Siman 318

Cooking is a primary category of labor, and it was in the Mishkan where they cooked the dyes. The Tanna in the Mishnah of the primary categories of labor counted baking, and baking was not in the Mishkan; and the reason he did not employ the term "cooking" is because he employed the order of bread (74b). That is to say, because he began with "one who sows," etc., he concludes with "one who kneads" and "one who bakes," see there, and for the law there is no practical difference. A derivative of cooking is baking, and cooking via a derivative of fire—for example, one who places an egg next to a kettle that is next to the fire so that it will be roasted by the derivative of fire—it is like cooking in the fire itself. And so too, one who melts any amount of any type of metal, or one who heats metal until it becomes a coal—this is a derivative of cooking and he is liable. And so too, one who dissolves wax or fat or pitch or sulfur and the like—this is a derivative of cooking and he is liable.

And in the Gemara (ibid.): "One who throws a peg into a furnace is liable on account of cooking," and Rashi explained that he threw a moist peg into a hot oven to dry it so that it would harden. Thus far his words. And the Rambam in chapter 9, law 6, explains that this is one who cooks earthen vessels until they become earthenware—he is liable on account of cooking. This is the rule: whether one softened a hard body with fire or hardened a soft body—he is liable on account of cooking. Thus far his words. And in the Yerushalmi of "Klal Gadol" it says there that baking is a derivative of cooking, and likewise one who roasts, fries, parboils, or smokes—all of them are liable on account of cooking. And in the Yerushalmi of Nedarim (chapter 6) it remained in doubt whether smoking is included in cooking regarding the matter of Shabbat, see there, but here it was obvious to it, and such is the halacha. However, one who cooks in the hot springs of Tiberias or in the derivatives of the sun or cooks in the sun—it is not a derivative of cooking, and their prohibition is rabbinic, and in the sun it is permitted as I wrote in section 17, see there.

And how much is its measure to be liable? The Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 9: "One who bakes an amount equal to a dried fig is liable; whether one bakes bread, or one cooks food or spices, or heats water, it is all one matter. The measure for one who heats water: enough to wash a small limb with it; and the measure for cooking spices: enough that they be fit for that purpose for which they are being cooked." Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad wrote: "Enough to dye a small garment with them, the size of a hairnet's opening," see there. And the source is not known to us, and it appears that they wrote this from logical reasoning.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): "If one placed the fire, and one placed the wood, and one placed the pot, and one placed the water, and one placed the meat, and one placed the spices—they are all liable for cooking, for anyone who performs an action necessary for cooking is a cooker. However, if one placed the pot first, and another came and placed the water, and another came and placed the meat, and another came and placed the spices, and another came and placed the fire, and another came and placed wood upon the fire, and another came and stirred—only the last two are liable for cooking." Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: When they all acted at once, and the first one placed the fire and they all performed the labor at the time of the action—they are all liable, for at the moment the wood was on the fire the cooking begins, and they are all liable. Even the one who placed the fire, since at that moment another placed the wood—it is as if they are all one action, and they are all liable. But in the latter case where they did not act together but rather one after another, it follows that until the placing of the fire it is nothing, and even the placing of the fire is nothing, for fire without wood goes out, and the liability is upon the last two who were after the placing of the fire, namely the one who placed the wood and the one who stirred, and this is the way of the Tosefta (Chapter 12). And in the Gemara Beitzah (34b) it is stated that the last one is liable, see there, and it can be settled so as not to contradict the Tosefta, because in the Gemara it says that he brought fire last, meaning upon the wood, and therefore only the owner of the fire is liable, see there (all this I learned from the words of the Mahari Berav brought by the Kesef Mishneh). And in the Gemara there it says that the one who sets the pot is only liable in the case of a new pot, which requires firing to strengthen it, see there. And regarding the liability of the stirrer, some say that only the first stirrer is liable, but those who stir afterward do not benefit the cooking as much and their liability is rabbinic, and this is the opinion of the Ramban and the Rashba, of blessed memory (Maggid Mishneh). (And this requires further study according to this in the first chapter 18b, where it asks: "And let us fear lest he stir it," what is the difficulty? Let us say it is a case where they stirred it once while it was still day. And it can be said that there the liability is due to dyeing, as the Tosafot wrote, see there, and dyeing occurs every time one stirs; and delve into this.)

From Menachot (57a) it is explained that when one placed meat upon coals on Shabbat, if it was fully cooked—he is liable even if it was cooked only on one side, namely the side that is upon the coals. And if it was cooked only to the extent of the food of Ben Drusai, which is a third of its cooking according to Rashi and Tosafot—he is not liable unless he turned it over and it was cooked on both sides to the extent of the food of Ben Drusai. And what is the measure of the cooking: like a dried fig, and even if the dried fig is not in one place but rather a small amount here and a small amount there—it joins together for liability, and this is what emerges from the sugya according to the commentary of Rashi and Tosafot there.

But the Rambam there wrote: "If one placed meat upon coals, if there was roasted of it the volume of a kargogeret, even in two or three places—he is liable. If there was not roasted of it the volume of a kargogeret but the whole of it was cooked to the extent of half-cooked—he is liable. If it was half-cooked on one side—he is exempt, until he turns it over and it is half-cooked on both sides." Thus far his words. And behold, the Rambam holds everywhere that the food of Ben Drusai is half-cooked. And behold, the first clause and the final clause are according to the explanation of Rashi and Tosafot, but that which he wrote: "but the whole of it was cooked to the extent of half-cooked—he is liable" is not understood; for if his intention is that regarding half-cooked one is not liable for a kagrogeret but only for the whole of it, from where does he have the basis to say so? And it appears that he inferred this from the wording of the Shas, since it says: "on one side like the food of Ben Drusai, and on both sides etc.," and afterward it says: "and if there was roasted of it the volume of kagrogerot," see there; learn from this that regarding the food of Ben Drusai, a kagrogeret is not sufficient, because it is not complete cooking. Nevertheless, it is a wondrous matter (and it appears that this is the intention of the objection of the Ramach brought by the Kesef Mishneh, see there; and the Kesef Mishneh understood that his objection was because he did not know its source, and it is a wondrous thing to say so, see there and examine carefully).

We say at the beginning of Shabbat (4a): "If one stuck a loaf of bread to the oven—they permitted him to remove it before he comes to a prohibition of stoning." And even though the removal of the bread is a shevut, nevertheless, so that he does not come to a Torah prohibition, they permitted him to remove it before its surface forms a crust in the oven. And this is whether it was unintentional or intentional, for in the case of intentional it is obvious that he will not listen even if we do not permit him (Tosafot 4a, s.v. "kodem"), and in the case of unintentional as well, so that he does not become liable for a chatat. And even though once he remembers he will not be liable for a chatat, for all those liable for chatat offerings require that their beginning and their end be unintentional, as I wrote in siman 242, nevertheless, a prohibition is at any rate performed by him. And so wrote the Rambam there: "If one forgot and stuck a loaf of bread to the oven on Shabbat and remembered—he is permitted to remove it before it is baked and he comes to a melakhah." Thus far his words.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 6, law 23: "An Israelite who performed melacha on Shabbat, if he transgressed and performed it intentionally—it is forbidden for him to benefit from that melacha forever, but for other Israelites it is permitted for them to benefit from it immediately at the conclusion of Shabbat, as it is said: 'And you shall keep the Shabbat for it is holy to you,' it is holy, but its products are not holy. How so: An Israelite who cooked on Shabbat intentionally—at the conclusion of Shabbat it may be eaten by others, but for him it may never be eaten. And if he cooked unintentionally—at the conclusion of Shabbat it may be eaten by both him and others immediately, and so too anything similar to this." Thus far his words. And there are some of our teachers who ruled that in an unintentional case it is permitted even for him on that very day, and in an intentional case it is forbidden on that day even for others and in the evening it is permitted even for him, as the Tur wrote in the name of Ri, the author of the Tosafot (who ruled according to Rabbi Meir, while the Rambam rules according to Rabbi Yehuda). The Ramban decided in accordance with the words of the Rambam, and so ruled the Geonim and so ruled our teacher, the Beit Yosef. And the pot is also forbidden, but one who cooks for a sick person—the pot is permitted. And as for why they did not require waiting at the conclusion of Shabbat for the amount of time it takes to be performed, this is because that applies only to a gentile who performed it for an Israelite, which is light in his eyes, and if we do not require him to wait for the amount of time it takes to be performed, he will come to tell him to perform it for him. This is not the case regarding an Israelite himself when he performed this, as it is not relevant to say he will come to perform it. And even according to Rashi, of blessed memory, that the reason for the amount of time it takes to be performed is so as not to benefit from the melacha of Shabbat, and if so there is no distinction, nevertheless they did not decree in such a case, because it is an uncommon matter that an Israelite himself would perform melacha, and they did not decree in this (Magen Avraham, subsection 2). And only if the conclusion of Shabbat was a Yom Tov—it is forbidden due to preparation, for Shabbat does not prepare for Yom Tov (ibid.), and if he acted based on a sage—it is called unintentional (ibid.).

