Siman 62

A limb from a living animal is forbidden, and one is lashed for it by the authority of the Torah, as it is written: "And you shall not eat the life with the flesh." And from the oral tradition they learned that this is to forbid a limb that was severed from a living animal. And regarding a limb from a living animal, the Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Noah: "But flesh with its life, its blood, you shall not eat." However, one who cuts flesh from a living animal, this is not a limb from a living animal; rather, its law is as a terefah, and we explained this in siman 29, section 13; see there. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said [102b]: "'You shall not eat the life with the flesh'—this is a limb from a living animal; 'and flesh in the field, a terefah, you shall not eat'—this is flesh from a terefah." And if one ate a limb from a living animal and flesh from a living animal, he is lashed twice: on account of a limb from a living animal and on account of a terefah; see there.

And from where do we know that "you shall not eat the soul with the flesh" refers to a limb from the living? Rashi, of blessed memory, explained [ibid.] that a living limb is called "soul," for if one cuts it off, it does not produce a replacement, as it will not return with the removed soul which does not return. And this is the implication: "you shall not eat the soul" while it is still "with the flesh," while the life is still with the flesh. Thus far his words. And according to this, one must say regarding what is explained in the Gemara [103a] that chelev is called a limb from the living—and yet chelev produces a replacement—but the intention is regarding the heart, upon which the limb depends, like a kidney in its chelev. And this is the opinion of the Ramban which the Rashba, of blessed memory, brought in his novellae there; see there. And so too is the opinion of the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, in the fifth chapter of Ma'achalot Assurot, law 2, who wrote that chelev from the living is like flesh from the living and its law is like a terefah; see there. And also one must say here that what the sages said, that chelev would be like a limb from the living if the Torah had not permitted it [Bekhorot 7b], is not literal, for it indeed produces a replacement.

But according to the Rambam there, who wrote that the heart is considered a limb from a living animal, it is impossible to say this reason of exchange. And it appears to me that the essence of the soul is the blood and the fat, for so it implies in the Gemara [69a] which said that the creation of the living being is from the fat and the blood, see there. And just as the blood is the soul, so too is the fat. Therefore, the heart is also like a limb from a living animal because the fat comes from the blood, as is stated elsewhere, "blood is decomposed and becomes milk" [even though one could reject the proof from the Gemara there, that the intention is that the creation is also from fat and blood, for it speaks regarding the prohibition, see there; nevertheless, it does not imply so. Therefore, for the offering, it is the fat and the blood, because the blood is the soul and so is the fat].

Ever min hachai is one of the seven Noahide laws, and therefore a Noahide is also forbidden in ever min hachai, but in basar min hachai he is permitted, since the prohibition is due to tereifah and a Noahide was not commanded regarding tereifah. However, regarding ever min hachai, he is more stringent than an Israelite, for the prohibition of ever min hachai for an Israelite only applies to pure domestic animals, wild animals, and birds, and not to impure ones. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, received [Chullin 102a]: "You shall not eat the soul with the flesh," but rather flesh alone; anything whose flesh is permitted, you are commanded regarding its limbs, and an impure one, since its flesh is forbidden, you are not commanded regarding its limbs. Therefore, if they warned him on account of ever min hachai and not on account of it being impure, he does not receive lashes. Furthermore, regarding the flesh of an impure animal, he only receives lashes for a kezayit, whereas regarding ever min hachai, a kezayit is not required, as will be explained. And this is for an Israelite, but for a Noahide, for whom impure animals were not forbidden, the prohibition of ever min hachai applies to him even in an impure animal. And it is not relevant to challenge: "Is there anything that is permitted to an Israelite and forbidden to a Noahide?" for even for an Israelite it is forbidden on account of it being impure [Tosafot 33a, s.v. "Echad"]. And it is forbidden for an Israelite to give ever min hachai to a Noahide because of "do not place a stumbling block before the blind."

