Siman 31

One does not betroth with less than the value of a perutah, and even if the woman is willing, it is of no avail, for it is not called "money" at all. And there is reason to doubt regarding an object that is not the value of a perutah whether she is able to say, "To me it is worth a perutah," just as with the five sela'im of the redemption of the son where the kohen is able to say so, as the Tur wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 305; or perhaps regarding monetary value one can say "to me it is worth more," but an object that is not money at all, one does not have the power to grant it the status of money. However, even there, there are opinions that this is specifically if it is truly worth five sela'im to this kohen, such as if it is his way to give for such an object more than its value; and according to this, even if it is worth the value of a perutah to this woman, if the witnesses do not know of this, that it is her way to pay dearly, there is no kiddushin here, for it is like one who betroths without witnesses. But the Rambam and the Tur there do not hold so, see there; and therefore there is reason to doubt in all cases if the woman says that to her it is the value of a perutah.

Nevertheless, if he betrothed her with an unspecified object, it is not necessary to appraise it beforehand if it is worth a perutah; rather, since it is in truth worth a perutah, she is betrothed retroactively from the time of the giving of the kiddushin. And it is not only necessary when he did not specify the value of the object at the time of the kiddushin, but even if he specified and said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this object which is worth fifty zuz," or if he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with fifty zuz, and here are these for their value" [Rashi] and they did not appraise its value beforehand, if it is found afterward that it is worth fifty zuz – she is betrothed retroactively from the time of the giving of the kiddushin. And there is room to doubt if the value of the object is lacking less than a sixth, which constitutes a waiver in buying and selling, if this law also applies to kiddushin. And in the case where he said, "Be betrothed to me with fifty zuz and here are these for their value" – certainly waiver is not applicable in this [Avnei Miluim]; and likewise, regarding a worth of a perutah, if its value is lacking less than a sixth, it is obvious that it is not money. However, in the case where he said, "Be betrothed to me with this object which is worth fifty zuz" and it is lacking less than a sixth – there is room to doubt this. And it appears that in kiddushin this is not applicable, for the reason for waiver in buying and selling was written by the Tur in Choshen Mishpat siman 227, that such is the way of buying and selling, for they cannot calibrate exactly, and it is the way of the world to waive for less than a sixth, see there. But in kiddushin, which is a rare occurrence to betroth with an object and state its value, it is not applicable to say in this that it is the way of the world to waive. Furthermore, since we see that these people are particular, in that they did not act according to the way of the world's custom in kiddushin, it is certainly unlikely that she would waive. Furthermore, behold the reason that an appraisal beforehand is not required even though a woman is not expert in appraisal and we should have said that her mind was not resolved regarding its value, nevertheless we do not say so, but rather we say that her mind was resolved; and if we say that even with less than a sixth she is betrothed, certainly her mind was not resolved, for perhaps it is lacking in its value a bit more and it will be a sixth or a bit more, for how is it possible to be precise in every small amount? Rather, it is certain that its value must be in its fullness; nevertheless, in practice, it requires further study.

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 7, law 18: If he said to her, "Behold, you are betrothed to me with these garments which are worth fifty dinars," and they were of silk or the like which a woman desires, if they were worth fifty—behold, she is betrothed from the moment of taking, and there is no need for an assessment in the market and only afterwards she would be betrothed so that her mind would be at ease; rather, since they are worth as much as he said to her, behold, she is betrothed from the first moment, and if they are not worth that much—she is not betrothed. Thus far his words. And it is clarified from his words that specifically regarding things that a woman desires, there is no need for a prior assessment, but regarding things that a woman does not desire, a prior assessment is required [Ran and the Maggid Mishneh]. It is also understood from his words that even regarding things that require an assessment, if they did not assess it, the kiddushin are not void, but rather they do not take effect until they are assessed [ibid.]; however, there are some of our teachers who hold that if an assessment is required and they did not assess them, they are not kiddushin at all [Rashi], but they hold as a matter of law that an assessment is not required for anything [Ran in the name of others]. And some say that it is also the opinion of the Rambam that in a case where an assessment is required, a subsequent assessment is of no use unless he betrothes her anew, but rather this is what he means: that for a thing that does not require an assessment, we do not say that they should assess it and afterwards he should betroth her since it does not require an assessment, but in a case where an assessment is required—they should assess it and afterwards he should betroth her, and if he betrothed her without an assessment— the subsequent assessment is of no use [Bach and Beit Shmuel, subsection 1].

However, it is certain that in a matter requiring an appraisal, and they did not appraise it beforehand but appraised it afterward and he returned and betrothed her anew—she is betrothed, even though he did not take the object back [Rashba]. And also if she remained silent and did not say "yes," but only did not throw it from her hand—she is betrothed. And this is not like silence after the giving of money, for here, since she received it for the sake of kiddushin beforehand, it is better than a case where they had arranged the marriage [Beit Shmuel]. And we have already explained in siman 27, section 25, that this is not similar to the cases of doubtful language explained there, where he must take the kiddushin from her when he betrothes her once more; see there.

There is one who says that when one betrothed with stolen property, which are not kiddushin as explained at the beginning of siman 28, and afterwards he purchased this object from the victim of the theft—the kiddushin take effect from that moment when this object is still in existence in the hand of the woman [Beit Shmuel there, end of subsection 3 in the name of the Ritva]. However, according to the opinion of our teachers that was explained, that regarding an object that requires an assessment and they did not assess it they are not kiddushin at all, also regarding stolen property where he afterwards purchased it, the kiddushin do not take effect [Beit Shmuel subsection 1]. And it appears to me that even according to the one who holds of the opinion of the Rambam regarding assessment, that the kiddushin take effect when they assess them as I have written, nevertheless, regarding stolen property where he afterwards purchased it, he would admit that they are not kiddushin. For it is well and good regarding assessment, where the object is his but she did not rely in her mind, it can be said that she relied in her mind that when they assess them the kiddushin shall take effect; but regarding stolen property where the object is not his at all, by what shall the kiddushin take effect afterwards? Behold, there are no witnesses here who saw the kiddushin, for at the time of the witnesses' observation the kiddushin were nothing, and what does this have to do with assessment? And I am astonished at whoever holds thus regarding stolen property, that the kiddushin should take effect afterwards. And this is not similar to what is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 374 regarding one who steals a field and sells it and afterwards the thief purchases it from the victim, where we establish that the field is confirmed in the hand of the buyer, for there the reason is because it is pleasing to him that he should stand by his trustworthiness, but regarding kiddushin this is not applicable [Tosafot Kiddushin 63a]. And even though also regarding kiddushin it is certainly pleasing to him that they should be kiddushin, nevertheless what does it avail? For behold we explained there that even though there is no kinyan here, nevertheless it is like one who says "this field is acquired to you when I purchase it," and this does not avail, for a person cannot transfer an object that has not yet come into the world, and the reason is because of the reliance of the mind as explained there. But regarding kiddushin which require witnesses, whichever way you look at it, it does not avail; for if the witnesses see that it is stolen, there are no kiddushin here at all, and if they did not know, it is obvious that it does not avail. And also the other reasons that we explained there are not applicable at all to kiddushin. And behold, even regarding stolen property where the owners despaired, if the change of domain was before the despair, we explained in siman 28 section 10 that it does not avail even according to the Rambam, who does not require the despair before the change of domain, since at the time of the kiddushin they were not his, see there [and so wrote the Beit Shmuel there, subsection 4], and all the more so in a case such as this.