In Yoreh Deah at the end of siman 102, it was explained that a work of Shabbat is not called a "davar sheyesh lo matirin" regarding mixtures. For even though for others, since it is permitted after the conclusion of Shabbat, it would be relevant to say regarding this "davar sheyesh lo matirin," nevertheless, since for himself it is forever forbidden—it is not relevant for him to say "davar sheyesh lo matirin." This is like a mixture of terumah in chullin, which is not called a davar sheyesh lo matirin for an Israelite because it is permitted to a kohen, as is found in Yevamot (82a), and so too it is here. And even though this is not a complete comparison, for to a kohen it is permitted even now, but here it is forbidden on Shabbat even to others, and since for others it is a davar sheyesh lo matirin, one could say that for him too it is a davar sheyesh lo matirin (Magen Avraham, subsection 2); and only at the conclusion of Shabbat when it was mixed could one say that for him it is not a davar sheyesh lo matirin because now it is permitted to others, and not when it was mixed on Shabbat (ibid.); nevertheless, such is the law, for since it is explained from Yevamot that from one to another is not relevant and we judge for each one according to what he is, it follows that here too we do not judge from others to himself (so it appears in my humble opinion, and also the Tuv Ta'am VaDa'at disagrees with the Magen Avraham for another reason, see there). And know, that even for the one for whom it was cooked—it is permitted at the conclusion of Shabbat, and we do not say that he is like the one who cooked it himself as in mixtures in Yoreh Deah siman 99, for it is not similar; for there, there is a concern lest they increase for him, but here there is no concern that the Israelite will cook for him (ibid.).

Shechitah is a primary category of labor and its liability is due to the taking of a soul, and it was in the Mishkan regarding the skins of reddened rams that were needed for the work of the Mishkan, and they would perform shechitah or kill them. This is the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 11: "One who performs shechitah is liable, and not only one who performs shechitah, but anyone who takes the soul of any species of beast, animal, bird, fish, or creeping thing—whether through shechitah, through stabbing, or through striking—is liable. And one who strangles a living creature until it dies—this is a derivative of shechitah. Therefore, if one removed a fish from a bowl of water and left it until it died, he is liable due to strangling. And not only until it dies, but once it has dried to the size of a sela between its fins, he is liable, for it can no longer live. If one extended his hand into the womb of a beast and detached the fetus that is in its womb, he is liable." Thus far his words.

And creeping things that reproduce from male and female or whose formation is from the dust—one is liable; and those that are from sweat—one is exempt. We have already explained this in siman 316 regarding trapping, and there we also explained the labor of wounding, and that in this there is also the taking of a soul, see there, and if so, it is a toldah of slaughtering. And know that in the Yerushalmi, chapter 2, halacha 5, there is a dispute: for one says that slaughtering is the av and wounding is a toldah, and one says that wounding is the av and slaughtering is a toldah, see there; and in the Yerushalmi of "Klall Gadol" it holds this way as the primary view, see there. And I do not understand what practical difference there is in this, unless we were to say that one must warn specifically on account of the av, and in truth it is not so, as I wrote in siman 242. And it appears to me that the practical difference is that if wounding is an av, then anyone who causes damage through a wound is liable even without any improvement, for most wounds are such; but if slaughtering is the av, and in slaughtering there are several improvements even when it is found to be treifah—for it is an improvement to remove it from the status of a limb from a living animal and an improvement to remove it from the status of impurity, as is found in Pesachim (73a), see there—then according to this, we require some improvement in wounding as well. And we have already explained in siman 316 that there is a dispute regarding one who causes damage through a wound whether he is liable or exempt, and we dealt with this at length there. And this dispute is not found in the Yerushalmi; therefore, according to the one who holds that wounding is an av melakhah, everyone agrees that one who causes damage through a wound is liable. However, our Talmud, which says that there is a dispute in this, must necessarily say that slaughtering is the av. And in truth, according to the one who holds that one who causes damage through a wound is exempt, one who kills a domestic animal, a wild animal, or a bird, where the meat is not permitted for eating and it also has the impurity of a nevelah, and there is no improvement except that he removed it from the status of a limb from a living animal—if so, according to the one who holds that one who causes damage through a wound is exempt even when he needs the blood, as I wrote there, then in such cases as these he would also be exempt, unless we were to say that the improvement from a limb from a living animal is a great improvement, such that everyone calls him one who improves and he is liable, as is implied from Pesachim there; and it requires further study.

One who cooks for a sick person on Shabbat or performs other melakha—it is forbidden for a healthy person or for a sick person who is not in danger to eat from this food or to benefit from that melakha. For even though it was not performed for them, nevertheless we decree that if we permit it to them, we decree that he might increase for them; that is to say, after he places the pot on the fire he will add more food for them, and it will turn out that he performed a Torah prohibition for a healthy person or a sick person who is not in danger, for this is cooking in its own right. And even if he increases for them before he places the pot on the fire, where it is all one cooking, nevertheless there is certainly a rabbinic prohibition even in such cases. And there are some of the poskim who hold that even in such cases it is a Torah prohibition (see Beit Yosef and Magen Avraham subsection 6), for increasing beyond what the sick person needs—one is liable on account of cooking (this is the opinion of the Ran as the Beit Yosef wrote in siman 331, see there). And even cooking by a non-Jew is forbidden to a healthy person on Shabbat, and on Saturday night it is permitted immediately and does not require the time it takes to be made, since the non-Jew cooked permissibly (ibid. subsection 7). And the issue of bishul akkum does not apply here, as written in Yoreh Deah at the end of siman 113, for in this they did not decree, see there. But for a sick person who is not in danger, it is certainly permitted, for it is permitted ab initio for him by means of a non-Jew, as written in siman 328, see there.

But one who slaughters for a sick person on Shabbat—it is permitted for a healthy person, for regarding slaughtering it is not relevant to decree lest he increase for his sake, since even for a kezayit of meat the slaughter of the entire animal is required (Chullin 15b). And behold, the Ra'avad in chapter 2 and the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote that this is only if he became ill on the eve of Shabbat, such that there is no muktzeh here, for during bein hashemashot it was standing to be slaughtered; but if he became ill on Shabbat—it is forbidden to a healthy person due to the reason of muktzeh. And the Rosh and the Maggid Mishneh wrote that even if he became ill on Shabbat—it is permitted, for we hold like Rabbi Shimon who does not maintain muktzeh except in a case of pushing it away with one's hands, and this is the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 2 who wrote: "Whether he became ill yesterday or whether he became ill today etc." see there, and so it appears from the words of the Rambam who did not distinguish in this. And seemingly it is not understood, for behold, regarding the muktzeh of living animals even Rabbi Shimon admits, and furthermore, it has already been explained in siman 308 that regarding the muktzeh of "since it was set aside during bein hashemashot it is set aside for the entire day" we hold like Rabbi Yehuda and not like Rabbi Shimon, and behold here it was set aside during bein hashemashot since he became ill on Shabbat. However, the clarification of the matters is as follows: that regarding this it is not relevant to say the muktzeh of living animals nor "since it was set aside during bein hashemashot," for this is only relevant to say regarding a thing whose muktzeh status has now been removed, like a lamp that was extinguished or dried figs and raisins that were not fit during bein hashemashot and now they are fit. But this muktzeh, behold even now it is not fit, rather the Torah permitted the slaughter because of pikuach nefesh, and all the more so it permitted the muktzeh. And if he were sick during bein hashemashot as he is now—behold even during bein hashemashot the muktzeh would have been removed, and now too it is removed; rather, according to Rabbi Yehuda we say in any event that his mind was not upon this, and this is nothing other than a light muktzeh about which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagree, and we hold like Rabbi Shimon (and this is also the intention of the Taz in subsection 2, see there, and the difficulty of the Magen Avraham in subsection 4 is answered).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: That if one detached fruit from that which is attached on Shabbat for a sick person, even if he was sick while it was yet day—it is forbidden to a healthy person on Shabbat, because it continues to grow on Shabbat, and it involves the law of mוקצה. Thus far his words. And this is not understood at all, for an animal also grows on Shabbat, and behold we have explained that there is no mוקצה here even if it fell ill on Shabbat, and certainly if it was ill while it was yet day; and if it is because of the detaching on Shabbat, behold even with an animal the shechitah is on Shabbat. And on the main point it is difficult, for regarding the detaching of fruit, it is anyway forbidden to a healthy person lest he increase for his sake, as in the case of one who cooks; and if we say, for example, that he detached one fruit and the sick person did not eat the entire fruit, and in such cases there is no concern lest he increase for his sake, as in the case of shechitah, if so, in the case of one who cooked one piece [of meat], let us also say that it is permitted to a healthy person. Rather, certainly the concern is lest he increase for his sake to cook another piece; if so, also with fruit there is a concern lest he detach another fruit. And furthermore, they raised a difficulty against him, that the growth on Shabbat should be nullified by the majority (Magen Avraham, subsection 8), and so wrote the Tosafot in Bava Kamma (69a), see there.

