Siman 178

The kinui mentioned in the Torah, "and he shall warn his wife," refers to him saying to her, "Do not seclude yourself with such-and-such a man." And what is the meaning of the term kinui? They disagree in the Gemara at the beginning of Sotah; for one says it is a term of anger, as it is written, "They have moved Me to jealousy with that which is not God," and similarly, "For jealousy is the rage of a man" (Proverbs 6). And one says it is a term of warning, like "Then the Lord was jealous for His land" (Joel 2). And similarly regarding that which is written, "a spirit of jealousy," they disagree there: one says it is a spirit of purity, and one says it is a spirit of impurity. And similarly they disagree there, for one says it is forbidden to warn, and one says it is an obligation to warn. And the truth is that these and those are the words of the living God, for when a man sees some licentiousness in his wife, it is an obligation to warn her, and it is a spirit of purity when he warns her. However, when he sees nothing in her and only warns her because of his anger, it is a spirit of impurity and it is forbidden to warn, and then kinui is a term of anger.

And in the Torah this matter is explained, for it is written: "And a spirit of jealousy passes over him and he is jealous of his wife and she has been defiled, or a spirit of jealousy passes over him and he is jealous of his wife and she has not been defiled." And according to the commentators that it is one matter, meaning that there is a doubt whether she was defiled or was not defiled, it should have said "and she has been defiled or has not been defiled." Rather, certainly this is what the verse says: that sometimes a spirit of purity passes over the man and he warns his wife not to be in seclusion with a certain person, such as when she has been defiled, meaning that he sees in her signs of defilement, which is licentiousness; or sometimes a spirit of impurity passes over the man and because of anger he is jealous of his wife, and that is when she has not been defiled, meaning when he does not see in her signs of defilement; and it is to teach us:

For the law, there is no practical difference in this, for whether he warns her out of anger or whether he warns because of licentiousness that he saw in her, they have one law, and his kinui is a kinui, and all the laws of a sotah that will be explained apply to her. And the Rambam at the end of the Laws of Sotah, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who wrote that it is a mitzvah to warn their wives, this refers to one who sees in her some licentiousness and things that are not proper, as will be explained at the end of this siman with the help of Heaven.

The primary law of a sotah is thus: when he warns her before two kosher witnesses and says to her, "Do not seclude yourself with so-and-so," and she violated this and secluded herself with him and remained for the duration of defilement—and the sages estimated that this is the duration it takes to roast an egg on a medium fire and swallow it, and in the Yerushalmi it is brought that this duration is after the loosening of the belt—behold, she is forbidden to her husband until she drinks the bitter waters and the matter is examined. And this was during the time the Beit HaMikdash existed; but now, she is forbidden to him and shall leave without a ketubah.

And we maintain that kinui and stirah occur specifically with two kosher witnesses, such that he warns her in the presence of witnesses and two witnesses testify that she secluded herself with this man for the duration that has been explained. And if after the kinui and stirah even a single witness came and testified that she was defiled, he is believed, and she does not drink the bitter waters and is forbidden to her husband and leaves without a ketubah. And even if he is among those disqualified from testimony, as will be explained. And for what reason did the Torah believe one witness? Because there is a basis for the matter, for he warned her and she secluded herself, and presumably he is telling the truth that she was defiled. And even if this witness of defilement is one of the witnesses of the stirah or the kinui, he is believed.

Even a woman, a slave, a maidservant, and one who is disqualified from testimony due to a rabbinic transgression, and even a relative, is believed in the testimony of a sotah after the kinui and the setirah to testify against her that she committed adultery, and she is forbidden to her husband forever, and she does not drink, and she leaves without a ketubah. For since the Torah believed one witness due to the reason of "raglayim ladavar," everyone is believed regarding this. And even the five women who hate one another, whom we enumerated in siman 17, are believed against one another to testify that she became defiled when the kinui and setirah preceded it with witnesses; and they are believed to forbid her to her husband and so that she does not drink, but not to cause her to lose her ketubah, and she takes her ketubah and leaves with a get (Rambam chapter 1, halacha 15). And so the sages taught in the Mishnah (beginning of chapter 6): Even a slave, even a maidservant are believed even to disqualify her from her ketubah; her mother-in-law, her mother-in-law's daughter, her co-wife, her yevamah, and her husband's daughter—behold these are believed, but not to disqualify her from her ketubah, but only so that she shall not drink; see there.

