Siman 316

Trapping is among the primary categories of labor, for when one traps any creature of a species that is trapped—meaning that it is the way of the world to trap them—he is liable for stoning and excision if done intentionally, and if done unintentionally he is liable for a sin offering. And trapping was in the Mishkan, for they required the chilazon for its blood to dye the tekhelet with it and they would trap it, and likewise they would trap the techashim whose skins they required to cover the Mishkan with them, and also the quail they needed to trap. And in the Gemara (75a) the matter is simple that there is trapping regarding the chilazon, and in the Yerushalmi, chapter Kelal Gadol (end of halacha 2), there is a dispute regarding this, as there is one who holds that there is no trapping regarding the chilazon. And the reason seems to me to be that since it is a mere worm, it is called a species that is not trapped, but the halacha is that there is trapping regarding it. (And the commentators of the Yerushalmi explained there that he holds that there is no trapping among the primary categories of labor at all, and their words are astonishing, and so wrote the Tosafot (75a end of the heading starting with "He who traps")) This is his wording: "And it requires further study, for in the Yerushalmi it implies that one who traps a chilazon is not liable on account of trapping." Thus far his words. And this is according to our words, only the Tosafot wrote it simply, and in truth there is a dispute in the Yerushalmi, see there.

A derivative of tzida is not found explicitly in the Gemara or the Yerushalmi, only the Rambam in chapter 10, law 22 wrote: "One who sends dogs so that they may hunt deer and rabbits and the like, and the deer fled from the dog and he was chasing after the deer or stood before it and startled it until the dog reached and caught it - behold, this is a derivative of hunting and he is liable; and so too one who acts in this manner with birds." Thus far his words. According to his words, it is called a derivative when he commands the dog to hunt it and he assists the dog in its labor, but if he does not assist it but only sends it to hunt - there is no Torah labor in it, only a rabbinic prohibition. And this which our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2: "One who incites a dog after a wild animal on Shabbat - it is tzida, and some say that even on a weekday it is forbidden due to 'the seat of scoffers'" - thus far his words; if his intention is that he assists the dog in its labor - it is from the Torah, and if he does not assist it - it is rabbinic (see Magen Avraham, subsection 4). And this which he wrote that some say that even on a weekday it is forbidden, the explanation of his words is that specifically by means of dogs, but by himself - it is permitted to hunt if he needs to do so for his labor or for his livelihood or for his food, and by means of dogs it is "the seat of scoffers" and he will not merit to see the joy of the Leviathan, as it is brought in the Midrash on Parashat Shemini (ibid. subsection 5), and see section 5.

The Rambam wrote there: "One who traps a creature whose species is typically trapped is liable, such as a beast, birds, or fish, provided that he traps them into a place where they do not lack trapping. How so: For example, if he pursued a deer until he brought it into a house, a garden, or a courtyard and locked it in, or if he caused a bird to fly until he brought it into a coop and locked it in, or if he drew fish from the sea into a bowl of water—this person is liable. But if he caused a bird to fly into a house and locked it in, or if he drove a fish and moved it from the sea into a pool of water, or if he pursued a deer until it entered a wide hall and locked it in—this person is exempt, for this is not complete trapping, as if he comes to take it, he must pursue it and trap it from there. Therefore, one who traps a lion is not liable until he brings it into its cage where it is imprisoned. And any place where if he runs in it he would reach the beast in one lunge, or where the walls were close to one another until the shadows of both fall in the middle as one, this is a small place, and if he drove the deer or its like into this place—he is liable; and a place that is larger than this, one who drives a beast or bird into it—is exempt." Thus far his words.

The Rambam did not distinguish between one bird and another, for he established a general rule that for a bird there is no "house of trapping," and similarly the Tur did not distinguish. And even though in the Gemara (106b) it distinguishes between a swallow and other birds—that other birds even in a house it is considered trapping, and only a swallow which does not accept authority and slips from corner to corner is not considered trapping in a house until one brings it into a coop, and as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 1, and this is his wording: "One who traps a bird into a coop where it is trapped, and other birds into a house etc." see there—nevertheless, the Rambam and the Tur do not hold accordingly, and also the Rif and the Rosh did not rule accordingly, because they hold that this is merely a tentative resolution, and according to the conclusion it is not so. (For afterwards it says: "Now that you have come to this, here it is in a large enclosure and here in a small one; what is the case: any where one runs and reaches it in one lunge etc.", and consequently in all things and also with birds in a very small house it is trapping, and since the Rambam wrote this, there is no longer a need for the established case of a swallow, and similarly in the Yerushalmi there is no distinction regarding a swallow, see there. And the Bach wrote that they did not concern themselves with the resolution of the Shas, see there, but this is not correct, and according to our words it works out well. And on the contrary, one must wonder about the Beit Yosef, for since all our teachers do not hold accordingly, what did he see to disagree with them? And it requires further study, and examine it well.)

It appears to me that even though [trapping] a bird into a house is not considered tzida, and similarly a fish into a pond or a deer into a hall, nevertheless, one who traps them from there afterwards is not liable according to the Torah. For even though regarding the first person the tzida was not completed in its entirety, nevertheless, that it should be called tzida from this point on does not seem so, for they do not have the ability to escape from here. And it is possible that if the first person traps them afterwards from there—he is liable, for in any event he has performed tzida, and it requires further study. However, our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote in Beitzah (24a, s.v. "ve-tanya") that anywhere it is called "lacking tzida," one who traps from there is liable according to the Torah, unlike our words, see there; and so it is explained from their words in Shabbat (106b, end of s.v. "ve-ein," see there). And according to their words, it is possible to call this a toldah of tzida, for complete tzida is the actual trapping, and it is called a toldah even though they are in a place where they are as if trapped—meaning they cannot exit from there—nevertheless, if they are not completely prepared in the hand of the person, such that one must also in this place pursue them, it is a toldah of tzida. But from the language of the Rambam, who wrote regarding a bird into a house, etc., "that this is not complete tzida," it implies like our words, that it is tzida but the tzida has not yet been completed, and consequently, one who traps from there, it is obvious that this is not complete tzida; and see in section 10, and see what I wrote further on in siman 497 as a proof to our words.

