Siman 252

It is written: "Six days you shall labor and do all your work, and the seventh day is a Sabbath to Hashem your G-d, you shall not do any work." Meaning, for six days you shall do your work with your hands, and on the seventh day you shall not do with your hands. But if he did the work with his hands before the Sabbath and the work was completed on its own on the Sabbath—it is permitted, (Yerushalmi chapter 1, halacha 5) such as one who places bread in the oven while it is still day or meat in a pot to cook, and the completion of the baking and the cooking until it is fit to eat requires three hours for this, and it turns out that the completion will be on the Sabbath—nevertheless it is permitted, since it is done on its own and he does nothing. (And this is the dispute of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel in the first chapter regarding many laws, for according to Beit Shammai it must be cooked while it is still day, and Beit Hillel permit it, and the halacha follows Beit Hillel.)

There is a question regarding this: since we only follow the beginning of the labor, why regarding the liability of stoning do we follow the completion? For example, one who places dough in an oven on Shabbat or places a pot with cooked food into an oven on Shabbat—if he were to remove them immediately from the oven, he would have done nothing; yet when he left them until they were baked or cooked, he is liable. Behold, he only performed the beginning and not the completion. Rather, you attribute the completion to him as well, as if he completed it with his hands. If so, even when he began with his hands while it was still day and it was completed on its own on Shabbat, we should consider it as if he performed the completion as well. (In Menachot 56b: if one placed leaven upon dough and went and sat down, and it became leavened on its own—he is liable for it like a Shabbat act; see there.)

However, the matter is indeed so, for we certainly attribute the completion after the beginning. When the beginning was on Shabbat, we attribute the completion after the beginning as if he also performed the completion with his hands. And when the beginning was on Erev Shabbat, we also attribute the completion after the beginning—meaning, as if the completion was also on Erev Shabbat—for the Torah said that the beginning of the action with his hands is as if he completed the entire labor then. And we see more than this regarding the labor of Shabbat: that even if the completion will be after several days, he is liable for stoning and a chatat, such as one who sows on Shabbat and the taking of root occurs after three days; he is liable because it is considered as if he completed the labor on Shabbat. And conversely, one who sows on Thursday, even though the taking of root will be on Shabbat, it is nothing, for it is considered as if the taking of root was also on Thursday, as the Torah did not obligate for labor that is performed on its own on Shabbat.

Nevertheless, one should not learn from this regarding one who placed dough or a cooked dish into an oven on Shabbat at nightfall, for the baking and cooking occurred at night on a weekday; why should he not be liable just as one who sows on Shabbat? For in truth there is no comparison, as in sowing, the entire labor of sowing is performed in the manner of people who sow, which is not the case with baking and cooking—it is only called such if it is baked or cooked so that it is fit for eating, and if so, he performed nothing on Shabbat. And if you say that if so, even on Erev Shabbat in such a case, he has not yet performed anything, and the essence of the labor will be on Shabbat. This is not a difficulty at all, for on the contrary, if he performed nothing—why should he be liable for what occurred on its own on Shabbat, for he performed nothing with his hands, and the Torah only prohibited an action with the hands on Shabbat, and that the completion of the labor in the manner of people should also be on Shabbat. Nevertheless, the matter is not clear to me, for perhaps in baking and cooking on Shabbat at nightfall—he is liable, just as in such cases on Erev Shabbat it is permitted, so too on Shabbat—he is liable by Torah law, and it requires further study for the halacha. (See Nimukei Yosef in the second chapter of Bava Kamma, on "his fire is on account of his arrows")