And the reason seems to me that by law, one witness should not have been believed regarding the matter of her ketubah, as we do not find one witness in matters of money. And indeed, in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 6, Halacha 2), there is one who holds this; however, they said there that just as regarding a married woman, we also do not find that one witness should be believed, and nevertheless the Torah decreed regarding a sotah that he should be believed because of the circumstantial evidence, so too regarding matters of money. Therefore, regarding these women who hate one another, since the entire essence of their hatred is due to money, as is explained in Yevamot (117a), even though they are believed regarding the prohibition due to the circumstantial evidence, nevertheless regarding matters of money—since the entire essence of their hatred is because of this—the sages did not wish to believe them.

It further appears to me that the fact that one witness is believed to say she became defiled applies specifically to this man regarding whom the husband warned her and with whom she secluded herself; however, regarding another man, he is not believed. For since the credibility is based on the rationale of "circumstantial evidence," there is only circumstantial evidence regarding this man, for we see that her inclination overcame her to seclude herself with him after the warning, and not regarding another man. Even though the prohibition is the same regarding another man as it is regarding this one, nevertheless, we have not seen from her the overcoming of the inclination toward another man (and that which the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 11, "at that same time," is not a logical reasoning at all, and Rashi merely adopted the common way of the matter).

The Rambam wrote at the end of the first chapter of Sotah: If one witness came and said, "She has been defiled," she does not drink, as has been explained. If one witness came and contradicted him and said, "She has not been defiled," we do not listen to him, for one witness regarding the defilement of a sotah is like two, and the words of the latter do not override the words of the former, who is like two. If both came as one, this one saying, "She has been defiled," and this one saying, "She has not been defiled," or if one said, "She has been defiled," and two came and said, "She has not been defiled," she drinks. If one valid witness and many women or many disqualified witnesses came as one, the witness saying, "She has been defiled," and the women or the disqualified witnesses saying, "She has not been defiled," she drinks, for one witness and many disqualified witnesses are like half and half. If they were all disqualified, follow the majority. How so? If two women say, "She has been defiled," and three say, "She has not been defiled," she drinks. If three say, "She has not been defiled," and four say, "She has been defiled," she does not drink. If they were half and half, she drinks. Thus far his words. The Tur wrote similarly. And some say that a valid witness is not considered like two unless they ruled based on his testimony, and we have already explained this in siman 17, section 93; see there. And the general rule is that in an evenly balanced doubt she drinks, for the primary purpose of the drinking is to clarify the doubt.

Kinui is only when he said to her, "Do not be secluded with so-and-so." But if he said to her, "Do not speak with so-and-so," even though his intention was to distance her from him, nevertheless, this is not the language of kinui, and if she was secluded with him, she is permitted to her husband. And so too, when he said to her, "Do not be secluded," and she spoke with him, this is nothing, and all the more so if he said to her, "Do not speak," and she spoke (Gemara 5b). And we do not say that since the reason the Torah forbade her in seclusion after the kinui is because of the husband's objection in that he warned her—for without kinui she is not forbidden by seclusion alone—if so, what does it matter to me if he used the language of seclusion or the language of speaking, since ultimately he objects? Nevertheless, we require that he warn her explicitly regarding the matter for which she would violate it, and that is the language of seclusion.

And even if he warned her with the language of seclusion, this is specifically when he said to her "do not seclude yourself" without qualification, and certainly when he said to her "do not seclude yourself so that he will not come upon you in a natural or unnatural manner," as is well known throughout the Shas where they raised difficulties from one "lying" to another. But if he said to her "do not seclude yourself with so-and-so so that he will not hug you or kiss you," or "so that he will not go mad for you with other parts of the body" and the like, this is not a kinui, since through these she is not forbidden to her husband (Gemara 26b), and we require that he warn her regarding a matter that forbids her. And if you should ask, why should this be worse than "do not seclude yourself" without qualification, for certainly through seclusion alone she is not forbidden? In truth, it is not comparable, for in seclusion without qualification his intention is that he should not come upon her in the manner of an adulterer and adulteress, as the seclusion is for the sake of intercourse. But when he says to her explicitly the matters that were explained, certainly his intention is that he does not suspect her of intercourse but rather of other intimacies, and therefore she is not forbidden by this. And for this reason, there is one who says that if he said to her "do not seclude yourself so that he will not rape you," this is not a kinui, for she is not forbidden in a case of rape (Mishneh LaMelech at the end of chapter 1), and we require a matter that forbids her.

