Siman 240

Honoring father and mother and fearing them are positive commandments, as it is said: "Honor your father and your mother," and it is said: "Every man shall fear his mother and his father." These are among the great commandments, and the weightiest of the weighty. And how great is the power of this commandment, for the Scripture equated His honor and fear, may He be blessed, to their honor and fear, as regarding Him, may He be blessed, it is also written: "Honor the Lord with your wealth," and it is written: "The Lord your God you shall fear": just as He commanded regarding the honor and fear of His great and holy Name – so He commanded regarding their honor and fear. And according to the Yerushalmi Kiddushin (chapter one, halacha 7), their honor is preferred, and thus it is stated there: Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai taught: Great is the honoring of father and mother, for He preferred it more than His own honor. It is said here "Honor etc.", and it is said further on "Honor the Lord with your wealth." With what do you honor Him? With your wealth: one sets aside leket etc. but honoring father and mother: whether you have or whether you do not have – honor, even if you must beg at doorways. Thus far his words. And regarding the essence of this law, it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven in section 18, see there.

Honoring father and mother is among the rational mitzvot, and it has spread among every nation and tongue. Even those who deny the Torah are careful with it due to reason and nature. We, the people of the children of Israel, were commanded regarding every rational mitzvot not to perform them because of reason, but rather because of the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, in His holy Torah. And regarding this it is said: "And it shall come to pass, because you hearken to these ordinances, etc.," for previously it is written, "And you shall keep the statutes and the ordinances, etc.," and to this it says "And it shall come to pass, because you hearken to these ordinances," meaning: the statutes you will certainly perform because you hearken to My voice. However, the primary reward is that even the ordinances, which are the rational mitzvot—you shall perform because of the hearkening, meaning because I command you, and not because of reason. This is what David said: "He declares His words to Jacob, His statutes and His ordinances to Israel." And this is a great principle in the mitzvot of the Torah.

It appears to me that this is why in the latter Utterances it is written: "Honor your father and your mother as Hashem your G-d commanded you." That is to say: do not honor them because the intellect dictates so, but rather as Hashem your G-d commanded you. In the first Utterances they did not require this, because they were at a great level, as it is written: "I said... and you are all sons of the Most High." And it is obvious that everything they did—they did only because of the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. But in the latter Utterances, after the sin of the calf when they fell from their level—they required to be warned about this. (And so too regarding Shabbat it is written there accordingly, because this too is agreed upon by every nation and tongue to rest one day a week. And for this it says: "Observe the Shabbat day to sanctify it as [Hashem your G-d] commanded you," and not because of the intellect.)

And there are those who asked: Why do we not recite a blessing over this mitzvah? And so too regarding several mitzvot there is this question, such as tzedakah and acts of loving-kindness and those similar to these. And in my humble opinion it appears: that since every nation and tongue performs them, granted that they perform them because of reason, nevertheless, since in the action they are equal and the difference is only in the thought in the heart—that these perform them because of the command of the Holy One, Blessed be He, and those because of reason—they did not institute a blessing over this that they should say "Who has sanctified us with His mitzvot and commanded us, etc." And we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 427, see there. (And over the sending away of the nest one truly must recite a blessing, as I wrote there.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:1) that the beit din does not compel regarding the commandment of honoring father and mother, for it is a positive commandment whose reward is stated alongside it, for which a beit din does not compel. Thus far his words. And this is explicitly stated in Chullin (Chullin 110b) regarding one who did not honor his father and they imprisoned him. And they said that there is no need for this, for the reason that it is a positive commandment whose reward is stated alongside it etc., and so I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 97 regarding the returning of a pledge. And there is a question regarding this: for behold we find in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 8b) that they compelled regarding tzedakah, and behold there it is also written "for because of this thing [the Lord your God] will bless you etc."? And the Tosafot answered there that this compulsion was with words, and not actual compulsion. Furthermore: that it deals with a case where they accepted upon themselves that they should be compelled (our teacher, Tam). Furthermore: that regarding tzedakah there is the negative commandment of "do not harden your heart" (our teacher, Isaac). Furthermore: that which the beit din is not careful about—this means that they are not punished if they do not compel. But nevertheless, if they desired—they may compel (Ritzba in Tosafot ibid.).

And they further raised a difficulty from the Yerushalmi in Kiddushin (chapter one, halacha 7) regarding one who did not want to sustain his father, and they coerced him with all types of coercion until he gave him sustenance. And it says there: Would that every tradition were as clear to me as this tradition, that they coerce the son to sustain the father, see there. And the Mordechai in Bava Batra there answered that they do not coerce with great coercion, but they perform a bit of coercion (the Taz, subsection 1, cited this). And I wonder: for in the Yerushalmi there it is explicitly explained that they were coercing him with light coercion, and they commanded to coerce him with severe coercion, which is to bind him, see there. And perhaps they would say that even this is considered light coercion, and the difficulty is evident. And in my humble opinion, it would seem that certainly for the sake of the mitzvah itself—they do not coerce for a positive mitzvah whose reward is specified alongside it. However, this is when it does not affect the necessity of others, such as in Chullin where he did not honor his father, and he transgressed a positive mitzvah. But regarding sustenance, his father did not need to take from his son, and he had it from another place. This excludes the case in the Yerushalmi where his father had nothing to eat—it is obvious that they coerce the son to feed him. And not so that he fulfills the mitzvah, but rather because of the suffering of his father who is hungry for bread. And automatically, he fulfills the mitzvah as well. Therefore, regarding tzedakah they coerce, and not so that he fulfills the mitzvah but rather because of the suffering of the poor, and automatically, he fulfills the mitzvah as well. And according to this, that which our teacher, the Rema, says, that the beit din does not coerce for the mitzvah of honoring a father and mother, certainly it is so—if it is only a matter of honor, such as if he does not show him honor and the like. But in a case of bodily suffering, such as when his father and mother are hungry for bread—it is impossible to turn a blind eye to this, and they coerce him to sustain them with all types of coercion, if only his hand can reach it.