And know that there are in this matter, in the words of the Rambam in chapter 9 of Laws of Kings, law 6, perplexing matters, for he wrote, and this is his wording: And so too he is liable for a limb from a living animal and for flesh from a living animal in any amount, for the minimum measures were given only to Israel alone; and he is permitted to consume blood from a living animal, whether it is the limb or the flesh that separated from a domestic animal or from a wild animal, but as for a bird, it appears to me that a son of Noah is not executed for a limb from a living animal from it. Thus far his words. But behold, regarding flesh from a living animal, we learned from "And flesh in the field, a tereifah" that a son of Noah is not commanded concerning this. And also, regarding that which he distinguishes between a domestic or wild animal and a bird, from where do we have this to say so? And the truth is that the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, wrote there that it is a scribal error and it should say "but a creeping creature," and this is explicit in Sanhedrin [59a] that a son of Noah is not commanded concerning blood from a living animal nor concerning a limb from a creeping creature, since it is written, "Only flesh with its soul, its blood, you shall not eat"—one whose blood is distinct from its flesh, excluding creeping creatures whose blood is not distinct from their flesh, for Israel was not warned regarding the blood of creeping creatures because of blood, but rather because of the creeping creature, as it is stated in Keritot [21b] that the blood of a creeping creature is like its flesh. However, according to this it is difficult, for if so, why did he write "it appears to me" since it is explicit in the Gemara? Therefore, there are those who were pressed to say that a bird is different from a domestic or wild animal. But if so, I wonder why he did not mention that in a creeping creature there is no prohibition of a limb from a living animal. Therefore, it seems to me like the words of the Ra'avad, and that which he dependent on his own reasoning is because one could say that the Gemara was merely offering a rejection, and indeed there is one who says so, that it is only a mere rejection, and the Rambam holds that the Gemara said this as the law.

And this, that a ben Noach is liable for meat that separated from a living animal, is explicitly stated in the Gemara [121b] in this wording: An Israelite who slaughtered an impure animal for a gentile, etc., a limb that separates from it is like a limb separated from a living animal, and meat that separates from it is like meat separated from a living animal, and it is forbidden to bnei Noach, etc., see there. And it must be said that the reason is because for an Israelite we derive the prohibition of a limb from a living animal from "you shall not eat the soul with the meat," where "eating" refers to the "soul," which is a limb from a living animal, and that which is written "with the meat" means while the life-force is still with the meat. However, regarding a ben Noach, we learned the prohibition of a limb from a living animal from the verse "But meat with its soul-life, its blood, you shall not eat," where "eating" refers to the "meat," meaning: do not eat the meat while the soul is still in it. Consequently, meat from a living animal is also forbidden to a ben Noach just like a limb from a living animal [Lechem Mishneh].

Regarding fish and locusts, the prohibition of ever min hachai does not apply to them, as the Rambam wrote in the first chapter of Hilchot Shechitah, and we explained this in siman 13, section 2; see there. And there is a doubt whether the law is also thus for Bnei Noach. For it is understandable regarding an Israelite, for whom the Torah required shechitah for other species and permitted fish through mere gathering, it follows that ever min hachai does not apply to them as was written there. However, regarding a Ben Noach who does not require shechitah at all, from where do we know to distinguish between them and other species? And even if we say the reason is because there is nothing that is permitted to an Israelite and forbidden to a Ben Noach, nevertheless, regarding species of impure fish and locusts which are also forbidden to an Israelite, why should we not forbid them to a Ben Noach? And perhaps since it is impossible to forbid the pure ones to them, it follows that the verse "However, flesh..." etc. does not refer to fish and locusts, and consequently they are permitted even regarding the impure ones.

Nevertheless, according to the opinion of the Rambam there regarding a convulsing animal, that it is forbidden to the descendants of Noah, and he does not hold of this reasoning of "is there anything that is permitted to an Israelite and forbidden to a gentile?" as I wrote in siman 26, section 5, see there, it is still not settled. And perhaps the reason is that just as the sages, of blessed memory, expounded regarding creeping things that there is no prohibition of ever min hachai because its blood is not distinct from its flesh, as I wrote in section 5, so too here regarding fish, its blood is also not distinct from its flesh, for the blood of fish and locusts is permitted as I wrote in siman 66, and consequently the prohibition of ever min hachai does not apply to them at all.

