Siman 153

The sanctity of a beit midrash is greater than the sanctity of a beit knesset, for in a beit midrash they study Torah and in a beit knesset they pray, and Torah is greater than prayer. Therefore, it is permitted to turn a beit knesset into a beit midrash, and it is forbidden to turn a beit midrash into a beit knesset, for one elevates in sanctity and does not downgrade. And this which is permitted to turn a beit knesset into a beit midrash—this is specifically a beit midrash of the public. However, a beit midrash for an individual is forbidden, for it does not possess sanctity like that of the public. There is one who is uncertain regarding this (Magen Avraham, subsection 1), but there is no doubt, for it is certainly forbidden (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 1). And it seems to me there is a proof for this from Megillah (3b), where it says there that the Torah study of an individual is lighter than the Temple service, see there. And all the more so than prayer, which is in place of the Temple service. Furthermore, it seems to me that even though regarding sale it will be explained later that it is forbidden to sell that of large cities, nevertheless, to turn a beit knesset into a beit midrash is permitted even in large cities; for regarding sale the reason is perhaps it is not pleasing to the world, but to elevate to a sanctity greater than its sanctity—everyone is pleased. And even though there too they use the money for a superior sanctity as will be explained, nevertheless, the beit knesset itself at least departs to mundane status, which is not the case here, where the building itself is elevated in its sanctity.

In this siman it will be explained that the residents of the city are permitted to sell a beit knesset or another sacred object to a commoner to use as a dwelling, provided that with the money they perform some sanctity greater than this sanctity. And regarding performing with this a sanctity equal to this sanctity, there is a dispute as will be explained. It will also be explained that they are permitted to give them as a gift, because they certainly received a benefit from this recipient of the gift, for if not so, they would not have given it to him as a gift. And there is a great question in the generalities of this matter: Since the beit knesset is sacred, in what way is its sanctity revoked? For in Nedarim (29a) the Shas asks simply: The sanctity that was in them, where did it go? And one cannot say that this is like the sanctity of the upkeep of the Temple where redemption is effective, and the redemption enters into sanctity and the consecrated object departs to mundane status, and here too the money enters into sanctity and the beit knesset to mundane status—for if so, how are they permitted to give it as a gift? Does a consecrated object become redeemed for prior benefit?

And the early authorities, of blessed memory, were awakened to this inquiry. The Ramban, of blessed memory, answered that a beit knesset and everything similar to it—there is no inherent holiness in it. Rather, they made it like tashmishei mitzvah, such as a sukkah, shofar, lulav, and tzitzit, for as long as the time of their mitzvah lasts—one treats them with respect as a holy matter, and after their mitzvah, their holiness is removed. Therefore, regarding a beit knesset, when they cease from praying in it—its holiness is nullified. And only the sages established safeguards and distinctions within it, whether only the people of the city sold it without the seven leaders of the city, or when they sold them through the seven leaders of the city, as will be explained. And the Ran, of blessed memory, answered that all these holinesses are rabbinic. The rabbis imposed holiness upon it and they stated the details regarding this, and in this case they saw fit to forbid and in that case they saw fit to permit, according to the laws that will be explained (Ran, chapter "Bnei HaIr").

And from the words of the Rambam, another resolution to this appears to me. We have already written in siman 151, section 14, that the Rambam omitted that which was said regarding the batei kenesset of Bavel being built on condition. We explained there that he interprets "on condition" to mean that when they wish, they shall have the power to sell them, see there. According to this, it is possible that the kedushah is from the Torah, according to the plain meaning of the language of the Gemara there (26a), which calls the beit kenneset a sanctified place like the Mikdash. And as they expounded: "And I will be for them a small sanctuary" — these are the batei kenesset and batei midrashot. And this is implied explicitly in the Yerushalmi there, which says: Thus far when he built it for the sake of a beit kenneset; if he built it for the sake of a courtyard and sanctified it, what is the law? See there — behold, it called this "hekdesh." And it is difficult to say that the intention is a mitzvah or according to rabbinic law. And that which it says, the batei kenesset of Bavel are built on condition..., this is its explanation: because there is a distinction between a beit kenneset of villages and of cities, as will be explained, and regarding this it says that in Bavel, even in cities, they are built on condition, because they build it according to the mind of the leader of the city. And as Rav Ashi said (26a): This beit kenneset of Mata Mehasya..., since it is according to my mind... if I wish, I may sell it. And here too, that which stated the law of the batei kenesset of Bavel... (28b), in his days in all of Bavel it was so. And the Rambam wrote this law there in the eleventh chapter of Tefillah, law 19, see there. And he mentioned neither those of Bavel nor those of Mata Mehasya, because those places were only so in their days. But the primary reason for the Rambam is that every beit kenneset is presumably built on this condition, that there shall be the power to sell them and to give them, and it is like hekdesh for a time. And the rabbis made distinctions in this regarding the details of the laws, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And it is all because it is as if they stipulated so. And there is a proof for this from the language of the Rambam there when he distinguishes between villages and cities, as will be explained in section 16.

We have learned in the Mishnah at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Megillah: The residents of a city who sold a beit knesset may purchase with its proceeds a teivah. That is, the heichal in which they place a Sefer Torah. And this is the aron kodesh, whose sanctity is greater than a beit knesset, because the Sefer Torah is placed there. And the same law applies to the shulchan upon the bimah: if the Sefer Torah is placed upon it without the intervention of a cloth, its sanctity is like the sanctity of the aron kodesh. But if they do not place a Sefer Torah upon it without the intervention of a cloth, its sanctity is only like the sanctity of a beit knesset. And so too the bimah itself—its sanctity is only like the sanctity of a beit knesset, as will be explained in siman 154.

