Siman 198

She must immerse her entire body at one time and not in a partial immersion, meaning that she would immerse half the body and afterward the second half of the body; rather, all of it at once. And even if a small part of the pinky finger is outside the water, or a single hair is outside the water, it is as if she did not immerse. And regarding all those obligated in immersion it is so, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 11 of Mikvaot. This is his wording: Everyone who immerses must immerse his entire body while he is naked at one time; and if he was a possessor of hair, he must immerse all the hair of his head, for it is like his body according to Torah law. Thus far his words. And this matter is from the Torah, as it is found in Torat Kohanim, Parshat Emor, for it is written: "And he shall wash his flesh in water, and when the sun sets, he shall be pure." And since it is not written "and he shall be impure until the evening" as is written in all other places, we derive: just as the setting of his sun is all at once—meaning, when the sun sets and is hidden from the earth, not even a portion of it remains on the earth—so too the entry into water must be all at once. And from this we judge for all those obligated in immersion.

And it is not comparable to an object that interposes on a portion of one's body, for according to the Torah this is not an interposition, as will be explained; and behold, even the flesh that is beneath the interposition is not in the water. For it is not comparable to this, because there the entire body is beneath the water and is not visible outside, and therefore the portion is nullified to the whole body according to the Torah. This is not the case when a portion of one is outside the water, for behold, the entire body was not covered, and the nullification of a portion to the whole body is not applicable in this case since they are not in one place. Therefore, if even a portion of a fingernail is outside the water, or a single hair is outside the water, she requires another immersion and this immersion is nothing. Therefore, she must be very, very careful in this.

This is the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 1: She must immerse her entire body at one time; therefore, there must not be anything upon her that constitutes a chatzitzah, etc. Thus far their words. Meaning, that if she were not required to immerse her entire body at one time, even if there were found upon her a thing that constitutes a chatzitzah—which constitutes a chatzitzah according to the law of the Torah or according to the rabbis, following the laws that will be explained—we would not require a second immersion for the entire body, but rather she would immerse the part of her body where the chatzitzah had been. But now, since it is necessary to immerse the entire body at one time, therefore if she afterwards finds a thing that constitutes a chatzitzah, she will require a second immersion for the entire body [Beit Yosef]. And also regarding the immersion of vessels, the whole of it is required as one and not in halves. And it is not similar to hagalah, for in hagalah it is only necessary to expel the forbidden substance, and there is no difference whether one expels it bit by bit or the whole of it as one. This is not the case regarding immersions, which are from impurity to purity, and it is impossible to become pure bit by bit, but rather the whole of it as one.

Chatzitzah is disqualifying according to the Torah, as it is written: "And he shall wash all his flesh in water," that there shall be nothing intervening between his flesh and the water [Eruvin 4b], for this word "all" is superfluous, but rather to teach that all his flesh must be in the water without a chatzitzah between the water and the flesh. However, the specific laws of chatzitzah were not explained in the Torah, and this is a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai [ibid.]. And thus the Sages, of blessed memory, said there: According to the Torah, the majority of it and he is meticulous about it constitutes a chatzitzah; meaning, when there is a chatzitzah on the majority of the body or on the majority of the hair and he is meticulous about it, that he is distressed by this dirt [Rashi], it is a chatzitzah according to the Torah. But if he is not meticulous, it is not a chatzitzah. And similarly, on a minority of the body, even if he is meticulous, it is not a chatzitzah according to the Torah. But the Rabbis decreed even regarding the majority where he is not meticulous that it should be a chatzitzah, and similarly they decreed regarding a minority where he is meticulous. But regarding a minority where he is not meticulous, they did not decree. And even in this itself there are many specific laws, for there are cases where even on a small part of it it is a chatzitzah, and even if he is not meticulous if others are meticulous, as will be explained with the help of Heaven [And regarding what Tosafot questioned Rashi, who explained this regarding his hair, and they understood that Rashi holds that regarding his body the law is not so, see there, the Ritva already wrote there that Rashi also does not differentiate, and only comes to teach us that the hair is judged on its own according to the opinion of the Geonim brought by the Rambam in chapter 2 of Mikvaot, halacha 15, see there and examine carefully].

And behold, in this siman it will be explained which matter constitutes a chatzitzah and which does not constitute a chatzitzah, and it will also be explained that regarding this matter there is an objection when it is on her body and regarding that matter there is no objection. And seemingly, according to what has been explained, that even according to rabbinic law, on a minority of the body it does not constitute a chatzitzah unless one objects to it, and all the matters in this siman are on a minority of the body, if so, it is entirely redundant; for why do we need the specifics? For either way: if she objects, it constitutes a chatzitzah even regarding matters that are explained as not constituting a chatzitzah, and if she does not object, it does not constitute a chatzitzah even regarding matters that constitute a chatzitzah.

However, the truth is indeed that the opinions of people are not equal, and if she is always fastidious, it is a chatzitzah. But regarding a matter about which most of the world is fastidious, it is a chatzitzah even if she is not fastidious. For this reason, the poskim set out to clarify matters about which people are fastidious and matters about which they are not fastidious, meaning most of the world. Therefore, in a matter about which she is fastidious, even if most of the world is not fastidious, it is a chatzitzah, and so too the reverse. Therefore, there are those among the poskim who mentioned her own fastidiousness, such as the Rambam, who wrote in the second chapter of Mikvaot: A single hair that is knotted is a chatzitzah, provided that one is fastidious about it. Thus far his words. And he did not intend to exclude a case where she is not fastidious but most of the world is fastidious. And so too the reverse: the Rashba in Torat HaBayit wrote: If the hairs of her head were knotted, etc., until it is the way of a woman to be fastidious about such a thing, it is a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. And he made the matter dependent on others; he did not intend to exclude a case where she is fastidious and others are not fastidious. Rather, one master stated one thing and one master stated another thing, and they do not disagree on the law at all [so wrote the Bach, but the Rashba wrote explicitly, and this is his wording: Since it is not their way to be fastidious, even though this individual is fastidious, his opinion is nullified. Thus far his words. And one must look further into the Bach, and also into the Beit Yosef who was in doubt about it; nevertheless, the law is like the Bach].

And this is also the intent of the Tur, who wrote: It is necessary that there be nothing upon her that intervenes, even the slightest amount; if it is the way of people to sometimes be particular about it, it intervenes even if she is not particular about it now, or even if she is never particular about it; since it is the way of most people to be particular about it, it intervenes. And if it covers the majority of the body, even if it is not the way of people to be particular about it, it intervenes. Thus far his words. And he informs us of a novel point: it is not only necessary when she herself is particular, but even if she is not particular and others are particular, it also intervenes [Bach].

And that which he wrote "sometimes," the intention is not that the mind changes, such that sometimes she objects and sometimes she does not object, but rather, for example, a ring on her finger, which at the time of tevilah she does not object to, but at the time of kneading she objects so that it does not get soiled, it is called a "thing that one objects to." For so explained the Rosh in chapter 9 [siman 26]. And the measure of the words of the Tur is as follows: if it is the way of people to sometimes object to it [such as at the time of kneading and the like], even if she does not object now [at the time of tevilah], or even if she never objects to it [meaning that even at the time of kneading she does not object], since it is the way of most people to object to it [meaning at the time of kneading], it is a chatzitzah. And this is also the intention of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in the Shulchan Aruch, section 1, see there. [And also the intention of the Shach, subsection 1, must be so. And the words of the Taz, subsection 2, are astonishing, for in the Rosh there and the Ran in the second chapter of Shevuot it is explicit as I have written, see there. However, the ruling of the Taz is true, that if only a minority object and she never objects, it is not a chatzitzah; and the Taz admits that if she sometimes objects, it is a chatzitzah. And for no reason did the Sidrei Taharah, subsection 4, take issue with him, see there. Only in the interpretation of "sometimes" did they take a different path, and it is clear as I have written, and examine it closely.]

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: And initially she should not immerse even with items that do not constitute a chatzitzah, as a decree on account of items that do constitute a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. Behold, this is an extra stringency, for we explicitly learned in the Mishnah at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Shabbat: "And she may not immerse with them until she loosens them," see there, and when she loosens them, she is permitted initially to immerse. And in the Yerushalmi there it is even more explicit, see there. However, the matter emerged from the mouths of the Acharonim to be stringent initially, and therefore it seems clear to me that this is only when she has no need for it, such as bracelets and rings, for regarding this they cited from the Sha'arei Dura [see the Bach] that one should decree regarding loose items on account of those that are not loose, and why should she not remove them at the time of immersion? But if she has some need for it, such as for healing or the like, she may do so initially. And I saw what he wrote, that on the contrary, regarding healing one should decree lest she tighten them [Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 11 in the name of the Shulchan Gavoah], and I wonder at such words; for this would be so if it were the law of the Gemara, then we could well decree further in this. But in this case, where according to the law of the Gemara it is completely permitted and only some of the Acharonim decreed in this—and it is known that we do not have the power to issue decrees of our own—rather, since it emerged from the mouth of our teacher, the Rema, it is sufficient for us to be stringent in a place where there is no need. And the essence of the stringency was only regarding a matter for which she has no need, such as bracelets and rings [and so it appears in the Shulchan Aruch section 40, and see what I wrote in section 87].

The Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 2 of Mikvaot, disagrees with the Geonim regarding the matter of the hair of the head. For the Geonim hold that the hair is considered on its own and the body on its own; and if so, when there is a chatzitzah on the majority of the hair, even if he is not fastidious about it, it is a chatzitzah by rabbinic decree. And even though if we were to combine the hair with the body it would not be a majority, we do not say so; and when he is fastidious about it, it is a chatzitzah by Torah law. But the Rambam holds that the hair is a part of the body and we do not measure it by itself. And that which they said, "its majority and he is fastidious is a chatzitzah by Torah law," and by rabbinic decree even when he is not fastidious, this is by including the head with the body. In this, the Rambam is lenient and the Geonim are stringent. And there is also the opposite: for example, where on less than half of his body there is a chatzitzah that he is not fastidious about, and also on more than half of the hair of the head there is such a chatzitzah; if we combine them together it would be a majority of the body as a whole, for according to the Rambam it would be a chatzitzah on the body as well, but according to the Geonim it would only be a chatzitzah on the head. And so too in such a case regarding one who is fastidious for the matter of Torah law. The Ra'avad agreed with the Geonim, see there. And so it appears is the opinion of Rashi, as I wrote in section 4.

In the general principles of the matters of chatzitzot, there are two things: First, even though it is a complete chatzitza and the water does not spread over the flesh in the place of the chatzitza, nevertheless it does not constitute a chatzitza if it is on a minority of the body or on a minority of the head and he is not particular about it. And there are things that even if he is particular, nevertheless if the intervening object is not tightened well to the flesh or to the hair in a manner that the water enters under the intervening object onto the flesh or the hair, there is also no concern of chatzitza in this, for how does chatzitza apply since the water enters into them or under them and the water is connected to the flesh or to the hair in the place of the chatzitza.

And these are the things that people are typically meticulous about, and they are also tight such that water does not enter beneath them and they constitute a chatzitzah: wool threads and linen threads that one wraps the hair of the head with, and similarly straps that one wraps the hair of the head with and they are very tight. Therefore, she shall not immerse in them until she removes them or loosens their knot in a manner that the water enters beneath them, and this is only post facto as I wrote in section 9. And even though it is possible that they are not meticulous about them at the time of immersion, and it would be a minority that one is not meticulous about, nevertheless, since at the time of chafifah or washing with hot water they are certainly meticulous to remove them so that she may scrub there as well and wash there as well, therefore it automatically constitutes a chatzitzah during immersion as I wrote in section 8. And that which loosening is effective for them is only when they are tied upon the hair, but if they are braided into the hair, loosening is not effective, for however much one loosens them, the water will not enter beneath them.

And it is not specifically on the head, for the same law applies when they are wrapped in other places: she may not immerse in them until she loosens them. Only when they are wrapped around the neck does it not constitute a chatzitzah, for on the neck it is not very tight, as a woman does not strangle herself, and they are certainly loose. And even on the neck, if she ties herself with a very wide strap like a katla, which is a type of ornament that they make for a woman's neck and she wraps it around her neck, it constitutes a chatzitzah, for she strangles herself with it forcefully so that she appears full-fleshed, and because the strap is smooth and wide, it does not harm her, and therefore it constitutes a chatzitzah.