The source of the law is in the great book of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in the name of Orchot Chaim, and this is his wording: "One who plucks a fruit that has not finished its ripening for a sick person on Shabbat—it is forbidden to a healthy person due to mוקצה etc." Thus far his words. According to this, it can be somewhat settled, for because it had not finished its ripening it is muktzeh, and not when it has finished its ripening, and so the commentators explained. But if so, the main point is missing from the words of our teacher, the Rema, and why did he omit this point of it not having finished its ripening. However, even this is not understood, for what do we care regarding the prohibition of muktzeh between whether it finished its ripening or did not finish its ripening; and if we say that his intention from before the day was to pluck them on Shabbat for the sake of the sick person, if so, even in the case where it did not finish its ripening let it not be muktzeh and let it be nullified by the majority. Furthermore, why did he not pluck them from before the day, and it is a forced explanation to say that the cure was specifically when they would pluck them on Shabbat. Furthermore, even in the case where they finished their ripening, what benefit is there to preparation for that which is attached to the ground; and if so, even in a case where a non-Jew plucked fruits on Shabbat and the Israelite's intention was that he should pluck them on Shabbat, let us say also that it is permitted, and explicitly it does not imply so below in siman 325, see there. The end of the matter is that this law is difficult to understand, and there is no correct reason for it, and it requires further study.

And know, that I have heard those who wish to say that nowadays when one sets up a muliar, which is called a "samovar," for a sick person on Shabbat—that it is permitted for a healthy person to drink from it just as with shechitah, for it is impossible to have a kezayit of meat without shechitah; likewise, it is known that it is impossible to cook a small amount of hot water in the muliar, but only to fill it entirely, for if not, the copper will melt. And so too the herb called "tea," it is also impossible to be exact and provide only for one person as is known, and perforce one provides more than the drinking needs of the sick person, for in any other way it is impossible as is known, and if so, there is no concern here that perhaps he will increase for his sake. And if it is because we should concern ourselves that perhaps when they drink and wish to drink more they will pour more water into it and add herbs, for this we do not concern ourselves, as they did not concern themselves that perhaps he will cook another pot but only that he will add to that same pot, but for a completely new cooking, why should we concern ourselves. And if it is because for the sick person himself he would have set up a small muliar and now he will set up a large one, for this too, from where does he have reason to concern himself, for if so, let us concern ourselves that perhaps he will slaughter a larger bird; and furthermore, every householder always sets up his own muliar designated for his household. Nevertheless, it does not seem proper to permit it, for it is very close to certain that if we permit it to healthy people, many people will drink, and in this there is certainly reason to concern ourselves that perhaps they will increase the herb called "tea," and they will provide much more than if they provided for the sick person alone, and in all our days we have not practiced permissively in this. And even if he set it up by means of a non-Jew—it is forbidden as has been explained, for there is no difference in this.

We have already written that one who cooks with a derivative of fire is liable, for just as it is forbidden to cook with fire, so too it is forbidden to cook with a derivative of fire. Therefore, it is forbidden to place an egg next to a hot pot or to crack it onto a cloth that was heated by fire so that it will roast or cook. And even with a derivative of the sun, such as a cloth that was heated by the sun, it is forbidden—a decree on account of a derivative of fire. And so too it is forbidden to bury an egg in sand or in road dust that was heated by the power of the sun, and even while it is still day it is forbidden to bury it, for hatmanah is forbidden even while it is still day, as I wrote in siman 256 (Magen Avraham, subsection 10). But in the sun itself, such as placing an egg or placing water in the sun so that they will be heated—it is permitted, for the sun is not confused with fire, but a derivative of the sun is indeed confused with a derivative of fire, for the observer does not know if it is a derivative of the sun or a derivative of fire, which is not the case with the sun itself. And it is forbidden to roast an egg on top of a roof that is boiling from the sun, for we decree on account of a derivative of fire, and so too on top of sand it is forbidden for this reason, not like the one who wishes to permit this. And one may place a cooked food into a pit so that it will be preserved from spoiling, and we do not decree lest he come to level pits in order to set it down well (146b). And so we learned in the Mishnah (ibid.): One may place a cooked food into a pit so that it will be preserved, and good water into bad water so that it will cool, and cold water in the sun so that it will be heated, for we do not decree the sun on account of fire as I wrote. (See Bach and Magen Avraham, subsection 10, and their words require study, for they follow the opposite view, and the Machatzit HaShekel exerted himself to settle them with strained arguments, see there, and for the halachah they agree with all that has been explained. And as for what the Magen Avraham questioned regarding the words of the Rambam in chapter 9, who wrote that one who melts metal is liable on account of cooking, and in chapter 12 he wrote that one who heats iron in order to temper it is liable on account of kindling, and regarding melting there in chapter 9 he wrote: "or one who heats metal until it becomes a coal," the Lechem Mishneh already answered that at its beginning it softens and he is liable on account of cooking, and at the end when it becomes fire it is kindling, see there. And in my humble opinion it is not difficult at all, and the Rambam was precise in his words, for in chapter 9 he wrote: "until it becomes a coal," and this is like cooking, which is transformed from raw to cooked, and in chapter 12 he wrote: "in order to temper it," and that is much less than a coal, and therefore cooking is not applicable to it, only kindling, and delve into this.)

And know that the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote all the laws of bishul in this siman, and the Rambam divided them into two places, in chapter 9 and in chapter 22. And the reason is because in chapter 9 he explained bishul of the Torah, and in chapter 22 he explained bishul of the rabbis, as he began there in chapter 21: "It is stated in the Torah 'you shall rest'... which the sages forbade as a shevut," and in these chapters he explained all the laws of shevutin. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not follow the practice of explaining what is a Torah prohibition and what is a rabbinic prohibition, as written in siman 242, therefore they included everything in one place. And it is necessary to know and understand this, for there is a practical halachic difference regarding doubts, for a doubt regarding a Torah law is to be treated stringently and a doubt regarding a rabbinic law is to be treated leniently, and therefore the student must understand which bishul we are discussing, and we, in our humble opinion, will explain with the help of Heaven according to our ability, and may You, Hashem, be a helper to us.

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 9, at the end of law 3: "One who cooks over fire something that was fully cooked or something that does not require cooking at all—is exempt." Thus far his words. For example, oil, regarding which they disagreed in the Gemara (40b) whether cooking applies to it, and the conclusion is that cooking applies to it. However, when there is something that does not require cooking—he is exempt. And behold, the Rambam did not distinguish between a dry item and a liquid item, or between whether it cooled down or did not cool down, for he stated a general rule: that an item that was fully cooked is no longer subject to cooking, for there is no cooking after cooking. However, this is on the condition that it was fully cooked; but if it was not fully cooked, even though it was cooked like the food of Ben Drusai—it is subject to the prohibition of cooking. And regarding that which was fully cooked, it is implied from his words that even in a case where it shrinks and it is beneficial for it, it is not subject to the prohibition of cooking. And the opinion of the Rashba and the Ramakh and other commentators is that anything cooked like the food of Ben Drusai is no longer subject to cooking according to the Torah (Maggid Mishneh and Kesef Mishneh), and all this is from the Torah. But according to the Rabbis, there is a prohibition of cooking in this, for they forbade returning it onto a stove on Shabbat even when it shrinks and it is detrimental for it, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 3 (ibid.). And according to this, when the Rambam wrote "exempt," his intention was exempt but forbidden, like all exemptions of Shabbat.

And in chapter 22, law 8, he wrote: "A matter that was cooked before the Shabbat or was soaked in hot water from before the Shabbat, even though it is now cold—it is permitted to soak it in hot water on Shabbat, etc." Thus far his words. And one should not raise a difficulty, for did we not write that it is forbidden by rabbinic decree? For indeed it is so, and therefore he was precise to say "it is permitted to soak it in hot water," meaning, but not to cook. And the wording of the Mishnah is so (145b): "Anything that came into hot water from before the Shabbat—one may soak it in hot water on Shabbat," see there. And it does not say "one may cook," for cooking is certainly forbidden. And also one should not ask, since they said plainly "one may soak in hot water," it implies even in a kli rishon, for if not so, he should have clarified so that we would not stumble in the halacha, and if so, we hold that a kli rishon cooks. However, in truth, one who is precise in his words there will find that even a kli rishon does not cook according to the Torah, and according to the Torah there is no cooking except when the pot is standing on the fire.

And this matter is explained in the Yerushalmi Kira (halacha 5), which says there: "You have no clear scalding and you have no clear cooked dish except for anything that the fire moves beneath it," see there. And prior to this (halacha 4) it says: "They made a distancing for a kli rishon and they did not make a distancing for a kli sheni," see there; meaning that the sages forbade a kli rishon as a distancing. And from our Gemara it is also explained thus, for on the Mishnah of the stew-pot and the pot (42b), the Gemara says according to one version: "Rabbi Chiyya taught: Salt is not like spices, for even in a kli rishon it does not cook; and this is what Rav Nachman said: Salt requires cooking like the meat of an ox," see there. And it is a great wonder, for if so, is it permitted by the Torah to cook the meat of an ox and salt? (This is phrased as a wonder). Rather, it is certain that in a kli rishon it does not cook, but when it stands upon the fire it cooks. And the Rambam explained this there in law 6 with brief words, and this is his wording: "And so too a boiling pot, even though he removed it from upon the fire—he may not place spices into it, but he may place salt into it, for salt does not cook except upon a great fire." Thus far his words. Behold, this is explicitly like our words. (Also in Yoreh Deah siman 68 we explained this, see there, and the Pri Chadash noted some of this there, see there; and it is a new matter, but the truth is so. And with this you will understand why the Rambam wrote many laws of cooking in chapter 22 and not in chapter 9, and examine it closely.)