One who traps a sleeping or blind deer is liable, because it is its way to escape when a human hand touches it, and it is considered trapping. But for a lame, sick, or old one—he is exempt, for these do not typically escape and they are as if already trapped; so ruled the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch. And the Rambam added that for a small one he is also exempt, and I do not know his source, and perhaps he wrote this from the perspective of logic. And it appears that it is not specifically a deer, for the law is the same for all animals and all birds, but regarding fish it seems to me that this is not applicable, for lameness is not applicable to them and being old is also not applicable, for they are among the three things that as long as they age they increase in strength. And also being small is not applicable, for immediately when the fish is born it swims upon the water and requires trapping, and also being sick is not applicable to fish, for it always wanders in the water until it dies.

And know that in the Gemara (106b) they distinguished between one sick person and another, and according to the explanation of Rashi, for a person sick due to heat one is liable, and for a person sick due to exhaustion one is exempt, see there. And the Rambam had another explanation for this, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote, see there, and therefore he did not make a distinction in this. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, also did not make a distinction according to the approach of Rashi, because since it is forbidden by rabbinic law in any case, he did not see fit to distinguish between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition. And this is the reason of the Tur as well, because it is not their way to clarify this, as they only clarified what is forbidden and what is permitted, and therefore they only wrote according to the language of the Baraita. (And in the editions of the Tur before us there is a printing error, where it wrote: "Sleeping, blind, lame etc.", and it should say: "Sleeping, blind – liable; lame etc.", and before the Beit Yosef and the Bach and the Derisha it was written in its corrected form, see there.)

Anything whose species is hunted—one is liable for it, and anything whose species is not hunted, such as flies and mosquitoes and the like—one is exempt according to the Torah even if he hunts them for a purpose, because they are not within the category of hunting, but it is prohibited by rabbinic law even if he hunts them without a purpose. Therefore, flies, even though their species is not hunted—it is prohibited to hunt them, whether by hand or to invert a vessel over them. And therefore one must be careful not to close a small chest when there are flies there, but in a large one we have no concern with it, for even there it is not possible to catch it. And granted that regarding something whose species is hunted it is prohibited in such a case, however, regarding something whose species is not hunted they were not stringent in such a case, and only in a small chest or a small vessel must one be careful not to close them, because it is a pesik reisha that they will certainly be caught there, and there are those who are lenient in a case where if he opens the vessel to take them from there they would immediately flee. And regarding the halacha, certainly when he sees that there are flies in the vessel or in the chest he must chase them away as much as possible, but he is not obligated to examine if there are flies (Taz subsection 4), since according to the Torah there is no liability here at all in any manner.

One may spread a mat over a beehive, in the sun because of the sun and in the rain because of the rain, provided that he does not intend to hunt. This means that certainly if he leaves a large hole in a manner that the bees see the hole and are able to exit from there with ease—it is not relevant to say that he should not intend to hunt, for even if he intends to, there is no category of hunting here at all. And also if he does not leave a hole at all in a manner that they are unable to exit at all—it is of no avail even if he does not intend to hunt, for in any event they are hunted against his will, and it is a pesik reisha; and even though their species is not hunted and there is no Torah prohibition here, nevertheless there is a rabbinic prohibition, and in rabbinic matters a pesik reisha is also prohibited. And it is not similar to flies according to the one who permits it, because in the hunting of flies it is not pleasing to him at all, and it is possible that on the contrary they will spoil what is in the chest, whereas regarding bees in a beehive it is pleasing to him. However, here we permitted where he does not intend to hunt, and also that he leave some hole on the side in a manner that it is not inevitable that they be hunted, so that it should not be a pesik reisha, or that he should not spread the mat tightly but rather loosely, and then it is permitted if he does not intend to hunt, for if he intends it is certainly prohibited, as this is not a proper opening that they would be able to exit from (this is the reasoning of the Beit Yosef in section 4 and the difficulty of the Eliyah Rabbah is answered, and this is the intention of the Magen Avraham in subsection 9, see there and examine carefully).

It was taught in the Tosefta of Shabbat (Chapter 13, Halacha 5): "One who hunts a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird from an efer that is in the domain of a person, if they were lacking hunting – he is liable. To an efer that is in the domain of a person, if they were (so it should be said) lacking hunting – he is exempt. One who spreads a trap over a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird, even though they enter into it – he is exempt; for a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird, if they were entering into it – he is liable. One who dismantles a domesticated animal or a bird from the trap – he is exempt." Thus far its words. And it appears to me that this is its explanation: that an efer is a wide grazing area fenced all around, and one who hunts from there, even though they cannot exit from there, nevertheless, even to catch them there one must chase after them because the place is wide, and therefore one who hunts from there – is liable, and this is according to the method of the Tosafot that we wrote in section 5. However, even according to what we inferred from the words of the Rambam, that there one is not liable, nevertheless an efer is a very large place, and it is properly considered hunting when he hunts from there. And if he hunts into an efer – he is exempt according to the Torah, for this is like a bird into a house or a deer into a salon where one is exempt, as I wrote in section 3. And one who spreads a trap over a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird, meaning that he spreads a trap so that a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird will enter there, since at this moment they are not here, even though they enter into it afterwards – he is exempt according to the Torah but it is forbidden according to the rabbis. Therefore, it is forbidden to set a trap on Shabbat for mice (Magen Avraham, subsection 9), and also the trap is complete muktzeh and it is forbidden to move it even for the purpose of its use or its place, for one does not use it for anything and it is like pebbles and stones. And afterwards the Tosefta says: 'for a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird', meaning if the animal stood there near the trap at the time of his spreading it and it entered into it – he is liable, for this is like actual hunting and he is liable for a chatat, and even if done intentionally there is no liability of stoning, for he did not know it would enter immediately, and it is only an unintentional act (and so it is explained in Tosafot in the first chapter 17b, beginning with the word 'Ein' see there). And one who dismantles a domesticated animal, a wild animal, or a bird from the trap, meaning they were already caught and he came on Shabbat and opened an opening for them so they could exit, or he destroyed the trap – he is exempt but it is forbidden, as with any destructive act on Shabbat which is forbidden according to the rabbis, and all the laws of this Tosefta are for halacha.

