Siman 294

It is written in Parshat Kedoshim: "When you come into the land and plant any food tree, you shall treat its fruit as forbidden; for three years it shall be forbidden to you, it shall not be eaten. And in the fourth year, all its fruit shall be holy, for praise to Hashem. And in the fifth year, you may eat its fruit, to increase its yield for you; I am Hashem your G-d." The Torah commanded that when we plant food trees, there shall be three years of orlah, and all the fruits that grow during these three years are forbidden for benefit forever. And thus they expounded in Torat Kohanim there: I might think it is forbidden within the three years but afterwards they (those fruits) shall be permitted; therefore the text states "it shall be, it shall not be eaten." I only know that it may not be eaten; from where do I know that one may not dye with it and may not benefit from it? The text states "you shall treat as forbidden," "forbidden," "forbidden," to include all of them. Thus far the words of Torat Kohanim. And in Pesachim (22b) it was taught: From where do I know that one may not benefit from it, that one may not dye with it and may not light a lamp with it? The text states, etc. And the reason it requires a specific verse for dyeing and lighting, even though these are also included in benefit, is because regarding lighting I would have said since through this he consumes it, it should be permitted; it comes to teach us that it is forbidden (Tosafot ibid.). And regarding dyeing I would have said that appearance is of no substance; it comes to teach us that it is forbidden (ibid.). Furthermore, dyeing is not with the body of the fruit but with the peels, and it comes to teach us that they are forbidden like the fruit itself, for a protector of the fruit is considered like the fruit (this is the intent of Rashi there s.v. "and he shall not dye with it," such as with nut shells, etc., see there and examine carefully).

"And in the fourth year all its fruit shall be holy," etc., and this is neta revai, and its law is like ma'aser sheni, in that one must bring it up to Jerusalem and eat it during the time that the Beit HaMikdash existed. And in this time, one redeems it for a perutah; and if it applies in chutz la'aretz will be explained before us. "And in the fifth year you shall eat its fruit, to increase for you its produce," for in the fifth year they are completely permitted. And why does the Torah say "to increase for you its produce"? The Torah spoke against the yetzer hara, so that you should not say, "Behold, for four years I have troubled myself with it for nothing"; therefore it is said "to increase for you its produce" (Torat Kohanim), meaning the Holy One, Blessed be He, will pay you the reward of those years to increase for you a blessing from the fifth year and onward until it suffices for you even for the years from which you did not benefit. And it concludes, "I am Hashem your God," meaning I am faithful to pay a good reward to those who perform My will.

It has already been explained that orlah is forbidden for benefit and is among those things that are burned and those that are buried (at the end of Temurah): that which is typically burned shall be burned, and that which is typically buried shall be buried; that is, foods by burning and liquids by burial. So too with kilayim of the vineyard, as it is written regarding it, "lest it become sanctified [tikdash]," and we expound: "it shall be kindled [tukad] with fire," and orlah is derived from kilayim of the vineyard (Rashi ibid.). It appears to me that the intention is not that he is obligated to burn and bury the orlah, for we do not find a Torah obligation to destroy things forbidden for benefit except for idol worship and chametz on Pesach. Rather, the intention is that if he desires to remove them from the world so that people do not stumble because of them, he should burn that which is typically burned and bury that which is typically buried (and so wrote the Chatam Sofer at the end of siman 286). Rather, he plucks their fruit and throws them away. I have heard that there are those who err in saying that he is obligated to wait until the fruits are spoiled and only then pluck them and destroy them, but it is an error, for he is permitted to pluck them while they are unripe; for even if they did not grow at all within the three years—and this is the way of coarse fruits—nevertheless, after the three years they are permitted. The nullification of orlah and kilayim of the vineyard when they fall into permitted matter of the same species is with two hundred of permitted matter and one of forbidden matter, as we learned at the beginning of the second chapter of Orlah: Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard are neutralized in one and two hundred, and they join together with one another, and there is no need to remove [the forbidden portion]. The reason is explicit in the Yerushalmi there; see there in the commentators on the Mishnah. This is specifically regarding its own species, for in a different species it is in sixty like all other prohibitions; and see what I wrote in siman 296, section 15.

Orlah and kilayim of the vineyard and all prohibitions of benefit do not catch their value, for since the Merciful One revealed regarding idolatry that everything you bring into existence from it is like it, it follows that regarding all other prohibitions of benefit it is not so (Kiddushin end of chapter 2). However, for the seller himself it is forbidden, as is written in Even HaEzer at the end of siman 28, see there. And according to the Yerushalmi it is not a sale at all and the money is like theft in his hand, but from our Gemara it does not appear so, and we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 234, see there. And whether prohibitions of benefit are called his or are not his at all, there are different opinions on this, and in my humble opinion they are his, and we explained this above in siman 221 section 63, see there well.

Orlah, even though it is among the commandments dependent on the Land, is nevertheless forbidden also outside the Land in every place by the Torah. This is because the tradition came to Moses from Sinai that orlah applies outside the Land. This is what we learned at the end of orlah: Chadash is forbidden by the Torah in every place, and orlah is a halachah, etc., and this refers to a halachah to Moses from Sinai (Kiddushin 38b). It is known that there is no difference between a commandment written in the Torah and one that was stated to Moses at Sinai; both this and that are matters of Torah law. However, regarding orlah there is a leniency concerning a case of doubt of orlah, for outside the Land it is permitted. Thus was the halachah to Moses from Sinai explicitly stated: that only certain orlah is forbidden outside the Land, but not a doubt of orlah (ibid. 39a). This is well-settled according to the method of the poskim who hold that every doubt is forbidden by the Torah. But according to the Rambam and his faction, who hold that every doubt is permitted by the Torah, if so, for what purpose was this stated regarding orlah? The explanation is as follows: that every doubt that is permitted by the Torah regarding all prohibitions is only in a case of a complete doubt, but a doubt that is closer to a prohibition than to a permission is certainly forbidden by the Torah, as is understood. But regarding orlah, the halachah was stated that any doubt whatsoever, and even to create a doubt, is permitted (Ran ibid.). These matters will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

