Siman 6

Three women are forbidden to all kohanim: a gerushah, a zonah, and a chalalah, as it is written: "A woman who is a zonah or chalalah they shall not take, and a woman divorced from her husband they shall not take." Added to these is the Kohen Gadol, who is also forbidden to a widow, and is only permitted to a virgin, as it is said: "And the Kohen who is greater than his brothers... he shall take a woman in her virginity. A widow, or a gerushah, or a chalalah, or a zonah—these he shall not take; but a virgin from his people he shall take as a wife. And he shall not profane his seed among his people, for I am Hashem who sanctifies him." This applies both to a Kohen Gadol anointed with the anointing oil, or one distinguished by the additional garments who was not anointed with the anointing oil from the day the sanctified oil was hidden from the days of Josiah and onward, and both to a Kohen who is serving, and to a Kohen Gadol who was appointed and then removed from his priesthood—for example, if a tumah occurred to the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur and they appointed another in his place, and afterward the first returns to his service and the second departs. And it appears to me that when they removed the second from his priesthood and told him that he departs from his priesthood, his legal status returns to being like a Kohen Hedyot, for a Kohen Gadol is appointed by word and departs by word. And likewise, a Kohen anointed for war is commanded regarding a virgin and is forbidden to a widow.

Any kohen who comes in transgression upon one of the women disqualified from the priesthood—he has profaned her, and she becomes a chalalah from the moment he initiated the first stage of intimacy, even if he did not complete his act. And if he completed his act and a child was born—the child is a chalal; if it is a male—he is not a kohen at all, and if it is a female—she is forbidden to the priesthood. And know that even though "he shall not profane" is written only regarding a Kohen Gadol, nevertheless we learned this also for an ordinary kohen [Kiddushin 77a], and we derive it from the fact that the Torah repeated the disqualifications also regarding a Kohen Gadol, which is superfluous as it is an a fortiori argument from an ordinary kohen, and it should only have written "widow" which was added to him as a prohibition; rather, it is to teach us: just as here his offspring is chalal, so too there his offspring is chalal. And from where do we know that she also becomes profaned by his act? From that which is written "and he shall not profane" and it is not written "and he shall not profane his offspring," we learn from this two profanations—one for her and one for his offspring.

According to the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, he is not liable for malkot unless he betrothed and had intercourse, but if he betrothed and did not have intercourse, or had intercourse with her through zenut and did not betroth—he does not receive malkot, as it is said, "they shall not take"—until it is through the way of taking, and without intercourse it is obvious that he does not receive malkot for behold he did not profane her, except for a Kohen Gadol with a widow—he is liable for malkot even for intercourse without kiddushin, for behold he profaned her with his intercourse and she became forbidden to a Kohen through this, which is not the case with a divorcee, a zonah, or a chalalah, who even before his intercourse are profaned to the Kehunah, for behold he did not profane her with his intercourse, therefore he does not receive malkot without kiddushin. And he follows his reasoning that we wrote at the beginning of siman 4, that for all those liable for a lav, one is not liable except with kiddushin and intercourse, and many disagree with him on this, for in all of them, if he had intercourse and did not betroth they receive malkot just as with a Kohen Gadol with a widow. And some say that a Kohen Gadol is liable for all of them if he had intercourse and did not betroth, but not a Kohen Hedyot, for that which we learned of profanation for a Kohen Hedyot from a Kohen Gadol—this is for his offspring to be chullin, but not to receive malkot because of the lav of "he shall not profane." However, most of our teachers agreed that in all of them they receive malkot because of the lav of "he shall not profane," but if they betrothed and did not have intercourse—according to all the poskim there are no malkot here, for there is no "taking" except for the sake of profanation.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote [ibid.]: If a Kohen Gadol betrothed a widow and had relations with her—he is lashed twice, once because of "a widow... he shall not take" and once because of "he shall not profane." Thus far his words. And in the Gemara [ibid. 78a] it is explained that when he completes his act of relations he is lashed three times—also because of "he shall not profane his seed," but he, of blessed memory, held that this is not according to the conclusion, for how could he be lashed twice for one prohibition? And the profaning of his seed does not occur until the child is born [the Maggid Mishneh]. And all the poskim hold that regarding all those disqualified from the priesthood the law is so, that if he betrothed and had relations he is lashed twice or three times at the completion of the act of relations, and for relations without betrothal he is lashed once because of "he shall not profane his seed," but for her profanation—he is not lashed, for she stands already profaned as I have written [it appears to me]. And some say that regarding other those disqualified from the priesthood he is not lashed for relations alone when he did not complete his act of relations [the Ra'avad], and this stands to reason [see Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, negative commandments 125]. And a Kohen who has relations with a gentile woman or a maidservant—is lashed for her because of the status of zonah, and betrothal is not applicable to them as betrothal does not take effect with them. And if he had relations with a female convert or a freed maidservant without betrothal—he is not lashed according to the system of the Rambam, and according to those who disagree with him—he is lashed because of zonah. However, some say that even though they are forbidden to a Kohen as a zonah, nevertheless their law is not like a literal zonah as I wrote in siman 5, section 6, see there, [and it appears to me that this is the opinion of the Ra'avad, chapter 18, halacha 3]. And know that there is no difference in the prohibitions between him and her, and everywhere that he is lashed—she is also lashed, whether regarding the prohibitions of the priesthood or regarding those disqualified from the congregation, for there is no distinction between a man and a woman, except regarding a designated maidservant where the Torah decreed that she is lashed and he is liable for a sacrifice even intentionally. And so too regarding a gentile woman and a maidservant, lashes are not applicable to them—and he alone is lashed [it appears to me].