And behold, according to what we have explained regarding the method of the Rambam: any item that was cooked or baked, if only it was cooked completely, even if it shrinks and it is beneficial for it—it is permitted by Torah law regarding cooking, and by rabbinic law it is forbidden to cook it, but to place them into a boiling vessel—even of a kli rishon is permitted. However, to heat them in an oven, if the oven is hot and fit for cooking—it is forbidden, and such is the law regarding items that do not require cooking. And it appears that according to this, that which they place on Shabbat morning onions and garlic into cooked foods—it is permitted, for it is not their way to be cooked. And even though they place them into the cooked food for cooking, yet those that are placed at the time of eating, the cooking spoils them, and our intention is that they should not be cooked as is known, and if so, even when the cooked food is hot, behold it is not near the fire and there is no Torah cooking in it, and also there is no rabbinic cooking in this, for this is a matter of unintentional act, and on the contrary, one intends the opposite. And also it is not a psik reisha, for behold we sense in the taste that in most instances they have no cooked taste at all. And behold even a psik reisha that is not pleasing to him is permitted according to many poskim, and even according to Rashi, as long as one intends the opposite—it is permitted, as I have written regarding this in siman 242, and therefore from all these reasons there is no prohibition in this at all, and in vain did some great ones protest this (so it appears in my humble opinion), and see in section 25 and 44.

This is the wording of the Tur: "Even a cooked food that has already been cooked is subject to the prohibition of cooking if it has already cooled, but while it is still boiling – no. And if it was not fully cooked, even if it was cooked to the extent of the food of Ben Drusai – the prohibition of cooking applies to it even while it is still boiling. And these words apply, that there is cooking after cooking, to a cooked food that has broth, but a dry item that was already cooked – it is permitted to soak it in hot water on Shabbat, as we learned in a Mishnah: 'Anything that came into hot water etc.'" Thus far his words, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote with this same wording in section 4. And they wrote that this is the approach of Rashi, that there is no cooking after cooking in a dry item, but in a liquid item when it has cooled it is subject to the prohibition of cooking after cooking, and this is not like the Rambam, who holds that even in a liquid there is no prohibition of cooking after cooking. Nevertheless, it is possible to say that they do not disagree, for by rabbinic decree the Rambam also forbids it as he wrote, and they did not clarify that this is from the Torah; however, the distinction between liquid and dry we have not heard from the Rambam (for they interpret the Mishnah that anything that came into hot water from the eve of Shabbat may be soaked in hot water on Shabbat, that this is cooking, and for the Rambam we explained that it is only permitted to place it in hot water and not to cook it, and more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven).

However, afterwards the Tur wrote, and this is his wording: "The Ra'ah of Metz wrote: Even though there is no cooking after cooking in a dry item, in an item that was baked or roasted there is the prohibition of cooking if one cooked it afterwards in liquids, and it is forbidden to place bread even in a kli sheni that is yad soledet bo. And it is a wonder why they forbade it in a kli sheni... and it does not seem correct to forbid it in a kli sheni... and even according to his words, there is no baking after baking and no roasting after roasting." Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote likewise in section 5, and regarding placing bread in a kli sheni he brought both opinions. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who are lenient even in a kli rishon, and the custom is to be careful ab initio not to place bread even in a kli sheni as long as it is yad soledet bo. Thus far his words. And the explanation of the matters: That the Ra'ah of Metz innovated that while it is true that in a dry item there is no cooking after cooking, this is when the dry item was cooked, such as meat in a pot and the like, for regarding this we learned: Anything that came into hot water, etc. But a baked item, such as bread or meat roasted over the fire—there is cooking after baking and after roasting. And his proof is from that which is in Pesachim (41a), that one does not fulfill the obligation with matzah that was cooked after the baking; evidently, the cooking nullifies the baking. And this is not a clear proof, for regarding matzah it is because we require the taste of matzah and it is not present, and thus the Ra'avyah rejected it; however, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch were concerned for this.

And regarding the matter of placing bread into boiling sauce, for the one who prohibits it in a kelli rishon, it is for this reason: since there is cooking after baking, and a kelli rishon cooks—and even according to what we explained, that this cooking is rabbinic—nevertheless, it is prohibited rabbinically. Furthermore, it appears that these teachers of ours do not hold of the distinction between a kelli rishon and being over the fire, and they maintain that a kelli rishon constitutes cooking from the Torah; therefore, since there is cooking after baking, it is prohibited, but a kelli sheni does not cook. And those who were stringent even in a kelli sheni, it is because anything that is cooked in a kelli sheni is prohibited even in a kelli sheni, as will be explained, and they maintain that bread, which is soft, is cooked even in a kelli sheni. Our teacher, the Rema, who permits it even in a kelli rishon, does so because he maintains like the Ra'avyah that there is no cooking after baking, and it is entirely permitted. And according to these opinions, to place onions and garlic into a kelli rishon is certainly prohibited, since in their opinion this is cooking from the Torah and they maintain that it certainly cooks, and it is a psik reisha; however, it seems to me that if he does not find it pleasing that they should be cooked, it is a psik reisha d'lo nicha lei and is permitted. And in a kelli sheni, it seems to me that even for those who prohibit placing bread in a kelli sheni, this is because it is soft, but onions and garlic certainly do not cook in a kelli sheni, for from where does he have the basis to say so, that they cook in a kelli sheni? And according to this, the custom of the world is well-settled even according to these opinions. And I saw one who is stringent regarding onions even in a kelli sheni (Taz, subsection 8), and I do not know from where he has the basis to be so stringent.

And know that regarding this which has been explained, that for a liquid substance there is cooking after cooking once it has cooled, even if it was fully cooked, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4 that some say this is specifically if it shrinks and it is improved by it. Thus far his words. However, if it shrinks and it is detrimental to it, there is no cooking after cooking. And they wondered about him, for what relevance does this have to cooking? Only regarding the concern that one might rake the coals is there this distinction, for in a case of shrinking and it is detrimental to it, one will not rake, as written in siman 253; but regarding that which constitutes cooking, in any case it is cooking, and therefore they rejected his words (Bach, and Taz subsection 4, and Magen Avraham subsection 8). And in my humble opinion, the primary view is like the words of our teacher, the Rema, and this is the explanation: Since it shrinks and it is detrimental to it, if so, he does not intend for cooking but rather to warm it slightly, and even if it is a pesik reisha and it will necessarily be cooked, it is a pesik reisha that is not pleasing to him and it is permitted, especially since according to the opinion of the Rambam, the Rashba, and the Ramakh, there is no Torah cooking in this at all as we have explained. And in general, I wonder that our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, did not mention the opinion of the Rambam at all, and his system is the clearest according to the sugya of the Shas and the Yerushalmi as I have written.

And we learned in the Mishnah that anything that came into hot water etc. (145b), that anything that did not come into hot water from the eve of Shabbat, one may rinse it with hot water on Shabbat, except for old salted fish and the Spanish mackerel, for their rinsing is the completion of their labor and constitutes cooking (Rashi), because they require only a little, and their rinsing is the completion of their labor. And the rinsing is in a kli sheni, and that is that one pours hot water over it from a kli sheni. But it is forbidden to soak it even in a kli sheni, for it appears like cooking (Magen Avraham subsection 15), and for old salted fish, even to pour over it is forbidden. And from this we learn regarding our herrings that it is forbidden to pour hot water over them from a kli sheni, but it is permitted to soak them in cold water. And perhaps soaking appears like a labor, but to wash them in cold water is certainly permitted (Taz subsection 5). And likewise in lukewarm water it is permitted, and only in hot water in which the hand is scalded is it forbidden.

Since it has been explained that anything for which rinsing is the completion of its labor constitutes bishul and one is liable on Shabbat, according to this, the herb called tea upon which one pours hot water, and it is a known matter that its bishul is easy, and even in a keli sheni it is cooked as our eyes see, one who pours hot water upon it on Shabbat even by means of a keli sheni is liable for a chatat. Many stumble in this with vain arguments: there are those who say that the tea was already cooked in its place of origin and there is no bishul after bishul. This is a great error, even if the truth were so, for there the bishul is not to cook it but to make it a fruit that is fit for bishul, and how can we say of this that it is already cooked, for behold they sell it now for full price in order to cook it. Furthermore, I have heard that the matter is a lie, for they do not cook it in its place of origin. And there are those who do it by means of a keli sheni, which is to say they pour hot water from a keli rishon into a jar, and place the tea upon it and afterward place the water and the tea into the teapot, and afterward pour hot water upon them from a keli rishon, and in any case they are liable for a chatat, especially since our eyes see that they are cooked in a keli sheni and in a keli shelishi, as their bishul is easy. And there are those who are accustomed to pour boiling water upon them from a keli rishon while it is still day, and it stands a little and afterward they pour out the water and the tea remains dry, and the next morning they pour hot water upon it from a keli rishon, for behold it was already cooked from yesterday and there is no bishul after bishul in a dry item. However, in this manner one must leave the hot water on the tea while it is still day for a short time so that it will be cooked, and not pour the hot water on the tea and immediately pour the hot water out, for in a single moment they will not be cooked. The straight path is to prepare the essence while it is still day, and so we are accustomed, and such is the law regarding coffee and other such types of bishul like chocolate and cocoa.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4 that the same law applies to any hard item that is not fit to be eaten at all without soaking—that it is forbidden to soak it on Shabbat, for it constitutes the completion of a labor. Thus far his words. Meaning, even in cold water, if it is not fit for eating without this, it constitutes the completion of a labor and one is liable on account of makeh b'patish; and similarly, a salted item that one cannot eat without rinsing and he rinsed it—he is liable. Many have maintained that his intention is specifically to soak it in hot water, but in my humble opinion it appears that even in cold water it is forbidden when this constitutes the completion of its labor, yet we do not know of such foods that would not be fit except by means of soaking.

