Siman 46

A woman about whom a rumor emerged that she is betrothed to a certain man, and she was previously unattached, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 9, law 22, that she is in the legal status of being betrothed even though there is no clear evidence there, and any rumor that was not established in a beit din is not a cause for concern. And what is the rumor through which she is established as betrothed? For example, if two people came and testified that they saw the candles burning and beds prepared and people entering and exiting and women rejoiced for her and were saying "so-and-so was betrothed today." If they heard them saying "so-and-so will be betrothed today" – there is no concern for her, for perhaps they gathered to betroth but she was not betrothed, until they hear that she was betrothed. And so too if two people came and said "we saw something like the joy of an erusin and we heard a sound of a rumor and we heard from so-and-so who heard from so-and-so that so-and-so was betrothed in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so" and the witnesses went to another province or died – this is a rumor that establishes her as betrothed. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words: That a rumor in the city is nothing unless this rumor was established in beit din by way of kosher witnesses who testify that they themselves saw the preparations for the kiddushin according to the custom of the world. And even though regarding the kiddushin itself they do not know but rather heard it from the mouths of women or from one who heard from another, and the witnesses of the kiddushin died or went away—this is called a "rumor," for it is like a basis for the matter since they themselves testify regarding the preparation that they saw with their own eyes. And the difference between hearing from women or from one witness, even though in the law they are the same, nevertheless it is clear from his words that hearing from women is in a manner where they themselves saw that she was betrothed, and from one witness even if he himself did not see the kiddushin and also did not hear from two witnesses but rather he is a witness from the mouth of a witness who saw the kiddushin. And it is possible that for this reason regarding women he wrote that they should say "today she was betrothed" and regarding the witness he did not write so, for the women, since they themselves saw the kiddushin, must say that it was today, but this witness from whom they heard does not say that he himself saw but rather that he heard from another, if so, from where would he know when the kiddushin was. And that which regarding women he required that they say they themselves saw and it is not sufficient if they say they heard, it seems to me the reason is that regarding one witness, in any case, we find that his testimony is testimony from the Torah to obligate an oath, therefore his testimony of hearing is effective regarding a rumor, whereas women have no substance unless they said they saw for themselves. It is further possible to say regarding his intention that because regarding the witness he added to say that these witnesses themselves heard a rumor in the city of the kiddushin, therefore it is enough even if he testifies as a witness from the mouth of a witness. And in any case, we have heard from his words that even regarding a witness he required that they see the preparations for the kiddushin [for he explains that Rabbi Elazar at the end of Gittin refers to Ulla and explains not that they heard a rumor alone, and regarding Ulla it is not necessary to explain for the multitude of women is itself a rumor, and he explains "and so-and-so from so-and-so and so-and-so" for if not so, why must it say "and they went away etc.", and the difficulty of the Ran is answered, and examine it closely].

And there are some of our teachers who hold that regarding a witness from the mouth of a witness, it is not necessary that these who testify see the preparations for the kiddushin. The reason is that a witness from the mouth of a witness is, in any event, a clear matter for the rumor that emerged, for they testify that so-and-so testified from so-and-so and so-and-so from so-and-so; and although in law this is not testimony, nevertheless regarding the rumor it is called a clear matter. But regarding women saying "so-and-so was betrothed today," this is not like a clear matter but rather like a mere sound of commotion; therefore, we require that these people see the preparations for the kiddushin, and it is like "feet to the matter" such that a clear matter is not required for this [Tosafot ibid. s.v. ed, and so it appears from the Rosh and Ran, see there].

And there are some of our teachers who hold that hearing from the mouths of the women and seeing the preparations is a more definitive sign of the rumor than hearing witness from the mouth of witness, and if the rumor emerged at that time, it does not help at all what they heard from witness from the mouth of witness, but specifically when they saw the preparations – lamps burning and beds spread and the women saying "so-and-so was betrothed today," but if the rumor emerged afterward – it is sufficient when they heard witness from the mouth of witness [Rashba in a responsum, the Beit Yosef brought it].