The Tur wrote that the fact that wool and linen threads intervene is specifically when they are of braided work, for they are tight, but if they are woven, they are loose and do not intervene, provided they are not gilded and are not filthy. The Ra'avad forbade even woven ones and only permitted hollow ones made of lacework. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 3 ruled stringently according to the opinion of the Ra'avad. This is his wording: If these threads are hollow, made of lacework, they do not intervene. Thus far his words. And there is a question regarding this: for in Orach Chaim at the beginning of siman 303, he himself ruled according to the first opinion. This is his wording there: A woman may not go out neither with wool threads etc. and if they are of woven work it is permitted, for she does not need to remove them at the time of tevilah. Thus far his words. And according to the Ra'avad it is forbidden unless they are made of lacework [Shach subsection 5 and Magen Avraham ibid. subsection 4]. And it must be said that regarding the tevilah itself he was concerned for the opinion of the Ra'avad, for even though it is of rabbinic origin, as from the Torah an intervention on a minority of the body does not intervene as I have written, nevertheless regarding the essence of tevilah he was stringent. But regarding the matter of Shabbat, where the prohibition to go out in them is due to the concern of tevilah as is explained there, he was not concerned to be so stringent, for it would be like a decree upon a decree [it appears to me].

And that which the Tur wrote, "provided they are not gilded and they are not filthy," our teacher, the Rema, also ruled so in section 3 [and in the Shulchan Aruch it was printed in section 4, and it is a printing error as the Shach wrote in subsection 6]. This is his wording: And if they were gilded they interpose, for she is meticulous about them that she not ruin them; and similarly if they were filthy initially, she is meticulous about them that she not be dirtied by them in the water, and they interpose. Thus far his words. Meaning, that even though essentially they are loose and do not interpose, nevertheless, since she is meticulous about them at the time of tevilah to remove them so that she does not ruin them or that she herself does not become dirtied by them, this also constitutes an interposition. And one of the great authorities wrote concerning this [Sidrei Taharah, subsection 13] that this law has brought us great confusion; for behold, it is an explicit Gemara: A niddah who has no garments may use a ruse and immerse in her garments [Beitzah 18a]. And so the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled later in this siman. It is obvious that every person is meticulous to remove his garments at the time of washing, and if so, why does it not interpose even if now he is not meticulous?

But in truth, there is no comparison between them, for in the Gemara there the explanation is that, on the contrary, it is for her benefit that she immerse in her garments in order to purify the garments, because she has no other pure garments to change into during her days of purity, as Rashi explained there and as the Rambam wrote in the fourth chapter of Hilkhot Yom Tov; see there. And this is the meaning of the expression "she uses artifice," meaning that she performs an artifice in this; for even though on Yom Tov it is forbidden to immerse impure garments because it appears like repairing a vessel, nevertheless, when they are upon the person it is permitted. And how could the language of "fastidiousness" apply to this, when on the contrary, she does so with intent and desire? And if it is because since at another time she is fastidious, it automatically constitutes a chatzitzah even at the time of immersion—this we do not say except regarding a complete chatzitzah, and not regarding something that is only a semblance of a chatzitzah. Furthermore, we only say this regarding something where even now she is merely not fastidious, but she also derives no benefit from it; but here, does she not have a benefit in this, that she purifies her garments? And all women are not fastidious in such a case.

And perhaps you will say that in truth there is no difficulty at all from the Gemara, but rather the difficulty is from the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who ruled so, and in our time there is no tumah and taharah and she is not forced to wear pure garments; this too is no difficulty at all, for even though there is no hindrance in our time regarding this, nevertheless even now women are meticulous to wear pure and clean garments even during the days of whitening, as is written in siman 196, and all the more so during the days of her purity. Furthermore, in truth our teacher, the Beit Yosef, did not bring this law of gold-embroidered and soiled garments, and also the Rambam did not bring this law for a reason that will be explained, and regarding the Tur it may be said according to the first resolution [and therefore the Rema did not provide a gloss on "one who immerses in garments"].

However, the essence of this law is perplexing, for what does this have to do with chatzitzah? In the Gemara [at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Shabbat] they only said this regarding the matter of not going out with them on Shabbat, lest she need to immerse and she is fastidious about removing them because of the filth, and she will come to carry them four cubits in a public domain; but not regarding the matter of chatzitzah during immersion. And so Rashi explained there, and this is the reasoning of the Rambam and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who did not bring this law here, and only in the laws of Shabbat did they write this in Orach Chaim, at the beginning of siman 303, see there. However, Rashi, of blessed memory, brought there the explanation of his teachers who explained this law also regarding the matter of chatzitzah during immersion, and in truth he wondered about them, what does this have to do with chatzitzah, see there. Therefore, the Tur and our teacher, the Rema, were concerned for the opinion of the teachers of Rashi, because their words can be settled, for the intention is that through the gold or through the filth they become tight and it is truly a chatzitzah [Beit Yosef, and there is proof for this from the wording of the Ra'avad in the book Ba'al HaNefesh, and this is his wording: For those that are woven etc. are tight etc. but these hollow ones etc. and they are not well tightened etc. and that is provided they are clean from the mud etc. Thus far his words. And it implies explicitly that when they are dirty they truly form a chatzitzah. Or it is possible to explain that since she is fastidious about the filth she will not immerse properly [Perishah]. However, from the words of the Tur in Orach Chaim siman 303 it is explicitly clear like the previous resolution, as he wrote there: Provided they are not filthy, for then she must remove them because of the mud which forms a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. For it implies explicitly that through the mud it becomes tight and forms a chatzitzah (see the Bach who inclined the intention of the Tur, but it does not imply so, and so it appears from the Taz in Orach Chaim there, subsection 2, see there and examine carefully)].

Specifically, wool threads and linen threads constitute an interposition when one ties the hair of the head with them, but if they were tied with hair threads, they do not constitute an interposition because they are not tightened well. And so we learned in the ninth chapter of Mikvaot: those of hair do not constitute an interposition because the water enters into them, see there. And this is specifically when they are wrapped over the hair, but if some of her hairs were tied, meaning that there are knots in them, there is a different law regarding this: for if one hair is tied, meaning it was tied by itself, and similarly if one is tied to another, it is tightened well according to several poskim [see Beit Yosef]. And there are those who disagree on this, who hold that one to one is not tightened, only one by itself [see there]. But two hairs or more that were tied in one knot do not constitute an interposition, and there is no difference whether one tied two hairs with two other hairs or tied two hairs by themselves. Therefore, one hair that was tied and she is fastidious about it, or others are fastidious about it, it constitutes an interposition and she requires another immersion. But if both she and others are not fastidious, the immersion is valid for her, unless the majority of her hairs are tied strand by strand individually, for then they constitute an interposition even when they are not fastidious, as has been explained, for by rabbinic decree the majority constitutes an interposition even without fastidiousness [and see Yerushalmi at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Shabbat].

From the language of the Shas at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Shabbat, it is implied that hair upon hair does not constitute a chatzitzah in pairs, as has been written. However, when one ties it in the hairs at the place of the flesh, it constitutes a chatzitzah, for hard upon soft constitutes a chatzitzah. This is also somewhat implied by some poskim. But the Ra'avad in the book Ba'al HaNefesh wrote that in no place does it constitute a chatzitzah, for they slide; see there. And it must be said that he holds that the implication of the Shas there is not according to the conclusion; see there. And there is one who asked: how is it possible to constitute a chatzitzah? For when one ties the hairs at their ends, it is impossible to tie them well when they are many, as has been explained. And this is not a difficulty at all, for nevertheless, upon the flesh they adhere around well. And regarding the law, it requires further study, and in my humble opinion one should be stringent [see Sidrei Taharah, subsection 15].

The sages taught in the Mishnah at the beginning of the ninth chapter of Mikvaot: The kalki of the heart and the beard and the hidden places in a woman interpose; and these do not interpose: the kalki of the head and the armpit and the hidden places in a man, see there. Kalki is the name of a place, as we have learned "like a Cilician bean," and there they would make garments from goat hair, and the garment was stiff and tangled and the ends of the threads protruded, and such a garment was called kalki after the name of its place. And there are people who have much hair on the chest over the heart, and sometimes due to sweat they are filthy and tangled with one another, and similarly in the beard and in the hidden places, which is the place of the genitals, and similarly on the head and in the armpit, which is under the shoulders, it happens sometimes so. And this is what the Mishnah says, that on the heart and the beard even in men they interpose, because everyone is fastidious about this; and on the head and in the armpit even in married women they do not interpose, because they are not fastidious about this. And it is simple that in a woman, when she is fastidious even though others are not fastidious, they interpose, as has been explained in section 6, and it appears that in a man the law is also so. And in the hidden places in a man it does not interpose, and in a woman it interposes, and this is in a married woman so that she should not become repulsive etc., but an unmarried woman's law is like a man's. And now there is no immersion for a man or an unmarried woman, for this was only in the time of the Mishnah when they ate pure foods and terumah. [And they are all called by the name kalki because then they resemble this garment, as the hairs are tangled with one another and the ends of the hairs are visible].

And this is the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 6, who wrote, and this is their wording: Hair opposite the heart and in the beard that is stuck together due to sweat constitutes a chatzitzah; that which is on the head and in the armpit does not constitute a chatzitzah; and that which is in that place, for a man it does not constitute a chatzitzah, and for a woman, for a married woman it constitutes a chatzitzah, and for an unmarried woman it does not constitute a chatzitzah. Thus far their words. And that which they wrote regarding the law of a married woman and an unmarried woman is not for practical law, for in our time this is not relevant, and they only used the language of the Mishnah [Beit Yosef]. Furthermore, it teaches us that even for a married woman, similar to an unmarried woman—meaning that she is not fastidious and is confident that she will not be repulsive—nevertheless it constitutes a chatzitzah since other women are fastidious, as I wrote in section 6 [Bach]. And know that within the hidden places are also included the hairs of the rectum [Tosafot Yom Tov].

And know that the words of the Rashba in Torat HaBayit at the end of the section on immersion are entangled regarding the matter of a woman's armpit, for he wrote, and this is his wording: The tangles of the heart and the beard, etc., and a man is particular about these, but those in the armpit and the hidden places he is not particular about, but a woman is particular even about the hidden places. Thus far his words. And afterwards he also wrote regarding the matter that a thing about which a person is particular constitutes a chatzitzah even though others are not particular, and this is his wording: Each and every one according to the person he is, and in the manner that they divided between the law of women and men regarding the armpit and the hidden places, etc. Thus far his words. For from his wording it is implied that for women, even in the armpit it constitutes a chatzitzah. And indeed, one of the great authorities [Sidrei Taharah, subsection 18] wrote that the opinion of the Rashba is that for a woman, the law of the armpit is like the law of the hidden places. And he also wrote that this is also proven from the words of our teacher Shimshon in the commentary on the Mishnah there, who wrote that the Tanna mentioned the armpit for no reason, as it is included in the hidden places; see there. And if you should think that the armpit even for women does not constitute a chatzitzah, there is no explanation for his words. [And as for what the Sidrei Taharah wanted to say, that even the intention of the Rambam in chapter 2 of Mikvaot can be explained thus, see there; it is impossible to say so, for the Rambam explicitly added the word "person" regarding the armpit, see there, meaning that for any person it does not constitute a chatzitzah, and regarding the hidden places he divided between a man and a woman; and examine this carefully].

And that which forced these teachers of ours to remove the Mishnah from its plain meaning, it appears to me, is that the term "beit hasetarim" was difficult for them; for if it refers only to the place of the genitals, it should have said "beit erutah." Therefore, they hold that "beit hasetarim" includes everything, even the armpit, as its definition is any hidden place. However, the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch explain that the armpit is not included in the term "setarim," but rather in the term "beit hakamattim," for so Rashi explained in Niddah [66b]: "beit hakamattim" is the armpit, etc., see there. And so the Rosh in his commentary on the Mishnayot at the end of chapter 8 of Mikvaot wrote regarding "beit hakamattim," such as under the armpit, etc., see there, and this is the armpit. And so wrote the Bartenura, see there [and see there that he wrote also the place of the genitals, and so too the Rambam in the commentary on the Mishnah]. Therefore, they hold that the armpit is not included in the term "beit hasetarim," and as for why it did not use the term "beit ha'ervah," it used refined language. In truth, the term "beit hasetarim" refers to other places: inside the ear, inside the nose, and inside the mouth, as all the commentators wrote at the end of chapter 8, see there. And that which they were forced to explain that which is in chapter 9 as referring to the place of the genitals is because in those other places there are no hairs; therefore, they explained that it refers to the place of the genitals and the Tanna used clean language. However, in any event, it does not pertain at all to the armpit. Therefore, they explained according to the plain meaning that in the armpit, even for a woman, it does not constitute a chatzitzah. But the Rash and the Rashba, and so too the Ran at the end of chapter 2 of Shevuot, hold that it refers to all hidden places, and the armpit is also included; therefore, it constitutes a chatzitzah there for a woman. For this reason, they explained that it mentioned the armpit unnecessarily [so it appears to me]. And for the law, certainly one should be stringent.