The Rambam wrote there: Whether it is a limb that contains flesh, sinews, and bones, such as the hand or the foot, or whether it is a limb that contains no bone, such as the tongue, the testicles, the spleen, the kidneys, the heart, and the like; however, regarding a limb that contains no bone, whether one severed it in its entirety or whether one severed a portion of it, this is forbidden as ever min hachai. But regarding a limb that contains a bone, one is not liable for it as ever min hachai until it separates in its natural form—flesh, sinews, and bones. But if only the flesh separated from the living animal, one is liable for it as tereifah, not as ever min hachai. Thus far his words.

It is further written: One who eats a kezayit of ever min ha-chai is lashed, and even if he ate an entire limb, if it contains a kezayit he is liable; less than a kezayit, he is exempt. If he cut from the limb as it was created—flesh, sinews, and bones—a kezayit and ate it, he is lashed even though it contains only a minimal amount of flesh. However, if he separated the limb after tearing it from the living animal, and separated the flesh from the sinews and from the bones, he is not lashed until he eats a kezayit of the flesh alone, and the bones and sinews do not combine for the kezayit since he changed its created form. If he divided this limb and ate it little by little, if there is a kezayit of flesh in what he ate, he is liable, and if not, he is exempt. If he took a kezayit from the limb as it was created—flesh, sinews, and bones—and ate it, even if it disintegrated in his mouth inside before he swallowed it, he is liable. Thus far his words. [See there in the Maggid Mishneh and in the Lechem Mishneh].

The explanation of his words is that regarding ever min hachai, the sages of blessed memory said [102a] that a kezayit is required, for the language of eating is written concerning it, "You shall not eat the soul with the flesh," and every eating is with a kezayit. And perhaps you will ask, if so, why is an organ required? For even without an organ there is liability for a kezayit due to tereifah, as has been written regarding basar min hachai. The answer is that regarding basar min hachai, specifically a kezayit of meat is required, and the bones or sinews do not combine for karet. But regarding an organ, a kezayit from the meat alone is not required, and from the three things—that is, from meat, sinews, and bones—they combine for a kezayit. However, there is a condition in this: that the organ must be in its natural form, meaning that the meat, sinews, and bones must be attached in their natural form, to the exclusion of if he separated one of them from the two; even if he placed them all into his mouth as one, the law of ever min hachai does not apply to it, but rather basar min hachai, and a kezayit of the meat alone is required. And there is another condition in this: that he must place the kezayit of ever min hachai into his mouth whole at one time, to the exclusion of if he cut it into two pieces or more; even if in every part of the piece the three things are attached together, the law of ever min hachai is nullified from it, and a kezayit of meat is required. And even if he placed all the pieces into his mouth together, the law of ever min hachai does not apply to it. And that which he wrote, "divided this organ and ate it little by little, etc.," the intention is not specifically that he placed it into his mouth one after another, for the same applies even if he placed them all together, the law of ever min hachai does not apply to it. And his main intention is that by dividing it, he nullified from it the status of ever min hachai. And that which he wrote, "and ate it little by little," he taught the common way of the matter, and furthermore to inform us a novel point: that when there is a kezayit of meat, he is liable even if he ate it little by little, according to the law of all prohibitions where it is not necessary to eat the entire kezayit together, and only if he ate it within the time of kedei achilat pras is he liable. But if he placed the entire kezayit whole into his mouth and it was divided inside his mouth, we have no concern [so we are forced to explain his words, and this is according to the explanation of the Tosafot there 103b, s.v. chelko, for it cannot be explained according to its plain meaning and according to Rashi there, for if so, the end of his words would not be settled, what he wrote that if it was divided in his mouth he is liable, for even if it was divided outside he should be liable if he placed it all in his mouth as one; and the Lechem Mishneh elaborated on this and I did not descend to the depth of his opinion, see there and examine carefully].

