Siman 326

That which has been explained, that "biting" joins in one species or in a species with its own species, this is when the two doughs belong to one person. But those belonging to two people do not join. And if there is not a shiur of challah in each one, both are exempt, as we learned in the Mishnah at the beginning of the fourth chapter: Two women who made two kavs, and they touched each other, even if they are of one species, they are exempt. And even if they were kneaded together, if they did not form a partnership together. Rather, for example, if two people commanded a baker to make a dough for them, and he made one dough for both of them, they are exempt, as we learned in the Mishnah in the first chapter: Women who gave a baker dough to make leaven for them, if there is not a shiur in the portion of one of them, she is exempt from challah. And that which we learned previously: A baker who made leaven to divide is obligated in challah, the Yerushalmi explains there that it is because the baker's intention is that if he does not find buyers, he will keep it for himself and not divide it at all; see there. And this reasoning is also found in our Gemara in Pesachim regarding the loaves of the Todah sacrifice; see there.

And that which we maintain: a partnership dough is obligated in challah, as I wrote in siman 330—this is when both consented to make a dough in partnership. And so too regarding a baker, certainly if two women commanded him to make for them a dough of two kavs—it is obligated in challah. However, in the Mishnah it is dealing with a case where the baker joined them together on his own. And I saw one who wrote that regarding a partnership, even nishuk is effective (Shach, subsection 1). And I do not know from where he has this, for the plain meaning of the Gemara in Chullin (Chullin 135a) refers to a partnership dough. And so it is clarified from the wording of the Rambam in the sixth chapter (Rambam, Laws of Bikkurim and Other Gifts to the Priesthood Outside the Land 6), who wrote: A partnership dough, and one who makes a dough for the public—is obligated in challah. And such is the wording of the Tur (Tur Yoreh Deah 330) and the Shulchan Aruch (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 330) in siman 330, see there. And this is not related to nishuk.

And this which the Rambam wrote at the beginning of the seventh chapter and the Shulchan Aruch section 1: Two doughs that together have the measure obligated in challah, but in neither one of them is there the required measure, and they touched one another and bit into one another, if they belonged to two people, even if they are of one species—they are exempt from challah, for ordinarily two people are particular. But if it is known that they are not particular regarding the mixing of the doughs—behold, these combine. Thus far their words. Consequently, even with biting, partnership is relevant—this is certainly when they are consistently not particular to mix their dough together during kneading, as they wrote "that they are not particular regarding the mixing of the doughs," meaning: in kneading, and even now by way of biting it is as one. But to say that partnership is established through biting—we have not heard this, since they are divided in the doughs. And perhaps his intention is also thus, that when they are always partners in kneading, therefore even now biting is effective. And this is certainly so as I have written, and so it appears to me to be the primary law.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work that as long as they do not intend to divide the dough, even if they intend to divide it after it is baked—they combine (Shach ibid.). And he wrote that from the words of the Semag it implies explicitly that it is required that they eat together. And perhaps he did not mean this precisely, see there. And his reason seems to me to be because regarding challah the primary factor is at the time of its obligation at the time of kneading, and since they are then partners—it is obligated in challah. And it further seems to me that in Chullin ibid. we learn this from terumah, see there; and in terumah when they are partners, even though they afterwards divide the grain between them, nevertheless they are partners and are obligated in terumah. And these words apply to challah.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that students who study before a teacher, ordinarily they are not meticulous. Thus far his words. This means that each student eats from his own, and gives the mistress of the house money so that she should bake for him such and such loaves, and she baked for all of them together – it joins, for ordinarily they are not meticulous with one another. But other people ordinarily are meticulous, unless it is known that they are not meticulous.