It is a known matter that a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, unless the two prohibitions came simultaneously. Or, even if the second prohibition came afterwards—and it is more severe than the first. Or, even if it is not more severe but it is an inclusive prohibition—where the latter prohibition includes additional pieces that were not prohibited by the first. Or, an additional prohibition—where the second prohibition adds a prohibition to the piece that was not present in the first prohibition, and this is in two manners: either that upon the essence of the prohibition an additional prohibition was added to it regarding itself—such as a divorcee who became a chalalah, for previously she was prohibited to a kohen but permitted in terumah if she is the daughter of a kohen, and when the prohibition of chalalah was added to her, she is prohibited in terumah; or that the prohibition was added to the piece regarding others—such as a widow who became a divorcee, who initially was prohibited to a Kohen Gadol, and when the prohibition of a divorcee was added to her, a prohibition was added regarding an ordinary kohen. Therefore, a woman who was a widow and became a divorcee, and afterwards became a chalalah, and afterwards a zonah, and a Kohen Gadol came upon her afterwards—he receives four sets of lashes. And so too an ordinary kohen who came upon a divorcee who became a chalalah and afterwards a zonah—he receives three sets of lashes. And specifically when it proceeded in this order, where there is an additional prohibition in them as we have explained; but if the order changed, for example, if she was initially a zonah and afterwards a divorcee—he does not receive lashes on account of "divorcee," for there is no additional prohibition in this, and so too in any such case. And know, that this which we said, that "zonah" upon "chalalah" is an additional prohibition even though no prohibition was added to her, for even when she is a chalalah she is prohibited in terumah, nevertheless this is called "additional" because the category of zonah exists which is prohibited to an Israelite, such as if his wife committed adultery willfully, for she is prohibited to her husband. Therefore, even though this zonah is not prohibited to an Israelite, nevertheless the category of zonah is more severe than chalalah because there is a zonah who is prohibited also to an Israelite [Kiddushin 77b], and it appears to me that this is not a literal "additional" prohibition but rather a "severe" prohibition. But a widow who was a widow from several men—he only receives one set of lashes for her, and we do not say that he should receive several sets of lashes because she is the widow of Reuven and the widow of Shimon and the widow of Levi, for ultimately there is only the category of "widow" upon her [ibid.], and it is one body and one prohibition, and there is neither an inclusive nor an additional prohibition here. But if the Kohen Gadol came upon two widows—even if they were of one man—nevertheless he receives two sets of lashes, for they are distinct bodies [Tosafot ibid.], and there is no difference between a widow from marriage and a widow from betrothal.

The chalutza is forbidden to a kohen by the words of the scribes because she resembles a divorcee, and we strike him with lashes of rebellion, and the offspring from her is a challal by the words of the scribes. And if he married a doubtful chalutza, we do not remove her from him since this is rabbinic, and she is fit and her offspring is fit because they did not decree upon a doubtful chalutza, for it is impossible to say that his seed shall be profaned, for if so, we would strike him to remove her so that he would not increase challalim in Israel. And the Tur wrote in siman 7 that she and her offspring are doubtful challalim, and our teacher, the Rema, wrote likewise there, and the matters are astonishing. And there are those who wished to distinguish between zenut and marriage, that only in zenut are they doubtful challalim [Bach], and it is not logical at all [Mishneh LaMelech]. Furthermore, in Yoreh Deah siman 373 it is proven from the Tur himself that he holds like the Rambam, for he wrote there that one born from a doubtful chalutza is a complete kohen; therefore, the primary halacha is as I have written, and an error fell into the books of the Tur [for it was written S"Ch, meaning "doubtful challala," and the printer swapped it for "chalutza"].

But a doubtful gerusha, and a doubtful zona or chalala, and a doubtful widow to a Kohen Gadol—the Rambam ruled that we strike him with makkat mardut and compel him to divorce, and the children are doubtful chalalim and we apply to them the stringencies of Kohanim and the stringencies of Israelites. And it appears to me that according to the Rambam, who holds that a doubt regarding a Torah law is lenient by Torah law and only by rabbinic law do we follow the stringent path, the children are doubts by rabbinic law; but according to the Rashba, who holds that a doubt regarding a Torah law is stringent by Torah law—they are doubts by Torah law. And the practical difference is when they redeemed firstborns with these doubtful individuals, for according to the Rambam they are exempt from redeeming again, and according to the Rashba they are obligated. But regarding service in the Mikdash there is no practical difference, for ab initio in either case we do not allow him to perform the service, and ex post facto even a definite chalal does not disqualify the service, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 6 of Biat Mikdash.

A Kohen Gadol is forbidden to marry a beulah, as it is stated, "a virgin" – and not a beulah. And if he married her – they compel him to divorce her, but he does not receive lashes, for it is a negative commandment derived from a positive commandment. And even if the one who had intercourse with her did not yet remove her virginity, nevertheless, since the intercourse was fit to remove the virginity – she is a beulah [Maggid Mishneh]. And if she had intercourse in an unnatural manner – she is also disqualified to a Kohen Gadol. And the matter is simple that the children born from a beulah to a Kohen Gadol are challalim, for there is a challal from those forbidden by a positive commandment. And so too, he should not initially take a ketannah or a bogeret, as it is stated: "And he shall take a woman in her virginity" – "a woman" and not a ketannah, "in her virginity" and not a bogeret whose virginity has diminished, but rather a naarah. And if he married her – he does not divorce her, for she would eventually become a bogeret under him. And so too, he should not initially marry a mukat etz, and if he married her – she is married. And if he betrothed a beulah or a widow and was appointed to be Kohen Gadol – he may enter her into marriage since he betrothed her in a permitted state. But if he raped a naarah or seduced her and was appointed to be Kohen Gadol – it is forbidden for him to marry her, for he did not betroth her. And nevertheless, if she bore a child from him – he is not a challal, but one raped by another or seduced by another – the child is a challal [Yevamot 59a], for there is a challal from those forbidden by a positive commandment [ibid. 60a]. And if a yevamah from a marriage falls before us – it is forbidden to perform yibbum with her, but rather he must perform chalitzah for her, for a positive commandment does not come and override a negative commandment and a positive commandment. And if she is a widow from betrothal and is not yet a beulah and there is only a negative commandment from the Torah – it is permitted to perform yibbum with her and have the first intercourse, for a positive commandment comes and overrides a negative commandment, except that we decree regarding the first intercourse on account of the second intercourse [ibid. 20b]. And it appears to me that if he performed yibbum with a widow from betrothal and she conceived and gave birth – the child is not a challal by rabbinic decree and is not similar to a chalutzah, for he nonetheless performed a mitzvah, and such is the law regarding a divorcee to an ordinary Kohen. And a widow who fell for yibbum before an ordinary Kohen and he performed maamar with her and did not manage to have intercourse with her until he became Kohen Gadol – he is forbidden to marry her, as she is not similar to an arusah, and also regarding an arusah – if he betrothed a ketannah and she became a bogeret under him before the marriage – he shall not marry her, and she is not similar to a widow because the bogeret's body has changed. And nevertheless, if he married her – he shall not divorce her, for she would eventually become a bogeret under him. And know that the Rambam wrote that it is forbidden for a Kohen Gadol to marry two wives [see there 59a, "one" etc.], and they disagreed with him on this, for this is only during the Yom Kippur service, as it is stated "and he shall atone for himself and for his house" – one house and not two wives, but during the rest of the year, from where do we know that two wives are forbidden? And they brought proof for this from a verse in Chronicles [24] where it is written "And Jehoiada took for him two wives" – and he was a Kohen Gadol. And they answered for the Rambam that he married the second after the death of the first [the Maggid Mishneh]. And there is one who says that it does not refer to Jehoiada, but rather to King Joash, that Jehoiada took for him two wives because he guided him as is explained in the verse, and the entire matter of the section there deals with Joash. And there is proof for this from the fact that this verse is not written in Kings – which implies that it refers to Joash, for the book of Chronicles expands on the matters of the Davidic monarchy.