The melakhah of tzida is different from all other melakhot, for in all other melakhot one must perform the action, but causing a melakhah is not prohibited by the Torah, as it is written: "You shall not do any melakhah," it is the doing that is forbidden, but causing it is permitted (120b). However, regarding the melakhah of tzida, one is liable even for causing it, as we learned in a Mishnah (106b): "A deer that entered a house and one locked it in—he is liable," and this is causing it, for he did not bring the deer into the house, rather the deer entered on its own, and he only caused the deer to be trapped by locking the door. And the reason for the matter is that in tzida this is not called causing it, as Rashi explained: 'this is its trapping' thus far his words, meaning that the essence of the trapping is the final act of locking before the deer. For if he did not lock the door, even if he trapped it himself by leading it with his hands from the field and bringing it into the house but did not lock it—he has done nothing, and it turns out that the essence of the trapping is the locking. And if two people locked the door—both are exempt, for in all melakhot of Shabbat, two who performed it are exempt, as it is written: 'in her doing,' that an individual must perform the melakhah when he is able to do it by himself. However, if one was unable to lock and two locked it—both are liable, for when this one is unable and that one is unable—both are liable. And if this one is able and that one is unable—the one who is able is liable, as I wrote in siman 301 regarding hotza'ah, and the second is a mere assistant and there is no substance to it. However, if the entrance is already closed, such that it is already considered trapped—it is permitted to lock the entrance with a lock, for even though by this he adds guarding upon its guarding, nevertheless in the matter of tzida he has done nothing, as its trapping was already completed, and see what I wrote in section 16.

A deer that entered a house while the entrance was open, and one came and sat at the entrance and filled the entrance in a manner that by his sitting the deer was trapped, a second person may sit at his side, in front of him or behind him. And even if the first person stood up and went away, and now the deer cannot exit due to the second person, nevertheless—the first is liable and the second is exempt, and it is permitted for him to do so ab initio, for this is nothing other than like one who guards a deer that was trapped yesterday, where he does nothing at all, and here too it is so.

And know that there are those who say: when is the second one exempt? Specifically in such a case where the second one sat before him and the first one entered the house, such that the door was never open even for a moment (Tosefot Yom Tov ibid. and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 16), and the same law applies if he sat behind him, and the first one stood and went outside. But if he sat at his side and the first one stood and went away, and the second one moved from his place and filled the place of the first—the second one is also liable, for since for a moment the place remained vacant and the deer could have exited, it follows that when the second one sat, he performed the trapping of now. And there are those who say that even in such a case it is permitted for the second one ab initio, because the deer was already trapped; like one who has a hen inside his house and the opening was opened, is it forbidden for him to close the opening? (Magen Avraham subsection 11 and Tosefot Shabbat subsection 11).

And in the Tosefta there it is explicitly implied like the first opinion, as it is taught: "One who traps a deer in a courtyard that has two entrances is exempt (even if he locked one). If the first person locked the entrance and the second person came and locked the second entrance—the second is liable and the first is exempt. If the first person returned and opened and locked—the first is liable for the second trapping." Thus far its words. Behold, it is explicit that even after it was already trapped, if he opened the entrance afterward and returned and locked it—he is liable, because the deer was able to exit. And according to this, indeed, regarding a chicken that is in a house, if the entrance was opened—it is forbidden to lock it. And we further learned there regarding this matter where the second person sat beside the first, and this is the wording of the Tosefta: "If one sat at the entrance and another came and sat inside of him, and another came and sat outside of him—the one sitting at the entrance is liable and the two latter ones are exempt." Thus far its words. It is explicitly implied like the first opinion, for that which we learned: "And the second came and sat beside him," means from in front of him or from behind him as I wrote, and not literally from the side. However, this is certainly even according to the first opinion, when the second sat from the side and did not leave even a vacant moment, but rather the first stood and the second at that same moment filled his place—that also is nothing, as is understood. And likewise regarding a chicken in a house where one opens the entrance and immediately locks it—it is nothing, and the prohibition is only when it was open for a short time, for then the first trapping was nullified and it now becomes a new trapping. But regarding chickens in a house, trapping does not apply at all, according to what will be explained in siman 497 (Eliyah Rabbah there), and also in this siman it will be explained that a beast or bird that is in his domain—trapping does not apply to them, and even according to the one who forbids trapping them on Shabbat, nevertheless there is no liability. Therefore, there is no concern in the opening of the entrance and its closing regarding our domestic birds.

It is further explained in the Tosefta there: "If one sat at the entrance and another came and trapped it inside—the one sitting at the entrance is liable and the one who trapped it inside is exempt." Thus far his words. That is to say, even if the second person actually trapped it in the house—nevertheless he is exempt, since it is already as if trapped by the first person's sitting at the entrance. However, it appears to me that in such a case the second person is exempt but it is prohibited. And we further learned there: "If one sat at the entrance and a deer was found inside, even though he intends to sit until it grows dark—he is exempt, because the trapping preceded the thought. You have no one who is liable except one who intends to trap, but if the trapping preceded the thought—he is exempt." Thus far his words. That is to say, since when he sat at the entrance he did not know at all that there was a deer in the house, but during his sitting when he became aware he sat with intent until nightfall so that it would remain there—he is exempt, because the trapping preceded the thought. And it appears that he is exempt and it is permitted, and so it is in the Gemara (107a): "If a bird entered under his garments—he sits and guards it until it grows dark," behold, it is permitted ab initio to guard it until it grows dark.