It appears to me that there is no opinion among the Rishonim who would maintain this regarding a stolen object. That which says it is effective refers to one who enters the house of his fellow and betrothes her with an object belonging to the homeowner, and the homeowner comes and says to him, "Go to the better ones," for he has revealed his mind that he is pleased with it. In this case, he maintains that since he revealed his mind that he was pleased with it from the outset, this is not like a stolen object and the kiddushin take effect from this point forward. But regarding a completely stolen object, he does not maintain this. Furthermore, even this law is not clear to him, for see there that he concludes that in his opinion it is not so. We have already explained this law there in section 71, that even if he said this with a whole heart, he must betroth her afterwards; see there. And what he wrote there in subsection 44, he cited this in the name of the Ritva, see there; and his words there and in the final subsection and in this siman, subsection 1, require great study, for one who examines the Ritva there will see that as a matter of law he does not maintain this even there, and certainly not regarding a completely stolen object.

We have already explained the opinion of the Rambam that regarding items for which a woman does not have a longing, an appraisal is required. There are some of our teachers who hold a different distinction in this matter: that regarding all objects for which most of the world is expert in their appraisal and the money involved in them is a small amount—an appraisal is not required. However, regarding precious stones and pearls and the like, for which most of the world is not expert in their appraisal and sometimes they err in them greatly out of proportion, and he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this precious stone which is worth fifty zuz"—an appraisal is required, for behold, her mind did not rely on the fact that it is worth that much [the Rosh]. According to this, there is no concern except when he said to her that it is worth such and such, but if he betrothed her without specification—there is no concern. And there are some of our teachers who hold that even without specification there is a concern, for her mind did not rely because she always errs; even though he said to her that he is betrothng her with any amount, nevertheless she believes it is worth a lot and errs in this, and therefore in every case an appraisal is required [the Ran in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, and so it appears in Tosafot 9a, for if not so, what is the difficulty from a nophekh? And furthermore, according to the "there are those who say" (7b), they disagree even regarding any amount, see there].

Our teachers wrote that therefore the world is accustomed to betroth with a ring that has no stone in it, for if it had a stone in it, an appraisal would be required as has been written, and they were not concerned for the opinion of the Rambam; or perhaps even with a ring without a stone the woman desires it, and certainly it is proper to satisfy even his great opinion and betroth with something that the woman desires. And perhaps it is for this reason that our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2 that it is the custom under the chuppah to ask the witnesses if the ring is worth a perutah so that the bride will know that he is betrothing her only with the value of a perutah, thus far his words. And with this, it is also settled according to the Rambam, for they have appraised the ring. However, in our provinces, it is not the custom to ask the witnesses. He further wrote that it is also the custom to cover the faces of modest brides and they are not particular about what he betroths them with, thus far his words; meaning that by covering their faces, it is as if they are saying "betroth me with whatever you wish, provided it is worth a perutah," and this custom is widespread throughout the entire province. According to this, it is settled even according to the opinion of the Rambam. And even so, why is it not our custom to betroth with a ring that has a stone in it? For it can be said that one cannot rely on this alone, for when she knows it has a precious stone in it, she will always err in her mind to say that it is worth a great deal, and the kiddushin would not be valid according to our other teachers. As is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 227 regarding the matter of ona'ah, that even when one says "on condition that you have no claim of ona'ah against me," nevertheless there is ona'ah if it is worth much more than what he says, because one can say: "Since I saw that it was worth more than what you said, I knew that you only said it to appease me." Therefore, the woman will also err in this even if the witnesses say it is only worth a perutah. And even if they cover her face and she shows that she is not particular as has been written, nevertheless this is effective according to the opinion of the Rambam and according to the opinion of our other teachers regarding all objects; but with a ring with a precious stone, which every woman knows is worth a very great deal, all these will not be effective according to our other teachers, for she will still say: "Even though I covered my face, nevertheless I knew it was worth a great deal," and if so, we would require an appraisal before the kiddushin. Therefore, the custom among us is to cover the face of the bride and also not to betroth with a ring that has a precious stone in it, in order to satisfy all opinions.

And a great question should be asked regarding this: since they cover the face of the bride and the witnesses of the kiddushin do not see whom he is betrothing, why should we not be concerned that it is like one who betroths without witnesses? However, with us there is no concern in this, for it is known that they led this virgin to the chuppah and it was established by presumption that she is the one being betrothed, and we stone based on presumptions [Avnei Miluim]. But nevertheless, this is testimony of knowledge without seeing, which is effective in monetary laws as is written in Choshen Mishpat at the end of siman 30, but not in capital cases. And in matters of gittin and kiddushin, knowledge without seeing is also effective, for we learn the matter of witnesses for gittin and kiddushin from the word "matter" written regarding monetary law [ibid. and Mikneh in siman 42]. Furthermore, this is also considered seeing, since she was revealed afterward and everyone sees her, just as if witnesses saw someone whose face was covered and he killed a person, would they not be able to bring this man to beit din and testify against him? [see Pitchei Teshuvah]. Furthermore, this is actual seeing when the entire body stands before the witnesses, for there is recognition by visual identification of the body even without the features of the face according to the method of Rabbeinu Tam that was explained in siman 17. Furthermore, with us, when they give her to drink from the cup of erusin that precedes the kiddushin, her form must necessarily be partially revealed, and it is actual seeing [it appears to me]. [And the intent of the Maharit, who distinguishes between seeing the kiddushin and seeing the woman, means in her recognition, but there is seeing, and the difficulty of the Avnei Miluim is settled].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: If he betrothed her with a ring that has a stone in it or with an unspecified ring and it was found to be of copper, even though it is not the practice to betroth with such, we are concerned for the kiddushin; and even if the witnesses said under the chuppah that it is of gold and it was found to be copper, even though regarding the law it appears that she is not betrothed, nevertheless one should be stringent regarding the practical act. Thus far his words. And he wrote that therefore they are accustomed to ask the witnesses if the ring is worth a perutah and also to cover the face of the bride as has been written, for in such a case, even when it is found to be of copper, there is no betrothal in error here, and there is no difference between one who actually betroths with copper and one who betroths with gold and it is found to be of copper, provided that it is worth a perutah. And the explanation of his words is that according to our custom it is in every case certain kiddushin, and even without this we are concerned for the kiddushin since he betrothed her with an unspecified ring without stating its value, and even though the witnesses said it was of gold, nevertheless he did not mislead her, rather the witnesses misled her. And in truth there is no practical difference in this, and she can say "I relied upon the witnesses," and this is as if he himself misled her, but in practice it is difficult to release her without a get, and this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote, that one should be stringent regarding the practical act even though according to the law it appears that it is not kiddushin. However, according to the custom to cover her face, even according to the law one must be concerned, since this is like her saying that she does not mind; and nevertheless, if another came and betrothed her, it appears that she requires a get also from the second, since the witnesses explicitly said that it was of gold. And in one who betrothed with an unspecified ring or with one that has a precious stone—it is obvious that she is completely betrothed according to our custom to cover her. And know that there is one who wrote that we do not betroth with a coin, and we have already explained in siman 27 that it is not so.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 4, law 19: One who betroths with less than a perutah – she is not betrothed; if he betrothed her with a vessel or with food and the like which is worth less than a perutah – behold, she is betrothed out of doubt and requires a get out of doubt, lest this object is worth a perutah in another place. Thus you have learned that anyone who betroths with the equivalent of money, if it was worth a perutah in that city, behold these are certain kiddushin, and if it is not worth a perutah, behold these are kiddushin of doubt. It appears to me that if he betrothed with a cooked dish or with a vegetable that does not endure and the like, if they were not worth a perutah in that place – she is not betrothed at all, for behold, this object will not reach another place before it spoils and is lost and will not be worth a perutah. Thus far his words. And one cannot say even when it is worth a perutah in another place what concern is there, for behold the witnesses see that he betroths her with less than a perutah and it should be like one who betroths without witnesses; for it can be said that since the witnesses also have this doubt – it is kiddushin with witnesses [Beit Shmuel]. For some say that the opinion of the Rambam is that if it is known that it is worth a perutah in another place regarding an object that endures, it is certain kiddushin [Tur], and it must be said that this was also known to the witnesses, for if not so, it would be like one who betroths without witnesses regarding the matter of certain kiddushin. And some say that even the Rambam does not hold that it would be certain kiddushin for a reason that will be explained [Maggid Mishneh].