Therefore, it is permitted to begin a labor on Erev Shabbat close to darkness, even though he cannot complete it while it is still day and it is completed on its own on Shabbat, such as soaking ink and dyes in water, and they soak throughout the entire Shabbat; and to place bundles of flax into an oven so that they will be whitened, and whitening is among the primary categories of labor; and similarly flax that he removed from the soaking-pool and places in the fire to dry it, and it contains the prohibition of cooking. (Mordechai, first chapter). And why do we not decree in this case lest he rake the coals, as we decree regarding all things that are on the fire, as will be explained in siman 253? They explained in the Gemara (18b) that since the wind ruins the flax, he will not open the oven to rake the coals. And similarly, it is permitted to place wool into a dyer's vat on Erev Shabbat close to darkness, and the wool is dyed throughout the entire Shabbat. However, in this there is a concern lest he rake the coals on Shabbat in order to hasten the cooking, and therefore there is no permission unless the vat is not on the fire, having been removed from the fire. (Gemara, ibid.). And even if it is not on the fire, nevertheless we require that the vat be covered, and the cover must be sealed with clay around it, for if not so, we fear lest he stir it with a spoon; and one who stirs a boiling pot, even if it is not on the fire, is liable on account of cooking, for through this they hasten the cooking, as I wrote in siman 318. And although it will be explained there that this applies to food that is not fully cooked, but regarding that which is cooked there is no cooking prohibition in stirring—this applies to food, but regarding dye, even when it is fully cooked the dye is absorbed, and it constitutes dyeing, and this is among the primary categories of labor. But when it is sealed with clay, we do not fear that he will remove the sealant with the cover and stir, for since this requires much time, he will remember that today is Shabbat. However, when it is not sealed and in a brief moment he can remove the cover and stir it, there is reason to fear that he will forget that today is Shabbat. And similarly, it is permitted to spread traps for beasts, birds, and fish on Erev Shabbat close to darkness, and they are trapped throughout the entire Shabbat. And although the trap performs an action, in that it captures the living creatures within it, we have already explained at the beginning of siman 246 that we are not commanded regarding the resting of vessels; see there. (See Bach there, that the Rokeach holds that even Beit Hillel holds of the resting of vessels where it performs an action, but all the poskim do not hold so; see there.)

And likewise, it is permitted to open water to a garden, and it continues to flow throughout the entire Shabbat and waters the seeds. And likewise, it is permitted to place a thick kilyor upon the eye, which is a medicinal drug, and it continues to heal throughout the entire Shabbat, even in a manner that is forbidden to perform on Shabbat, namely, a place where there is no danger, as I have written in siman 328. And likewise, they may place incense under vessels and they continue to be perfumed throughout the entire day, according to their custom where they would place frankincense and types of spices upon the fire, and smoke the garments so that their scent would spread. (Gemara ibid.) And likewise, they may place sulfur under vessels upon the fire, and the vessels are silver vessels upon which they draw flowers and forms, and they smoke them with sulfur and they blacken and become recognizable. (Rashi ibid.) And even if the incense and the sulfur are placed in a vessel—for we are not commanded regarding the resting of vessels, as has been written.

And likewise, it is permitted to place barley into a vat of beer to soak them, and they soak throughout the entire Shabbat and become beer, and similarly with whiskey in these manners. And likewise, one may load the beams of the olive press upon the olives to make oil from them, or upon grapes in the winepress to make wine from them, and the oil and the wine flow throughout the entire Shabbat. And it is permitted to load them close to nightfall, except that the oil and the wine that emerge from them are forbidden to be drunk on Shabbat; for if we permit them, we decree lest one squeeze with his hands, as he might say, "Were they not also whole in the olive press and the winepress close to nightfall and were squeezed on Shabbat? What difference is there to me between squeezing by hand or by means of a beam?" and in squeezing by hand there is a liability of stoning and a sin offering. Therefore, if he loaded the beams while it was still day in a manner that the olives and the grapes were already crushed before nightfall, since then even if he squeezes them by hand there is no Torah prohibition—it is permitted to drink the liquids that emerge from them on Shabbat. For even though there is a rabbinic prohibition even when they are crushed, nevertheless they did not decree because of this to forbid the liquids that emerge from them, as it would be a decree upon a decree. (Magen Avraham, subsection 18). And according to the opinion of the Tur, there is no permission for the liquids to drink them on Shabbat unless he initially crushed them on Erev Shabbat and afterwards loaded the beams upon them, and this will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 321 (see Taz, subsection 6). And likewise it will be explained there whether it is permitted to finish with his hands when they were crushed from Erev Shabbat or not. And likewise, unripe grapes and ears of grain from produce, when he crushed them while it was still day—the liquids that emerge from them on Shabbat are permitted. But if he did not crush them while it was still day—the liquids that emerged on Shabbat are forbidden even if they emerged on their own, for regarding them there is also a Torah prohibition on Shabbat: in grapes because of squeezing, and in produce because of threshing, and there it will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven. But other fruits and garlic that are not intended for liquids—the liquid that emerges from them on Shabbat is permitted in any case, (Magen Avraham, subsection 19) and there are those who disagree as is written there.