It has already been explained in section 11 that regarding "this one is able and this one is not able" — the one who is able is liable. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote (93a, s.v. 'amar') that this "is not able" means even if he is a person of great strength, but he is carrying the beam in such a manner that were it not for the other, he would not be able to carry it alone, such as with a finger or holding it in such a manner that he cannot carry it alone. For what does his strength matter to us, since now, at any rate, he is unable to carry it. Thus far their words. And this is what they said in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 13, Halacha 6) regarding the Mishnah of a deer that entered a house, if two locked it they are exempt; if one was unable to lock it and two locked it they are liable, the Yerushalmi says: "If one was healthy and one was weak, and the sick person locked it with all his necessary strength and the healthy person did not lock it with all his necessary strength — the sick person is liable and the healthy person is exempt." Thus far its words. Meaning, it is not only necessary to state if both are equal in health and each one is able to lock it alone, but one of them locked it with weak strength in a manner that he alone would not have been able to lock it with this amount of strength, that he is exempt and the second is liable; but even if one is healthy and one is sick, but the healthy person locked it with weak strength and the sick person with all his strength — the healthy person is exempt and the sick person is liable (so it was explained in the Gilyon HaShas there, and in the Pri Megadim, see there; and the Korban HaEdah explained a strange and internal explanation, see there).

It is further stated there in the Yerushalmi: "If a deer was running in its usual way, and one intended to lock for his own sake and locked for his own sake and for the sake of the deer—it is permitted." Thus far its words. And some explained that even if he knew the deer was inside, but his intention was only for the locking of his house, and only automatically the deer was trapped—it is permitted. And they objected to this, for how is it possible to say so, as it is a pesik reisha (Ran, end of chapter 13). Rather, this is the explanation: that he is occupied with the locking of his house and did not know at all that a deer was inside, and afterward he found the deer inside—it is permitted and he is not obligated to open the door so the deer may exit (ibid.). And I do not understand, for if so, what did the Yerushalmi innovate over the Mishnah, for in the Mishnah it also says: 'To what is this comparable? To one who locks his house to guard it and a deer is found guarded inside.' And in my humble opinion, this is the explanation: that he is occupied with the locking of his house and stands at the completion of the locking, and in the midst of this the deer entered—he is not obligated to delay himself from locking. And this is not a matter of pesik reisha, since he has no involvement at all in its trapping (and perhaps this is the intention of the Rashba brought there by the Ran and the Magen Avraham, subsection 11).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 7: "One who traps snakes and scorpions on Shabbat or other harmful creeping things, if for medicinal use – he is liable, and if so that they should not bite him – it is permitted." Thus far their words, and this is a Mishnah in the second chapter of Eduyot, and it is brought in Shabbat at the end of the thirteenth chapter. And it is explained there that even though in the Mishnah we learned 'exempt,' this 'exempt' means exempt and permitted. And the reason is that this is a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah, and in a place of damage the rabbis did not decree. And if there was definite damage, such as if they are chasing after him – it is permitted even to kill them as will be explained, but here we are dealing with a case where the damage is not definite, therefore a Torah prohibition may not be performed for this, but a rabbinic prohibition, namely a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah – the rabbis did not uphold their words in the face of a concern of damage. And if for medicinal use – he is liable, because when he traps them for medicine he certainly intends to trap them, and it is a melakhah ha-tzerikhah le-gufah, and therefore he is liable. And this is not in the case of a patient whose life is in danger and the medicine is proven, for if so it is permitted to desecrate Shabbat, rather we are dealing with either a patient whose life is not in danger, or one whose life is in danger but the medicine is not proven.

And behold, this is correct according to the method of the poskim where we hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah, but according to the Rambam in chapter 1 who ruled like Rabbi Yehuda that for a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah one is liable, it is impossible to explain that the permission because it might bite him is based on the reason of melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah. And indeed, the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 10, and this is his wording: "Harmful creeping things, such as snakes and scorpions and the like, even though they do not kill, since they bite—it is permitted to trap them on Shabbat, provided that he intends to be saved from their bite. How does he do this: he overturns a vessel over them or ties them up so that they do not cause harm." Thus far his words. And that which was said, 'if for medicine he is liable,' he omitted, because he wrote previously that regarding swarming things and creeping things that are of a trapped species, one who traps them whether for a need or not for a need or to play with them—is liable, since he intended to trap. Thus far his words. And this which he wrote 'since he intended to trap' requires explanation, for even if he did not intend to trap, it is a psik reisha. However, the intention is this: that regarding trapping, when he did not intend to trap but rather to protect himself so it would not bite him—this is not within the category of trapping at all, for with trapping his primary intention is to trap it into his domain, and here his primary intention is to distance it, and it is the exact opposite of trapping. Therefore, even the matter of melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah is not relevant here, for this is not a melakhah at all, since it is the opposite of the primary intention of the melakhah as I have written. And this is what he said there: "provided that he intends to be saved from their bite... he overturns a vessel over it," meaning that in such a case it is not within the category of trapping. (And what the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 12 that they are not of a trapped species is a wondrous thing, and the Eliyah Rabbah already questioned him, and in the Tosefot Shabbat he wrote that it is a printing error and thus it should say: 'that are of a trapped species,' and see Machatzit HaShekel and Pri Megadim and there is no practical difference in this, and the intention of the Rambam is as I have written) (And with this, the difficulty of the Ba'al HaHalakhot Gedolot in Tosefot at the beginning of Shabbat, starting with the words "He who traps," is answered; see there and examine it carefully)