But when the two doughs belonged to one person, if they are of one species according to what I wrote in siman 324 and 325 – they combine by means of biting and are obligated in challah. And if they are of two species – they do not combine, for presumably he is particular that they not mix together. And even if he is not particular, since they are two species – the biting does not combine them unless they were kneaded together. And even with one species, if he was particular that this one should not touch that one, and this one should not mix with that one – they do not combine. And if one dough was coarse bread and the second was clean bread, even of one person, we say that presumably he is particular and it does not combine. And the same law applies when in one there is saffron and in one there is not. And so too anything similar to this, when in some detail the doughs are different from one another – presumably he is particular, unless we knew clearly that he is not particular. And in this, the law of one is like two.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding the law that has been explained, and this is his wording: And all this is when there is not a shiur in each one. But if there is a shiur in them – one separates from one for its fellow if they belong to one person. Thus far his words. And it appears to me that this does not only stand on an identical species where one is different from the other, such as this is coarse and this is clean, or in other differences. But in two species – one does not separate from this one for that one. And some say that this which one separates from one for its fellow is specifically when there is contact and a "bite" from this to that (Taz, subsection 1). And even though it was explained in siman 325 that when there is a shiur in each one nothing is required, that is in those that are completely equal. But in those that are different, it is required. And some say that even in this it is not required (Levush and Nekudot HaKesef). And the first opinion appears primary. And it appears to me that all the laws explained here regarding a "bite" apply as well to the combination of a basket, for they have one law, as I wrote in siman 325. And this which requires it to belong to one person, and not to two people – that is when one separates without the knowledge of the second. But if both of them desire it – one separates one for both of them.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 2 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 326:2): A baker who made dough to make it into leaven for several people to distribute—it is obligated in challah, for if it is not sold, he will make it into bread. But any other person who makes dough to distribute it as dough—it is exempt. And two people who gave flour to a baker to make leaven for them, if there is not a sufficient measure in the portion of one of them, even though there is a sufficient measure in their total—it is exempt. And this is specifically if he mixed them without their knowledge; but with their knowledge—it is obligated, for they are not fastidious. Thus far his words. There is one who wrote that their intention must be to eat together (Be'er HaGolah). And it is not so, for even though the Smag wrote thus—it is not a requirement, as I wrote in section 4, see there. And behold, all these matters have already been explained. However, that which they wrote: "But any other person who makes dough to distribute it as dough is exempt"—and certainly the intention is not that they gave it to them to make, for they explained this law afterward. Furthermore: they took a case similar to a baker. And if so, what is his superiority over a baker, for certainly if they do not receive it, it will remain for himself? And if we say that he makes it from his own and gives it to them as a gift, for they will certainly receive it, firstly, it does not imply this, and furthermore: if so, until his giving it to them, it is entirely his. And certainly it would be obligated in challah.

In my humble opinion, they did not explain this with all the necessary clarity. The source of the law is from the Yerushalmi, first chapter (Halacha 5) (Yerushalmi Challah 1:5), which says: One who makes dough with the intention of dividing it while it is dough—it is exempt. And it asks a difficulty from a baker, and answers that it is not similar to a baker for the reason that has been explained. And it appears that this is the explanation: that a householder who has many members of the household where each one eats for himself, and the householder must make it for them, whether they pay him or he gives to them from his own pocket. Therefore, since he gives to each one less than the shiur of challah, and they presumably are particular, it does not combine. But a householder who makes it for sale—his law is like a baker. (And the Bach also explained similar to this, and this is his wording: A householder etc. to divide it to the members of his household, to give to each one a portion that did not have in it the shiur etc. Thus far his words. And the intention is not that they all rely on his table. And the doubt in Tosafot Berakhot 37b s.v. Lechem: regarding vermicelli that one puts into several pots, see there. And many wondered about them, see Shenot Eliyahu and Gilyon HaYerushalmi there. And their intention is simple: that it is possible since it is one householder it is a combination, as I wrote at the end of this siman. And the intention of the Bach is that each one eats by himself. And such is the intention of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, except that they were brief in the meaning. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