However, one must be precise regarding the fundamental law that was explained according to the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, that in the armpit it does not constitute a chatzitzah even for a woman because they are not fastidious about this—for we maintain that on the majority it constitutes a chatzitzah by rabbinic decree even if she is not fastidious, as I wrote in section 4. If so, they should have explained that this refers to a minority of the hairs in the armpit. Granted, according to the Rambam it is well-settled, for he holds that we follow the majority of the entire body, as I wrote in section 10. But according to the Geonim, that the place of the hairs is distinct, as I wrote there in section 12, one must say that this refers to a minority of the hairs of the armpit. And it is difficult to say that we consider all the hairs on the body as one place, for it does not seem right to say so. If so, why did the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch not explain this? But in truth, it appears that the Tur also holds like the Rambam, since the Tur wrote at the beginning of this siman that if it covers the majority of the body it constitutes a chatzitzah even if one is not fastidious, and he did not write that the hairs are considered independently; hear from this that he holds like the Rambam. But according to the system of the Geonim it is not so. Therefore, in practice, even though it was explained that the tangles on the head do not constitute a chatzitzah, and similarly in the armpit according to the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, this is specifically regarding a minority of them and not their majority. And so one should instruct and not be lenient in this [so it appears to me, and see Perishah and Sidrei Taharah sub-section 17, and delve into this]. And from section 5 it is clear that he holds like the Geonim.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 6: And those who have a kind of braids of hair stuck to one another, which were made at night by a demon and it is a danger to remove them, they do not constitute a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. In the Ashkenazi tongue this is called "marlocken" and in our tongue "kaltenes." And the Levush wrote the reason is because they are not particular about them to remove them and they do not constitute a chatzitzah, see there. And I wonder, for this reason is effective when they are on a minority of the head, but when they are on a majority of the head, according to the method of the Geonim, does it not constitute a chatzitzah by rabbinic enactment even when she is not particular? This requires further study.

And in truth, the Mordechai at the end of the second chapter of Shevuot wrote three other reasons. The first: since they are very tightly attached to one another, it is like that which is absorbed and like a hidden place, which does not contract impurity, and since it does not contract impurity, it does not constitute a chatzitzah. And the second: even if you do not consider them as absorbed and as a hidden place, we established that three knotted hairs do not constitute a chatzitzah, and certainly many. And the third: since they are not permitted to remove them because of the danger, it is their natural way of growth and they do not constitute a chatzitzah, like a fetus which does not constitute a chatzitzah even if we do not say "it is the thigh of its mother," as we say in Yevamot; see there. And he did not write the reason of the Levush because of our difficulty. And the first two reasons are like a "from whatever you will" argument: for if they are attached with strength, it is like that which is absorbed, and if they are not attached with strength, we established that three hairs knotted together do not constitute a chatzitzah, and certainly many hairs. Nevertheless, these two reasons are not primary, for even if we say they are attached with strength, what comparison is there to that which is absorbed and a hidden place, where the creation is such that they are absorbed and hidden places, and not a revealed place that became so through a cause. And similarly the opposite, what he wrote that if you do not consider them as absorbed, behold three do not constitute a chatzitzah and certainly many—what comparison is there? For there it deals with three that are all knotted together, but here, perhaps each hair is attached to its fellow and it is like one and constitutes a chatzitzah. Therefore, it appears that the primary reason is the third reason, that such is their natural way of growth.

However, even this requires clarification: how is it relevant to say "this is their way of growing," for is it not their way of growing only for those who have such a pain? But healthy women are fastidious about this, and if so, several types of chatzitzot would be nullified; for example, a plaster over a wound, which will be explained as a chatzitzah, and yet those who have wounds certainly are not fastidious, but we follow the majority of healthy women, and here it is the same. However, the clarification of the matter is that since there is danger in removing them, it is not relevant to follow the majority of women who do not have this cause and are fastidious about it. This is similar to a dyer whose hands are dyed, which is not a chatzitzah because all craftsmen are not fastidious about it, as will be explained, and we do not follow the majority of people whose work is not in this and are fastidious; for the craftsmen are like a category unto themselves because their livelihood depends on it. And certainly when there is danger, we do not follow the majority of people, as is understood [and so it appears is the opinion of the Sidrei Taharah, subsection 19]. Nevertheless, it is obvious that such a woman must remain for a short time under the water so that the water may enter wherever it is possible to enter, for it is known in the laws of nature that this thing repels water, and therefore she must do so.

And all this is when the braid is formed on its own, but to make such a braid for her for medical reasons, the great authorities did not permit [Panim Me'irot Part 2, Siman 146]. And the reason is because the first two reasons of the Mordechai do not apply in such a case, as is understood, and there remains only the third reason because of danger, and who says that the doctor intended the truth, see there. And they only permitted it for a minority of the hair of the head, which is a rabbinic matter, see there. And even though we rely on doctors even regarding Torah law, as I wrote in Siman 187, nevertheless in this matter it did not seem appropriate to the great authorities to rely on them. And their reason, it seems to me, is because it is known that this is not comparable to all illnesses where doctors judge according to their wisdom, whereas this remedy is nothing but a mere estimation, as is known; therefore, regarding Torah law, we do not rely on them. And there are those who wish to forbid when there are threads inside the braids until she removes the threads, but it is not the primary view, for certainly if there is no danger in this she is obligated to remove them, but if there is danger in this, they do not constitute a chatzitzah [Sidrei Taharah ibid.]. And that which we permitted for a minority of the head, this is when they do so by means of drugs and a bandage which themselves do not constitute a chatzitzah, but to do so by means of anointing wax on the head and the like, where the wax itself constitutes a chatzitzah, it is forbidden in any case [Chatam Sofer Part 6, end of Siman 82].

Rheum that is outside the eye, which is the discharge of the eye, constitutes a chatzitzah even if it is moist, because it is the way of people to be fastidious about it to wipe it away. But that which is inside the eye, when it is moist, does not constitute a chatzitzah, for people are not fastidious about this to wipe it away. However, if it is dry, it constitutes a chatzitzah even inside the eye, because people are fastidious to remove it from there. And when is it called dry? From the time it begins to turn yellow. And so too, if it is her way to paint her eyes with blue dye, she should not do so before the tevilah, for with blue dye the law is also thus: that with the dye that is outside the eye it constitutes a chatzitzah, and that which is inside the eye does not constitute a chatzitzah. And if it is her way to open and close her eyes constantly, even that which is outside the eye does not constitute a chatzitzah, because the constant opening of the eyes removes the blue dye [Rashi 67a]. And the wording of the Gemara is: "And if her eyes are fluttering, even on top of the eye it does not constitute a chatzitzah," and its explanation is as I have written. And there are those who explain that the intention is that her eyes tear constantly, for the tear removes the blue dye [ibid.]. And based on this, the Ba'ag wrote that every woman should guard herself for some time before the tevilah not to smear her flesh or her hair with anything, so that there will not be a chatzitzah in her tevilah, for any oily substance that is smeared constitutes a chatzitzah. And all of this is according to the approach of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch [see Taz subsection 12].

But there are many of our teachers who wrote that this interposition of eye secretions and of blue eye-paint was only stated in the Gemara there regarding matters of purity and not regarding her husband, because people are not fastidious about this, and they were only stringent regarding purity just as there are several things where they were more stringent regarding purity. And this matter depends on a variation of versions in the Gemara [67a], as they read in the Gemara that the halacha is not like all these teachings, for when they were stated, it was for purity and not for her husband [see there in Tosafot, s.v. pitmah]. Rashi did not read this version, but the Rambam, the Ra'avad, the Rashba, and other Rishonim did read it in the Gemara, and such is the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot there. The great Acharonim wrote that ex post facto, if it is impossible for her to immerse another time, we rely on this opinion and she is permitted to her husband [Shach, subsection 13]. However, ab initio, all agree that she must be careful with all the stringencies that they were stringent about for purity [ibid. in the name of the Re'em, the Semag, and the Mordechai], and such is the primary ruling.

The wound itself, when it is on one of the locations of the body, does not constitute a chatzitzah unless there is a bandage on the location of the wound or it was smeared with some ointment, for the ointment constitutes a chatzitzah and she must wash off the ointment. And if blood emerged from the wound onto the wound, when the blood is moist it does not constitute a chatzitzah, but if the blood dried it is a chatzitzah. This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 9: Dried blood that is on the wound constitutes a chatzitzah, but the fluid within it does not constitute a chatzitzah; if the fluid emerged from within it, throughout three days it is moist and does not constitute a chatzitzah, after this it is dry and constitutes a chatzitzah. Therefore, a woman with scabs must soak in water until they soften. Thus far his words. [And see in section 35].

And it appears ostensibly that this is the meaning: that the fluid within it is called the pus of the wound, and when the fluid emerges, a crust begins to form. For all three days from the time the pus emerges, the crust is moist, and afterwards it dries and becomes like a scar and constitutes a chatzitzah. Therefore, a woman with sores, upon whom dry scars are common, they constitute a chatzitzah and she must soak them in water until they soften and become like her flesh. However, from the words of the Rosh there, it is explained that this distinction between three days and afterwards is not regarding the crust, but regarding the fluid itself that dried on the outside; see there. And so it is explained from the words of the Rashba in Torat HaBayit; see there. And it must be said that the intention is that she did not wipe away the fluid at the time of its emergence. Nevertheless, it can be said that what we wrote regarding the matter of the crust is also true, for if it dried and became like a scar, it constitutes a chatzitzah. However, in the Rambam there, it is stated that the scab upon the wound does not constitute a chatzitzah; see there, for so it is explained in Mikvaot chapter 9; see there.

I am astonished that this law is not found in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, for in the Mishnah there it is explained that the scab upon a wound does not constitute a chatzitzah. However, I saw in the Rashba there who wrote in this wording: The scab upon the wound is the discharge that emerges from the wound and dries and becomes a scab, see there. And it appears that he interprets the Mishnah in this way, and if so, the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch are well-settled, as this is the law that they wrote, and they interpret that the Mishnah is dealing with moist discharge. According to this, it can be said that the intention of the Rambam is also thus, and it refers to the discharge and not to the crust. And it is possible that the crust indeed constitutes a chatzitzah when it becomes like a scar, and as I have written, so it would appear ostensibly.

Nevertheless, it is not clear to explain thus in the Mishnah and in the Rambam, for everywhere in the Shas the meaning of "gelad" is the crust that is upon the wound, as in "the mouth of the wound formed a gelad," which the Aruch explained as a thin skin that rose upon the wound. And also in Scripture it is so, in Job [16]: "I have sewn sackcloth upon my gelad," and Rashi explained: a dry wound that has formed a crust, see there. And in the Aruch, entry "gelad," he brought a Midrash on this verse: Job said, the way of the world is that one who had a wound and it healed and formed a crust, etc. Thus far his words. And see what I wrote above at the beginning of siman 59. Therefore, the matter is clear that also in the Rambam this is the intention, and so too in the Mishnah. And if so, according to this, the crust that is upon the wound once it has dried does not constitute a chatzitzah. And that which our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, that a woman with scabs must soak them until they soften, does not refer to the crusts, but rather to the secretions that have dried. [And the Rosh and the Rashba, who explained the Mishnah as referring to the secretions, hold like the explanation of Rashi in Chullin 51a, who explained "the mouth of the wound formed a gelad" as "croûte" in the foreign tongue, and it is not like the explanation of the Aruch, as is clarified in Choshen Mishpat at the end of siman 124, that they are two different explanations, see there. And it appears that this is the secretion that has dried; however, as a matter of law, the crusts do not constitute a chatzitzah, according to the words of the Rambam, and delve into this.]