And this is the matter regarding the trapping of harmful creatures, and what the law is regarding killing them, it is as follows: any beast or creeping thing that bites and certainly kills—they are killed on Shabbat even if they are not running after him, for if they are merely seen it is a matter of pikuach nefesh and supersedes the Shabbat. And other harmful creatures such as a snake or a scorpion in a place where they do not certainly kill: if they are running after him—it is permitted to kill them, for this is pikuach nefesh, and if not—there is no pikuach nefesh here and it is forbidden. But it is permitted to trample them in passing, and even intentionally so long as he shows himself as if he does not intend to do so; such is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 10. And this is only according to the one who holds that a melacha she'eina tzricha legufa is exempt, and the prohibition is rabbinic, they permitted it here where there is a concern of injury. But according to the Rambam, it is certainly forbidden intentionally. And that which they said in the Gemara (121b): "a snake and a scorpion, one tramples them in passing," this is its explanation: when he is walking in his usual way and a snake or scorpion is before him, he does not need to turn away from them but rather walks in his path, and if they died by his trampling upon them, they died, since he did not intend it; so Rashi explained there. And consequently, even according to Rabbi Yehuda it is permitted, for there is no pesik reisha here, and a davar she'eino mitkaven even according to Rabbi Yehuda the prohibition is only rabbinic, and because of the concern of injury it is permitted. And I saw one who labored to establish the words of the Rambam, who wrote at the beginning of chapter 11 that it is permitted to trample them in passing, that the intention is even when intending to kill them (Maggid Mishneh there), and the reason is because a snake and a scorpion in most places kill and there is a danger to life in this, but with other harmful creatures it is forbidden (Magen Avraham, subsection 23), and these are puzzling matters as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 11, law 4: "Wild beasts and creeping things that bite and certainly kill, such as the fly of Egypt, the hornet of Nineveh, the scorpion of the mountains (in the Gemara the version is 'of Adiabene'), the snake of the Land of Israel, and a rabid dog in any place—it is permitted to kill them on Shabbat when they are seen. Regarding all other harmful creatures: if they are running after him, it is permitted to kill them; but if they were sitting in their place or fleeing from before him, it is forbidden to kill them. And if he stepped on them incidentally while walking and killed them, it is permitted." Thus far his words. If so, he included all harmful creatures and did not specify snake and scorpion. Furthermore, how is it possible to say "that in the majority of cases they kill," for he wrote: "or fleeing from before him," and since they are fleeing from before him, how could it be permitted to desecrate Shabbat? Furthermore, from the words of the Rambam it appears explicitly like Rashi, since he wrote: "And if he stepped on them... and killed them," why does he conclude "and killed them"? Since he stepped on them to kill them, it is obvious that he killed them. Rather, this is the explanation: that he stepped on them incidentally while walking, and it is not certain that through this they will be killed; regarding this he says "and killed them," meaning if he killed them, it is permitted. (And there is a very great difficulty regarding the Maggid Mishneh who wrote that Rashi explained according to Rabbi Shimon, see there, for in Rashi it is explicit even according to Rabbi Yehuda, see there; and I do not know if this is from the Maggid Mishneh, and perhaps an erring student wrote it.)

According to what has been explained, it is permitted to kill a rabid dog on Shabbat, as it is a clear danger. And there is reason to doubt if it is not clear that this is a rabid dog but rather there is a doubt regarding it, whether it is like any doubt of pikuach nefesh which overrides Shabbat, or if it is not similar, for even with a certain rabid dog it is also only a doubt, for is it certain that it will bite whoever it encounters? And since regarding the madness itself there is a doubt, perhaps it is not permitted to desecrate Shabbat. And even though for pikuach nefesh one desecrates Shabbat even with many doubts, as written in siman 329, nevertheless this is all when the pikuach nefesh is apparent. But when there is a doubt regarding the primary fact, perhaps it was not permitted, and one must deliberate on this; however, it is certain that one must tell a non-Jew to kill it. And to kill the lizard that they call "spin" on Shabbat—it is a complete prohibition and one is liable for a chatat, for it does not cause harm, and even if it falls into food, who says that it is dangerous? And also, they can cover the food. And there are those among the masses who kill them on Shabbat, and one is obligated to inform them that it is prohibited by the Torah (Magen Avraham ibid.).

The sages taught in the Mishnah (Chapter 14, Mishnah 1): "The eight sheratzim mentioned in the Torah: one who traps them or wounds them is liable; and regarding other creeping things and swarming things: one who wounds them is exempt, one who traps them for a purpose is liable, and for no purpose is exempt." And the eight sheratzim are explicitly stated in Parashat Shemini: the weasel, the mouse, the toad, the hedgehog, the chameleon, the lizard, the snail, and the mole. And regarding the matter of trapping, the difference between them and other creeping things and swarming things is that for those, a person mostly traps them for the sake of their skin, therefore one is liable for trapping them as it is a labor required for its own sake; but other creeping things and swarming things are generally trapped for no purpose other than so they will not cause harm, and it is a labor not required for its own sake, and therefore specifically one who traps them for a purpose is liable, but for no purpose—and also their general status is for no purpose—he is exempt (Ran there). And therefore the Rambam, who ruled that for a labor not required for its own sake one is liable, ruled not in accordance with our Mishnah. This is the wording of the Rambam in Chapter 10, Law 21: "Whether it be the eight sheratzim mentioned in the Torah or other creeping things and swarming things that are of a species that is trapped, one who traps any of them, whether for a purpose or for no purpose or to play with them, is liable, since he intended to trap and trapped, for one is liable for a labor not required for its own sake." Thus far his words. And that which he ruled regarding harmful swarming things that it is permitted to overturn a vessel upon them is because there it is not considered trapping at all, as I wrote in section 19. And therefore the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, who ruled like Rabbi Shimon, wrote the Mishnah in its original form. The general principle of the matter: "for a purpose" is a labor required for its own sake, and "for no purpose" is not required for its own sake. And this applies to all species, only that generally the eight sheratzim are considered "for a purpose," and other creeping things and swarming things are considered "for no purpose."