And regarding that which the Rambam wrote, that it is sufficient when they say they heard from so-and-so, there are some of our teachers who hold that we specifically require that they heard from two [the Rosh], only that it is not necessary that these heard from the mouths of two, but even one from one and the second from another [the Ran], for behold, we do not require witnesses of kiddushin here; but in any event, the rumor must emerge from two from the mouths of two, but two from one or one from two is not a rumor. And it is possible to say that in the final ruling they do not disagree, for according to the Rambam who ruled that we also require in this case that they see the preparations for the kiddushin, it is sufficient with two from the mouth of one, and without seeing the preparations the Rambam would admit that we require two from the mouths of two; and these teachers of ours would admit to the Rambam that when they saw the preparations it is sufficient with two from the mouth of one, for it is no worse than the statement of women, and they interpret that this deals with a case without seeing the preparations, as has been written. And also regarding what the Rambam wrote, that if the final witnesses went to another province or died, this is a rumor, there is one who disagrees with him and holds that specifically if they went it is a rumor, for they are afraid lest they come and contradict them, but if they died it is not a rumor [the Tur in the name of the Ramah]; and this too appears to me, that according to the interpretation of the Rambam that it deals with seeing the preparations, all agree that even if they died it is a rumor [see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 4 and Beit Shmuel subsection 6 and subsection 7, and according to what I have written this is not necessary, and examine it closely].

In the Gemara it is explained that specifically when they say that so-and-so was betrothed to so-and-so, but if they do not mention to whom she was betrothed—this is not a kol; and specifically regarding the kol itself is it required that they say so, but the women or the witnesses do not need to say so, and so it is explained from the wording of the poskim. And it is also explained in the Gemara that if a kol went out that she was betrothed in another city, this is not a kol; and the poskim did not need to explain this, for from their words where they wrote that the beit din must investigate the evidence of the preparations, it is as if explicitly stated that it deals with this city and not another city, and therefore the women or the witnesses do not need to say "in this city," for it is understood as a matter of course; however, if they explicitly say she was betrothed in another city—this is not a kol [Beit Shmuel subsection 4, and see Chelkat Mechokek].

This is the wording of the Tur: An unmarried woman about whom a rumor spread that she was betrothed, we are concerned for it and she requires a get, provided that the rumor is clear and was established in beit din; meaning, when the rumor spread, the beit din investigated it and found it to be sound, but if it is not clear or was not established in beit din – no. And what is a clear rumor? For example, that witnesses came and testified that they saw lamps burning and beds spread and women rejoicing for her and saying "So-and-so was betrothed today to so-and-so" etc. Thus far his words. It is implied from his words that the women also must say that she was betrothed to so-and-so today, and it is possible that even the Tur agrees with what has been explained, for the Tur is dealing with a case where the rumor spread that she was betrothed generally, as is clear from his words, and therefore he requires that the women say "to so-and-so," but the Rambam, who wrote that the rumor spread that she was betrothed to so-and-so, the women do not need to say "to so-and-so" [see Be'er Sheva subsection 4, but it appears to me as I have written]. And also, that which the Rambam and the Tur required that the women say she was betrothed today, this is because they did not mention "today" in the rumor, and therefore our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote "an unmarried woman about whom a rumor spread that she was betrothed today to so-and-so in this city" etc., wrote regarding the statement of the women that they say "So-and-so was betrothed" and did not mention "today" [it appears to me].

The general rule of the matter – we do not concern ourselves with a rumor unless it was established in a beit din, meaning that the beit din investigated the matter and heard that there is substance to the rumor as we have written. And four things are required: that they say "she was betrothed" in the past tense, and that they say the kiddushin were "today," and that they say "to so-and-so," and that they say "in this city." And according to what we have explained, only the phrasing "she was betrothed" is required, either in the rumor itself or in the testimony of the women. And as long as the rumor was not established in a beit din – we do not concern ourselves with it; even if they said there are witnesses in a nearby place, we do not prevent her from marrying. However, this depends on the understanding of a beit din of God-fearing men. However, if there is a strong presumption that she was betrothed, such as if she is established in the city as certainly betrothed – then we do not require it to be established in a beit din, for we stone and burn based on presumptions, and only regarding a mere rumor do we require the investigation of a beit din. And the beit din should go back and scrutinize the rumor as long as she has not yet married another, in order to clarify if there is substance to it; but once she has married another, we do not scrutinize the rumor, for a rumor that arises after marriage we do not concern ourselves with, as will be explained.