And know that all the laws that were explained as being forbidden due to bishul—it is forbidden even to place [the food] upon the stove or the oven before the heating, as is written at the end of siman 253 (Magen Avraham, subsection 11). And even if a non-Jew will heat the oven, nevertheless, the Israelite who placed it upon the stove and the oven is liable, for this is like one who places the pot and another who brought the fire, where both are liable (Machatzit HaShekel). However, according to this, there is no liability unless the non-Jew lit the oven immediately, and that both were in a single act. But if he lit it afterwards—the first one is exempt, as is written in section 4, see there. But in truth, even this is forbidden rabbinically, unless the non-Jew places the pot upon the oven according to the details that were explained at the end of siman 253, and see there what we wrote at the end of the siman there.

And since regarding a dry item there is no cooking after cooking, therefore an item that was fully cooked and is dry, having no broth, even if it has already cooled—it is permitted to place it opposite the bonfire even in a place where the hand would be scalded by it. And why do we not fear that perhaps he will rake the coals, for because of this reason they forbade leaving it upon a stove or an oven even with a boiling item, as I wrote in siman 253, section 32? For it is not comparable, as it was already explained there that to place it adjacent to a stove is permitted, as I wrote there in section 7, and here it is like adjacency and not like leaving it upon it. And even though it is not exactly comparable, for there regarding adjacency there is the partition of the wall and it is noticeable and he will not come to rake, whereas here there is no partition between the pot and the fire, nevertheless, since they only permitted it for him not upon the bonfire but opposite the bonfire, which is to say somewhat distant from the bonfire, he has a reminder and will not come to rake (Magen Avraham, subsection 38 in the name of the Rosh). However, upon a stove—it is forbidden due to leaving it upon it, as I wrote there. And this is regarding a dry item, but regarding a liquid item—it is forbidden when it has cooled. And if it has not cooled, such that the hand is still scalded—even with a liquid item it is permitted, for when it has not cooled, even with a liquid there is no cooking after cooking. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 15, that there are those who are lenient to say that as long as one does not place it upon the fire or upon the stove itself but only adjacent to it—even if it has cooled it is permitted, and they are accustomed to be lenient in this if it has not cooled completely. Thus far his words. And this is according to the opinion of the Rambam that we explained, that there is no cooking after cooking even with a liquid item that has cooled, except that upon the fire itself it is forbidden by rabbinic decree as I wrote in section 19, and upon the stove itself—behold, this is leaving it upon it. And that which he wrote that they are accustomed to be lenient when it has not cooled completely has no correct reason, rather, regarding one that has cooled completely they were concerned for the opinion of those who hold that there is cooking after cooking with a liquid, but with a dry item it is permitted. (And the Machatzit HaShekel, subsection 39, wrote that even with a dry item it is forbidden if it has cooled completely, because it is like placing it initially and it is forbidden lest he rake as in siman 253, see there. And I wonder at this, for there we are dealing with inside the oven, as I wrote there in section 32, see there, and what comparison is there to here? And delve into this.)

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 16: "It is permitted to place an empanada (this is like our kugel) opposite the fire in a place where the hand would be scalded, even though the fat within it that was congealed returns and melts. And all the more so a pot that has broth in it that congealed, for when the fat melts it is not distinct, which is permitted. And there are those who are stringent, and the custom is to be stringent; however, in a place of need, one may rely on the first opinion." Thus far their words. The explanation of the matters: Since in a dry item there is no cooking after cooking, it is therefore permitted to place it opposite the fire, and that which the fat returns and melts—this is not prohibited due to nolad, for it happens on its own, and this is like placing snow and hail in a cup, which is permitted, and like we place sugar in a cup of hot water and also fat in food, and all the more so in a pot where the fat is not recognizable when it is mixed into the cooked food. And even though the empanada is fried, and there is cooking after frying according to this view, nevertheless even now it is not cooking but frying, and there is no frying after frying. But the "those who are stringent" prohibit it for the reason that the fat melts and it is nolad, and it is not similar to snow and hail and sugar and oil that one places in cooked foods or in hot water, for there it melts and is not recognizable, which is not the case here where the fat is recognizable on its own and is prohibited; and a pot is indeed permitted for the reason that it is not recognizable by itself. And even according to this view, nevertheless the empanada itself does not become prohibited. And for the halacha: initially the custom is to be stringent, however the primary view is like the first opinion, and in a place of need one may rely on this opinion. And all this is not relevant to returning it to the oven or to the stove, for there there is another prohibition lest one rake the coals. However, to place it near the stove tiles is permitted, as I wrote in siman 253, and see what I wrote in siman 320, section 23.

Therefore, it is permitted to place meat, fish, dough-pastries, dry cheese-pastries, kugel, and the like into the kacheln, provided one is careful that there is not so much fat there that the fat alone flows out. If there is a great need for this, it is permitted even with fat. However, into the oven it is forbidden, unless the oven does not have much heat or coals to the point that it is close to cooling down, for then even in the oven there is no prohibition, as I wrote in siman 253, section 32; see there. (And in Sha'arei Teshuva, subsection 35, he cited in the name of the Maharit that in the city of Constantinople the maidservants place the mulyah and the chicken to warm inside the oven on Sabbath morning before the meal, and the Maharit permitted this on the grounds that our ovens, whose openings are from the side, are like "opposite the bonfire"; see there, and it requires further study.)

According to the opinion of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch that regarding a liquid substance, once it has cooled, there is cooking after cooking—it is forbidden to place a vessel containing a hot substance in which the hand is not scalded by it on top of a pot that is hot enough such that the upper substance could be heated from its heat to the point that the hand is scalded by it, for this is cooking, as the derivative of fire is like fire. However, a dry substance is permitted. Similarly, a liquid substance in which the hand is scalded is permitted to be placed on top of such a hot pot in order to preserve its heat so that it does not cool, for there is no cooking in this since it has not cooled and the hand is scalded by it. And there is one who says that even if it was not fully cooked—for in such cases there is cooking after cooking even without it cooling, as I wrote in section 23—nevertheless, on top of a pot is permitted, because on top of a pot it is impossible to reach the point of complete cooking (Taz, subsection 9). And I do not know from where he has the authority to say this, and several great authorities disagreed on this and such is the primary ruling; see in section 36. And even if the pot is insulated in a substance that adds heat, nevertheless it is permitted to stand the vessel containing liquid in which the hand is scalded and its cooking is finished on top of it, for this is not like insulation. And all this is according to the system of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, but according to the system of the Rambam that there is no cooking after cooking even in a liquid substance—and our teacher, the Rema, mentioned this opinion in section 15 and as I wrote in section 31—it is permitted even when the hand is not scalded by the upper substance (and this is the intention of the Magen Avraham in subsection 21, and see in Machatzit HaShekel).

There are those who explain that this which we permitted, to place a vessel containing liquid that is yad soledet on top of a covered pot, this is even when the pot is standing on the fire. And there are those who explain that if the bottom one is on the fire—it is always forbidden, for it is like placing it on top of a kirah for the first time on Shabbat. And the first opinion holds that since the pot intervenes, this is not like placing it on top of a kirah, for on a kirah it stands directly on the fire. And such is the primary ruling like the first opinion, for the prohibition on the kirah is due to the concern that one might rake the coals, and here, since it stands on the pot, there is a reminder. However, it is certainly necessary that it be far from the fire when it has not been fully cooked (Taz, subsection 11), and this is according to the one who permits in the previous section when it has not been fully cooked, but we have already explained there that this is not so. And know, that even according to the latter opinion that forbids it, if they removed the upper one from on top of the kirah after it became dark—it is permitted to place it on the pot, as is written in siman 253, for in such a case there is no prohibition of shehiyah when one returns it to the kirah, and consequently the same law applies to placing it on top of the pot (Magen Avraham, subsection 24).