The Rambam and the Tur wrote: Regarding honor, He preceded the father to the mother, as it is written: "Honor your father and your mother." And regarding awe, He preceded the mother to the father, as it is written: "Every man shall revere his mother and his father." This is to teach that both are equal, both regarding honor and regarding awe. Thus far their words. The explanation of their words: It appears as they wrote in the Midrashim, that sometimes He precedes heaven to earth, and sometimes earth to heaven, to teach that both are equal. And so too with Moshe and Aharon, for sometimes it is written "Moshe and Aharon" and sometimes it is written "This is Aharon and Moshe" – to teach that both are equal. And even though in the Gemara in Kiddushin there they gave another reason for this, that because a person is accustomed to honor his mother more than his father, therefore He preceded "his father," and because a person is accustomed to fear his father more than his mother, therefore He preceded "his mother," see there. However, there are many faces to the Torah, and for the halacha there is no practical difference. And know that this fact that both are equal – this refers to each one on their own. But when one needs to honor both of them as one – the father comes first, as will be explained in section 37.

Honor and awe are two distinct matters: Honor consists of matters of actual deeds, such as feeding him, giving him drink, and the like, as will be explained. Awe is the fear of their stature, for awe is in the heart. Therefore, regarding any matter entrusted to the heart, it is said: "and you shall fear your G-d." And the prophet said: "with their mouth and with their lips they honored Me, but their heart they have removed far from Me, and their fear of Me is a commandment of men learned by rote," meaning that the awe is nothing. And any matter that involves a lack of honor—one violates "Every man shall fear his mother and his father," and all the more so when he disparages them with words.

What is awe? He shall not stand in the place designated for him to stand there in the council of elders with his colleagues, or the place designated for him to pray. And he shall not sit in the place designated for him to recline in his house or in his shop. And it is understood of its own accord that standing in the council of elders in the place designated for him is only relevant to a person of great stature, and not to a simple man. But regarding sitting in his house, even for a simple man, it is the way of the master of the house to recline at the head of the table, and it is forbidden for the son to sit there, whether in his presence or not in his presence. The poskim wrote that regarding the place designated for his father for sitting—it is only forbidden for him to sit there. However, to stand is permitted. But in the place designated for his father for standing—it is forbidden for him to even stand there (Beit Yosef and Taz and Shach subsection 1). And it is obvious that the law is also thus regarding his mother, but because it is not the way of a woman to have a fixed place, they therefore did not speak of this. Therefore, if his mother has a fixed place—it is forbidden for him to sit there. And so too a daughter—she should not stand in the women's beit knesset in the place designated for her mother, unless she gives her permission. And so too a son regarding his father's place in the beit knesset, when he gives him permission—he is permitted to stand. And it seems to me that now sons stand in their father's place in the beit knesset when the father is not there. And the reason is that this is the custom, and it is as if he gave him permission. And no one opens his mouth or chirps against this, and the father is not particular about it.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work in the name of Orchot Chaim, that it is forbidden to sit at his side without intermediaries, and he brought a proof for the matter. Thus far his words. And in our days we have not heard of this. And also in the Shulchan Aruch he did not bring it, nor did he explain his proof. And it appears that his proof is from Samuel (I Samuel 20:25), as it is written: "And the king sat upon his seat etc., and Jonathan arose and Abner sat by Saul's side." And Rashi and all the commentators explained: because David always sat next to Saul, and Jonathan next to David, and Abner next to Jonathan. And now that David's place was empty – Jonathan remained adjacent to his father, and it is not the way of the land. Therefore they switched places, so that Abner sat next to Saul, and Jonathan next to Abner. And all the later authorities did not bring this law, and learn from this that they were not concerned for it. And from there there is no proof, for the honor of the king is different, and one does not learn from this. And also the custom is not so. (And also in the Tosefta chapter seven of Sanhedrin there is a contradiction to this law, see there. And be precise and you will find it easily.)

And know that there are many cases where the father is elderly, and his son takes him into his home to his table, and the son sits in his permanent place as before, and the father sits at his side. And the father is not meticulous about this. And also according to the law there is no concern, for since the son is the master of the house and his wife sits beside him, if so, it is impossible for the father to sit at the head beside his daughter-in-law. And of necessity the son must sit in his permanent place near his wife, and automatically the father's place is to the side. Nevertheless, the obligation is upon him to wash his hands first, and to give him the first portion, and also the other distinctions of honor at the table are given to the father. And so we practice and one should not change.

It was taught in a baraita in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 31b): And he may not contradict his words, nor may he decide between them. Rashi explained: If his father and another sage were divided on a matter of halacha, he should not say, "The words of so-and-so appear correct." Thus far his words. And the Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah that this is not necessary, as that would be contradicting his words; rather, even if his father's words appear correct to him, he should not say, "My father's words appear correct," for it appears as if he is deciding his father's words. Rather, if he has a response to answer those who disagree—he should answer. Thus far his words. And it is also forbidden to say, "The words of so-and-so appear correct," for this is also like contradicting his father's words (Shach, subsection 2). And all this is only in his presence, but not in his presence—behold, we find in the Gemara that Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Shimon disagrees with his father (Shabbat 44a). And Mar bar Rav Ashi said: This [statement] of father's was from [his] childhood (Gittin 29b). And the Rambam disagrees with his father in the eleventh chapter of Shechitah, law 10, see there. And the Tur disagrees with the Rosh. And how is it possible to say that one should not disagree on laws with his father? Is it not the Torah of Hashem, and it is a Torah of truth and one does not show favoritism in it? And even in his presence, the son may engage in pilpul with the father, and raise difficulties and resolve them, and establish the halacha on its proper foundation. And there are many instances in the Gemara where the son raised a difficulty to his father and he answered him, and such is the way of Torah. And there is one who says that to contradict his words is forbidden even not in his presence (Shach, ibid.). And I wonder at that which we brought from Mar bar Rav Ashi. Rather, in his presence it is forbidden to speak in a language of contradiction, for it is not the way of honor. Rather, he should deliberate with him until one concedes to the other. And even if the son remains of his opinion that it is not so—he should keep this in his heart, and not say to him explicitly: Your words do not appear correct to me.