There is one who says that regarding which kol a beit din must investigate, this is specifically when a rumor and a commotion went out in the city that "so-and-so has been betrothed," but when there is no rumor and commotion in the city – it is not called a kol. For if it were not so, no daughter of Israel would remain unmarried, as two empty and reckless people could go and say at a gathering that so-and-so has been betrothed, and one would hear and testify in their name, and two would hear from the one, and two others would hear from the two, and there would be no end to the matter. Therefore, there must be a rumor in the city, for people do not accept a rumor unless there is substance to it, and when this is joined by two saying "we heard" – we are concerned for kiddushin. And indeed, the wording of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch indicates this, and particularly according to the Rambam who wrote that even with witnesses they must see preparations for kiddushin, it is explicitly explained that one should not rely on mere rumors. There is also one who says that regarding the statements of women, it is specifically required that they be rejoicing with her and saying "she has been betrothed," but if they are rejoicing with him and saying that he betrothed, it is not a kol; but this is not definitive.

These two who testify before beit din that they saw the preparations and that they heard the women saying or that they heard from so-and-so, as has been explained, must be kosher witnesses. For although we are concerned for a kol even though we have not come to the foundation of the testimony that they went to the overseas provinces, or that the entire clarification depends on the statement of the women and the preparations, nevertheless, regarding these matters, how can we rely upon witnesses who are not kosher for testimony? And so it implies from the language of the Rambam and all the poskim. And truly, the Tur cited in the name of one of the Rishonim that even a woman who heard from two, we are concerned for the kol; this is a lone opinion that has not been clarified. Aside from this, there is a printing error there in the Tur regarding this entire matter, see there [see Beit Shmuel subsection 5 who brought proof from "Rabbi Shimon" in the Shas that kosher witnesses are not required, and it requires great study, for "Rabbi Hanina" and "Rabbi Shimon" do not refer to the first witnesses, but rather from whom they heard, see there in Rashi and Tosafot; and it is simple that Rabbeinu Tam is like Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Shimon is like Ulla, see there and examine closely].

Even when the rumor has spread and the beit din investigated and established through investigation that there is substance to the rumor and there is reason to fear that she was betrothed, it is only when there was no explanation with the rumor that breaks the rumor, for then even if she denies it and says she was not betrothed, she requires a get; but if there was an explanation with the rumor and they heard the explanation when they heard she was betrothed – she is not established as betrothed, but rather they ask her and rely on her words since there is no clear evidence there nor a strong rumor.