There is no difference regarding a divorcee between one from erusin or one from nisuin, and even a "scent of a get" disqualifies from the priesthood. And what is a "scent of a get"? For example, if he said to her, "Behold you are divorced from me but you are not permitted to any other man," and even though she is not released by such a get—nevertheless, she is disqualified from the priesthood by the Torah, as it is written: "And a woman divorced from her husband they shall not take," and we expound: even if she was only divorced from her husband and was not permitted to another—she is disqualified from the priesthood, and they compel him to divorce her and the offspring is a chalal. And according to the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 10 of Gerushin that this is rabbinic, nevertheless they compel him to divorce her as with all rabbinic prohibitions [the Gra] and the offspring is a rabbinic chalal. But if he gave her a get on a condition and the condition was not fulfilled—it is nothing and does not disqualify. And even a kohen himself is permitted ab initio to divorce on a condition, and when the condition is not fulfilled there is no get here and he is permitted to be with her as is written in siman 145, and there is not even a rumor of a get in this, for everyone knows that when the condition is not fulfilled it is not a get at all.

An orphaned minor girl who was married off by her mother or her brothers, and who has the ability to leave him without a get but merely through miun by saying "I do not want him," as the sages ordained as written in siman 155—if she left through miun, she is permitted to a kohen, for this does not even resemble a trace of a get. However, if the husband gave her a get, she is forbidden to a kohen; even though this is not like a get since she does not require a get, nevertheless, it somewhat resembles a complete get and the sages forbade her from marrying a kohen. Therefore, if this man who divorced her returned and married her and she left him the second time through miun, the miun nullifies the status of the previous get and she is permitted to a kohen. This is specifically if this same husband returned and married her and she performed miun against him; but if after the get she married another and performed miun against him, we do not say that the miun against the fellow nullifies the get of the first. Thus ruled the Rambam, of blessed memory. And the proof for this is that she is forbidden to return to the first according to the law of a divorcee who married another, who is forbidden to return to the first as written there; evidently, the status of a get applies to this. But the Tur permits her to a kohen, and the fact that she is forbidden to the first has another reason as written there. And since there is a dispute among the poskim and it is a rabbinic prohibition, if a kohen married her, we do not remove her from him [Bach and Beit Shmuel].

We hold that regarding kiddushin and divorce we are concerned for a rumor when the rumor is established in a beit din, and the details of the laws will be explained in siman 46. We hold that we are not concerned for a rumor that arises after marriage or after erusin, whether the rumor emerged regarding an act after the marriage or whether the rumor emerged regarding a prior act—we are not concerned for it, for we do not remove a woman from her husband by means of a mere rumor. Therefore, if a rumor emerged that a certain kohen divorced his wife and she is residing with him and serving him, we do not remove her, for it is a rumor after marriage. However, if he died and she married another kohen—she must leave, for regarding this second kohen it is a rumor prior to marriage. We are not concerned for the emergence of a slur against the children of the first husband when we compel the second to divorce her, for on the contrary, people will say that since they removed her from the second and did not remove her from the first, he presumably divorced her close to his death, and there is no slur here against the children [Gittin 81a].

And if a rumor spread that a certain kohen wrote a get for his wife, we see: if in that city they do not call giving "writing" – there is no substance to that rumor, for writing is nothing. But if they call giving "writing" – even though they also call writing alone "writing" – nevertheless, we are concerned for the rumor to forbid her to a second kohen after the death of this one, as has been written. And the reason we are stringent in this is because certainly the rumor did not spread for naught, but rather it is to wonder about the kohen who remains with her; and if their intention was for the writing alone, there is no wonder here, but rather certainly their intention was for the giving. However, in a place where they do not call giving "writing" – it is impossible to say that their intention was for the giving. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not distinguish in this between whether they call giving "writing" or not, but rather wrote without qualification that she must leave the second. And the primary rule in halacha is like the first opinion. And if a rumor spread regarding a Yisrael that he divorced his wife and died and she married a kohen – she must also leave.

A rumor spread regarding an unmarried woman that she was betrothed and divorced; if the two rumors spread at the same time, she is forbidden to the one about whom the rumor spread if he is a kohen. And if initially the rumor spread that she was betrothed to this kohen, and after some time a rumor spread that he divorced her, we do not remove her from this kohen, as it is a rumor following betrothal, and when he dies she is forbidden to another kohen. And if a rumor spread regarding a Yisrael that he betrothed a woman and divorced her and died, she is forbidden to a kohen in any case. And in siman 46 more will be explained regarding this in the case of a Yisrael, whether she is forbidden because of the rumor of betrothal [see Be'er Sheva, subsection 10].

Any kol that emerged with an amatla that breaks the kol—we do not concern ourselves with the kol, for the kol and its breakage are together. Therefore, if a kol emerged regarding a divorce that there was a condition in the get, or that he threw the get to her and it was a doubt whether it was close to him or close to her, and the like—we do not concern ourselves with the kol. Not only that, but even if a kol emerged that she was betrothed and divorced, and an amatla emerged regarding the kiddushin—she is also permitted to the priesthood, for since there are no kiddushin, there is no divorce. And if there is an amatla regarding the divorce but not regarding the kiddushin—we concern ourselves with the kol of the kiddushin to forbid her to the whole world, and we do not concern ourselves with the kol of the divorce to forbid her to a kohen after the death of this one. And specifically when the amatla emerged immediately after the kol, but if a clear kol emerged and after some time the kol of the amatla emerged—one does not nullify the clear kol with the kol of the amatla, unless it was clarified in beit din that the previous kol is false, for then even without an amatla we nullify the kol, for behold, any kol that was not strengthened in beit din is not a kol as I have written, and since it was afterwards clarified in beit din that the kol is false—we publicize it and nullify the kol.

That which we wrote, that regarding a rumor of kiddushin and gerushin where an explanation emerged regarding the kiddushin she is permitted to the priesthood, for if there is no kiddushin there is no gerushin—this is when the holding of the get was also only by a mere rumor; but if he actually divorced her—even though he only divorced her because of the rumor of kiddushin, and even if it was clarified that the rumor was false, nevertheless, since ultimately a reputation as a definite divorcee emerged for her, even though the get was only due to a mere stringency—nonetheless, she is disqualified from the priesthood [this is the intention of the Chelkat Mechokek in subsection 6, and like the second resolution of the Beit Shmuel at the end of subsection 11], and see what I wrote in section 18.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: If a rumor emerged about her that she is a chalutzah—we do not concern ourselves with it. Thus far his words. Because a chalutzah to a kohen is only rabbinic, and therefore we do not concern ourselves with a rumor. And there are those who disagree on this and forbid her to a kohen [Ra'avad]. And it appears to me that even according to this opinion, if she married—she shall not go out, for it is no worse than a doubtful chalutzah. And the great Acharonim agreed with the opinion of the Rambam, and so it appears to be the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in section 5, see there. And similarly, a chalutzah who did not require chalitzah—her chalitzah does not disqualify her.