And there is a doubt regarding worldly matters whether he is permitted to contradict his words and decide. And perhaps specifically in Torah matters it constitutes a lack of honor and not in worldly matters, or the opposite: since even in matters of Torah it is forbidden – all the more so in worldly matters. And so appears to be the primary view. And it is a simple matter that if his father says to him "it is my will to hear your opinion," he must say to him according to what appears to him, whether in matters of Torah or in worldly matters, even when his opinion is opposite to the opinion of his father.

And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 2 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:2): And he shall not call him by his name, neither in his life nor in his death, but rather says "my father, my master." If his father's name was the same as the name of others—he changes their name, if it is a name that is wondrous such that not everyone is accustomed to calling by it. But a name that they are accustomed to—it is permitted to call others by it not in his presence. Thus far their words. And there are those who disagree, that not in his presence it is permitted to call others even by a wondrous name, and by a name that is not wondrous—it is permitted even in his presence (Derishah and Shach subsection 3). But there are those who decided in accordance with the words of the Shulchan Aruch (Taz subsection 5). However, in any event, to call his father by his name—it is forbidden even not in his presence. And that which the Tur always wrote "my lord, my father, the Rosh" is because this is a way of honor, meaning: a head to all of Israel. So wrote the Maharshal in Yam Shel Shlomo (first chapter of Kiddushin, siman 65), that the Rosh was not his name, and his name was "our teacher, Asher." And consequently, the Rosh is not his personal name, but rather a title of honor.

And I am astonished: For we find at the end of the first chapter of Gittin that Rabbi Dostai b'rebi Yannai said: "If they had killed Dostai, who would have given Yannai my father a son like me?" See there. And Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai said: "I say to Yochai my father" (Pesachim 112a). And Rabbi Yosei said: "Even Abba Chalafta was among them" (Sanhedrin 80a). And Yaakov said: "And the names of my fathers, Avraham and Yitzchak." And Shlomo said: "David my father." And besides this, they did not say "Abba Mari," but simply "Abba." And also in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 81a) it is stated: He says to him, "Abba, a verse is written, etc." And so said Rav Yehuda to his father, see there. And in truth, in the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b) it is not found that one must say "Abba Mari" except when saying a matter of halacha in his name in public, see there. And to say that the intention of the Rambam and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is also thus—it does not appear so from the plain sense of their words, but of necessity one must say so. Or perhaps their intention is that he should not call him by his name alone without "Abba," but when he says "Abba [So-and-so]"—it is permitted. And that which they wrote: "rather he says 'Abba Mari'"—is regarding a matter of halacha when he speaks in his name, for in that case it is appropriate to say "my teacher." But in mundane matters—he should say "Abba [So-and-so]," for how is "my teacher" relevant to mundane matters? And so appears to be the primary view.

To what extent does their awe reach? If the son was dressed in fine garments and sitting at the head of the assembly, and his father and mother came and tore his garments, and struck him on his head and spat in his face – he shall not shame them, but rather he shall remain silent, and fear the King of kings of kings who commanded him so. For if a king of flesh and blood had decreed this upon him – he would not have been able to struggle against the matter. How much more so regarding the King of kings of kings, the Holy One, Blessed be He. However, it is permitted to sue him in a beit din for tearing his garments (Shach, subsection 4). And it appears to me that just as will be explained regarding throwing a purse into the sea, that when he is able to prevent him beforehand from doing so – he is permitted. Here too in this case, when he is able to prevent them beforehand so that they do not do this to him, such as having others not allow them to enter the place where he is sitting, and to prevent them in a manner that is not through degradation – he is permitted.

What is honor? Feeding them and giving them drink, clothing and shoeing, and covering with covers, and bringing in and leading out. And he should give them to them with a pleasant countenance. For even if he fed him every day fine foods, but showed him a scowling face – he is punished for it. And the opposite: even if he makes him grind in a mill if his intention is for the good. And two stories were brought in the Tosafot (Kiddushin 31a) from the Yerushalmi Peah (Yerushalmi Peah page 3b): A story of one who was feeding his father pheasants. His father said to him: From where do you have all these? He said to him: Old man, what does it matter to you? Grind and eat! That is to say: chew and eat, like dogs that grind and eat. And another story of one who was grinding in a mill, and he had an old father. And a command came for the grinders to come for the service of the minister. His son said to him: Grind, and I will go in your place for the service. If it is for degradation, it is better for me, and if it is for lashes, it is better for me. Thus far his words. And he should serve his father in all matters that a servant serves his master, and likewise his mother in the manner that a son is able to serve her.

In the Gemara there, there is a dispute: whether one honors him from the father's property, meaning that the money for the father's expenses is from the father's property, and only the exertion is incumbent upon him; or from the son's property, that he should spend from his own money for the father's expenses, and the same law applies to his mother, obviously. And the halacha was decided: from the father's property. And ostensibly it is not understood either way: if the father has [means], what is the reasoning of the one who holds it is from the son's property? And if the father does not have [means], what is the reasoning of the one who says it is from the father's property? Behold, he has nothing. And should we say that if the father has nothing, the son is not obligated to feed him from his own—this is certainly not a logical position at all. And so it is explicitly explained from the words of the Rambam and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, who wrote that this matter of feeding him and giving him drink from the father's property applies if he has [means]. And if the father does not have [means] and the son has [means]—they compel him, and he sustains his father according to what he is able. And if the son does not have [means]—he is not obligated to go begging from door to door to feed his father. Thus far their words. Behold, it is explicit that they interpreted the dispute of the Shas as being when the father has [means], and if so, what is the reasoning of the one who says it is from the son's property? And it is possible to say, for example, that his father is a miser, and is stingy with his money, and does not want to be supported from his own. For regarding other people, we do not pay him heed, as will be explained in siman 253. But regarding his father—he is obligated to give to him from his own according to the one who says it is from the son's property. But for us, as we hold it is from the father's property—he is not obligated to give to him. And it appears to me that afterwards he is permitted to summon him to a beit din.