And there are some of our teachers who said that this concern—that perhaps it is worth a perutah in another place—is not a Torah concern, for certainly in every transaction you have only its place and its time according to the market value standing there at that time, for even regarding hekdesh they said that hekdesh has only its place and its time [Arachin 24]. Rather, the reason for the stringency is lest there be a man from that place where it is worth a perutah there, and if he sees that we do not concern ourselves with the kiddushin, they also will not concern themselves in their place [Ran]. And according to this, there is no difference between an item that spoils before it arrives there and one that does not spoil. And so too, according to this reason, even if there are witnesses that it is worth a perutah in another place, it is not certain kiddushin since here it is not worth it, but rather a doubt of kiddushin, and it is also not like all other doubts but is merely a rabbinic stringency. And also according to the reasoning of the Rambam, one should not ask: why should we concern ourselves with the doubt that perhaps it is worth a perutah in another place, let us establish her on her status of being unmarried? For it can be said that since an act of kiddushin was performed with her, her status was weakened; and furthermore, this is a matter that is possible to clarify, and we do not rely on a status.

And there is one who wrote regarding the reasoning of the Rambam that the reason it is a Torah betrothal when it is worth a perutah elsewhere is because since it is worth a perutah elsewhere, it is as if she says, "to me, it is worth a perutah," and even though we wrote in section 1 that even when she says "to me it is worth a perutah" it is a doubt, that is when it is not known if it is worth a perutah elsewhere, but when it is known, she can say so. And one cannot say, from where do we know that she is willing to receive it for a perutah, for it is certainly so, since she received them for the sake of kiddushin and everyone knows that a woman is not betrothed with less than a worth of a perutah, she presumably received them for a perutah since it is worth a perutah elsewhere. And also regarding that which we wrote in section 11 that the witnesses also need to know of this, that it is worth a perutah elsewhere, some say that even this is not necessary, for the witnesses before us see with what he betrothes her, and in the place of high cost there are witnesses that this thing is worth a perutah, and one should not consider the witnesses before us as testifying to half a matter since they testify to all that they saw and they are unable to see more, just as three sets of witnesses join together regarding the matter of chazakah in Choshen Mishpat siman 145. And to me it seems primary as I wrote in section 11, that this is not similar to there, for there the witnesses do not contradict one another, but here, according to the sight of the witnesses before us, there are no kiddushin here, and what benefit is there that there are witnesses at a distance that there it is worth a perutah.

And one should not ask how it is possible to say the reason is that it is as if she says, "To me it is worth a perutah," for if so, we should say this even regarding an object that does not endure, and why did the Rambam divide between an object that endures and one that does not endure? For it can be said that certainly it is so, as I wrote in section 1, that it is not within one's power to make money from something that is not money at all, see there; and if so, regarding an object that spoils before it arrives there, it is not money at all.

And there is one who is uncertain regarding the poskim who hold that even if it is worth a perutah in another place, they are not kiddushin of the Torah—and also regarding the opinion of the Rambam there are those who hold so, as I wrote at the end of section 11—and for the reason that you have nothing in any matter except its place and its time: if the woman needs to travel immediately to that place where it is worth a perutah, if they are certainly kiddushin of the Torah according to all opinions, or if even in such a case they are only kiddushin of doubt. And from the language of the Rishonim it is implied that in any case they are not certain kiddushin. And even though regarding ma'aser sheni we established that a woman is not betrothed with it for the reason that it is "property of Heaven," as I wrote in siman 28 section 86, but were it not for this reason, they said in the Gemara [53b] that she would be betrothed with it; and ma'aser sheni is not worth anything in the province until they bring it to Jerusalem [Rashi ibid. s.v. mishum], and nevertheless the kiddushin take effect immediately when he betrothed her in the province [Tosafot ibid.]. For it is not comparable, as there the essence of its mitzvah is such, and when he betrothed her with ma'aser sheni she knew that an obligation is upon her to go to Jerusalem and eat it. To what is this comparable? To one who betrothed a woman on a fast day with a food item; even though now it is worth nothing, yet she accepted that in the evening she will eat it and she knows that the necessity is so. And so too regarding ma'aser sheni, everyone pays a perutah for it because they know that in Jerusalem they will eat it. This is not the case with a thing that is not worth a perutah here; one will not find any man who will pay a perutah for this even though it is worth a perutah in another place [and the difficulty of the Beit Shmuel at the end of subsection 6 is answered]. Therefore, for the law, one must be stringent in every case, and they are kiddushin of doubt.