He wrote further: If a rumor spread regarding a virgin that she is a non-virgin—we do not concern ourselves with it and she may marry a Kohen Gadol. If a rumor spread regarding her that she is a maidservant—we do not concern ourselves with it and she may marry even a Kohen. If she gained a reputation in the city as a harlot—we do not concern ourselves with it. And even if her husband sent her out because she violated the laws of Jewish women or through witnesses of an unseemly matter, and he died before he could give her the get—she is permitted to a Kohen, for we do not forbid a woman from these cases except through clear testimony or by her own admission. Thus far his words. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, holds that they only concerned themselves with a rumor of kiddushin and divorce where the prohibition is clear; but regarding a rumor of a harlot, the prohibition is not clear, for they merely saw in her general licentiousness, and it is the way of the world to call a licentious woman a harlot. And so too regarding one who violates the laws of Jewish women or through witnesses of an unseemly matter, nevertheless it is not clear that she committed harlotry. And for a rumor of a maidservant we do not concern ourselves, for to disqualify based on being a maidservant we do not concern ourselves with a rumor. And so too for a reputation of being a non-virgin we do not concern ourselves, for we also say that they saw in her licentiousness. And there are those who disagree in all of this, except that regarding a reputation as a harlot we do not concern ourselves for the reason that has been explained, and the same applies to a rumor of being a non-virgin.

Some say that what we wrote in section 15—that if he gave her a get, even if it was clarified that the rumor of the kiddushin was false, she is forbidden to the priesthood—this is specifically when she was at least betrothed to him; but when there were no words of betrothal between them, we do not concern ourselves with the get. And so too some say specifically when she was divorced in a beit din that required him to divorce her because of the rumor—then she has the status of a divorcee even though there is no substance to it; but if he stood and divorced her himself before witnesses because of the rumor of the kiddushin and it was clarified that it was false, we do not concern ourselves with the get. And so too some say that if she married, she does not leave in any case when it was clarified that the kiddushin did not exist at all, and there are those who disagree on this. And know, that any kohen who transgressed and married one of those disqualified to him—we compel him with all types of compulsions until he divorces her, and we forbid any person to conduct business with him and similar such stringencies until he divorces her. And a kohen who divorced his wife—she may not dwell with him in the same alleyway as long as she has not married another. And when she has married another—it will be explained in siman 119 that whenever the prohibition is more severe, it requires more distancing. And if they were dwelling in one courtyard through rental or in a courtyard belonging to both of them—she is displaced before him, for the displacement of a man is harder than that of a woman; and if the courtyard is hers—he is displaced before her, and there it will be explained further regarding this with the help of Heaven.

Who is the zonah mentioned in the Torah, such that a kohen who has relations with her is lashed on account of zonah? According to the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 18 of Issurei Biah, anyone who is not a daughter of Israel, and even if she converted or was emancipated at less than three years and one day old; and similarly a daughter of Israel who had relations with a man whom she is forbidden to marry with a prohibition that applies equally to everyone—to the exclusion of if she is forbidden to him due to a prohibition of the priesthood, such as a widow to a Kohen Gadol or a divorcee to an ordinary kohen, she does not become a zonah, for from prohibitions of the priesthood she becomes a chalalah and not a zonah. However, regarding a prohibition that applies equally to everyone, such as those liable for karet, and even those liable for negative commandments, such as one who has relations with a mamzer, a Natin, or an Ammonite or Moabite convert, or even those liable for a positive commandment, such as an Egyptian or Edomite convert—when she has relations with him, she becomes a zonah. Similarly, one who has relations with a petzuah daka or a kerut shofkhah becomes a zonah and is forbidden to the priesthood, and a kohen who has relations with her is lashed on account of zonah, and if she was the daughter of a kohen, she is disqualified from eating terumah. The Rambam gave a general rule in this matter: one who has relations with a man whom she is forbidden to marry with a prohibition that applies equally to everyone—to the exclusion of prohibitions of the priesthood because they do not apply equally to everyone as I have written; and to the exclusion of one who has bestiality with an animal, for even though she is liable to stoning, she does not become a zonah since she did not have relations with a man; and similarly one who has relations with a niddah, even though she is liable for karet, she does not become a zonah since she is not forbidden to marry him; and similarly one who has relations with a kedeshah, even though according to his system they are liable for lashes, nevertheless, since she is not forbidden to marry him, she does not become a zonah. And in all of these where she does not become a zonah, she is not disqualified from the priesthood, for this is dependent on that according to his system, that she who is disqualified from the priesthood is either a zonah or a chalalah, and only from prohibitions of the priesthood does she become a chalalah, and from other prohibitions she becomes a zonah. And only one case is excluded from this rule: one who has relations with a chalal—even though she is permitted to marry him—nevertheless she becomes a zonah because it is written, "and he shall not profane his seed among his people," and we expound: just as he disqualifies a widow through his cohabitation, so too his seed, who are chalalim, disqualify any woman through their cohabitation from terumah and the priesthood [ibid. 69a], and since he disqualifies her from the priesthood, she is automatically a zonah as I have written. And with the system of the Rambam several of our teachers agreed: Rashi [ibid. 61a s.v. ve-shenivalah], and the Nimukei Yosef, and the Bartenura [ibid.], and the Rashba [ibid. 68a s.v. minalan hanei milei, for the prohibition of the priesthood is dependent on zonah, see there].

But our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, and the Ra'avad, and the Rosh, and the Tur disagree with what the first opinion holds, that from any of those liable for negative commandments or positive commandments she becomes a zonah; rather, only from those liable for karem does she become a zonah. For the general rule of zonah is: anyone with whom kiddushin does not take effect, such as one who comes upon a forbidden relation, she becomes a zonah. But one who comes upon those liable for negative or positive commandments—granted that she becomes disqualified from terumah and from the priesthood, but she does not become a zonah. And similarly, one who has relations with a challal—even though she is disqualified from the priesthood and from terumah—nevertheless she does not become a zonah, for the holders of this opinion hold that these are not dependent on one another. And the first opinion holds, by what name is she disqualified from the priesthood? If because of being a challalah—behold, she is not a challalah except from prohibitions of the priesthood, and perforce the name zonah is upon her. And the holders of this opinion hold that this is a prohibition unto itself, for the primary verse is for terumah, as it is written: "And if a priest's daughter be married unto a stranger, she shall not eat of the offering of the holy things," for to teach us that if she married a stranger she shall not eat terumah we learned from another verse—from "and is returned unto her father's house," and this verse comes [to teach] that since she had relations with one disqualified to her, she is disqualified from terumah. And the prohibition of the priesthood we learned from a kal vachomer: if a divorcee, who is permitted for terumah, is forbidden to the priesthood, she who is disqualified from terumah, is it not all the more so that she is disqualified from the priesthood?! And it is possible that one does not receive lashes at all for this negative commandment. And according to the first opinion, one receives lashes because of the negative commandment of zonah. Furthermore, there is a practical legal difference between these two opinions, for according to the first opinion, since she is a zonah—the offspring from her is flawed for the priesthood, and according to this opinion—the offspring is not flawed, and this requires further study.