And likewise, it is permitted to place wheat and barley into a water mill close to nightfall, and it grinds throughout the entire Shabbat, for we are not commanded regarding the resting of vessels. The same law applies to a windmill, but a mill operated by an animal is forbidden, as we are commanded regarding the resting of our animals. And likewise, a mill that a person operates—it is forbidden by means of his manservant or maidservant, as we are commanded regarding their resting, and likewise by means of a worker hired by the day it is forbidden, but through a contractor it is permitted as I wrote in siman 244. And there is a stringency regarding a mill compared to the other labors we have enumerated, for in a mill there is the production of sound, and there is a degradation of Shabbat, and in the Gemara there, there is a dispute regarding this, and most of the poskim decided like the one who permits. And in truth, there are those who forbid a mill for this reason, that they will say "the mill of so-and-so is grinding on Shabbat," and likewise in any place where there is concern for the production of sound, and such is the custom ab initio. However, in a place of loss one should be lenient, for such is the essence of the law, and likewise it is permitted to rent it to a non-Jew. (Ibid. subsection 22) And one should not ask according to the one who forbids the production of sound on Shabbat, that if so, how do we set the weight-driven instrument called a "zeiger" on Friday, for does it not produce a sound on Shabbat? For it can be said that everyone knows this was prepared from yesterday, for such is the way to set them from yesterday, and see below, siman 338.

And if the mill belongs to a non-Jew, it is obvious that if the Israelite gives him the wheat on the eve of Shabbat, and even if he gives them on Shabbat—it is permitted, for he acts for his own benefit, provided that the Israelite does not stand next to him, as it appears like his agent. However, in the case of a mitzvah, such as when grinding wheat for Pesach—it is permitted to sit at a distance, when he does not involve himself in the labor but rather supervises the kashrut, as I wrote at the end of siman 244, when he watches so that he does not steal (as the Taz wrote there in subsection 7), and we have already explained this there. (See Magen Avraham subsection 20, who intended to say that in the giving of wheat to a water mill there is no Torah prohibition, see there; and already all the giants of the world, the Eliyah Rabbah, the Pnei Yehoshua, and the Teshuvot HaShav, cried out against him, and his inference is not an inference as the Maharsha wrote there and all the giants, and Heaven forbid to let such a thought arise, and especially according to what I wrote at the beginning of this siman, and examine it closely.)

And likewise, it is permitted to sell an object to a non-Jew close to nightfall, and to load the object onto his shoulder or onto his donkey, provided that he exits the entrance of his house while it is still day. And as for that which he carries the object in the public domain or outside the techum—we have no concern with it, for it is his. But if he did not exit his house while it was still day but rather on Shabbat—it is forbidden for two reasons: First, because the primary acquisition is when he exits his house, and furthermore, because the observer will think that he sold it to him on Shabbat; therefore, even in a city where it is permitted to carry within it—it is forbidden for this reason. And there are those who permit it when he designated a place for him in his house at the time of the sale, that it is permitted for him to exit even on Shabbat. And this is only regarding the reason of acquisition, but regarding the reason of suspicion that he sold it to him on Shabbat—this is of no avail. And this reason was written by the Rambam in chapter 6, and we brought his words above in siman 246. Therefore, one should be stringent in all manners, and one should not be lenient except for a great need and a time of exigency, or if the buyer is a violent person, and then there is room to permit even without designating a place, for in such cases the rabbis did not decree, (Taz subsection 3 and see Magen Avraham subsection 5) and it is proper to distance oneself from this. And the law of lending him a vessel and renting to him—was explained in siman 246, see there.

And so too it is permitted to give one's garments to a non-Jewish launderer, and hides to the craftsman who processes them, on Friday close to nightfall, provided he leaves his house while it is still day, and that he fixes the price with him as a contractor, such that he takes such-and-such for each garment or hide, and that he does not tell him to launder them on Shabbat, and also that the non-Jew performs the work in his own home. And so too if the price for laundering is known—this is also considered as if he fixed the price. And in this time, giving vessels to a launderer—presumably this is a fixing of the price, as it is a known matter, and especially if he is his regular launderer, for would he fix the price with him every single time? (Magen Avraham, subsection 6) Therefore, the common custom is that they give vessels to a laundress on Friday close to nightfall without fixing a price now, because the price is known. (ibid.) And so it appears to me regarding hides for processing, if he regularly does work for him and they have already fixed prices between them for each hide such-and-such—that he may give them to him without specification.