There is one who says that if he betrothed with an etrog that is not worth a perutah, and only by virtue of its mitzvah is it worth a perutah—she is not betrothed [Birkei Yosef in the name of Mishneh LaMelech], and there are those who are uncertain regarding this. And it appears to me that certainly if for all of Israel it is worth a perutah by virtue of its mitzvah and it is sold in the market for a perutah—she is certainly betrothed, for what does it matter to me if its value is because it is needed for eating or because it is needed for a mitzvah; ultimately it is worth a perutah. And if for everyone it is not worth a perutah even by virtue of the mitzvah because it is very common, yet to her it is worth a perutah as she says "to me it is worth a perutah because of the mitzvah," if in truth she cannot obtain another for the mitzvah—it is certainly better than a kohen who says "to me it is worth five sela'im" which we brought in section 1 even though for everyone else it is not worth a perutah. However, if she also can obtain another, only she says that to her, because of the preciousness of the mitzvah, it is worth a perutah—it appears like the first opinion that she is not betrothed, for the value of a mitzvah is not money, as even a mitzvah performed in the choice manner is not called money relative to one not performed in the choice manner if it is not possible to sell it at a higher price [as is proven in Bava Kamma 78b; and see Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 1 who compared this to what the Chakham Tzevi wrote, but according to our words this is not a comparison; and also the primary proof of the great authorities from the Rambam at the end of chapter 4 of Hilkhot Mamrim was rejected by the Noda BiYehudah in siman 67 with good reason, see there; nevertheless, it appears to me as the law like what I wrote, but nonetheless, in practice, it requires further study].

It is a simple matter that the concern that perhaps it is worth a perutah in another place is only regarding one who betroths without specification, but if he said to her that this object is worth a perutah and it is found that it is not worth a perutah here, even if it is worth a perutah in another place—she is not betrothed, for even if he said to her that it is worth a hundred maneh and it is found that it is not worth that much, she is not betrothed, and there is nothing to doubt in this. Nevertheless, there is one who is uncertain in this and it requires further study [see Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 6].

Regarding this concern that perhaps it is worth a perutah in another place, even though there are some among the Rishonim who ruled that we do not concern ourselves with this [Ba'al HaHalachot Gedolot], nevertheless, all our teachers the Rishonim and the Geonim ruled that we do concern ourselves with this. Therefore, this opinion was not cited at all in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch; and even if it is worth a perutah in a distant place, we concern ourselves with it [as is implied in the Gemara]. And there is no distinction between whether it can endure or cannot endure, as we have explained that according to most of the Rishonim, since this is a rabbinic concern, there is no distinction in this. Even according to the Rambam, it is only when it is impossible in any way for it to endure, but a moist fig that is capable of being dried and transported—even according to the Rambam we concern ourselves with it [Beit Yosef], and so too anything similar to this. However, regarding something that according to appearances is not worth a perutah in any place, one should not be concerned with this, and particularly since according to most poskim this is only a rabbinic concern; and in practice, it requires further study.

That which we say, that she is betrothed out of doubt lest this item is worth a perutah in another place—she requires a get to permit her to the world, and if he wishes to maintain her, she requires other kiddushin; and even if it is known that it is worth a perutah in another place, since according to most poskim these are only kiddushin d'rabbanan. And some say that she does not require other kiddushin, just as with the kiddushin of a minor where the kiddushin are d'rabbanan and when she grows up he intends to betroth her through intercourse, and so too here. However, regarding the concern that perhaps it is worth a perutah in another place, these are not even complete kiddushin d'rabbanan but merely a concern. And even though the reason regarding a minor is because a person knows that according to the Torah the kiddushin of a minor are nothing and therefore when he has intercourse during her adulthood he has intercourse for the sake of kiddushin, indeed here too a person knows that there is no Torah kiddushin in kiddushin of less than a perutah and he will have intercourse for the sake of kiddushin. And some say further that in any case he does not require other kiddushin, for even in mistaken kiddushin he does not need to return and betroth her because his intercourse acquires and he does not require other kiddushin. But this is not the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, and so it is written in siman 42 that in doubtful kiddushin one must return and betroth, see there. And also regarding this which we wrote, that a person knows that a woman is not betrothed with less than a perutah, there is a dispute regarding this in the Gemara; and therefore in any case he must betroth her anew ab initio, for according to the Rambam this entire matter is like doubtful kiddushin.

When he betroths her anew, he must betroth her with a full perutah, and we do not say that the previous amount that was less than a perutah combines with this to reach a perutah, for they do not combine with one another according to the opinion of most poskim. For the previous ones were rabbinic kiddushin and are hers, and she does not need to return them to him as written in siman 50; if so, she has already acquired this. Only according to the Rambam, where they are kiddushin of doubt and the kiddushin return as written there, can he combine them. However, if the previous ones were already consumed, it is a loan and they do not combine.

If another came and betrothed her with complete kiddushin – the first must divorce and the second may marry her, but the second may not divorce and the first marry her, as a decree lest they say that it is permitted to take back one's divorcee after she was married to another. For since the rumor spread that the first betrothed her and afterwards the second betrothed her and she returned, they will say that the first divorced her and the second married her and divorced her and she returned and married the first. And even though in siman 10 it was explained regarding the kiddushin of a deaf-mute that since it is only rabbinic they were not stringent with this decree, that is because with a deaf-mute there are no Torah kiddushin at all; however, in a case where there are Torah kiddushin, even though in these kiddushin there are no Torah kiddushin, nevertheless we decree, as was written there in section 4 regarding a minor, see there [and the difficulty of the Beit Shmuel in subsection 9 is answered].

And this, that she is permitted to the second—specifically when the second did not have relations with her prior to the divorce from the first; but if he had relations with her, she is forbidden to the first according to the law of a married woman who committed adultery, and consequently she is also forbidden to the second, for just as she is forbidden to the husband, so she is forbidden to the paramour. And even though the primary matter of the first is only rabbinic according to most poskim, nevertheless, we judge this like Torah kiddushin, as written in siman 46 regarding when a rumor spreads that she is betrothed even though the rumor was not clarified by witnesses, see there. And it is not specifically that he had relations with her, but even if she was secluded with him, we say the witnesses of seclusion are the witnesses of relations [see there in the Be'er Sheva, subsection 18], and the general rule is that in any place where she requires a get from this one and from that one, we judge thus. And some say further that even if she married the second based on the ruling of a sage, she is forbidden to this one and to that one; and even if we say regarding uncertain kiddushin that when she marries another she shall not leave because the offspring is presumed permitted since we establish her in the status of an unmarried woman, and it is not similar to "two and two" where we hold she shall leave—however, this uncertainty of perhaps it was worth a perutah in another place is more stringent than uncertain kiddushin [Be'er Sheva, subsection 10]. And the reason is that since an act of kiddushin occurred here, but the uncertainty is in the value, her status is impaired, as written in siman 30, section 15. And some are lenient in this [see Avnei Miluim, subsection 12], and the main point is like the first opinion, for so ruled our teacher, the Rema, in section 4; however, from what we wrote in siman 17, section 262, it is explained according to the opinion of those who are lenient, see there.