It is a clear matter that regarding ever min hachai, one does not need to eat the entire limb according to the opinion of the Rambam, for even a portion of it, if there is a kezayit in its original form, he is liable. And even if he ate an entire limb, if there is not a kezayit in the entire limb among all three things, he is exempt. According to this, one must understand that which the Rambam wrote regarding the difference between a limb that has a bone and a limb that does not have a bone—that in one that does not have a bone, he is liable whether he cut all of it or he cut a portion of it. Behold, even in one that has a bone it is so, if he cut it in its original form without separating the three things from one another, as he himself wrote. And if his intention is that in one that does not have a bone it does not need to be in its original form, as is implied by the flow of his wording, one must understand what "in its original form" pertains to in one that does not have a bone, for it contains only meat. And perhaps his intention is that in one that does not have a bone, one does not need to cut an entire kezayit together, but rather even if he cut small pieces, if he put a kezayit into his mouth he is liable, because since it has no bone, it is not considered to have changed from its original form.

However, our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote [96a, s.v. "v'Ri"] that one is never liable for ever min hachai until he eats the entire limb, see there. But the Rambam certainly does not hold so, and thus wrote the Acharonim [Pri Chadash subsection 3 and Pri Megadim subsection 1]. And perhaps even the Rambam holds somewhat like the Tosafot, namely, that regarding the piece from the animal, he must sever the entire limb, but regarding the eating, a kezayit of it in its original form is sufficient. The reason is that since it is written, "You shall not eat the life [nefesh] etc.," and when one separates half a limb from the animal it is not called "nefesh" unless he separates the entire limb; and this is the reason of the Tosafot as well regarding eating. And if we say this regarding the opinion of the Rambam, his words concerning the difference between a limb that has a bone and one that does not have a bone would be explained according to their plain meaning. All this requires further study.

And also the words of the Tur are perplexing in this, for he wrote: A limb severed from a living animal, whether it has flesh, sinews, and bones, or whether it has only flesh alone, such as the tongue, the spleen, the kidneys, and the testicles, it is forbidden to eat it, whether it has a kezayit or whether it does not have a kezayit. Thus far his words. And behold, in the Gemara it is explicitly stated that it must have a kezayit, and the commentators wrote that his intention was regarding the matter of the prohibition, for a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah. But this too is perplexing, for if so, why did he need to state this? Behold, in all prohibitions it is so. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already raised this difficulty against him; see there.

It appears to me that the Tur has informed us of a great matter in this, for truly, were it not for his words, I would have said that regarding ever min hachai, a half-measure is not forbidden by the Torah. For the reason for a half-measure is because it is fit to be combined, and regarding ever min hachai this is not applicable, since even if you combine another half-measure to this, it has already been explained that if one divided it outside he is exempt. For this, he informs us that there is a prohibition even when there is not a kezayit in it. And the reason can be said to be because it was fit to be combined before it was divided. Furthermore, according to rabbinic law, in any case it is forbidden, and perhaps this was his intention. [And it appears to me that regarding a half-measure where one eats bones alone, there is no prohibition in it, as with all prohibitions; and examine this carefully]:

The Rambam wrote: If one tore a limb from a living animal and it became a terefah through its removal and he ate it, he is liable for two: on account of a limb from a living animal and on account of terefah, for behold, the two prohibitions come as one. Similarly, one who tears chelev from a living animal and eats it is lashed twice: on account of a limb from a living animal and on account of chelev. One who tears chelev from a terefah and eats it is lashed three times. Thus far his words. And they wondered about him, for since he wrote in the first clause that the reason he is liable for two in the case of it becoming a terefah through its removal is because the two prohibitions come as one—meaning that we hold that a living animal is not considered as standing to be divided into limbs, as I wrote in siman 29, section 6, see there, and therefore the prohibition of a limb from a living animal and the prohibition of terefah come as one—it is explicitly explained that if the prohibition of terefah existed previously, the prohibition of a limb from a living animal would not come and take effect upon the terefah, for a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition. If so, in the case of tearing chelev from a living animal, why is he liable for two? Behold, the prohibition of chelev preceded it, and the prohibition of a limb from a living animal does not take effect upon the prohibition of chelev. And similarly, it is difficult in the final clause regarding tearing chelev from a terefah. Many things have been said regarding this [see Lechem Mishneh and Pri Chadash and Kereti U-Peleti]. Furthermore, they questioned him, for behold, a limb from a living animal is an "added prohibition" (issur mosif), for through this an additional prohibition was added for the children of Noah; and the Rambam in chapter 17 of Issurei Biah ruled that an added prohibition takes effect upon another prohibition, and such is the prevalent halakhah throughout the entire Talmud. It is only the one who says so in the Gemara [103a] who does not hold of an added prohibition, and we do not rule accordingly.