According to all opinions, a shomeret yavam who had relations with another becomes a zonah, for kiddushin does not take effect with her, as it is written: "The wife of the deceased shall not be outside to a strange man," meaning—there shall be no "becoming" for her, that kiddushin shall not take effect with her. Conversely, regarding one who has relations with his divorcee after she married another, even though it is a prohibition applicable to all—nevertheless, she does not become a zonah, and according to the latter opinion, she is not disqualified from terumah if she is the daughter of a kohen, for since we derive this from "And if a kohen's daughter be married to a strange man" as has been written, and he is not "strange" to her from the outset [ibid. 69]. Similarly, an ailonit is permitted to a kohen and is not a zonah, and we do not say that since she does not give birth it is an act of relations of zenut, for since it is in the manner of marriage and permitted, this is not zenut. Likewise, one who has relations with one of the secondary prohibitions of incest and the like, such as one who has relations with his chalutzah or the relative of his chalutzah—he has not made her a zonah, since according to the Torah she is permitted to him. And even though regarding chalalut we were stringent even with rabbinic prohibitions, the prohibitions of the priesthood are different, just as they were stringent regarding the lineage of the priesthood. And there are those who hesitate even regarding a yevamah to a stranger [the Gra, subsection 28].

From here you learn that her being a zonah does not depend on a forbidden cohabitation, for one who has relations with a niddah or one who is carnally known by an animal does not become a zonah, yet one who is married to a challal is a permitted cohabitation and she becomes a zonah according to the Rambam, and according to those who disagree with him she is nonetheless disqualified from the priesthood, and the matter depends only on a flaw according to what we were commanded by the oral tradition from person to person until Moses from Sinai according to the opinions that have been explained. And a female convert and a released bondwoman, even if she is less than three years and one day old—according to the Rambam and the Rosh she is a zonah by Torah law even though she has not had relations, because they come from those steeped in licentiousness. And even though we learned this from a verse in Ezekiel as written in siman 5, section 6, nevertheless they hold that they were forbidden to a kohen by the Torah and Ezekiel came and supported them with a verse, like many laws that Ezekiel taught which are from the Torah [Zevachim 18b]. And the Ra'avad and the Rashba hold that their prohibition is not from the Torah [Chapter 19 of Issurei Biah, halacha 3]. And the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, appears to me to be that when she is older than three years and one day—her prohibition is from the Torah, and less than this—it is by rabbinic law [see Rashi there 61a, starting with "Ela," and in Kiddushin 78a, starting with "Rabbi Shimon," see there at the end of the comments, and according to what I wrote it is well-settled, for in Yevamot his intention is to one fit for relations and in Kiddushin his intention is that Rabbi Shimon declares her fit until she leaves the Torah disqualification, and examine this carefully], [see Beit Shmuel subsection 20, and the words of the Chelkat Mechokek subsection 10 are corrupted in the printing.]

Any woman who has intercourse with a man who renders her a zonah—whether by coercion or by will, whether inadvertently or intentionally, whether in the natural manner or in an unnatural manner—once he has performed initial penetration, she is disqualified as a zonah, provided that she is three years and one day old and the one having intercourse is nine years and one day old, for then they are fit for intercourse. There are some of our teachers who hold that by coercion she does not become a zonah [Ra'avad and Rashba], and nevertheless she is disqualified from the priesthood and disqualified from terumah, but they do not administer lashes for her on account of zonah [the Gra]. And there is one who wishes to say that if she entered the chuppah and did not have intercourse, she is also a zonah just as if he had intercourse with her—but it is not so, for although in every place we consider it as if she is truly married when she enters the chuppah, nevertheless regarding zonah, which depends on a blemish as the Rambam wrote [Chapter 18, Halacha 4], there is no blemish without intercourse; and the proof is that the approach of the Rambam regarding all those forbidden by a negative commandment is that one does not receive lashes without kiddushin and intercourse, and he wrote explicitly in Chapter 17 "marriage and intercourse," see there. And who is a challalah will be explained in siman 7 with the help of Heaven. And know, that regarding a nine-year-old who disqualifies with his intercourse, if there is a doubt whether he is nine years old or not, we follow the stringent view as with all doubts, and so it is explicitly stated in the Gemara [ibid. 68a] and so the Rambam wrote in Chapter 5 of Terumot [see Beit Meir].

Therefore, a married woman who had relations with another—whether by compulsion or by will—is disqualified from the priesthood and from eating terumah. And to her husband, if he is a Yisrael, she is not forbidden in a case of compulsion, as it is said, "and she was not seized"—implying that if she was seized, she is permitted; however, the wife of a kohen who was compelled is forbidden to her husband. And it is called compulsion whenever the beginning of the act was by compulsion, and even if its end was by will, it is called compulsion, for this too is compulsion because at the beginning of the act the one performing the act clothed her with the evil inclination, and the beginning was by compulsion not through the desire of the inclination; and see what I wrote in siman 7, section 1, regarding what constitutes compulsion.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: A wife of a kohen who was raped—her husband is lashed on her account because of tumah, as it is said: "Her first husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after she has been defiled." Everything was included, such that if they had intercourse they are forbidden to their husbands, and the verse specified for you regarding the wife of a Yisrael who was raped that she is permitted to her husband, as it is said: "and she was not seized." However, the wife of a kohen remains in her prohibition, for she is a zonah. Thus far his words. And his words are puzzling, for he opened with tumah and concludes with zonah. And in the Gemara [Yevamot 26b] there are two versions: according to the first version—he is lashed because of tumah and because of zonah; and according to the "there are those who say"—he is lashed because of tumah and not because of zonah, see there. Furthermore, he himself ruled in chapter 1 of Issurei Biah, halakhah 22, that he is lashed on her account because of zonah, see there [and the Maggid Mishneh remained with "it requires further study"]. And the explanation of his words appears to me: for behold, regarding the prohibition of tumah, the kohen and the Yisrael are equal, for if she committed adultery willfully she is forbidden also to her husband who is a Yisrael because of tumah. And since in a case of rape there is no category of tumah regarding a Yisrael, how could the category of tumah come into being regarding a kohen, for are they not equal regarding the prohibition of tumah? Rather, certainly the negative commandment is in the verse of tumah as I wrote, but the name of the prohibition is because of zonah, for even in a case of rape she is called a zonah, as I wrote in section 23. However, in the verse of zonah it is not explicitly stated that even in a case of rape she is called a zonah, and in tumah the Torah explained that to a kohen she is forbidden even in a case of rape, and she remains in the prohibition of zonah which applies only to a kohen and not to a Yisrael [and he ruled like the "there are those who say" as is his way in the entire Shas; and that which is said there "evidently in a case of rape she is not called a zonah" is not according to the conclusion and is in the form of a wonderment, and it concludes: "everything was included in 'after she has been defiled' etc., it follows that if so, she stands as she stood," meaning she remains in her prohibition, and it is the prohibition of zonah] [and in the Derashah we explained that he distinguishes between the husband who is a kohen and another kohen, and look closely].