Nevertheless, regarding the offspring she bore from the second before the first gave a get – the offspring is kosher, and he is obligated to divorce her. For since the kiddushin of the first are nothing but a mere concern that perhaps it was worth a perutah in another place, we are not to make the offspring from the second a mamzer. This is not similar to what the sages penalized in the case of a woman who heard her husband died and married another and it was found that he is alive, where the offspring is a mamzer from this one and from that one; for there they penalized her because she married under the prohibition of a married woman and she should have investigated, as I wrote at the end of siman 17. Therefore, if a rumor actually spread that it was worth a perutah in another place, and certainly if it was clarified that it was worth a perutah in another place – the children from the second are doubtful mamzerim [Beit Shmuel]. But without this, even according to the Rambam as some have understood his words that it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, nevertheless there is no Torah prohibition and the children are kosher. For even if it becomes known that it was worth a perutah in another place, nevertheless at the time of the kiddushin this was not known to the witnesses, and it is like one who betrothes without witnesses [ibid.]. But if at the time of the kiddushin the rumor spread and was known also to the witnesses – they are indeed doubtful mamzerim; and see what I wrote in section 26.

If the second man also betrothed her with that same object worth less than a perutah – she is permitted to the first man and does not require a get from the second, regardless of the circumstances: if it is worth a perutah in another place, then she is betrothed to the first, and if not, the betrothals of both of them are not betrothals. And if she received a get from the second – she is forbidden to his relatives, as I wrote at the end of siman 15, that in any place where she received a get, even if it is superfluous, the law is such, see there; and consequently, she is forbidden to the first. And if the second man betrothed her with another object worth less than a perutah, she requires by law a get also from the second, for one could say that the first man's object is not worth a perutah in another place while the second man's object is worth one [ibid.]. And some say that in such a case she is permitted also to the first and we do not concern ourselves with the get of the second, just as in siman 46 regarding a rumor of betrothal that went out about her from this one and from that one, see there, and this is similar to it [Chelkat Mechokek subsection 10]. And according to this, all the more so in the first case when the second man betrothed her with the same object that the first man betrothed her with, that she is permitted to the first; and even according to the Rambam that it is a doubt regarding a Torah prohibition, nevertheless he holds that a Torah doubt is, by Torah law, ruled leniently [Avnei Miluim]. And even though he is certainly forbidden to her relatives so that they should not say he is marrying the relative of his divorcee, and likewise she is forbidden to his relatives as I wrote in siman 15, nevertheless to return to him there is no concern that they will say he is remarrying his divorcee after she was married to another. However, it is not comparable to siman 46, for there it is a mere rumor and they will say it was clarified that the rumor was false, but here where there were betrothals, only that it was not worth a perutah, one could say it is more stringent [see Tosafot Gittin 90a]. Nevertheless, there is no clear proof for this, and since the essence of this law is a rabbinic doubt according to most poskim – it is possible to be lenient in this.

The Tur wrote in the name of our teacher, Meir HaLevi: If one betrothed with something that we do not know now whether it was worth a perutah at the time of the kiddushin or not – we follow its current status, and if it is worth a perutah now, it is a certain kiddushin until it is clarified by witnesses that it was not worth a perutah at the time of the kiddushin. And if it is possible to clarify through witnesses that it was worth a perutah at the time of the kiddushin, we are concerned for them and we do not permit her even if the witnesses are very far from here; it is not only necessary to say if it is known that there are witnesses who know, but even if a rumor emerged that there are witnesses who know that it was worth a perutah, we are concerned for them. However, we do not forbid her based on the word of a woman or based on a relative who says that they knew it was worth a perutah at that time. Thus far his words.

And we are concerned for the rumor even when the rumor was not established in beit din [Beit Yosef], and even though any rumor that was not established in the beit din is nothing, as is written in siman 46, this is regarding a rumor about the essence of the kiddushin; however, when the kiddushin are certain and the doubt is regarding its value, we are concerned [it appears to me]. And also regarding the matter of a doubt of mamzerut in section 23, it is also even with a rumor that was not established in beit din for the reason we explained. And if the object now is not worth a perutah and we do not know how it was at the time of the kiddushin, it automatically becomes a case of doubtful kiddushin, for even if at the time of the kiddushin it was not worth a perutah, we are concerned that it is worth a perutah in another place. And the general rule of the matter is that we never have to concern ourselves that the object changed at the time of the kiddushin from how we see it now, and we follow the present state [Chelkat Mechokek subsection 11].

And there is one who says that regarding a transaction we do not follow the present status, for transactions are prone to constant change, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 227 section 12. According to this, even when it is presently worth a perutah, they are not certain kiddushin, for if another were to betroth her, she would not require a get from him; for she certainly requires a get because perhaps it was not worth a perutah at the time of the kiddushin. And it seems to me that the primary view is like the plain meaning of the wording of the Tur, that we follow the present status. And even though it is the way of the market price to change, nevertheless, since the majority of people do not betroth with less than the value of a perutah, it is sufficient for us if we say that when it is presently worth less than a perutah, we should be concerned that perhaps also at the time of the kiddushin it was not worth a perutah. But when it is presently worth a perutah, to be concerned that perhaps at the time of the kiddushin it was not worth a perutah—it is obvious that one should not be concerned to remove it from the present chazakah which is supported by the majority. And a proof for this is from that which we established in siman 37 regarding a na'arah who betrothed herself in the evening on the day of the change from na'arut to bagrut, and her father betrothed her in the morning, that the kiddushin of the father do not take effect; because there is no contradictory chazakah here, we follow the present status—since she is presently a bogeret, in the morning she was also a bogeret, see there. And all the more so when there is a majority that supports the present chazakah. And even though the chazakah of being unmarried contradicts the present chazakah, nevertheless, a majority is superior to a chazakah. And as for why we do not follow the present chazakah in Choshen Mishpat siman 251 regarding the gift of a shekhiv mera where the giver says he was a shekhiv mera and the recipient says he was healthy, that the recipient must bring proof even if the giver is now healthy—this is because of the chazakah of money that the giver possesses. And one cannot say that here too there is a chazakah of money, that if we say it was less than the value of a perutah the money should return to him, for it is not so—firstly, because less than the value of a perutah is not considered money, and furthermore, because we have already explained that the kiddushin money does not return. However, from the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in Bedek HaBayit, it is also implied that they are not certain kiddushin, see there. And the law requires further study. And all the more so if he betrothed her with an object and said to her that it is worth a maneh, and they did not appraise it at its time and afterwards they appraised it—whether it was found to be worth a maneh or whether it was found not to be worth a maneh—they are kiddushin of doubt.

It is a simple matter that when one betrothes with three or four items, each of which is not worth a perutah but in their joining they are worth a perutah, if he betrothed her with all of them—she is מקודשת. If he said, "Be betrothed to me with one of them"—she is not מקודשת, except for a doubtful betrothal lest it is worth a perutah in another place, as has been written. And even if he betrothed her with all of them, but he betrothed her with each one individually, they do not join with one another, since he divided the designation of the betrothal upon each one. Therefore, one who says to a woman, "Be betrothed to me with this date, be betrothed to me with this one, be betrothed to me with this one"—if there is in one of them the value of a perutah, she is מקודשת, and if not, she is not מקודשת except out of doubt lest one date is worth a perutah in another place. But if he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this one, and this one, and this one"—they all join together, so that if there is in all of them the value of a perutah, she is מקודשת, and if not, she is not מקודשת except out of doubt, as has been written.