And regarding the matter of chavalah, the explanation of the matters is: one who causes a chavalah on Shabbat is liable when he makes a wound, and this requires two conditions: the first is that he makes a wound in a living being that has skin and blood emerges from it, or that the blood is trapped under the skin; and the second is that he intends through that wound to benefit from the blood or from the flesh for medicine or to feed an animal. But if he only intended to damage it or to cause it pain—behold, he is merely a destroyer and is exempt (the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah there). And the eight sheratzim mentioned in the Torah all have skins like a wild animal, a domestic animal, and a bird; and even though regarding the matter of tumah there are those among them whose skins are like their flesh, nevertheless regarding the matter of Shabbat they have skin, and therefore one who causes a chavalah in them is liable even if the blood has not yet emerged but is trapped under the skin. But other creeping things and swarming things, one who causes a chavalah in them is exempt until the blood emerges outside, for regarding them it cannot be said that the blood is trapped under the skin since they have no skin. And the intention is not that they have no skin at all, but rather their skin is thin and soft and the blood is quickly trapped there even though there is no wound, and if there is only a wound the blood will emerge outside.

To which primary category of labor does wounding belong? The Rambam in chapter 8, law 7, wrote that one who wounds is liable because of extracting, which is a derivative of threshing, for one who wounds also extracts the blood from the flesh. And even though he himself ruled there that threshing only applies to products of the soil, this is only to exclude creatures in the water such as fish and worms, which are not subject to the prohibition of wounding; however, domestic animals, wild animals, birds, and man, who grow upon the earth, are called products of the soil (Maggid Mishneh there). And since the prohibition is because of extracting, he therefore wrote that one is not liable until there is an amount of blood extracted equal to a dried fig, and in the case of clotted blood, the clotted area must be equal to a dried fig, like the measure of food on Shabbat which is a dried fig, for threshing and extracting apply to foods. Rashi, of blessed memory, at the beginning of the chapter "Eight Creeping Creatures," explained two explanations regarding the liability of wounding: one because of dyeing, and the second because of slaughtering, which is the taking of a soul, for the blood is the soul. To this the Tosafot and all the Rishonim agreed, that the liability of wounding is because of the taking of a soul, and the primary category of labor is slaughtering; according to this, one does not require the measure of a dried fig, but rather even with a small amount of blood one is liable.

The Rambam wrote there that this which was explained, that one who intends to damage is exempt because he is a destroyer, regarding what are these matters stated: regarding a domestic animal, a wild animal, a bird, and the like. But one who wounds a person, even though he intended to damage—he is liable because of his satisfaction, for his mind was cooled and his anger subsided, and this is like one who improves; and even though he does not need the blood that he extracted from him—he is liable. Thus far his words. And this is according to his system, for he ruled that for a labor not needed for its own sake, one is liable. But according to most of the poskim—he is exempt, for he does not need the essence of the wound, and so it is explicitly in the Gemara (105b) that this depends on the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon, see there. And so the Rambam ruled in chapter 10, law 10, regarding one who tears, which is a destroyer, that one who tears to subside his anger—this is like one who improves and is liable; and so at the beginning of chapter 12 regarding kindling to destroy, that one who burns the stack or the house of his fellow in order to take revenge on him and through this his anger subsided—he is liable, see there. And the Ra'avad and several of the Rishonim disagree with him, for in these cases even according to Rabbi Yehuda he is not liable. For it is true that previously the Shas says according to Rabbi Yehuda that this is called an improver, for he performs satisfaction for his inclination, but it asks against this: "And in these cases is it permitted? But was it not taught: One who tears his garments in his anger and one who breaks... let him be in your eyes like an idolater, for this is the craft of the evil inclination etc.," see there; behold, it rejects what it said previously that this is called an improver. And the Rambam holds that it does not reject the law, but rather it means that it is certainly forbidden to do so even on a weekday; however, regarding Shabbat—it is called a labor, for at any rate he improves for his foul desire, and there is a prohibition in this as well even on a weekday (see Maggid Mishneh there).

And know that in several places in the Shas is found the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon regarding one who acts destructively in wounding and in kindling, for Rabbi Yehuda exempts and Rabbi Shimon obligates. And their positions are reversed, for Rabbi Yehuda, who obligates in a labor not needed for its own sake, exempts in one who acts destructively in wounding and in kindling; and Rabbi Shimon, who exempts in a labor not needed for its own sake, obligates. Rashi, of blessed memory, (106a) explained the matters, and such is the presentation of the tradition: for behold, from where do we know that the Torah obligated for wounding? For behold, circumcision is a wounding and the Torah permitted it on Shabbat. And if it should enter your mind that wounding was not forbidden by the Torah, why was it necessary to permit circumcision, for there is no prohibition here at all from the Torah? And so too regarding kindling, the Torah forbade it in the case of a daughter of a kohen who committed adultery, whose liability is by burning, and the Torah forbade burning her on Shabbat (Yevamot 6b). And why did it forbid it, for behold, he is acting destructively? Rather, learn from this that one who acts destructively in kindling is obligated. And Rabbi Yehuda holds that there is no destruction here, since there is a mitzvah in both of them—it is certainly considered constructive. And even though this is a labor not needed for its own sake, as he does not need the purpose of the labor but rather the fulfillment of the mitzvah, behold, according to Rabbi Yehuda one is obligated for a labor not needed for its own sake. And so too in any construction that there may be, one is obligated according to Rabbi Yehuda, such as in wounding when he needs the blood for his dog, and kindling when he needs its ash; and even though it is not needed for its own sake, he is obligated. And all this is according to Rabbi Yehuda, but according to Rabbi Shimon, for whom a labor not needed for its own sake is exempt, all this is not a construction for the essence of the labor and it is a labor not needed for its own sake, and despite all this the Torah obligated—learn from this that one who acts destructively in wounding and in kindling is obligated.