How is the law of reva'i in the fourth year? Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 6: The fruits of reva'i have the law of ma'aser sheni in every matter. In the time of the Temple, they were required to bring them up to Jerusalem to eat them there, or to redeem them and bring the redemption money there, and they are permitted immediately after the redemption. Nowadays, when they cannot bring them up to Jerusalem, one redeems them after they are finished and detached, and one can redeem all of them for a perutah (so it should be said) even if they are many, and he shall cast the perutah into the Great Sea, or grind it and scatter it to the wind, or cast it into a river after grinding. He shall recite a blessing at the time of redemption (before casting it): "Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us regarding the redemption of reva'i," or he may redeem it with fruits worth a perutah, which is one thirty-second of a ma'ah, etc. And the fruits of reva'i are exempt from leket, shikhecha, pe'ah, and olelot. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that the currency common in these provinces, the half-wiener, is more than a perutah and one redeems with it. Thus far his words. A half-wiener is four perutot, but they did not have a smaller coin than it (Shach). In our time, the smallest coin is a copper half-kopek. Ab initio, one should only redeem when they are detached from the tree; however, in a time of pressing need, one can redeem even when they are attached, provided he says that the redemption shall not take effect until they are detached (Shach, subsection 12). And although according to the Rambam one does not redeem while attached, nevertheless the Ramban and the Rashba disagree on this (see the Gra, subsection 19).

However, regarding the primary law of reva'i, it is stated in Berakhot that R. Hiyya and R. Shimon bar Rabbi disagree; one taught "neta reva'i," meaning that every type of planting of trees is obligated in reva'i, and one taught "kerem reva'i," that only vineyards of grapes are obligated in reva'i and not other species, and he derived this from a verse, see there. And it was not decided according to whom the halacha follows. And the She'iltot, parashat Kedoshim, wrote that even in a vineyard one is not obligated in reva'i for a single vine, but only in a complete vineyard, which is at least two opposite two and one extending as a tail, see there. And our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote, and this is their wording: And now we maintain that reva'i applies even outside the Land; however, it applies to a vineyard and not to other trees, for whoever is lenient in the Land, the halacha follows him outside the Land, etc. Thus far their words. And several of the Rishonim ruled likewise.

But the Rambam in chapter 10 of Ma'achalot Assurot, law 15, wrote, and this is his wording: It appears to me that the law of neta revai does not apply outside the Land, but rather one eats the fruits of the fourth year without redemption etc. and some of the Geonim instructed that regarding kerem revai alone one redeems it outside the Land etc. and there is no basis for this matter. Thus far his words. And according to his words, the law of revai does not apply at all outside the Land. And the Rashba in a responsum explained his reasoning, that since we derive revai from ma'aser sheni, just as ma'aser sheni does not apply outside the Land, so too revai. And some have written that in the Yerushalmi Ma'aser Sheni (chapter 5, halacha 2) this is explained (Ran), and it is implied likewise from the Rambam himself who made this law dependent on Syria, and there it is explained so. But it is a wonder, for there it deals with an idolater, see there. And they have already challenged him on this (Rashba and the Gra, subsection 28). But his opinion appears to be that he interprets that it also deals with an Israelite, since he likens it to ma'aser sheni. And regarding the practical law, our teacher, the Rema, in section 7 decided that kerem revai applies outside the Land but not neta revai, and therefore one should redeem it without a blessing, since according to the opinion of the Rambam, revai does not apply at all outside the Land. And it appears to me that according to everyone, regarding that of an idolater, certainly revai does not apply even in the Land of Israel. And that which we learned at the end of chapter 3 of Terumot, that the sages say he has neta revai, this is when he desires so, as is explained in the words of the Rambam in chapter 10 of Ma'aser Sheni, law 10, and this is his wording: And an idolater has neta revai, for if he comes to observe this mitzvah, it is holy like the neta revai of an Israelite. Thus far his words. And according to the Rambam, it must deal with the Land of Israel, for he holds that there is no revai as a prohibition outside the Land (and the opinion of the Talmidei Rabbenu Yonah in Berakhot there is that neta revai also applies outside the Land, and the Beit Yosef brought their opinion first, and the Shach wrote in subsection 17 that whether regarding kerem revai or neta revai one should redeem without a blessing, see there; and in truth it is a solitary opinion and is difficult, as the Gra wrote in subsection 28 that the primary view is like the Rema, see there).

One should be in doubt regarding that which has been explained, that orlah outside the land is a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai and that the halakhah was stated such that a doubt is permitted: was the halakhah stated such that it is included in the negative commandment of the Torah in a case of certainty, or is it not included in the negative commandment but rather is forbidden from the halakhah alone? The practical difference is regarding the matter of malkot, for if it is included in the negative commandment, he is liable for malkot, and if it is not included, he does not receive malkot, as we do not find malkot from a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. And so it is explained from the words of the Rambam in chapter 10 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 9, who wrote: Anyone who plants a food tree etc. for three years they are forbidden for eating and for benefit etc. and anyone who eats a kezayit from them receives malkot from the Torah; in what case does this apply? To one who plants in the Land of Israel etc. but the prohibition of orlah outside the land is a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, that its certainty is forbidden and its doubt is permitted etc. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explained that outside the land one does not receive malkot, for the essence of its prohibition is from a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai and not from a verse (and this is what he wrote in section 5, that there is no practical difference, and this is regarding the essence of the prohibition, and examine this closely).

And know that there is one who says that according to the one who holds that in this time the sanctity of the Land was annulled regarding terumot and ma'asrot, it was also annulled regarding orlah, and even in Eretz Yisrael its doubt is permitted in this time as in chutz la'aretz (Mishneh LaMelech). And even though from the Rambam it is implied that even nowadays in Eretz Yisrael its doubt is forbidden, and he indeed holds that terumah in this time is rabbinic in Eretz Yisrael as he wrote at the end of the first chapter of Hilkhot Terumot, see there—this is not because the sanctity of the Land was annulled, for he explicitly ruled at the end of Hilkhot Ma'aseh HaKorbanot that the first sanctity sanctified it for its time and sanctified it for the future to come. And so it is explained from his words at the beginning of Hilkhot Terumot, see there. Rather, his reason is because regarding terumot and ma'asrot we require "all its inhabitants upon it," as he explained there, and regarding orlah this is not applicable. Therefore, even in this time in Eretz Yisrael, one is lashed for orlah when he eats a kezayit, and its doubt is forbidden. And also regarding kilay ha-kerem it is so, for according to the one who holds the sanctity of the Land was annulled, even kilay ha-kerem in Eretz Yisrael is rabbinic (Tosafot Yevamot 81a, "Mai"), and also kilay zera'im is permitted as in chutz la'aretz. However, we do not rule so, for we rule that the sanctity of the Land was not annulled. And according to the Tosafot (ibid. 82b, "Yerusha") and according to the Ra'avad at the end of the first chapter of Hilkhot Terumot, even terumot and ma'asrot in this time are de-oraita in Eretz Yisrael, see there. And many of the Rishonim hold so, except for the Rambam, of blessed memory, as I have written.

