of the trees, "Uproot your tree and go," for they are only like mere movables. But when they have a right in the land to remain until a known time, they have the law of a metzran, for it is no worse than a mashkanta itself which is sold, as the land and the house, or the land and the tree, are considered as one thing. Therefore, in such a case, when the owner of the land sells his land to others, even to the metzran, the owner of the house and the trees can prevent him and remove it from him. And the opinion of Rashi and the Rosh is that even if they have a right for a time, since this right is not forever, they are not considered as a metzran. And it is not similar to a mashkanta, for there the primary right is that perhaps it will not be redeemed and will remain in his hand; but in this case, when the time arrives, they do not have even a doubtful right. And it is also not similar to rental, for in rental, which is a sale for the day, he also possesses the body of the land, which is not the case here, as the owner of the house and the trees has nothing in the body of the land, but rather there is a compromise between them that they shall stand until a certain time. Furthermore, we have already explained in section 39 that even according to the opinion that holds there is bar metzra in rental, nevertheless, if the house next to it was sold, the renter does not remove it from the buyer; so too in this case, the power of the owner of the house and the trees in the land is not greater than the renter in the house next to it. And just as there, according to this opinion, if the renter bought it the metzran cannot remove it from his hand, so too here, if the owner of the house and the trees bought the land, the metzran does not remove it from their hand [and so it appears from the language of the Shas]. And if he has the ability to say to them at any time, "Demolish your building" and "Uproot your trees," they have no right at all, and it is possible that when the metzran buys it, he removes them according to this opinion, and perhaps also according to the opinion of the Rambam, for they are considered only like movables. And if they have a perpetual right, their law is like partners and they remove the metzran. And the owner of the house and the trees who sold the house and the trees, even to a metzran, the owner of the land removes them in any case. And so too, if land adjacent to this land was sold, the owner of the land takes precedence over the owner of the house and the trees and removes it from their hand, unless they have a right in the land according to the opinions we have explained [as above].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 51: If the house and the upper story belong to two people, and one sold his house to a neighbor, the owner of the upper story cannot remove him, for they are not called partners with one another, but rather their status is like neighbors. Thus far his words. The later authorities disagree with him and hold that their status is like partners, for the owner of the upper story also has a portion in the ground, and he may remove the neighbor. And it appears to me that even he only said this when the owner of the upper story does not have permission to rebuild it when it falls, for according to this, all the ground belongs to the house alone. Nevertheless, if the owner of the upper story purchased it, the neighbor does not remove it from his hand, as I wrote regarding a house and trees that stand for a limited time. But regarding a permanent upper story where he has permission to return and rebuild it when it falls, certainly he is like a partner and removes the neighbor. And regarding the adjacent house, if the upper story is only for a limited time, it has no status of neighborliness regarding the adjacent house, and the neighbor removes it from his hand, and all the more so the homeowner [it appears to me].

Regarding all lands in the world, the law of metzranut applies, and everything attached to the ground is like the ground. Therefore, in houses and shops and all types of buildings, such as a cattle stall, a bathroom, a woodhouse, a storehouse, and the like, the law of metzranut applies to them. However, regarding movable property and slaves, there is no metzranut. Even though according to the Torah slaves are compared to lands, nevertheless in this matter it is not applicable, for the reason for metzranut is so that all his lands will be together, and regarding slaves this reason is not applicable. However, even though there is no metzranut regarding movable property, nevertheless if they are partners in movable property and one sold his portion, if it appears to the beit din that the buyer is not comfortable for the second partner, he may remove the buyer and retain it for himself. This is not due to the law of metzranut, but rather because he is not permitted to cause harm to his partner, and there is in this the "doing of the good and the right" since he suffers no loss by this, and the partner shall retain his portion or sell it to someone who is comfortable for him. Similarly, those who lend together in a shop, this does not have the law of land. Even though they are established in this shop to conduct the business of lending, as was the case in ancient times in certain countries, nevertheless since they are unable to keep merchandise there and it is only for the business of lending, its law is like movable property. However, if it appears to the beit din that there is damage to the remaining partner in that this one sells his portion to another, they can compel him to sell to the one who remains or to someone who is comfortable for him, if there is no loss in this to the seller, as I have written regarding movable property [it appears to me].