And know that there is one who says that even regarding this law of dried mucus, that it constitutes a hatzitzah, many of our teachers disagreed and hold that this is only for taharot and not for her husband, as with the eye discharge and blue dye that we explained in section 31 [Shach, subsection 13]. And they disagreed with him, for certainly regarding this law everyone agrees that it constitutes a hatzitzah even for her husband, and there are many proofs for this, and such is the primary ruling [Sidrei Taharah, subsection 23]. However, the Tur wrote in the name of the Ra'avad that even a scab upon a wound is included in this, see there, and the great authorities labored over this [see Beit Yosef and Sidrei Taharah ibid.]. And in my humble opinion, it appears that the Ra'avad interpreted "a scab upon a wound" as referring to the crust, according to the words of the Rambam and the Aruch that we brought, and this truly does not constitute a hatzitzah as we explained. This is not related to the dried mucus explained in the Shulchan Aruch and the Tur [and with this, everything they questioned regarding this is answered; and study this carefully].

It is stated in the Gemara [67a]: And these ridges of bloodletting, meaning the letting of blood, until three days they do not constitute a chatzitzah; from here on, they constitute a chatzitzah. Rashi explained that the way of a bloodletting wound is to form a scab, and until three days the scab is soft and is like flesh; see there. I am astonished at the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who omitted this. And if it is because they hold that this applies to taharot, if so, they also should not have written regarding eye secretion and kohl, as has been explained. The Rambam, of blessed memory, in the second chapter of Mikvaot, wrote this in a different wording. This is his wording in Law 20: If she scratched her flesh and blood came out, and she immersed within three days, the place of the scratches does not constitute a chatzitzah; after three days, it constitutes a chatzitzah, etc. Thus far his words. He holds that it is not specifically bloodletting, but rather the law is the same for any type of scratch in the flesh when blood comes out. The Ra'avad disagreed with him, saying that this is not comparable to bloodletting, for it could be that even within three days it constitutes a chatzitzah; see there. Meaning, that a scratch is not similar to bloodletting where the blood comes out from the interior of the body, for then it requires three days until the blood dries, which is not the case with a mere scratch. But regarding the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, it requires further study.

An arrow or a thorn that is stuck in her flesh, if it is visible from the outside—meaning that it protrudes or is exactly level with her flesh—it constitutes a chatzitzah, because it is impossible that some part of it does not intervene between her flesh and the thorn. But if it is not visible from the outside, meaning it is slightly recessed into her flesh, even though they see it from the outside because the hole has not closed, nevertheless it does not constitute a chatzitzah; for regarding immersion, "and he shall wash his flesh in water" was only stated regarding the outer skin and not regarding the inner flesh [Levush and Shach subsection 16, and there is a scribal error therein where he wrote "and it appears as a stringency" and it should say "as a leniency," as written by the Sidrei Taharah subsection 25]. And it is simple that if a crust formed over it, in any case it does not constitute a chatzitzah [Taz subsection 15]. And there is room to doubt when it protrudes much from the flesh and a crust formed over it, whether it is effective, and it appears to me that it is not effective, but this matter is not common, as is understood [see Shach subsection 17 and delve into it].

When a person sweats, it becomes like filth on their flesh and they do not constitute a chatzitzah. However, if they hardened and became like a scab, they constitute a chatzitzah. Similarly, the melimulin on the flesh constitute a chatzitzah, and the explanation is: when one kneads mud or kneads dough and rubs their hands against one another, things like threads fall from them, and if they fell on her flesh they constitute a chatzitzah, and she must remove them with her hands or pour water on the place and they will fall off on their own.

The Tur wrote: The mud of pits, the mud of potters, and the mud of public roads, if they adhere to the flesh and are dry, they constitute a chatzitzah; but other types of mud, even if dry, do not constitute a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. The opinion of the Tur is that when any type of mud has not dried, it does not constitute a chatzitzah because when one descends into the water they will fall off, and other types of mud aside from these three, even when dry, will fall off from the body [Beit Yosef]. However, the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch in section 14 wrote: Mire mud, potters' mud, and the mud of roads found there constantly even in the summer months—all these constitute a chatzitzah; and all other mud, when it is moist, does not constitute a chatzitzah, for it is dissolved in water, but when it is dry, it constitutes a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. And they hold that these three constitute a chatzitzah even in their moisture, because due to their thickness they adhere greatly and do not pass away even in water entirely without scrubbing [ibid.]. And it is proper to be stringent with all types of mud in every case, for we are not experts in the types of mud [Bach], and such is the custom to remove every type of filth that is on the body. [The words of the Tur are against the Mishnah in Mikvaot chapter 9 where it is explicitly stated there: "And with all other mud, one may immerse in it when it is moist," see there. And the Bach answered that he interprets it regarding the matter of hashakah, see there, and this is according to the explanation of "some say" brought by the Bartenura, see there. But nevertheless, from where does the Tur derive this law? And it appears to me that he interprets that which we learned "when it is moist" as an explanation of a "moist type," meaning from the mud that is made moist, as we learned at the end of chapter 2 of Mikvaot: "Regarding which mud did they say," see there. And perforce it must deal with when it is dry, for if not so, there is no difference between a moist type and a dry type, for if it is currently moist, it falls off by means of water; and examine this carefully].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this law: However, if she is fastidious, even regarding a moist substance it is a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. And it is not understood, for when it is moist it falls from the flesh, and if so, how is fastidiousness relevant? And it must be said that he holds that every type of mud remains as a kind of mark upon the flesh even when it has fallen, only that it is not the way to be fastidious about this; and regarding this he says that if she is fastidious, such as if she is an istanis, it is a chatzitzah until she rubs it well. And even though this too has already been explained, that anything about which she is fastidious is a chatzitzah, yet this itself he comes to teach us: that without rubbing, the water does not remove it entirely, and therefore if she is fastidious, it is like all things where through her fastidiousness it is a chatzitzah.

Ink, milk, honey, blood, and the sap of the fig, the sap of the mulberry, the sap of the carob, and the sap of the sycamore—dry, they constitute a chatzitzah; moist, they do not constitute a chatzitzah. And all other saps, even moist, constitute a chatzitzah. Sap is that which drips—gum—from the trees before their full ripening [the Bartenura in Orlah chapter 1, mishnah 7]. There are those that adhere very much even in their moisture, and there are those that do not adhere so much, and they are the four types that were explained. And mulberry is a type of fruit, and sycamore is a type of fig. And so too, blood that has become stringy on the flesh, even moist, constitutes a chatzitzah; and this refers to blood that begins to dry and adhere slightly, such that when one places a finger on it, a thread is drawn and follows from it [Rashi, Menachot 21a]. And the Behag wrote that blood that has been cooked, even moist, constitutes a chatzitzah, and one should be concerned for his words [Shach, subsection 20].

The dye that women dye upon their faces, their hands, and the hair of their head does not constitute a chatzitzah for two reasons: First, since they do this for beauty, it is as if it is part of the body of the flesh and the hair, and like a dyed garment where the dye is not like an additional thing but like the essence of the garment, for we find immersion for the Parokhet even though it was dyed with purple wool and crimson wool. And second, that there is no substance here at all but only the appearance of the dye, and it does not constitute a chatzitzah; and it is not similar to ink, which constitutes a chatzitzah because it has substance [the Rosh and the Rashba there].

And there are some of the early authorities who permitted based on the second reason alone, as the Rokeach wrote: A woman who touched a cauldron or a pot and became slightly blackened, it is not a matter of concern even though a little adhered to the flesh, because there is no substance to it. And for this reason, one of the great authorities permitted in the case of a woman who immersed and found in one place on her body blackness from touching the walls of the bathhouse which were blackened because of smoke, and she does not require a second immersion [Taz, subsection 17]. And so too, women who dye, whose hands are always soiled with dye, do not care and it does not constitute a chatzitzah, for anyone whose craft is such does not care. And so too, those who sell meat and their hands are always slightly soiled with blood, it does not constitute a chatzitzah for this reason. And it is obvious that in everything that has been explained, if that woman specifically cares, it constitutes a chatzitzah for her. And so too, a woman who has two crafts, such as a dyer and a seller of meat, and her hands are soiled with blood and with dye, even though she does not care—and so too all craftsmen who have these two things do not care—nevertheless it constitutes a chatzitzah, for so it implies in Zevachim at the end of the chapter "Dam Chatat," see there. And so the great authorities ruled [Be'er Heitiv and Magen Avraham, siman 161, subsection 7, see there]. And there is room to doubt if it is sufficient that she remove one of them, or if we say that since she has begun cleaning, she must clean both of them. And we find something similar to this in Kilayim at the beginning of chapter 2 [that less than a rova is nullified, and regarding a rova the first Tanna holds he should reduce it, and Rabbi Yose holds he must clear everything, and the halachah is like the first Tanna; and according to this, here too one is sufficient, but it is possible to distinguish from there as is understood, and in practice one should be stringent].

In the Mishnah of the ninth chapter of Mikvaot we learned that dough which is under the nail is a chatzitzah, and filth is not a chatzitzah, meaning other types of dirt like dust that is under the nail in the manner of people. It is explained in the Tosefta that even filth is a chatzitzah in the nail that is not opposite the flesh, and that is what is above the flesh; and dough is a chatzitzah even in the part that is opposite the flesh, because regarding dough one is fastidious, but regarding other things one is not fastidious. And so they ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 18. This is his wording: Filth that is under the nail not opposite the flesh is a chatzitzah; opposite the flesh it is not a chatzitzah. And dough, etc., is a chatzitzah. And what is "not opposite the flesh"? This is that which the nail exceeds the flesh. Thus far his words. However, the Rambam there did not make a distinction in this, but rather wrote plainly that dough or mud are chatzitzot and filth is not a chatzitzah, and he did not distinguish between opposite the flesh and not opposite the flesh, and he rejected the Tosefta from the halachah, and we do not know his reason [see Beit Yosef]. And for the law, we hold like the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch [and Tosafot 67a distinguished between moist and dry, see there; and for us there is no practical difference because we remove the nails entirely, as will be explained].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote there, and this is their wording: And because there is no ability to determine what is called "opposite the flesh" or "not opposite it," women are accustomed to remove their nails at the time of immersion. Thus far their words. And it appears that even after the custom, it is not an absolute requirement, and if she did not cut them, if only they were clean, she does not require another immersion. For our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote afterwards in section 20, and this is his wording: Specifically dough that is under the nail is a chatzitzah, but the nail itself is not a chatzitzah, and even if it was long and standing to be cut, and protruding and passing beyond the flesh, it is not a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. And one should not say that this is only according to the core law but according to the custom it is a chatzitzah, for if so, he should have specified and not placed a stumbling block before those who study it; rather, it is because he holds that the custom is not an absolute requirement. And so it is found among the early authorities who ruled thus [see the Bach who cited in the name of the Ri of Corbeil that if she did not remove the nails, the immersion is valid for her, and so wrote the Hagahot Sha'arei Dura, and this is his wording: And if she forgot and did not remove her nails before immersion, it is not a chatzitzah, provided that there is no mud within them; nevertheless, it is good to be stringent and immerse a second time because it is impossible that there should not be mud within them. Thus far his words].

But our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this, and this is his wording: However, all this is specifically when there is no excrement or dough beneath it at the time she immersed, and since it is already the custom to remove the nails, even if one nail remained on her hand and she immersed, she requires another immersion, and such is the custom. Thus far his words. And ostensibly his words are not understood, for what does he come to teach us that there should not be excrement or dough beneath it, for has this not already been explained? And furthermore, what is this that he wrote, "and since it is already the custom etc. she requires another immersion," for behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, also brought this custom, and nevertheless did not require another immersion.