Regarding that which has been explained, that where the hand recoils it is permitted to place it upon a pot, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 6: That one may smear its opening with dough if he has dough that was kneaded yesterday. Thus far his words. And we are not concerned regarding smearing, even though certainly smearing applies to dough as well, because he does not seal it extensively but only so that it is not exposed, and he will not smear it thoroughly but only a slight adhesion; and smearing is only when one smears with his finger very thoroughly so that it becomes smooth (Taz, subsection 10). However, if he smears it very thoroughly—it is forbidden, and so too with any other substance that is smeared (Magen Avraham, subsection 22). And the reason they were not concerned lest he smear is because since this is for a brief moment, he will not smear it, and this has already been explained in siman 258 (and it is an explicit Gemara at the end of Bameh Tomnin, see there. And they were not concerned lest the dough bake due to the heat, for he does not intend for this and it is not a pesik reisha, and from this there is a slight proof for the Taz, subsection 9, and reflect on this).

It has already been explained that a dry item that has been fully cooked—it is permitted to place it opposite the fire, for there is no cooking after cooking regarding a dry item. And consequently, the same law applies to placing a dry and cold item that has been fully cooked on top of a water urn that is on the fire—it is also permitted, for anything that is permitted opposite the fire in a place where the hand would be scalded by it, is also permitted on top of a water urn that is on the fire. And some say that it is forbidden, for the reason that this is similar to placing it on top of a stove initially, which is forbidden for the reason that perhaps one will rake the coals; and even if it was fully cooked and it shrinks and it is detrimental to it, it is forbidden to place it on the stove initially on Shabbat, and how is a water urn different from a stove. Nevertheless, the primary view is like the first opinion, for it is not similar to a stove where there is no separation between it and the fire, but on top of a water urn, the pot separates. And just as they were not concerned opposite the fire that perhaps one will rake, because there is a distinction there in that it is far from the fire, so too here there is a distinction, as I wrote in section 31.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8 regarding this law that has been explained, and this is his wording: "And in any event, if it is a cooked food that contains broth and it shrinks and it is beneficial for it—it is forbidden according to all opinions." Thus far his words. That is to say, just as it has been explained that it is forbidden to place a vessel containing a liquid substance that is not yad soledet bo upon a covered pot, so too it is forbidden to place it upon a water heater, even though the heat of the water heater is not as strong as the heat of the pot. And in any event, it is slightly more lenient than it, for it is only forbidden in a case of shrinking and it is beneficial for it (so it appears in my humble opinion his intention, and with this the great difficulty of the Magen Avraham, subsection 26, is answered, see there; and only regarding a water heater is the law so, and delve into this).

It has already been explained that a kli rishon cooks, and we explained in section 20 that from the words of the Rambam it is explained that this is rabbinic, and from the Torah it does not cook unless it is standing on the fire, and that this is explained from the Shas and Yerushalmi, see there. However, from the words of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch it does not appear so, and although they were not precise to distinguish between Torah law and rabbinic law, nevertheless it appears from the simple meaning of their words that it is complete cooking from the Torah, and so it appears from the words of our teachers the Tosafists in Shabbat (42b, s.v. "Aval," see there), and so too in other places. But from the words of Rashi there it appears explicitly like the words of the Rambam (for he wrote in s.v. "De-ve-kli": "And it is permitted to place even in a kli rishon once he has removed it from the fire," thus far his words; behold, he distinguished between this and that. And the Ran there wrote that the Yerushalmi holds so and not our Shas, see there, and in my humble opinion it requires further study, for behold in the Shas it also appears explicitly so, as I wrote in section 21, see there).

A kli rishon cooks even after they have removed it from the fire as long as the hand recoils from it, and if the hand does not recoil from it – it is permitted. And even though regarding matters of issur v'heter there is an opinion to say that even afterwards it causes absorption and emission, nevertheless regarding cooking it is certainly not so (Magen Avraham, subsection 28). And the reason is simple, for regarding absorption and emission, according to the Torah it absorbs and emits in a kli rishon, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 68, and therefore there is an opinion to say that even afterwards it absorbs and emits by rabbinic decree. And there are those who hold also that a kli sheni absorbs and emits when the hand recoils there, as is written there, and it is all for this reason, but regarding cooking according to the Torah it does not cook in a kli rishon, as we have explained. And even according to those who hold that according to the Torah there is cooking, they admit that the Yerushalmi does not hold so as I have written. Therefore, we do not have to be stringent neither in a kli sheni from which the hand recoils, nor in a kli rishon from which the hand does not recoil.

And there is one who wishes to say that in the Yerushalmi it is found that they made a distancing for a keli rishon even if the hand is not scalded by it (ibid.), but it is not so, for the Yerushalmi is referring to where the hand is scalded by it. And that which it calls it a "distancing" is because according to the Yerushalmi a keli rishon does not cook at all, but from the rabbis they made a distancing for this. This is the wording of the Yerushalmi, chapter 1 of Ma'asrot (halacha 4) and in Kirah (halacha 4): "What is the difference between a keli rishon and what is the difference between a keli sheni? Rabbi Yosa said: here the hand controls (meaning it is not scalded) and here the hand does not control. Rabbi Yonah said: in both cases the hand does not control, but they made a distancing for a keli rishon and they did not make a distancing for a keli sheni" see there. (And we have further explained this in Yoreh Deah, and the Magen Avraham, because it was simple to him that a keli rishon cooks according to the Torah, was forced to explain that the hand is not scalded, and he does not read the version 'controls' but rather 'scalded,' and it is not so, and the matters are clear with the help of Heaven).

Therefore, it is forbidden to place spices in a kli rishon as long as the hand recoils from it, nor onions, nor garlic, nor anything that requires cooking. However, the sages permitted salt (Shabbat 42b), because salt requires much cooking like "ox meat," which only cooks over the fire. Nevertheless, ox meat is forbidden for the reason written by the Tur: that even though the meat does not cook, the fat and the moisture within it do cook; and further reasons for this will be explained. And know that in the Gemara there, there are two versions regarding salt: one as I have written, and one to the contrary, that the cooking of salt is very easy, for it cooks even in a kli sheni when the hand recoils there, and therefore some forbid placing salt even in a kli sheni. For the law, the primary view is as I wrote previously, but one who is stringent in this, may a blessing come upon him. And if one transgressed and placed salt in a pot while it stands near the fire and performed a Torah prohibition—nevertheless, the cooked food is not forbidden, because the salt is nullified relative to the food. And even though it is "made for flavor," and it is a "thing that has permitters," nevertheless, since it is not recognizable in the pot, it does not have the power to forbid due to "cooking on Shabbat," since the cooking is not recognizable at all, and it is also "this and that causes," for the meat was salted on the eve of Shabbat. And although there is room to deliberate on this, nevertheless the primary law is that it is permitted, not like the one who wishes to forbid it, and so wrote the great Acharonim and such is the primary view. (See Taz subsection 14 and they disagreed with him, and also what the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 31 that if the current salt has enough to provide flavor without yesterday's salt it is forbidden, see there, it is not so clear. And what he wrote that sea salt has no cooking because there is no cooking after cooking, and according to this the law for sugar is also so, however there are those who hesitate about this and see Tosefet Shabbat and delve into it.)

We have already written that even though the Shas says that salt requires cooking like the meat of an ox, and therefore it is permitted to place salt into a kli rishon, nevertheless, the meat of an ox is forbidden, for the reason written by the Tur: that the moisture within it cooks. And the Rosh wrote another reason: that if it is old salted meat, it hastens to cook, see there; and therefore the Tur did not mention this reason, as it is not applicable to newly salted meat, as is understood. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 9 regarding the law of a kli rishon, wrote: There are those who say that it is forbidden to place into this vessel salted meat, even if it is of an ox. Thus far his words. And his intention is to the words of the Rosh. And it is not understood, for the Rosh wrote this only regarding old salted meat. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this, and this is his wording: "And it seems to me that even without being salted it is forbidden, but he mentioned salted because without this it is forbidden due to the blood within it." Thus far his words. That is to say, the primary reason is as the Tur wrote, but he mentioned "salted" because it must necessarily be salted, for if not, it is forbidden anyway because of the blood. And this is a great forced interpretation, for if so, why did he need to mention salted, and why did he not write the reason of the Tur? Therefore, it seems to me that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, spoke a great matter, for according to the Tur's answer, what shall we do with meat that has dried and has no moisture, and according to the Rosh's answer, what shall we do with newly salted meat—shall we permit this, Heaven forbid? For this reason, he wisely answered that all salted meat cooks, for the Shas only said that salt requires cooking like the meat of an ox, meaning that the natures of both are equal regarding cooking, in that they require strong cooking, and it is not dealing with matters of prohibition and permission, but rather with the matter of the nature of their cooking. But when are they equal? At a time when the meat has not been salted, but when it is salted, the salt softens it and a kli rishon's cooking is sufficient for it. And if so, it follows automatically that it is forbidden to do so on Shabbat, for how shall he act? If he salts it, it will cook, and if he does not salt it, it will be forbidden from the perspective that it was not salted. And perhaps this is also the intention of our teacher, the Rema. (And in truth, I do not know who compelled the Rosh and the Tur not to explain it so, and according to what I have written, there is no need for all the lengthiness of the Taz in subsection 13, and the Magen Avraham in subsection 30 is well-settled, and delve into this.)