And what is the nature of the pretext? The Rambam wrote: If [it was said that] such-and-such a woman was betrothed on condition or it was a doubtful betrothal—she is not established [as betrothed]. Thus far his words. And the Tur wrote: For example, if a rumor spread that he betrothed her on condition, or that he threw her the betrothal money and it was a doubt whether it was close to him or close to her, or even if there is reason to consider a pretext to void the rumor, such as if there is doubt whether the betrothal money was worth a perutah or perhaps he was a minor—we do not concern ourselves with the rumor. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that the pretext exists in two ways: either that the public explicitly states the pretext, such as "on condition" or "doubtfully close to him or doubtfully close to her," which is like them saying themselves that there is a doubt in the betrothal; or even if the public does not cast doubt, but through their story it is possible to cast doubt, like those incidents mentioned in the Gemara where a rumor spread that he betrothed with dates that had not ripened, and according to this it is possible that if we came to appraise them they would not be worth a perutah; and similarly an incident where a rumor spread that one of the sons of such-and-such a person betrothed such-and-such a woman, and that person had adult and minor sons, and according to this it is possible that one of the minors betrothed and there is no betrothal here. For the primary concern that they concerned themselves with a rumor is because of the slander and not from the fundamental law, and since there is even an opening to say that there is no betrothal here, people will say that certainly the beit din investigated this well and found that there was no value of a perutah in this or that the minor betrothed.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention this second pretext, and some say that this too is included in his words where he wrote "doubtful kiddushin" [Beit Yosef], but from the Tur it does not imply so [Beit Shmuel, subsection 11]. And it appears clear to me that the Rambam has a different view on this, for behold, in the Gemara they said regarding those two incidents that even according to the one who says we do not nullify a kol, in these cases we do nullify it for the reason that people will say the beit din certainly investigated and found that there are no kiddushin here. And this is not a matter of a pretext at all, for when there is a pretext in the words of the public themselves, such as "on condition" or "a doubt close to him or to her," there is no need to nullify the kol at all; rather, we immediately do not concern ourselves with the kol. And there is a stringency in this as well, that if the pretext did not emerge together with the kiddushin, even if over the course of time the pretext emerged and the public says they were on condition or a doubt close to him or to her—it is not effective, for we require the pretext at the time of the kol, as will be explained. But those two incidents are not called a pretext at all, and if the public themselves do not cast this doubt that it is not worth a perutah or that he is a minor—we concern ourselves with the kol and she requires a get, except that in this case we require the nullification of the kol, which means that the beit din shall announce that there is no substance to the kol, for this is the explanation of the Shas that "we nullify the kol," meaning, through an announcement. But the Rambam ruled that we do not nullify a kol and omitted the entire dispute of whether we nullify a kol, and the Rif also did not mention the nullification of a kol; if so, we do not nullify a kol. Rather, regarding this matter it is superior to a pretext that emerges together with the kol, for this pretext is effective even if the pretext emerged over the course of time and the people say it is possible that in this case it was not worth a perutah or that the one performing kiddushin was a minor, it is effective. And the reason for the matter is that regarding a pretext of "on condition" or "a doubt close to him or to her," we do not accept it if over the course of time the pretext emerged, for why did they not say this at the time of the act? And since the kol was established, we do not pay attention to the pretext. But regarding the pretext that it is not worth a perutah, behold, even at the time of the act when the kol emerged they said "with what did he perform kiddushin?" And similarly when he is a minor, behold, at the time of the act they said that "one of the sons of so-and-so performed kiddushin," and the minor is included. However, even so, if the public themselves do not specify the permit, we do not rely on it to nullify the kol; but if over the course of time they specify the permit, we accept this as a pretext because the kol was not so strongly established. This is not the case with "on condition" or "a doubt close to him or to her," which is an entirely new matter; the kol has already been established and we do not accept the pretext after some time [and its source is from that which Rav Zevid said: "In a place of a pretext, we concern ourselves with the pretext," meaning, in a place where even according to the reports at the time of the kol there is a pretext, like those incidents above, we concern ourselves with the pretext even from now until ten days later, for on the contrary it stands, see there; and consequently it is proven that the halakhah is not like the one who says we nullify a kol even in those incidents above, and although the commentators did not write so, nevertheless so it appears to me, and examine it closely].

And this law that we wrote according to the Rambam, the Rambam explained it afterwards, as he wrote: If a rumor went out that she was betrothed to a certain person and after some days they stated an amatla, if the matters appear to the beit din to be so – they rely on the amatla and she is not established as betrothed, and if not, since the amatla was not heard at the time the betrothal was heard, they do not concern themselves with the amatla. Thus far his words, and so wrote the Shulchan Aruch in section 4. And the explanation of the matters – if the matters appear to the beit din to be so, for example, that the rumor that went out can sustain this amatla, like those incidents we wrote where they said at the time of the rumor with what he betrothed her and afterwards they themselves explained the amatla that it was not worth a perutah, and similarly with a minor as we wrote – they rely on this and she is not established as betrothed, because the rumor was not strengthened. But if not, for example, if the amatla is a new matter such as "on condition" or a doubt of "close to him" or "close to her," where the rumor at the time of the betrothal does not sustain this interpretation – they do not concern themselves with the amatla since the rumor has already been strengthened, and this is the intent of the Tur who wrote regarding the Rambam in the language of a dispute, for in truth he disagrees with the Tur according to what we explained regarding those two incidents [and the difficulty of Rav Papa from that which it teaches there implies at the time of the act, and all the more so it is difficult for Rabbah bar Rav Huna, and Rav Kahana challenges Rav Papa from "she was betrothed" etc., meaning that it is necessarily proven that sometimes even not at the time of the act it is effective, for this is like those incidents since they said to her "your husband died" it is like "on condition," if he died it shall be betrothal and if not it is not betrothal, and all the more so for Rabbah it works better, and he answers that it is different there because he comes and protests, meaning that everyone sees the falsehood, and all the difficulties of the Lechem Mishneh are resolved, see there and examine carefully].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 3 like the Tur, that even in these cases she is permitted immediately and they do not need to state the pretext. And in section 4 he transcribed the words of the Rambam that we brought. If so, it is impossible to explain that which he wrote, "if the matters appear so to the beit din," as referring to these cases, for regarding them the Tur does not require a pretext. It is also impossible to explain that it refers to a condition or a doubt of "close to him" or "close to her," for regarding this it is not relevant to say "that the matters appear so to the beit din," for by what would this appear? And some say that the intention is, for example, where initially a rumor spread that he betrothed her by throwing, and the pretext spread that it was close to him, and in my humble opinion, the Tur does not require a pretext for this at all. For how is it worse than one who betrothed her with inferior dates, where it is possible to say they are not worth a perutah even though it is possible they are worth a perutah; or with "one of the sons of so-and-so," where it is possible to say it refers to the minor even though it is possible to interpret it as referring to the adult? So too here regarding throwing: since it is possible to interpret that it was close to him, even though it is possible it was close to her, nevertheless there is a doubt, and why is it necessary for a pretext to spread?