And know that the previous law is explicitly stated in the Gemara ibid., and thus it is stated there: "And a man lie with her" (Numbers 5:13) with an emission of seed—this excludes where he warned her regarding unnatural contact. And in the Rambam this law is not found at all, and from his words at the end of chapter 3 it appears explicitly that he interprets this regarding the paramour where the warning was general, "do not sequester yourself," but the paramour used her via unnatural contact. This is his wording there: A woman who committed adultery under duress or in error, or if he who was the subject of the warning had relations with her via unnatural contact, the water does not evaluate her, etc. Thus far his words. And he interprets the Gemara "excluding where he warned her" as meaning the paramour had relations with her via unnatural contact. And his reasoning appears to be that since they derived this from the verse "and he lie," it presumably does not refer to the warning but rather to the lying of the paramour. Furthermore, why should it be inferior to a general warning, as I have written. However, Rashi and Tosafot wrote as I have written (and the Mishneh LaMelekh there requires further study, for he labored over this, see there; and regarding what he questioned, why he did not write even kissing, the reason is simple, for between kissing and initial penetration it is difficult for witnesses to distinguish, whereas with unnatural contact they see explicitly; and delve into this).

One may express kinui to her regarding any man, even regarding his father or her father, or his brother or her brother, or regarding a kutei, or a slave, or his son or her son. Even though regarding her father and her son there is no prohibition of yichud, as a man may sequester himself with his mother and with his daughter as is written in siman 22, nevertheless, it constitutes kinui. And so it is stated in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of Sotah. Therefore, he may express kinui to her regarding two men at once, such that he says to her, "Do not sequester yourself with Reuven and Shimon together," even though with two upright men a woman is permitted to sequester herself as is written there. And if she sequestered herself with both of them and remained for the duration of defilement, she is prohibited until she drinks, and in this time she is prohibited forever and leaves without a ketubah. But if she sequestered herself with only one of them, she is not prohibited to him, for it is like sequestration without kinui, by which a woman is not prohibited. And even though regarding the law of yichud it is worse with one than with two, nevertheless, regarding the matter of kinui, the sequestration must be exactly as he expressed kinui to her.

It is stated in the Gemara (26b) that a shachuf may be the subject of a kinui. Rashi explained that his flesh is wasted, depleted, and dry such that he has no strength. The Tosafot, in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel, explained that he does not engage in intercourse in the typical manner and does not emit seed; see there. It appears that nevertheless he does engage in intercourse, and through his intercourse she becomes forbidden, for if not so, it would be no worse than intercourse through the limbs, which does not cause her to be forbidden, as has been explained. The Rambam at the beginning of the first chapter wrote, and this is his wording: A shachuf is a man who does not have an erection and does not procreate. Thus far his words. This is difficult: since he does not have an erection, his intercourse is with a flaccid organ, and the Rambam himself ruled in the first chapter of Issurei Biah that with a flaccid organ this is not considered intercourse at all; see there. And even though he does not hold of that which was said regarding kinui through the limbs, as has been explained, nevertheless it is difficult why she should be forbidden by her seclusion, for he is not fit for intercourse. One must say that he does not have an erection to the point of being fit to procreate, but regarding intercourse, it is considered an erection.

The Rambam wrote there: If he said to her, "Do not seclude yourself with such-and-such a person," and he was a minor less than nine years and one day old, or if he said to her, "Do not seclude yourself with this animal," this is not a kinui, as it is said, "and a man lie with her," excluding a minor and an animal, for they do not forbid her to him. Thus far his words. And even though in every other place he is called a minor until thirteen years and one day, nevertheless, regarding cohabitation, he is called a minor when less than nine (and the Bartenura in chapter 4, mishna 4, explained less than thirteen, see there; and so it appears from Tosafot 26b, starting with "But," see there).

We establish that a husband who waives his kinui, his kinui is waived (25a), and it is as if he did not warn her at all, and if she secluded herself afterward she is permitted. The reason is because the kinui is only due to his personal objection, and therefore if he waived it, it is waived. This is specifically before seclusion, but after seclusion he cannot waive it, for she has already become forbidden and shall not return to her permitted status until she drinks. Similarly, if he divorced her, the kinui is nullified, and if he remarried her, he requires another kinui if he wishes to warn her, for the first kinui was nullified by the divorce since she had already separated from him.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): If he warned her in the presence of two witnesses and saw her enter into seclusion with this man regarding whom he warned her, and she remained for the duration of defilement, she is prohibited to him; he must divorce her and give the ketubah, for he cannot make her drink based on his own testimony. Likewise, if he heard the people gossiping about her after the warning and the seclusion, until he heard from the women spinning by the light of the moon discussing that she committed adultery with the man regarding whom he warned her, he is prohibited from maintaining her; he must divorce her and give the ketubah. If one witness came and testified to him that she entered into seclusion with him after the warning and remained for the duration of defilement, if he is trustworthy to him and his mind relies upon him, he must divorce her and give the ketubah, and if not, his wife is permitted to him. Thus far his words. And the Tur wrote likewise.