And in my humble opinion, it appears that certainly the prohibition of ever min hachai takes effect upon another prohibition by virtue of the principle of isur mosif. And that which it does not take effect upon the prohibition of terefah is for another reason: for just as the prohibition of ever min hachai does not take effect in an unclean animal because its flesh is prohibited, as I wrote in section 4, so too in a terefah. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote this reasoning [103a, s.v. "U'mar etc. and if according to the Rabbis who say 'anything whose flesh is permitted' etc."]. And this is only regarding flesh, but regarding chelev, which even in a kosher animal is prohibited to an Israelite, this reasoning is no longer relevant, and therefore it also takes effect on a terefah by virtue of isur mosif. According to this, Rava, who says so in the Gemara there, also holds of isur mosif. [In this, that which the Rambam wrote regarding the law of one who tears chelev from a living animal—that he is liable for two—is well-settled. For this is not found in the Gemara at all, but rather he heard it by implication from the latter clause, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote. And it is not his usual way, but rather he wrote this intentionally because regarding the statement of Rabbi Yochanan that chelev of a living animal is from a terefah, there are three interpretations, and he ruled according to the middle interpretation that it is not destined for its limbs, see there. And he holds that in this they disagree: whether a weak prohibition takes effect or not, based on whether chelev is comparable to flesh, where we do not say its prohibition is chelev when it is unclean, or whether it is not comparable, as I wrote. And were it not that he wrote the previous law, I would not know why he ruled that one is liable for three, and perhaps it would be according to the first or last interpretation; therefore he wrote this, for from this his reasoning flows, and examine it closely]:

Since we hold that a living animal is not considered as if it were standing to be divided into limbs, and likewise a wild animal and a bird; therefore, if one ate a whole bird upon its death, if it does not contain a kezayit of meat, he is not liable for it, and the bones and the sinews do not join together because it does not have the law of a limb except regarding terefah and nevelah, which require a kezayit of meat. And if he ate it while it was alive, it has the law of a biryah even in a pure species according to the opinion of the Rambam that we explained in siman 29, section 4, see there. And in an impure species, whether in its life or in its death, it has the law of a biryah and does not require a kezayit, see there; and there we explained this with the help of Heaven.

And know that it is stated in the Gemara [160a] that even according to that which we establish that during its life it is not standing to be divided into limbs, nevertheless, if we say that the intent for eating is considered a valid intent, if he intended to eat it limb by limb and ate it all, he is liable even if there is not a kezayit of meat, and we join the sinews and the bones to the kezayit according to the law of a limb from a living animal. But if another person ate it, he is not liable without a kezayit of meat, for this one follows his intent and that one follows his intent. The Rambam did not bring this law, and perhaps because he was in doubt whether the intent for eating is considered a valid intent or not, and therefore due to doubt he is not liable. However, I wonder, for in several places it is explicit that intent is effective regarding food, in the eighth chapter of Taharot and in the third chapter of Uktzin and in many other places. And perhaps it is certain that to make it food through intent is effective regarding impurity, but regarding a thing that even without his considering it is already food, but he intends its details regarding how to eat it, in this there is a doubt if it is effective. [And perhaps because of this Rava said: If you will say that Rabbi holds that the intent for eating etc., and it is difficult what his doubt was, and according to our words it is settled. And one should not raise a difficulty that every "if you will say" in the Shas, according to the rule of the Geonim, is the halakha, for this is only in an inquiry and not in an independent statement, and there is still more to deliberate on this, and examine it closely]:

A limb that separates from the living is forbidden, and even if it is still within the animal—for example, if it was severed from the spleen or from the kidneys and the piece remained inside it—it is forbidden due to the prohibition of a limb from the living. And even if the animal was slaughtered afterward, since it was detached from its body, the slaughtering no longer permits it. And likewise, if a piece of meat was separated from it and the piece remained inside it, it is forbidden due to the prohibition of meat from the living. However, that which is severed from the fetus is permitted, as I wrote in siman 14; see there.