Therefore, it appears to me that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, interprets that this refers to all types of explanations, even if the rumor spread that she was betrothed without qualification and afterwards a rumor spread that it was on a condition, or that he threw her the kiddushin and it was closer to him, the subsequent explanation is effective—provided that the beit din clarified with absolute clarity that it is so, that he betrothed her on a condition and the condition was not fulfilled, or that it was certainly closer to him. And that which he wrote, "if the matters appear to the beit din to be so," means that it became known to the beit din that it is so according to the explanation. And the reason for the matter is that in the Gemara they disagreed whether we cancel a rumor or not—meaning, when it becomes known that the kiddushin are not kiddushin—except that we are stringent and do not cancel a rumor. Therefore, granted that we ourselves do not cancel it, nevertheless, if this explanation emerged from the people, we certainly cancel the kiddushin. However, the great later authorities did not write so, and therefore one should be stringent in practice.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: If it was clarified afterward that the rumor was false, such as if the witnesses upon whom the kiddushin was based and in whose presence they were allegedly betrothed came and said "the matter never occurred" – we nullify the rumor; and some say that in this time we do not nullify a rumor. Thus far his words. And we have already explained that the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam is also that we do not nullify a rumor, and there are supports for this from the Shas as I wrote in section 13. Also, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, did not mention this at all. Our teacher, the Rema, holds that since the concern of a rumor is only a rabbinic concern, we therefore established the law according to the one who is lenient. Nevertheless, he was concerned for the "some say" that in this time we do not nullify it, because in the Gemara they dependent this upon the custom of the places, and we do not know which places we are from. And even in a place where we nullify a rumor, it is only when the witnesses upon whom they relied came and said that the matters were false; but if the witnesses who spread the rumor came and said it is false – we do not pay heed to them, since they are retracting their initial words. And some say that even in such a case it is effective, since from the beginning it was nothing more than a mere report; and all the more so if through investigation and inquiry they were caught in their words that the matter is false – it certainly is effective. And know, that regarding any rumor, if the witnesses upon whom they relied are near the city – it is not a rumor until they ask the witnesses, when the beit din sees that the rumor is continuously strengthening.

He wrote further: If he sent her savlonot while he was on a journey, we do not concern ourselves with the savlonot he sent her. Even though a rumor emerged from this that she is betrothed, we do not concern ourselves with the rumor, for it is common practice to call savlonot "kiddushin." Thus far his words. And he means to say that the beit din does not concern itself with investigating the rumor even if a general rumor emerged that she is betrothed, for this is like a rumor and its retraction with it; since it is known that he sent her savlonot, we attribute the rumor to them. For were it not for the savlonot, the beit din would be obligated to investigate the rumor, as I wrote in section 8. However, if the beit din investigated the rumor and found substance in it—that they testify to preparations for kiddushin and women rejoicing and saying she was betrothed, or they testify in the name of witnesses who went to the provinces overseas that there was actual kiddushin—certainly we concern ourselves with the rumor [see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 11 and Beit Shmuel subsection 15]. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that in any place where there is no need to be stringent, one should not be stringent regarding a rumor at all, so as not to give a hand to the wicked who would spread rumors about the daughters of Israel to leave them agunot or to extract money from them. Thus far his words. Therefore, in a place where there is no need to investigate the rumor because there is something to which it can be attributed, it is proper for the beit din not to investigate at all, unless according to their perception there is substance to the matter. And it is a simple matter that if the beit din sees that the hand of the wicked is involved in spreading a rumor, they are obligated to do everything possible against the workers of iniquity and to silence the rumors so that the daughters of Israel are not treated as ownerless.