It appears to me that he informed us of a great matter in this, and this is the explanation: "However, and so wrote," meaning that even according to the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, that the nail itself does not constitute a chatzitzah even after the custom, however, this is certainly specifically when there is no filth or dough, etc. That is to say, even a minute amount of mud or dough, regarding which people are not normally fastidious, nevertheless, after the custom, there is fastidiousness regarding this even ex post facto. For since they practiced removing the nails entirely, it is like a notification that they are fastidious even about a small amount of mud or dough. Therefore, because it is difficult to be careful in this, they practiced removing them entirely, for if it were not so, they would not have practiced thus. And if so, automatically now by strict law even a slight minute amount of mud or dough obstructs. And he further says, "And since they have already practiced," etc., meaning that in this he adds to the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef. And this is the explanation: since the custom has already become established to the point that according to the view of the women it is like a strict law, and in their eyes even the nail itself is considered a complete chatzitzah, therefore, if she forgot to remove even one nail, she requires another tevilah like a matter that is a complete chatzitzah. And the great authorities disagreed on this: for some say that when the night passed and she had relations with her husband, she should not immerse the next day so as not to cast a slur upon the tevilah [Taz, subsection 21 and Maharimal]. And some say that she requires another tevilah [Shach, subsection 25 and in Nekudot HaKesef]. And even according to this opinion, she should immerse without a berakhah. And in a time of pressing need, one may rely on the first opinion. And there is one who says that regarding the toenails one should be lenient in every case, even if mud is found under them, and she does not require another tevilah, for regarding the feet it is obvious that they are not fastidious [see there, Sidrei Taharah in the name of Hemdat Yamim]. And these are words of reason; nevertheless, the matter requires further study for practical application.

And since the cutting of the nails has been accepted as an obligation, therefore on Chol HaMoed women may cut their own nails without any hesitation; see Orach Chaim siman 532. And on Shabbat and Yom Tov, if she forgot to cut the nails while it was still day, they should be cut by a gentile woman. And if it is possible for her to cut them with her teeth or with her fingers, it is certainly fine. However, in most cases it is impossible to cut them well except with a knife, and therefore she should ask a gentile woman to cut the nails for her with a knife, as this constitutes a shevut d'shevut in the context of a mitzvah [Nekudot HaKesef and Magen Avraham in siman 340, and Shevut Yaakov, and Sidrei Taharah subsection 39]. And there are those who wish to forbid it, but their words have been rejected.

And if she has swelling from pain at the location of the nail and she is able neither to cut nor to scrape, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 19 that if it is so swollen that the dirt under the nail is not visible, it does not constitute a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. This is according to the law of a thorn that was explained in section 38 [Beit Yosef]. And according to this, it is not necessary for skin and flesh to have formed a crust over the dirt; rather, as long as the dirt is at a depth that is not visible level with the flesh, it does not constitute a chatzitzah [Shach, subsection 24]. However, in truth, it is not comparable to the thorn above, for there it is swallowed within the flesh, but the dirt lies between the nail and the flesh [Rav Baruch Frankel]. And it appears to me that here too the intention is such: that because of the pain it entered deep into the flesh, for if it is between the skin and the flesh, is it not possible to scrape after it? And certainly, whatever is within her ability she should clean. And it is not relevant to say that since other women are fastidious it is a chatzitzah—both the dirt and the nail itself according to the custom—for it is not so, as all women when they have such pain are not fastidious. And it is like dye that those of that craft are not fastidious about, as I wrote in section 44. And it is not comparable to a bandage, as is understood.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 21: A dangling fingernail where a minority of it has separated constitutes a chatzitzah; if a majority of it has separated, it does not constitute a chatzitzah. A dangling limb or flesh constitutes a chatzitzah. Thus far their words. However, a wart or an extra digit that are not dangling do not constitute a chatzitzah [Rema]. The explanation of these matters is that regarding a fingernail, when a minority of it has separated, the water does not enter beneath the separated minority, and it is a chatzitzah. But if a majority of it has separated, the separation is wide and the water enters it, and regarding the minority that is attached, the concept of chatzitzah does not apply since it is attached and is like her body. But a limb or flesh, even if a majority of them have separated, the minority constitutes a chatzitzah because it is not the way to leave it so, for it hurts much and is destined to be cut off, and it is a chatzitzah [Taz subsection 22]. And it appears clear to me that also regarding a fingernail we are dealing with a case where it hurts her much and she is unable to cut it, and consequently it remains on the body until it falls off on its own, for if it were not so, she would be obligated to cut it [and with this, all that the Shach hesitated about in subsection 27 is settled; see there and examine it closely].

Earrings, nose rings, rings, and necklaces, which are types of jewelry worn on the ears and hands or rings for the nose and neck—if they are loose such that the water enters them, they do not constitute a chatzitzah ex post facto. However, initially she is obligated to remove them. For even regarding the washing of hands, which is more lenient, it is explained in Orach Chaim siman 161 that one must remove them because we are not so expert in what is called "loose," see there; and all the more so regarding the stringent laws of a niddah, and only ex post facto do they not constitute a chatzitzah. But if they are tight, they constitute a chatzitzah even ex post facto, and she requires another immersion. Such is also the law regarding a bandage over a wound and splints over a fracture—meaning thin pieces of wood with which they bind a fracture of the body or a fracture of a limb. And some say that a bandage and splints always constitute a chatzitzah even if they are loose, for the water does not enter them [Bach]. Everything is according to the perception of the posek. One should not ask why jewelry constitutes a chatzitzah, for is it not a minority of the body that one is not fastidious about? For this is not so; since at the time of kneading and the like one is fastidious to remove them, they always constitute a chatzitzah, as I wrote in section 8 [see Sidrei Taharah subsection 44 who wrote in the name of the book Gan HaMelech that one should only be stringent for one who performs degrading work, etc., and these are astonishing words, and it is against all the poshkis, and I wonder at the Sidrei Taharah for bringing this, and Heaven forbid to be lenient in this, and it requires great study, and delve into it].

Hidden places in the body, such as the inside of the mouth and the inside of the ears in depth, and likewise other hidden places, do not require that the water enter them, as it is written: "And he shall wash his flesh in water"—just as his flesh is on the outside, so too everything must be on the outside [Kiddushin 25a]. However, we require that it be fit for the entry of water. And there was an incident with the maidservant of Rabbi who immersed and came up, and a bone was found between her teeth, and Rabbi required her to undergo another immersion [ibid.]. Therefore, every woman before her immersion must pick her teeth so that there is no intervening substance in them, for if she immersed and any substance was found stuck in them, her immersion is not valid for her, and it is an obligation upon her to check the teeth beforehand.

Therefore, the upright women have the custom not to eat meat on the day they go to the beit tevilah because it enters between the teeth more than other food, and even though they check and pick the teeth, they are concerned lest a small amount remain without her noticing. It is a beautiful custom, and it is simple that if she did not do so, it does not impede the tevilah. On Shabbat and Yom Tov, the custom is to eat meat, provided that she is careful to clean the teeth well afterward [Taz, subsection 25]. She should not eat anything between the washing and the tevilah, and she should not occupy herself the entire day prior to the tevilah with dough or with wax candles and the like—things that stick—so that it does not stick to her; and so they have practiced.

Some say that specifically the hidden parts of the body must at least be fit for the entry of water, for these are revealed places that are merely covered or wrinkled; however, swallowed places within the body, such as in the depth of the womb and the like, do not even require being fit for the entry of water. For this reason, they ruled regarding a woman for whom they placed a ring in that place for medical reasons, and it is difficult for her to remove the ring from her womb at the time of immersion, and there is almost a danger involved—if the ring is deep in her womb in a place where the organ does not reach, she may immerse while the ring is in her womb and it does not constitute a chatzitzah [Noda BiYehudah siman 64 and Zichron Yosef siman 10], and so we rule in practice:

If she did not rinse the hidden places and the folds of her body, and a substance that constitutes a chatzitzah was found in them, her tevilah is not valid. But if no substance that constitutes a chatzitzah was found on her, even though she did not examine herself before tevilah, her tevilah is valid. This is not similar to the examination of the body and the washing of the head that will be explained in siman 199, where if she did not examine or wash, her tevilah is not valid even if no substance that constitutes a chatzitzah was found; for there, the water must actually reach, therefore it is necessary to examine and wash beforehand. This is not so regarding the hidden places and the folds, for they only require being fit for the entry of water, and it does not impede when no substance that constitutes a chatzitzah was found [Shach, subsection 32]. Furthermore, regarding the entire body, we are concerned that perhaps there was a substance that constitutes a chatzitzah and it fell off after the tevilah, but in the hidden places and the folds, it is not the way for it to fall off, and if there had been a substance that constitutes a chatzitzah there, it would not have fallen off [ibid. in the name of the Levush and Ma'adanei Melech]. Furthermore, there are some of the Rishonim who said that this requirement that the hidden places be fit for the entry of water is rabbinic [Ritva in the name of his teacher, cited in Mishneh LaMelech, chapter 1 of Mikvaot], however, from all the Rishonim it is implied that it is from the Torah.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 26: If she did not examine between her teeth nor her hidden parts before immersion, and after immersion she also did not examine until she had occupied herself with stains and with cooked foods, and afterwards she examined and found a bone between her teeth or an intervening substance within her hidden parts, we hang it on the side of leniency and say that after immersion they entered therein. Thus far his words. And so the Tur wrote in siman 199 in the name of the Ra'avad, see there. And it is a great leniency. Now, if the law of "fit for the entry of water" is rabbinic, it is well that it would be a rabbinic doubt and judged leniently; but if it is from the Torah, how can we hang it on the side of leniency? And indeed, there are those who disagree with this [Shach, subsection 33 in the name of the Rokeach]. And some say the reason is that since the Torah was lenient regarding hidden parts, that they do not require the entry of water but only to be fit for the entry of water, therefore we hang it on the side of leniency in this as well [Levush]. And I do not understand, for shall we expound the reasons of the Torah? For ultimately, the Torah decreed that it must be fit for the entry of water, and since there is a doubt, we should have been stringent. And it must be said that since through the occupation with stains and cooked foods it is close to a certainty that something would cling to her, this is not a deficiency at all, and a doubt does not remove a certainty, for we always hang it on that which is common [see Shach, siman 50, subsection 3].

If she placed her hair in her mouth, or pressed her lips together—meaning she stuck her lips together with force—or clenched her hand in a manner that the water would not enter them, her immersion is not valid. This is a Mishnah in the eighth chapter of Mikvaot. Now, regarding placing her hair in her mouth or clenching her hand, it is simple, for the water did not enter the hair or the hand. However, regarding pressing her lips together, one must doubt whether the disqualification is because the water was not fit to enter into her mouth, and we require it to be "fit for the entry of water," or if the reason is because of the place where the lips adhere, as the water did not enter there. There is a practical halachic difference in this, such as if she pressed her lips together loosely and the water entered the lips, but the mouth was not fit for the entry of water; or perhaps when loose it is also called "fit for the entry of water" and it is not disqualified unless she stuck her lips together with force.

And this is implied from the words of the Rosh in his commentary on the Mishnah, who wrote: "she pinched her lips," meaning she pressed them against each other excessively. Thus far his words. For this implies explicitly that if they were loose, her immersion is valid. However, from the wording of our teacher, Shimshon, there, it appears that he is uncertain about this, as he wrote: "she pinched her lips," from the expression "to pinch with a fingernail," for her lips adhere and the water does not enter her mouth; and although we do not require the entry of water etc., we require it to be fit for the entry of water. Thus far his words. And from this it is implied according to the first explanation toward stringency. But afterwards he wrote, and this is his wording: And it would somewhat appear that "pinched" is an expression of pressure, that she presses her lips excessively etc. Thus far his words. And this is like the explanation of the Rosh. And so it is implied in the Tosafot in Niddah [67a, s.v. "she opened"], and this is their wording: And we also learned in a Mishnah etc. "she closed her lips" etc. Thus far their words. And their version was "she closed," which implies with force.

