Siman 242

Just as a person is commanded regarding the honor of his father and the fear of him, so too is he commanded regarding the honor of his teacher and the fear of him. And his teacher is greater than his father, for his father brought him to the life of this world, and his teacher brings him to the life of the World to Come (Bava Metzia 33a). Therefore our sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid.): The lost object of his father and the lost object of his teacher – the lost object of his teacher takes precedence for this reason, see there. And there is no honor like the honor of one's teacher, and no awe like the awe of him. And we learned in Avot (chapter one): And let the awe of your teacher be like the awe of Heaven. And the sages said: Anyone who disputes his teacher is as if he disputes the Shekhinah (Sanhedrin 110a). And anyone who engages in a quarrel with his teacher is as if he engages in a quarrel with the Shekhinah. And anyone who complains against him is as if he complains against the Shekhinah. And anyone who contemplates [critically] after his teacher is as if he contemplates after the Shekhinah (ibid.).

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of the fifth chapter of the Laws of Talmud Torah: If he saw the lost object of his father and the lost object of his teacher—that of his teacher takes precedence over that of his father. If his father and his teacher are carrying a burden—he sets down that of his teacher, and afterward sets down that of his father. If his father and his teacher are captives in captivity—he redeems his teacher, and afterward redeems his father. But if his father was a talmid chakam—he redeems his father first. And similarly, if his father was a talmid chakam, even though he is not equal to his teacher—he returns his lost object, and afterward returns the lost object of his teacher. Thus far his words, and all of this is in the Mishnah at the end of the chapter "Elu Metziot." And from the wording of the Rambam here, it is clarified that in all of these, even if his father is not equal to his teacher—his father takes precedence. And that which he wrote this point of "even though he is not equal" regarding a lost object—it is to show the greater novel point: that even in a monetary matter it does not require equality, and all the more so regarding redemption where there is a danger to life. And that which regarding a burden he did not mention at all if his father was a talmid chakam—it is because we would know it automatically, since he mentioned it regarding a lost object and regarding redemption—it follows automatically that this too is included in them. And also in the Mishnah it is so, see there. And therefore they placed burden in the middle, in order to be concise. And the Rambam employed the wording of the Mishnah, as is his holy way to seize the wording of our sages, of blessed memory.

But in the twelfth chapter of Lost Property (the Rambam, Laws of Robbery and Lost Property 12), he himself wrote that regarding lost property—his father does not take precedence unless he is equal to his teacher; see there. And such is the opinion of the Rosh, and the Tur at the end of this siman. And they explained the reason: that regarding redemption where there is a danger to life—his father takes precedence even if he is not equal to his teacher, but regarding money—he must specifically be equal. And in truth, there is a variation of versions in this, for in the Mishnah in our Shas it is stated regarding lost property also without qualification: if his father was a talmid chakam—his father takes precedence, which implies explicitly even if he is not equal to his teacher. But in the Jerusalem Mishnah it is stated regarding lost property that it is specifically when he is equal to his teacher. And it is likewise found in the early authorities that there are different versions in this (as written in the Shita Mekubetzet ibid.). And it is clear that the Rambam in the Laws of Lost Property adopted the Jerusalem version, and here he adopted the version of our Shas. (And the Beit Yosef wondered about him here, that this is against the Mishnah. And it appears that before him there was no variation of versions, and therefore he wrote that here it is a scribal error; see there. And it is not certain, and see the Lechem Mishneh who elaborated on this. And there is no need for this, and so it appears from the Tosafot Yom Tov; see there. And examine closely and you will find it simple.)

Our teacher, the Rema, in section 34 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:34) wrote regarding the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, and this is his wording: And so too, unloading his burden takes precedence over his teacher, even though he is not equal in wisdom to his teacher. But he does not return his father's lost object first, unless he is equal to his teacher. Thus far his words. And this is the approach of the Rosh and the Tur, for they hold that unloading his burden is similar to redemption and is more stringent than a lost object. And it is necessary to say the reason is because there is physical pain involved (Taz, subsection 19). And perhaps it could also lead to danger (Lechem Mishneh), as is proven from the Rambam at the end of the Laws of the Murderer (Rambam, Laws of the Murderer and the Preservation of Life), see there. However, from the words of the Rambam it appears that this is comparable to a lost object, and such is the opinion of the Radbaz (in the Shita Mekubetzet there).

He further wrote: Some say that this rule that his teacher takes precedence over his father—this is when he learns with him for free. But if his father hires his teacher for him and he teaches him—his father takes precedence in everything. And so it appears to me to be the primary view. Thus far his words. And so too after he has paid tuition to his teacher on his behalf, then the lost object of the one who paid takes precedence over his teacher (Sefer Chasidim siman 585). And it implies explicitly that only regarding this matter does the tuition that his teacher received diminish the status, such that his lost object does not take precedence. But regarding the honor and awe of his teacher—he is obligated, even though his teacher received tuition on his behalf, for ultimately he received Torah from him. And every instance of "his teacher" in this siman refers to his primary teacher, from whom the majority of his wisdom is derived.

The Rambam wrote: Who is one who disputes his teacher? This is one who establishes for himself a house of study, and sits and expounds and teaches without the permission of his teacher, while his teacher is alive, and even if his teacher is in another province. And it is forbidden for a person to rule in the presence of his teacher ever, and anyone who rules on a matter of halacha in the presence of his teacher is liable for death. If there were twelve mil between him and his teacher, and a person asked him a matter of halacha—it is permitted to answer, etc. In what case are these words said? Regarding a matter that occurred by chance. But to establish himself for ruling, and to sit and rule for every inquirer, even if his teacher is at the end of the world and he is at the end of the world—it is forbidden for him to rule until his teacher dies, unless he received permission from his teacher, etc. Thus far his words. And behold, according to his opinion, to establish a yeshiva to judge and to rule is forbidden even at a distance, and only to rule occasionally is permitted outside of twelve mil. And within less than this, even occasionally it is forbidden. And if he received permission from his teacher, it is permitted in any case. And so it appears to be the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 5b, s.v. "unless," see there). And from their words it is implied that within twelve mil, even if he received permission, it is forbidden and even occasionally, see there (and so wrote the Kesef Mishneh). And it is possible that the opinion of the Rambam is also thus, and that which he wrote that if he received permission it is permitted—this is outside of twelve mil. And even to establish a yeshiva for ruling, but within twelve mil—it is forbidden in any case.

And I wonder regarding that which our teachers permitted to judge occasionally beyond twelve mil even without receiving permission. Granted that in this there is no concern for the honor of one's teacher, but in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 5b) it was taught: Once Rabbi went to a certain place and saw etc. He said to them: For what reason do you etc. They said to him: A certain student came here and ruled etc. and he expounded to them regarding egg water. But they thought he expounded to them regarding swamp water etc. At that time they decreed: A student shall not rule unless he receives permission from his teacher. Thus far the wording of the Gemara. And since the reason is due to a potential pitfall, that he does not know how to explain well and they stumble and err in his words, if so, what difference is there between within twelve mil and beyond twelve mil? And from the Shas it is explicitly implied that without receiving permission from his teacher, and his teacher understanding that he knows how to rule and explain his words so that they do not err in his words—it is forbidden for him to issue any ruling even at a distance, see there.

Regarding the essence of the matter, I do not understand: for from the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, it is explained that requesting permission from one's teacher is due to the honor of the teacher, and therefore there is a difference between an occasional ruling and establishing a permanent practice of ruling. Yet in the Gemara there, it is proven that it is not due to the honor of the teacher but rather for the reason that has been explained, for it says there that when Rav went down to Babylonia, Rabbi gave him permission. And it asks: if he is learned, why does he need to take permission? And it answers: because of an incident that occurred with a certain student through whose words they stumbled, see there. And if it should enter your mind that it is due to the honor of the teacher, why does the Talmud ask "why does he need permission?" For Rav was a primary student of Rabbi, and it should be forbidden for him to rule in any place in the world without requesting permission. And in Eruvin (Eruvin 62b) it implies explicitly that only in the place of his teacher is there a lack of honor for the teacher when his student rules there, see there. And according to the words of our teachers that have been explained, in his teacher's place, requesting permission is of no avail, and the requesting of permission is for a distant location. And in Sanhedrin there, it implies explicitly that in a distant location, the requesting of permission is not due to the honor of his teacher, but rather because of the stumbling, as I have written. And it requires further study.

And I found similarly in the Maharik (shoresh 169), and this is his wording: For that which they said, "a student should not rule unless he has received permission from his teacher"—this is so that they do not err in his words, as it is stated there: A student came here and ruled for us that marsh water does not render [seeds] susceptible to impurity; he [actually] expounded "egg water" to them. And they thought, etc. But when he has received permission from his teacher, there is no concern. And as Rashi explained, and this is his wording, etc.—his teacher gives him permission, he is precise in this so that his wording is clear, and the listeners will not err. Thus far his words. And since the matter depends on the listeners not erring, etc., likewise they can err in a simple matter, etc. Thus far his words. And also later in that same response he wrote, and this is his wording: For it is simple that what we said, "a student should not rule unless he has received permission from his teacher," etc., and it is obvious that the reason is not due to the honor of his teacher, but rather because perhaps he will not be precise in his words and they will err in his wording, etc. Thus far the wording of the Maharik. And why did they not mention at all in this that the reason is because of this?

And I saw in the Rivash (siman 271) who wrote that according to the method of the Rambam it is so: that in his actual presence – he is liable to death, and not in his presence – within twelve mil it is forbidden, and outside of twelve mil – occasionally it is permitted and permanently it is forbidden, for the reason that perhaps he will not be precise in his words. And he wrote that the incident of the student in Sanhedrin was permanently, see there. And I do not understand: for how is it possible to say that this incident was permanently? Behold, they said thus: a certain student came here and ruled for us etc. – it implies explicitly that he only ruled this ruling for them. Furthermore: since they erred in his words, if it should enter your mind that he established his place of sitting there – behold, he would have returned them from their error. Rather, certainly he was only a passerby, and he ruled this ruling for them. Furthermore: if it should enter your mind that the reason was due to the concern of error, how could the Rambam not mention this matter?