The wife of a kohen who said to her husband, "I was raped," or "I acted unintentionally and someone had relations with me"—she is not forbidden to him, for we do not believe her, and we say that she has set her eyes on another and is lying in order to release herself from her husband. And we do not say that she has rendered herself a forbidden object, for she does not have the power to do this since she is subordinated to him, and by law she is not believed. And she is even permitted to eat terumah, for this presumption that she set her eyes on another is powerful; and she did not come initially to forbid herself from terumah, but rather to forbid herself to her husband, and it is an assessment of the mind that she is lying. And why must we press ourselves to permit her to eat terumah? For if she were forbidden from terumah, it would cast a slur upon her children. The Rambam, in the end of chapter 15 of Terumot, ruled that she is forbidden to eat terumah. And in the Yerushalmi, the first chapter of Sotah, halacha 3, it is explicitly stated like the first opinion. And if she is trusted by him that she is not lying—he is obligated to divorce her. And likewise, if one witness came and said, "Your wife committed adultery, whether by rape or by will"—he is not believed, for there is no matter of forbidden relations established by fewer than two. However, if the witness is trusted by him—he is obligated to divorce her in order to satisfy the doubt, and more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in siman 115. And if she says, "I was raped," and one witness testifies according to her words, it is considered a basis for the matter and she is forbidden to him if there is no suspicion of collusion, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: The wife of a kohen who said to her husband, "I was raped"—even though she is permitted to her husband as has been written—she is forbidden to every kohen in the world after her husband dies, for she has confessed that she is a zonah and has forbidden herself, and she becomes like a forbidden piece. Thus far his words. And if she married, she does not leave, unless this kohen believes her previous words [Bach and Beit Shmuel]. And similarly, her children are not challalim when she marries, for the Torah gave the father credibility over his children and not the mother [ibid.], for we say that she lied completely then. And if this kohen believes her previous words and is obligated to divorce her, it is possible that the children are challalim [see Beit Shmuel subsection 27]. And similarly, if she gave an am tila for her previous words and said that she lied because her intention was to release herself from her husband, she is permitted ab initio to marry a kohen [Ra'avad], and there are those who hesitate regarding this [the Maggid Mishneh], and the first opinion appears primary [for it appears that the Maggid Mishneh holds like the first resolution of the Ran at the end of Nedarim, and we rule like the second resolution, and see what the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 26, and there is no distinction between one am tila and another am tila, for if not so, the words of the Maggid Mishneh are perplexing, and with this that which the Be'er Mayim found difficult is settled for us, and especially according to the words of the Ritva].

This fact that a woman is not believed to forbid herself to her husband—this is when there are no grounds for the matter, but if there are grounds for the matter, she is believed. And the details of these matters will be explained in siman 115. Similarly, a woman whose husband warned her regarding a certain man and she secluded herself with him and did not drink the sotah water—she is forbidden to her husband even if he is a Yisrael, and if her husband dies she is forbidden to a kohen, because she is a doubtful zonah—whether she did not want to drink, or he did not want to have her drink, or there was testimony there that prevents her from drinking, or she was among the women who are not fit to drink according to the laws explained in Sotah. Similarly, there is no difference whether her husband warned her or a beit din warned her according to the laws there, for sometimes a beit din must warn her. And in all of these—since in any case she did not drink the bitter waters during the time of the Temple, or in this time when we do not have the waters, and it was not clarified by witnesses that she is pure—she is in the presumptive status of a doubtful zonah, and is forbidden to a kohen and her children from a kohen are doubtful challalim. And know, that the husband is believed to say that he knows that his wife committed adultery and was forbidden to him. And even though he is bound to her just as she is bound to him, and why is he believed while she is not believed? The reason is simple—for he is able to divorce her against her will and does not need to lie in order to be free of her, but she cannot release herself from him without his will, for even if she says "he is repulsive to me" and according to the method of the Rambam that we compel him to divorce, nevertheless without proof for this she is not believed, and therefore we say that she is lying and has set her eyes on another. And according to this, in our times when it is impossible to divorce against her will and one may not marry two women because of the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom, it is possible that he too is not believed, and it will be explained in siman 177 with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: A kohen who betrothed an adult or a minor and after some time had relations with her and claimed that he found her to have been previously penetrated by a man, she is forbidden to him due to doubt, perhaps she was intimate before the betrothal or after the betrothal. But an Israelite who claimed this claim – she is not forbidden to him, for there are two doubts here – perhaps before the betrothal or perhaps after the betrothal, and even if we say after the betrothal, perhaps by compulsion or perhaps by will, for a woman who was raped is permitted to an Israelite. Therefore, if her father betrothed her to an Israelite and she was less than three years and one day old and he claimed that he found her to have been previously penetrated by a man – she is forbidden to him due to doubt, for there is only one doubt here, perhaps by compulsion and perhaps by will, and a doubt regarding a Torah prohibition is ruled stringently. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, transcribed it in section 14.