And in my humble opinion, since to the Rosh and the Tosafot it is certain to them that with looseness it is permitted, we do not abandon their certainty because of the doubt of the Rash. Therefore, she does not need to open her mouth, but only that she should not press her lips together strongly. And so it is explained from the words of the Ramban, of blessed memory, at the end of the laws of niddah, and this is his wording: And regarding the laws of chatzitzah, it is not good for a person to be overly stringent and to search after doubts, etc., such as closing her eyes excessively, pressing her lips together excessively, etc., for who can discern, etc. Thus far his words. And his primary intention is that she should hold her eyes and her lips in her usual manner, neither completely open nor completely closed. And so it will be explained in section 86, see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 28: Her friend should not hold her with her hands at the time of immersion unless she loosens her grip so that the water may enter the place where her hands are holding. And if she rinsed her hands in water first, it is permitted, for the moisture on her hands is a connection to the waters of the mikveh. Thus far his words. And specifically moisture that is wet enough to moisten another object is considered a connection, and similarly, she should moisten her hands in the waters of the mikveh [Shach, sub-section 37]. And some say that even with detached water it is permitted, for afterwards they are connected to the waters of the mikveh [Taz, sub-section 28]. However, there is nevertheless a practical difference: for when she rinsed in the waters of the mikveh, even if her hand is attached to the flesh of the woman immersing, it is fine, for this place is also attached to the waters of the mikveh—meaning, to the water on her friend's hands, which are waters of the mikveh. But when she rinsed in detached water, which becomes like the waters of the mikveh by way of connection, if so, she requires that her hands not be attached to the flesh of the woman immersing, but rather loose from her flesh, so that there will be a connection of the waters of the mikveh to the water on her hands [and so wrote the Sidrei Taharah, sub-section 57, and the Atteret Zahav, sub-section 27, and it must be that his intention is also thus, though it is not explained well]. And know that even if she rinsed her hands in the waters of the mikveh, they do not have the status of the waters of the mikveh except as long as she has not raised her hands from the mikveh; once she has raised them, they become like detached water, for she has severed them from the waters of the mikveh [ibid.], and she must be careful in this.

And behold, from his wording it is implied that if she loosened her grip or rinsed, it is permitted even ab initio, and so it is clarified from the wording of the Tur. However, from the wording of the Mishnah in the eighth chapter of Mikvaot, where we learned: One who holds onto a person or onto vessels and immerses them, they are tamei; but if he rinsed his hand in water, they are tahor. Rabbi Shimon says: He should loosen his grip so that water may enter them, see there; it is implied only ex post facto. And so it is clarified from the wording of the Rambam there, who wrote: And if he rinsed his hands, the immersion is effective for him. Thus far his words. This also implies ex post facto. And it must be said that certainly it is so; however, the intention of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is in a case where the woman immersing is unable to immerse by herself due to fear or another reason, and it is necessary that her friend hold her, and it is considered ex post facto since it is impossible otherwise. And this is the explanation: Her friend shall not hold her, etc., meaning in a case of necessity, unless she loosened, etc.

Behold, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled that even loosening is effective, for they hold that Rabbi Shimon is more stringent and requires specifically loosening, and according to the First Tanna, loosening is also preferable to rinsing her hands. However, the Rambam there ruled that only rinsing is effective and not loosening, for we decree lest she not loosen her hands, see there; for he holds that according to Rabbi Shimon it is effective but not according to the First Tanna, and the halacha is not like Rabbi Shimon. And such is the opinion of the Ramban. But the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch were not concerned for this opinion for the reason that the Rashba wrote in Torat HaBayit, for behold, even regarding jewelry loosening is effective, as has been explained, and we do not decree lest she not loosen them. However, one may distinguish that here, since she holds her so that she does not fall, it is nearly certain that she will tighten her hands to her body without intention [the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit]. Therefore, there are those who were concerned for this opinion, that without rinsing it is not effective [Bach and see Shach subsection 35]. And there are those who wrote that since it is a rabbinic prohibition on a minority of the body even though one is fastidious, and from the Torah it is not a chatzitzah, the Rashba, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch are sufficient to rely upon [Taz subsection 29 and 27, and so it appears in the Drisha]. Especially since from the wording of the Ba'al HaHalachot Gedolot, who wrote "Rabbi Shimon says until one loosens," it is explicitly clear according to their words. Nevertheless, the custom in this is that when her friend immerses her, her friend lifts her hands for a moment from the water so that she will be entirely in the water, and it is a beautiful custom. And even though there is one who wrote that they do this for no reason [Drisha], nevertheless many agreed to this [Shach subsection 36 and Be'er Hetiv and Mahari Bruna]. However, regarding a woman who cannot stand on her feet, it is necessary that others hold her and they shall not separate their hands from her, and they shall be careful to rinse their hands in the water of the mikveh and not to lift their hands above the water of the mikveh during the entire time of her immersion, and the holding of her body shall be beneath the water.

The Tur wrote: If she placed coins in her mouth and immersed, her immersion is valid. Thus far his words. And this is a Mishnah there; meaning, that it is not similar to finding meat or a bone between her teeth, where her immersion is not valid because it is not fit for the entry of water, for meat and bone are stuck fast. This is not the case with coins and similarly other things that are not edible and do not have sharpness to be wedged between the teeth like a needle or the like—there is no concern in this, for it is fit for the entry of water. [And the Shulchan Aruch omitted this because it is obvious, and in the Mishnah there it comes to teach us another law, that the saliva is impure, see there].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 29 further wrote: One who immerses in a mikveh that contains only exactly forty seah, if he says to his fellow, "Press your hand upon me in the mikveh," this is disgraceful. Thus far their words. And in the Tosefta we learned this without qualification: One who says to his acquaintance, "Press," etc. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch explain that this is only in a mikveh that has only exactly the measure of a mikveh, for we fear perhaps he will lift his hands before the other immerses properly, and it will be found that the measure of the mikveh is diminished—namely, the water that is on his fellow. However, the Rambam wrote this without qualification in chapter 1 of Mikvaot, following the wording of the Tosefta, and he holds that we do not approach this from the reason of a deficiency in the measure of the mikveh, for he wrote the law of an exact mikveh in chapter 8; rather, he holds that the reason is because it appears like a chatzitzah, and therefore he used the expression "disgraceful." Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work that the intention of the Rambam is also regarding an exact mikveh, see there; and in his work Kesef Mishneh there he also wrote thus, and he himself brought that from the responsa of the Rivash it does not imply so [see Shach subsection 39 who wrote that the Rivash explains this law, see there; and it requires further study, for he did not write concerning this law, but rather concerning the laws at the end of siman 201, but automatically it is so, and so it is implied from the Kesef Mishneh, see there; however, what he wrote that the reason is because it appears like jesting, see there, in my humble opinion it appears more likely because of the chatzitzah, and he follows his reasoning that we wrote in section 63; and also what he brought from tractate Derech Eretz Zuta chapter 7, and in our versions it is in tractate Derech Eretz Rabbah at the end of chapter 10, also from there there is no necessity, see there and delve into it].

A woman does not need to lift her feet from the floor at the time of her immersion, and we do not say that if so, the floor intervenes between the soles of her feet and the water and constitutes a chatzitzah. For this is not so, since she entered into the water and the water preceded her feet and her feet were moistened by the water of the mikveh, it is considered a connection to the water of the mikveh and there is no chatzitzah here, as I wrote in section 61 regarding the grip of her friend, that when she rinsed her hands it is permitted. And this is when there is no mud there, but when there is mud there, even if the mud is moist such that it does not constitute a chatzitzah, nevertheless she must lift her feet from the ground. This is implied in the Shulchan Aruch section 30 [and Shach subsection 40], for even though it does not constitute a chatzitzah, nevertheless the water does not pass under the soles of her feet [and the Sidrei Taharah subsection 60 wondered at this, but according to what I wrote it is well-settled, and so wrote the Hagahot Rav Baruch Fraenkel].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 31: One may not immerse upon vessels. Therefore, if there was mud in the place where she immerses, she should not stand upon a wooden vessel that contracts tumah from its back, nor upon planks that are fit for midras, nor upon any vessel fit for midras and immerse, because of the decree regarding baths of vessels. If she transgressed and immersed, her immersion is not valid. However, she may place bundles of vine-shoots under her feet because of the mud. Similarly, she should not stand upon an earthenware vessel nor upon a log and immerse; and even though an earthenware vessel does not contract tumah from its back and is not fit for midras, it is a concern of the sages lest she be afraid of falling and not immerse properly. If she transgressed and immersed upon these, her immersion is valid. According to this, a mikveh that has wooden rungs, meaning steps, if she immersed upon the rungs, even if they are attached to the walls of the mikveh, her immersion is not valid, for they are flat wooden vessels; and it is necessary to make in their place a step of stones, and the step should be four wide—the place for resting the foot—so that there will be a significant area so she will not be afraid of falling from it. And a wooden pipe fixed to the floor of the immersion pool, if it does not have a rim, meaning a frame, for then it has no receptacle, she is permitted to stand upon it and immerse. Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matter is that it is known that one only immerses in a river, a spring, or a mikveh, and not in vessels; and even if the spring water entered the vessel, they are disqualified, as written in siman 201. Therefore, if there was mud at the bottom of the mikveh of the kind that one may not immerse in, as will be explained, and it is necessary to place something on the ground to stand upon, there are two conditions for this. The first is that the object must be four tefachim wide, for with less than this, she will be flustered lest she fall and will not immerse properly. Therefore, since this is merely a concern, if she immersed on less than this and she says that she immersed well, the immersion is valid for her. The second is an essential requirement: that she does not stand on a vessel susceptible to tumah, such as on the bottom of a wooden vessel, for a wooden vessel is susceptible to tumah from its exterior; nor on planks fit for midras, for they contract midras-tumah; nor on any vessel fit for midras, such as a chair, a bench, or the like. For even though according to the Torah this is nothing, as the mikveh is not disqualified by this since the water is not inside the vessels, nevertheless, it is forbidden by rabbinic decree because the masses will not distinguish in this matter and will reason that just as it is permitted to immerse on top of a vessel even though it is susceptible to tumah, so too it is permitted inside the vessel. And this is what they called the decree of bathhouses, meaning the bathtubs of a bathhouse in which they wash; and they will say that it is permitted to immerse in them. Therefore, even ex post facto, the immersion is not valid for her. But on something that is not susceptible to tumah, such as on top of an earthenware vessel, for an earthenware vessel does not contract tumah from its exterior, it is permitted, provided that it is four tefachim wide. Furthermore, an earthenware vessel does not contract midras-tumah by scriptural decree [Shabbat 84b; and see Rashi, Bekhorot 38a, who wrote the reason is because she will slip, and it requires great further study].

And behold, it is true that this is the approach of the Ra'avad and the Rashba in Torat HaBayit, but it is not prepared at all; for is there a distinction regarding immersion within vessels between a vessel that is susceptible to tumah and one that is not susceptible to tumah? Even in a vessel that is more than forty se'ah, which is not susceptible to tumah, or vessels of dung, vessels of stone, or vessels of earth, immersion is invalid in them, as is taught at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Mikvaot and as I wrote in siman 201, that the invalidity of vessels is due to the reason of sho'avin. If so, what difference is there between a vessel that is susceptible to tumah and one that is not susceptible to tumah? And one must say that they hold that even though in essence there is no difference, nevertheless, since on the back of the vessel there is no prohibition at all except due to the error of the masses, therefore, with something susceptible to tumah they will err, for they will say: "Behold, we are standing on something that is susceptible to tumah from its back or midras, and even so it is permitted," and if so there is no difference between its back and its interior; but on something that is not susceptible to tumah they will not err. And they learned this from the fifth chapter of Mikvaot where they said there: "Provided that one does not immerse on top of a bench," which implies because it is susceptible to midras tumah. [And that which they said in Niddah 66b: "A woman should not stand on top of a clay vessel etc." because of the decree of the bathhouses, see there; either they do not have the version "clay vessel," or they hold that according to the conclusion it was only because of fear, see the Beit Yosef and delve into this.]

But the opinion of the Rosh is indeed thus: that it is forbidden to immerse upon any vessel, even upon the back of earthenware vessels, due to the decree of bathhouses. That is to say, they might say that just as it is permitted to immerse upon the back of a vessel, so too it is permitted inside the vessel. And this is what they innovated in the Gemara there, that even upon the back of earthenware vessels, which do not contract impurity, she should not immerse due to the decree of bathhouses. For from the Mishnah we only learned regarding a bench, which contracts midras impurity. And perhaps you will say that if so, why did the Mishnah specify a bench? This is not a difficulty at all, for the Mishnah is dealing with other laws regarding passing over a bench, and it will be explained in siman 201; and incidentally, it informs us that one should not immerse upon it, but the same applies to all vessels. And the Tur brought this dispute, and it appears to me that one should be stringent [see the Bach who was stringent like this, and the wonderment of the Shach in subsection 43 I do not understand, and it seems to me that the opinion of Rashi and Tosafot is also thus; see there and examine carefully].