There is no distinction in orlah between when the tree belongs to an Israelite and when it belongs to a gentile; in all of them, the prohibition of orlah is from the Torah, and this is in the Diaspora as a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, and its doubt is permitted. How is its doubt permitted? Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9: A vineyard that contains saplings of orlah and grapes are sold outside of it, in the Land of Israel it is forbidden, and in Syria it is permitted, and this is provided that he did not know they were brought from that vineyard; and in the Diaspora it is permitted even if he knows they were brought from that vineyard, as long as he does not see that they were harvested from the saplings of orlah. Thus far his words. And in section 10 he wrote: A vineyard that is a doubt of orlah, in the Land of Israel it is forbidden, and in Syria it is permitted, and it goes without saying in the Diaspora. Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matters: A vineyard that has plantings of certain orlah and also old plantings that are not orlah, and the owner of the vineyard, who is a non-Jew, sells grapes—if he sells them inside and the Israelite sees that he harvests them from the orlah, it is certainly forbidden to buy from him, for only a doubt of orlah was permitted. Therefore, when he sells them outside of it—and not specifically outside of it, for even if he sells them inside, but he already harvested them in a manner where the Israelite did not see from where he gathered them—therefore, in Eretz Yisrael it is forbidden according to the law of a doubt regarding a Torah prohibition. And even a minority of orlah, it appears to me that it is forbidden in Eretz Yisrael, for orlah is not nullified by a majority in a case of like-kind with like-kind as with all other prohibitions, but rather in two hundred and one. And in Syria, where they were somewhat stringent like in Eretz Yisrael, it is permitted when he did not know that this is from this vineyard, but when he knew, it is forbidden as in Eretz Yisrael. And in Chutz La'aretz, where the halacha was stated that any side of doubt whatsoever is permitted, as I wrote in section 5, it is permitted in all manners to buy from him, provided only that he does not see him gathering. And it appears to me that in Chutz La'aretz, even if the majority of plantings are orlah and a minority of them are not orlah, it is permitted since there is some side of doubt, as I wrote there (and so wrote the Tur, and also the intention of the Rambam there who wrote "If there was a vineyard and orlah etc." his intention was that there was also permitted [plantings], and there are those who understood his intention to mean that the entire vineyard is orlah and they questioned him, see Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh and see the Ran at the end of the first chapter of Kiddushin, and his intention is clear as I wrote, and see in section 16).

Regarding that which he wrote in section 10, a vineyard that is a doubt of orlah, etc., and it goes without saying in chutz la'aretz; the explanation of his words is that if the entire vineyard is a doubt of orlah, it is permitted for the Israelite himself to pick the fruits from the trees, since it is a doubt of orlah, and the halacha was stated that a doubt is permitted in chutz la'aretz. And the Tur, who wrote: a vineyard that has plantings of orlah, etc., provided that they do not see that they were harvested from the plantings of orlah, and it goes without saying that a vineyard that is a doubt of orlah is permitted, thus far his words; his intention is not that even in a doubt of orlah the law is as before, that he should not pick them himself, for this is not a logical reasoning at all, and what reason is there for this? Rather, he did not see fit to elaborate, and his intention is also that a doubt of orlah is certainly permitted, and even to pick with one's own hands (and so wrote the Taz in subsection 15, and so it appears from the Beit Yosef and the Bach, who did not write to distinguish). And so the Mordechai ruled explicitly; see there.

And there are those who wished to explain in the words of the Tur that even regarding a doubt of orlah, he did not permit the Israelite himself to harvest, but rather only according to the previous law (Derishah and Shach subsection 21). Based on this, they explained the words of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote at the end of section 9, and this is his wording: And all the more so regarding a vineyard that is a doubt of orlah, that it is permitted. Thus far his words. And it is difficult: what did he innovate in this, for our teacher, the Beit Yosef, himself wrote this law in section 10? Rather, his intention was that even regarding a doubt of orlah, the permission is only by means of a gentile and not that he should harvest himself (Shach ibid.). And these matters are very puzzling, for how can we disagree with that which was stated explicitly, that its doubt is permitted? And even more puzzling than this, for in the Gemara (39a) it is explained that even a doubt created by an Israelite is permitted for another Israelite to take and eat, as will be explained, and all the more so regarding the primary vineyard which is a doubt. Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that the primary view is like the first opinion (and it is evident that the Shach in Nekudot HaKesef did not dispute the Taz as is his way; and the intention of the Rema, it is possible to say that on the contrary, it is toward leniency, meaning that the author in section 10 is dealing with eating the fruits, and he wrote that it is permitted, meaning that it is permitted for him entirely to engage with this vineyard, to buy it and to sell the fruits, and therefore he wrote that it is permitted, and delve into this).

And know that in the Gemara there it is stated: Levi said to Shmuel, "Create a doubt for me and I will eat." Rav Avya and Rabbah bar Rav Chanan would create doubts for one another, see there; meaning, they created doubts and the second would eat. The Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch did not cite this. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work that they hold that this leniency is only according to Shmuel, who holds there that that which we learned in the Mishnah, "orlah is a halachah," means it is a law of the province; but we, who establish the law like Rabbi Yochanan that it is a Halachah LeMoshe MiSinai, do not be so lenient, see there. And one must scrutinize this, for in any case, if Levi and Rav Avya and Rabbah hold like Shmuel, why do we not rule like Shmuel against Rabbi Yochanan? For the halachah follows the many, and especially Levi who was very great and among the greatest students of our holy teacher. And in the Mordechai at the end of the first chapter of Kiddushin it is explicitly stated so, that even according to Rabbi Yochanan it is permitted to create a doubt, see there. Therefore, it appears to my humble opinion that the reason they did not write this is not because the halachah is not so, but because certainly the sages of the Gemara, when they created a doubt, it was a complete doubt and they acted according to the law; but to hand this over as a ruling for the masses is impossible, as it is understood that they would not create the doubt properly and it would be like a mockery and a joke, and they would encounter a certain prohibition. And one can infer this from the Shas itself: why did Levi need to tell Shmuel to create the doubt for him? Was there no other person to create the doubt for him? Rather, this is what he said to him: "If you create the doubt for me I will eat, but not another." And so too Rav Avya and Rabbah relied only upon one another and not upon others. And according to this, they omitted this from the essential law (as appears to my humble opinion clearly with the help of Heaven).