It is further possible to say regarding their dispute, for behold the commentators explained that which they wrote, that if the father does not have and the son has – they compel him, and he sustains his father according to what he is able. Thus far their words, for the intent is that he is not obligated to supply all the sustenance necessary for his father, but rather they compel him to give him what he is obligated to give for tzedakah according to his wealth (Beit Yosef and Bach and Taz subsection 6). And according to this, it may be said that they disagree in this: for the one who says "from the son's [property]" – he is obligated to give him all the sustenance necessary for him when the son's hand can afford it. And the one who says "from the father's [property]" – he is not obligated to give him all that he needs, but rather according to tzedakah, as I have written.

However, I wonder at this interpretation of theirs. For the phrasing "according to what he is able" implies explicitly that they should support him according to his ability. And if it is within his ability to provide him all the sustenance he requires, why should he not provide it for him? Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work brought a proof for this from the words of the Rif and the Rosh, who wrote that we take from him under the category of tzedakah and give it to his father, see there. I do not know the proof: for granted that it is so, nevertheless we give him everything he needs, for they did not write that we take from him "the amount of tzedakah" but rather "under the category of tzedakah." And it appears to me that this is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote in section 5 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:5): And some say that he is only obligated to give him what he is obligated to give for tzedakah. Nevertheless, if he has the means—a curse shall come upon one who sustains his father from his own tzedakah funds. Thus far his words, and they questioned him: for even the first opinion holds so (Taz ibid.). But according to our words it fits well, for he interprets what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that "he sustains his father according to what he is able," that the intent is that he is obligated to provide him all the sustenance he requires. And regarding this he brought the "some say" that he is only obligated to give what he is obligated to give for tzedakah (and so it is implied in the Mordechai and in the Smag that he is obligated to provide him all his needs). And the Bach wrote that if it were from the law of honoring—he would be obligated even from the cloak on his shoulders. And since they only obligated him under the category of tzedakah according to what he is able—learn from this that it is according to the obligation of tzedakah alone, see there. I wonder: for certainly he is not obligated from the cloak on his shoulders, since we hold "from the father's [assets]." However, in a case where he has none and the son has, and they permitted him to sustain him from tzedakah funds, but who says that he does not need to give him everything he needs, and it will be considered "under the category of tzedakah" but not "the amount of tzedakah" that he is obligated to give? Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion for the halakhah that he is obligated to sustain him according to his means. And so is the common custom and one should not change it. And also one does not calculate this from tzedakah funds, as it is stated in the Yerushalmi: A curse shall come to a person who feeds his father from the poor man's tithe, and as the Rema wrote. (And see Shach subsection 6. And from the law of coercion there is no proof according to what I wrote in section 6. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

Our teacher, the Rema, further wrote that if he has many sons—they calculate according to their wealth. And if some of them are wealthy and some of them are poor—they obligate the wealthy ones alone. Thus far his words. And ostensibly there is no novelty in this, for how could it be otherwise? And it seems to me that he is teaching us that since it has been explained that we hold "from the father's property," but when he has none the son is obligated to give to him as tzedakah, and later in siman 249 it will be explained that even a poor person is obligated to give tzedakah, see there. According to this, it would have been possible to say that the poor ones should also assist the wealthy ones with their tzedakah—he teaches us no. And it is further possible to say that he teaches us that even the exertion is cast upon the wealthy and not upon the poor. For even though it will be explained that exertion is cast even upon the poor person, nevertheless, that is when there are no wealthy ones. But when there are wealthy ones, the poor person is exempt from everything, and it is better for him to engage in his livelihood, and everything is cast upon the wealthy (so it appears in my humble opinion).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 5 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:5) that if the son does not have money – he is not obligated to beg from door to door to feed his father. However, he is obligated to honor him with his person, even though through this he is idle from his work and will need to beg from door to door. And this is specifically when the son has sustenance to sustain himself for that day, but if he does not have it – he is not obligated to be idle from his work and beg from door to door. Thus far his words. And ostensibly this is a contradiction: for since he is obligated to honor him with his person, why is he not obligated to beg from door to door? Behold, this is only physical exertion. But the matter is as follows: regarding a matter that is the essence of honor – he is obligated in physical exertion, even though through this he will be idle from his work, such as washing him, anointing him, dressing him, and similar things that the father needs for his bodily service. But begging from door to door is not from the essence of honor but rather a preparation for his sustenance, and he is not commanded in this when his hand cannot reach it (Bach). And even regarding bodily service, it is only when he has sustenance for this day, even though through this he will need to beg from door to door tomorrow. But when he does not have sustenance – even for this day there is no obligation upon him at all. And it is simple that the son does not need to give his own sustenance to his father such that he himself will need to beg from door to door (Shach subsection 5). However, it appears that if he has bread and meat for his meal – he should not eat meat, and he should buy bread also for his father. And so too anything similar to this. (Regarding his mother, it appears to me that in no way should he allow her to beg from door to door, for the degradation of a woman is very great, as it is written: "The entire glory etc.")

If the son needs to request some favor from the townspeople or from one of the people of the city, and he knows that they will fulfill his desire and show him favor, if he knows that they would also show favor and fulfill his desire for the sake of his father—he should not say "do it for my own sake," but rather he should say "do it for the sake of father," to attribute the honor to his father. But if he knows that they would not do it for the sake of his father—he should not mention his father's name to them, but rather for his own sake. And if the matter is in doubt whether they would do it for the sake of his father or not—he may do as he wishes. And so too if he does not mention at all "do it for my own sake" but rather requests the favor without specification—there is no concern in any case. (And that which the Beit Yosef wrote, and the Shach in subsection 9 in the name of the Ramah—is somewhat not understood. And also the words of the Taz in subsection 8 are very forced. And the main point is like the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, and as I have written. And the inference of the Taz also fits well according to what we have explained, see there. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