It is explained from this that when he says "with this, and with this, and with this," it is as if he included them all together, like one who says "be betrothed to me with these." The Rambam wrote similarly in chapter 5, law 27. And even though in chapter 7 of Shevuot he ruled that when one swears an oath "that you have nothing in my hand, nor you, nor you," it is as if he specifies each one individually, and similarly regarding an oath "that you have no wheat, nor barley, nor spelt in my hand," and he ruled similarly in chapter 4 of Nedarim, see there; however, the Rambam holds that even though this language is like specifying each one individually, nevertheless, this language is also inclusive. And when there is not the value of a perutah in each one, we say his intention was to include them. All the more so regarding kiddushin, which does not take effect with less than the value of a perutah, certainly his intention was to include them all together; and only when there is the value of a perutah in each one do we say it tends more toward specifying than toward including. And so it is stated explicitly in the Yerushalmi Kiddushin [chapter 2, halacha 1] and in the Yerushalmi Shevuot [chapter 5, halacha 4]. And even though in our Shas it does not imply this [46a], the Rambam, of blessed memory, holds that in our Shas as well there is one who disagrees with this [Shevuot 38a, for Rabbi Yochanan said a perutah from all of them combines; that is to say, even regarding wheat, barley, and spelt when there is not a perutah in each one, for Rabbi Yochanan says so there in the Yerushalmi and disagrees with Rabbah there, and the difficulty of the Kesef Mishneh, the Lechem Mishneh, the Beit Shmuel subsection 12, the Atzei Arazim, and the HaMakneh is resolved; and examine this carefully].

Sometimes, even when saying "Be betrothed to me with this, and with this, and with this," they do not combine together to the value of a perutah; for example, if she was eating them one by one until she had eaten them all by the time he finished his words. Since the kiddushin are not completed until she receives them all, and she already ate them before she acquired them through her kiddushin, therefore all the dates until the last one are considered like a loan in her possession. It is not similar to one who says to a woman, "Be betrothed to me after thirty days," where she is betrothed even if the money was consumed, as written in siman 40, and it is not like a loan, for he gave it to her for kiddushin and she ate her own. But here, since the kiddushin were not completed until the last one, it is like a loan [Tosafot], except for the last one which is not like a loan because at the time she ate it the kiddushin were already completed and she ate her own. Therefore, if the last one is worth a perutah, she is betrothed; and if not, she is only betrothed out of doubt. And even if all those prior to the last one were each worth a perutah, nevertheless we do not say that his intent was for the first ones and he is like one who betrothes with a loan, for it has already been explained in siman 29 that one who betrothes with a loan and a perutah, his intent is for the perutah.

But if he did not say to her, "Be betrothed to me with this, and with this, and with this," but rather said to her, "Be betrothed to me with these," and she ate them one by one, they all combine to the value of a perutah, even those she ate. For since he finished all the words of the kiddushin before he gave her anything, if so, immediately when he gave her the first one for the sake of kiddushin, it entered her possession, and she ate from her own. And the same law applies if he said "with this, and with this, and with this" and finished all his words before she received all of them—they combine even if she ate them one by one for the reason that has been explained; since he finished the words of the kiddushin before he gave her anything, she is eating what is hers. And some say that we require that even the delivery into her hand must be such that all are delivered before she has eaten anything, but if when he delivered the first to her she ate it, and he delivered the second and she ate it, and so with all of them—they do not combine with one another even when his speech was finished before she ate anything, for the essence of the completion of the kiddushin is in her receiving them into her hand, and as long as they have not come into her hand, it is like a loan one by one. However, when he said "Be betrothed to me with these," even if by the time he delivered the last one she had eaten the first ones, nevertheless they combine, since he did not divide them with his language—they are all as one. And some disagree even in this, and the first opinion holds that the essence depends on the completion of his speaking, and when his speaking is finished, they all become as hers and she eats from her own, even though she did not receive them all at once and ate them one by one.

One who betroths half a woman—she is not betrothed, as it is written: "When a man takes a woman" (Deuteronomy 22:13) and not half a woman. Therefore, if he said to her, "Half of you is betrothed to me"—she is not betrothed. And even though kiddushin is a language of hekdesh, and regarding hekdesh we maintain that one who says "half of an animal is an olah," the sanctity spreads to the whole of it, as the Rambam wrote in the fifteenth chapter of Korbanot, nevertheless here it is impossible to say so, for she must transfer herself to him, and when it is not her will to be betrothed to him in her entirety, how can the kiddushin spread to the whole of her? And nevertheless, if he said to her regarding his half, saying "Be betrothed to my half"—she is betrothed, for his intention is not to half of his body, but rather it is as if to say that he will take another wife, for a man is permitted to marry two women by Torah law. And even though after the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom it is forbidden to marry two women, nevertheless the kiddushin takes effect, for it is no worse than those liable for a negative commandment where kiddushin takes effect; but a woman is not fit for two men. And it appears to me that if he said explicitly, "I am not betrothing you except to half of my body and not to the whole of it," that she is not betrothed. And regarding him, it is not applicable that the sanctity should spread to the whole of him, for she is betrothed to him and not he to her, as she becomes forbidden to all men like hekdesh and he does not become forbidden to all women by Torah law, as has been written. And nevertheless, in practice, the matter requires further study, for I have not found this law explicit in all the poskim. And all the more so when he says to a woman, "Behold you are betrothed to me and to Shimon," that she is not betrothed. And when he said, "Half of you is betrothed to me," even if he said after an hour, "Your other half is also betrothed to me"—he has said nothing, for when he spoke at two different times, his words were interrupted, and neither this nor that takes effect. This is not the case if he said at one time, "Your half and your half," which would be a case of doubtful kiddushin, as will be explained.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 3: If he said to her, "Behold, half of you is betrothed to me for a perutah and half of you for a perutah," or if he said to her, "Half of you is betrothed to me for half a perutah and your other half is betrothed for half a perutah" – behold, she is betrothed. If he said to her, "Half of you is betrothed to me for a perutah today and half of you for a perutah tomorrow," "Your two halves for a perutah," "Your two daughters to my two sons for a perutah," "Your daughter is betrothed to me and your cow is sold to me for a perutah," or "Your daughter and your land to me for a perutah" – in all these cases she is betrothed in doubt. Thus far his words. And many of our teachers disagree with him regarding what he ruled in "half of you for a perutah and half of you for a perutah" or "half of you for half a perutah and half of you for half a perutah" that she is certainly betrothed, for behold, "your two halves for a perutah" is better than this since he spoke in a single expression and nevertheless it is a doubt, and certainly in such a case they are only kiddushin of doubt. Furthermore, the language of the Shas which stated that a woman is not betrothed in halves implies in all manners, and therefore they ruled that even in these cases it is only kiddushin of doubt. And so ruled the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 7, see there, and for the halakhah we hold like the majority of the poskim. However, the reasoning of the Rambam is that certainly a woman is not betrothed in halves, only that when he said "half of you and half of you" his intention is not to betroth her in halves but rather he is counting as he goes [Ran], and this reasoning is found in the Shas. And this is like one who says, "Behold I am betrothing your head and your hands and your feet and all your limbs," where it is not relevant to say that she is betrothed in halves but rather he is counting all her limbs. This is not the case when saying "your two halves for a perutah," for he included them in one statement and even so divided them, it is possible his intention was to betroth her in halves. And that which he ruled regarding "half of you today and half of you tomorrow" that it is a doubt, is because it is possible to say that whenever he does not betroth her on one day, even though his statement was at one time, he has interrupted his matter and it is kiddushin in halves [ibid.].