And behold, that which they wrote—that when he or one witness saw the seclusion after the warning she is forbidden to him—is not explicitly stated in the Gemara. They wrote this based on reasoning: since the Torah forbade her after a warning through two witnesses to the seclusion, so too through his own sight or one witness. And as is written in the twenty-fourth chapter of Ishut and the Tur above in siman 115, when he saw for himself that she committed adultery, or one witness saw that she committed adultery and his mind relies upon him, she is forbidden to him. And they compare seclusion after a warning to actual adultery, and not to an "ugly matter" for which the woman is not forbidden to her husband according to most poskim, as was written above in siman 11. And even though, in essence, seclusion after a warning is not similar to adultery—for for adultery there is no remedy, while for seclusion there is a remedy through drinking the water—nevertheless, as long as she has not drunk, she is forbidden to him just as with actual adultery. And behold, he cannot make her drink based on himself or based on one witness, and consequently she is forbidden to him. And he shall give the ketubah, for regarding monetary matters one witness is not believed, and certainly not he himself. And we have already written in siman 115 that a prohibition based on one witness is not by the letter of the law, but only to fulfill his duty toward Heaven. And it appears to me that therefore the Rambam here, when he saw the seclusion himself, wrote that she is forbidden to him, but regarding one witness he did not write so; learn from this that it is not from the core of the law, but rather to fulfill his duty toward Heaven. And there we explained this at length, see there. And know that regarding seclusion after a warning, there is no difference whether she denies the witness or not, for seclusion after a warning is similar to adultery and is like "feet to the matter" (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel in subsection 7). And similarly, there is no difference whether her husband is in the city or not in the city, or between an open entrance to the public domain or not open, since it was after a warning.

However, regarding that which he wrote, that if there is a rumor after kinui and stirah she is forbidden to him and he must divorce her and give her the ketubah, behold, that she is forbidden to him is an explicit Mishnah (beginning of chapter 6). However, they questioned him: why should he give a ketubah? Behold, he already wrote that after kinui and stirah she has lost her ketubah. They answered that his intention is that there is only one witness to the stirah (Keseph Mishneh). But it does not imply this, for if so, he should have specified; and furthermore, he should have written this after the law of one witness. Also, in his commentary to the Mishnayot it does not imply this, see there. And it appears to me that his intention is after stirah according to witnesses, and it deals with the time the Beit HaMikdash existed. And that which he wrote above, that after kinui and stirah she is forbidden and leaves without a ketubah, behold, he explained explicitly that this is in this time, when she does not have the water that would test her. But in the time of the Mikdash, he cannot cause her to lose her ketubah, as she can say "I will drink the water." And this is what he says, that when there is a rumor after the kinui and the stirah she is forbidden to him, and nevertheless she does not lose the ketubah, for she can say "I will drink and test myself," and shall we cause her to lose her money because of a rumor? Therefore, the Tur did not write this law, because in this time this is not applicable, as I have written.

That which has been explained, that kinui and stirah must be based on two witnesses, so it is in the Mishnah at the beginning of Sotah and such is the halakhah. And in the Gemara there it is stated: Rabbi Yose bar Yehudah says in the name of Rabbi Eleazar (so it should be read, and so it is in the Tosefta, and examine this carefully) that kinui may be based on one witness or on his own word, and stirah must be based on two witnesses. And it is stated there: Rabbi Hanina of Sura said, a person should not say to his wife in this time, "Do not be secluded with so-and-so," lest we establish the halakhah like Rabbi Yose that kinui may be based on his own word, and she will be secluded, and there are no mei sotah nowadays to test her, and he will prohibit her to himself with a permanent prohibition. And even though if so, even in the time of the Temple one should be careful of this, for based on his own word he cannot make her drink without two witnesses to the stirah, nevertheless, in the time of the Temple there is not so much concern, for perhaps there will be witnesses to the stirah, and furthermore, he can warn her in the presence of two and she will drink. But in this time there is no remedy. And one should not ask: behold, even in this time, what concern is there in this when there are no witnesses to the stirah? For this is no question: first, for perhaps there will be witnesses to the stirah, for without kinui she is not prohibited, but with kinui she is prohibited; and furthermore, even without witnesses she would be prohibited according to the Rambam and the Tur, who ruled that stirah based on his own word after kinui in the presence of two prohibits her, as I wrote in section 18, and automatically according to Rabbi Yose she is prohibited after his own kinui as well.

