Siman 347

One who carries from domain to domain is not liable by the Torah—unless there is an akirah and a hanachah, which is to say that he must perform an akirah from a reshut hayachid and perform a hanachah in a reshut harabim, or vice versa. However, an akirah without a hanachah or a hanachah without an akirah—he is exempt. And it is not similar to every chatzi shiur which is forbidden by the Torah, and the reason for the matter we explained in siman 242, section 35, and by rabbinic law it is forbidden. And so too regarding one who conveys four amot in a reshut harabim, there is also a requirement for akirah and hanachah. And we explained there that less than four amot—it is permitted even by rabbinic law, see there for the reason for the matter. And also the akirah must be specifically from a place that has four by four tefachim, and so too the hanachah must be upon a place of four by four, because the akirah must be from a significant place and so too the hanachah. And it appears to me that it must be specifically four by four and not long and narrow, even though in total it has the calculation of four by four, for since it does not have four in width its use is not convenient and it is not a significant place, as I wrote regarding a makom patur in siman 345, section 45, see there.

Even though a space of four by four is required, nevertheless the Sages, of blessed memory, said (5a) that a person's hand is considered like four by four, for there is no greater importance than a person's hand with which he performs all labors. And there is no difference between the right hand and the left hand, for even his left hand is more important than another space of four by four, as we learned in a Mishnah (92a): "One who carries out, whether with his right or with his left—is liable." Therefore, if he uprooted the object from the hand of a person standing in this domain and placed it in the hand of another person standing in a second domain—he is liable. And there is a doubt whether specifically a person's hand is considered like four by four and not another limb, such as if he uprooted it from a person's head or from the forearm or from his leg, for all of these do not have four by four. And it appears that it is not effective. (And so it is explicit from section 4, see there.)

This is the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 13: "A person's hand is significant… and similarly, if one was standing in one of these two domains, and extended his hand to the second domain and uprooted an object from it or from the hand of a person standing in it, and returned his hand to himself - he is liable. And even though he did not place the object in the place where he is standing, since it is resting in his hand, it is as if it is resting on the ground." Thus far his words. And there is a novelty in this, that even though his body is in this domain and his hand is extended to the other domain, we do not say that his hand is drawn after his body and consider the hand also as if it is in the domain where the body is, and if so there would be no carrying out from domain to domain; it comes to teach us - that it is not so. And similarly there is a novelty that even though there was no change between the uprooting and the placing, as it rests in the same hand with which he uprooted even at the time of the placing, nevertheless the uprooting of his hand is like the uprooting of an object and the placing of his hand is like the placing of an object. And it turns out that the uprooting was in this domain and the placing was in another domain - and he is liable.

And so we say (at the end of the chapter HaZorek [Shabbat 102a]) "that his intention makes it a place." That is to say, even though we require placement upon a place of four by four, nevertheless, if he intended for it to rest in a certain place—he is liable, even though it was not a place of four. For example, if he threw it so that it would rest in the mouth of a dog and it rested in the mouth of a dog—he is liable, even though there is no place of four here. And so if he was eating and going out from one domain to another domain, and he intended to carry the food from one domain to another domain—he is liable, because his intention makes his mouth like a place of four. And even though he did not carry it out in the manner of those who carry—he is liable, because in the manner of eating it is considered carrying in its typical manner. And so too regarding one who stands in one domain and urinates or spits into another domain, and it will be explained in siman 350 with the help of Heaven, that the reason is because his intention makes it a place of four, and there in section 5 the reason will be explained, see there.

It is stated in the Gemara (5b): "Rava said: Water upon water—this is their resting." And when one uproots from the water or places upon the water—it is an uprooting and a resting upon a place of four. And specifically when one uprooted water and placed water, but a nut upon water—this is not its resting, and if one placed the nut upon the water it is not a resting upon a place of four. And likewise, if one uprooted a nut from the water it is not an uprooting. And not specifically a nut, for the same law applies to any object. And it appears to me, that an object whose way is to be upon the water, such as a ship, it is a resting, and the uprooting from there is an uprooting, and see in section 6.