In a kli sheni—it is permitted to place spices even if the hand is scalded by it, for a kli sheni does not cook. And even though regarding absorbing and emitting there are those who forbid, nevertheless, according to everyone there is no cooking in a kli sheni. Furthermore, even regarding absorbing and emitting we do not hold so, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 105. Therefore, it is permitted to place spices, onions, and garlic on Shabbat morning into a kli sheni. And there is one who is stringent regarding onions in a kli sheni, because we see that they become sweetened from their bitterness after they are placed there for some time (Taz, subsection 14). This is an excessive stringency, and that which they become sweetened is because of the broth and the fat; on the contrary, we see on weekdays when one places an onion in a cooked dish, one places it at the time of the peak of the cooking, and learn from this that it requires much cooking. And at the beginning of the tenth chapter of Terumot it is explained that an onion is difficult to absorb, see there; although there it is when it is in its peel, nevertheless we have heard from there that it is more difficult to absorb than other things, and how can we say that regarding cooking it is easier? This is nothing but a wonder. Therefore, it is permitted to place onions in a bowl on Shabbat morning without any hesitation, and even though it is a davar gush, nevertheless it is spread out upon the plate. And all the more so if one places the onions on a plate, which is a kli shlishi, for there is no judgment and no judge, and those who love this, it is for them Oneg Shabbat, and one who refrains from this refrains from Oneg Shabbat, and such is the simple custom.

And to pour from a kli rishon onto spices when the hand shrinks back from it is forbidden, for pouring cooks to the depth of a peel. Therefore, it is forbidden to place spices in a bowl and pour upon them from a kli rishon, and if one poured—it is forbidden to the depth of a peel. And even though regarding the laws of hagalah we are stringent that it is not like a kli rishon, as will be explained in siman 451 because there are those who hold that pouring is not like a kli rishon, nevertheless regarding the laws of Shabbat we are stringent according to the opinions that forbid. And nevertheless, it appears to me that one should not forbid the cooked food because of the spices that were forbidden to the depth of a peel, and in Yoreh Deah siman 91 it was explained that in a case where peeling is required, if they did not peel it and cooked it thus—it is permitted post facto, see there, and likewise when it is difficult to peel it is permitted, unlike the one who is stringent in this.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 22, law 5: "A bathhouse tub that is full of hot water—one may not place cold water into it, for he heats them significantly; and likewise, one may not place a cruse of oil into it, because it is like cooking it. However, one may place hot water into a tub of cold water. A water heater from which one emptied the hot water—it is permitted to place cold water into it in order to lukewarm them. And it is permitted to pour hot water into cold water or cold into the hot, provided they are not in a kli rishon, because it heats them significantly." Thus far his words. (And the wording of the Gemara 42a: For Beit Hillel say: whether hot into the cold or cold into the hot. In what case are these things said? In a cup; but in a tub, hot into the cold but not cold... Rabbi Yehuda thought to say a bowl is like a tub; Abaye said to him: Rabbi Chiyya taught a bowl is not like a tub.)

There are those who explain his intention that an ambati is a kli rishon (the Ran and the Beit Yosef); therefore, it is forbidden to place cold water into it so that they do not become heated from the heat of a kli rishon. However, from it into cold water is permitted—firstly, because the bottom prevails, and furthermore, because presumably in the vessel into which the water is placed, the water is plentiful (Tosafot ibid.), for if it were the opposite, it would be permitted from cold into hot. Therefore, the Rambam was precise to say "an ambati of a bathhouse that is full of hot water," meaning that then certainly the cold water is a small amount. And afterward he states the law of a mikhum from which one cleared out hot water—it is permitted to place cold water into it in order to lukewarm them, meaning that he places a lot of cold water. But a small amount is forbidden, and this law is a Mishnah unto itself there (41a). And even though the conclusion of the Gemara there is that they cleared it with the water, this is according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds that an unintended act is forbidden; but we, who hold like Rabbi Shimon, do not require this (and even though he is precise from the wording "they cleared it," behold the Rambam did not write this wording, and examine this closely). And afterward he says that it is permitted to pour hot into cold or cold into hot in a kli sheni, for a kli sheni does not cook. And the reason he did not employ the language of the Shas, "a cup," was in order to include also a bowl, which according to the conclusion is not like an ambati. (And even though a bowl is certainly a kli sheni—for if not so, why is it not like an ambati—nevertheless, an ambati is a kli rishon. And if it is difficult, for if so, how could he have thought to say that it is like an ambati? One can say because it is for washing they were stringent, according to the explanation of Rashi. And he concludes that it is not so, for there is no distinction; therefore, the Rambam also mentioned "ambati," to teach that even for washing, specifically in a kli rishon it is forbidden, and not in a kli sheni. And behold, we have settled this system from all that was questioned against it; see the Bach and the Taz, subsection 18, and examine this closely.)

And there are those who explained his intention that this bathtub is a kelli sheni (Maggid Mishneh, Bach, and Taz there, and so the Tosafot wrote there). And the reason they forbade cold into hot is because since the water stands for washing, they heat it significantly—meaning, the sages issued a decree regarding this. However, in other instances of a kelli sheni, it is permitted; and even in a basin, which is also for washing, nevertheless they were not as stringent with it as with a bathtub, because it does not contain much water. But a bathtub that is a kelli rishon is forbidden even from hot into cold (Taz there), for they were stringent regarding water for washing. And there is one who says that in a kelli rishon, even a large amount of cold to minimize the hot is forbidden (Bach), but this is not the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, as will be explained. And one cannot say that it cooks the thickness of a peel immediately when they fall into the hot water, for this is not applicable to water, which immediately mixes together. But with a dry item, it is certainly so, even with hot into cold—for example, placing a piece of boiling meat into cold sauce—for until it cools, it cooks the thickness of a peel, as is found in Pesachim at the beginning of the chapter "Keitzad Tzolin," and in Yoreh Deah siman 91 (Magen Avraham subsection 35).

The words of the Tur are very perplexing in this matter, as he wrote: "A cup into which one emptied hot water from a kli rishon for drinking—it is permitted to mix cold water with them, whether one puts the water that is in it into the cold water or puts the cold water into it. However, a basin that has hot water in it for washing, even if it is a kli sheni—it is forbidden to put cold water into it, for since they are for washing, they are ordinarily very hot, and the cold water mixed into them becomes cooked. But to pour from them into cold water is permitted, for the bottom one prevails. And such is the law regarding a kli rishon that is for drinking, that it is permitted to pour from it into cold water, and it is forbidden to pour cold water into it. And these words apply to a small amount of cold water, but if they are many and cannot be cooked in it but only to mitigate their coldness—it is permitted." Thus far his words.

And his words are perplexing, for the Shas explicitly concludes that a sefel is not like an ambati and it is permitted to place cold water into it, and many things were said regarding this, and they do not suffice as a resolution at all. (See Taz subsection 17 who wondered at the resolutions of the Beit Yosef and the Bach, and he wishes to emend the words of the Tur and this is even more perplexing. And regarding what he wrote of the change in the Tur between plural and singular phrasing, I wonder, for regarding the vessel it is singular phrasing and regarding the water it is plural phrasing, and behold even regarding a cup he wrote "with them" in plural phrasing, rather it is because it refers to the water. And what the Derisha wrote is more clarified, that the Tur holds that according to the conclusion the halacha is like Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya that in an ambati it is forbidden even hot into cold, see there in Tosafot, and in this a sefel is not like an ambati, but cold into hot is forbidden, see there. However, even this does not settle well, for if so, why did he not write the law of an ambati, and delve into this.)

And in my humble opinion, it appears that the words of the Tur are correct, for indeed it is difficult: if a bathtub is a second vessel whose prohibition is because it is for bathing as I have written, why is a bowl not like a bathtub? And that which we wrote, that it is because there is not much water in a bowl, is a forced explanation, for what measure is there for this? Therefore, the Tur explains: either the bowl is a third vessel with which they take from the bathtub and therefore it is not like a bathtub, or it is not for bathing. And it is an explicit verse in the Song of Deborah: "He asked for water, she gave milk; in a lordly bowl she brought curd," which proves that the bowl is for drinking, and likewise in Shabbat (129b) regarding bowls of oil. And in this, he was inclined to be stringent, that its law is like a bathtub because it contains a large amount of water, but he concludes that it is not so. But a bowl for bathing—certainly it is similar to a bathtub.

And in that which he wrote, that regarding a kli rishon for drinking it is permitted to pour from it into cold liquids, it implies even into a small amount of cold liquid; for since he said that it is forbidden to pour cold liquids into it, and these words apply to a small amount of cold liquids, but a large amount is permitted, we learn from this that when he permitted pouring from it into cold liquid—it is permitted even into a small amount of cold liquid. And his reasoning is that even though the cold liquid is a small amount, nevertheless we hold that the bottom one prevails, and everything that is poured into the cold liquid, the cold liquid cools it bit by bit and it does not cook the cold liquid, and therefore he mentioned previously the reason that the bottom one prevails. And according to his words, when one drinks hot liquids on Shabbat morning from a kli rishon and the essence is cold, and one puts a little essence in a cup and pours the boiling liquid over them from a kli rishon—they act correctly, and there is no need to first pour the hot liquid into the cup and afterwards put a little essence into the cup, which is a kli sheni (and so we are accustomed).