And know that just as in a vineyard that contains plantings of orlah it is permitted to purchase outside of it provided that one does not see him harvesting, so too in a vineyard that is entirely orlah and the idolater sells outside of it, it is also permitted to purchase from him, for perhaps they are not from this vineyard. But inside it is forbidden because it is certain that this is from this vineyard. And even though even outside of it there is more of a reason to say that this is from this vineyard, nevertheless it is at least a doubt, and we have already written that any doubt whatsoever is permitted. And this matter is clarified to me from the Rambam and the Mordechai there, and it is also explicitly clarified in the Yerushalmi at the end of Orlah, which says regarding the Mishnah that a doubt of orlah etc. and in chutz la'aretz one may go down and harvest provided that one does not see him harvesting, the Yerushalmi says: What is a doubt of orlah? A vineyard of orlah and grapes are sold outside of it, etc. See there, for in Syria there is a dispute, but in chutz la'aretz everyone agrees; see there well.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 11: A barrel of wine hidden in a vineyard of orlah is permitted, for a thief does not steal from this vineyard and hide it within it. However, grapes found hidden within it are forbidden, for it is likely that he stole them from it and hid them within it. Thus far their words. And the Rambam wrote similarly there, except that he wrote that the wine is forbidden for drinking and permitted for benefit due to the concern of wine used for idolatry, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch explained this law above in siman 129; see there. And they raised a difficulty against them, for this law is in Bava Batra (24a), and according to the conclusion there, where we hold like Rav Chanina that in a case of majority versus proximity we follow the majority, even grapes should be permitted, as we follow the majority of the world which is not orlah. And the Rosh indeed ruled accordingly there (Rashal and Derisha). And there are those who answered that even though the halacha is like Rav Chanina, nevertheless, from the language of the Gemara there which says "but grapes, he hides them within it," it implies that this is the truth, and it is a strong logical premise that they stole them from this vineyard (Taz subsection 16 and Lechem Mishneh). And behold, it is possible to say so, but regarding the essence of the matter, it appears in my humble opinion that there is no dispute here at all. For certainly in the Diaspora, where any doubt whatsoever is permitted, the grapes are certainly permitted, and the Rosh is dealing with such a case, for there he is not occupied with the laws of orlah regarding the distinction between the Land of Israel and the Diaspora. And the Rambam and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch here, who wrote the laws of orlah in the Land of Israel, in Syria, and in the Diaspora, their intention here is regarding the Land of Israel, and they did not concern themselves with elaborating and explaining that in the Diaspora it is permitted, for it is understood automatically from what they wrote previously (and with this it is settled how the Tur would not mention the opinion of his father; and delve into this).

All types of trees that produce fruit are subject to the laws of orlah. We say in Berakhot (36b): Since regarding orlah they are not considered fruit, regarding the blessing they are also not considered fruit, and we do not recite over them "Who creates the fruit of the tree" but rather "Who creates the fruit of the ground," see there. We learn from this that anything over which we recite the blessing "of the tree," orlah applies to it. According to this, regarding gooseberries, currants, and raspberries, even though the trees are small and are not like those of apples, nevertheless orlah applies to them, for we recite over them "Who creates the fruit of the tree." In the Maharil, it is found in this language: Fruits that grow on trees called *himbeeren*, *brombeeren*, *erdbeeren*, and their like, are not included in orlah. Thus far his words. And we do not know what they are, and perhaps one who knows of this will not practice orlah with them. Know that the world does not practice orlah with these three fruits that we enumerated, and perhaps they are the fruits that the Maharil wrote about. In truth, if they were to practice orlah with them, they would be forbidden forever, for approximately every three years one is forced to uproot them and plant them due to their weakness. And if it is because we say in Berakhot there that the blessing depends on orlah, and their blessing is certainly "of the tree," one can say that they only said this there regarding a complete tree and the details of its fruits, such as *aviyonot* and *kafrisin*, see there; but regarding the essence of the tree, orlah requires a complete tree, and these do not resemble trees, as is known. There is some proof for this, for in Berakhot there, it requires a verse to teach that peppers are liable for orlah, see there, and without this I would have exempted them from orlah even though it is a complete tree, as the Magen Avraham wrote at the end of siman 202, see there; rather, it is because it is not in the form of standard trees. If so, these three that we enumerated are also not in the form of trees (as it appears in my humble opinion).

The fruits of orlah are forbidden for benefit, whether the main part of the fruit, the seeds, or the soft peels, such as the soft nut shells that are upon the food and the peels of pomegranates, as it is written: "and you shall count its fruit as orlah," and the word "et" comes to include that which is secondary to its fruit. And likewise their blossom, and this is the flower that is upon the pitma, and the skins and the seeds of grapes, and the temed made from them, and the pagim, and the dates that do not ripen, and the grapes that were stricken and do not complete their ripening; and likewise all boser in all fruits are subject to orlah. And all these are subject only to orlah and not to reva'i, for regarding reva'i it is written "its fruit" and "et" is not written, and one is only liable for the main part of the fruit. And there is one who forbids dates that do not ripen even in reva'i (see Shach subsection 5, for such is the primary view). But the leaves, the shoots, and the water of vines—and this is when one cuts the vine, water-like drops drip from it—are exempt from orlah, for they are not even secondary to the fruit, but rather to the tree itself, and regarding the tree there is no orlah, but only regarding the fruit.

There is a species of tree called tzalaf, and in the vernacular "caper tree," and it is the hardiest of trees, which produces three fruits: leaves, aviyonot, and kaprisin (Beitzah 25b), and it ripens its fruits quickly (Shabbat 30a), and a fruit that is not recognizable today is finished at the end of three days (Rashbam Bava Batra 28b). The aviyonot are the primary fruit, and we recite over them "ha'etz" (Berakhot 36a). Also over the kaprisin, because they are a protector for the fruit, we also recite "ha'etz" (ibid.). However, over the leaves, which are also eaten in their youth, we recite "borei peri ha'adamah," and within the leaves grow a kind of sprouts (timrot), over which we also recite "ha'adamah." Nevertheless, in Eretz Yisrael all of them are subject to orlah, and we consider everything as the essence of the fruit. But outside of Eretz Yisrael, orlah applies only to the aviyonot and not to the kaprisin and the timrot, and certainly not the leaves. The opinion of the Rif and the Rambam is that even in Eretz Yisrael the kaprisin are permitted, and their opinion was not brought in the Shulchan Aruch (see the Gra, subsection 11, who agreed with their opinion and wrote that such is the primary law).