And we say there: "Rava inquired: A nut in a vessel, and the vessel is floating on the water—do we follow the nut, and it is at rest; or perhaps we follow the vessel, and it is not at rest because it moves—it remains undecided." And since it was a doubt, he is not liable, and so wrote the Rambam there. And the Tosafot (starting with "A nut") raised a difficulty from that which we say regarding the acquisition of a ship, that it is at rest and it is the water that moves it (Bava Metzia 9b). And they answered—that acquisition is different, for there it is considered as if it is resting. But regarding Shabbat, we learn from the Mishkan, and in the Mishkan they stored things in the manner that people usually store things, see there. And in my humble opinion it would seem, that certainly in a ship it is considered resting, and such is the way of people. And Rava only spoke of a vessel whose way is not to be upon the surface of the water. And so if there was oil floating on the surface of the water and he scooped from the oil and took it out—he is exempt, for they are not joined to one another (ibid.), and it is like scooping from a place that does not have four by four. And it appears to me, that specifically oil which does not mix with any liquid, but other liquids, since they mix with water, they are like one thing.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 13, law 5: "We have already stated that one who carries from domain to domain is not liable until he performs an uprooting and a placing. But if he uprooted and did not place, or placed and did not uproot—he is exempt. Therefore, one who was standing in one of two domains and extended his hand into the second domain with an object in his hand and another took it from him, or another placed an object in his hand and he brought his hand back to himself—both are exempt, for this one uprooted and this one placed. In what case are these matters stated? When his hand is higher than three [tefachim]. But if his hand was within three [tefachim] close to the ground, it is as if he placed it on the ground and he is liable." Thus far his words. And in such a case it appears that even if another placed an object into his hand that was within three [tefachim] and he brought his hand back to himself—he is liable. For since we hold that his hand is not drawn after his body, as I wrote in section 3, and the uprooting of his hand is like the uprooting of an object, if so, it is as if he uprooted from upon the ground, and when he brought his hand back to himself it is a placing, even though he did not place it upon the ground, as I wrote there. (And this is explained from Tosafot 5a, starting with the word "Kegon," see there). And some say that even below three [tefachim] it is not like being placed on the ground. (Ramakh in Chidushei Maniach, and "some say" in the Maggid Mishneh).

It is simple that what we have said, that both are exempt when this one performed the akirah and that one the hanachah—nevertheless, it is prohibited by rabbinic law, like all exemptions of Shabbat which are "exempt but prohibited," and so it is explicitly stated in the Gemara at the beginning of Shabbat; see there. However, in a case where one performed both the akirah and the hanachah and the second did nothing—for example, if he was standing in one of these two domains and his fellow stretched out a hand from the second domain and took an object from the hand of this one standing in this domain and brought it in to himself, or if he brought an object out from himself and placed it in the hand of this one standing—this one standing has done nothing, for he merely placed it in his hand or took it from his hand. And the second is liable, for he performed the akirah and the hanachah. And in the Gemara there, it says regarding the one standing—"exempt and permitted," and so it is clear from the wording of the Rambam who wrote regarding him—"he has done nothing"; see there.

The Rishonim asked why he is exempt and permitted, for is he not assisting those who commit a transgression, and violating "do not place a stumbling block before the blind"? And even if we say that even without him this second person would have taken and placed it, nevertheless there is at least a rabbinic prohibition. And even if we say that the second person is a non-Jew, nevertheless it is forbidden to give him an object belonging to an Israelite so that he may carry it out into the public domain, as is written in siman 325. And it must be said that it deals with a case where the object also belongs to the non-Jew. (Tosafot 3a). And some answered that the Gemara only said that regarding the matter of Shabbat he is exempt and permitted, but nevertheless there is another prohibition in this, because there are those who hold that even with the object of a non-Jew it is forbidden ab initio to give it so that he may carry it outside because of those who see, (the Rosh) as is written in siman 325, and according to this are the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, see there. And in my humble opinion it appears that we are dealing with these laws in cases of unintentional acts—and regarding the obligation of a chatat offering. For behold, all obligations and exemptions of Shabbat generally refer to unintentional acts, as is proven from the Mishnah of "Klal Gadol" where we learned "he is only liable for one" or "he is liable for each and every one," and this is only regarding the matter of chatat offerings and unintentional acts, for with intentional acts it is not relevant, for would we execute him with two executions? And since with an unintentional act "before the blind" is not relevant at all as is understood, we only say that in such cases this one is completely liable and the second is completely exempt, and in such cases both are exempt but they performed a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally. But this is not a matter of "before the blind." (The laws written by the Magen Avraham in subsection 4 have no relevance to the laws of Shabbat, see there).

In the Yerushalmi at the beginning of Shabbat it says, that when is one liable for placing into the hand of his fellow who is standing in another domain—specifically when the hand of his fellow is below ten tefachim. But above ten it is a makom pator in the reshut harabim, and therefore regarding hotza'ah in such a manner one is not liable above ten, and so wrote the Tosafot (5a, starting with "Kan", see there) and the Rashba. This is the wording of the Yerushalmi: "And this is provided that the hand of the poor man standing in the reshut harabim is within ten of the ground," see there. And even though regarding moving an object we hold that even above ten one is liable, for such was the burden of the sons of Kehat, nevertheless when he placed it there he is certainly exempt. (See Maggid Mishneh at the beginning of chapter 13 who wrote that there are those who disagree, and so wrote the Magen Avraham, and I do not know who these dissenters are).