If they sold a chest—they may buy with its proceeds a wrap for a sefer Torah, which is holier because the sefer Torah is clothed in it or wrapped in it, and the cloth and the mantle are equal in their holiness. If they sold a wrap—they take with its proceeds sefarim, meaning Chumashim that were written on parchment like a sefer Torah. And so too they take Nevi'im and Ketuvim that are written on parchment, for they are holier than the wraps even though they serve a sefer Torah and a sefer Torah is holier; nevertheless, the essence of holiness is more stringent than an accessory of holiness even if that holiness is greater than it. If they sold sefarim or Nevi'im and Ketuvim—they take with their proceeds a sefer Torah. But the reverse—no. That is to say: if he sold a sefer Torah—it is forbidden to take sefarim and Nevi'im and Ketuvim. If he sold sefarim and Nevi'im and Ketuvim—it is forbidden to take a wrap. If he sold a wrap—it is forbidden to take a chest. If he sold a chest—it is forbidden to take a beit knesset. And Nevi'im are greater than Ketuvim. And some say that they are like one another, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 282, see there. And the holiness of Chumashim is greater than Nevi'im and Ketuvim, as I wrote there. And all this is regarding those written on parchment according to the fitness of a sefer Torah. But the printed ones—their holiness is light, and all of them are equal in their holiness as we explained there in section 22. And nevertheless, it appears to me that their holiness is greater even than wraps, for in them there is at any rate the essence of holiness, and they contain many Names. Therefore, it is forbidden to sell them and take with the money these accessories of holiness that we enumerated, and the reverse is permitted. And a sefer Torah in which a mistake was found—its holiness is only like Chumashim. And even though it is possible to repair it, as long as they have not repaired it—it does not possess the holiness of a sefer Torah (Magen Avraham, subsection 3). And know that even if they bought an object whose holiness is greater than what they sold, and more money remained from the sale, nevertheless it is forbidden to buy even with the remainder an object whose holiness is less than it, because the holiness of the sold item took effect upon all the money (Gemara ibid.).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4: Whether it is permitted to purchase with the funds of one sanctity another sanctity of the same kind – some prohibit and some permit. Thus far his words. And behold, regarding a sefer Torah, there are certainly no differences of opinion, for it is obvious that ab initio it is prohibited to sell it in order to purchase another, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 270. And in the Gemara there, it was a question that was not resolved and is prohibited. And ex post facto, it is obvious that it is permitted to purchase another sefer Torah. For what else should he purchase, since there is no sanctity higher than the sanctity of a sefer Torah? And the dispute is only regarding other items. And some say that all items have the same law as a sefer Torah. And there is no dispute here, for ab initio it is prohibited and ex post facto it is permitted (Bach and Derisha). And there is no proof: for granted that ab initio it is certainly so that it is prohibited to sell, nevertheless, ex post facto it is not comparable to a sefer Torah, for which there is no other sanctity higher than it. But regarding other items, behold he can purchase a sanctity that is higher than it, and regarding this there is a dispute. And so the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, is precise, that it refers to ex post facto, but ab initio everyone agrees that it is prohibited. (And in vain did the Derisha and the Bach take issue with him. And also the difficulty raised by the Taz from Yoreh Deah there is astonishing, for there it is ab initio and here we are dealing with ex post facto. And so wrote the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 7. Also, what the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 4, that ex post facto it is permitted – I do not know from where we have this. And there is a dispute regarding this, and the words of the Beit Yosef are clear. Examine and you will find it simple.)

However, from the wording of the Rambam, chapter eleven, it is clear that even ab initio it is permitted to sell a beit knesset in order to purchase another beit knesset. For he wrote: The people of a village who wished to sell their beit knesset, or to build another beit knesset with its proceeds… see there. Behold, he permits ab initio to sell in order to purchase a comparable sanctity, and so too regarding all things. And only regarding a sefer Torah is there a prohibition ab initio because there is a slight disgrace in conducting trade with a sefer Torah. But regarding all things, it is permitted ab initio to sell in order to purchase another comparable to it. And such is the custom among us to sell sefarim and purchase others, and many have agreed that this is the opinion of the Rambam. (Tosafot Yom Tov ibid., and Eliyah Rabbah ibid. And so wrote the Magen Avraham ibid. And only what he wrote to distinguish regarding a sefer Torah because they cannot divest it of its sanctity, which is more stringent, see there—there is no reason for this, and on the contrary, for this reason it is superior, as is understood. And the primary reason is as I have written, and it appears the world has grasped the opinion of the Rambam as the primary one. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 5: If they collected money to build a beit knesset or a beit midrash, or to buy a teivah or a mantle or a Sefer Torah, and they wished to change them from the purpose for which they collected them—they may only change from a light sanctity to a more stringent one. But if they performed with them the matter for which they collected them—they may change the remainder for whatever they wish. Thus far his words. And in this, money is more lenient than the sanctity of the object itself, for with the sanctity of the object itself, it is forbidden to change even from the remaining money, but where they collected money—it is permitted to change the remainder. And regarding the permission of the remainder, it is explicitly stated in Megillah (27a), and the Rambam and the Tur also wrote according to his wording, see there. And one of the Rishonim already wondered why it is forbidden to change the money, for do we not hold that designation is not a significant act? And even if they built a beit knesset, as long as they have not prayed in it—it is permitted to change it, as will be explained. And all the more so money, which does not even have designation here. (And it is like spun thread for weaving; Beit Yosef in the name of Ramakh.)

And there is one who answered that in truth it is not because holiness takes effect upon the money, but rather due to the reason of a vow. And also regarding the law that will be explained as well, that they are able to change it. However, they must build another beit knesset to fulfill the vow, and here too they are permitted to change this money only if they give other funds (Taz, subsection 2). And it is impossible to say so, for if so, why is it permitted to change them for a holiness more stringent than this, since they vowed for a light one? And there is one who says that for a more stringent one they are certainly pleased (Pri Megadim). And it is not so, for since they vowed for this mitzvah – it is forbidden to change to another even if it is greater than it. And this matter is explicit in the Mishnah in Menachot (107b), that within the same species if one vowed to bring a small one and brought a large one – it is a dispute whether he has fulfilled his obligation, but from another species he has not fulfilled his obligation even with a larger one than this. And so it is explained from the Rambam in the sixteenth chapter of Ma'aseh HaKorbanot, see there.

And there is one who answered: that since the people of the city gave for the sake of this mitzvah—it is forbidden to change them without their knowledge. And only the community is permitted to change them, since they gave with their knowledge (Magen Avraham, subsection 5), and that means the seven leaders of the city in the presence of the people of the city (Machatzit HaShekel). And it must be said according to this that when they change to a more stringent sanctity—it is not called a change. And there is one who answered that collecting money is considered an action and not merely designation (Shach, Yoreh Deah, siman 259), for since they gave the money into the hand of the gabbai—it is like an action. And even though the building of a beit knesset is certainly an action, and nevertheless it is permitted to change—this is because their intention is such, that as long as they do not pray in it, the sanctity does not take effect. This is not the case with money. (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 8, and he answers with this the difficulty of the Magen Avraham there. And also what he questioned from Sanhedrin regarding a corpse, 48b—it is not a difficulty at all, for there it deals with the remainder, see there. And if you examine closely, this is also the answer of the Beit Yosef and the Bach, who wrote that since they came into the hand of the gabbai—it is forbidden to change. And the Taz there wondered at this, see there. And it is not a difficulty at all, for their intention is that through this it is like an action. And the Tosafot wrote this reasoning in Sanhedrin 48a, beginning with the words "Mutar", see there. And here it is superior. Examine and you will find it simple.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, further wrote: That if when they collected the money they stipulated to do as they wished with the surplus of the funds, even if they bought and sold, and then bought a holy object with part of the funds – it is permitted to lower the status of the surplus. But if they did not stipulate when they collected, but rather stipulated when they sold – it is forbidden to lower their status. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: If they bought with all of the money and sold, and then bought with part of the money, even if they stipulated at the time of the sale – it is not effective, for the holiness took effect upon all the money from the first purchase. And only if at the time of the collection they stipulated – it is effective even in such a case. (The Gra and the Eliyah Rabbah raised a difficulty regarding this, for if so, what was the question of Abaye to Rava in Megillah ibid.: The reason is that they stipulated, but if they did not stipulate – no? Let him say that it deals with such a case, see there. And I do not understand: for the Baraita refers to the Mishnah of "and so with their surpluses" and the Mishnah, behold, does not deal with such a case, see there. And examine closely and you will find it simple.)