It is a simple matter in the Gemara (Kiddushin 31b) that one is obligated to stand before his father and his mother, and this is included in the category of honor. And it is simple that he must stand to his full height. It also appears from the Gemara there that only when he hears the sound of his father's or mother's footsteps must he stand, see there. However, regarding that which there is reason to doubt: behold, regarding his teacher, our sages of blessed memory said (Kiddushin 33b) that he should only stand before his teacher morning and evening, so that his honor should not be greater than the honor of Heaven, see there. For seemingly, also regarding his father and mother the law is so, as we have not found that the honor of his teacher should be less than the honor of his father. Furthermore: so that their honor should not be greater than the honor of Heaven. If so, when his father or mother enter to him several times a day, he should not need to stand before them except morning and evening. Or perhaps according to the Yerushalmi, which says that the verse preferred their honor over the honor of Heaven, he is always obligated to stand before them. Or perhaps because of those who see, he must always stand, as the Tosafot wrote there regarding students who do not reside in the teacher's house, see there. And it requires further study. It also appears that if they reside in one house or one courtyard, standing before him is not applicable except when he comes from the beit midrash and the like, as is understood.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 7 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:7) wrote that if his father was the student of his son—each of them stands before the other. Thus far their words. And their reasoning is because in the Gemara there was a query regarding both of them that was not resolved, and they ruled stringently. However, the Rambam there wrote that a father who was a student to his son—the father does not stand before the son. And not only that, but the son stands before his father, even though he is his student. Thus far his words. And they wrote that our teacher Chananel ruled likewise, and the poskim labored over their reasoning (see Beit Yosef and Bach, and what they wrote in the name of the Ran, see there). And in my humble opinion, the reason seems simple: since it was a legal doubt, and the doubt is regarding the commandment of honoring a father—therefore we follow the stringency. And the son, due to a doubt regarding a Torah prohibition—is obligated to stand. And likewise the opposite: it is forbidden for him to allow his father to stand before him, because of the doubt. And even though there is a doubt that perhaps he is his teacher, and the father is obligated to stand before him—the son is able to waive, for a teacher who waives his honor—his honor is waived. And even though the father can also waive, nevertheless, since both of them are able to waive—it is better that the son should waive than that the father should waive, as is understood.

And the words of our teacher, the Rema, lean this way, as he wrote regarding this: And if the son wishes to forgo his honor to serve his father—he has the permission to do so, for a Rav who forgives his honor—his honor is forgiven. And specifically in private, or even in public if he is well-known in his city, such that everyone knows that he is his father. But if the son is great in Torah and his father is not well-known in his city—there is reason to fear for the disgrace of the Torah if the son is disgraced before the father, and they should distance themselves from one another so that neither one will treat the honor of the other lightly. And so did the Maharam do with his father. Thus far his words, meaning: that from the day he rose to greatness he did not greet his father, and did not want his father to come to him (Taz, subsection 9). And it must be scrutinized: for according to the wording of our teacher, the Rema, when his father is well-known in his city—he may serve him; if so, the Maharam should have seen to it that his father resided in his city, and everyone would recognize him as his father. And in truth, it is explained in the Rosh that because the Maharam ruled that it is a Torah doubt whether they must stand for one another or not, he therefore wanted to distance himself from his father. And there is no obstacle here either way, see there; but according to his words, there is surely a solution for this. And it appears clearly that our teacher, the Rema, was not comfortable with this, for since he can forgo his honor—if so, why did he distance himself from his father? Therefore, he holds that this was the matter: for his father did not want to dwell in the place of his son, the Maharam. And if so, he is automatically not well-known in his city, and there is reason to fear for the disgrace of the Torah, and therefore he distanced himself from him.

It is stated in the Gemara there (Kiddushin 32a): To what extent does the honor of a father and mother reach? Even to the extent that they take a purse full of coins and throw it into the sea in his presence, and he does not shame them. And they said there that according to the one who holds that honor is from the son's funds, even if the purse belongs to the son. And according to the one who holds that it is from the father's funds, if the purse belongs to the son – he may prevent them; only with a purse belonging to the father he may not prevent him, even though he is fit to inherit it, see there. And according to this, for that which we establish that honor is from the father's funds, it deals with a purse belonging to his father. And so wrote the Tur in the name of our teacher, Isaac, see there. But the Rambam ruled that even if the purse belongs to the son, see there. And there are those who wrote that his opinion is to distinguish between honoring him and not causing him pain (Kesef Mishneh). And the primary point seems to be that certainly the Rambam also admits that beforehand, if he can prevent him from this – he should prevent him. However, after he has cast it into the sea – there is no benefit in his anger, and therefore he should accept the decree of Heaven and remain silent, for what has been, has been (Lechem Mishneh). And the Rambam deals with after he has already cast it into the sea, as is clear from his wording where he wrote: Even if they took a bag of gold coins of his and threw it in his presence into the sea – he shall not shame them, and he shall not show pain in their presence, and he shall not be angry against them, but rather he shall accept the decree of the Scripture and remain silent. Thus far his words. And so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 8 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240, 8).

And according to this, that which our teacher, the Rema, wrote: And some say that if he wants to throw the son's money into the sea, he may prevent him, for he is only obligated to honor him from the father's property, but not from the son's property. And there is no difference between honoring him or causing him distress. And specifically before he has thrown them, for it is possible that he will refrain and not do it. But if he already threw it – it is forbidden to shame him, but he may sue him in a beit din. Thus far his words, and according to what I have written, the first opinion also holds this. And it appears to me that even regarding the father's money, if the son can prevent him from this through others – he should do so, and not allow him to destroy property and transgress "bal tashchit."

He further wrote: And specifically if he wants to throw his purse into the sea, where there is a financial loss. But if he wants to withhold from him a mere profit—it is forbidden in any case. Thus far his words. And it is true that the Ran wrote this to resolve that which we maintain "from the father's [assets]," why the Gemara brings a proof from Dama ben Netina who lost a profit of a great sum because he did not want to wake his father. And he answered two answers: One, that there is a distinction between honoring and causing distress. And further, that there is a distinction between a loss and the prevention of profit. For regarding distress or the prevention of profit—all agree it is from the son's [assets], see there. But the Rambam and the Tur did not bring this, which implies that they do not hold accordingly. And even according to the opinion of the Ran, of blessed memory, there is no proof from this incident except when both things exist: the absence of profit, and causing him distress such as waking him from his sleep and the like, like this incident of Dama ben Netina. And even though he wrote this as two answers, nevertheless, for the halacha one can only infer when both are present. Therefore, in my humble opinion, this law requires further study. (And that which he wrote that the son must go to the father's location for the Torah law, even though he is the defendant and lives in another city, has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 14, see there. And that which he wrote that the father is obligated to pay him his expenses, because honoring is from the father's [assets]—it requires further study: for regarding one's teacher the law is also thus, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat there. And if so, his teacher must also pay expenses, and there is no logic to this at all. And further: since by law he is obligated to go to his location, why should he pay him his expenses? And I wondered even more that the source of the law is from the Maharik siman 58, and he himself wrote, and this is his wording: And do not trouble your mother etc. and if you need to spend more etc. she must pay. And even if perhaps the law would not dictate so, nevertheless, so that you should have no opening to disagree, I said so etc., thus far his words. Behold, he himself wrote that the law is not so, and it requires further study. Examine and you will find it simple.)