We hold that the uprooting of one's body is like the uprooting of an object, and the setting down of one's body is like the setting down of an object. (3a.) That is to say, one who was standing in one of the two domains, and his fellow placed a burden upon him or placed it in his hand or on his shoulder, and he went out with that object to the second domain and stood there—he is liable, even though he did not uproot the object nor set it down, because by uprooting his body after he was loaded, it is like the uprooting of an object, and when he stood in the second domain, it is like the setting down of an object. Therefore, if his fellow did not load him while he was standing but rather during his walking, it is not an uprooting. And likewise, if he did not stand in the second domain but rather enters and exits the entire day and did not stand until it grew dark, there is no setting down here. And even if he stood in order to adjust the burden, this is not a standing, but only when he stood to rest.

Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said (5b): "Within four amot—if he stood to rest, he is exempt; to adjust his burden, he is liable. Outside of four amot—if he stood to rest, he is liable; to adjust his burden, he is exempt." Meaning, within four amot, when he stood to rest and it constitutes a placement, behold he did not carry four amot as one. But when he stood to fix his burden, which is not a placement—he is liable, for this is not an interruption. And after four amot, when he stood to rest, it constitutes a placement—and he is liable, for behold he carried out four amot. And to fix his burden he is exempt, as we have written. And they further said (153b): "If his bundle was placed on his shoulder from the eve of Shabbat and the day became sanctified upon him, he runs beneath it until he reaches his house, and there he shall throw the burden in an unusual manner." And specifically when he runs, but if he walks slowly—it is close to coming to a Torah prohibition, which is that he might stand for a moment and not realize, and it would constitute a placement and afterwards a removal. But when he runs, he has a reminder. (From the Rambam chapter 13, halacha 9, it is explained that by walking slowly he is certainly liable, see there; however, the wording of the Gemara does not imply this, and so Rashi explained. And perhaps the Rambam did not mean this precisely, and delve into this.)

The Rambam wrote in chapter 13, law 11: "If a reed or a spear or the like was lying on the ground, and he lifted one end while the second end remained lying on the ground and he threw it before him, and then returned and lifted the second end that was lying on the ground and threw it before him in this manner, until he moved the object several miles—he is exempt, because he did not uproot the object in its entirety from upon the ground. But if he pulled the object and dragged it over the ground, from the beginning of four to the end of four—he is liable, for one who rolls is an uprooter" Thus far his words. That is to say, that dragging and rolling is itself considered uprooting and placing. Therefore, if one rolls a barrel in the reshut harabim four amot or rolls it from one reshut to another reshut—he is liable. (Tosafot 8a, s.v. 'Lo') And so too a round chest, but a square one—he is exempt, for it is impossible that it should not rest a bit. (ibid.) and even though it is the normal way to move it in such a manner, and so too with a reed or a spear even though it is the normal way to move it in this manner because of its weight—nevertheless, he is exempt (ibid.).

He further wrote: "If one uprooted an object from this corner to another corner to place it there in that same house, and this uprooting is found to be a permitted uprooting, and he changed his mind while on the way and took it out to a second domain—he is exempt, because the initial uprooting was not for this purpose, and thus there is a placement here without an uprooting. Similarly, one who uproots an object and places it upon his fellow while he is walking, and at the time his fellow wishes to stand still he took it from upon his fellow—this person is exempt, for there is an uprooting here without a placement." Thus far his words. And this is exempt but forbidden, as I wrote in section 8.