Therefore, the Rambam, who rules like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor not needed for its own sake, consequently ruled regarding one who causes a wound and needs the blood, or one who kindles and needs the ashes—that he is liable. But where he does not need the blood or the ashes—he is exempt, because it is a destructive act. And behold, according to this, the other poskim who rule like Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor not needed for its own sake should have ruled the opposite, that a destructive act in wounding and kindling is always liable even when one does not need the blood or the ashes, yet we have not found anyone who ruled thus. And it is true that the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not delve into the liabilities, for since even a destructive act is forbidden rabbinically, they did not further delve into distinguishing between a Torah liability and a rabbinic prohibition, as is known; nevertheless, for the law, we must know how it stands according to this system.

And behold, according to the system of Rashi, it is certainly so, for according to Rabbi Shimon one is liable for wounding and kindling even though he does not need it for anything. However, our teachers the Tosafists innovated there regarding this that according to Rabbi Shimon himself there is a dispute in the Gemara there regarding this, as Rabbi Abbahu holds that according to Rabbi Shimon one is liable without any repair, and Rabbi Yochanan holds that even according to Rabbi Shimon one requires a bit of a repair or the repair of a mitzvah, or that he needs it for his dog or for its ash, and this is called "needed for its own sake." And that is to say, since the essence of the mitzvah is performed in this manner, the melakhah is needed for the sake of the melakhah itself in order to perform the mitzvah. However, one who wounds and needs the blood for his dog or kindles and needs its ash—certainly this is called "not needed for its own sake," like one who digs a pit and needs only its earth, and you do not find it except in wounding and kindling with prohibited items of benefit, where he thinks he can give it to his dog or cook a pot with it, for with prohibited items of benefit which are not fit for anything—this is called "needed for its own sake." And this our teachers proved there, that even according to Rabbi Shimon who deems one liable for a destructive act in wounding and kindling—nevertheless, he requires a melakhah that is needed for its own sake, see there. And according to this, according to the system of the Tosafists, in wounding and kindling—he is exempt, except for wounding and kindling with prohibited items of benefit to use the blood and the ash—he is liable.

It has already been explained that for a creature whose species is not hunted, one is not liable for its hunting, but it is forbidden by rabbinic law, as we learned in the Baraita (106b): "For something whose species is hunted—one is liable, and for something whose species is not hunted—one is exempt." And this is the wording of the Rambam at the end of chapter 10: "One who hunts something whose species is not hunted, such as locusts, hornets, wasps, mosquitoes, fleas, and the like—this person is exempt." Thus far his words. And all exemptions regarding Shabbat are "exempt but forbidden," for we decree on account of those whose species are hunted. Therefore, a flea—which is the black jumping louse called "flea," and in Arabic "barghut"—it is forbidden to hunt it by rabbinic law, but according to the Torah there is no hunting here, for its species is not hunted. However, if it is standing on his flesh and biting him—it is permitted to take it and cast it away, for in a place of pain they did not decree. And he should be careful not to kill it, and one who kills it is liable because it reproduces and does not come from sweat; therefore, it is a creature like all other creatures. It is also forbidden to rub it with his hand, lest he kill it, and they only permitted taking it because of pain; but when it is on his garment and not biting him—it is forbidden even to take it. And some say that when it is on his shirt from the inside, or in trousers or stockings where it jumps there—he is permitted to take it and cast it away, and such is the custom. And there is one who is concerned even when it stands on his flesh and is not biting, but the custom is as I wrote (see Magen Avraham subsection 18 and Taz subsection 8). But the crawling louse found in the head and in worn-out garments—it is permitted to kill it, for it is not a creature and it comes from sweat.

Nevertheless, one who searches his garments for lice—he should not kill them, but rather rub them with his hands and throw them away, because fleas are also found there, and we decree that if we permit him to kill the lice, he will also kill the fleas. Therefore, one who searches his head—it is permitted to kill them, because fleas are not common in the head. This is the wording of the Rambam, chapter 11, law 2: "Creeping things that reproduce from male and female, or whose existence is from the dust, such as fleas, one who kills them—is liable like one who kills a domestic or wild animal. But creeping things whose existence is from dung or from rotted fruit and the like, such as worms in meat and worms inside legumes—one who kills them is exempt... and it is permitted to kill lice on Shabbat, because they come from sweat." Thus far his words. And there are three disputes regarding them: liability for a chatat, exempt but forbidden, and permitted ab initio; and more will be explained regarding this in siman 316 with the help of Heaven.

Just as they permitted regarding a snake and a scorpion when there is a concern of damage to tread upon them incidentally, as was written in section 20, so too there is one more thing they permitted by treading incidentally, because a person's mind cannot tolerate them. That is, it is known that to level a depression is forbidden by the Torah, as this is like building as was written in siman 313, and consequently it is forbidden to rub with one's feet saliva that is upon the ground because of leveling depressions. And the sages, of blessed memory, permitted (121b) to tread upon the saliva incidentally in the course of his walking because of the repulsiveness, provided that he does not intend to smear and level depressions. And even though it is smeared automatically, nevertheless, since he does not intend it, it is permitted, provided that it is not a psik reisha, as was written regarding a snake and a scorpion. And this is according to the Rambam who ruled that a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah is liable, but according to the other poskim, it is permitted even with a psik reisha, because it is a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah. And this is all in a place where there is no floor, but on a floor, it is permitted to smear, as leveling depressions is not applicable there, and also smearing is not present here, for smearing is only when one smears one thing upon another, and not when his desire is that it be absorbed into the ground or floor so that it is not noticeable at all, for this is his primary intention (Magen Avraham, subsection 24). And there is one who wrote that nowadays we are not particular about saliva because of repulsiveness, and therefore it is forbidden to rub, but only to place his feet upon it without rubbing. But phlegm that comes from the mouth and from the nose is certainly repulsive to everyone and is permitted with rubbing (ibid. subsection 25), and on a floor it is permitted in any case.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (107a): "A beast or bird that is in one's domain—one who traps them is exempt," and such is the wording of the Rambam at the end of chapter 10: "A beast or bird that is in one's domain, such as geese, chickens, and loft-doves—one who traps them is exempt, and every exemption of Shabbat is 'exempt but forbidden'." It appears to me that for this reason this law is not found in the Tur, for since it is forbidden rabbinically, he did not see fit to clarify that it is exempt by Torah law, as this is not his way. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 12 wrote: "A beast or bird that is in one's domain—it is permitted to trap them," see there, and he follows his own reasoning in his great work where he wrote that this is what they said at the beginning of Shabbat, that every exemption of Shabbat is "exempt but forbidden," except for these three: trapping a deer, etc. And his words are puzzling, for this refers to the law where one person sat at the opening and filled it and a second person came and sat beside him, for it is regarding this Mishnah that this statement was made at the end of HaOreg (and also the Magen Avraham at the end of siman 326 wondered at this). And clear proof that this is "exempt but forbidden" is from the Tosefta (chapter 13) where it is taught: "Geese, chickens, and Herodian doves, and anything that does not lack trapping—one is exempt." Thus far his words. And "lacking trapping" refers to a bird into a house or a deer into a garden or a courtyard, as is explained in the Mishnah, and there it is obvious that it is forbidden, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 1.