And know that regarding that which was explained concerning money that was collected, that they may do with the surplus whatever they wish, some say that it is permitted even for a mundane matter (Magen Avraham, subsection 6), and only for that which is for the needs of the community (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 9). And there is one who wrote that it is permitted only for a lesser sanctity, and not for a mundane matter (Taz, ibid.). And the primary view is like the first opinion, for if not so, what is the meaning of the phrasing "for whatever they wish"? (And the Eliyah Rabbah answered the difficulty of the Taz, see there. And so it is necessitated by the wording of the Shas, see there. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: And if they purchased wood and stones with these funds that they collected—the sanctity of the funds takes effect upon the wood and the stones, and it is forbidden to change them except for a more stringent sanctity. And if they brought wood and stones for the purpose of the building of the beit knesset, if they came into the hand of the gabbai—it is forbidden to change them except for a more stringent sanctity. And before they came into the hand of the gabbai—it is permitted to change them, but nevertheless they cannot retract. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: For even though one who volunteers wood and stones before they come into the hand of the gabbai is permitted to change them, as is explained in Yoreh Deah siman 259, nevertheless if they came through the collection of money that came into the hand of the gabbai as I have written, and they purchased the wood and the stones with this money—they have the law of the money even before they come into the hand of the gabbai. And afterwards he says that if they brought wood and stones as a donation for the building of the beit knesset, if they came into the hand of the gabbai—it is forbidden to change them except for a more stringent sanctity, and only the seven representatives of the city are permitted to change them as will be explained. And before they came into the hand of the gabbai—it is permitted to change them, meaning: to borrow them and give others in their place (Magen Avraham subsection 8). And this is what he wrote "but nevertheless he cannot retract," meaning: on account of his donation which is like a vow. (See Taz subsection 3, and he follows his reasoning. And according to what I have written it works out well.)

And since it has been explained that these items are sold for the sake of a sanctity more stringent than them, all the more so we sell them in order to study Torah and for the support of students (Levush). And even a sefer Torah, for what benefit will there be in them and in a sefer Torah if they do not study? And the excellence of the learner is greater than the excellence of the Torah itself (ibid.), and the entire world was only created for the sake of the study of Torah. And so too, we sell a sefer Torah to marry off orphans with its proceeds, and this has already been mentioned at the beginning of Even HaEzer. And some say there specifically male orphans and not female orphans, because women were not commanded regarding the mitzvah of procreation (Chelkat Mechokek ibid., and see there in Beit Shmuel). And it is not so, for on the contrary, we find in Ketubot (67a) that a female orphan takes precedence over a male orphan regarding marriage. And so wrote the Levush here, for behold, regarding "He created it to be inhabited," everyone was commanded. And the shame of the female orphan is greater than the shame of the male orphan, and thus we hold. (And so wrote the Magen Avraham and the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 12. And so he wrote in the Responsa of Rabbi M. Alashkar.)

It is stated in Megillah there (26a) that this matter of a beit knesset being sold—this is specifically regarding those of villages. However, a beit knesset of cities, since people come to it from the world at large—they cannot sell it, for it belongs to the public such that everyone is its owner, and the townspeople are not the sole owners of them (Rashi). And behold, according to the method of the Ramban and the Ran which we brought in section 3, that there is no sanctity in a beit knesset other than being a designation for a mitzvah or a rabbinic sanctity—it is not understood what the sages saw to divide between those of villages and those of cities. And it would be necessary to press the matter. But according to what we explained in section 4 regarding the method of the Rambam, that the sanctity is from the Torah, and the fact that it is permitted to sell is because from the outset the townspeople build on this condition; and even though they did not explicitly stipulate, it is as if they stipulated, for the townspeople always have it in mind that perhaps they will need to sell it. And according to this, the distinction between villages and cities fits well with good reason: for in cities it does not depend on them alone, and what benefit is their stipulation? And the public of the world certainly do not have this stipulation in mind, for what have they to do with the needs of the city? And so the wording of the Rambam is precise in this law in chapter eleven, law 16, and this is his wording: To what do these matters apply? ...Of villages, which they only made based on their own intent alone... but those of cities, since [it is not] based on their intent alone... it becomes the property of all Israel. And they may never sell it. Thus far his words. That is to say: what benefit is the stipulation of the townspeople, given that they are not all of its owners? And it is not relevant that all Israel would intend for this stipulation.

And know that there is no distinction regarding with which funds it was built. For in villages, even if it was built from donations of the world—they are permitted to sell it, for the donations were given according to their discretion. And in cities, even if they built it from the funds of the city—they cannot sell it, for since it was built in a city, every beit kenesset is built with the intent that people from the whole world will come to pray in it—thus all of Israel has a portion in this. However, even in a city, if individuals built a beit kenesset for themselves—they can sell it just as in a village (Taz, subsection 6). And this is explicit in the Gemara there (Megillah 26a), regarding the beit kenesset of the Tarsians that was in Jerusalem and they sold it, see there. For since it is designated only for craftsmen, or for a minority of the public—it belongs to them alone. And specifically a beit kenesset of the entire city in a city is not sold, but in a village even in such a case it is sold.

And it has already been explained that the money from a sold beit knesset remains in its sanctity. It is forbidden to change its use except for a more stringent sanctity, and they are not permitted to lower it from its sanctity. However, this is specifically when the townspeople sold it without the knowledge of the seven leaders of the city, or if the leaders of the city sold it without the presence of the townspeople. But if the seven leaders of the city sold it in the presence of the townspeople—they are permitted to spend the money for whatever they desire, even for a mundane matter, for the money departs entirely to a non-sacred status. And according to the Ramban and the Ran, the reason must be said: that thus the sages ordained. And according to the Rambam, the reason appears to be because from the outset this was the intent of the townspeople, that if the sale would be by the seven leaders of the city in the presence of the entire city—it would depart entirely to a non-sacred status, and it is as if they consecrated it on this condition. And that which we wrote that it requires "in the presence of the entire city"—is not literal. Rather, it must be with the agreement of the entire city. Therefore, if the seven leaders of the city sold it publicly—it is called "in the presence of the townspeople" even if they said nothing, provided only that they did not protest against them. Therefore, if some of the townspeople protested against them—the money does not depart to a non-sacred status. And so too, if the townspeople accepted upon themselves at the time of the sale that whatever a certain individual does with the money he has the authority to do, what he has done—is done. And he can spend it for mundane matters, and it is like the seven leaders of the city in the presence of the townspeople.