The great authorities wrote: Some are accustomed to purchase from a Jewish baker a portion of a large dough, and there is in that portion the required measure for challah, and one separates from it and recites a blessing over it. And so he sells from that same dough to several people, and each one separates and recites a blessing. And it is an error and blessings in vain, for as soon as the baker rolled his large dough it became obligated in challah, even if his intention was to sell it in portions. And subsequently the entire dough is exempted with one separation of challah, so how can they recite many blessings (Bach and Shach, subsection 4)? And there are those who justify the custom: that if this baker has acquaintances who always purchase from him, and they purchase on the condition that each one will separate challah—it is as if it were theirs before the rolling. And this is like two people who gave to a baker, who do not combine with one another when there is not in each one the required measure for challah as has been explained. And the same law applies when there is the required measure for challah—they have no connection to one another (Taz, subsection 2, and Responsa Meishiv Banim, siman 1, and it must be said that their intention is as I have written). However, in our time we have not heard of this custom. And regarding those who purchase dough from a gentile baker, it will be explained in siman 330 with the help of Heaven. (And they wrote of another custom: that at weddings where they make a large dough, and several women take challah and recite blessings. And this is certainly blessings in vain, and one must protest against them. Shach, ibid. And in our time we have not heard of this.)

There are those who wrote that even though when they are kneaded together one challah exempts it, nevertheless, if she takes from it a piece of dough the size of the challah requirement, and intends not to exempt anything but this piece of dough—the rest of the dough is not exempt from challah. (The Gaon of Lissa in the siddur Derech HaChayim and in his book Mekor Chayim himself hesitated regarding this. And the words of the Magen Elef there, subsection 5—there is no reasoning for this). And certainly it is not so, for if not so, why did all the great authorities cry out regarding the doughs of weddings, where several women take the required amount of challah and recite the blessing? And likewise regarding what they take from a baker, since intention is effective? (And it requires further study on the Mekor Chayim there who wished to infer from this the opposite, see there.) And likewise regarding Pesach, all the poskim wrote that when they divided the matzot into two vessels and took challah from one—there is no remedy for the second except to bake more, as I wrote at the end of siman 325. And behold, they certainly only intended for the matzah in this vessel. Rather, it is certain that it is not effective, and behold, this is like one who takes challah and intends not to exempt, and they are two opposites in one subject. And one does not learn from terumah, which requires thought. Therefore, Heaven forbid to rely on this, and such is the simple custom and one must not change it.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 4 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 326:4): Two people who made a dough of the required measure and divided it, and afterward each one added to his portion until they completed it to the required measure—behold, this is exempt. For they already had a time of obligation, and they were exempt at that time because they made it to divide. And the same law applies to one person who makes two kabin and his intention is to divide them and he divided them; but if he did not make them on the condition to divide them—the subsequent division is of no effect. Thus far their words. And so wrote the Rambam in the seventh chapter, law 9 (Rambam, Laws of Bikkurim and the Rest of the Priestly Gifts in the Borders 7:9), and it is from the Yerushalmi, third chapter (Yerushalmi Challah 3). And the Ra'avad cried out against this like a crane, that one should not rely on this Yerushalmi, for what is the difference between this and one who makes his dough into kabin and joins them, which is obligated in challah? And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that this is not a comparison, for there, there was never an obligation. But here, where there were two kabin, and there was an obligation upon it except that it was exempt because they made it with the intention to divide it—it has left the state of obligation entirely, and it is no longer obligated (Kesef Mishneh). And it is not understood: for ultimately there was no obligation upon it at the time of kneading, and what does it matter to me if the exemption is because it does not have the required measure of itself or because of division, for in any event there was no obligation at all upon this dough? And it requires further study. And it is obvious that if he added afterward the required measure by itself, this exempt portion did not exempt it (Shach, subsection 8). And the Pnei Moshe in Mareh HaPanim exerted himself with reasoning to settle the words of the Yerushalmi, and there is no more taste in all his words than what the Kesef Mishneh wrote, see there. And the Ra'avad further questioned: is there not no "rejection" regarding commandments? And the Kesef Mishneh wrote that this is not relevant to "rejection." And the Pnei Moshe elaborated on this, see there.