The three years of orlah are not counted from day to day; rather, we follow the year of the world, which is Rosh Hashanah. We hold that thirty days in a year are considered a year (Rosh Hashanah 10b). It is established for us that until the tree takes root in the ground, it requires fourteen days from the day of its planting (Yevamot 83a). The thirty days must be counted from the time it took root in the ground. Therefore, if one planted forty-four days before Tishrei—namely, from the fifteenth of Av, and certainly before then—it is considered a year for orlah until Tishrei. However, we learned at the beginning of Rosh Hashanah that the fifteenth of Shevat is the Rosh Hashanah for trees, because regarding trees we follow the budding for all matters, for tithes and for Shemitah. By the fifteenth of Shevat, most of the year's rains have already passed, the sap has risen in the trees, and the fruits bud (Rashi, Rosh Hashanah 14a). Therefore, even though these forty-four days are considered like a year, and if he waits two more years until the third Rosh Hashanah the three years of orlah are completed, nevertheless the prohibition extends until the fifteenth of Shevat following the third Rosh Hashanah, because that is the Rosh Hashanah for trees. He gains by this, in that we counted as a year from the sixteenth of Av until Rosh Hashanah the days from the fifteenth of Shevat until the sixteenth of Av. And also for revai it is so, that the time of the prohibition extends until the fifteenth of Shevat following the fourth year, and this is the three years of orlah.

And behold, the opinion of the Rambam and others of the Rishonim is that when does the prohibition extend until the fifteenth of Shevat? When we were lenient from the beginning to count forty-four days as a year. But if one planted on the sixteenth of Av, such that he then needs to wait three full years from day to day, he does not need to wait afterwards until the fifteenth of Shevat. However, the Me'or and the Ran hold that there is no distinction in this, for even with three full years, one must wait until the fifteenth of Shevat that follows the third year. And it is a simple matter that if the year was intercalated, it was intercalated for orlah and for revai; that is to say, the intercalation is not part of the count. And also according to the first opinion, when one sowed in less than forty-four days before Rosh Hashanah, he has lost those days, and from Rosh Hashanah the years of orlah and revai begin. And know that one must sow on the fifteenth of Av so that forty-four full days remain until Rosh Hashanah, but when one sowed on the sixteenth, his law is as if after this. The Tur holds like the second opinion, see there. And in our lands, where there is no growth at all in the winter, there is no practical difference in all of this; and when they plant in the summer, one needs three full years, and after this time, if it buds, it is permitted, and what budded previously is forbidden. And if he plants in the winter, then it will automatically be more than three years, for when the three years arrive it is not a time of growth, and he will automatically wait until the summer.

Since it has been explained that the fruit of orlah is forbidden for benefit and the wood is permitted, therefore it is permitted to plant a shoot of orlah, but it is forbidden to plant fruits of orlah from which a tree will grow, for he thereby benefits from orlah. Nevertheless, if he did plant them it is permitted, for we maintain in siman 142 that anything caused by both a permitted and a forbidden source together is permitted, as "this and that cause" is permitted ex post facto. And here, the ground also caused the tree to grow, and "this and that cause" is permitted ex post facto; it is like any other tree, and they shall wait the years of orlah and afterwards it shall be permitted.

An Israelite and a gentile who were partners in a planting, the Israelite may stipulate at the beginning of the partnership, saying to him: "You take the three years of orlah, and I will take three other years corresponding to them." This is not considered the exchange of orlah, for the Israelite has no connection at all to the years of orlah since the stipulation was made beforehand. And even though, ultimately, the orlah causes him a benefit—in that the gentile will not take a portion in the three years after the years of orlah—we do not find that causing a benefit is forbidden regarding things from which it is forbidden to derive benefit. However, this is specifically when he does not make an accounting with him as to how much reached him in the years of orlah and how much reached the Israelite afterward, and if they are not equal in their yield, they compensate one another; for in such a case it is certainly forbidden, as this is like a partnership in all the years and he is exchanging orlah fruit for others. And this is specifically when they stipulated at the beginning, but when they did not stipulate, it is forbidden even in such a case; for whenever they did not stipulate, it follows that when the gentile takes the years of orlah and he takes the three years afterward, even without an accounting, it is like the exchange of orlah, for perforce they are partners for all the years, and a subsequent stipulation is not effective, as with regard to Shabbat in Orach Chaim siman 245, see there. And it appears to me that even with a stipulation and without an accounting, it is only permitted when the Israelite takes three other years corresponding to the years of orlah; but when he takes fewer than three years because the fruit of the orlah years is sparse, it is forbidden, for this itself is like making an accounting and is like the exchange of orlah. For why does he take less? Because a year of orlah is not worth as much as a year that is not of orlah, and you have no greater making of an accounting than this. And this is the approach of the Rambam in chapter 10 of Ma'akhalot Assurot.

But the Tur ruled that even without stipulating from the beginning, it is permitted when the akkum agrees that the Israelite shall take three other years corresponding to the years of orlah, and this is not "exchanges of orlah" for it is merely a gift from the akkum to the Israelite, but the Israelite has no portion in the orlah. Therefore, the Israelite may say to him: "You take the years of orlah and I will take afterwards," and if the akkum agrees, it is permitted for the reason we have written. And it appears to me that according to this opinion, it is permitted even when he agrees to less than three years, for since it is merely a gift, what does it matter to me if he gives him a gift of one year or three years? And if he does not agree, the akkum takes all three years of orlah, and afterwards they divide every single year. And according to the opinion of the Rambam, the law is so even when he agrees if they did not stipulate. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 13 ruled like the Rambam, and our teacher, the Rema, like the Tur. And this is also the opinion of Rashi and the Rosh at the end of the first chapter of Avodah Zarah, see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 14: It is permitted to say to a gentile during the years of orlah, "Work my vineyard and take its fruits, and give me your vineyard whose years of orlah have passed, and I will work it and take its fruits." Thus far his words. And it is simple that this is specifically without making a calculation of one against the other, for by making a calculation it would be exactly like an exchange. And seemingly, this law is only according to the opinion of the Tur, for according to the opinion of the Rambam that without a prior stipulation it is forbidden, here it is like they did not stipulate. And there are indeed those who raised this difficulty against him, that since he previously ruled like the Rambam, how did he permit this? And it must be said that he holds that here even the Rambam admits, for there is no partnership here at all, and it is like a mere sale, where this one sells him his land and that one sells him his for a duration of some years (Taz subsection 22, and see Shach subsection 30, and Levush).