Just as one is obligated to honor them during their lifetime, so too is one obligated to honor them after their death. How so? If one was relating a matter of tradition from the mouth of his father, he says, "Thus said my father, may I be an atonement for his resting place." This applies within twelve months, for a person is judged after his death, and he takes upon his own soul the suffering. But after twelve months—he should not say this, for he has already received his judgment; rather, he should say, "of blessed memory." This is the wording in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 9 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240, 9), see there. And in the Rambam the wording is "his memory for the life of the World to Come." And in the Gemara the version is "his memory for a blessing for the life of the World to Come," see there. And I do not know if the Tur and Shulchan Aruch hold that it is not specific and it is sufficient when he says "of blessed memory," or if they did not care to be lengthy. And it appears like the first reasoning. And such is the custom to say only "of blessed memory," and so too in writing. And there are some who are meticulous who write "zallaha." And there is no difference between a father and a mother in all of this.

There is one who wrote that even within twelve months one may say "of blessed memory," but that after twelve months one should not say "may I be an atonement for his resting place," because he has already received his judgment (Shach, subsection 13). However, the custom is not so. Furthermore, it is not implied as such from the words of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote that some say if one writes a matter within twelve months and mentions his father—he does not need to say "may I be an atonement for his resting place" but rather "of blessed memory," for his writing endures after twelve months. And there are those who are stringent even in writing, and so we practice. Thus far his words. Behold, they were stringent to say specifically "may I be an atonement for his resting place." And there is one who was precise: why for "may I be an atonement for his resting place" do we write it all twelve months, yet for "Kaddish" we only say it eleven months, as I wrote in siman 378? And he answered that there it is "sit and do not act," but here where it is necessary to mention either "may I be an atonement for his resting place" or "of blessed memory"—it is better to mention "may I be an atonement for his resting place" (Taz, subsection 12). And furthermore: a public matter is not comparable to a matter done in private.

One whose father's or mother's mind has become deranged – he endeavors to behave with them according to their mind until they are shown mercy, that is, until their mind is settled. And if it is impossible for him to withstand because they have changed excessively, the Rambam wrote that he should go away and leave them, and command others to lead them properly. And the Ra'avad objected that if he goes away and leaves them, whom shall he command to guard them? Thus far his words. And this is not an objection, for it seems to me that the Rambam is saying this: that it is known that those who are extremely mad must necessarily be bound in chains and ropes, and the son is not capable of doing so himself. Therefore, he commands others, and he goes away. (And see Taz subsection 14, and Derishah. And according to our words, it is well understood.)

If one saw his father transgressing words of the Torah due to a lack of knowledge, he should not say to him, "You have transgressed words of the Torah." Rather, he should say to him, "Father, is it written in the Torah thus and so?" – as if he is asking him, and not as one warning him. And he will understand on his own and will not be shamed. And if he was stating a certain tradition in error – he should not say to him, "Do not teach it thus" (Gemara). Rather, he says to him: "Father, thus we have learned." And it is implied in the Gemara (Bava Kamma 94b) that if his father is a rasha – he is not obligated in his honor, see there. And if he is not a rasha, but only conducts himself with bad character traits and is hated by people, and likewise if he was a drunkard – it is good that he should distance himself from him. And in Midrash Vayikra (parashah 12) it brings a deed regarding a certain drunkard, what his sons did to him, see there. And know that regarding the mitzvah of honor – it is appropriate and correct that it be clearly recognizable that he does it for the sake of the mitzvah, as I wrote in Sefer Chasidim (siman 91) that a son who stands before his father and needs to go after his standing – he should return and sit, and afterward stand and go, so that it will be recognizable that he stood for his honor, for if not so, it appears as if he stood to go. And the same law applies to his teacher, he should do so, and so too anything similar to this. And that which we wrote that for a rasha one is not obligated in his honor, it will be further explained in section 39 that the Rambam disagrees in this.

It is a simple matter that honoring a father and mother does not override any mitzvah. And it is not only if his father commands him to transgress the words of the Torah through "arise and act" or through "sit and do not act," for it is forbidden to listen to him. As it was taught in a baraita (Bava Metzia 32a): If his father said to him, "Contract tumah from a corpse," and he is a kohen, or "Do not return a lost object" – might one think he should listen to him? The verse states: "A man shall fear his mother and his father... I am Hashem your G-d" – you are all obligated in My honor. And even if he commands him to transgress a rabbinic mitzvah even through "sit and do not act," such as not to light the Hanukkah candle or the like, it is forbidden to listen to him. And we do not descend in this matter to the principle of "a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment," or at any rate to override a rabbinic prohibition because of the positive commandment of honoring, for since the Torah revealed that anything that is against the Torah – a father has no authority to command his son regarding this. And it follows that even regarding a rabbinic prohibition it is against the Torah, for the Holy One, Blessed be He, commanded not to turn aside from all that the sages tell us.