In my humble opinion, it appears that the Rambam would explain the incident of that student with a different interpretation. For according to the explanation of Rashi, it is very difficult: what benefit is there for one who "stammers in speech" in receiving permission from his teacher? Is it as if his teacher will correct his speech? And should you say that one who "stammers in speech" may not be ordained—we have not found such a thing. Furthermore: if so, was Rabbi Chiyya, who was unable to pronounce the letter chet, not ordained? It is a wonder. Furthermore: is it because a mishap occurred once that we should decree a permanent decree? Therefore, the Rambam explains that this student was punished in that his ruling did not turn out well because he ruled in the place of his teacher. And this matter is explicit in Ketubot (Ketubot 60b): The sharecropper of Abaye came before Abaye. He said to him: Is it permitted to be betrothed within fifteen months for a woman nursing the child of another? And he permitted it to him. When he came before Rav Yosef, he forbade it to him. Abaye ran after his sharecropper to retract his ruling, but did not overtake him. Abaye said: This matter that the rabbis said: A man should not permit in the place of his teacher is not because it appears like insolence, but because the matter will not be successful, for I have learned it, etc., see there. And here too in Sanhedrin it is so: that the matter was not successful for that student, and all because of the honor of his teacher. And previously they did not pay attention to this, like Abaye who did not pay attention because it does not appear like insolence. And afterwards, when they saw that the matter was not successful, they decreed in this that in the place of one's teacher it is completely forbidden. And not in the place of one's teacher, which is after twelve mil, it is permitted occasionally. But to establish a yeshiva for ruling is forbidden in any place, for this is insolence and disputing his teacher. And this prohibition existed previously, but regarding an incidental ruling in the place of one's teacher they were not strict, until they saw that the matter was not successful.

And know that from the words of the Rambam it is explained that this is all regarding one's primary teacher. However, regarding a student-colleague – it is permitted in all manners, for he wrote in law 9 that one is not obligated in the honor of a student-colleague in all these matters, see there. It is explicitly explained that it is permitted to rule even in his place. This is not the opinion of the other poskim, as will be explained. And the Rambam explains that which we say in Eruvin (Eruvin 63a) that a student-colleague is permitted even in his actual place. And I say that with this, that which is to be questioned is resolved: How indeed did Abaye rule in the place of Rav Yosef? Rather, it is because Abaye considered himself a student-colleague of Rav Yosef as is proven in the Shas, for to Rabbah he always spoke using the term "Mar" and to Rav Yosef he spoke in the second person "you." And from this language the Shas inferred in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 158b) that Ben Azzai was a student-colleague to Rabbi Akiva, see there. Therefore, he was not concerned about ruling in his place, until he saw that from Heaven they did not allow him. And perhaps then he considered him his primary teacher.

And the opinion of the Rashba in a responsum (siman 111) is so. For they questioned the Rashba that in Sanhedrin ibid. it is explained that only within three parsas is it forbidden to rule, and in Eruvin ibid. we say that in his presence one is liable for death, and not in his presence it is forbidden but one is not liable for death, and it implies even outside of three parsas. And the Rashba brought that the French sages answered regarding this that that which is in Sanhedrin refers to a talmid chaver, and according to their words, a complete student—even outside of three parsas it is completely forbidden to issue any ruling without taking permission. And a talmid chaver is forbidden within three parsas, and permitted outside of three parsas. And the Rashba, of blessed memory, rejected their words, for in Sanhedrin ibid. it is proven that they were complete students, see there. Therefore he answered that in Eruvin as well the intention is within three parsas, which is to say: certainly from the decree of Rabbi in Sanhedrin ibid.—it is forbidden even outside of three parsas, since the reason is because they stumble in his language, as I have written. Rather, for this there is hope when he takes permission from one of his teachers, but within three parsas he must also take permission from his second teacher who is in this border, see there. And behold, according to his words, within three parsas—one must take permission from all of his teachers. Outside of three—taking permission from one is sufficient.

And our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot in Eruvin there, wrote like the French sages that the Rashba cited, to distinguish between a complete student who is forbidden even beyond three parsaot, and a talmid chaver who is permitted beyond three, but within three even a talmid chaver is forbidden to rule. However, there in Sanhedrin they were not satisfied with this for the reason of the Rashba, see there. And they wrote to distinguish that in Eruvin it deals with one who did not receive permission from his teacher, for then even beyond three parsaot it is forbidden, and in Sanhedrin it is permitted beyond three parsaot with the receiving of permission, but within three even with the receiving of permission it is forbidden, for this is like being literally in his presence, see there. And the Rosh and the Tur wrote like the Tosafot in Eruvin, and like the French sages whom the Rashba brought, to distinguish between a complete student and a talmid chaver. And they did not clarify what their opinion is when he received permission from his teacher. However, from the words of the Rosh in Eruvin there, who after all these things concluded that it is not fitting for a talmid chakham to take authority in the presence of his teacher, unless he received permission from his teacher. Thus far his words. It implies that with the receiving of permission it is permitted in any case. And I wonder at the Tur who did not clarify this, and perhaps he relied on what he brought previously of the opinion of the Rambam that with the receiving of permission it is permitted, see there. And it implies that with the receiving of permission it is permitted even for a complete student and even in his presence, and perhaps literally in his presence it is forbidden in any case. And the Tur relied on what he wrote previously, that it is forbidden for a person to rule in the presence of his teacher forever. Thus far his words. Meaning: even with the receiving of permission. And nevertheless, he should have clarified, and in any case it appears that such is his opinion. And these are the positions of all our teachers according to what we have explained with the help of Heaven.

And according to this, you will see that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 4 (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chaim 242:4) combined two opinions together, and this is his wording: It is forbidden for a person to ever rule in the presence of his teacher. And anyone who rules in his presence is liable to death. And if he is twelve mil distant from his teacher, and a person asked him a matter of halacha by chance, he may answer; but to establish himself etc. is forbidden etc. or until he gives him permission. Thus far his words, and this is the view of the Rambam, of blessed memory. And afterwards he wrote: And some say that a total student within twelve mil is liable to death if he rules, and outside of twelve mil he is exempt but it is forbidden. And a talmid chaver within twelve mil is exempt but it is forbidden, and outside of twelve mil it is permitted. Even though he took permission from one teacher, it is not sufficient until he takes permission from all of his primary teachers. Thus far his words. And he combined the view of the French sages, which is the view of the Tosafot in Eruvin and the view of the Rosh and the Tur, with the view of the Rashba in the responsum that we cited. And these are separate resolutions, for according to the view of the Rashba there is no distinction between a total student and a talmid chaver. And also in this he did not explain well, for that which requires permission from all his teachers—this is only within three parsaot, and outside of three, taking permission from one is sufficient. And perhaps his intention is also so, and his words require great study. (And also the words of the Shach in subsection 10 are puzzling, for he wrote regarding that of a talmid chaver being permitted outside of three parsaot, and this is his wording: It implies even without taking permission, and so it implies from Tosafot in Sanhedrin etc., thus far his words. And it is difficult: for what does he bring from Tosafot there regarding a talmid chaver? Behold, they rejected there this distinction of a talmid chaver, see there, and they wrote to distinguish between taking permission and not taking permission from one's primary teacher. And what matter is it to a talmid chaver? And this law of the Beit Yosef is according to Tosafot in Eruvin. And also what he wrote: "It implies even without taking permission etc."—it requires study, what "implies"? It is obvious that it is so, for with the taking of permission even a primary student is permitted within three when not literally in his presence according to all views. And also what he wrote in subsection 11, that it refers to a total student, but for a talmid chaver it is sufficient to take permission from his teacher, thus far his words—they are very puzzling. For this law is from the Rashba, and he does not distinguish between a total student and a chaver, but rather distinguishes that within three parsaot one needs from all his teachers, and outside of three, one teacher is sufficient, but one teacher is necessary so that they do not err in his words. And if so, according to the Rashba, regarding a talmid chaver one could say that he does not need it at all, like the view of the Rambam. If [so], one can settle his words: that according to the words of the Beit Yosef who combined the two views, one must say so, but what is he teaching us? It is obvious that it refers to a total student, since he wrote "from all his primary teachers," this is not relevant to a talmid chaver. And this too is difficult for the Shach, for from the words of the Beit Yosef it is explicitly explained that for a chaver outside of twelve mil he does not need to take permission at all. And look closely and you will find it easy.)

And also the words of our teacher, the Rema, regarding this matter require investigation, for he wrote concerning that which was said of "all his teachers," and this is his wording: However, there are those who disagree, and they hold that if he received permission from one teacher—it is effective to rule outside of three parsas. But within three parsas—it is not effective for him. For it is clear from his words that there is an opinion that holds that even outside of three parsas one requires all his teachers. And it is difficult: who is the one who says so? Behold, this matter was an innovation of the Rashba to distinguish between within three, where one requires all his teachers, and outside of three, where one is sufficient. And also the intention of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, is such, for according to the other opinions, in every case one is sufficient, as they did not mention this matter at all. If so, what is the "there are those who disagree" that he wrote? And it requires investigation.