If a rumor spread about her that she is betrothed to a certain man, and the rumor was established according to the law in a manner that she requires a get, and another man came and betrothed her in our presence with certain kiddushin – we return and investigate very thoroughly the kiddushin of the first man which are based on a rumor. If clear witnesses come with clear evidence that the kiddushin of the first are complete kiddushin – the kiddushin of the second are nothing, for kiddushin do not take effect with a married woman. This is specifically when she received kiddushin from the second not in the presence of the first, for if she received them in the presence of the first – it is obvious that she requires a get from the second, for a woman does not embolden herself in the presence of her husband to receive kiddushin from another, and it is as if she says "you divorced me," as written at the beginning of siman 17, see there. However, even to the second she is not permitted according to what our teacher, the Rema, wrote there, that we follow the stringency in this matter, see there. But if she received them not in his presence – she does not require a get from the second if the kiddushin of the first are certain kiddushin. And why is the beit din obligated to return and investigate the rumor of the first which was already investigated? Because if the rumor stands as it was, she is forbidden to the first as will be explained; therefore they return and investigate, and perhaps they will find the kiddushin of the first to be certain and she will remain under him, and we will not need to compel him to divorce her [as is implied in the Gemara].

And if the beit din returned and investigated and found no innovation regarding the kiddushin of the first, and the kol remains as before, the sages of blessed memory said that they compel the first, whose kiddushin are by a kol, to divorce her, and the second marries her because his kiddushin are certain. Nevertheless, he must perform kiddushin with her anew, for perhaps the kol of the first was true and his kiddushin do not take effect [it appears to me]. But the opposite—that the second should divorce her and the first should take her in—is forbidden, for perhaps they will say that he divorced her and the second performed kiddushin and divorced her, and it turns out that he is taking back his divorcee after she was betrothed to another. And if the second divorced her and the first took her in, it is possible that post facto he does not need to send her out, as it is a double doubt—perhaps the first did not perform kiddushin as the kol was false and she is permitted to him, and if you say he did perform kiddushin, perhaps he did not divorce her and consequently the kiddushin of the second and his get are nothing, and only ab initio he should not take her in [Rashba]. And it is possible that even post facto he must send her out, for since the reason is because of the world's slander, and people do not examine a double doubt; and see what I wrote in siman 31 [Chelkat Mechokek subsection 13, and see Beit Shmuel]. And all this is when the second did not take her in before the divorce of the first, for if he took her in and had relations with her, she is forbidden to him by Torah law if the kiddushin of the first were kiddushin, according to the law of a married woman who committed adultery, who is forbidden to the husband and the paramour; and she is forbidden to the first and the second, and both of them give her a get, and she is forbidden forever to both of them. And if there was only a chuppah—we have no concern with it [Beit Shmuel].

And all this is when the kiddushin of the first were via a rumor and the kiddushin of the second were certain; however, if those of the second were also via a rumor, such as if a rumor went out about her that she is betrothed to so-and-so and the beit din investigated the rumor and it was established as a rumor according to the law, and afterwards another rumor went out like the first rumor that she received kiddushin from another and the beit din investigated this rumor as well and it was also established as a rumor according to the law—in this case one divorces and one marries, whether the first or the last. And even though here too there is reason to be concerned that they might say he is taking back his divorcee after she was betrothed to another, nevertheless, since from the second there is also nothing here but a mere rumor, they were not stringent in this.

If a rumor spread about her that she was betrothed to a certain person and he divorced her, we are not concerned with forbidding her because of the betrothal, for behold, the rumor and its refutation are together; however, she is forbidden to a kohen because of the rumor of the divorce if the rumor was established in beit din according to the law. And if a rumor spread regarding betrothal and divorce, but the rumor is that the divorce was on a condition—some say that this too is called an amtaia, since in any event there is a side through which we nullify the betrothal, just as if the rumor spread that the betrothal was on a condition and they say that the condition was fulfilled and it is a get [Ramban]. And some say that this is not called an amtaia [Ra'avad], and it is not similar to a condition of betrothal where we say that the condition was not fulfilled and she remains in her status of an unmarried woman as before; but if regarding the betrothal there was a clear rumor and she left the status of an unmarried woman, to depend on the divorce that the condition was fulfilled—there is no proof that we depend on this [Beit Shmuel, subsection 11].