The Rosh wrote in a responsum: A father who commanded his son not to speak with a certain person, and that he should not forgive him for what he did to him until a certain time, and the son wished to be reconciled with him but is concerned for his father's command—he should not be concerned for his command, for it is forbidden to hate any person unless he sees him committing a transgression. And a father who commanded him to hate—it is not within his power to cause him to bypass the words of the Torah. Thus far his words. And not only this, but even if he did not command him regarding a forbidden matter, but rather commanded him to serve him, and there is a mitzvah for the son to perform, behold if the mitzvah is not passing—it is simple that he serves his father and afterward performs the mitzvah. However, if it is a passing mitzvah, the law is as follows: if it is possible for the mitzvah to be performed by others—he shall serve his father and others shall perform the mitzvah. But if it is impossible to be performed by others—he shall set aside the honor of his father and perform the mitzvah, because both he and his father are obligated in the honor of Hashem, may He be blessed, who commanded us regarding the mitzvah. And even if it is possible to be performed by others, if he already began the mitzvah—he shall not stop to serve his father, for one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from a mitzvah. And a "passing mitzvah" is defined as accompanying the deceased, and his burial, and similar matters. (And one must look into accompanying the deceased, whether "to be performed by others" is applicable, for it is incumbent upon everyone.)

Our sages, of blessed memory, said at the end of the first chapter of Megillah (Megillah 16b): Talmud Torah is greater than honoring a father and mother, for regarding those fourteen years that Jacob studied with Shem and Ever—he was not punished for honoring his father. Therefore, if one wishes to go and study in another city—he may go without the permission of his father and mother. It appears from this that when he goes for another mitzvah—he requires the permission of his father and mother. And even though when he requires it for his livelihood he certainly does not need to take permission, nevertheless, for the sake of a mitzvah he must take permission, for one who is engaged in a mitzvah is exempt from a mitzvah, and how can he abandon the mitzvah of honoring and take another mitzvah? (So it appears to me from the words of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 13, who wrote that Talmud Torah is greater etc., and for what did they write this? Rather, it is certainly as we have said. Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

If his father said to him, "Give me water to drink," or any other service, and his mother also said so to him—he sets aside the honor of his mother and engages in the honor of his father, because she too is obligated in the honor of her husband. Therefore, if she was divorced, such that she is not obligated in his honor—they are both equal, and he may prioritize whichever one he desires (see Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 9, but it is not clear). However, regarding food, clothing, and redemption from captivity—his mother takes precedence over his father. And if his father died and his mother is alive, and his mother commanded him regarding a matter that is the opposite of the father's command—some say that the honor of the living takes precedence over the honor of the dead, and he should act according to his mother (Noda BiYehudah Tinyana, Even HaEzer, end of siman 45). And there are those who disagree on this (the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger, end of siman 8). In my humble opinion, the first view appears correct. And as for that which is explained in siman 376, that one should not say kaddish for his mother if the father objects, because the honor of the father is superior to the honor of the mother, see there, and he did not state the reason that the honor of the living takes precedence (and this is the proof of the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger), it is because certainly regarding the recital of kaddish the honor of the dead takes precedence, because this is a rectification for the soul. Therefore, he was required to state the reason because the honor of his father takes precedence.

Both the man and the woman are equal in the honoring and the fearing of a father and mother. And even though it is written, "A man (ish) shall fear his mother and his father"—it is not to exclude a woman, but rather such is the way of the Torah, and the entire Torah was stated in the masculine tongue. However, in a place where "ish" is explicitly written, a derivation is required to include a woman (Tosafot Bava Kamma 15a, s.v. "hishvah"). And for this, our sages, of blessed memory, expounded in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 30b): "ish"—I only have a man, from where do I have a woman? When it says "tira'u" (you shall fear, in the plural)—behold, here are two. If so, why does the verse say "ish"? A man has the means in his hand to perform, a woman does not have the means in her hand to perform, because the authority of others is upon her. That is to say: and therefore regarding the matter of honoring—it is not within her capability if the husband objects. But when he does not object—she is obligated to give to her father (Shach, subsection 19). And even though she has her handiwork, and that which belongs to her husband is merely rabbinic, nevertheless she is not found with her father but rather with her husband (Tosafot). That is to say: and against her will he takes them, and furthermore he provides her with sustenance in exchange for her handiwork. And all this is when she is married. But when she is unmarried—she is obligated in honoring like a man. And it appears to me that if the father has nothing and also has no sons to sustain him, and his son-in-law is wealthy—they compel him to sustain him from his tzedakah funds, for he is no worse than his relative. And furthermore: for he is obligated in the honor of his father-in-law, as will be explained in section 44.

The Rambam wrote: A mamzer is obligated in the honor of his father and his awe, even though he is exempt for striking him or cursing him until he performs teshuvah. Even if his father was a rasha and a transgressor – he honors him and stands in awe of him. Thus far his words. The Tur and several of the Rishonim disagree with him, for it is explicitly explained in Bava Kamma (Bava Kamma 94b) that one is not obligated in the honor of a rasha, as above in section 33, where it says there regarding the return of prohibited money after his death – the son is not obligated when his father was a rasha. And there are those who answered that there it deals with after death, but in his lifetime – he is obligated to honor him (Lechem Mishneh). But the wording of the Shas there does not imply so. And so Rashi explained there, that regarding one who does not act according to the practice of your people – one is not obligated to honor him. And there is one who answered that regarding returning from his own – he is not obligated (Kesef Mishneh). And also the wording of the Shas is difficult according to this. And the reasoning of the Rambam appears to be from that which is found in Sanhedrin (Sanhedrin 85b), that a son does not become an agent for his father to strike him or curse him even though he is a rasha, see there. And this is not a proof, for this is a great disgrace. But this is not relevant to honoring him, and how shall he honor the enemies of Hashem? And perhaps even the Rambam’s intention was only in the negative, that is to say: not to disgrace him. But the wording does not imply so. And even according to the opinion of the Rambam, it appears that specifically a rasha out of desire, but one who acts to provoke like the apikorsim and the minim – it is obvious that it is forbidden to honor them. And it is simple that one is not called a "rasha" unless he transgresses regularly. But if he happened to commit a transgression – he is not called a "rasha," and according to everyone one is obligated in his honor and awe. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled in section 18 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:18) like the Rambam. And our teacher, the Rema, ruled like the Tur. And this is the opinion of most of the poskim, and so appears the primary view in the Shas there.