It is stated in the Yerushalmi regarding this Mishnah—that one who traps a beast or a bird that is in his domain is exempt: They only said this when they are in a person's domain, but if they are not in a person's domain—he is liable. Rabbi Yissa said: This implies that one who traps an ox that rebelled on Shabbat—is liable. Thus far his words. There is one who explains that it is a single matter, for "not in a person's domain" refers to one that rebelled (Pnei Moshe), but if so, what is the meaning of the phrasing "this implies." And there is one who explained "not in a person's domain" as meaning he is unable to subdue it (Korban HaEdah), and if so, that is an ox that rebelled. In my humble opinion, it appears that this is the explanation: Specifically when they are in his domain, in his house or in his courtyard; but if they are not in his domain, such as if they went to another courtyard as is the way of living creatures and did not rebel either, and when the owner whistles to them they will come to their cage—nevertheless he is liable, for since they are not in his domain and he needs to bring them to his domain, it is called tzida. And regarding this Rabbi Yehuda said: This implies an ox that rebelled, meaning that it does not allow itself to be caught, even though it is in the owner's domain—it is called tzida. Therefore, if there is a rebellious hen that flies from corner to corner when they want to catch it—one who traps it is liable for a chatat.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef: "A wild animal or bird that is in one's possession—it is permitted to trap them, provided that they do not rebel. But if they are rebellious—it is forbidden to seize them even in a courtyard, if the courtyard is large such that if they had not grown up among humans they would require a trap." Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: "And there are those who say that it is forbidden to trap a wild animal or bird that is in one's possession, and if one trapped them—he is exempt. But a cow or a horse, and all the more so other wild animals or birds that rebelled, if one trapped them—he is liable for a chatat, and such is the primary ruling." Thus far his words, and certainly such is the halacha. And according to what we explained of the words of the Yerushalmi, even if they did not rebel, if one trapped them from another domain—he is liable for a chatat. However, in any event, according to the law it is forbidden to occupy oneself on Shabbat with the seizing of a domestic animal, wild animal, or bird.

However, with all this, the matters require clarification, for if so, it should be forbidden to bring a cow or a horse into a stable or a hen into its coop, yet we have explicitly learned (128b): "One may assist a beast, animal, or bird to walk in a courtyard," and even a hen which is forbidden—this is due to the category of muktzeh and not due to the category of tzida, as I wrote in siman 308. However, the matter of tzida is not applicable at all to domestic beasts and birds that are accustomed and enter their cages on their own as well; therefore, if the owners whistle to them and they go to their cages without refusal—this is not within the definition of tzida at all, as is understood, and regarding this we learned: "One may assist etc." And the matter of tzida that we mentioned, that it is permitted to trap an animal or bird in one's possession or that one is exempt but it is forbidden, refers to those that are not yet accustomed and some effort is required to bring them into their cages, to block their path or the like; in this are all the distinctions that have been explained (and similarly I saw in Chayei Adam, klal 29, in Nishmat Adam, letter 2, see there).

Behold, cattle and horses are always domesticated, and the matter of tzida does not apply to them unless they have rebelled, and this is not common. However, regarding roosters and hens, every householder must supervise the members of his household, for if they are accustomed to the house and are easy to bring into the house or into their coop—meaning that when one whistles and chirps to them they come immediately—it is permitted. However, if they are not accustomed and there are those among them that fly here and there, and escape from the hand of the owners until it is necessary to stand before them to block their path, if they are outside—it is forbidden for an Israelite to bring them into the house or into their coop by means of an act of blocking the path, rather only by means of a non-Jew, and in this there is a rabbinic prohibition in any case. And if they are rebellious like madmen, as is common with roosters—it is close to reaching a Torah prohibition, and one must be very, very careful in this. And geese and turkeys, it appears that they are easy and tzida does not apply to them; nevertheless, with them too one should be precise so as not to come to a desecration of Shabbat, Heaven forbid, and it is good to bring them in by means of a non-Jew if they are not easy enough to come by means of a whistle. And regarding pigeons, it appears that it is forbidden in any case, for with them, as it appears, tzida certainly applies.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: "A cat is judged like any other undomesticated animal, and it is forbidden to catch it on Shabbat." Thus far his words. And there is no novelty in this, for certainly there are those of its species that are hunted; rather, his intention is even regarding a domestic cat when it has gone out—it is forbidden to stand before it and block its path until it enters the house. But if one whistles to it with his mouth and it enters because it is accustomed to this house—it appears that it is permitted. And that which he wrote "to catch it" is not literal, for it is muktzeh, but rather it means to do something until it enters as I have written. And bees that have left a hive—it is considered hunting and it is forbidden to return them (see Sha'arei Teshuva, subsection 18).