And behold, according to the essential law, we should not have been concerned with this statement, since we establish the law according to our Mishnah that kinui is specifically by the testimony of two witnesses. It appears explicitly that this is the opinion of the Tur, who wrote this law in the name of the Smag, see there, and he means to say that the Smag was concerned for this law. However, from the words of the Rambam at the end of chapter 24 of Ishut, it appears that it is an absolute law. This is his wording: If he said to her between him and her, "Do not seclude yourself with such-and-such a man," and he saw her seclude herself with him and she remained for the duration of defilement, she is forbidden to him in this time when there are no sotah waters. Thus far his words. And it is a great wonder, for in the Laws of Sotah he ruled explicitly that kinui is by two witnesses and did not mention this at all, and how did he rule there like Rabbi Yose? And it appears to me clear that everything revolves around one axis that we explained with the help of Heaven in siman 115, that most of the words of the Rambam there in these matters are not of absolute law but only to satisfy the judgment of Heaven. And so the Rif, of blessed memory, holds in the third chapter of Kiddushin as I wrote there at length. And the Rambam holds that also Rav Chanina of Sura, who says this law, his intention is likewise only to satisfy the judgment of Heaven and not as an absolute law. And you should know that it is so, for if not so, where do we find that we rule like a Baraita as a lone opinion against an explicit Mishnah? Rather, it is certainly only to satisfy the judgment of Heaven. Therefore, the Rambam did not write this law in the Laws of Sotah, but only in a place that deals with satisfying the judgment of Heaven. And behold, above in siman 115, section 56, we wrote regarding this matter to distinguish between the drinking of the sotah waters and the prohibition to the husband, and this is according to the way of the commentators, and so it appears from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in siman 115 and in this siman, section 7. But the essential point appears to me as I have written. And if one stumbled regarding kinui to his wife, there is a simple counsel for the matter: that he should forgo the kinui for her, for it has already been explained that forgiveness is effective for kinui prior to seclusion. And if he did not do so and saw that she secluded herself, it appears to me that after the fact she is not to be forbidden (and so wrote the Bach and the Derishah; and that which they questioned the words of the Rambam as contradicting each other, according to what I wrote there is no difficulty at all, and examine it closely).

It has already been explained that seclusion without kinui does not forbid a woman to her husband, even if two witnesses testified regarding the seclusion and that they remained long enough for tumah, and thus our sages, of blessed memory, said: we do not forbid based on seclusion (Kiddushin 81a). The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 6 wrote that we do not forbid based on seclusion even if they were secluded together for the purpose of ervah, unless he first warned her with kinui. Nevertheless, there is a prohibition for a woman to be secluded, as is written in siman 22, except that we do not forbid because of this. And know that this which they wrote, that even if they were secluded together with the intent of ervah she is not forbidden, contradicts the words of our teacher, the Rema, in siman 7, section 11. We have already explained there in section 22, see there, where we wrote the opinion of the commentators and what appears to me in this matter with the help of Heaven.

If he did not warn her, and one witness came and said to him, "Your wife has committed adultery," and she remains silent: if he is trustworthy in his eyes and his mind relies upon him as two witnesses, he must divorce her and give the ketubah. And if not, she is permitted to him. And there are those who say that if she remains silent, even if the witness is not trustworthy to him as two witnesses, he must divorce her (Beit Shmuel, subsection 8, in the name of the Rashal). And we have already explained in siman 115, section 24, that the primary view is according to the first opinion; see there what we have written further regarding this.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 9: And the same law applies if she herself says to him that she committed adultery, that she is forbidden. And some say that in this time, when there is the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom, of blessed memory, not to divorce a woman against her will, he is not believed to say that he believes her or that he believes the words of the witness, for we fear perhaps he set his eyes upon another and says he believes her even though he does not believe; and they distance him for saying that he believes her and causing the nullification of the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom, of blessed memory. And the same law applies in any place where he cannot divorce without the consent of the woman. And some say that they compel him and he has relations with her even though he says that he believes the words of the witness, since the woman does not admit, or even if she herself said "I am defiled to you" and retracted and gave a justification for her initial words. But there are those who disagree and hold that even in this time he is believed; and if he had a quarrel with her, he is not believed to say that he believes the words of the witness, for certainly because of hatred he said so. Thus far his words.