And also that which he wrote at the beginning of this section is difficult. For he wrote regarding that which it is forbidden to rule before one's teacher, and this is his wording: And even obtaining permission is of no avail within three parsaot if he is his primary teacher. Thus far his words, and it is difficult: For behold, this is the view of the Rambam, and according to the Rambam it is certainly permitted with the obtaining of permission when not literally in his presence. And this idea that anything within three parsaot is considered as literally in his presence—this is the view of the Tosafot in Sanhedrin, and it is not the view of the Rambam at all. And also that which he wrote, that all this applies to a primary teacher, but regarding a student-colleague—even within three parsaot it is permitted. Thus far his words. And it is difficult: For how could he write this according to the view of the Rambam? For behold, according to the Rambam, regarding a student-colleague it is permitted even in his presence, as I wrote in section 12. However, regarding this it can be said that indeed his intention is so, that even literally in his presence it is permitted. And proof for this is from what he wrote afterward: And some say that nevertheless, literally before one's teacher—it is forbidden. And even when not literally in his presence, if they began out of honor for the teacher to say they would ask the teacher, or if the teacher is preeminent in wisdom and age—one should not rule in his city. Thus far his words. For from this it is clear that according to the first opinion, even literally in his presence—it is permitted for a student-colleague. And that which he wrote "if they began out of honor for the teacher etc."—it is a simple matter that according to all views it is so, for behold, this enters the category of disgrace. And so too when he is preeminent in wisdom and age. And such is the primary ruling. (And in general, the words of the Shulchan Aruch are perplexing in this matter. And regarding this it is not relevant to say that they wrote this according to their own reasoning, as I have written several times. For it is not logical, since the entire essence is to reconcile the contradictions of the sugyot from Sanhedrin to Eruvin, and each one answered according to his view. If so, it is not relevant to graft two opinions together, as is understood. And it requires further study.)

And know that "establishing a midrash" which the Rambam wrote, according to his interpretation, refers specifically to one who establishes it to issue rulings. However, establishing a midrash without rulings is permitted (Beit Yosef, and with this he answered the difficulty of the Ramakh). And some say that even a midrash without rulings is forbidden due to the display of authority (Bach). And in my humble opinion, it is all one matter. For it is known that in the time of the Gemara and also in the time of the Geonim, rulings went out from the academy of the Exilarch or the head of the academy to all of Israel. And now that the student also establishes such a midrash to teach Torah to all of Israel and to issue them rulings—there is no greater case of one who disputes his teacher than this. And the Ramakh, who wondered about the Rambam as to why this is called disputing his teacher, wondered correctly according to his time, just as in this time when there is an establishment of a midrash in many towns, and no ruling goes out to the public from such a midrash. And certainly in this, "disputing his teacher" is not applicable; on the contrary, he shall magnify the Torah and make it glorious. But the Rambam took the law of the Gemara, and he was also not far from the time of the Geonim. And according to this, in this time, this law is not applicable at all. (So it appears in my humble opinion. And the Rambam and the Ramakh are both correct.)

And what is called a "distinct teacher"? The Rambam wrote that he learned the majority of his wisdom from him, and so it is in Bava Metzia (Bava Metzia 33a). Rashi explained there: if Scripture—Scripture, and if Mishnah—Mishnah. Thus far his words. But the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, explained: the majority of each and every wisdom (Shitah Mekubetzet). And so it is implied in the Yerushalmi which says: anyone from whom the majority of his study is derived, see there. And so it appears explicitly to be the opinion of the Rambam, and we can also explain Rashi in this way, meaning: if Scripture—Scripture etc., that from every matter of Torah, whether Scripture, whether Mishnah, whether Talmud—the majority of his wisdom must be from him. Nevertheless, he can have several distinct teachers: for this one established him in proficiency, and this one in sharpness, and this one in concluding the discussion according to the halakhah. Just as we find in the Shas that Rabbi Meir studied under Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Akiva, and Rav Yehuda studied under Rav and Shmuel, and Abaye and Rava studied under Rabbah and Rav Yosef. And the law of all of them is as a distinct teacher.

And this is what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: Until he takes permission from all his primary teachers. Thus far his words. For it is explained that there can be several primary teachers. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this, and this is his wording: And this term "primary" does not refer to the standard primary teacher from whom most of his wisdom is derived, for if so, it would not be possible for him to have many primary teachers. Rather, it means: a complete student, to exclude a student-colleague, which is one who has grown in Torah and become a colleague to his teacher, meaning he is close to being as great as his teacher, etc. And some say that anyone who is not his primary teacher, meaning that most of his wisdom is not from him—is a student-colleague. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, understood that according to the first opinion, he is called a "primary teacher" even though most of his wisdom is not from him, but rather that as long as he is lesser in wisdom compared to his teacher—the teacher is called a "primary teacher." And these are perplexing words, for regarding this there is no one who disputes that the halacha follows Rabbi Yehuda at the end of the second chapter of Bava Metzia: Who is a primary teacher? Anyone from whom most of his wisdom is derived. And although Rabbeinu Chananel and the Ra'avyah ruled like Rabbi Yosi there, that even if he only enlightened his eyes in a single halacha—he is called a "primary teacher," Maharik wrote that they did not rule so for all matters. And even if we say they ruled so for all matters, nevertheless, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch section 30 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242, 30) ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, and did not bring another opinion at all. Furthermore: if so, what is this "complete student" that our teacher, the Rema, mentions? For this can also be a great man. And the proof: for Rava said there, such as Rav Sechora who explained to me "zuhama listerin," see there. And you have no one greater than Rava, and all his words require investigation. (And also the Shach in subsection 12 elaborated to reject his words, except that he wrote that there can be several primary teachers, one for Scripture, etc., and according to what I have written there is no need for this, see there. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

And it appears to me that even from our teacher, the Rema, all these things were not hidden; rather, he holds that this was all in the generations of the Tannaim and Amoraim, whose learning was oral, by tradition from teacher to student. Some were experts in many Mishnayot and Beraitot, and some were not as expert but were sharp and analytical. And some were deliberate and reached conclusions according to the halacha. Therefore, it was possible for one to have several primary teachers: perhaps a primary teacher for Mikra alone, for Mishnah alone, and for Gemara alone. But in these times when our learning is from books, and the entire Talmud is written before us, and likewise all the novellae and all the poskim are written before us—it is obviously not applicable to make such distinctions, for they are all within them. And a primary student is not applicable now unless he studied in his yeshiva for many years and received from him the way of the Torah, whether in expertise or in straightforward reasoning, as is known. And according to this, now it is impossible for a person to have more than one primary teacher, and he is the first who established him upon the horn of the Torah. And regarding this he says that if so, how are several primary teachers applicable now? Rather, one must say that anyone who is minor compared to his teacher is called "his primary teacher." And according to this, there can be several primary teachers, and for this reason he brought the "some say" that it is not so, but rather anyone from whom the majority of his wisdom is derived. And if so, in this time it is impossible to have several primary teachers. (So it appears to my humble opinion to settle his puzzling words.)

The early authorities wrote that this which is forbidden for a finished student to rule in the place of his teacher, even beyond three parsaot—this is when his teacher comes there frequently, such as every week on the market day, or on Monday and Thursday, for it is considered the place of his teacher. But when his teacher does not come there frequently, even though he comes there at distant intervals—he is permitted to rule, for it is not considered the place of his teacher. (And the Rema brought this, and see Shach subsection 8. And this is in the Mordechai in Eruvin there in the name of Riva. And with this the sugyot are reconciled. And in any case, regarding the halacha, certainly all agree to this.)

Specifically, to issue a ruling in the place of one's teacher is forbidden. However, to debate with one's teacher regarding a particular ruling or instruction that does not appear correct to him as his teacher says, and he has proofs and evidence—this is certainly permitted, for the entire Shas is full of this, where the students debated with their teachers. And our sages, of blessed memory, said: Even a teacher and his student become enemies to one another in halacha—"Et vahev be-suphah," for afterwards they become beloved to one another. And so too a father and his son, and such is the way of Torah. And our sages, of blessed memory, said: And from my students more than all of them. And it is forbidden to flatter in matters of Torah, and the Torah is called "truth." Nevertheless, if his teacher stands by his opinion—it is forbidden for him to issue a ruling until his teacher admits to his words. (See Shach, subsection 3, and his words require great study. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

And this which is forbidden to rule in the place of one's teacher—specifically to rule on a case that comes before him, which is to say, halacha le-ma'aseh. But if they asked the student like whose words the halacha follows—he may say what is in his mind, since he is not ruling on a case that comes before him. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:8) that it is not called "ruling" except regarding a matter that contains a novelty for the inquirer. But regarding a known ruling that is simple to all, such as "noten ta'am lifgam," or to nullify a forbidden substance in sixty and the like—it is permitted. And there is one who wrote that anything written in the books of the rulings of the Geonim—one may rule in the place of one's teacher. Only he shall not rule a matter from his own heart, and he shall not rely on his own proofs to compare one matter to another on his own. Thus far his words. And there are some of our teachers who wrote that even a law revealed to all—it is forbidden to rule in the place of one's teacher, according to the plain meaning of the language of the Shas, for even "an egg in kutach"—it is forbidden to rule in the place of one's teacher (the Ran, cited by the Shach in small subsection 15). And so too regarding that which he wrote that a matter written in books is permitted, they raised a difficulty from there, for they said that even Megillat Ta'anit, which is written and placed—it is forbidden to rule a law regarding it (Hagahat Derisha). And there is one who answered that it deals with a novel matter in Megillat Ta'anit (ibid.). But behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, even in a novel matter permitted things written in books (Shach small subsection 16). And there is one who answered that it deals with one who comes to compare one matter to another in Megillat Ta'anit (ibid.). But it does not imply thus from Rashi and Tosafot in Eruvin there (Eruvin 62b), see there. And it is possible to say that in their days, even the matters written in the Oral Torah were in concealment, and they called it "Megillat Setarim," as Rashi wrote in Shabbat (Shabbat 6b). This is not the case in this time, for they are in public.