It is written in Sefer Hasidim regarding the incident in the Gemara, concerning one whose keys were under his father's head and he did not wake him. This is specifically when the father is not pained by the fact that he did not wake him, but if he knows that he will be pained – he must wake him. And likewise to go to the beit knesset or for a d'var mitzvah – he wakes him (ibid. siman 337). And it appears that this is specifically when the time for prayer will pass. And one must scrutinize: for it certainly appears explicitly in that incident in the Gemara that his father would have benefited if he had woken him and earned much money. And conversely: he is presumably pained. And perhaps everything is according to the type of person he is. In any event, it is better to wake him through another and not by himself. And it seems to me that such is the custom, and so it is proper to do.

It is further written there: That if the son knows that his father and mother are distressed by the fact that he is fasting—he should not fast a fast that is not obligatory. And a father who was ill, and the doctors commanded that he should not eat this food nor drink this beverage, and the father requests of his son to give him this—he should not give it to him. And even if he says to him, "I will not forgive you if you do not give it to me"—he should not pay him heed; since the doctors warned him regarding this—it is impossible to give it to him (ibid. siman 234). And if the mother commanded her son some matter, and the father asked his son, "What did she say to you?" and the son knows that if he tells him the truth he will be angry with her—he should not tell him what she commanded. And it is permitted to deviate for the sake of peace (ibid. siman 336).

It is forbidden for a father to impose a heavy yoke upon his sons, and to be exacting regarding his honor with them, so that he does not lead them to a stumbling block. Rather, he should forgive and turn a blind eye toward them, for a father who forgives his honor—his honor is forgiven (see Be'er Heitev, subsection 16). And one who strikes his adult son violates "do not place a stumbling block before the blind." Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:2) that he is not called an adult regarding this matter unless he is twenty-two years old or twenty-four years old. Thus far his words. And his source is from that which is in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 30a): While your hand is upon the neck of your son etc. until twenty-two; and some say etc. until twenty-four, see there. And this is not a proof regarding striking if in truth this pertains to a fine, that they fine him for having struck him. However, there is a prohibition even at fewer than these years, as the Maharshal wrote in Yam Shel Shlomo, see there. And all the more so when the son is married, that it is forbidden to strike him.

A person is obligated to honor his father's wife even though she is not his mother, as long as his father is alive. And he is obligated to honor his mother's husband, as long as his mother is alive. And this is from the Torah, for we expound "Honor your father" – this is your father's wife, "and your mother" – this is your mother's husband (Ketubot 103a). And this is specifically during their lifetimes, as I have written. But after their deaths – he is not obligated to honor them. Nevertheless, it is a proper thing to honor them even after their deaths, for our holy teacher commanded his sons so (ibid.). And so have all those who fear Hashem conducted themselves. And a person is obligated in the honor of his older brother, whether he is his brother from his father or whether he is his brother from his mother. And so our sages, of blessed memory, expounded (ibid.): "And" – to include your older brother. And there are those who wrote that this is specifically the first brother, but not the second even though he is older in years than him (Be'er Heitev, subsection 17, in the name of Halachot Ketanot and Shiyarei Keneset HaGedolah). And the Rambam wrote that he is obligated to honor him like his father, and this is midrabbanan, see there. Nevertheless, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 23 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:23) that an older brother who insulted and blasphemed his younger brother who is a talmid chacham, and the younger one rebuked him and fined him – he did well, for since he does not show favor to the Torah – he is not "acting as your people act," and he is not obligated to honor him. Thus far his words. But without this – he is obligated to honor him, even if the younger one was a talmid chacham and the older one is not a talmid chacham. (And the honor of his brother applies even after the death of his father, as is proven from the Rashbam in Bava Batra 131b, see there.)

A person is obligated to honor his father-in-law and his mother-in-law, for David called Shaul "my father," as it is written: "My father, see, yea, see." So wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 24. And I do not understand the proof, for Elisha also called Eliyahu "My father, my father! The chariot of Israel and its horsemen!" And if it is because he was his primary teacher, if so, regarding Shaul we can also say this, because he was a king. And so the servants of Naaman, the general of the king of Aram, called Naaman "my father," as it is written: "And his servants drew near, and spoke to him, and said: My father, had the prophet bid thee do some great thing, etc." And "my father" is only a title of honor, as Elihu said to Iyov: "My father, let Iyov be tried unto the end." And perhaps because at that time Shaul was pursuing David, and David had no reason to love him or honor him, and were it not that the status of "father" applied to his father-in-law, he would not have called him "my father." And they wrote that the intention is not that he is obligated in honoring him like a son, but rather to honor him like other important elders (Bach and Shach, katan 22), and see what I wrote in section 35. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who say that a person is not obligated in the honor of his father's father. And it does not seem so to me, but rather that he is obligated in the honor of his father more than the honor of his father's father. Thus far his words. And the great authorities wrote there that if the father and the son have nothing and the grandson has, they compel the grandson to sustain them according to his ability. And it appears that also a daughter's son is obligated in the honor of his mother's father. And that which we find in the Gemara where one said to his daughter's son "give me water to drink," and he said to him "I am not your son," see there—Rashi already explained there: I am not obligated to honor you like a son. Thus far his words. That is to say: that honoring like a son is not required, but nevertheless he is obligated to honor him.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 25 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 240:25): If the father wishes to serve the son – it is permitted to accept from him, unless the father is a ben Torah. Thus far his words, meaning: that a ben Torah would feel distressed by this, as it is in the Gemara (31b). And he further wrote: A student who wishes to go to another place, because he is confident that he will see a sign of blessing in his study before the Rav who is there, and his father protests against him because he worries that in that city the star-worshippers bring false accusations – he does not need to listen to his father in this. Thus far his words, for Torah protects and rescues. And so it is regarding any matter of a mitzvah – he is not obligated to listen to them. And even to marry a woman who is right in his eyes, our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: And so if the father protests against the son regarding marrying any woman whom he desires – the son does not need to listen to the father. Thus far his words. And it is simple, that so it is regarding any matter of a mitzvah. (See Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 23, what he wrote in the name of the Chavot Yair. And it is not clear at all. And what he wrote in subsection 22 in the name of the Chidushei HaDin – certainly so it is, see there. And be precise and you will find it easy.)