And the great Acharonim in many responsa exerted themselves over his words, and we, with the help of Heaven, clarified his words in siman 115 from section 27 until section 32, and everything is based on the foundation we wrote: that the prohibition is not by the letter of the law but only to fulfill one's duty toward Heaven, and therefore we have the ability to be stringent regarding it in this time. And in section 43 we explained there what the law is when the husband says that he himself saw that she committed adultery, see there. And in section 31 we explained there that where there are grounds for the matter, she is prohibited even in this time, see there.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 10: One who spread a rumor about his wife that she committed adultery and said that the matter was clarified to him, and afterwards said it is not true but rather because of the anger that she caused him he spread this rumor—if he gives an explanation for his words, she is permitted, and if not, she is forbidden to him. Thus far their words. And it implies that we require a different explanation, but in the Responsa of the Rosh, Klal 32, it is explained that the anger itself is the explanation. Therefore, there is one who says that in truth we require a different explanation (according to the Pitchei Teshuva, subsection 24). And it is not clear to me, for certainly the anger is a good explanation, and the intention of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is that he must clarify the cause of the anger, and if it appears to the beit din that this matter was appropriate to bring him to a state of anger, it is a good explanation; and if not, we do not believe him regarding the anger that he says. And in this time, how the law is, we explained in siman 115, section 43, see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 3: A minor girl whose father married her off and who committed adultery of her own will, there is one who says she is forbidden to her husband; therefore, one issues a warning to her in order to cause her to lose her ketubah. And there is one who says she is not forbidden to her husband unless he is a kohen. Thus far his words. For the seduction of a minor is considered rape. The first opinion is the view of the Rambam in the second chapter of Sotah and the third chapter of Issurei Biah, who does not hold of this reasoning. All the poskih rejected his words, and we clarified his intention with the help of Heaven in siman 68, section 8, and in siman 6, section 30; see there.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: An adult woman who committed adultery inadvertently, thinking it was her husband when it was another man, is permitted to her husband who is an Israelite. But if she committed adultery because she thought it was permitted to commit adultery, she is considered as one who acted willfully and is forbidden to her husband who is an Israelite. Thus far his words. For it is not written "and she commits a trespass against Hashem," but rather "and she commits a trespass against him." If so, even if we say that one who says "it is permitted" is considered inadvertent, nevertheless she has committed a trespass against her husband (Beit Shmuel, subsection 4). And even if she was modest and was intimate with a rapist willingly in order to save many Jewish souls, nevertheless regarding the matter of adultery such that she would be forbidden to her husband, it is considered complete willfulness, and Esther proves this, as she became forbidden to Mordechai (ibid.). But when she thought it was her husband, this is a complete inadvertence, and she is believed regarding this with a migo that she could have said "I was raped." Therefore, it seems to me that if there are witnesses that it was with her will and she has no migo, she is not believed to say so, and it requires further study. And regarding an imbecile, it is obvious that she is of lesser status than a minor and has no will at all. Regarding a deaf-mute, it appears that her law is like a minor. Therefore, according to the Rambam, who holds that in marriage by Torah law a minor has will, if the deaf-mute married while she was of sound senses and afterwards became a deaf-mute and committed adultery willingly, she would be forbidden according to the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory.

He further wrote: A woman who was secluded with men on the road and came and said, "I was secluded and I was raped," some say she is believed through a migo that she could have said "I was not intimate," and some say she has lost her migo since she was secluded unlawfully. Thus far his words. And it appears that even according to the latter opinion, this is only when there are witnesses to the seclusion, for if not so, she has a migo that she could have said "I was not secluded." And likewise, specifically when she was secluded with one, for with two there is no prohibition of yichud, as I wrote in siman 22. And even though it was explained there that with licentious men it is forbidden even with ten, she is not expected to know that they are licentious, and all of Israel are presumed to be of proper standing (it appears to me).

We remove a woman from her husband by means of witnesses of impurity even if they did not see "like a brush in a tube," since they saw them clinging to one another and behaving in the manner of adulterers. And any woman who was forbidden to her husband, whether by means of kinui and stirah or whether not by means of kinui and stirah, once she is forbidden to her husband she is also forbidden to the boel. And from the oral tradition they learned: "and she be defiled" and "and she be defiled"—one for the husband and one for the boel. Therefore, if he transgressed and married her, we remove her from him so that he shall divorce her, even if she had several children from him. And any woman where two witnesses came and testified that she committed adultery with this husband while she was still under her first husband, she must leave him with a get even if she has several children. And these laws were already explained in siman 11, and there are many detailed laws there regarding the matter of the prohibition of the boel. And likewise regarding stirah without kinui where there are only witnesses to "ugly things," they were also explained there; see there.

