Siman 454

The Tur wrote: One may make matzah from clean fine flour, and even if it is as beautiful as the matzot of Solomon or as hadra'ah bread. And Rashi explained: even if it is entirely bran. But the Rambam, of blessed memory, prohibited that which is entirely bran, for he wrote in the sixth chapter: One does not fulfill the obligation with bread made of bran, nor with bread made of coarse bran. However, if one kneads the dough with the bran and coarse bran within it, one fulfills the obligation. And such is the opinion of Rav Alfas. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters: So that you should not say since it is written "bread of affliction" it must not be fine flour. It comes to teach us that it is permitted. And "bread of affliction" pertains to the kneading, the shaping, and the baking, that they should contain only flour and water, and to bake it immediately. And so it is in the Gemara (36b). And likewise the opposite: even hadra'ah, meaning coarse bread, so that you should not say that this is not called "bread." It comes to teach us that this is not so, for many poor people eat thus.

But according to Rashi, who explained "entirely bran" – it is certainly difficult. For this is not considered bread at all regarding the matter of challah, and they share one law (Ran). But according to the Rif and the Rambam, it works well. And it must be said that Rashi's intention also was not "entirely bran," but rather that he mixed in much bran, such that despite all this, it is fit for human consumption (Bach). And also from the words of the Rif it appears so, as he wrote "hadra'ah bread is bran bread," and even though the Rosh explained the words of the Rif like the Rambam. But the Ran, of blessed memory, explained his intention like Rashi, for if it were like the Rambam, he should have said "bread with bran," and his intention was much bran.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: And it is good ab initio not to make the matzah excessively wide, for it is like an ashishah. Thus far his words. Meaning, and in the Gemara there it was taught: "Bread of poverty" – excluding scalded dough and an ashishah, see there. And it is a great wonder why all our teachers omitted this matter of "ashishah." And also our teacher, the Rema, wrote "And it is good..." – is it not an explicit Baraita? And it is possible to say that they rejected it from the halakhah, for since even like the matzah of Solomon it is kosher – all the more so this is kosher. Or it is possible because we say there that an ashishah is one sixth of an ephah, see there. And the measure of challah is a tenth of an ephah, as it is written "And the omer is a tenth of an ephah," and an omer is the measure of challah. And if so, the ashishah would need to be close to two measures of challah, and this matter is entirely impossible, for we do not knead more than the measure of challah, as will be explained in siman 456. If so, automatically there is no need to write this law. And regarding this our teacher, the Rema, said "And it is good...", meaning: that even with our matzot – it is good to do so, so that it should not in any part resemble an ashishah. And this is not by the letter of the law. And so we are accustomed to make the matzot for the Sedarim, not very large. And this is not a requirement that invalidates.

We learned in a mishna in the first chapter of Challah: Dog dough, when the shepherds eat from it, is obligated in challah, and a person fulfills his obligation with it on Pesach. If the shepherds do not eat from it, it is exempt from challah, and he does not fulfill his obligation with it on Pesach. And the Rambam explained that when one kneads it with bran and intends to feed it to dogs and not to man, it is exempt from challah, as it is written: "When you eat of the bread of the land"—those that humans eat, and not what animals eat. Therefore, he does not fulfill the obligation of matzah on Pesach, for matzah is dependent upon challah. However, when the shepherds eat from it—meaning that it is the practice of that place that even though they make it to feed to dogs, nevertheless it is the practice of shepherds to eat from it—we certainly read regarding this "When you eat of the bread of the land."

Our teacher Shimshon explained that this is the explanation: Dough for dogs—such as when it contains much bran. Therefore, when the shepherds eat it, because it does not contain so much bran that they would be unable to eat it—it is obligated in challah, and one fulfills the obligation of matzah with it, for it is called "bread." But if they are unable to eat it—it is not bread. The Ramban, of blessed memory, explained according to the Yerushalmi that even if it were of fine flour, only if its kneading and its preparation are not like the form of bread—it is called "dough for dogs," for thus they make for dogs without the form of bread. And we have already written in Yoreh Deah at the end of siman 330 that they do not disagree with the Rambam regarding the law, but rather in the explanation of the Mishnah, and also in the Yerushalmi there is a dispute regarding this, see there. And this too is not regarding the law but in the explanation of the Mishnah, see there.