And also regarding those of large cities, which we said that it is forbidden to sell even if they built it from their own funds, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7: But those of large cities... – it is not sold unless they made it dependent upon the discretion of an individual, for then the individual may do with it whatever he wishes with the consent of the community. And the same law applies to all sacred objects mentioned here, for they all follow after the beit knesset. Thus far his words. Meaning: that at the time of the building they made it dependent upon the discretion of an individual, for then he can do whatever he wishes. And behold, there is no novelty at all in this, for it is obvious that a condition from the beginning is effective, and what is this teaching us? And why is it necessary to say that they made it dependent upon the discretion of an individual, for surely with an explicit condition it is effective even without this? Furthermore: if it was explicitly made dependent upon the discretion of an individual, why is the consent of the community necessary? However, the matter is as follows: that there was no explicit condition, but rather that they made the entire building dependent upon the discretion of an individual, that he should build according to his discretion and he would be the one occupied with the expenses of the building. For in this case, it is as if they gave him permission to do with it afterwards whatever he wishes, even to sell it and use the funds for a mundane matter (and so it is implied in the Taz, subsection 7). And therefore the consent of the community is required for this, for the end of the law is like the beginning of the law, that just as in the beginning there was the consent of the community upon him – so too whatever he does with it afterwards requires the consent of the community.

There is one who says that this is specifically when they built it from their own funds, for then it is like a condition. However, if they built it from the money of others who are not from that city, what does their intention alone avail? Perhaps the others are not pleased with this (Magen Avraham, subsection 12). And it is a correct reasoning, but if so, why did they not clarify this? Furthermore, the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote, "Even if they built it from their own, it is not sold unless they made it dependent on the opinion of an individual..." implies that all the more so with the funds of others it is not sold, and it is upon this that the ruling of making it dependent on the opinion of an individual stands. Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that even if they built it from the funds of others, if at the time of the collection of the donations they said that they made the entire building dependent on a certain person—everyone gave with that understanding. But if they did not say so—it is forbidden to sell it even if only a portion of the money was from others, according to the law of a large city (and perhaps even the Magen Avraham would concede to this).

And so too regarding all matters of sanctity that have been explained, the law for all of them is thus, that there is a distinction between villages and large cities. And in villages, when the seven representatives of the city sell with the agreement of the city—it is permitted to use the proceeds. And so too regarding all vessels of the beit din, benches, and curtains (Magen Avraham, subsection 15). And curtains that are spread over the ark are like the ark itself (ibid.). However, not all sanctities are equal regarding themselves, for a beit knesset itself may be sold even for mundane use. And so too all tashmishei mitzvah when they are sold—it is permitted to use them for mundane matters as will be explained. But tashmishei kedushah, such as the ark and the parokhet and the like—they remain in their sanctity even when they sell them, and they are sold only so that the buyer will use them for sanctity, similar to a sefer Torah. And it will be explained in siman 154 (ibid., subsection 14).

It is a simple matter that this which we permitted, the sale of a beit knesset in villages—this is when they have another beit knesset in which to pray. For if not so, even to demolish it in order to build another is forbidden until they build another first, as I wrote in siman 152. Unless they want to sell it to buy another beit knesset with the proceeds, and in a manner where there is no concern for negligence, then it is permitted. And in cities, in all manners it is forbidden (ibid. subsection 17). And there is one who wishes to say that this which was permitted in villages to sell when they have another beit knesset, the intention is that they have now built another. But if they did not build it now, even if they have two batei knesset—it is forbidden to sell one, for even to demolish one is forbidden as I wrote in siman 152, and all the more so to sell (ibid. subsection 16). And these are wondering words, and the entire sugya of Megillah and in all the Rishonim it does not imply so. And that which to demolish is forbidden—certainly it is so, for when they required its sale they permitted it. But when they only want to demolish it and build another, they were concerned lest they not build. And what is the connection of this to that? (And conversely, what he wrote in subsection 17 that to buy another more stringent sanctity it is permitted even when they do not have another beit knesset—is also wondering. And the Eliyah Rabbah already disagreed with him on this in subsection 18, see there. And so it implies in Yoreh Deah at the beginning of siman 252. And also what the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 33 requires investigation. And what the Shach and Taz wrote there—this is specifically regarding the redemption of captives as the Shach wrote there, or where they collected for the purpose of a beit knesset as the Taz wrote there. But to sell a beit knesset for the sake of a more stringent sanctity, when they do not have another beit knesset—certainly we have not heard of this. Examine and you will find it light.)

And regarding [synagogues] of large cities, certainly even if they built another—it is forbidden to sell the first, because the matter does not depend on them alone. However, regarding the law of demolition that was explained in siman 152—there is no difference between villages and large cities, since they desire to build another in its place. If so, what does it matter to those who are far away? But the wood, the stones, and the ground remain in their sanctity, and it is forbidden to use them and also to sell them, for perhaps there is one at the end of the world who is not pleased that their sanctity should be revoked (Magen Avraham, subsection 16). And there is one who permits (ibid. in the name of Mas'at Binyamin). And one should be stringent. (The Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 18, decided like the Mas'at Binyamin to permit, and disagrees with the Magen Avraham, see there.)

There is one who wrote that it is not called a "kerach" unless it is a city where merchants constantly gather for trade, or they gather there constantly due to another reason, such as provincial capitals and the like. However, that which many pass through there without permanent residence in the city is not called a "kerach," for what do the passersby have to do with the synagogue of this city? And anything that is clear to us was not built with the intent of the whole world is called a "kefar" regarding this matter, and they may sell it (Magen Avraham, subsection 17, in the name of Mas'at Binyamin). And so it appears from the perspective of logic. According to this, there are few synagogues now in this time that are judged as a kerach regarding this matter. An individual who built a synagogue and handed it over to the public—its law is like all synagogues in the city, such that the individual has no say in its sale. But if he reserved for himself any power in it—it has no sale except by the word of both of them, which is to say: by the opinion of the public, and by his opinion or the opinion of his heirs when he dies. And if before his death he gave all his power to the public—they do not need the opinion of his heirs. And see in section 39.

Any sacred matter that is sold and may be changed to a different use—it is sold without proclamations, even regarding lands which require proclamation. And there is no ona'ah in it, even regarding movable objects where there is ona'ah in every other place (Taz, subsection 8). And the reason for the matter: for the primary reason for proclamations is lest they be defrauded, and behold, they are permitted to give them even as a gift (ibid.). Furthermore: for proclamations are only relevant if we are collecting for others, and not when we are selling something of our own (Magen Avraham, subsection 18 in the name of the Ran, see there). And the reason that there is no ona'ah in this regarding movable objects, it must be said that it is because it is like a homeowner selling his vessels, in which there is no ona'ah, as is explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 227. But a matter that is forbidden to be changed, and consequently they do not have the ability to give it as a gift—it requires proclamation, for anything without proclamation is like a disparagement of the sale (ibid., subsection 20). And consequently, there is ona'ah for this in movable objects as in all movable objects, for in land there is no ona'ah in any place, as there is no ona'ah for lands. And some say that in movable objects there is ona'ah even in a matter that they are permitted to change, unless they knew from the outset that it was worth more or less. But a matter that is forbidden to be changed, there is ona'ah even in lands, for their law is like that of an agent, where in any amount [of fraud] his sale is void even in land, as is explained in Choshen Mishpat there (ibid. and Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 19).