He further wrote in section 15: It is permitted to sell to a non-Jew the fruits of the second year of orlah for three years, since they have not yet come into the world. Thus far his words. For he only sells the place of the trees, and the wood of orlah is permitted for benefit (Beit Yosef in Bedek HaBayit in the name of the Ra'avad). But when they have come into the world, the sale takes effect upon the fruits, and the fruits are forbidden for benefit. And one should not ask: behold, he sold him the fruits and not the trees? For it can be said that it is like a palm tree for its fruits; and even though he did not say so, we are witnesses that this was his intention, for if not so, behold he benefits from orlah, and also the acquisition would not take effect because it is a thing that has not yet come into the world; rather, certainly this was his intention (this is the intention of the Gara"a). And one should not ask: behold, in the end he benefits from orlah? For it is not so, but rather it is a mere cause, and we have not found regarding things forbidden for benefit that their cause is forbidden, as I wrote in section 24.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 16: Whether one plants a seed or a shoot, or uproots an entire tree and plants it in another place, or one who grafts a shoot onto another tree, or one who performs mavrikh—which is that he makes a pit next to the tree and lowers one of the branches of the tree and buries its middle in the pit while its top emerges from the other side and it becomes a tree—all of these are liable for orlah. This is specifically if he cut it from this side from the primary tree or if it does not draw nourishment from it; but as long as it is attached and draws nourishment from it, it is considered like one of its branches and is exempt. And if after the branch that he layered grew, he layered from it another branch into the ground, and he does this several times one after the other, as long as the first is attached to the primary tree, all of them are exempt. If he severed the first from the primary tree, they are liable, and they begin to count for them from the time he severed it, and the primary tree is exempt (and the same law applies if he severed the second or the third). And if the primary tree was uprooted from the ground, it returns to being secondary to the branch that he layered, and they count for both the primary tree and the branch from the time it was uprooted. Thus far their words.

And know that that which they wrote, that one who grafts a shoot onto another tree is liable for orlah, this is only in the case of one who grafts a young tree onto a young tree, where the tree being grafted onto is also liable for orlah, or if he grafted it onto a barren tree. But when he grafted a shoot onto an old fruit tree whose years of orlah have passed, orlah does not apply to the graft, for it is nullified relative to the old tree. For so we say in Sotah (43b): A young tree that one entwined with an old tree, the young tree is nullified by the old tree and the law of orlah does not apply to it. And Rashi explained: And that which we learned in the Mishnah that one who grafts is liable for orlah, we learned it regarding a young tree, for even that branch is liable for orlah; and even though he cut it from an old tree, it now becomes a young tree, for this is its planting. Thus far his words. And this is what we learned in the Sifrei, that one who grafts is exempt from orlah, as the Ran wrote in the first chapter of Rosh Hashanah. And even if he grafted onto a barren tree, there is a dispute in the Yerushalmi, the first chapter of Orlah, whether it is liable for orlah, and there is one who holds that it is nullified relative to the old barren tree, see there. However, from the poskim it implies that it is liable for orlah (see Taz subsection 24 and in the Gilyon HaMaharsha). And conversely, that which they wrote, that as long as it is attached and draws nourishment from the tree the law of orlah does not apply to it, it is stated in the Yerushalmi there that sometimes even while attached it is liable for orlah, such as if its leaves turn toward the old tree; this is a sign that it does not draw nourishment from it, and your mnemonic is: "one who eats that which is not his is ashamed to look at his face." And it is only exempt when the leaves are turned to the other side, for then it is a sign that it draws nourishment from it (ibid. subsection 25). And it is a wonder regarding the poskim that they did not cite this, and perhaps it is because this is not common (and also in the Rambam chapter 10 of Maaser Sheni halakhah 14, it must be said regarding what he wrote in the intention of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, see there and see in the Gra subsection 48, and examine carefully).

They further wrote that even though it is the custom of farmers to layer vines every year, it is permitted to drink wine from the vines of gentiles because a doubt regarding orlah is permitted. And even in vineyards that Jews work and layer every year, it is permitted because one who layers or grafts is not liable for orlah except in the Land of Israel, but not in the Diaspora. And it is possible to find a permit even for the inhabitants of the Land of Israel regarding wine from the vineyards of gentiles, because the majority of vines are not orlah. And even in vineyards where it is known with certainty that there is orlah in them, they should be permitted because before their years of orlah pass, they do not produce fruit; and if they do produce, they are thin and weak such that they are not fit to make wine from them. Thus far his words. And this is all from the words of the Rosh in the laws of orlah, see there; and so wrote the Ramban, see there.

And behold, the second permission is a simple permission, but this is only regarding grapes and other fruits of a large species like apples and the like, for certainly in the years of orlah they do not have proper fruits. But with fruits of small species like currants, gooseberries, and raspberries, they certainly produce proper fruits even within the years of orlah, and we have only the first permission because in chutz la'aretz it is permitted to layer and to graft. And regarding this permission, one of the great authorities (Sha'agat Aryeh in the New Responsa, siman 14) disagreed and wrote that behold, the reasoning of the Ramban and the Rosh is because Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds in Sotah (43b) that for one who layers and grafts, he does not return from the war ranks, and presumably he holds that orlah also does not apply to them, for this is dependent on that, as is explained there in the sugya. And we establish that whoever is lenient in the Land, the halacha follows him in chutz la'aretz. And he questioned them, for they grasped that just as Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov holds there from the verse "and have not redeemed it [lo chillalo]"—and it is not written "has not redeemed [lo chillal]"—to exclude layering and grafting, if so, also regarding orlah where it is written "and you shall plant [unetatchem]," it is to exclude layering and grafting, and specifically a complete planting; so wrote the Ramban. And he wondered at this, for if so, why does he need the verse "and have not redeemed it," for behold, it follows automatically, since there is no orlah in them from the verse "and you shall plant," it follows automatically that also regarding the war ranks it is so; rather, certainly regarding the matter of orlah, even Rabbi Eliezer ben Yaakov admits, see there. And I wonder at his words, for the intention of our teachers is this: that certainly from "and you shall plant" alone it is impossible to exclude layering and grafting, for this too is a planting, but since the Merciful One excluded them there from the verse "and have not redeemed it"—and "redeeming" is when the years of orlah have not yet passed such that he would require the redemption of revai—it follows automatically that you learn from this that orlah does not apply to them. And for this, it is necessary to interpret also the verse "and you shall plant" as referring only to a complete planting, and from there we learned this, and not from the essence of the verse "and you shall plant." And furthermore, he wanted to reject their words for another reason and rejected it himself, see there. Therefore, for the law, we have only these words of our teachers, and so we establish (and also the Rashba in his Responsa and the Ran wrote according to their words).