Specifically a limb or flesh that was separated entirely is forbidden due to eiver min hachai and basar min hachai, but a dangling limb or flesh—meaning that it is partially attached to the animal—if they cannot return and heal, even if they did not separate until after the shechitah, although they are not forbidden by the Torah since they are still partially attached, nevertheless the sages said that there is a mitzvah of separation regarding it; that is to say, the Rabbis forbade this as a fence for eiver min hachai [74a]. And this is when the animal was slaughtered, but if the animal died, we view it as if it fell off during its lifetime, and one is liable for it due to eiver min hachai and not due to nevelah. And so our sages, of blessed memory, said [73a]: death effects a falling, but shechitah does not effect a falling. And they learned this from verses as is explained in the Gemara there. And all this is when it cannot return and heal, but when the limb or the flesh can return and heal, if the animal was slaughtered, this is permitted even by Rabbinic law, and if it died, it is nevelah. So wrote the Rambam there, and in the Gemara this is not explicitly explained, but it is a simple matter that this which the sages forbade regarding a dangling limb or flesh is only when it cannot return and heal [Maggid Mishneh]. And know that in this there is no distinction whether skin and flesh cover most of it or not, for this is only regarding a bone that was broken or displaced as I wrote in siman 55, and not regarding dangling parts [Shach subsection 10], and so it is explicitly implied from the Tur, see there.

The testicles of a male that were completely detached from their scrotum, even if they remain inside the scrotum, are forbidden due to the prohibition of ever min hachai, as has been written. However, if they were not completely detached, such that they are still partially connected to their scrotum, even if they cannot return to their original state, they are nevertheless permitted by Torah law. Nonetheless, it is still forbidden to eat them due to the custom practiced by Israel, for the sages forbade them because it somewhat resembles ever min hachai, as has been written. And if one was detached and the second was not detached, the one that was detached is forbidden and the second is permitted, and we do not say that they are considered as one. And one must be precise regarding this with the testicles of rams, for in many places the gentile slaughterers are accustomed to detach them three days prior to the slaughter [Issur V'Heter]. And one should not ask from where we know that castrated rams are permitted to be eaten, for it is certainly so, since the Torah forbade "crushed" or "beaten" for a sacrifice, it implies that for an ordinary person it is permitted [see Bekhorot 39b and Tosafot Shabbat 111a, s.v. "lehavi"].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: An extra limb situated in a place that does not render the animal treifah is permitted to be eaten, and we do not say "an extra limb is as if it were removed" and thus consider it like a dangling limb. Thus far his words. And the novelty of this is according to the one who explains that "every extra limb is as if it were removed from its place," as I wrote in siman 41; I might have said that since we view it as if it were removed from its place, it is like a dangling limb, so he comes to teach us that it is not so. He further wrote: A limb that was dislocated from its place in a location that does not render the animal treifah is permitted to be eaten, even if skin and flesh do not cover the majority of it; however, the custom is to be stringent even in this. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that since this dislocated limb is in a place that does not render the animal treifah, its law is like the testicles of a male that were detached but are still slightly attached, which is permitted by the letter of the law. And even though there it is forbidden by Jewish custom, nevertheless here it is permitted even by custom because they are still attached by sinews; but nevertheless, the custom is to be stringent even in this, for the testicles are also attached by some sinews and yet it is forbidden due to the custom. And all this is when skin and flesh do not cover the majority of it, but in a case where they do cover it, it is obvious that it is permitted, unlike the one who is stringent even in this. And there is clear proof, for in siman 55, even regarding the treifah status of the entire animal, we permit in such a case; certainly regarding the limb itself, which involves only the commandment of separation. And so the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch agreed, and such is our established law [Taz subsection 2 and Shach subsection 14].