There are some of our teachers who said that this matter of "your half and your half" being a case of uncertain kiddushin is only when he used the language of erusin or other languages that are effective for kiddushin, but if he used the language of kiddushin—she is certainly betrothed. The reason is that it was explained in section 32 that the reason we do not say regarding "your half is betrothed to me" that the kiddushin should spread to her entirety as it does with kodashim is because it also depends on her intent; if so, this is only when he said only "your half," but when he said "your half and your half," since she consented to be betrothed in her entirety, the kiddushin automatically spreads to her entirety [Tosafot] through her first half. However, all the poskim did not make this distinction, and the reason may be said to be because it is possible that at the moment he said "your half" she did not consent to be betrothed in her entirety, and only afterwards when he said "and your half" did she consent [Beit Yosef] regarding her second half. According to this, when he said "your two halves" for a perutah and used the language of kiddushin it would be effective, and similarly if she said that upon the statement of the first half she consented to the whole it would be effective, but this is not implied by the poskim [see Beit Shmuel subsection 15].

But in truth, this is not necessary, for the reason explained there—that it depends on her will—is insufficient; for ultimately, since she also consented to her half, let us say that her sanctity spread to her entirety. Rather, the primary reason is that since, according to his speech, the kiddushin did not spread to her entirety except by virtue of her will, it results in kiddushin on her account and not on his account. It is thus found that she is sanctifying herself to him, whereas the Torah said that he shall sanctify her, and not that she shall sanctify herself to him [Beit Shmuel in the name of the Maharit, and so wrote the Rashba]. And even though in all kiddushin we require her will—for it is certainly so that without her will it is impossible to sanctify her—nevertheless, he sanctifies her in her entirety. This is not the case with the expression "half of you," which only sanctifies half of her, and this is not kiddushin; and that by his speech the kiddushin should spread to her entirety is not within his power, as it depends also on her. Rather, if we say that by virtue of her will for the half it spreads to the whole, and not because of his speech, it is found that he did not sanctify her with his speech [and the Avnei Miluim challenged this point without cause]. And according to this, even with any expression of halves, even if we say that she consents to the whole, nevertheless, since according to his expression this is only for halves and depends on her, it is found that with his speech he did not sanctify her [and the resolution of the Tosafot Rid brought by the Avnei Miluim in subsection 18 to distinguish between two opinions and one opinion is a difficult distinction to make, and perhaps their intention is also similar to what I have written].

There are some of our teachers who say that regarding what was explained in "half of you today and half of you tomorrow" that it is at least a doubt of kiddushin, this is when he said it to her at one time, meaning in one sequence; but if he said to her "half of you today" and no more, and after a duration of time he said to her "half of you tomorrow" – it is obvious that this is not kiddushin, and so it is implied from the language of the Shas and the poskim. And similarly, regarding one who says "half of you for a half-perutah and half of you for a half-perutah" or "half of you for a perutah and half of you for a perutah," it deals with a case where he gave her the entire perutah or the two perutot at one time and said it to her in one sequence, but when he divided them into two givings and two times, it is nothing. And he must say the second statement within the time of a speech-act of the first. And there is one who wishes to say that we require literally immediately, but if it was not immediate, even though he said it within the time of a speech-act, it is not effective, because we hold that in kiddushin within the time of a speech-act is not like the speech itself regarding retraction; but this is not clear, for all of these are matters of doubt, and that which we hold is not like the speech itself is for stringency and not for leniency, and what difference is there in this.

And that which he wrote, "Your two daughters to my two sons for a peruta" – the doubt is whether we follow the giver and the receiver, and there is money, or perhaps we follow those who effect the kiddushin and those who are sanctified, and there is not a peruta for each one. And it deals with minor daughters, where the kiddushin belong to the father; but if they are adults and made the father an agent to receive their kiddushin, it is obvious that a peruta is required for each one, and an agent is no better than the one who sent him [Tosafot]. And even though sons are not under the authority of the father and necessarily made their father an agent, and behold there is not the giving of a peruta for each one, nevertheless, regarding the giver we are not so concerned, only that the receiver must receive the value of a peruta [ibid.]. And some say that this is specifically when the father gives the money on their behalf, for then there is one giver; but if the two sons gave the father one peruta to effect kiddushin for them – this is not kiddushin [Beit Shmuel in the name of the Maharit], for one does not effect kiddushin with less than the value of a peruta. However, when the father gave a peruta, we consider the peruta for each one of them, and since the receiver has the value of a peruta and the giver also gave a peruta, it is a case of doubtful kiddushin. And according to this, it can also be found with adult daughters, such as if they said, "Give the kiddushin money to our father and we will be sanctified to them," for it is effective by the law of a guarantor as written in siman 29. Furthermore, it is possible that in such a case it would be certain kiddushin even if we say that we follow those who are sanctified, since we approach it by the law of a guarantor, it is as if each one received a full peruta. And it requires further study regarding the law, but in practice we follow the stringency and it is a case of doubtful kiddushin [see Avnei Miluim, subsection 20].

There are some of our teachers who say that regarding "your two daughters to my two sons," which is a case of doubtful kiddushin, this is only when he specified for which of them, such as Rachel to Reuven and Leah to Shimon; for if not so, it would be kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse. And even though we hold that kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse are valid kiddushin, as I wrote in siman 41, nevertheless here, where each of the sons made the father an agent to give kiddushin on his behalf, certainly his intention was for kiddushin that can lead to intercourse, and if not so, it is a deviation from the agency. According to this, if the two sons said to the father, "Betroth on our behalf the two daughters of so-and-so" – it is kiddushin. And there is one from whose words it is implied that in any case, regarding kiddushin that cannot lead to intercourse, they are valid kiddushin, and therefore in practice it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, and see what I wrote in siman 35, section 53.