He further wrote in section 10 that it is forbidden for a sage to permit a matter that appears baffling to the public, for to the public it appears that he permitted the forbidden. Thus far his words. And this is specifically when left unexplained, but if he explains the reason why he permits it – we have no concern regarding it (Shach, subsection 17). And know that regarding this, that it is forbidden for a student to rule in the place of his teacher – even a question regarding his own household he is forbidden to rule upon, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 12, and this is his wording: If the members of a student's household required a ruling, and they asked him – he shall not rule for them in the place of his teacher. Thus far his words. And from this language it is implied that specifically for the members of his household, but for himself – he is permitted to rule and to act if he has reached the level of ruling. And the law is clear to him, for since he is not ruling for others – this is not a lack of honor for his teacher.

And all these matters regarding which it is forbidden for a student to rule—this is when by remaining silent there will be no ruin. But if by his silence they will come to commit a transgression—it is permitted to speak even in the actual presence of his teacher. And so our sages, of blessed memory, said in Eruvin ibid., that to separate from a prohibition, such as when one sees a person committing a transgression due to his lack of knowledge or due to his wickedness, and his teacher remains silent—it is permitted to separate him and to say to him that it is forbidden even in the actual presence of his teacher, as it is written: "There is no wisdom and no understanding and no counsel against Hashem." And in any place where there is a desecration of the Name of Heaven—one does not accord honor to a teacher, for the honor of Heaven comes first.

And even if his teacher died, or went to another country – it is forbidden for a talmid chakham to rule unless he has reached the level of ruling. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded (Avodah Zarah 19b): What is the meaning of that which is written: "For she has cast down many wounded, and all her slain are a mighty host"? "For she has cast down many wounded" – this refers to a student who has not reached the level of ruling and yet rules. And behold, such a person is a fool, wicked, and arrogant. And these minor students who jump to rule, and to sit at the head, and to aggrandize themselves before the am ha'aretz, increase dispute, and destroy the world, and extinguish the candle of the Torah (Tur). And that which is written: "And all her slain are a mighty host" – this is the opposite, for any chakham who has reached the level of ruling, and does not rule when they ask him to rule – behold, he withholds Torah, and places obstacles before the many. And how do we know if he has reached the level of ruling or not, for it is simple that a person cannot rely upon himself, we will explain with the help of Heaven. (And with this you will understand the words of the Rema in section 14 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:14), see there. Examine carefully and you will find it easy.)

During the time of the Temple and also afterward during the time of the sages of the Shas, semikha was practiced, which is to say that they ordained the sage to judge cases of fines and capital cases, for other matters do not require semikha. We explained all of this in Choshen Mishpat siman 3, see there. And three ordained judges, who are ordained by those ordained back until Moses our teacher who ordained Joshua, and Joshua ordained others, and others ordained others, and they call him "Rabbi." And semikha is specifically in the Land of Israel, as I wrote there. And after we were scattered due to our sins to all ends of the earth—semikha ceased from us, and we have no authority to judge cases of fines and certainly not capital cases. And only in monetary cases do we perform the mission of the former ones, as we explained all of this there at the beginning of siman 1, see there. And according to this, we asked a great question there in section 14, that if so, what is the semikha practiced in this time? And we explained there that this semikha is only a mere remembrance from the enactment of our rabbis, see there.

And this is the clarification of the matters: that the matter of semikha in this time is so that all the people shall know that he has reached the level of instruction, and that what he instructs is with the permission of his teacher who ordains him. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that therefore if his teacher has already died, he does not require semikha. And likewise, regarding a talmid chaver, he does not require semikha. Thus far his words. And according to the times before us, and furthermore from the generations of the ancients, every city chooses for itself a preeminent rav to instruct and to judge, and he is considered the preeminent rav for the entire city and the surrounding area. And no other person has permission, even if he has reached the level of instruction, to instruct or to judge in this place, unless the rav of the city gives him permission. For this reason they give him semikha, so that they may be able to choose him as a rav in some community. But without semikha, it is forbidden to be a rav or a moreh tzedek. And so our ancients conducted themselves, and Heaven forbid one should change it. And this is the essence of the matter of semikha in this time, and this is like the taking of permission and a testimony that he has reached the level of instruction.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who say that one who is not ordained as "Morenu" and administers gittin and chalitzot (in a place where there is no rav, or the rav died or went to another city)—his actions are of no consequence, and there is concern regarding the gittin and chalitzot that he administered. Unless it is known to all that he is an expert for the public, only that due to humility and lowliness he does not seek greatness. And in a case of iggun, one may be lenient if he already administered gittin and chalitzot, but not in any other way, for the custom of Israel is Torah. Furthermore, it seems to me that it is permitted to grant "Morenu" to someone so that he may arrange gittin, and even though according to the law of ordination in earlier days the law was not so, nevertheless, now it is nothing more than the taking of general permission, and it is permitted. Thus far his words. That is to say: in earlier days they would not grant permission to someone for a specific detail unless he was fit to judge and instruct in all the laws of the Torah, as the Rambam wrote in the fourth chapter of Sanhedrin. And we explained this in Choshen Mishpat, siman 3, section 13; see there. If so, how can they grant him permission to arrange gittin if he is not fit for all the laws of the Torah? However, since our ordination is nothing more than the taking of permission, it is therefore permitted even for one specific detail. Nevertheless, in our days we have not heard of this, and the custom is not so. Especially regarding the laws of gittin which are stringent, and involve the prohibition of a married woman—we do not grant ordination for this detail alone. And also regarding the laws of kiddushin—it is forbidden for one who is not an expert in the nature of gittin and kiddushin to attend to them, if there is even any question regarding the kiddushin and it is necessary to ask a preeminent rav.

And from the perspective of the matter of semikha that has been explained, it is the custom that the one receiving semikha is somewhat subordinate to the one granting him semikha. Similarly, one who studies in a yeshiva for a period of time, it is the custom to say that he is a student of the head of the yeshiva, even though it is possible that the head of the yeshiva heard more novellae from him. And these customs have a basis upon which they may rely. Our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly in section 5 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:5), see there. And the student cannot grant semikha to others in the place of his teacher. And if the one receiving semikha did not receive the semikha directly from that specific rabbi granting semikha, but rather through other rabbis, and he was joined to them as an adjunct—that rabbi has no authority to lord over him at all if he is not his teacher. For only when he granted him semikha alone, or if he was the primary granter of semikha, then it is the custom that the one receiving semikha shall be somewhat subordinate to him, as I have written.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 13: Every person should be careful not to rule when he is drunk from wine or other intoxicating things, even in a simple matter, unless it is a matter that is clear in the poskim. And it is a matter known even to schoolchildren. Thus far his words. This is the wording of the Rambam in the first chapter of Biat Mikdash: Just as it is forbidden for a kohen to enter the Mikdash because of drunkenness—so too it is forbidden for any person, whether a kohen or an Israelite, to rule while he is drunk. Even if he ate dates or drank milk, and his mind became slightly confused—he should not rule, as it is said: "And to teach the children of Israel." And if he ruled in a matter that is explicit in the Torah, such that even the Sadducees know it—it is permitted. For example, if he ruled that a creeping animal is tamei, and a frog is tahor, and blood is forbidden, and similar to this. And it is permitted for a drunk person to teach Torah, and even laws and midrashot, provided that he does not rule. And if he was a sage established for ruling—he should not teach, for his teaching is a ruling. Thus far his words. And it appears that his intention is to teach others, and so it is explained from the source of the law in Keritot, see there. And according to Rashi there, even to teach is permitted; unless he is a great man whom many ask questions, and he is unable to escape from this—it is forbidden to teach.

There is one who wondered at the words of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote that regarding a matter that is clear in the poskim, it is permitted to issue a ruling. For behold, the Rambam only permitted a matter explicitly stated in the Torah that the Sadducees admit to. And so it is found in Keritot there: for example, a creeping animal is impure, a frog is pure. And he wrote that perhaps an error fell into his words, and so it must be said: "a matter explicitly stated in the pesukim" (Shach, subsection 20). And there is one who explained that in truth his intention is indeed so, regarding a matter that is explicitly clear. And therefore he said: "and go read in the schoolhouse" (Taz, subsection 3). And in my humble opinion it is not so, for behold, in his book Darkhei Moshe (letter 6), he explicitly transcribed the words of the Maharik (169), that any law that is clarified in the poskim—it is permitted to issue a ruling. And it did not seem correct to me what the Terumat HaDeshen wrote, specifically that which is explicit in the Torah, see there. However, in truth it is not a difficulty at all, for behold, the primary reason is so that he should not come to err. And a matter explicitly stated in the poskim, such as "imparting a flavor for the worse" or "nullification in sixty"—an error is not relevant in this, obviously. And the Gemara which cited "a creeping animal is impure and a frog is pure"—the Talmud could not have said another matter, for in their time "a matter explicitly stated in the poskim" was not relevant, for behold, even regarding "imparting a flavor for the worse" there is a dispute. And it is not the way of the Gemara to speak thus. And the Rambam adopted the language of the Talmud according to his way, and also in his days the term "poskim" was not customary. But in truth, what practical difference is there between this and that? On the contrary, therefore he was precise to say: "and go read in the schoolhouse." That is to say: just as the Talmud permits a matter explicitly stated in the Torah because it is "go read in the schoolhouse," here too for us: a matter explicitly stated in the poskim is "go read in the schoolhouse." And as the Tur wrote regarding issuing a ruling in the place of one's teacher, see there. And regarding adjudicating monetary laws, see in Hoshen Mishpat, siman 7.

The Rambam wrote there that this applies specifically when one drank a רביעית of undiluted wine. If he drank only the amount of a רביעית and it contained any amount of water, or if he slept a little, or walked the distance of a mil – the wine has already passed, and he is permitted to rule. But if he drank more than a רביעית, even if it was diluted, or if he slept a little or traveled – it adds to his drunkenness. Rather, he must wait according to the level of drunkenness until nothing of his drunkenness remains; see there. And one who is riding is not like one who is walking, and requires three mil (Shach, subsection 19). And it appears to me that when one sits in a carriage – it does not dissipate the wine at all. And in these days of ours, the wines are very weak. And brandy certainly intoxicates, as does mead when one drinks a lot. And the Rashba wrote in a response (siman 247) that on a Yom Tov, or at a large feast such as a wedding feast, a circumcision, Purim, or the like, in places where they drink a lot – it is forbidden to rule the entire day until the next morning. But if he had already applied his mind to the ruling of the matter – it is permitted to rule, whether for prohibition or for permission, even after a large feast. Thus far his words. And the reason is simple: because in such a case he certainly will not err (also from the Rashba there is proof for what I wrote in the previous section).