He further wrote: "One who throws an object from one domain to another, or from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits in a public domain, and before it came to rest another caught it in his hand or a dog caught it or it was burned—he is exempt, because this is not the resting that he intended. Therefore, if he intended for this at the time of throwing—he is liable. One who throws an object from one domain to another, and it was tied with a rope and its knot was in his hand, if he is able to pull the object back to himself—he is exempt, for there is no complete resting here, and it is found to be as one who uprooted but did not set down. One who throws and it rested in the hand of his fellow, if his fellow stood in his place and received it—the thrower is liable, for he uprooted and set down. And if his fellow moved from his place and received it—he is exempt. (For he did not intend for this) If he threw and the thrower himself ran after the object and received it in his hand in another domain or outside of four cubits—he is exempt, as if another moved and received it, for there is no complete resting until the object rests in the place where it was meant to rest at the time of uprooting." Thus far his words. And this person did not allow the object to travel to the place that was his intention at the time of the uprooting. And in the Gemara (5a) this was a query that was not resolved. And it appears that if from the beginning he intended for this, at the time that he threw, that he would run and receive it—he is liable. (And so it is explicitly stated by Rashi there s.v. 'kesheni' see there, for behold there is resting here according to the thought of the uprooting).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 14, law 19: "If one threw a reed or a spear from the reshut hayachid and it became stuck in the reshut harabim while standing—he is exempt, for part of it is in a makom patur (above ten [tefachim]). If one threw a vessel from the reshut hayachid to the reshut harabim, and that vessel was large and possessed four by four [tefachim] at a height of ten—he is exempt, because this vessel is a complete reshut hayachid, and it is found to be like one who carries out from a reshut hayachid to a reshut hayachid." Thus far his words. But if it was less than ten—he is liable, and we do not say that it is a karmelit, for there is no karmelit regarding vessels, as I wrote in siman 345. And it appears to me, that even with a large vessel he is exempt only when throwing, for it is like throwing from a reshut hayachid to a reshut hayachid through a reshut harabim. But when handing such a vessel to his fellow—he is liable when they both stood along the length of the street. For regarding handing, one is liable from a reshut hayachid to a reshut hayachid through a reshut harabim in such a manner, as I wrote in the previous siman. (And it is likewise explicit from Tosafot 8a, starting with the words "Rechava"; see there carefully). And it is simple, that if it is not four by four wide—he is liable even if it is ten high, for it is not a reshut. But when it is high above ten—he is exempt, for the upper edge is in the air of a makom patur. And therefore the sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid.) that if it was a vessel made of reeds, such as a beehive or the like, even if it is ten high—he is exempt, for it is impossible for the fibers of the reed not to rise above ten; see there, and I do not know why the Rambam omitted it.

He further wrote: "A pit nine [tefachim] deep in the public domain, and he uprooted a clod of earth from its floor and completed it to ten, (and placed it in the public domain) even though the uprooting of the object and the making of the partition come as one—he is exempt, because the partition was not ten at the beginning. If the pit was ten, and he threw a clod into it and diminished it from ten—he is exempt, for the placing of the object and the removal of the partition come as one." Thus far his words. And in the Gemara (99b) this was a query that was not resolved, see there. And specifically a clod of earth, which he nullifies so that it will remain permanently in the pit—this constitutes the removal of a partition. But for another object—he is liable, for he will take it from there and there is no removal of a partition here. (Gemara ibid.) (And it is not similar to that which is in Gittin 77b where we say 'her get and her courtyard come as one' and it is a valid get, for here we require a domain from the beginning of the uprooting and also at the very end of the placing, and it is not similar to there, and delve into this).

He further wrote: "One who throws a board and it comes to rest upon pegs in the reshut harabbim and it becomes a reshut hayachid, even if there was a vessel upon the board—he is exempt, for the making of the partition and the resting of the vessel occur simultaneously." Thus far his words. This is also in the Gemara there. And there is a question regarding this as to what case we are dealing with: if the pegs are truly close to one another at a height of ten and a width of four, then there is no making of a partition here, for it was already a reshut hayachid beforehand. Rather, it must be that the pegs are far from one another; if so, how does it become a reshut hayachid by means of the board, for it would be a partition that kids can break through? (Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Rashba). And it is possible to say that up to three tefachim from the ground there are complete partitions and no more, if so there is no breaking through of kids here, (and perhaps this is the intent of the Tosafot there, s.v. 'zarak', see there) but nevertheless, the area beneath it would not be a reshut hayachid. (ibid.) And it must be said that there are two complete partitions of pegs, and when he throws the board we say "the edge of the ceiling descends and closes" (ibid.) and it becomes a reshut hayachid. And the Rashba wrote that it deals with a case where it is adjacent to a reshut hayachid and it is like the holes of a reshut hayachid, which the breaking through of kids does not nullify, see there, and it requires further study. And in my humble opinion it appears, for example, that the pegs are close to one another but are not ten high. And by means of the thickness of the board they become ten high, and this is why the making of the partition and the resting occur simultaneously.

He further wrote: "A pit that is ten deep and eight wide in the public domain, and one threw a mat into it (so it must be said) and it divided the pit across its width into two—he is exempt, for with the placement of the vessel the partitions were nullified, and each area of them became less than four by four." Thus far his words. And specifically when he nullifies the mat so that it will remain there forever. And the same law applies if he threw it onto the floor of the pit and diminished it from ten.