And it has already been explained in siman 247 that in any fixed price for a purchase—it is not necessary that he tell him how much he will give him, and only if he stipulated with him that he will give him his wage—it is sufficient, for he relies upon him that he will pay him appropriately, and he acts for his own sake. And so too even if he does not give him anything, but the non-Jew acts for him in exchange for a benefit he received from him—it is also considered as if he fixed a price, for in the end he acts for his own sake, because of the benefit he received from the Israelite. But if he does not act for free and expects payment of a wage and he did not speak with him, even though it is in his mind to give to him—it is forbidden, for then he acts for the sake of the Israelite, as was written there.

And if he did not fix a price—it is forbidden to give it to him on Erev Shabbat, unless there is sufficient time to do it while it is still day. But otherwise—it is forbidden according to the opinion of the Rambam even on Sunday, if there is not sufficient time to finish them before Shabbat. And our teacher, the Rema, ruled above in siman 247 according to the opinion of those who disagree with the Rambam, and he holds that on Wednesday and Thursday it is permitted even without fixing a price, and even if he cannot finish them before Shabbat, for he is not telling him to do it on Shabbat, and only on Erev Shabbat does it appear as if he is telling him to do it on Shabbat. And even though regarding a letter he only permitted there in such a case when he is forced to do so—this is because there, when he goes every day, it appears as if he told him to go on Shabbat. But here, where he does it in his own home, and it makes no difference to the Israelite when he does it—it is permitted in any case. (ibid. subsection 8)

If the Israelite went on Shabbat to the launderer or the tanner and sees that he is doing his work on Shabbat, if he contracted with him as has been explained—it is unnecessary to say anything to him. However, if he did not contract, such that he gave it to him on Wednesday or Thursday according to the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in the previous section, for such is the opinion of most of the poskim—he is obligated to tell him not to do it on Shabbat; and likewise if he does it for him for free as a favor. And if he obeys—how good, and if not—he has also fulfilled his obligation. And the reason for this is that with a contract, it is certainly obvious that he acts for his own sake, and what does the Israelite have to do with this? And this is similar to one who sees a non-Jew doing his own work on Shabbat; must he protest against him? And so too it is here. However, without a contract or as a favor, which is not exactly like a contract, even though we permitted it—this was because we are not obligated to know when he will do it. But when one sees that he is doing it on Shabbat, and here it is certainly possible that he is acting for the sake of the Israelite—therefore he is obligated to protest against him, to show him that he does not desire its being done on Shabbat. And if he does not obey—then it is obvious that he acts for his own sake. (And a favor is similar in this regard to not contracting, for even if he gave it to him in the middle of the week—he must protest against him when he sees that he is doing it on Shabbat.)

And this which we have said, that regarding a fixed-price contract one is not required to protest against him when he sees him working on Shabbat—this is regarding work done in private. However, when the work is in public—one is obligated to protest against him even regarding a fixed-price contract because of those who see, so that they will not say the work of an Israelite is being done on Shabbat. And if you should ask, surely we have forbidden public work even with detached items in siman 244—this is certainly so, but here the Israelite did not tell him to work on Shabbat, and therefore in truth when he sees him working—he must protest against him. Therefore, ab initio it is permitted to give it to him, for we do not have to concern ourselves that he will work on Shabbat. However, even in this there is a distinction, for a thing upon which the name of the Israelite is not yet called—one must protest, and if he does not comply—he does not comply. But in a matter that is well-known to be the Israelite's—one is obligated by law to protest and to do every possible stratagem so that he does not do it on Shabbat, as with work on attached items in siman 244. (This I learned from the words of the Magen Avraham, subsection 10, see there.)