There are those who wrote that just as it is forbidden to issue a ruling in the presence of one's teacher, so too one should not issue a ruling without consulting a book; for they are our teachers, and one must not issue a ruling in the presence of one's teacher. But these are matters that have no reason, and we have not seen the elder rabbis act in this manner. For it is understandable that in the presence of one's teacher it is a disgrace that they did not ask the teacher, but in this matter disgrace is not applicable. Everyone knows that everything we rule is from the words of our teachers, the poskim, and there is no concern for this at all. And something similar to this is stated explicitly in Yevamot (Yevamot 96b): Rabbi Eleazar, your student, sits and expounds, and everyone knows that his Torah is yours, see there. We too shall say the same: we rule, and everyone knows that it is the Torah of our teachers.

And one must be even more precise regarding what the Maharsha, of blessed memory, wrote in Sotah (Sotah 22a), and this is his wording: And in these generations, those who rule on halacha from the Shulchan Aruch, and do not know the reason for the matter of every thing if they do not first examine it within the Talmud etc., and an error falls into their ruling etc., and one must rebuke them. Thus far his words. And so wrote the "Tosafot Yom Tov" in the introduction to his work "Ma'adanei Yom Tov," and this is his wording: And even the Rav etc. who provided grain in his book Beit Yosef, and from within it made the work he called "Shulchan Aruch" etc. – he never intended to rule from his book, Heaven forbid etc., only one who has studied and delved into the Sefer HaTurim with his commentary the Beit Yosef, and is weary of finding the conclusion of every law – he will understand it from the Shulchan Aruch etc. Thus far his words. And although afterward commentaries were composed on the Shulchan Aruch by our teachers the Acharonim, nevertheless it is known that without the well of living waters from the Shas and the Rishonim – it does not turn out well. And we have already explained this in our introduction to this book of ours in the section of Choshen Mishpat, see there well.

It is forbidden for a disciple to call his teacher by his name, whether in his presence or not in his presence. Furthermore, even after his death it is forbidden. However, not in his presence and after his death – it is permitted to say "my teacher, so-and-so." In his presence, even this is forbidden; rather, he says to him simply "my teacher." And even to call others whose name is like the name of his teacher, if the name is unusual – it is forbidden for him to call them by this name, even not in his presence. But in his presence, even with a name that is not unusual it is forbidden; rather, he changes their name slightly. And this is like with his father, as we wrote in siman 240, section 14, see there. And know that there are those who wish to say that when his father is his primary teacher – he should call him "my teacher" and not "my father." And the proof is from the son of Rabbi, who called him "Rabbi" (beginning of the chapter "HaZahav"). But the custom is not so. And from Rabbi there is no proof, for he was the Nasi, and Torah and greatness were in one place. And we are accustomed to call him "Abba," and not in his presence "Abba Mori." (Shach, subsection 1. And that which we wrote is according to the words of the Taz, subsection 4. And also in the Rambam it is necessary to explain thus, and to slightly reverse the version in his words, as the Taz wrote. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

One should not extend greetings to his teacher, nor return a greeting to him, in the manner of the rest of the people. Rather, he bows before him and says to him with awe and with honor: "Peace be upon you, my teacher." And if his teacher extended a greeting to him, he says to him: "Peace be upon you, my master and my teacher." And so is the custom. And some say that a student should not inquire after the peace of his teacher at all, as it is said: "The youths saw me and hid." And this is the approach of the Yerushalmi, which said it is not our custom for the lesser to inquire after the peace of the greater. But in our Shas it is not so. And so wrote the Rambam and the Tur, see there. And know that in ancient times everyone would speak in the second person singular "you," such as "Peace be upon you, my teacher." But now we speak to an honorable person in the plural, and say "Peace be upon you [plural]," and all the more so to one's teacher. Only to his father does a son speak in the second person singular, even if he is his student, for to his father and his mother and his brother and his sister one speaks in the second person singular "you," and if they were to speak in the plural – it would be nothing but a cause for wonder. And so is the simple custom in all lands. (And that which the Yerushalmi said is also to hide oneself, but when they have seen him, he is obligated to extend a greeting.)

And one should not remove his tefillin in the presence of his teacher, for this is a lack of derech eretz. Regarding Jeroboam, our sages, of blessed memory, said in "Chelek" (Sanhedrin 101b) concerning that which is written, "and he raised his hand against King Solomon" – that he removed his tefillin in his presence, see there. And the reason is not understood. Some say it is because it will be explained later in section 50 that all labors a slave performs for his master – a student performs, except for untying a shoe, so that they do not say "he is a slave." But if tefillin are upon him – even this is permitted, for a slave does not wear tefillin. And now when he removes them – he exempts himself from this (Maharsha ibid.). And the reason is not sufficient. It appears more likely that it is known that it is necessary to uncover a bit of his head and hand, and in this there is certainly audacity to uncover the head or hand in the presence of his teacher. But if so, should it also be forbidden to don tefillin before his teacher? Perhaps because in donning them he accepts upon himself the yoke of the Kingdom of Heaven, which is not the case when he removes them. And regarding honoring a father, this law was not explained. And it must be said that because of the closeness of a son to his father – there is no objection if he removes tefillin in his presence. However, if his father is his teacher, it appears that he should not remove them in his presence.

And when he reclines with his teacher at a meal – he should not sit before him as an equal, but rather he sits at his side like one who sits before a minister. And when he takes permission from those reclining, such as for birkat hamazon and the like – he first takes permission from his teacher, and afterward from all those reclining. And if his father and his teacher are at the meal – the law is the same as with a lost object (see Shach, subsection 27). And now the custom is that one only takes permission from the host of the meal, and they say: "With the permission of the master of the house." But from one who is not the host of this meal, even his father or his teacher – one does not take permission from him. And if it is a meal of some society, they say only "With the permission of our masters, etc."

And he shall not pray in front of him, nor behind him, nor at his side. And it goes without saying that it is forbidden to walk at his side; rather, he should distance himself behind his teacher. And he should not align himself directly behind his back, but rather should incline himself to another side, whether when praying with him or when walking with him. And outside of four amot, everything is permitted. And the reason for all this is: so that he does not equate himself with his teacher, to stand or to walk adjacent to him as an equal. And even though behind his teacher he is not equating himself, and on the contrary, this is like a servant before his master, nevertheless there is another prohibition in this regarding prayer, as it appears as if he is prostrating to him. And there is also in this an interruption between him and the wall, and see Orach Chaim siman 94 (Shach subsection 28). Therefore, when walking on the way—it is permitted to walk behind him, and such is the proper conduct. And even regarding prayer, specifically when they pray in private. But in a congregation, the distribution of honor is not applicable, and it is permitted to pray facing him in his place (ibid.). And for a student-colleague—everything is permitted, only that his back should not be toward his teacher, for that is a great disgrace (ibid. subsection 29). And similarly, where it is permitted outside of four amot—his back should not be toward his teacher. And there are those who are lenient outside of four amot even in such a case (ibid. subsection 30), for due to the distance, it is not applicable to say his back is toward his teacher.

And he shall not enter the bathhouse with his teacher. The reason is not due to improper thoughts, as with his father, father-in-law, and sister's husband as explained in Even HaEzer siman 23, but rather due to honor: that he should not see his teacher while he is naked. Therefore, if his teacher needs his service to serve him in the bathhouse—it is permitted. And similarly, if the student was previously in the bathhouse, and afterwards his teacher came, he does not need to leave, since the reason is not due to improper thoughts, but rather due to honor. Therefore, when he was not the cause—it is permitted (and the difficulty of the Shach, subsection 31, is answered). Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 16 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242, 16) that all this applies in a place where they go naked in the bathhouse. But in a place where they go with trousers—it is permitted. And so the simple custom is to enter with one's teacher, father, father-in-law, mother's husband, and sister's husband into the bathhouse, even though in the Gemara they forbade them all. And it is all for the reason that now they go with trousers. Thus far his words. So it was in his time, but in our time it is not so. Nevertheless, the majority of the world is not careful in this, even bnei Torah as is known. And I wished to say that ordinary washing in the time of the Gemara was in one bathtub, and also now in Asia it is so, for in this improper thoughts are relevant as they are very close to one another. But in our bathhouses, which are only in one building, and there is a separation between one and another—improper thoughts are not relevant. And similarly regarding his teacher, it is not a lack of honor. But I found in the Mordechai, the fourth chapter of Pesachim, in the name of the Maharam of Rothenburg, who brought this reasoning and rejected it without proof, only writing that it is a "reasoning of the belly," see there. Nevertheless, it is a point of merit for the many, to say that they hold according to this reasoning. And one who fears the word of Hashem must be careful in this, for it is the law of the Gemara in Pesachim (Pesachim 51a). And we have already explained this in Even HaEzer there, section 8, see there.