It has already been explained that one who grafts is not liable for orlah unless he grafts a young branch onto a young tree, but a young branch onto an old tree in a fruit tree is exempt from orlah; however, in a non-fruit-bearing tree it is liable, and regardless of this, there is a prohibition of grafting in it as will be explained in siman 295. And later it will be explained that even a fruit tree, when one planted it for a fence or for timber, is exempt from orlah. According to this, even if one grafted a young branch onto an old tree in a fruit tree, when the old tree was planted for a fence or for timber, the young branch is liable for orlah. And it is an explicit Gemara in Sotah ibid., and so wrote the Ran in the first chapter of Rosh Hashanah. The poskim did not explain all of this, but nevertheless, such is the halacha (see Taz, subsection 24). And a young branch onto a young tree, when the tree being grafted onto is exempt from orlah—for example, if he grafted a young branch onto a young tree of one or two years—when the years of orlah pass for the tree being grafted onto, the graft is also exempt (ibid.).

A tree that was cut down and grew back from the root: if it was cut down completely, meaning level with the ground, it is subject to orlah, and the years of orlah are counted from the time of cutting. However, if any amount of it remained above the ground, it is exempt from orlah. According to the opinion of the Rosh, we require that a tefach remain above the ground, and with less than a tefach it is subject to orlah. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 18, did not bring the opinion of the Rosh at all and ruled like the Rambam (see Shach, subsection 31, who was concerned for the opinion of the Rosh; and the Gra, in subsection 54, did not write so, but wrote that from the law that will be explained in section 36 it is proven like the Rosh, see there. In my humble opinion there is no proof, for there it is because of appearances, and all its days it is less than a tefach, and seemingly there is proof to the contrary, that by the essential law we have no concern with it, and delve into this).

A tree that the wind uprooted or a river washed away and carried to another place along with the earth that was around its roots, and one added earth to it there and it took root there in the ground, we estimate it: if it were able to live with the first earth that came with it without the addition of other earth, this is as if it were planted in its original place and it is exempt from orlah. And if not, it is liable for orlah. Therefore, one must be careful when they wish to uproot a tree from this place to another place, that he should uproot it with the earth around it so that it can live in it, and it will be exempt from orlah; and if not, it is liable for orlah. And a tree that was uprooted and there remained from its roots a connection even only like the thickness of the needle with which they stretch the garment after weaving, it is known that it can live without the addition of earth and it is exempt even if one added much earth to it. And this is not a case of "this and this causes," since it does not need the other earth, and it is permitted even ab initio.

There is one who wishes to forbid ab initio bringing an old tree with the earth surrounding it from which it can live and planting it in another place (Pitchei Teshuva subsection 13 in the name of Levushei Serad), but there is no reason for this to create new decrees, and the inference from the Gemara is no inference at all. Similarly, there is one who says that we require earth from which it can live for three years, and I do not know the definition of this, for certainly if, according to the assessment of experts, it is able to live from this earth, it is sufficient, and especially outside the Land [of Israel], and there is no basis for these matters.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said in Sotah (43b) that a tree that is not a tefach high is liable for orlah forever by rabbinic decree because of the appearance of the eye, for it appears as if it is one year old. And this is specifically with one planting or a few plantings, such as two opposite two and one protruding like a tail, but if the entire vineyard is thus, it is permitted, for it has a voice.

A branch full of fruit that was severed from an old tree and planted in another place, and similarly an old tree that was uprooted without the earth surrounding it while it was full of fruit and planted in another place, or if one took a branch full of fruit from an old tree and grafted it onto a young tree: if the fruit increased in the new planting, such that each successive growth grew in prohibition and there is no nullification of more than two hundred according to the measure of nullification in orlah, it is forbidden; and if not, it is permitted. The Rambam wrote (chapter 5), how do we measure? We see, if a vegetable or grain were cut from the ground, in how much time it would dry out until no moisture remains in it; and according to the duration of its stay to dry out, so is its measure for growth. How so? Behold, if it took one hundred hours to dry out, we know that in one hundred hours is its growth; and if it stayed for half an hour, it is known that it added one part in two hundred, and so too anything similar to this. And so it is stated in the Yerushalmi. And if one grafted a branch of orlah full of fruit into an old tree, the fruits of the branch are forbidden forever, even if they grew significantly, for the permitted growth does not neutralize the forbidden, and therefore he must discard all the fruits that were upon it previously.

One who plants a fruit tree and his intention is not for the purpose of eating the fruits, but rather to be a fence for the field, or for the sake of the wood to burn them or for building, is exempt from orlah. This is specifically when it is evident that it is not for the purpose of eating, such as when he planted many trees close to one another and did not distance between tree and tree as is appropriate for fruits, and it is evident that they are for burning. And so too when he planted for building, he prunes the branches and cuts them so that the wood will thicken. And if he does so for a fence, the evidence is when he planted them in a place that requires fencing, he is exempt; but when there is no evidence, he is obligated, and he is not believed in what he says that his intention is not for the fruits. And so too when he planted to smell them and not to eat them, and there is evidence of this, he is exempt from orlah. And so too if these fruits are not food for healthy people and they plant them only for medicine, they are exempt from orlah (the Gara).

And not only this, but even if one planted one side of the tree for its fruit and the second side for the purposes we have considered, and there is a recognizable distinction on this side, the second side is exempt from orlah and the fruit upon it is permitted, while from the side intended for fruit they are forbidden. And the same law applies if the upper side is for food and the lower side is for one of all these, or conversely, the upper side is for a hedge, for timber, or for a fence and the lower side is for food; that part which is not for food is exempt. And one should not ask, when the lower part is for food, how the upper part is permitted since it draws nourishment from the lower part, for it can be said that specifically when there are fruit there is no nullification, as in section 37, but without fruit it is a case of "this and this causes," for the ground also causes the growth, and we hold that it is permitted.