And in the case of "your daughter and your cow for a peruta," there is a doubt: do we say that his intention was your daughter for a half-peruta and your cow for a half—and she is not betrothed—or perhaps your daughter for a peruta and your cow through meshikha, for he certainly knows that one does not betroth a woman with less than a peruta [Rashi] and presumably such was his intention even though his wording does not imply so; and furthermore, that movable property is not acquired through money but only through meshikha [Tosafot]. And so too in the case of "your daughter and your land for a peruta," there is a doubt as in the case of the cow, and even though land is acquired through money, nevertheless because of the first reason it is a doubt. Therefore, if he said "your daughter and your cow for two perutot"—it is certainly kiddushin since there is a peruta for the daughter; and even though the cow is not acquired through money, nevertheless she is betrothed, for we maintain "acquire you and a donkey" that he acquires half, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 210, see there, and all the more so since according to the Torah movable property is acquired through money; and it is an a fortiori argument for "your daughter and your land for two perutot" that she is betrothed. [See Beit Shmuel subsection 17, and his words are puzzling since we maintain he acquires half as has been written, and it can be settled according to the words of the Ran cited in Chelkat Mechokek siman 41 subsection 4, see there and examine carefully].

There is one of our teachers who holds that this which is a case of doubtful kiddushin regarding "your daughter and your cow for a perutah" or "your daughter and your land"—this is when he pulled the cow or performed a chazakah on the land, for according to this it can be said that the entire perutah is for the kiddushin; but where he did not pull and did not perform a chazakah, it is obvious that the perutah is for both of them and she is not betrothed at all, and nevertheless it is proper to be stringent [Mishneh LaMelech chapter 3 in the name of the Ritva]. But all the poskim did not mention this, for either way: if at the time of the giving of the perutah he pulled or performed a chazakah, it is explicit that his intention was for the perutah to be for the kiddushin; and if he pulled or performed a chazakah afterward, which creates a doubt regarding his intention at the time of the kiddushin, if so, even if he has not yet pulled or performed a chazakah, perhaps he will yet pull or perform a chazakah. Furthermore, perhaps at the time of the kiddushin his intention was indeed to pull and perform a chazakah and now he changed his mind; and even if we say that even if at the time of the act he pulled and performed a chazakah it is a case of doubtful kiddushin and not certain, for perhaps his intention was to acquire the cow or the land for half a perutah and through pulling or chazakah, if so, even if he did not pull and did not perform a chazakah, perhaps at the time of the act such was his intention and now he changed his mind, and ultimately it does not emerge from the state of doubt. Furthermore, it is possible that if we follow the recipient, she should be betrothed with half a perutah since a perutah came into the hand of the recipient, as in the case of "your two daughters for my two sons" which has been explained; and although there is a distinction to be made, nevertheless there is a doubt in this [see HaMakneh 7: starting with "Rava inquired"].

The sages taught: One who betroths two women with a peruta’s worth together, or one woman with less than a peruta’s worth, even if he sent sivlonot after this—she is not betrothed. We do not say he knew that his betrothal was not a valid betrothal and he intended and sent sivlonot for the sake of betrothal, but rather we say he sent them on account of the first betrothal. There is not even a doubtful betrothal in this if there is no concern that perhaps it is worth a peruta in another place, such as if he betrothed her with silver, which from the Torah requires the measure of half a barleycorn, and certainly if he betrothed her with a coin or, according to the Rambam, with something that is not durable. And even in a place where we concern ourselves with sivlonot according to what I wrote in siman 45, nevertheless here we are not concerned, for the sivlonot were sent based on the previous betrothal.

And even though regarding sivlonot we do not fear for kiddushin, nevertheless, if he betrothed her with less than a perutah and afterwards had relations with her in the presence of witnesses of yichud—she requires a get, and so our Sages, of blessed memory, said [Ketubot 74a]: One who betrothes with a loan and had relations, on a condition and had relations, with less than the value of a perutah and had relations—she requires a get from him because a person does not make his relations relations of zanot and he intended and had relations for the sake of kiddushin, and therefore it is not similar to sivlonot. And from the wording of the Rambam at the end of chapter 7 it is implied that with less than the value of a perutah and with a loan it is certain kiddushin, and so it is implied from the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, here in section 9 who wrote she requires a get because he certainly had relations for the sake of kiddushin, and according to this if another came and betrothed her she does not require a get from him, but many of the poskim hold that this is only a case of doubtful kiddushin and if another came and betrothed her she requires a get from both of them. And one must wonder about our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who in his book Kesef Mishneh there wrote that even according to the Rambam it is not certain kiddushin, and here he decided that it is certain kiddushin, and so he wrote in his great book, and even more so one must wonder about our teacher, the Rema, who wrote here: And the same law applies to a minor who betrothed and grew up with her, she requires a get because he certainly had relations when he grew up for the sake of kiddushin, thus far his words, and even though there are no witnesses to his yichud nor to his relations [the Gra] since they lived in the manner of a man and his wife it is like witnesses as is written in siman 26, and it will be further explained in siman 43, and above in siman 28 our teacher, the Rema, himself wrote in section 16 regarding less than the value of a perutah and he had relations that it is doubtful kiddushin, and here he compares this to a minor who grew up which is according to everyone certain kiddushin when they lived in the manner of a man and his wife. And for the halachah the acharonim decided regarding less than the value of a perutah and he had relations that it is doubtful kiddushin, and even if she was in yichud with him and we did not know that he had relations she requires a get, for we say the witnesses of yichud are themselves the witnesses of relations [Beit Shmuel]. And it seems to me to reconcile the words of our teachers the authors of the Shulchan Aruch that certainly in a case where he betrothed her with less than the value of a perutah and had relations one time by chance she requires a get due to doubt, and here it deals with one who betrothed her and had relations with her in the manner of a man and his wife, for in this it is simple that it is certain kiddushin since he knew that he betrothed her with less than the value of a perutah, and so it is implied from the words of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote: and specifically in such a case where every person knows that the kiddushin of a minor or with less than a perutah is nothing and therefore he had relations for the sake of kiddushin, but in a place where one might err she requires other kiddushin, thus far his words, and it was explained in the source of the law [in Teshuvot Maimoniyot] in a case of a certain man who had several sons from his wife and in the end it became known that the ring of kiddushin was not the value of a perutah, and they ruled that he must betroth her anew, for since he did not know that he required other kiddushin it did not enter his mind to betroth her through his relations. And the general rule of the matter—that any matter of kiddushin that are not kiddushin and he knew of this and had relations with her once, we say there is a presumption that a person does not make his relations relations of zanot and she requires a get. However, if another betrothed her—she requires a get from both of them, but if he lived with her in the manner of a man and his wife and the matter is public—it is certain kiddushin, and this is greater than the presumption that he does not make his relations relations of zanot, and all this is when he knew that they were not kiddushin but if he did not know at all of this in any case she requires other kiddushin, however if after it became known to him that it was not the value of a perutah he lived with her in the manner of a man with his wife and there were no witnesses of yichud—it can be said that it is like witnesses of yichud [Beit Shmuel], and there is one who is in doubt about this [ibid.], and one should follow the stringency. [And according to what I have written all that they questioned against the Beit Yosef and the Rema is settled, and see what I wrote in siman 28 section 70].