It is a known matter that regarding all articles of holiness and articles of a mitzvah, we hold that "designation is of no consequence" until one designates it verbally and performs an action. Therefore, if they built a beit knesset, as long as they have not prayed in it—the holiness of a beit knesset is not upon it. And even if they built it as a mere house, if they subsequently consecrated it as a beit knesset—the law of a beit knesset applies to it, yet it is not holy until they pray in it. However, if they prayed in it, even individuals, even guests temporarily, since they prayed in it and it was set aside for prayer—it is holy. And if they consecrated it temporarily—everything is according to what they said, for a condition is effective in everything. Regarding the matter of the money, if they built it from money that was donated for a beit knesset—it is forbidden to change its use, as has been explained (Magen Avraham, subsection 21). However, an individual who volunteered and built a beit knesset from his own funds and on his own land or that of others, although it is not holy until they pray in it, nevertheless he cannot retract it, for it is like a vow, as will be explained in section 36 (ibid.).

The people of the village, when they sell a beit knesset as will be explained—they may sell it as a permanent sale. And the one who purchases it may do with it whatever he desires, except for four things he is forbidden from doing with it, and they are: a bathhouse, a tannery, a ritual bathhouse, and a latrine. And if seven of the city's elders sold it in the presence of the people of the city—the purchaser may do even these four things, for in such a case the sanctity is completely removed, both from the beit knesset and from the money, and the seller may do with the money whatever he desires. And so it is with all matters of sanctity that have been explained, except for a Sefer Torah and books, which perforce remain in their sanctity (Levush). However, with the money, the seller may also in these cases do whatever he desires (ibid.), since they were sold by seven of the city's elders in the presence of...

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 10: There are those who say that an individual regarding his own—even a sefer Torah—it is permitted to sell it and to do with its proceeds whatever he desires, as long as he did not consecrate it for public reading. And there is one who forbids, unless it is to study Torah or to marry a woman. Thus far his words. The first opinion is the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur, and they hold that that which our sages, of blessed memory, said, "one may not sell a sefer Torah except to study Torah or to marry a woman," and likewise the entire sugya in Megillah—this is all regarding that of the community or an individual who turned it over to the community. But any individual regarding his own, when he makes even the greatest sanctity like a sefer Torah, from the beginning his intention is for this: that when he needs to, he may sell it and use the money. And likewise when he built a beit knesset or a beit midrash only for himself—he can always sell them or change them, because from the outset he made them with this intention. And it is not similar to what I wrote at the end of section 26, that in any event it is a vow—that is when they have not yet prayed in it at all, or have not studied in it at all. But here, behold, they have prayed and studied and he has fulfilled his vow—he may certainly do with it as he wishes as long as he did not turn it over to the public. And the "one who forbids" is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter ten of Sefer Torah, who wrote: One may not sell a sefer Torah...—and he did not distinguish between an individual and the public. And I wonder about this: for behold, even the Rosh and the Tur wrote thus in the laws of a sefer Torah in Yoreh Deah siman 270, see there. And despite all this, they distinguished here between an individual and the public, and what proof is there that the Rambam disagrees with this? And in my humble opinion, it would seem to say that regarding "sefer Torah," it deals with the one sefer Torah that is an obligation upon every man as explained there, and therefore even an individual is forbidden to sell it. This is not the case here, where it deals with another sefer Torah, where the prohibition is due to its sanctity—in this we distinguish between an individual who made it for himself and one who turned it over to the community, and there is no dispute here at all. And it requires further study. However, for the halachah, it appears that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, also held like the first opinion, and so wrote one of the great authorities. (Eliyah Rabbah subsection 22, and so wrote the Rema in Darkhei Moshe, that the custom is like those who permit, see there.)

And there is one who raised a difficulty against this law from what was written in Choshen Mishpat, siman 248, regarding one who said, "My property is to so-and-so," whether a sefer Torah is included in "property" since it is forbidden to sell it? And this is a Gemara in Bava Batra (150a). And it deals with an individual, for if he consecrated it to the public, he certainly cannot sell it. And he was forced to say that it deals with one who gave it to the public so that they may read from it, but did not hand it over to them completely, for in such a case he is also not permitted to sell it. And he wondered at the custom of the world, who are accustomed to sell even in such a case (Magen Avraham, subsection 22). And according to what I have written, it is not a difficulty at all: for there it deals with an individual's sefer Torah that he is obligated to write, and therefore it is forbidden to sell it. And the world, which practiced permissiveness in this, did so because they hold like the opinion of the Rosh in Yoreh Deah there, that nowadays the mitzvah is with books and not with a sefer Torah, see there. And in Yoreh Deah there we explained further regarding this, see there. However, it is certainly true that one who sells it does not see a sign of blessing in the money, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah there. (And know that according to what I wrote there in Yoreh Deah, that the prohibition of the sale is only because of the disgrace to the sefer Torah that it should be sold like other objects, and therefore even when he has several sifrei Torah one should not sell it as I wrote there—this is not a matter at all for the laws in this siman. And if so, there is no proof from the Rambam at all. Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

Just as it is permitted to sell a synagogue of villages, so too they permitted giving it as a gift. And the recipient of the gift may do with it whatever he desires, just as with a sale. And the reason is that if they did not have some benefit from him regarding the matters of the synagogue, they would not have given it to him as a gift. Therefore, the gift is considered like a sale, and this requires the seven tvei ha'ir in the presence of the people of the city. And in large cities it is forbidden (Magen Avraham, subsection 26), and the reason was explained in section 3 and section 4. And to give it as a gift to a distant city where they certainly would not have benefit from them—it is certainly forbidden (ibid. subsection 27). And so too wood and bricks from an old synagogue that they demolished with permission, as was explained in siman 152—it is also permitted to sell them and give them as a gift like the synagogue itself.