The words of the Rambam are not clarified in this matter, for in chapter 1 he wrote: She should not immerse upon a wooden vessel or a basket and the like because she is afraid, and the immersion is not valid for her. Thus far his words. This implies that the reason is only because of fear, like the opinion of the Ra'avad and the Rashba. Yet in chapter 9 he wrote: A spring whose waters flow etc. provided that one does not immerse upon vessels. Thus far his words. And since he did not write according to the language of the Mishnah, "upon the bench," it proves that he is speaking of all vessels. If so, why does he need the reason of fear? Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, pressed himself regarding his words to say that he holds that a vessel that does not have a receptacle is worse than the back of vessels, or that it refers specifically to when the water passes over it; see there. Furthermore, it is difficult, for how could he write regarding the reason of fear "the immersion is not valid for her," which implies even ex post facto, contrary to the logic of all the poskihm that this reason is only ab initio? [And see there in the Kesef Mishneh who pressed himself regarding this]. However, it can be said that his intention is not regarding ex post facto, but rather this is the explanation: because she is afraid, the immersion will not be valid for her properly; but regarding the matter of ex post facto, it can be said that he holds like all the poskim.

And it appears to me that the Rambam, of blessed memory, had another approach in this, for here is the wording of the Gemara: Rava said, a woman should not stand upon an earthenware vessel and immerse. Rav Kahana thought to say, what is the reason? Because of the decree of bathhouses; but upon a basket, it would be fine. Rav Hamnuna said to him, there, what is the reason? Because of fear; on a basket she is also afraid, see there. And it is difficult: from where did Rav Hamnuna know that Rava's reason was because of fear? And if Rava truly stated the reason was because of fear, if so, how could Rav Kahana think to say the reason of bathhouses? Rather, certainly the matter is thus: that Rav Kahana thought that Rava's reason was because of bathhouses, and it is like the bench of the Mishnah, and Rava comes to teach us that specifically a vessel that has the status of ritual impurity, but a basket—meaning a basket of willows—which does not have the status of a vessel at all, is permitted. And to Rav Hamnuna it was obvious that this is not so, for if so, why did he specify an earthenware vessel? Let him say a vessel in general. Rather, certainly this law does not relate to the reason of the Mishnah at all, but the reason is because of fear. And the practical difference is that even if it has a large hole such that the status of a vessel is nullified from it and the reason of the Mishnah does not apply, it is also forbidden because of fear. And therefore Rava specified an earthenware vessel, for regarding it there is fear that it might break and she will fall, and therefore even upon a basket it is forbidden, because since it is soft, she will also be afraid lest she fall. And therefore in chapter 1 the Rambam transcribed this law, and the practical difference is even if the status of a vessel was nullified from it by way of a hole, as I wrote. And he does not explain that the fear is because of the narrowness of the place, for he does not explain "silta" as a piece of wood like Rashi, but as a basket, and this is ab initio. And in chapter 9 he wrote the law of the Mishnah [so it appears to me].

And regarding that which our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, "and not upon planks that are fit for midrasot," and the Rashba likewise wrote this wording in Torat HaBayit, great controversy has increased. For in its simple sense, it appears that the intention is wide planks that are fit for midrasot, and if so, one must wonder how we place wide planks on the floor of the mikveh. The Levush cried out about this like a crane, see there. And likewise, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, that a mikveh which has wooden rungs, if she immersed upon the rungs, the immersion is not valid, for they are flat wooden vessels; meaning, that even though according to the Torah they do not contract impurity, nevertheless, according to the Rabbis they contract impurity, as the Rambam wrote in the first chapter of Kelim. And even according to the Tosafot in Sukkah [60a] that they are completely pure, they wrote explicitly that regarding those that are fit for midrasot, they are impure according to the Torah, see there, and the Rambam wrote likewise there. And if so, how do we make steps with wide rungs upon which the women stand and immerse? [And at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Kelim, the Rambam wrote that a wooden vessel that is not made for containing and is made for human use alone, such as a ladder, is pure even according to the Rabbis, see there; yet it is made for treading, and it is possible to distinguish between short rungs like a standard ladder and wide rungs upon which they tread well, and it requires further study, and examine it well]:

The Levush strove to settle the custom regarding the planks in his place, Lublin, because the river water surrounds the entire immersion room in such a way that the mikveh water is connected to the river water. In this case, the decree of bathhouses does not apply, as they do not resemble bathhouses made of vessels, and there is no reason to decree lest they immerse inside vessels; see there. This justification does not apply to our mikvaot which stand on their own. This justification would only serve to validate in many places during the summer when they establish wash-houses and immersion houses on the rivers for pleasure and cooling, which are called "kupalnes," for the water is connected to the river water and it is valid to immerse in them, but not regarding our standard mikvaot.

Indeed, many of our teachers, the later authorities, have responded extensively to him [the Bach, and the Shach in subsection 45, and the Ma'adanei Yom Tov, and the Hagahat Derisha, and the Maharam Padua in siman 31, and the Maharam Lublin in siman 57], and the essence of their words is this: That which they wrote regarding boards fit for midras, the intention is boards designated for vessels and fit for midras, such as a bench and the like, and not boards intended for construction which have no status of a vessel at all, and all the more so if he attached them with nails, for they have become a complete structure. However, there is a question regarding this: if so, why did the Rashba and the Shulchan Aruch, who wrote "but she may place bundles of branches etc.," require bundles of branches? Let them say "but she may place boards that are not designated for midras" [and the Shach likewise questioned this in subsection 63]. However, this is no question at all, for ordinary boards made by craftsmen are for the sake of vessels, as is known; and it is obvious that if they made the boards for the sake of the floor of the mikveh, it is perfectly fine. And they are not dealing with this at all, for they are dealing with a case where she takes an object to place under her feet for a brief moment and afterwards she will remove them from there, and where would she take boards that are not fit for midras? Therefore they mentioned bundles of branches, as it is common and available, and after the immersion she will remove them. But if they make boards specifically for the floor of the mikveh, this law does not apply, for if so, there is no mud here and it is a permanent improvement, whereas they are dealing with a temporary improvement, as is understood from their wording.

Furthermore, even with planks made for the purpose of vessels, they do not possess impurity until the vessel is made; for that which we establish that unfinished wooden vessels are impure [Chullin 25a], this is when the essence of the vessel is finished and only they have not yet beautified it, as the Rambam explained in the fifth chapter of Kelim, see there. If so, there is no prohibition except with planks that were made for treading as they are; but planks made for vessels are still pure, and all the more so planks made for building will never enter the category of impurity. And that which they cited bundles of branches, they cited it merely as an example, as it is common and ownerless [it appears to me].

And that which they wrote, that immersion is not effective upon the rungs, this is when they made the rungs while detached while it was still outside the mikveh, and certainly the status of a kelli applies to this. But in truth, when they make this in the mikveh, the craftsman prepares the sides of the rungs and the rungs all as is proper, but afterwards he dismantles them entirely and stands one side of the rungs in the mikveh and fixes them in the ground, and likewise the second side, and it becomes like a building. And afterwards he places each and every rung in the holes of the sides, and they come from the start for a building, and the status of a kelli does not apply to this at all. Therefore, if the rung is only four tefachim wide, she is permitted to stand upon it and immerse. And likewise, if they make steps in the excavation itself without the sides of rungs, and they fix step after step in the mikveh itself, it is simple that this is not a kelli but a building. And all the more so if they fixed them with nails, it is simpler than a "beita de-kutaḥa" that the status of a kelli does not apply to this, and especially since the water floats over them and it is like a complete building. [And the Taz in subsection 31 permitted it on the grounds that we do not rule like the Ra'avad, for the prohibition is not from the aspect of tumah, see there. And therefore he permitted in subsection 32 even if the rungs were made outside in their entirety, see there. And all his words require study, as the Sidrei Taharah wondered and rejected all his words where the Taz wanted to reject the words of Maharam Padua and the Bach, see there. And the main point is as we have explained, and to this all the great authorities agreed.]

And that which he wrote regarding a wooden pipe, that it is permitted to stand upon it and immerse, implies that even if it is not four tefachim wide, because it is fixed to the ground, she is not afraid of falling. Thus the reason is explained in the Responsa of the Rosh, see there. And if so, we do not require four tefachim. And that which he wrote "that it should not have a rim," the intention is that on the third side it should not have a rim, as the primary laws of pipes will be explained in siman 201. And I wonder about this, that he mentioned "of wood," for since it is attached to the ground, even one of metal does not contract tumah, as the Tur wrote in the name of the Rosh in siman 201 and in the Shulchan Aruch there, section 48, see there. And it appears to me that in truth he did not mean specifically [wood], but rather because they asked him regarding one of wood. And I examined the Responsa of the Rosh [Klal 31, Din 3] and the truth is indeed so, for when he answered based on the reason of being attached to the ground, he did not mention "of wood," and regarding "of wood" he did not write "attached to the ground." Furthermore, the Tur did not mention "of wood," and the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, require further study.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 33: She should not immerse in a place that has any mud on its floor because of chatzitzah, unless she places branches upon it or something similar that is not susceptible to tumah; and if she immersed, some say the immersion is not valid for her. Thus far his words. The commentators [Shach, subsection 47] wrote, and this is his wording: And even though above in section 14 he ruled that only "Yaven mud" etc. constitutes a chatzitzah, it can be said that here too it refers to a mikveh that has thick mud like "Yaven mud," and perhaps it is upon this that they rely now and immerse in a place that has mud, etc. Thus far his words. Nevertheless, she must lift her feet at the time of immersion [Dagul Merivavah], as we wrote in section 66; see there.

However, regarding the primary interpretation, it appears to me that one who examines the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, [will see] he initially wanted to say that this mud is like the mud of the pit; but afterwards he brought in the name of the Ra'avad, who wrote that some say she may not immerse in any mud. And that which we learned in the Mishnah of Mikvaot, that only the mud of the pit constitutes a chatzitzah, that is regarding vessels; but regarding a person, who has cracks in her feet between one toe and another, we are concerned regarding any mud that the water will not enter them, see there. And this is truly the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, in Shabbat [65b] and in Niddah [67a], and as the Ran wrote there, that this is the opinion of Rashi. And if so, certainly this is the intention of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, for in section 14 he wrote the primary law according to the opinion of most poskim, and here he wrote to be concerned for the opinion of Rashi and the Ra'avad, and therefore he wrote "some say." And according to this, one must certainly be careful with every type of mud, and so it appears [correct] to instruct. And only post facto, when she did not immerse another time and was with her husband, one may rely on the opinion of most poskim [so it appears to me].

And she should not immerse in a place where there is a concern of people seeing her, whether Israelites or idolaters, because it is a source of embarrassment and she will hasten to immerse and will not be meticulous in her immersion. However, ex post facto, if she said that she was properly meticulous, the immersion is valid for her, as this is only a mere concern, and as I have written regarding the matter of fear in section 68.

She should not immerse in an upright posture because there are places that remain hidden in her, and she should not delay long until her hidden parts cling to one another; rather, she stoops slightly until the hidden parts of the pudenda are visible in the manner they are visible when she is kneading bread, and under her breasts is visible in the manner it is visible when she is nursing her son, and under the armpit is visible in the manner it is visible when she is weaving and spinning while standing, as she raises her hands slightly. She does not need to distance her thighs from one another excessively, nor to distance her arms from the body excessively, but rather in the manner they are during her walking. This is consistent with the measures that have been explained, but this measure is one that everyone is familiar with [Atzei Levonah subsection 37, and according to what I wrote it is well-settled, and delve into it]. If she deviated, such as if she stooped excessively or stood excessively upright, the immersion is valid for her; others say it is not valid. Thus wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 35. There are those who took issue with him, for according to what he himself ruled at the beginning of this siman regarding eye-paint and the blood of a wound—that it constitutes a chatzitzah—he should not have brought this opinion that it does not hinder ex post facto, for this is dependent on that according to the version of the Gemara [Shach subsection 49], if this is only for taharot as we explained. Furthermore, one must raise a difficulty, for the Rambam is among those who are lenient regarding eye-paint and the blood of a wound, as he wrote explicitly in chapter 2 that this is only for taharot, yet regarding "the manner of her growth" he ruled in chapter 1 that she requires it even for her husband, for he wrote there in law 10, and this is his wording: And the woman must immerse in the manner of her growth, like a weaver, etc. Thus far his words. If so, certainly our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who ruled strictly in those cases, should certainly rule strictly regarding the manner of her growth.