There are those who say that if a woman committed adultery with a koti and he subsequently converted, he is permitted to marry her after her divorce or after the death of the husband. We do not say that just as she is forbidden to the husband, she is forbidden to the paramour, except in a case where she would not have been forbidden to him without this; however, regarding a koti, even without this, kiddushin do not take effect for him with her. Furthermore, he is like a newborn child. Therefore, one who committed adultery with his wife's sister and her husband divorced her, she is forbidden to the paramour after the death of his wife. It is not necessary to say that the second reason does not apply to him, for he is not like a newborn child, but even the first reason does not apply to him; for even though she was also forbidden to him without this due to the prohibition of a wife's sister, nevertheless, she was destined to be permitted to him after the death of his wife. But regarding a koti this does not apply, for the fact that she is permitted to him afterward, he is not the same person who existed before, as he is like a newborn child (see Beit Shmuel subsection 13 and the Gra sub-sections 22 and 23, and examine this carefully).

A married woman who claims regarding someone that he is pursuing her, and he denies it, she is not believed in order to punish him, but it is necessary to be concerned, and they shall decree upon him that he should not speak with her at all and that they should not dwell in the same neighborhood. This means that he is not obligated to distance himself from the place where he currently dwells, but rather that he should not enter to dwell in her neighborhood. And if they currently dwell in the same neighborhood, she should distance herself from this neighborhood, for how can we compel him to distance himself when he denies it? But if he is established in the eyes of the public as being suspected of forbidden relations, it is proper to rebuke him with a reprimand and to threaten him and distance him from her neighborhood. And they should warn him that if he does not behave properly, they will separate him from among them and push him away with both hands, just as the Sages, of blessed memory, said at the end of Kiddushin: they lash for a report that is not good, and as the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the twenty-fourth chapter of Sanhedrin; see there.

Our Sages, of blessed memory, received a tradition that a woman does not drink and repeat for one husband and one paramour. However, with two paramours even with one husband, or two husbands even with one paramour, she drinks and repeats. They derived this from the verses in the portion of Sotah, as is explained at the end of the first chapter of Sotah. How so? Reuven who warned his wife regarding Shimon, and she secluded herself and was tested by drinking the water, he can no longer warn her regarding Shimon, even if he divorced her and remarried her after the divorce (this is implied by the Rambam, chapter 1, halacha 13; see there and examine carefully). And if he warned her regarding Shimon a second time and she secluded herself, he cannot make her drink again, but rather she is forbidden to him forever, as in this current time. But regarding another man, he may warn her and make her drink, and similarly regarding a third and a fourth, forever. And if Reuven divorced her and she married Levi, Levi may warn her even regarding Shimon and make her drink. And if Levi divorced her and she married Yehuda, he may also warn her regarding Shimon, and so on forever. All of this is a decree of the Torah.

And these are the ones for whom the beit din warns the women without the knowledge of the husband: one whose husband became deaf or became insane, provided he married her while he was of sound mind, for then she is a married woman according to the Torah. For if he married her during his deafness, there are no Torah kiddushin here and warning is not applicable. And likewise, one whose husband was in the provinces overseas or was incarcerated in a prison. In all these cases, if the beit din heard that the people are gossiping about her, that she has a closeness with a certain man, they summon her and say to her: "Do not seclude yourself with that man." And if witnesses came afterward that she secluded herself with him and remained for the duration of defilement, they forbid her to her husband forever and tear up her ketubah, and they do not give her sustenance from the property of the husband. And when the husband regains his senses, or arrives from afar, or leaves the prison, he gives her a get. But he cannot have her drink the water, for the drinking of the water is only when he warned her, as is explicit in the Torah, and the warning of the beit din is only to separate from a prohibition.

A woman whose husband warned her and she secluded herself, and he wishes to have her drink and she does not wish to, they do not compel her to drink. Whether she says "I have been defiled" or whether she says "I have not been defiled, but nevertheless it is not my will to drink," they do not compel her, and she leaves without a ketubah (the Rambam, beginning of chapter 2). And even if they brought her up to the Temple and prepared her offering and wrote the scroll, as long as they have not erased the scroll, she can say "I will not drink," even if she does not say that she was defiled (and the proof is from Mishnah 6, chapter 3: "And these are those whose meal-offerings are burned: one who says 'I am defiled to you,' etc., and one who says 'I will not drink,'" see there; and this is even if she says "I am pure," for if not so, it would be the same as the first clause).

And so too, if the husband does not want to give her to drink, even though she wants to, she does not drink and she takes her ketubah and leaves. And he cannot say, "Since you are forbidden to me because of your seclusion, I will not give you a ketubah," for she can say, "Since the Torah gave you permission to examine me with the water because I am pure, please give me to drink and I will not lose my ketubah." And the reason for these two laws is because the Torah did not compel drinking the water, but rather gave permission that when they desire to clarify the doubt, she shall be examined by the water. Therefore, if one of them does not desire the drinking, we do not compel this. And all the more so when her husband had relations with her after her seclusion—for then the water does not examine her, as will be explained—that she does not drink and she takes her ketubah and leaves, for it is impossible to cause her to lose her ketubah because of a prohibition that he committed. Even though she also did not act well in that she allowed herself for him to have relations with her, nevertheless, the primary prohibition is upon him, for she can say, "I know that I am pure," but he committed a complete prohibition.