And just as they are permitted in sale and gift, so too they are permitted to exchange the beit knesset or the wood and the stones for another, so that the other shall take the place of the first in the sanctity of a beit knesset, and likewise the wood and the stones, and this beit knesset shall depart to secular status, and likewise the wood and the stones. For what is the difference to me between sale and what is the difference to me between exchange? And even though they permitted all these matters, nevertheless they did not permit to lend them or to rent them or to use them as collateral, to perform secular matters with them. And the reason is that they only permitted such that another thing should take on their sanctity, like the money of the sale or the exchange. But in lending and renting and collateral—nothing else takes on their sanctity, for they themselves remain in their sanctity after the conclusion of the time of the loan and the rental and the collateral. If so, it would depart to secular status without anything, and this is forbidden. And that which they permitted a gift is because of the prior benefit, which is like an exchange, and it is forbidden even with the seven leaders of the city and in the presence of the people of the city. And even though in such a case the money also departs to secular status as I wrote in section 18, nevertheless at the time of the sale it is caught in its sanctity. But afterwards the seven leaders of the city in the presence of the city have the power to bring it out to secular status, which is not the case here (ibid. subsection 28). And even if we say that here too the rental fees shall ascend in their sanctity, nevertheless it is forbidden since they themselves remain in their sanctity—it is impossible for another to take its place. (And with this the wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 11 is understood, where they wrote that they still remain in their sanctity, for there is no other thing here upon which it may take effect... Thus far their words. And they are like two contradictory things, but according to our words it fits well. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

And know that all that has been explained—that the permission of sale does not apply to large cities—this is all when they sell it to remove it to secular status, for since they are removing its sanctity, it follows that another thing is needed upon which this sanctity and the agreement of all shall devolve. Therefore, in large cities it is forbidden, as has been explained. However, they may sell a beit knesset to others provided that the beit knesset remains in its sanctity. And they do not need any other thing at all for its sanctity to devolve upon it (Magen Avraham subsection 27, and not like the Bach). And this matter is permitted even in large cities, only that according to the opinion of the Tosafot (beginning of the fourth chapter, starting with the words "Ogora") from many to an individual is forbidden, see there. And the reason must be stated: that it was lowered from its honor. But most of the poskim disagree on this, and they hold that even from many to an individual is permitted, as long as they do not remove its sanctity. And this is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, at the end of section 11, who wrote: And specifically in a manner that lowers them from their sanctity. But it is permitted to lend even a sefer Torah to read from it, even from that of many to an individual. Thus far his words. And all the more so a beit knesset and a beit midrash and other sacred objects, that one may lend them and rent them and pawn them, and likewise sell them so that they remain with the buyer in their sanctity. And even in large cities, and an individual who donated a sacred object, if he handed it over to the community, it belongs to the community. And if not, or if the custom is that for the time being the community uses it, and when he wishes he takes it and sells it—we follow the custom. And this matter was explained in Yoreh Deah siman 259. And see below, siman 154.

One of the great authorities wrote (Magen Avraham there in the name of Masat Binyamin): If they built a new beit knesset and demolished the old one by the decision of the seven leaders of the city in the presence of... – the sanctity is removed from the old one and takes effect upon the new one. And they are permitted to do with the old one whatever they wish, for it is no worse than a gift. But without this, even the seven leaders of the city in the presence of... do not have the power to use it for a mundane matter, for there is no other object here for its sanctity to take effect upon. And so it is implied in the Tosefta... Thus far his words. And that which was explained in Yoreh Deah siman 259, that the seven leaders of the city have the power over a menorah of a beit knesset... to change it to a voluntary matter, nevertheless, it is not comparable to a beit knesset, which is essentially made for the purpose of saying matters of sanctity – it is impossible for its sanctity to be removed for nothing (Magen Avraham). But in the Responsa of the Rosh (Klal 5), he wrote that the seven leaders of the city have the power to turn a beit knesset into a dwelling house, just as with a menorah. And it requires investigation: for how can its sanctity be removed for naught? And one must say that the intention of the Rosh is when they built another in its place, such that the sanctity took effect upon it (ibid.). And this resolution is very astonishing: for it is explicitly explained in the Responsa of the Rosh that they built upper rooms for the beit midrash, and afterward they decided that they would study in the beit knesset there, and they rented the upper rooms for dwellings, see there. And the Rosh responded that the seven leaders of the city... can change it to a voluntary matter, and there is no exchange here for the sanctity to take effect upon another thing. And besides this, it is very astonishing: for the Rosh brought proof from the fact that the seven leaders of the city can sell it even for a voluntary matter, yet it is explicit in the Gemara there that to rent it is forbidden, as the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote. And the Rosh himself in Megillah there brought this, and wrote the reason: that there is nothing upon which the sanctity can take effect. Therefore, it appears to my humble opinion that one does not learn from this Responsa, and it requires great investigation. (And the main point for the halacha is that it is forbidden. And also regarding what the Magen Avraham wrote in the name of the Nimukei Yosef, we do not rule according to the Nimukei Yosef, as the Machatzit HaShekel wrote. And I am surprised at the Machatzit HaShekel and the Pri Megadim and the Eliyah Rabbah, that they did not comment on this.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 12: One who has a condition with the community that no one may build a beit knesset except for him and his descendants—he cannot sell his right to another. Thus far his words. And they wrote that this is specifically when they honored him with this. However, if he purchased this right—he purchased it for every right like all acquisitions (Taz subsection 11, and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 24). But this is not implied in the source of the law in the Mordechai, chapter "HaChovel," where the case was that they inherited this right and the heirs sought to sell this right, and he ruled that they do not have the power to do so, see there. And if it should enter your mind that they honored their father with this, what kind of inheritance is it? And the truth is that even when he purchased this right, nevertheless, we are witnesses that they granted it to him on this condition, that he should not sell to another without their permission, for perhaps he will sell to one who is not fit. (And the Taz himself wrote: And nevertheless it is clear that he shall not sell except to one who is as fit as he is, for with this intent they granted him this right. Thus far his words. And if so, why was he compelled to say that they honored him with this? And the intention of the Beit Yosef is also thus, that he cannot sell without their will.)