However, in truth, the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, are correct, for there are many proofs that this law of "the way of its growth" does not invalidate post facto, whether regarding her husband or regarding purities. Through this, one understands why the Rambam changed the language of the Gemara, which said "a woman should not immerse except in the way of her growth," while he wrote "and she needs etc.," except to instruct so that one should not err and say that it invalidates even post facto. And there is a clear proof for this from what the Rambam wrote there in chapter 1: One who binds his hands and feet and sits in a water channel, if the water entered over his entire body, he is pure. Thus far his words. And this is a Tosefta in chapter 8 of Mikvaot. Now, this is an a fortiori argument: if even when bound there is a possibility that the water will enter over his entire body, all the more so regarding crouching or standing upright. Rather, it is certainly so that this is only ab initio, even for purities, for the Tosefta is dealing with a man, as is clear from the language, and all the more so that regarding her husband it does not invalidate.

And there is further proof from what will be explained, that if the water is shallow in height, she may immerse by lying on the side of the body, and this is from the Bahag; and we are witnesses that immersion in such a manner is worse than stooping or standing upright. Rather, it is certain that the water always enters every area of the body, but this is only ab initio. And even though one could say that by lying down her entire body spreads out in the water, nevertheless it is unavoidable that she contracts somewhat, and it is worse than stooping or standing upright. And there is further proof, for behold there is one who asked: what concern is there in stooping or standing upright? Behold it has already been explained that as long as the water has covered, we have no concern, and here, upon entering the water, the waters of the mikveh rose over the entire area of the body [Taz subsection 38]. And they answered that we fear perhaps her folds will cling together before she enters the water, and upon her arrival they are already clinging. Therefore they wrote that it is good that she first enter up to her neck in the water, and we do not fear if afterwards, when she immerses her whole self with her head, she stoops much [ibid.]. And behold, who does not see this difficulty, that we should fear the clinging of the folds beforehand? For behold, when she goes to the mikveh, she goes in an upright posture, and why should she stoop then? And there is one who answered that we fear perhaps her folds will cling so much that the water in the folds will not be connected to the water of the mikveh [Nekudot HaKesef], and this too is difficult, as is understood. Therefore it appears to me that certainly it is so, that there is no concern here ex post facto, and they only warned about this ab initio. And this is the reasoning of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who holds that this law is more lenient than all of them [the Sidrei Taharah subsection 76 also labored to settle this, and according to what I wrote it is settled simply; and study this]:

Since it has been explained that she must immerse in the manner of her natural growth, therefore our teachers wrote that one must see that in the height of the water in the mikveh, it reaches a zeret above her navel, which is half a cubit, three tefachim above her navel, and this is ab initio. However, on account of this, the immersion is not delayed. And the Geonim wrote that she may roll like a fish and it is well; that is to say, if the water is minimal in height such that in a standing position it is impossible for her to immerse because the entire body would not be under the water, she should lie on her side or on her back and her belly, and her entire body will be under the water. And this is "like a fish," that is to say, like a fish. And more will be explained regarding this in siman 201, section 7.

She does not need to open her mouth so that the water enters it, and conversely, she should not press her lips together excessively. If she pressed them together excessively, her immersion is not valid for two reasons: first, because we require the mouth to be fit for the entry of water; and second, because at the place where the lips meet, the water did not enter, and the place where the lips meet requires the actual entry of water, as this is not a hidden place. How should she act? She should touch her lips one to the other with a moderate contact, neither open nor completely pressed together, in a manner that the lips will be in the water and the mouth will also be fit for the entry of water. Similarly, she should not close her eyes too tightly so that there is no chatzitzah below the eyes, nor should she open them too wide so that there is no chatzitzah above the eyes; rather, she should hold them in the manner of people. If she closed them excessively or opened them excessively, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 39 that there are those who say her immersion is not valid, see there. And he did not bring another opinion as he did in section 35 regarding standing or stooping excessively. It is clear from this that in this matter his opinion is to be stringent even after the fact. Logic dictates this, for upon her entry into the mikveh, the eyes are above the water, and if she opened or closed them excessively, water would not reach at all above the eyes or below the eyes. Nevertheless, he wrote this in the phrasing of "there are those who say" and did not write plainly that her immersion is not valid as he did regarding pressing her lips together, for that is an explicit Mishnah at the end of the eighth chapter of Mikvaot. There is room to say that the closing and opening of the eyes is lighter than it, as is understood [see Shach, subsection 51], for one does not have the power to press the eyelids together like the pressing of the lips. Therefore, he wrote this in the phrasing of "there are those who say," meaning that according to the law, it does not seem right to distinguish between this and pressing her lips together, and here too her immersion is not valid.

It is a known matter that when a person enters the water, the hairs of the head, due to their lightness, float upon the surface of the water, and if even a single hair remains outside the water, it is as if she did not immerse. Therefore, our teachers wrote that she should not immerse alone, but rather an adult woman, no less than twelve years and one day old, who is of sound mind, should stand over her at the time of immersion, and she shall see that not even a single hair remains outside the water and that it does not float upon the surface of the water. Aside from this, it is known that young women are anxious at the time of their entry into the water, and it is possible that she will not immerse properly. Therefore, the simple custom in all the dispersions of Israel is that a woman stands over her at the time of immersion, and they call her a "Tukerin." However, if she is in a village and there is no woman with her, she should not delay the immersion because of this. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 40 that she should wrap her hair upon her head with wool or linen threads or a strap, and tie the hairs loosely so that the knots are slightly distant from the hairs so that the water may enter them, or with chains of hollow threads, or tie a loose cloth over her hairs. And even though at the beginning of the siman it was explained that ab initio one should not tie even loosely, nevertheless, when there is no choice, it is necessary to do so. And as I wrote in section 9, it is explicitly proven from the Mishnah and Gemara that it is permitted even ab initio, see there. Furthermore, another of the great authorities wrote that a woman who is diligent and is not anxious in the water may hold her hair in her hands until all her hairs enter into the water and then remove her hands from them, and then the immersion will be proper, and she may rely on this in a time of pressing need [Sidrei Taharah, subsection 49 in the name of Maharshak, see there. And know that the Sidrei Taharah in subsection 78 investigated how one woman is believed in a case where a prohibition is established, and he was pressed to explain it because it is in her power to do it, see there. But this is not necessary, for the Torah believed the woman who immerses herself, and she only seeks another to oversee her as an extra measure; if so, what relevance does this have to an established prohibition? And delve into this].

She should not hold near her immersion, while she is naked, her small son or daughter, for children's feet are generally soiled with mud and refuse, and there is a concern that they will climb upon her and the mud will stick to her body. This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 2 and the Shulchan Aruch section 41: One who slings her son behind her while she is naked and immersed, her immersion is not valid, lest there was mud on the infant's feet or hands and it stuck to his mother and intervened at the time of immersion, and after she ascended it fell off. Thus far his words. [This is the version of Rabbeinu Chananel in the Gemara 67a, as the Tosafot wrote in the heading "Netanah"]. And one should not wonder why we must assume a flaw, for it can be said that they hold this to be a matter of certainty; however, there are some of the great authorities who ruled that after the fact we do not concern ourselves with this [Shach subsection 23 and Bach]. And it is obvious that if pebbles or splinters entered the cracks of her feet, it is a chatzitzah and she is obligated to immerse another time. And similarly, a plaster, a poultice, or a bandage, even in a hidden place, intervene; for even though the water does not need to enter them, nevertheless they must be fit for the entry of water, as has been explained. And similarly, the application of oil or another fatty substance on her body or her head, she must be careful to wash them beforehand so that there will not be a chatzitzah, because a fatty substance repels the water and is also a concern of chatzitzah, as I wrote in section 30.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 43: Some say that a woman must urinate before immersion if she needs to do so; she also needs to check herself regarding bowel movements and urination so that she will not need to restrain herself, and [those areas] will not be fit for the entry of water; she also needs to remove mucus from the nose. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words appears to me to be as follows: that "if she needs to do so," meaning if she feels she needs to urinate, she certainly must urinate, for perhaps the urine will reach near the place of its exit at the time of immersion and the place will not be fit for the entry of water. And afterwards he says, "she also needs to check etc.," meaning even if she does not feel that she needs [to go], it is proper to check, for perhaps at the time of immersion she will need a bowel movement or urination, for the reason of the concern that has been explained. And for this same reason, she also needs to remove mucus from the nose. However, all of this is ab initio, but post facto it does not invalidate [ibid. subsection 55 and so it appears in the Bach]. But dry discharge that is on the edge of the nose certainly constitutes a chatzitzah, for it is on the outside [Rema MiPano siman 110]. And dry discharge that is inside the nose, in the upper part of the nose, does not constitute a chatzitzah [ibid.], for it never comes out and it is also a concealed place that does not require being fit for the entry of water. And teeth made by doctors—if she removes them occasionally to clean them, she also needs to remove them before her immersion. But if they are fixed firmly such that it is impossible to remove them, they do not constitute a chatzitzah. And so it is proven in the Rambam, chapter 19 of Shabbat, law 7, see there. And all the more so regarding the filling of teeth, which is called "plombiren," there is no concern in this.

If there was a wound near her head and the hairs of her head were outside the wound, but the tip of one or two hairs is stuck to the wound, this is a chatzitzah. And the same applies to other places on the body in a place where there is hair, and she must remove them from the wound. And so too if the tip of the hair was stuck with mud or with excrement, she must rinse them. And so too the eyelashes, meaning the eyebrows, she must be careful that any hairs from the lower eyebrows are not stuck to the upper eyebrows. And so too sometimes it happens that a hair or two hairs from the lower eyebrow go up and pierce the eyelashes from above and emerge from there, and it is a chatzitzah. And so too she should not immerse with dust that is on her feet, and if she immersed, there is one who says that it is not a chatzitzah because the water rinses away the dust, and there is one who says that it is a chatzitzah because the dust becomes like mud upon her descent into the water and creates a chatzitzah, unless she rubbed it beforehand or immersed in hot water, for hot water certainly removes the dust. And so too she must be careful as there is a species of lice that stick to the flesh in the pubic hair and they call them "filtz laiz," and they stick to the skin and the flesh strongly; she must remove them by means of hot water and thorough rubbing and scratching it with a fingernail. And that which is not in her power to remove is not a chatzitzah, for it is a minority that one does not mind.

The halakha was decided that immersion for terumah and for holy things requires intent for immersion, but for chullin it does not require intent. The immersion of a niddah for her husband is like chullin and does not require intent. Therefore, a niddah who immersed without intent, such as if she fell into the water or went down to cool off, she is permitted to her husband. However, there are those who are stringent and require another immersion without a blessing, for it is possible that since it was without intent, she did not immerse well. Furthermore, it is the opinion of the Rashba that intent is required, for indeed there is a dispute in the Gemara [Chullin 31b]; the Rambam and most of the poskim ruled like the one who holds that intent is not required, and the Rashba ruled like the one who holds that intent is required [see Beit Yosef]. Therefore, if her friend pushed her into the water with intent, it is effective according to all the poskim, for the intent of her friend is considered intent [Shach subsection 60 and Taz subsection 40]. One should be concerned ab initio for the opinion of the Rashba. It is also stated there in the Gemara that a niddah who immersed in her clothes is permitted to her husband when the clothes are loose and the water enters them over the entire body; but if there is even one place in the clothes stuck to the flesh, it is obvious that the immersion is nothing and she requires another immersion with a blessing. Know that it is the way of modest women to hide the night of their immersion, not to go in a commotion or in front of people so that people do not notice them; and regarding one who does not do so, it is said of her, "Cursed is he who lies with any animal." It is the way of women to be careful when they exit from the immersion that a friend should meet her, so that an impure thing such as a dog or the like should not meet her first. If these things met her first, if she is God-fearing, she should return and immerse; only after she has seen another woman is there no longer a concern, for the main thing is the first meeting, as the thought is active then. There are women who walk from the immersion with another woman and nevertheless, when they meet an impure thing, they return to immerse, but this is not the primary view as I have written. The Rokeach wrote that meeting a horse is of no concern to us because the horse sleeps little [see Shach subsection 61]. It is stated in Pesachim [111a]: One who meets a woman at the time she comes up from an immersion of mitzvah, etc., let him say this: "He pours contempt upon princes, and causes them to wander in the waste, where there is no way." Some versions cite the verse in Job [12]: "And He loosens the belt of the mighty," see there. And the modest woman is assured that she will have upright sons.