And even though there is also a double doubt regarding one who is less than three years old—perhaps it was by force, perhaps it was by will; and if you say it was by will, perhaps she committed harlotry when she was a minor, and the seduction of a minor is considered force [Yevamot 33b]—nevertheless, this is not a double doubt, for everything there is categorized as force, and there is only one doubt here: whether it was by force or by will [Tosafot Ketubot 9a]. According to this, the prohibition only applies if he married her in her adulthood, but if he married her in her minority, she is permitted to an Israelite in any case, for she is considered forced. However, from the wording of the Rambam it does not seem so, for he follows his consistent reasoning in chapter 3 of Issurei Biah, law 2, that one who has relations with a minor by her will, she is forbidden to her husband, see there; and he wrote similarly in chapter 2 of Sotah, law 4, see there; and already all the poskim have challenged him on this. And from his words there it is clarified that we do not say the seduction of a minor is force except when she was betrothed with a rabbinic betrothal not through her father, but in the Gemara in Yevamot there it is explicitly proven that it deals with a Torah betrothal [the Gra]. And it appears to me that his words are correct, for there in the Mishnah it is explicitly proven that it deals with a minor who is not fit to give birth, and in truth there are minors who give birth and live [ibid. 12b], and so wrote the Rambam in chapter 19 of Ishut, law 14 [see there in the Maggid Mishneh and in chapter 2, section 9]. According to this, the Sages only said it is force regarding minors so young that they are not fit to give birth, and if we knew the measure of the years, we would say that until those years their seduction is force and from then on their seduction is by will; but we do not know this measure, and consequently we must be stringent in a Torah matter as with all Torah doubts, and be lenient in a rabbinic matter according to the law that a rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently. According to this, the Rambam ruled well in these two places that in a Torah betrothal one must forbid her to her husband, and in a betrothal of mi'un one should be lenient; and see what I wrote in siman 68, section 8.

And that which he wrote, that he found her trodden by a man—the meaning is whether he claims "I found an open entrance" or whether he claims a claim of blood. However, when she is a bogeret, he cannot claim a claim of open entrance, as was written in the eleventh chapter of Ishut. There are some of the Geonim who hold the opposite, and the Rambam there rejected their words, and also the opinion of Rashi is like the Rambam. And that which he wrote, that after a time he had relations with her—his intention is that if he had relations with her immediately after the kiddushin, she is permitted even to a kohen, for an unmarried woman who committed zenut is not forbidden to a kohen. And likewise, if there are witnesses that after the kiddushin she did not have relations, even if he had relations with her after a time—she is permitted even to a kohen. And as for why we do not always validate her by saying that she certainly had relations before the kiddushin, that we should establish her on her chazakah of fitness and her chazakah of permissibility to her husband, it is because one can say the opposite—establish her on her chazakah of being a virgin, and now she has had relations, and a chazakah of the body is superior to other chazakot. And even though there is always a sefek sefeika even regarding the wife of a kohen—a doubt if she was struck by wood or a doubt if she was trodden by a man, and if you say trodden by a man, perhaps she had relations before the kiddushin? For one can say that being struck by wood is not common, and furthermore, if she were struck by wood she would have claimed so, for this is not a disgrace, and since she did not claim it, we learn from this that she was certainly trodden by a man.

There are some of our teachers who wrote that all of this only refers to when she contradicts him, for then we say that he is believed because he has made her a forbidden object upon himself, and the same law applies when she is silent; but when she says "I was intimate, and I was intimate prior to the kiddushin" – she is permitted to him, since she claims certainty and he claims uncertainty, and "certainty and uncertainty, certainty is preferable" [the Ri and the Ran], and behold, in such a case he has not made her a forbidden object upon himself, and so it is implied in the Yerushalmi [ibid. halacha 6]. However, there are some of our teachers who disagree regarding this, and they hold that since there is only a single doubt, we do not pay heed to her words [the Maggid Mishneh, and see the Rosh], and they wrote that this is also the opinion of the Rambam, but I do not see a proof from his words; on the contrary – from what he explained in chapter 11 of Ishut, it appears that he holds so, and also from what he explained there further on, it appears that if the majority of the city are fit people who do not disqualify with their intimacy for the priesthood – she is permitted post facto to the kohen and shall not leave, and similarly when she claims "I am a victim of wood," she is believed, and to this most of the poskim agreed [Shita Mekubetzet]. And similarly, specifically when he says "it is certain to me that I did not incline," but without this, it is possible that he inclined and was unaware [Ran], and so wrote the Rambam in chapter 11 of Ishut. And some say that without intent, inclining is not common, but rather we ask him if perhaps he inclined intentionally, and when he says that he did not incline intentionally – she is forbidden to him [ibid. (10a) according to one explanation]. And some say further that specifically a married man, but a bachelor – is not believed for he is not expert in this, and we lash him for having been insolent [ibid.], and it appears that this is the opinion of the Rif, of blessed memory. However, if it is known that he is a frequent visitor of harlots – he is believed, and we lash him for committing transgressions [as explained there in the Gemara]. And if she claims that she is still a virgin – we appoint witnesses that he shall be secluded with her once more and the matter will be clarified.

And know, that which has been explained from our words that if there were a chazakah of permissibility we would permit her even to a kohen—behold, even regarding other prohibitions when a flaw has arisen, there are many among the poskim who do not establish the status based on the chazakah, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 3; and all the more so regarding yuchsin, where we are very stringent, such that we do not even follow a single majority, and even regarding a sefek sefeka we are stringent, as is written regarding an "ealmanat eisa" in siman 2 section 19. How then can we validate here based on a mere chazakah in a case where she is silent or where she contradicts him? For indeed, regarding a disqualification that has been clarified to us, it is certainly proper to be stringent by rabbinic decree, and all the more so regarding disqualifications of yuchsin. However, here the disqualification of this woman has not been clarified to us, and she contradicts him or is silent, and we do not know if he speaks the truth or is merely spreading a libel; rather, we come to prohibit her because he made her upon himself a "shavya anafshei chaticha de-issura"—in this case, certainly if a chazakah of permissibility can only be found, the "shavya anafshei" is removed from him. And conversely—when she admits and says with certainty "I was previously intimate"—behold, a claim of certainty is powerful, for even the offspring we validate through a claim of certainty, and even amidst a majority of disqualified people, as is written in siman 4 section 30 [and with this, all that the Pnei Yehoshua and the Beit Meir questioned against the Tosafot in the sugya of the first chapter of Ketubot is settled], and in siman 68 more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: An unmarried woman who was seen having intercourse with someone and he left, and they said to her, "Who is this who came upon you?" and she said, "A fit man" – she is believed. And not only that, but even if they saw her pregnant and said to her, "From whom did you become pregnant?" and she said, "From a fit man" – she is believed and she shall be permitted to a kohen. In what case are these words said? When the place where she had intercourse was a crossroads or in the corners of the fields where everyone passes there, and the majority of those passing there were fit, and the majority of the city from which these passersby originated were fit, for the sages established a higher standard in matters of lineage and required two majorities. But if the majority of those passing would disqualify her, such as Kutim or mamzerim and the like, even though the majority of the place from which they came were fit, or if the majority of the people of the place were unfit even though the majority of those passing there were fit – we are concerned for her that perhaps she had intercourse with one who disqualifies her, and she may not marry a kohen initially, but if she married she does not leave. Thus far his words. And although it was explained there that even with a majority of unfit people we validate the offspring when she claims with certainty – this is in order not to disqualify the offspring from the congregation, but she, who is able to marry an Israelite – we forbid her initially to the priesthood until there are two majorities. And that which we validated in section 32 even her herself with a claim of certainty – this is because she already married, and furthermore because her disqualification was not clarified to us, as I wrote in the previous section. And the matter is simple that regarding a pregnant woman, when she says "I had intercourse with a fit man" and she is believed for herself – she is also believed regarding the offspring, for if she gives birth to a daughter – she is fit for the priesthood. And this is all when she said "I had intercourse with a fit man," but if she did not say so and remained silent – even after the fact she shall leave the kohen when there were not two majorities. And when she claims "I had intercourse with a fit man" – we do not remove her after the fact from the kohen even with a majority of unfit people. And it can be said that according to the Rambam, when she did not say "I had intercourse with a fit man" – we do not permit her to a kohen initially even with two majorities, for one who does not claim with two majorities is no better than one who claims with one majority.