And know: that even though flour from which the bran and the coarse bran were not removed joins to the volume of a kezayit, as I have written, nevertheless, if the bran or the coarse bran were removed from the flour and they returned it into it—it does not join. And there is one who is uncertain regarding this (Magen Avraham, subsection 2). But there is no uncertainty here, for behold, also regarding the matter of challah it is so, and matzah is dependent upon challah as I have written (Chok Yaakov, subsection 2). And know that Rashi, of blessed memory, at the end of the seventh chapter of Shabbat, explained that "subin" is the husk that falls off at the time of crushing, and "mursan" is that which remains in the sieve. And the Bartenura in the second chapter of Challah explained the opposite, see there. And the Aruch, in the entry "mursan," explained that "subin" is the fine waste of the flour, and "mursan" is the coarse waste, see there. And according to his words, the husk is nothing. And it appears that this is how the world has understood it, for behold, when a husk is found on Pesach in a cooked dish—we do not forbid the dish. But according to the words of Rashi and the Bartenura—behold, they come to leavening. And like the explanation of the Aruch, it is clarified in the Commentary on the Mishnah of the Rambam, the eleventh chapter of Terumot (Mishnah 5), and this is his wording: "Mursan"—it is that which arises from the "subin." And "subin"—is known. Thus far his words, meaning: the coarse waste that arises from the fine waste. And so it is in the explanation of the Rosh there, who wrote regarding "mursan"—the coarse waste, see there. And in the Mishnah there, it was explained that in new grain there is more bran than in old grain, see there well.

The Rabbis taught: "Bread of affliction" – this excludes scalded dough. For if one scalded the flour with boiling water, such that he does not allow it to leaven – nevertheless, he does not fulfill his obligation with it on Pesach, for this is the bread of the wealthy and not bread of affliction. And the Tur wrote: Dough whose kneading is soft, and is scalded with boiling water – it is not called "bread" to recite over it "Hamotzi." And if he baked it afterwards in an oven – it is called "bread" regarding "Hamotzi" and challah, and one fulfills the obligation of matzah with it. And if its kneading is thick and it is scalded and baked – it is "bread" regarding challah and "Hamotzi," but one does not fulfill the obligation with it on Pesach. And according to Rav Hai – one does fulfill the obligation with it on Pesach. And all this is according to the law of the Gemara, but the Geonim forbade all scalding. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Rif and the Rambam, that in this time there is no one who knows how to scald. Therefore, every type of scalding is forbidden. Nevertheless, if a grain of wheat, or barley, or a piece of dough fell into a boiling cooked dish – it is possible that there is room to permit the dish, and at any rate to join it to some leniency (see Magen Avraham and Chok Yaakov subsection 4).

A person does not fulfill his obligation with stolen matzah. This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter seven, law 7: A person does not fulfill his obligation with matzah that is forbidden to him, such as if he ate tevel, or ma'aser rishon from which its terumah was not taken, or if he stole it. This is the rule: anything over which one recites birkat hamazon—he fulfills his obligation with it. And anything over which one does not recite birkat hamazon—he does not fulfill his obligation with it. Thus far his words. And the Rosh in the chapter "Kol Sha'ah" (siman 18) also wrote that one does not fulfill the obligation with stolen matzah, because it is not "yours." For we learn matzah from challah in the Gemara (35b) that we require it to be from yours, see there. However, borrowed matzah is considered "yours" well enough, and one fulfills the obligation with it (Taz, subsection 3). And also regarding stolen matzah: specifically when he stole matzah. But if he stole wheat or flour and made it into matzah—he fulfills his obligation with it, for he has acquired it through a change, and he only owes him the monetary value. And this is according to the reasoning of the Rosh because of "yours."