The Rambam wrote in the eighth chapter of Matnot Aniyim, halacha 11: If they collected money for the building of a beit din, and a matter of a mitzvah came before them—they may spend the money on it. If they bought stones and beams—they may not sell them for a matter of a mitzvah except for the redemption of captives. Even if they brought the stones and dragged them, and the beams and hewed them, and prepared everything for the building of the beit knesset—they sell everything for the redemption of captives alone. But if they built and finished—they may not sell the beit knesset, but rather they shall collect from the community for the redemption. Thus far his words, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, transcribed it in this siman, section 13. And this law has already been explained in Yoreh Deah siman 252, see there. And in truth, its place is there in the laws of tzedakah, for it is not a matter of the sanctity of the beit knesset which is in this siman, since it was explained above that when they have collected money for the building of a beit knesset—it is forbidden to change its use. Rather, the reason here is because the redemption of captives is greater than all the mitzvot, and therefore by authority of the seven leaders of the city in the presence of the people of the city, they can change its use for the redemption of captives. And so it is in Yoreh Deah there. And this is explained in the Gemara at the beginning of Bava Batra. And in the Gemara it is only explained that they should give the money for the redemption of captives, and as for the Rambam who wrote that they are permitted to spend the money for another mitzvah as well—it must be said that such was his version of the text in the Gemara. And it also must be said that his intention is to borrow this money for this mitzvah, and afterwards others will pay in their place for the building of the beit knesset, as I wrote in section 10. However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work on Yoreh Deah there, wrote that even for another mitzvah they are permitted to change its use with the agreement of the seven leaders of the city... and it must be said that this is by means of the seven leaders of the city, whereas above it deals with a case without the seven leaders of the city, as I wrote in section 11. And that which they wrote that if they built and finished they shall not sell—it is not that there is a prohibition in this, but rather that it is not the way for a person to sell his dwelling. Therefore, even before they have prayed there, they should not sell. (Magen Avraham subsection 31 and subsection 33. And what he wrote in subsection 32 that in the Rambam the version of the text is "if they built they shall finish," see there—before us the version in the Rambam is like in the Shulchan Aruch. However, regarding the law it is certainly so, that even if the building is not yet finished they shall not sell, for the reason that it is no less than a person's dwelling as is explained in the Gemara. Examine and you will find it simple.) (And according to the Magen Avraham, the forced interpretation of the Taz at the end of subsection 13 is not necessary.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 14: Reuven who said, "This land I am giving to build a beit knesset upon it," and the idolaters did not want to allow them to build a beit knesset, and the community says to build a house for Talmud Torah upon it, and Reuven says, "With this in mind I did not vow" – Reuven is not able to retract. And if Reuven did not dwell there – they would be able to change it, and if he is of the residents of that city – they are not permitted to change it if he stands and protests. Unless there is a chever ir there, for everything that comes is on his mind. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: That if Reuven wants to retract entirely from what he consecrated for a beit knesset on the grounds that "with this in mind I did not vow" – he cannot, since he did not say at the time he consecrated the land "on the condition that they allow its building immediately." And even though he said to build a beit knesset upon it, it is possible that in the course of time they will allow it. But regarding the matter of changing it to Talmud Torah, if Reuven does not dwell there – behold, he gave according to the mind of the people of the city, and it is obvious that they are permitted to change it to a more stringent sanctity. But if he is of the people of the city – we are witnesses that his intention was that even without his knowledge they should not change it. And therefore when he stands and protests – one should not change it even to a more stringent sanctity. However, when there is a chever ir, we are witnesses that at the time he consecrated – he consecrated entirely according to the mind of the chever ir. And now he wants to retract, and he cannot.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that the seven leaders of the city have the status of a chaver ir. Thus far his words. And I wonder: it is understandable regarding a chaver ir, for everyone gives based on his opinion alone. But the seven leaders of the city require the agreement of the people of the city, as has been explained, and is he not one of the people of the city and may protest? (The Eliyah Rabbah also raised a difficulty similar to this, see there. And he ruled not like the Rema in subsection 28.) And conversely, there is one who raised a difficulty (Magen Avraham subsection 36) that in Yoreh Deah siman 259 it was explained that charities that were donated for the needs of a synagogue may be changed for the needs of a beit midrash, even if the owners object, see there. And here they ruled that the owners may object. (And what the Magen Avraham wrote, that in Yoreh Deah it is dealing with a case where the owners are not from the people of the city, see there and the difficulty is evident. And also the words of the Levush here are astonishing, see there. And in Eliyah Rabbah subsection 27 he wondered about him as well.)

It seems clear to me that the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, are correct. And the matter is as follows: for it has already been explained that to elevate to a more stringent holiness—one does not need the seven representatives of the city, and only for a lighter holiness or for mundane matters does one need the seven representatives of the city. And any person, when he consecrates an eternal thing such as money or land, certainly does not nullify his intention against all the people of the city, against each and every individual. But against a communal leader or against the seven representatives of the city, and the agreement of the entire city—he certainly nullifies his intention as a matter of course, unless he specified at the time of the consecration that he does not nullify his intention against them. And according to this, everything settles well: for previously they wrote that without his knowledge it is forbidden to change even to a more stringent holiness. But when there is a communal leader or the seven representatives of the city with the agreement of the entire city—certainly his intention was originally such that against the seven representatives of the city with the agreement of the entire city his intention would be nullified, and he is like one of the rest of the people of the city who does not agree with the seven representatives of the city. And "the entire city" is not literal, for the intention is the majority of the city. And even if he says now that such was his intention—he is not believed. And in Yoreh Deah it deals with the authority of the seven representatives of the city, and he did not see fit to elaborate there because the primary laws are here. And in Yoreh Deah there, section 7, we wrote another way regarding this, such as where he is not from this beit knesset to which he donated. (And with this one can uphold the words of the Magen Avraham that we cited. However, it seems more likely as I wrote, that it deals with the authority of the seven representatives of the city. Examine closely and you will find it simple.)

It is a simple matter that in large cities the seven representatives of the city are not effective, for how can they be effective for another city? Since the reason for the prohibition regarding large cities is because the whole world has a portion in it, as has been explained, if so, what will the seven representatives of this city achieve? Furthermore: for the seven representatives of the city require the agreement of the people of the city, and there is no agreement here from all the cities. Nevertheless, the great authorities wrote that nowadays the seven representatives of the city can sell even in large cities just as in villages (Magen Avraham subsection 37 in the name of M.B., and Beit Yosef in the name of Mordekhai Yashan, see there). And this is when they built it from their own funds (ibid.). And so one of the great authorities performed an actual deed to sell the land of a beit knesset when they saw that it was impossible to build there because of oppressors. And they sold it through the seven representatives of the city, even though it was in a large city and was built by others, because certainly it is pleasing to all of Israel in this matter (ibid. in the name of Maharam Lublin regarding the beit knesset of the Lukow community). And this matter must be understood according to the period and the time, and it is impossible to explain everything in writing. Furthermore: for above in section 24 we explained that the law of a "large city" mentioned in the Gemara is rare in this time, see there.

In siman 224 in Yoreh Deah it was explained: Since a partner can forbid his portion to his fellow, therefore in a beit knesset where all are partners—one can forbid his portion to another. And this is according to the law. However, the enactment of the early authorities was that a person cannot forbid his portion of the beit knesset nor of the books. And if he did forbid it, it is nothing, for the abandonment of property by a beit din is abandonment. And they enacted thus because of dispute: for this time this one will be angry with that one and forbid it to him, and tomorrow the second will do likewise, and there is no end to the matter. And a charity pouch where one forbade what is inside it to another—his prohibition is nothing according to the law, for since he gave to the charity pouch—it is not like his own. And similarly, he cannot forbid ma'aser money, for it is not like his own as is explained in Nedarim (83b), see there carefully (Magen Avraham subsection 38).