He shall not sit before his teacher until he says to him "sit," and he shall not stand until he says to him "stand," or until he takes permission from his teacher to stand. And when he departs from him – he shall not turn his back toward his teacher in the manner of those who depart from a house, but rather he shall walk backward with his face toward his teacher, in the manner that one descends from the aron kodesh. And our sages, of blessed memory, said in Moed Katan (Moed Katan 9a) that one who takes leave of his teacher to travel to his city, even though he took permission from him, meaning the parting blessing, if he did not travel on that day, but rather stayed the night there and traveled the next day – he must take permission from him once again. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 16 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:16) that this is specifically when he did not tell him at the outset that he wants to stay the night in the city, but if he told him at the time he took permission – he does not need to return and take permission from him. Thus far his words. And this is from the Nimukei Yosef there. And the Acharonim (Shach subsection 33 and the Gra subsection 49) challenged this, that this is based on an error that fell in there, but it is not so. And there is one who toiled to settle it (Taz subsection 9), but the observer will see that it does not suffice as a settlement at all. However, I wonder that this law is not found at all in the Rambam, the Tur, or the Beit Yosef. And perhaps because in the Tosefta, chapter four of Sukkah, it does not appear so, and this is the wording of the Tosefta: A blessing for itself, as it is said (I Kings 8:66) "On the eighth day he sent the people away, and they blessed the king" – could it be that they do not require staying the night? The verse teaches (II Chronicles 7:10): "On the twenty-third day of the seventh month he sent the people away, and they went to their tents." How is this? They took leave while it was still day, and they rose early and went on their way. Thus far its words. Behold, it is explicit that they did not take permission another time. And even though since it is explicit in the Gemara otherwise – we do not pay heed to the Tosefta, nevertheless, one could say even regarding the Gemara that the students were stringent upon themselves. And the proof: for behold, their teacher Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai did not know of this, see there. And according to the distinction of our teacher, the Rema, one could say that the Gemara does not contradict the Tosefta, and the Tosefta is dealing with where they told him that their desire was to stay the night in the city. (And there were those who said and those who did not say. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

The previous law was not explained regarding honoring a father. It appears that this is because regarding a father there is no meticulousness in this, since he eats and drinks with him together, and all day and all night it is impossible to act so. Also, it is not the way of a father to be meticulous in it, and in this he is not similar to his teacher. And all the more so that which was explained regarding honoring a father, such as he shall not sit in his place, and he shall not stand in his place, and he shall not decide his words in his presence, and he shall not contradict his words even not in his presence, and he is obligated to stand before him from the time he sees him from a distance as far as his eyes can see, until he is hidden from him so that he does not see his stature (Kiddushin 33a) and afterward he may sit, and even if he was riding he must stand before him for one who is riding is considered like one who is walking, and likewise when he sits in a carriage (see Taz subsection 11 that regarding uncovering the head it is also forbidden while riding or sitting in a carriage, see there). And if the student is riding or sitting in a carriage and passes before his teacher, he does not need to stand, since one who is riding is considered like one who is walking. And know that regarding his father it was not explained when he must stand, and it appears that in this he is no less than his teacher. Or perhaps he does not need to do so much because of their great closeness to one another, and he is not so meticulous. And as I wrote regarding the law in the previous section. And this requires deliberation.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said in Kiddushin ibid.: A Torah scholar is only permitted to stand before his teacher morning and evening, so that his honor should not be greater than the honor of Heaven in the recitation of Shema, which is only twice a day. The Tosafot wrote that this is when they study in the teacher's house. However, in the presence of others who do not know that he already stood before him—he is obligated to stand. But when they are not studying in his house—they are obligated to stand every time they see him. They said further that if three were walking on the way: the teacher is in the middle, the greater one to his right, and the lesser one to his left. And it appears to me that this is even if he is not his primary teacher, and even if he is not his teacher at all but is merely greater than them—the derech eretz is that he should walk in the middle. And similarly, upon reaching an entrance, the one who is greater in Torah must go first. And one does not show honor on the roads, and one only shows honor at an entrance that is fit for a mezuzah (Berakhot 47a). And in a place of degradation, such as in a bathhouse and the like—honor is not applicable there, as is understood. And so it will be explained in siman 244 regarding the matter of standing and hiddur, see there.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 17 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:17) that this matter—that one does not show honor on the roads except at a doorway suitable for a mezuzah—applies when each one is going his own way and they are not in one group. However, if they are in one group, they show honor on the roads. And in a place of danger, there is no need to show honor at all. Thus far his words. This matter was written by the Tosafot and the Mordechai in Berakhot there, based on the difficulty they raised from Shabbat at the beginning of the fifth chapter, for it is explained there that they show honor on the roads. The Tosafot distinguished that in Berakhot it deals with a case where each one is going his own way, and in Shabbat it deals with when they went in one group. And the Mordechai answered that in Berakhot it deals with a place of danger, see there. And one must wonder about our teacher, the Rema, who joined the two answers together, as he should have divided them into two opinions. And perhaps he maintains that from the perspective of logic both are true. But it is a strained explanation.

And know that from the words of Rashi, of blessed memory, in Shabbat ibid., I learned another resolution regarding the contradictions between the sugyot. For Rashi explained there regarding that which "the donkey preceded etc." and the mind of Rabba bar Rav Huna was weakened. And the second one wanted to appease him, and said to him: A donkey whose affairs are bad etc. And Rashi explained: To inform him that I did not intend [it]. And on "his mind was weakened," Rashi explained that he was a superior, and he thought that he did it intentionally. Thus far his words. And it is difficult: For is it so that in a place where one must show honor, what benefit is there that he did not intend it? Behold, he is obligated to see to it that the superior goes first. However, when we examine closely there in Berakhot, it says "the donkey of Ravin preceded that of Abaye," and he did not say to him: "Let the master go etc.," and in Shabbat this phrasing is not present, see there. And the matter is clear, that in Berakhot, Abaye understood that Ravin did not do this intentionally, but since he thought that we show honor on the roads, he should have been mindful. And he said to him that we hold that we do not show honor on the roads, and he does not have to be mindful of who goes first. But in Shabbat, Rabba thought that the second one did this intentionally, and therefore he was meticulous. For even granted that we do not show honor on the roads, nevertheless, to precede him intentionally is a disgrace. And he said to him: "A donkey etc." — to inform him that he did not intend it, according to the explanation of Rashi. That is to say: since he acted without intention, there is no cause for meticulousness, since we do not show honor on the roads. And according to this, even in a place where we do not show honor, nevertheless, to precede intentionally is not proper.

One of the great authorities wrote in the name of the Responsa of the Gaonim that one must show honor both when entering and when exiting. And if there is a great man among them, once he has entered before them or exited before them—those coming after him do not need to honor one another (Birkei Yosef). And this is in the sense that one does not show honor to a student in the presence of the teacher. And it is simple that this is when they are all completely minor in comparison to him, but when there are several great men of Torah or great men of instruction, and he is the greatest of them all—he shall exit first, and after him each man according to his standing. (So it appears to me. and with this, that which the Birkei Yosef brought wondering about this law is settled, see there in Shiyurei Berachah. And so he himself wrote there. And that which he questioned from mayim acharonim—this is no comparison at all. Examine closely and you will find it easy.)

It is a simple matter that when the teacher stands – the student may not sit. And when the teacher is in a different domain – he is permitted to sit. Therefore, when they call the teacher to ascend to the Torah on the bimah – the student may sit, for since it is ten tefachim high and four wide – it is a domain unto itself. And also even when the Sefer Torah is resting there – he does not need to stand for this reason. And that which the people are accustomed to stand at the opening of the Aron Kodesh even without the removal of the Sefer Torah, such as during the prayers of the Yamim Noraim and the like – in truth there is no obligation according to the law, but rather they have so accustomed themselves for the sake of the honor of Heaven (Taz, subsection 13). And know that this fact that the bimah constitutes a domain unto itself – is specifically when it is made like a structure, and it is high. But when they read on the table – it appears that all is as one domain. And there is one who wrote that the table also, if it is ten tefachim high and four wide – it is a domain unto itself (Taz, ibid.). And from the wording of our teacher, the Rema, it is implied specifically on the bimah. And perhaps he did not care to be precise in this, because it is the way of the world to read on the bimah. (The Pri Megadim wrote in Orach Chaim at the end of siman 142, that when his teacher stands in his fixed place – the student does not need to stand even within four amot, see there. And according to this, what has been explained that when the teacher ascends to the Torah he does not need to stand – there is no need for the reason of a domain, but rather because this is his place appropriate for him. So wrote the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger. But when he stands to rest not in his place – he must stand, see there.)

All types of labor that a slave performs for his master—a student performs for his teacher. And if he is in a place where they do not recognize him, and he does not have tefillin on his head, and he is concerned lest they say about him that he is a slave—he does not put a shoe on him nor remove it, so that he does not appear as an actual slave. But regarding other services, there is no such concern. And anyone who prevents his student from serving him—withholds kindness from him, and casts off from him the fear of Heaven. And any student who treats the honor of his teacher with contempt—causes the Shekhinah to depart from Israel (Ketubot 96a).

One does not accord honor to a student in the presence of his teacher, unless his teacher accords him honor. And even if he himself does not accord him honor, but rather he is honored by the fact that they accord honor to the student – one accords him honor as well (Shach, subsection 39) even in the presence of the teacher, since he is honored by this. And even the student of the student or the son of the student – they are not to stand when they are in his presence because of his teacher or his father, unless the teacher accords him honor, or he is honored by this, as I have written. And this is specifically if his student or his son is also a student of this teacher, who is the teacher of the student. But if he is not his teacher – he must stand before his teacher and his father, even though his teacher and his father is the student of this teacher. And there is one who says that even if he did not study before him – the honor of the teacher of his teacher is greater than the honor of his teacher. And all the more so if he studied a bit before him, that the honor of his teacher is set aside before the teacher of his teacher (Shach, subsection 40 in the name of Mahari Cohen). And it appears to me that even according to this opinion, nevertheless the honor of his father is not set aside before him since he did not study before him, for the honor of his father is not set aside unless he is also his student. And know that the wife of the teacher – her honor is like his honor while he is alive (Taz, subsection 14 and see there carefully). And nevertheless one must honor her even after his death when she has not married another (see there in the Taz).