If he initially planted it for one of any of these and afterwards he reconsidered and intended it for food, it is liable for orlah and for revai. From when do we count for it? From the time of the planting. Therefore, if he reconsidered in the third year, he has only one year of orlah, and if in the second, two years. If he did not intend it until the end of the third year, it does not have the law of revai in the fourth year, for there is no revai without orlah. And the reverse case, intention is not effective; for example, if he planted it for fruit, even though he intended it afterwards for a fence, etc., it is not effective, for intention is not effective for stringency, only for leniency.

It is stated in the Yerushalmi, the first chapter of Orlah: One who plants an etrog for a mitzvah or oil for the menorah is obligated in orlah, for even though it is not for eating, nevertheless, since he needs the fruit—granted that he needs it for a mitzvah—ultimately he is planting for fruit and is obligated in orlah. The Rambam wrote similarly there, Law 7, and this is his wording: One who plants for a mitzvah, such as one who planted an etrog for a lulav or an olive for the menorah, is obligated in orlah. Thus far his words. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 24 wrote: One who plants for the purpose of a mitzvah, such as for the purpose of a lulav or an etrog, is obligated. Thus far their words. These matters are puzzling regarding that which they obligated for the purpose of a lulav, meaning that he planted a palm tree for the purpose of a lulav; does the mitzvah cause the obligation? The Yerushalmi only said that when he plants for the sake of the fruit for a mitzvah, like an etrog and an olive, he is obligated just as for eating. But a palm tree for the sake of a lulav—he has planted for the sake of wood for a mitzvah! One of the great authorities rejected this from the halachah (Ma'aseh Yom Tov). But it seems to me that the primary view is like the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch when we examine why he is obligated for an etrog for a mitzvah, for in the Torah "a tree for food" is written, and the mitzvah is not for eating? It must be said that because the mitzvah gives it importance, it is like eating. Consequently, even when he plants a palm tree for the sake of a lulav and not for the sake of the dates, nevertheless, the mitzvah gives importance to this planting and it is as if he planted for the sake of eating, and the dates are fit for eating.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): If one consecrated and afterward planted, he is exempt from orlah; if he planted and afterward consecrated, he is obligated in orlah. Thus far his words. And this is from the Yerushalmi there, that consecrated property is exempt from orlah. And the reason must be because it is written, "three years it shall be for you as orlah"—"for you" and not for the Most High. And if he redeemed it from the consecrated status in the middle of the orlah period, orlah applies for the remainder of the time, and so it is explained in the Yerushalmi there; see there. And know that consecrated property refers only to the Sanctuary, where one consecrated it for the maintenance of the Temple, but if he consecrated it to a synagogue or for charity, it is like a commoner, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 95. Therefore, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch omitted this law because it does not apply in this time.

One who plants for the public within his field is obligated in orlah, as it is said, "and you shall plant," even for the public. The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote there: In what case does this apply? In Eretz Yisrael; but in Chutz La'aretz he is exempt. Thus far his words. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not make this distinction, and they hold that even in Chutz La'aretz he is obligated. There is one who wrote regarding the reasoning of the Rambam that it is because the verse deals with Jerusalem, as it is found in the Yerushalmi which says there regarding one who plants in a private domain and it belongs to many people, such as in Jerusalem (Bach). I wonder at this, for the Yerushalmi is stating an example; and furthermore, what does Chutz La'aretz have to do with the verse, for orlah in Chutz La'aretz is a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai? It seems to me there is another reason: for behold, in the Mishnah in the first chapter of Orlah, Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disagreed on this law, and Rabbi Yehuda exempts, see there. And we maintain that whoever is lenient in the Land, the halakhah is like him in Chutz La'aretz. The reason of the Rosh, who did not write this, and likewise the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, requires further study.

One who plants in a public domain or on a ship, and that which grows on its own in a private domain, and a gentile who planted whether for an Israelite or for himself, and a robber who planted, are obligated in orlah and in revai. And similarly, one who plants in a house or on a roof that he filled with soil and planted therein, or in a pot even if it is not perforated, is obligated, whether in a wooden vessel or in an earthenware vessel, as it is written: "and you shall plant," in any place that you plant. And a tree that grows on its own in a place of crags, which is a place of rocks that is not fit for sowing, is exempt. And even one who plants in a wilderness where there is no settlement is exempt, for this is not the way of planting. And this is specifically when the tree does not produce enough to justify the effort of tending to its fruits until he brings them to a settlement, and we do not call this a "food tree"; but if it produced enough to justify the effort, it is obligated in orlah. And the Rambam wrote there: That which the Canaanites planted prior to the Israelites' arrival in the Land is exempt from orlah, and from the time our ancestors arrived in the Land, even what the Canaanites planted is obligated, as it is said: "When you come into the Land and you shall plant," from the time of arrival. Thus far his words. And it is a Mishnah in orlah there. And he further wrote: A gentile who grafted a food tree onto a barren tree is obligated in orlah. Thus far his words. And the same applies to an Israelite as I have written, but because for an Israelite there is a prohibition due to grafting, therefore he mentioned a gentile. And he further wrote: And a gentile has neta revai, for if he comes to conduct himself according to this mitzvah, it is holy like the neta revai of an Israelite. Thus far his words. Meaning, that there is no obligation of neta revai in it just as there is no obligation in ma'aser sheni, but rather if he desired, it is holy, just as when he separates terumah from his produce, as is found at the end of the third chapter of Terumot; see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote at the end of this siman: If a non-Jew was selling fruit and said they are of orlah or of neta revai, he is not believed even if he said "I bought them from such-and-such a person." Thus far his words. For he says this to improve his sale, because the fruit of a young tree are better than those of an old tree (end of Yevamot). And it implies that if not for this reason, he would be believed. And in truth, even without this, his words neither raise nor lower, neither for prohibition nor for permission; rather, since here the fruit are his, if not for this reason he would be believed because he is revealing their defect. To this we say that in his opinion there is no defect in this, and on the contrary, it is an advantage (Taz siman 122 subsection 4 and Shach siman 127 subsection 20). However, if it appears that he says this in his innocence, one should be concerned and rule stringently (Taz ibid.).