And there are some of our teachers who hold that when she claims with certainty, "I was intimate with a fit man"—even ab initio she is permitted to the priesthood with a single majority. And when she does not claim, whether ab initio or ex post facto—she requires two majorities, and if not—she must leave [the Ramban and the Rashba and the Ran]. And some say that even when she does not say, "I was intimate with a fit man"—we permit her ab initio even with a single majority [the Meor at the end of the first chapter of Ketubot, who holds that the entire sugya follows Rabbi Yehoshua and not Rabbi Gamliel], and this is a minority opinion, and we do not rule accordingly.

And this requirement for two majorities ab initio, where one majority is not sufficient—this is when there is at least a minority of disqualified men; but where there is no minority of disqualified men, we do not require two majorities. Therefore, in a city that is entirely Israel, or where the Israelites have a neighborhood unto themselves—it is like a city unto itself and we do not require two majorities [Beit Shmuel]. And similarly, if it is known that she had relations with a fit man, but there is only a concern that perhaps she also had relations with a disqualified man—we also permit her ab initio with one majority [ibid.]. And all this is when she had relations willingly, but if she was raped—her claim of "certainty" does not help at all, for the reason that her claim of "certainty" helps is because we say that a woman who has relations investigates and has relations so as not to disqualify herself, as written in siman 4, section 31, see there; and in the case of rape, investigation is not applicable. Therefore, when it is known that she was raped, even two majorities do not help ab initio [Beit Shmuel]. And this is according to the "some say" at the end of section 34, that without her statement we do not permit her ab initio even with two majorities [it appears to me], for according to the other opinions, we do not require her statement in the case of two majorities. However, if we do not know that she was raped, but she says she was raped—we permit her based on her statement ab initio with two majorities, by way of a migo, for if she wanted she could have said "I was not raped and I had relations willingly" [ibid.]. And all this is regarding herself, but regarding the offspring, that we do not disqualify it from the congregation—it helps in any case, as written there in siman 4. And when we permit the offspring to the congregation—we also permit it to the priesthood, as it is impossible to distinguish between them. Only if she is a divorcee—then the distinction between ab initio and ex post facto applies also to the offspring, for perhaps a kohen had relations with her and the offspring is a challal [ibid.]. And even though regarding herself there is no "ex post facto" here since she is anyway disqualified from the priesthood, nevertheless regarding the offspring there is a distinction, and furthermore, regarding terumah there is a practical difference even regarding herself.

That which two majorities are effective ab initio—this is when she had intercourse in a place where people move about and are not sitting in their places. However, if she had intercourse in the city, granted that if we knew that the one who had intercourse went to her, "whatever separates, separates from the majority," but perhaps she went to the one who had intercourse, and "anything fixed is considered as half and half." Therefore, even if in the city everyone is fit and one is found unfit—a Kuthi, or a chalal, or a mamzer and a slave—she shall not marry a kohen ab initio in any case. But if she married—she shall not leave when she says "I had intercourse with a fit man," for even with a majority of unfit men we permit ex post facto. Therefore, in such a case where she does not say "I had intercourse with a fit man" and says "I do not know if he is fit or unfit," or if she was mute or deaf and we are unable to rely on her gesturing that she can distinguish between fit and unfit—behold, she is a doubtful zonah, and if she married a kohen—she shall leave and her children are doubtful chalalim. And two majorities are not effective at all unless the intercourse was at a crossroads and not in the city. And the Tur ruled that even in the city we are not stringent regarding two majorities unless it is known that she went to the one who had intercourse, but if it is not known who went to whom—we permit her with two majorities even if she does not say "I had intercourse with a fit man," and we hang the matter on the assumption that the one who had intercourse went to her. And if it is known that the one who had intercourse went to her—the Rambam also admits to this [see Beit Shmuel]. And when we saw that she became pregnant, and there are two majorities in this place according to the laws that have been explained—we do not fear that perhaps she committed zenut in another place and there were not two majorities there; rather, we say "here it was found, here the zenut occurred," and even regarding all prohibitions we do not maintain a prohibition from place to place [ibid.].

It appears to me that according to the opinion in section 35, that when she claims certainty she is permitted with a single majority, and according to what I wrote in siman 4, section 34, that the law of kava is merely a stringency, for ultimately there is a majority that perhaps the fornicator went to her, and even if she went, it is like half and half and consequently there is a majority for permission, there is no difference between whether she was intimate in the city or was intimate in a place of movement unless she does not claim certainty. However, when she claims certainty—there is no difference in this unless it is known that she went to him. And so we explained there that we do not fear lest she committed adultery with her relatives even though she is with them in one house, unless she is suspected of them with a suspicion that has substance. And there it was explained in section 32 what the law is when she says that she became pregnant from a certain person, and if that certain person admits or not; and his speech is only relevant regarding the offspring, but regarding herself—the speech of the fornicator does not add or subtract, and he is not in the category of a witness, for ultimately he makes himself a wicked person, and only regarding the offspring because the Torah gave credibility to the father, and without his admission we have no reason to establish him as his son, see there. But regarding herself—it is not only required to say that if he is disqualified and comes to disqualify her by saying he is the fornicator that he is not believed, but even if he is fit and comes to testify that he is the fornicator and she is fit for the priesthood, if he is a kohen—he is not believed to validate her if without his speech she is not believed, because we fear perhaps he set his eyes upon her, and everything is according to the matter and according to the sight of the eyes of the beit din if she is suspected of him or not [it appears to me]. And know, that one witness is believed regarding prohibitions where a prohibition has not been established, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 127. And these words apply when she does not contradict him, but when she contradicts him—one witness in the face of contradiction is nothing, as I wrote there.