If one sees his teacher violating the words of the Torah – he should not protest against him with language of disparagement, but rather say to him: "Our teacher, you taught us such and such." And even if he wanted to violate a rabbinic prohibition – he is obligated to protest against him with this language. And one who sees his teacher performing an action, and he has a difficulty to raise against this if it is a Torah prohibition – he should raise the difficulty to him beforehand, and not let him perform the action. And if it is a rabbinic prohibition – he should let him perform the action and afterward raise the difficulty to him, since he does not know for certain that he is violating but only that he has a difficulty – it is like a rabbinic doubt, and the honor of the teacher is not set aside because of this (Eruvin 67b). And it appears to me that the law is also thus regarding his father, for what is the difference? Only if his father is not a talmid chakam – certainly he must protest to him with respectful language even regarding a rabbinic prohibition, for presumably he does not know the law, which is not the case with his teacher, as is understood. And likewise when he mentions some halacha before his teacher, he should say to him: "Thus you taught us, our teacher." And it appears to me that this was in the time of the Shas, when they would learn by heart. But now this is not the customary language.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 24 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:24): One should not say a matter that he did not hear from the mouth of his teacher until he mentions the name of its author. Thus far his words. And the reason is that the world assumes that everything he says, he heard from his teacher. And since he did not hear this matter from his teacher, he is obligated to mention the name of its author. And if he learned from two, he must mention regarding everything he says from whom he heard it. And the matter is understood that nowadays this law does not apply, for it is known that we rule and proceed from the books of our teachers. And if a certain sage innovated some insight, one says it in his name. And it is forbidden to say it without attribution, for nowadays when one says it without attribution, it appears that he innovated this matter, and it turns out that he has wrapped himself in a tallit that is not his, and it is a great prohibition (see Shach, subsection 43, and this is his intention).

When his teacher dies – he rends all his garments for him until he reveals his heart, just as for his father and mother. This is the opinion of the Rambam, but the Ramban holds that only regarding the matter that the rending is never sewn back together is his teacher equal to his father and mother, but regarding the rending itself – a handbreadth in the upper garment is sufficient, for so it implies explicitly in the Gemara (Moed Katan 22b). And he mourns for him with the baring of the shoulder, and with all the laws of mourning, for part of the day of death or part of the day of the report. And even for a distant report – he mourns for his teacher for one hour, and rends for him in the manner he rends for his father and mother. And one whose teacher's corpse is lying before him – he does not eat meat and does not drink wine, just as when his deceased relative is lying before him. And these laws will be explained further in siman 340 and 374 and 341. And when he mentions his teacher within twelve months, whether orally or in writing, he must say: "Behold, I am the atonement for his resting place," as with his father. And afterwards he says: "May his memory be for a blessing" (of blessed memory) or "May his memory be for the life of the World to Come," as I wrote in siman 240 regarding his father, see there.

Only in the presence of his teacher is it included in "all who hate me love death" (Eruvin 99a). Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 29 that this specifically refers to phlegm, which is something that exits his body with force. But regarding mere saliva—it is permitted, for spitting is an unavoidable necessity. Thus far his words. It does not appear so from Rashi there, see there. And how is "unavoidable necessity" relevant? He should have moved to another side and spat (Shach, small subsection 46, and it appears so at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Nedarim, see there). However, from the wording of the Gemara there, it appears explicitly like our teacher, the Rema, and the wording of Rashi can also be reconciled accordingly, see there. And know that it is not only prohibited in the presence of his teacher, but even in the presence of any person, if the other is disgusted and repulsed by this. For so it is stated in Chagigah (Chagigah 5a): "For God shall bring every hidden thing into judgment"—Rav said: This refers to one who kills a louse in the presence of his fellow and he is repulsed, see there. And so we learned in Masechet Derech Eretz (chapter ten): A person should not spit in the presence of his fellow, see there. Rather, in the case of his teacher—he is liable for death, but there is a prohibition in the presence of any person. Rather, he turns to the side and spits.

All these matters that have been explained regarding the honoring of one's teacher—this is all regarding one's primary teacher, from whom the majority of his wisdom is derived, whether in Mikra, Mishna, or Gemara. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 30 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:30): In these days of ours, the essence of the rabbinate does not depend on one who taught him pilpul and distinctions, but rather on one who taught him the halachic ruling and in-depth analysis, and established him upon the truth and upon the proper path. Thus far his words; that is to say: this is a primary teacher. But if he did not learn the majority of his wisdom from him—he is not obligated to honor him with all these matters. Rather, he stands before him once he reaches within his four amot, and he does not fill his eyes with him like his primary teacher. And he rends his garment for him just as he rends for all the dead for whom he mourns, and the tear is sewn. And this is even if he only learned one thing from him, whether small or great—he stands before him and rends for him. And in siman 340 it will be explained that now we do not practice this; see there. And any talmid chacham whose views are upright—he does not speak before one who is greater than him in wisdom, even though he learned nothing from him. And as we learned in the fifth chapter of Avot, that this is among the traits of the wise, that he does not speak before one who is greater than him in wisdom.

It has already been explained that anyone who has reached the level of instruction must instruct. And we say in Sotah (Sotah 22b): Until when is one called "reached the level of instruction"? Until forty years. And it asks: But did not Rava instruct, and all his years were only forty years? And it answers there: In cases of equals. And Rashi explained: If he is equal to the gadol of the city in wisdom, he is permitted to instruct. Alternatively: When there is no one greater than him in the city. And Tosafot explained that in cases of equals he should not instruct unless he is greater than all of them. And this is in a place where they did not accept upon themselves a permanent Rav. But when they have established a permanent Rav, it is forbidden for another to instruct, even if he is greater than him in wisdom and years. And the reason for the forty years is because "a son of forty is for understanding," as we learned in Avot. And according to this, the explanation of "forty years" is from when he was born. And the Tosafot explained there that this is from the time he began to study, and from that which we say "a person does not stand upon the mind of his teacher until forty years." See there in the Maharsha who questioned this. And so it is explained from the words of Rashi and the Ran in the first chapter of Avodah Zarah, and so it is explained from the wording of our teacher, the Rema, in section 31, see there. And it is explained from his wording like Rashi regarding the matter of "equals" as well, that in cases of equals it is permitted. However, now this law is not applicable, for in every single city they appoint a Rav to instruct rulings, and it is forbidden for anyone to encroach upon his boundary in instruction. And besides this, it is an encroachment of the boundary regarding livelihood, for now every Rav in his city receives a stipend, and his entire sustenance is from this. And when another instructs, his livelihood will be diminished, and this one who encroaches upon him is considered like a robber.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 31 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:31): A chacham who prohibited—his colleague is not permitted to permit based on legal reasoning. However, if he has a tradition that he erred, or if he erred in a matter of Mishnah—he may permit. And even if he erred in legal reasoning—he may deliberate with the teacher until he recants. Therefore, there is no prohibition for the inquirer to ask a second, provided that he informs him that the first already ruled to prohibit. And even if the first permitted and his ruling already took effect—the second [may not] prohibit based on legal reasoning. And all this is regarding that same ruling itself. But regarding another case—it is simple that he may rule as it appears to him. Thus far his words, and his words require explanation.

And what appears to my humble opinion is that this is the explanation: For behold, the reason that the second [sage] cannot permit [it], the Ra'avad, the Ramban, the Rashba, the Rosh, and the Ran wrote in the first chapter of Avodat Kochavim (Avodah Zarah 7a), that this is not due to the honor of the sage, but rather because once the sage prohibited it – it takes on the status of a "forbidden piece," see there. And automatically, if this sage erred in a matter of Mishnah or in the weighing of judgment, as is explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 25, meaning that the general consensus follows the permissive view – the status of a "forbidden piece" is not applicable, just as it is impossible to make fat into forbidden tallow. And therefore the Tosafot wrote there that a sage who prohibited – his colleague is not permitted to permit it unless he can cause him to retract, such as if he erred in a matter of Mishnah or even in the weighing of judgment, and the consensus follows the other [view] etc., thus far his words. And the Rosh who wrote there, this is his wording: And if he can prove that he erred in a matter of Mishnah – he shall cause him to retract. And if he disagrees with him in the weighing of judgment, such that his reasoning inclines toward permitting etc., he shall say: I say thus, but I do not permit what you prohibited etc., and it has become a forbidden piece etc., thus far his words. – This is not like the weighing of judgment of the Tosafot, for behold, the Rosh did not write that the consensus follows the other [view], but rather the weighing of judgment from mere reasoning. (And the Ran raised a difficulty from the weighing of judgment in Sanhedrin, see there. And it requires great study).

And this is the discretion that our teacher, the Rema, wrote, that "he may deliberate with the teacher until he retracts," thus far his words. For when he retracts—the "piece of forbidden matter" is removed, like one who imagined that this was forbidden fat and they explained to him that it was permitted fat, and he admitted it. But when he did not admit it—it remains a piece of forbidden matter, since it cannot be clarified with whom justice lies, neither from a Mishnah nor from a general sugya. And therefore, since the reason is not due to the honor of the sage—the questioner is permitted to ask another, provided that he tells the other that he already asked the first, and he will see if he has the ability to clarify that he erred from an explicit matter, or from a general sugya, or if he has a tradition for permission—he may permit. And so, even if he permits only from general reasoning, if the first admits to him—it is permitted, and if not—it is forbidden. And consequently, the opposite, regarding a sage who permitted—his colleague may forbid, for so wrote the Tosafot there, see there. And our teacher, the Rema, explained the matter: "And this is when his ruling took effect." That is to say: certainly if the second can clarify that he erred from an explicit matter, or from a general sugya, or from his tradition for a prohibition—he makes him retract even if his ruling took effect. But if he cannot clarify that he erred except from general reasoning, therefore when his ruling took effect, that is to say when he already cooked or mixed it with other permitted matter—he shall not forbid, since he cannot clarify the error, and perhaps the reasoning of the one who permits is better. But when his ruling did not take effect, where the question remains as before—he shall forbid it, since according to his reasoning it is forbidden. And in this it is not similar to a sage who forbade, for then even without the ruling taking effect—the second cannot permit, for a prohibition is not similar to a permission. And all these matters are clarified from the words of our teachers there, and in Chullin 44b and in Niddah 20b, see there.