If he performed the labor of an Israelite on Shabbat and brought it to him on Shabbat, if he did not fix a price—it is certainly forbidden for the Israelite to wear it or to use it on Shabbat, for since he did not fix a price, it is possible that he is not acting on his own behalf but on behalf of the Israelite, and it turns out that he benefits from Shabbat labor. But where he fixed a price—it is permitted to wear and to use, for he certainly acts on his own behalf. And regarding muktzeh or nolad—there is none, for the object existed beforehand and he merely repaired it, and anything finished by human hands is not subject to muktzeh, as will be explained in the laws of muktzeh and nolad. However, some forbid wearing it or using it as long as it is known that he finished it on Shabbat, for in any event he benefits from Shabbat labor, and he must wait in the evening for the time it takes to perform the labor, and on Yom Tov when it was done on the first day—it is permitted on the second, and it will be explained in siman 515. The primary view is like the first opinion, and therefore if it is not necessary for him—one should be stringent like the "some say," but if it is necessary for him—it is permitted. And all the more so if it is not known clearly that it was finished on Shabbat—it is permitted in any case, and similarly if the main part of the object was finished beforehand and he only repaired and smoothed it on Shabbat—it is also permitted in any case. (Magen Avraham, subsection 13) And know, that all this is when the non-Jew brought it to his house. But to send to take it from the artisan's house—it is forbidden in any case, for one may not take vessels from an artisan's house even on Chol HaMoed, as written in siman 534, and all the more so on Shabbat and Yom Tov, and even through a non-Jew it is forbidden to bring it. (ibid. subsection 14) Our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 4, that all this applies to vessels he made for the Israelite. (Meaning, that the Israelite gave him the material.) But a non-Jew who makes shoes (from his own) for sale—it is permitted for an Israelite who knows him to go and take them from him on Shabbat and wear them, provided that he does not fix with him the purchase price. Thus far his words. And this is in a city where the majority are non-Jews, but if the majority are Jews—it is forbidden, for he is acting for their sake, and it is like one who lit a candle for the sake of an Israelite, where it is forbidden for the Israelite to use its light, as written in siman 276. However, there is one who disagrees entirely with our teacher, the Rema, and holds that to go to his house to take it from him on Shabbat—is forbidden in any case, unless he brought it to the house of the Israelite, (ibid. subsection 15) and so appears to be the primary view.

A person should not go out into the reshuth harabbim with an object in his hand close to darkness, as a decree lest he forget and carry it on Shabbat. And even though if he forgets about the object and carries it—there is no Torah prohibition here, for this is not "thoughtful labor," as from the Torah one is not liable for a chatat unless he forgot that today is Shabbat, or the prohibition was hidden from him, but when the object was hidden from him—he is not liable for a chatat, as I wrote in siman 242. And since in such cases there is no liability for a chatat—there is no need to decree lest he come to this, for we do not decree a decree upon a decree. (As Rava, 11b) Nevertheless—in this case we are concerned lest he forget about the object until it is night and he does not put it away, and at night he will remember the object but forget about the Shabbat. (Tosafot ibid.) But it is permitted to go out on Erev Shabbat with a needle tucked into his garment, for in such cases even if he forgets—he will not be liable for a chatat, as this is not the normal way of carrying as I wrote in siman 301. And even a tailor whose way is to go out thus, and there is a dispute in the Gemara regarding this whether a craftsman in the way of his craft is liable or not—the Rambam ruled in chapter 19 that he is exempt, (even though he ruled like Rabbi Meir against Rabbi Yehuda, see Maggid Mishneh, because the Sugya is like Rabbi Meir) and so the Tur ruled in siman 301. And since there is no Torah prohibition—we do not decree lest he come to this as I wrote. And according to this for us, who hold that nowadays we do not have a reshuth harabbim—this law does not apply for this reason. But with tefillin on his head—it is permitted even in a complete reshuth harabbim to walk close to darkness, and even though there is liability for a chatat with tefillin on his head—because the primary way of walking with tefillin is thus. (The Bach, not like the Beit Yosef, see there) And even though for another reason one is exempt regarding tefillin even when he goes out in them on Shabbat, because they are in the manner of a garment (Shabbat 61a)—nevertheless on Shabbat it is forbidden to go out in them, because when he needs to relieve himself as is the way of people and he removes them from his head—he might come to carry them four amot in the reshuth harabbim. (Rashi ibid.) And nevertheless close to darkness—it is permitted and we are not concerned that he will forget about them, for distraction of mind is forbidden with tefillin. And although it was explained in siman 28 that distraction of mind is only levity, see there—nevertheless it follows automatically, that since levity is forbidden—it follows that he will remember them and remove them from his head before darkness. (But otherwise it would be forbidden, and in this a decree upon a decree does not apply, because this is like a certainty as is the way of people, see Taz subsection 8)

It is stated in the Gemara (12a): "A person is obligated to feel his garments on the eve of Shabbat as it grows dark, lest he forget and go out," and such is the wording of the Rambam at the end of chapter 19; see there. And I wonder at the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 7 who wrote "it is a mitzvah to feel" etc., and changed from "obligation" to "mitzvah." And even for us who do not have a reshut harabim—nevertheless, perhaps there is something muktzeh in them. This is the wording of the Rokeach: "A person must feel in his pocket or in his belt lest a pouch or a knife be hanging on it, or in the belt of the trousers, and a woman in her pocket or in her sleeves or in the cap on her head." Thus far his words. And in the Gemara they concluded that this is a "great halakhah for Shabbat," meaning, a great safeguard for Shabbat.