Since the law of metzranut applies to everything attached to the ground, therefore, regarding seats in a beit knesset and a beit midrash, the law of metzranut applies to them. One who comes to sell his seat, the metzran takes precedence and removes the buyer. And even though there are those who hesitated about this—for what relevance does metzranut have to them, as one seat is sufficient for a person since he cannot stand in two places at once? And if it is because he needs it for his sons and sons-in-law, surely if the son himself were to plead the claim of a bar metzra regarding a field adjacent to his father's field, we would not pay him heed; how then can the father acquire it through the claim of a bar metzra for them?—nevertheless, many of our early teachers and our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, ruled as the law that there is bar metzra regarding seats in a beit knesset. The reason is that just as with the bar metzra of houses, we are witnesses that one person does not dwell in two houses, yet since he needs it for the members of his household, their law is like that of one person; so too regarding seats in a beit knesset, when this bar metzra needs the seat for the members of his household so they may stand together, the law of metzranut applies to this. On the contrary, in a beit knesset there is even more fastidiousness not to stand near people who are not proper [Rivash]. Therefore, just as with houses there is always the law of bar metzra even if the members of his household are few, so too in this, even if he has no one from the members of his household to stand on the seat, nevertheless he takes precedence and may place whomever he wishes on the seat [it appears to me]. All this is when the seat being sold is literally next to the seat of the metzran, but if it is distant even slightly, the law of metzranut does not apply to it [Netivot HaMishpat]. And if through his metzranut damage will reach the income of the beit knesset, we do not pay heed to his metzranut, for the general rule in metzranut is that anywhere there is damage caused by the metzran, this is not "upright and good" [it appears to me]. And some say that just as with one who sells his grave, we established that the family members may cancel the sale because of a family blemish, as is written in siman 217, so too with one who sells his seat in the beit knesset, his family members can cancel his sale and restore it to its previous place when there is a family blemish in this. And there are those who disagree in this, that it is not similar to a grave which is an eternal blemish. Our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly, but he wrote that everything is according to the matter; and if there truly is a blemish to the family in this, such as where families sit separately by themselves, one should judge according to the first opinion. And when a person sells his seat in the men's section and his wife's seat in the women's section, and the bar metzra of his seat comes to prevent him, but in the women's section he is not a bar metzra—if he does not want to also take his seat in the women's section and the buyer takes them together, certainly the buyer takes precedence. However, if the metzran also wants to take the two seats, there is a doubt if the buyer can say: just as you have no law of metzranut in the women's section, so too in the men's section since they are sold together, as is written in section 30 regarding a woman and her husband who bought together, see there. Or perhaps since the seats are distant from one another they have no connection together, and it is like two fields in two places. However, if the custom of the place is that for the most part, whoever has a seat in the men's section also has one in the women's section, and it turns out that these two seats are literally like one place, automatically the law of metzranut applies to this, for it is like a metzran in a field from one side; even though the other boundary is not a metzran, he is a full metzran, and here it is similar [Chatam Sofer]. And there are some of the great ones who wrote that regarding seats in a beit knesset, the beit din should judge according to what their eyes see. And in truth it is so, for sometimes through one seat all the seats are spoiled and there will be a loss to the income of the beit knesset and the like, and certainly in such a case the law of metzranut is void. However, from the core of the law, seats in a beit knesset have the law of metzranut like houses.

Faithful advice from our sages, of blessed memory, is that anyone who wishes to sell land, and two people who are not neighbors come to buy it at the fixed price, certainly the authority is in his hand to sell to whomever he wishes. Nevertheless, the sages, of blessed memory, said that if one was a resident of his city and the second was from another city, the resident of the city takes precedence. And even if the one who is not a resident of his city is a neighbor to his field, nonetheless the resident of the city takes precedence. And some say that this is specifically when he is his neighbor in the city [Tur], he takes precedence over the neighbor of the field; but if he is not his neighbor, he does not take precedence even if the neighbor of the field is from another city. Nonetheless, one should rule according to the first opinion, for even the "some say" possibly agree to this. And if one is a neighbor and one is a talmid chacham, the talmid chacham takes precedence even if he is not a resident of the city [it appears to me]. A relative and a talmid chacham, the talmid chacham takes precedence. A neighbor and a relative, the neighbor takes precedence, as it is said: "Better is a neighbor who is near than a brother who is far." And some say that one is not called a neighbor unless he is his friend who is accustomed to being with him, but the fact that they dwell in proximity is nothing, for many people dwell adjacent to one another and have no closeness. And there is one who disagrees, and the primary view is like the first opinion [Shach], and so wrote our teacher, the Rema, at the end of siman 253, see there. And all of this is ab initio to fulfill the advice of the sages, of blessed memory, who guide a person in a good and upright path, and a good soul does so, for this is also the path of the "upright and the good." But if one of them preceded and purchased, he has acquired it, and his fellow who was fit to precede him does not remove him.

There is a great principle in the laws of metzranut: in any case where the poskim are divided and it is not within the power of the dayan to decide, or if the dayan himself is in doubt whether the law of a metzran applies to this case or not due to doubts he has regarding this case brought before him, the purchaser is called the possessor, as I wrote in section 3. For as long as the law of his metzranut has not been clarified, it is not within his power to extract it from the hand of the purchaser. However, before the purchaser has bought it, it should certainly be sold to a certain metzran rather than to a doubtful one who is not a doubt at all [it appears to me].

It has already been explained in section 41 that regarding all chazakot, such as one who has a chazaka to dwell in this house or to trade in this shop, he has the law of bar metzra regarding that house and that shop, and they are no worse than a renter. And even though their chazaka is from a kutei, nevertheless, since he is the muchzak in it, he has the law of bar metzra. And the enactment of the early authorities in this matter has already been explained in siman 156. And so ruled the author of the Knesset HaGedolah in siman 140, that there is the law of bar metzra regarding chazakot, and from his words it appears that even for an adjacent house, the holder of the chazaka has the status of bar metzra. And he further ruled there that one who buys a house or a courtyard or a shop from a kutei, and bought it with the consent of the holder of the chazaka because the holder of the chazaka did not want to buy it, he cannot evict the holder of the chazaka; rather, the holder of the chazaka shall pay him as he would have paid to the kutei, and he cannot raise the rent more for him if the kutei would not have raised it for him. But one who buys from a minister many fields and courtyards and all that belongs to this, and among these things there is a house in which an Israelite holds a chazaka from the minister to maintain a livelihood therein, the custom is that his chazaka is nullified since he did not buy it alone and it was only included in the general sale. Nevertheless, the beit din sees that the wealthy buyer should compensate him appropriately. And regarding every chazaka, the son inherits from his father. [And the matter of chazakot is proper for every person of understanding to comprehend: that this is when it is with the will of the masters not to move the poor man and his household from their place, and one who comes against them is included in "Cursed is he who moves his neighbor's landmark," and it is similar to the law of metzranut; but if the master of the village does not want to maintain his chazaka, Heaven forbid that he should be there against the will of the master, and this is sufficient for the one who understands].