And according to this, the words of our teacher, the Rema, are clarified perfectly, and this is what he means: A sage who forbade—his colleague is not permitted to permit based on judicial discretion, meaning: from judicial discretion of mere reasoning. And this applies even if his ruling did not take effect such that it made it a "piece of forbidden matter." But if he has a tradition, or if he erred in monetary laws—he can permit. And the same law applies to judicial discretion regarding a general Talmudic discussion. For it is one and the same reason, that in this case "piece of forbidden matter" does not apply, just as regarding fat—forbidden fat. And he says further: That even if he erred in judicial discretion of reasoning—he can deliberate with him until he retracts. Meaning: that since he retracts—the "piece of forbidden matter" is removed, as I have written. And he wrote further: And therefore there is no prohibition for the inquirer etc. meaning: that since the reason is not due to the honor of the sage but rather due to "piece of forbidden matter"—therefore the inquirer may inquire of another, and inform him that he inquired of the first. And perhaps he will make him retract through his reasoning, or show him that he erred in monetary laws, or in tradition, or in a general Talmudic discussion, and then he does not require his retraction. And he says further: And even if the first permitted, and his ruling already took effect—the second may not forbid by force of judicial discretion. Thus far his words. Meaning: it is not only necessary to state regarding a sage who forbade, that the second cannot permit from judicial discretion of reasoning. Rather, even a sage who permitted—his colleague cannot forbid by force of judicial discretion of reasoning. Only that regarding a sage who permitted—his ruling must take effect, which is not the case regarding a sage who forbade, and as we have explained with the help of Heaven. And he says further that regarding another case—it is obvious that he does not need to look at the ruling of the predecessor, whether for permission or for prohibition. For since this is only from judicial discretion of reasoning—anyone who has reached the level of ruling may rule according to his reasoning. (And the Shach in subsection 55, and subsection 58, and subsection 59 lengthily disagreed with the Rema. And all his words require great scrutiny, and the main point is like the Rema. And we have already dealt with this at length in our book "Or Liyesharim" siman 146, see there. And all this is clarified from the words of the Rishonim. Examine carefully and you will find it easy.)

Some say that regarding this rule that a sage who forbade, his colleague cannot permit—this is even when he is greater than him in wisdom and in number. And some say that this is specifically when they are equal. Therefore they said: his colleague cannot permit, but when he is greater than him—he is permitted to permit (so wrote the Shach, subsection 53). And so the mind inclines, for since they differ in mere reasoning—certainly the reasoning of the greater one is more straight. Therefore also in the reverse, regarding a sage who permitted and one greater than him is inclined to forbid—he shall forbid even if the ruling of the first has already taken effect. And all the more so that every rabbi in his place, the ruling of another is nothing, whether for prohibition or for permission. And a fortiori regarding those who have not reached the level of ruling and exalt themselves to rule, for there is no substance in their ruling, and it is considered as nothing. And know that regarding this which they said, his colleague cannot permit—even ex post facto it is not permitted. So wrote the Ran in the name of the Ra'avad (Shach, subsection 54, and so wrote the Rivash). Furthermore, they wrote in the name of the Maharshal that if the first sage forbade the matter not because of the law, but because of a fence and a safeguard—the second cannot permit even in another case (ibid., subsection 60). And I wonder: how is it in our power to make fences and safeguards on our own to instruct others? And it requires further study.

And know that this law, that a sage who prohibited, his colleague cannot permit, is found neither in the Rambam nor in the Tur. Yet is it not an explicit Gemara in several places? And I have not seen anyone who remarked upon this. And it appears in my humble opinion: that these, our teachers, maintain that now, after the books of the Shas and the poskim have spread—this law is not applicable at all. For it has already been explained that this law only applies when they disagree based on mere reasoning. And now, you have no matter of ruling that does not have a proof from some Gemara or some posek, and it is generally remote to rule based on mere reasoning. And if it is because the poskim also disagree. However, in truth, regarding this the Rambam explained at the end of the first chapter of Mamrim, and this is his wording: Two sages who disagreed etc., one prohibits and one permits etc.—in a Torah matter, follow the one who is stringent; in a rabbinic matter, follow the one who is lenient. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, in Hoshen Mishpat siman 25 brought these words. And he added to this: that specifically when the disputants are equal, and not a minor against a great one, nor an individual against the many, see there. And we explained there in section 12 that if he is great in Torah and has the ability to decide with proofs, and the general practice has not spread like one of them but rather some rule so, in a Torah matter for stringency and in a rabbinic matter for leniency. And in monetary matters—one does not extract money from a state of doubt, see there. (See Shach in the summary of the conduct of Issur V'heter in letter 1, and he follows his own approach where he disagrees with the Rema. And we have already clarified that the primary view is like the words of the Rema, therefore his words should not be transcribed.)

A great principle in the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch: when they first write one opinion anonymously, and afterwards they write "there are those who say" – or "there is one who says" – the first opinion is the primary one (ibid. letter 5, see there). And if the teacher and the student are counted as one opinion or as two opinions, we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 18 section 5, see there. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 25 that this rule that the halacha follows the majority – even if they do not agree for one reason, but rather each one has his own reason, since they are equal regarding the law – they are called "the majority," and we follow them. Thus far his words. And there is one who disagrees with him, that regarding a Torah prohibition it is not effective, and they are not called "the majority" (Shach ibid. letter 7). And from the words of the Rambam, chapter ten of Sanhedrin, it is implied like the words of our teacher, the Rema. And we explained the words of the Rambam in Choshen Mishpat siman 18 section 12, see there. And so I found that the great authorities rejected the words of the one who disagrees. (The Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger cited in the name of Sha'ar Efraim and Megadim Chadashim, who concluded like the words of the Rema, see there.)

In any place where the words of the Rishonim are written in a book, and the Acharonim disagree with them – we follow the Acharonim. However, if there is sometimes found the words of a Gaon and the Acharonim did not see it, and they disagree with this law – there is no need to rule like the Acharonim, for perhaps if they had known his words, they would have retracted. And some say that we always do not listen to the Acharonim against the Rishonim, and one must deliberate on this. Nevertheless, if the teacher has the ability to decide – he may rule as it appears to him. In any event, one should not disagree with the early Geonim. And prior to the Rif, of blessed memory, the generations of the Geonim had already ruled (Shach ibid. note 8).

Just as it is forbidden to permit the forbidden—so too it is forbidden to forbid the permitted (ibid. letter 9). And so it is stated explicitly in the Yerushalmi at the end of the fifth chapter of Terumot (Yerushalmi Terumot 5:3): Rabbi Eleazar said: Just as it is forbidden to purify the impure—so too it is forbidden to impurify the pure. See there. And even regarding matters of idolaters, and even in a situation where there is no loss. Therefore, if he was required to forbid due to a doubt—he must state that the prohibition is not certain, but rather that because of the doubt it is necessary to be stringent. And likewise, when he permits sometimes in a time of pressing need, or a great loss—he is obligated to state that because of this he permits (ibid.). And a great principle one must know: in every place where our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, permit in a time of pressing need or in a case of great loss—it is because the primary law appears to them to be permitted, but because many poskim are stringent. Therefore, in a time of pressing need or in a case of great loss—we establish it upon the primary law. (In letter 10, the Shach explained the law not to form separate groups: that these would rule like this posek, and those like that posek. And we have already explained this above at the end of siman 180, see there.)

The preeminent teacher, if he wished to forgo his honor in all the matters that have been explained or in one of them, for all of his students or for one of them – his honor is forgiven. And even though he forgave – it is a mitzvah for the student to glorify him, and all the more so not to disparage him, Heaven forbid. And just as the students are obligated in the honor of the teacher, so the teacher must honor his students and draw them close. And the sages said: Let the honor of your student be as dear to you as your own. And the students are the spiritual children who benefit him in this world and in the World to Come. And they increase the wisdom of the teacher, as our sages, of blessed memory, said: And from my students I have learned more than from all of them. For just as a small piece of wood ignites the large one – so the student sharpens the teacher with his questions, until the halacha emerges in its clarity. And the laws of the lost object of his father and the lost object of his teacher, which takes precedence – has already been explained at the beginning of the siman. And his own lost object takes precedence over all of them.

Any talmid chakam who says a matter of halacha that pertains to himself, if he said it before the act—we listen to him, and after the act—we do not listen to him (Yevamot 77a). And specifically when he said: "Thus I received [as a tradition]." But if he says a matter based on logical reasoning, and shows a basis for his words and it appears so—we listen to him. And this is when the reasoning is proven regarding this law. But if the reasoning is proven regarding another law, but he compares one matter to another—one should not rely on him unless the comparison is simple (see Turei Zahav, subsection 21). And all the more so if he shows his words in some posek, that we listen to him. And if there is a leader of the generation and he agrees with his words—we listen to him in any case (so it implies in the Gemara ibid.). Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 31 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 242:31): One who says to his fellow: "I do not accept from you even if you were like Moshe Rabbeinu"—they lash him because of the disgrace. Thus far his words, meaning: the disgrace of Moshe Rabbeinu. And therefore we find in the Gemara: Even if they said "Yehoshua bin Nun"—we would not obey him. But Heaven forbid to say "like Moshe" for the reason we explained. And besides this, it is impossible to be like Moshe, as it is written: "And there has not arisen a prophet in Israel like Moshe, etc." (See Pri Megadim at the beginning of Orach Chaim, who wrote several rules regarding the poskim, and the conduct of the questioner and the one being questioned, and that they should not send a young boy or girl to ask questions. See there.)