Our sages, of blessed memory, said: Any rumor that arises after marriage, and even after erusin—we do not concern ourselves with it. And the explanation of the matter is: specifically regarding an unmarried woman, if a rumor emerged and the rumor was established in beit din, we concern ourselves with the rumor and she requires a get; but if she is an arusah, and all the more so a married woman, even if the husband is a Yisrael such that she would not be forbidden to him if the subject of the rumor were to divorce her—such as if a rumor emerged that he betrothed her before she was betrothed to her husband—nevertheless, we do not concern ourselves with the rumor and she does not require a get from the subject of the rumor, so that she should not be disgraced before her husband. For a rumor is nothing more than a mere concern, and they only concerned themselves with it regarding unmarried women. And the same applies to the wife of a kohen who is living with her husband and a rumor emerged about her that she was a divorcee or a zonah—we do not concern ourselves with the rumor, for we do not remove a woman from her husband except with clear testimony [Rashi].

And there is a question regarding this – how do you find this law? For we hold that any rumor that was not established in beit din is nothing, even regarding an unmarried woman, and if so, regarding a betrothed or married woman, the beit din should not investigate the rumor, and consequently it is nothing? And the answer to this is that indeed it is so, for the sages commanded that the beit din should not investigate a rumor that emerged concerning a betrothed or married woman, and even if they investigated and found it to be an established rumor, we do not concern ourselves with it. And it is possible that they are obligated to investigate lest they find clear testimony, but it does not appear so from the poskim. Furthermore, even if the rumor emerged long ago while she was still unmarried, but it was not established in beit din until after she was betrothed – they do not investigate the rumor to establish it. For even if the witnesses say, "We heard from so-and-so and so-and-so and they went to the provinces overseas," and even if they say so before a beit din, this is nothing but a rumor and not a clear matter. And likewise, if they say that they saw the preparations and women say "she was betrothed" – this is not testimony according to the law, and why should we expand the rumor and cause more slander? Therefore, it is better not to investigate after this unless clear witnesses come [see Be'er Sheva subsection 21] [see Ran and it requires great study, and examine it closely].

Regarding that which we explained, that we do not concern ourselves with a rumor that arises after the erusin, our teacher, the Rema, wrote: However, if she subsequently admits that she was betrothed to the first—she is forbidden to her husband, since the rumor emerged first. Thus far his words. And even though we hold that a woman is not believed to forbid herself to her husband, nevertheless, in this case where the rumor assists her—she is believed. But the great Acharonim disagree on this, as it is proven from several places in the Shas that a woman is not believed to forbid herself to her husband even when she has some measure of assistance [as in the case at the end of Nedarim], unless there is clear evidence or grounds for the matter where it is explicitly apparent [and the explanation in the Responsa of the Rosh is clear as the Chelkat Mechokek wrote in subsection 17, that his intention was regarding the matter of the ketubah, that the first husband has the power to cause her to lose it if he wishes to divorce her; and see what I wrote in siman 48].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work in siman 42 in the name of the Rashba, that one who spreads a rumor of kiddushin regarding an unmarried woman, we compel him to clarify his words or to give a get, see there. And this is not an absolute rule, for on the contrary, sometimes we punish the one who spreads the rumor so as not to cast a slur upon the daughters of Israel, as the Rashba himself wrote in a responsum that we do not concern ourselves with a rumor, see there; rather, everything is according to the matter as he wrote there, for everything is handed over to a beit din that fears Heaven. For example, if they understand that there is substance to this, they force him to clarify or to give a get, but if they do not see substance in this—on the contrary, they punish him and silence the rumor [and one must further study the Chelkat Mechokek, subsection 17, who brought this as a decided law]. And it has already been explained that we do not concern ourselves with a rumor of mere hearsay, and the Rosh wrote in a responsum that if it happened that based on a rumor of hearsay he gave her a get and she became betrothed to another and he died—she is forbidden to return to the first, for the world will think that the get was according to the law and they will say that he is taking back his divorcee after she was betrothed to another, and see what I wrote in siman 10 and 48.