In Yoreh Deah siman 221, it has been explained that one who lends a house to his fellow—he cannot prohibit it to him during the entire duration of the loan. But the borrower can prohibit it, for during the entire duration of the loan it is considered as belonging to the borrower, see there. Therefore, one who lent his house for a beit knesset, if he lent it for a set time—he cannot, within that time, prohibit it to all of them nor to one of them. And if he did not set a time but rather lent it indefinitely, or if the time passed—he can prohibit it to all of them. But to one of them or some of them he cannot prohibit it, for since he consents for the majority that it should be on loan, if so, it is not like his own such that it would be within his power to prohibit it to individuals. However, if he stipulated from the beginning that at any time he wishes to protest and whatever he wishes he may protest, or if he did not lend it to them explicitly but rather allowed them to enter his house—the authority is in his hand to protest as he wishes. But conversely, if he lent his house for a beit knesset and they were in it for a long time, and afterwards the public wants to change it to another place—they are not permitted to do so. As we say in Gittin (60a): We place the eruv in the old house for the sake of the ways of peace, so that people do not say the members of that house are suspect and therefore they turned away from them. And even if there is some reason why they wish to turn away from there, it is not proper to do so (Magen Avraham subsection 40). Unless they built a permanent beit knesset, for then everyone sees the reason. And so too anything similar to this. (And regarding what the Magen Avraham wrote that he can say "it is not my will to go far away," see there—I do not understand. For what does this matter to them, and will he force them through this? Rather, the main reason is because of suspicion as I have written.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 18: There is one who says that holy vessels of silver that they were accustomed to bring always to the beit knesset on the festivals – the (owners) cannot remove them for mundane use or sell them. And the community can seize them so that they remain in the possession of the sanctuary after the death of the donor. Thus far his words. And now the common custom is that they remain in the possession of the owners, and if so, even without explicit statement it is as if they stipulated regarding them (Magen Avraham, subsection 43). And the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, are puzzling, for afterwards in section 20 he wrote the opposite, and this is his wording: There is one who says that a sefer Torah that was established as having belonged to the ancestors of Reuven – the community cannot seize it. Thus far his words. And now the matter is a kal vachomer: for if a sefer Torah which has much holiness and stands always in the beit knesset, nevertheless if it was only established as having belonged to his ancestors they cannot seize it – kal vachomer regarding silver vessels that are always in his house and only on the festivals are brought to the beit knesset, that the community cannot seize them. (And the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 32, addressed this and answered with difficulty, see there.)

And behold, these two laws are from the Maharik (siman 70 and siman 161). And I have looked there and there is no contradiction here, for regarding the silver vessels it is dealing with a case where the community claimed that their ancestors gave them absolutely to the beit knesset, and regarding the sefer Torah it is dealing with the opposite: where it was established that it belonged to his ancestors, for he never handed it over to the beit knesset. And he wrote that the possession they held is not a legal chazakah, for behold, he gave it to be read from and not so that it should be theirs. And witnesses are of no use because they are all interested parties, see there. And so it must be said regarding the intention of the Shulchan Aruch. And therefore, regarding what the Acharonim cited (Taz subsection 15 and see Taz) that the Maharshal in a responsum (siman 16) disagrees regarding the law of the sefer Torah, for he ruled that not only are the heirs not believed but even he himself would not have been believed to say "I did not hand it over to the community," see there—there is no dispute here. For certainly, in an ordinary case, he must clarify that he did not hand it over absolutely to the community, and the Maharik is dealing with a case where it is known that he did not hand it over absolutely. And so one should rule, that if it is known that he did not hand it over to the community—the community has no chazakah. And when it is not known—he must bring proof, and if he did not bring it—he has lost.

He further wrote in section 19: There is one who says that if there was found after a person's death a document stating that he consecrated vessels, and there are no witnesses on it and he did not deliver it to the kahal – even so, it is hekdesh. Thus far his words. And even though in Choshen Mishpat siman 255 it is explained that even regarding hekdesh we say that he says this so as not to appear wealthy, nevertheless, writing is different. And so it implies explicitly from the Mishnah in Maaser Sheni at the end of the fourth chapter, see there. And although in Choshen Mishpat siman 81 section 17 it was explained that regarding writing to oneself we say "so as not to appear wealthy," see there – that is for a commoner and not for hekdesh, as is proven from the Mishnah there. (And the difficulty of the Magen Avraham, subsection 44, is resolved.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 21: One should not purchase cloaks that were used by a commoner for a sacred use. Thus far his words. And specifically without change, but through a change where they sewed it in a different manner than it was and the like—it is permitted. And we have already explained this above in siman 147, section 11; see there. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: It is forbidden to make from the hire of a harlot or the price of a dog a matter of mitzvah, such as a synagogue or a Sefer Torah. And specifically from the hire itself, but if he gave her money as hire—it is permitted to purchase with them a matter of mitzvah. And she is not called a "harlot" unless it is a prohibition of ervah, but those unmarried women who are harlots who dedicate something—it is permitted to receive from them. Thus far his words. And a prohibition of "ervah" is also called those liable to negative commandments, and a maidservant and a gentile woman. And there is one who says that a gentile woman the first time is not called a "harlot" (see Magen Avraham, subsection 48). And according to this, in the opinion of the Rambam at the beginning of the Laws of Marriage, that any unmarried woman who designated herself for harlotry violates a negative commandment—what our teacher, the Rema, wrote is not correct, but he follows the system of those who disagree with the Rambam. And we explained this in Even HaEzer, siman 26; see there. And know that a change is permitted regarding hire when the object was changed from what he gave her. And so too if he had relations with her and afterward gave to her—this is not hire. And there is no prohibition unless he gave to her and afterward had relations with her. And if she gave to him—it is permitted. And there are many more laws regarding this and the price of a dog, and they were explained in the Rambam, chapter four of Forbidden Altar-Offerings (and see Magen Avraham, subsection 46, who elaborated on this).

It has already been explained in section 41 that one should not change the house in which they prayed for another house. And the same applies to anything that a person has held as a mitzvah even one time, if he held it in the manner of a chazakah – it is not taken from him. And so too, if he merited a matter of honor – it is not taken from him. And there is one who says that if he merited a mitzvah for several years and died, if his son fills his place – he also merits this mitzvah (Sha'arei Teshuva, subsection 27, in the name of Knesset HaGedolah). And he compared this to an appointment, where the son takes precedence. And it is a wondrous thing, for this is merely a matter of honor. And it seems that the custom is also not so.

And a person who is accustomed to a mitzvah, such as gelilah or another mitzvah, and an accident or poverty befell him and the community gave the mitzvah to another, and afterward he became wealthy and wants them to return the mitzvah to him, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled in section 22 that if at the time they gave the mitzvah to another he had the means to give what he used to give every year and did not desire it, and he consented along with the rest of the community to give it to another – he has lost his right. But if when they gave it to the second, the first did not have the means to give what he used to give, and now that he has the means he wants to merit his mitzvah and return to giving what he used to give initially – he returns to his mitzvah. Thus far his words, and one does not change even from an am ha'aretz to a talmid chakham. And from his words we have learned that if the first was away for several years, and the community gave it to another – when the first comes, he returns and merits it, since he was under duress. However, if there is proof that he despaired of this – he has lost his chazakah (Magen Avraham, subsection 49).