And I have a great difficulty with the wording of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, and such is also the wording of the Yerushalmi there (Halacha 4) (Yerushalmi Challah 3:4): Two Israelites who made two kavs, and divided and this one added to his own, etc., for they already had a time of obligation. Thus far his words. And two things are difficult for me: for it is certain that they made it with the intent to divide it, as afterwards the division is not effective, as I have written. And if so, what kind of wording is "they made and divided"? He should have said: "they made to divide." Furthermore: what is this that he says, "for they already had a time of obligation"? When was the time of obligation? Therefore, it appears to me that this is the explanation: that these two, on the contrary, when they took the flour they wanted to partner in order to obligate it in challah. And they mixed the flour together and poured the water, and immediately before the forming of the dough they regretted it for some reason, and said they wanted to uproot it from challah and on that condition they would knead, so that they would divide, and it turns out they rejected it with their hands. And that which was seen and then rejected does not return to be seen. And the intention of the Rambam is also thus.

It is a simple matter that one who separates challah from dough that does not contain the required measure—it is nothing. Therefore, two doughs, neither of which contains the required measure, and one separated challah from each, and the doughs were not attached to one another, and afterward he mixed the doughs and made them one dough—it is obligated in challah, for the first challot are not challah at all.

The Rambam wrote at the end of the seventh chapter: Dough that is tevel for challah is not like challah. It is like chullin regarding the matter of tumah, for a second degree does not create a third degree in chullin, and it is permitted to cause tumah to chullin in Eretz Yisrael. Therefore, two batches of dough, one tamei and one tahor—one takes the amount of challah for both from dough from which challah has not been separated, and places it in the middle adjacent to the tahor dough, and draws from the tamei to the tahor the size of a kabeitzah in order to separate from that which is nearby. Thus far his words. And this is the Mishnah at the end of the second chapter of Challah. However, in the Mishnah we learned "less than a kabeitzah," see there; and the Rambam wrote "a kabeitzah" based on the sugya of the Gemara in Sotah, see there. And it is dealing with a case where the tamei is a second degree of tumah. However, the Ra'avad challenged him, for in the Mishnah Rabbi Eliezer holds this way and the Sages forbid it, so how could he rule like Rabbi Eliezer? See there. And in the Commentary on the Mishnah he himself ruled like the Sages, but here he retracted because in the Yerushalmi there are those who ruled like Rabbi Eliezer and instructed so in practice. And since it is a rabbinic matter, he ruled accordingly (Keseph Mishneh).

He further wrote: A person may make a pure dough and not separate its challah. He leaves it, or leaves a portion of it, to separate challah upon it and continues separating challah for other doughs, even if those doughs became impure, until the dough he left becomes entirely challah and he gives it to a kohen. This is provided that it does not become unfit for human consumption. But once it becomes putrid – he may not separate upon it. In what case are these words said? When those doughs for which he is separating are a doubt whether challah was taken from them or was not taken, for the challah of demai is taken from the pure for the impure ab initio. And not from that which is in proximity. Thus far his words. And this is a Mishnah in the fourth chapter (Mishnah 6). And even though demai is not applicable to challah, for the common people were not suspected regarding challah, and the Rash has already labored over this. However, the Rambam explains it as a case of doubt whether challah was taken or not. And even though there is a remedy for certain produce as well, by making it in proximity as in the previous law, he is not dealing with that here, as it is a very burdensome matter. And certainly he could do so by means of a connection of less than a kebeitzah. Rather, regarding demai this is not necessary, for ab initio one may separate not from that which is in proximity. And that which he wrote, that regarding demai it is taken from the pure for the impure ab initio, according to what the Rambam ruled like Rabbi Eliezer, he holds this even regarding certain produce, as is taught at the beginning of the second chapter of Terumot (Mishnah Terumot 2) and at the end of the second chapter of Challah (Mishnah Challah 2), and as I wrote in the previous law. Rather, the Rambam employed the wording of the Mishnah, and the Mishnah stated this because the Sages forbid it ab initio regarding certain produce. (That which the Pitchei Teshuvah wrote in subsection 2 – these are puzzling words. For it is obvious that a householder who makes a dough, even if he divides it into many loaves and many meals and many days – it is called "one dough," and is obligated in challah. And this is the intent of all the poskim. And the Tosafot in Berakhot 38a who were in doubt regarding vermicelli – this is because it is made for cooked dishes, and every cooked dish is considered a matter unto itself. But not regarding bread. Examine closely and you will find it simple.)