But our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, did not write so there in the sugya, and this is their wording: "One may place hot [water] into cold [water] even in a kli rishon… and not because tata'ah gavar, for if so it would be difficult for the one who says ila'ah gavar, and even for the one who says tata'ah gavar it would cook to the thickness of a k'lipah. Rather… that hot into cold implies that the cold [water] below is greater in quantity, as it is the way to place the small amount into the large amount, and therefore the small amount of hot [water] does not cook at all etc." Thus far their words. Behold, it is explicit that if the cold [water] were a small amount—it would be forbidden to place upon them from a kli rishon. And one cannot say that they wrote this according to the one who says ila'ah gavar while we hold tata'ah gavar, for even according to the one who says tata'ah gavar it cooks to the thickness of a k'lipah according to their words. And the Tur does not reason so, because this is only relevant to a dry substance, and not to water which immediately mixes. And the Tosafot themselves in Pesachim (40b, s.v. 'Ha'ilpas') wrote so, that a substance that mixes does not cook to the thickness of a k'lipah, and so wrote the Ran, of blessed memory, on our sugya, see there (and to this the Magen Avraham hinted in subsection 35). And according to this, according to the words of the Tosafot in Shabbat, one must be careful not to place hot [water] from a kli rishon upon cold essence. However, for the halacha, if one places [it]—we have no concern with it, because the Tur and the Ran and the Tosafot in Pesachim permit it. And also one may rely in this on the opinion of the Rambam and the Rashba and the Ramak that we wrote in section 19, that there is no cooking after cooking even in a liquid substance, see there. (And see the Beit Yosef who wrote that according to the opinion of the Tur, even regarding [water] for washing in a kli rishon it is permitted to place hot into the cold, and our teacher, the Rema, in Darkei Moshe, sign 6, disagrees with him. And for us there is no practical difference in this because we do not have [such] water for washing. But I wonder, for in the Shulchan Aruch, section 11, it does not seem so from his words, for he glossed regarding a bathtub even though it is a kli sheni, see there, and it implies that the same law applies to a kli rishon, and he says there that one places hot into the cold, see there, and it requires further study and delve into it.)

This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 12: "A water-heater from which one emptied the hot water—it is permitted to place into it a large amount of cold water in order to lukewarm them. And it is permitted to pour hot water into cold water or cold into hot, provided they are not in a kli rishon, because they heat up significantly. But if the water is so plentiful that it is impossible for them to be cooked, but only that they lose their chill—it is permitted even in a kli rishon, provided it is not on the fire" thus far their words, for on the fire or the coals in a place where it can be cooked—it is forbidden even if they are completely cold and one removes them immediately, since it is a place where it is possible to be cooked, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And know, that regarding a water-heater from which one emptied the hot water or which still has hot water in it—they only permitted a large amount of water, for a small amount would be cooked. And they explained in the Gemara that this which they permitted with a large amount of water is even though through this he tempers the water-heater. That is to say, that the water-heater is of iron, and hot iron when one places cold water upon it becomes strengthened, and it is a melakhah and this is the completion of the work of smiths (Rashi 41a). Nevertheless they permitted it, because he does not intend for tempering, and there is no pesik reisha here, for it is not certain that it will come to tempering through this. (Magen Avraham subsection 36; and the words of the Maggid Mishneh that he brought, that whenever one does not intend, pesik reisha is not applicable as there is no melakhah here at all see there, contradicts several sugyot, and the Maggid Mishneh himself in chapter 22 regarding tempering wrote: because it is possible that it did not reach tempering, and already the Lechem Mishneh wondered about him in chapter 12 see there and examine carefully)

It is permitted to place a pitcher of water or other liquids into a kli sheni that contains hot water, but in a kli rishon—it is forbidden, for a kli rishon cooks. However, a kli sheni, even if the hand is scalded by it—is permitted, because its walls are not hot and it continually cools (Tosafot 40b, s.v. "u-shema mina"). And one must be careful not to submerge the entire pitcher inside the vessel, for this is hatmanah and is forbidden on Shabbat even in a substance that does not increase heat, as was written in siman 259; rather, the pitcher should be uncovered from above (Taz, subsection 19). And there is one who says that if one scoops with a vessel from a kli rishon—it has the law of a kli rishon for stringency (ibid.), and in Yoreh Deah siman 92 this was explained. And it is obvious that if they left it in the kli rishon until it produced bubbles—it is like a kli rishon (Eliyah Rabbah and Tosefet Shabbat).

It is permitted to place a pitcher of water or other liquids opposite the fire to dissipate their coldness, provided that he places them far from the fire in a manner that it is impossible to become heated in that place to the point that the hand would recoil from it, which is to say that an infant's belly would be scalded by it. And with the hand it is difficult to estimate, for there is one who recoils from a slight heat and there is one who does not recoil except from a great heat. And when it stands near the fire in such a manner, he may leave it even until it becomes lukewarm, for this is included in the category of dissipating the coldness (Tosafot 48a, s.v. 'Mai'). But it is forbidden to bring it close to the fire to a place where it can become heated so that the hand would recoil from it, and even to leave it there for a short time only to dissipate its coldness is forbidden, since it can come to the point of heating. And it appears to me that the same law applies to proximity to a stove or an oven, and as with our kachlin the law is also thus: that if it cannot come to the point of cooking there, it is permitted, and when it can so come, it is forbidden. And such is the law regarding fruits that are eaten raw, such as apples and similar things that are eaten raw, which are very cold and he places them opposite the bonfire or in the kachlin to dissipate their coldness—it is forbidden to place them in a place where they have the potential to come to the point of cooking. And even things that are not eaten raw, if he places them in a place where they cannot come to the point of heating, it is permitted. And it is permitted to place it even in a lead vessel; even though the lead becomes slightly heated, we do not concern ourselves with this, since he does not intend for this (see Magen Avraham, subsection 37).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 17: "It is forbidden to place cold [food] upon a water heater even to warm it, as long as the water heater is so hot that if one were to leave it there for a long time it would reach the point of cooking, which is to say that the hand would recoil from it; for the law of placing upon a water heater is like the law of placing opposite a fire. But if it is not that hot—it is permitted." Thus far his words. And it is obvious that his intention regarding cold [food] is dry food that has not yet been cooked, for if it had been cooked, it would be permitted in any case, as it has already been explained that regarding a dry item, according to everyone, there is no cooking after cooking. Therefore, it is certainly permitted to place cold meat or fish upon a boiling pot so that their coldness dissipates. However, his intention is for an item that has not yet been cooked, or for roasted or fried food according to the one who holds that there is cooking after roasting or after frying. Therefore, teigach—which is fried—is forbidden to be placed upon the opening of a boiling pot if it can reach the point of cooking there. But that which we call roasted meat, gebratens, is nothing other than cooked, and roasting is only meat that they roast on a spit over the fire, which we do not know of, and for us all meat is considered cooked.

The stewpot and the pot that one removed from upon the fire while they are boiling, if it has not yet cooked all its needs—it is forbidden to stir within it, for one who stirs is liable on account of cooking. Therefore, one should not remove from there with a spoon, for it turns out he is stirring and there is a concern on account of cooking. But if it has cooked all its needs—it is permitted, for there is no longer a concern on account of cooking in his stirring. However, regarding wool in a vat, even though it has absorbed the color—it is forbidden to stir it, for regarding dyeing, as much as one stirs more, it is better for the dyeing. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 18: that initially one should be careful with a pot as well in any case, meaning not to stir in a boiling pot even if it has cooked all its needs. According to this, when one takes the cholent on Shabbat morning from the oven and it is boiling, one should not take them with a spoon. But the world conducts itself with a permit to remove the legumes or the potatoes or the kasha with a spoon, and there is no concern in this, for even stirring is permitted by the letter of the law, and it is enough to be careful initially regarding stirring and not regarding taking them with a spoon (Taz subsection 23 and Magen Avraham subsection 44). Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 19: that it is forbidden to smear oil and garlic on roast meat while it is still facing the fire, even if it was roasted while it was still day, for in any case the garlic and the oil will cook. Thus far his words. And it is simple that even after they have removed it from the fire while it is still boiling—it is forbidden to smear it, for this is complete cooking. Therefore, one must be careful not to smear roasted geese with garlic when the goose is boiling (Taz subsection 24). There is one who says that with fat that has already been cooked—it is permitted to smear it, for there is no longer a concern on account of cooking in it (Magen Avraham subsection 45), and on account of "nolad" there is no concern, since it is not distinct (ibid.) and it is like the crushing of snow into a cup. And one should not say, "But the fat is fried, and according to several poskim there is cooking after frying." For it is not so, for even now when he smears upon it, it is frying, and there is no frying after frying. Only he should not crush it with his hands, but rather he places the fat on the meat and it goes and is absorbed. (However, according to those who are stringent that the Rema wrote in section 16, that this is called distinct, and as I wrote in section 32, perhaps it is not correct. But even there the Rema wrote that in a place of need one may rely on the first opinion, for so is the primary view as I wrote there.)