But according to the Rambam, who hung the reason on the matter of the blessing, and according to what we hold later in siman 449 regarding a lulav—that even if he acquired it through a change, he does not recite a blessing over it—if so, here too, one has not fulfilled the obligation of matzah according to the Rambam. There is one who distinguishes between a change of name and a change of action, but it is not primary (Chok Yaakov, subsection 6). And it is similarly proven in the Tosafot in several places. And one cannot say that regarding Birkat HaMazon, which is from the Torah, one must recite the blessing; for behold, the Rambam ruled explicitly at the end of the first chapter of Berakhot that one does not recite Birkat HaMazon over a forbidden item. And the Rosh disagrees with him, as I wrote in siman 196. Therefore, I am astonished at our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who there ruled like the Rambam, and here ruled like the Rosh. However, the Maggid Mishneh also wrote that through a change, one fulfills his obligation, and it implies that even according to the Rambam it is so; see there. And it requires further study (and see Magen Avraham there, subsection 1).

And ostensibly, why did our teachers not state the reason is due to "a mitzvah that comes through a transgression"? However, it appears that they hold that a mitzvah that comes through a transgression is only rabbinic, and there are opinions among the Rishonim regarding this (Tosafot Sukkah 9a). And in the Yerushalmi, first chapter of Challah (halacha 9 [5]), it says: Stolen matzah – it is forbidden to recite a blessing over it. Rabbi Oshaya said: Because it is stated, "The thief blesses, he blasphemes Hashem." This which you say applies at the beginning, but at the end – it is money that he owes him. And the Rosh explained there that the intention is "at the outset" and "after the fact," for after the fact he fulfills his obligation with stolen property. And the Maggid Mishneh explained that "at the end" means by way of a change, see there. And in my humble opinion, it appears that "at the beginning" refers to the first blessing, for it is still in his power to return it. And "at the end" refers to Birkat HaMazon since he has already eaten it, and he owes him money. Therefore he blesses, for what was – was.

And afterward the Yerushalmi says: Rabbi says: A transgression is not a mitzvah. Rabbi Yose says: A mitzvah is not a transgression. Rabbi Ila said: "These are the mitzvot"—if one performed them according to their requirement, it is a mitzvah, and if not, it is not a mitzvah. Thus far his words. And the Rosh wrote: And it is possible that these Amoraim disagree, and they hold that since he did not perform them according to their requirement, it is not a mitzvah, and he does not fulfill his obligation. Thus far his words. And their reasoning is because of a mitzvah that comes through a transgression, except that they say it in different phrasings. And according to this, it implies that a mitzvah that comes through a transgression is a Torah prohibition.

The kohanim fulfill their obligation of matzah with challah and with terumah, even though it is matzah that is not fit for every person. And so too they fulfill the obligation with matzah of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem, as we establish that ma'aser sheni is the property of a commoner in Jerusalem, and not in the outlying areas (the end of the chapter "Chelek" according to the Rabbis of Rabbi Meir). And this is what the Rambam ruled in the third chapter, that ma'aser sheni is the property of Heaven, yet here he ruled in the sixth chapter that one fulfills the obligation of matzah with ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem (Lechem Mishneh). But one does not fulfill the obligation with matzah of bikkurim even in Jerusalem, as it is said: "In all your dwellings you shall eat matzot" – matzah that is eaten in all dwellings, excluding bikkurim which are only eaten in Jerusalem. But ma'aser sheni has a permit in the outlying areas by means of redemption (36b).

The loaves of a todah offering and the wafers of a nazir that one made for himself—he does not fulfill his obligation with them, as it is said, "And you shall guard the matzot"—matzah that is guarded for the purpose of matzah alone is that which one fulfills his obligation with, excluding this which is guarded for the purpose of a sacrifice. However, if he made them to sell in the market—he fulfills his obligation with them. For one who makes them to sell in the market, his intention is that if he does not sell them for the purpose of a sacrifice, he will eat them for the purpose of matzah, and it turns out that they were made for the purpose of matzah (38b). And even though if so we come to the law of bereirah, to say that afterwards the matter was clarified that it was made for the purpose of matzah, and in Torah law there is no bereirah—one can say that this is not like general bereirah, for he baked it for the purpose of a mitzvah, and afterwards the matter was clarified for which mitzvah it was made. (And it is similar to the words of the Ran at the beginning of the fifth chapter of Nedarim, see there well. Examine it and you will find it easy.)