And these are the women who are not fit to drink, even though they and their husbands desire the drinking; rather, once witnesses of seclusion have come after the kinui, they are forbidden to their husbands forever and go out without a ketubah, as in this current time, since according to the law of the Torah they are not to be given to drink. And the Rambam wrote in chapter 2 that there are fifteen women, and these are they: a betrothed woman, a woman awaiting levirate marriage, a minor who is the wife of an adult, an adult who is the wife of a minor, the wife of an androgynos, the wife of a blind man, and the wife of one who is lame, or mute, or who does not hear, or whose hand is severed. And likewise, if she is lame, or mute, or does not hear, or her hand is severed, or she is blind—all of these are not fit for drinking.

And from where is it derived that they are not fit? As it is said: "If a woman goes astray under her husband," excluding a betrothed woman and a woman awaiting levirate marriage, who are not "under her husband," for they have not yet entered their domain. "A woman," excluding a minor. "Under her husband," excluding the wife of a minor and the wife of an androgynous person, who is not a man. "And it be hidden from the eyes of her husband," excluding the wife of a blind man. "And the kohen shall stand the woman," excluding a lame woman. "And place upon her palms," excluding one who has no palm, or if it was crooked or withered such that she cannot take with it, and even if only one palm, as it is said "her palms." "And the woman shall say: Amen," excluding a mute woman. "And he shall say to the woman," excluding one who cannot hear. And behold it says: "If a woman goes astray under her husband," until she is whole like him and he is whole like her. Thus you have learned that anything that prevents her from drinking prevents her husband from making her drink, and anything that prevents the husband from making her drink, a blemish like it prevents her from drinking. Thus far his words.

And there are other women who do not drink due to a matter of prohibition, as will be explained, but he only counted here those in whom there is no prohibition at all. And he did not count the wife of a deranged man, for it is a simple matter that "the man shall bring his wife" does not apply to him, as he possesses no legal competence. And that which he counted the wife of an androgynos follows his own reasoning in chapter 1 of Issurei Biah, that an androgynos may marry a woman; for according to the other poskim, she is not a married woman at all. And similarly, one who said "I will not make her drink" can no longer make her drink (Mishneh LaMelech chapter 2), and even if both of them are willing for her to drink (Kesef Mishneh in Tosafot Yevamot 95a, s.v. "Ilima"). And the reasoning is puzzling: why should it not be in his power to make her drink when she is willing? And it is possible to say the reason is that presumably when he said "I will not make her drink," he knows within himself of some sin such that he cannot make her drink; and similarly she, when she said "I will not drink." (Most of these laws are at the end of chapter 4, see there.)

If he expressed jealousy to his betrothed or to his woman awaiting levirate marriage and then married her and had relations with her, and afterwards she secluded herself, she drinks like all other women (26a). For the expression of jealousy is not hindered by having occurred before the marriage, since the seclusion occurred afterwards, and we apply to her the phrase "under your husband." And this is specifically when the husband had relations with her before the seclusion, for if not so, even if he expressed jealousy to her while she was married and she secluded herself, if the husband had not yet had relations with her at all—such as if she entered the chuppah and did not have relations—she does not drink and leaves without a ketubah and is forbidden to him forever, as it is said: "And a man has had carnal relations with you besides your husband," implying that the husband's relations preceded the paramour's relations (24).

The female convert and the emancipated maidservant, and the wife of a convert and the wife of an emancipated slave, and a mamzeret who is the wife of a mamzer, and the wife of a congenital eunuch or a man-made eunuch among those permitted to their husbands, behold they are like all other women and they drink. And even though in the chapter of Sotah it is written, "Speak to the children of Israel," nevertheless, a female convert and an emancipated maidservant etc. also drink, for the Torah included them (see in the Gemara 26a). And similarly, the wife of a kohen drinks, and we do not say that since it is written, "and she was not seized," meaning that if it was not by rape she is forbidden and if by rape she is permitted, and regarding a kohen she is forbidden even by rape and therefore she should not drink—we do not say so, for this is not relevant to the drinking of the water, which is an examination of whether she was intimate at all (26a). And that which the Torah said, that if she was "seized" she is permitted, is to teach us that the wife of an Israelite who was raped is permitted to her husband, but this is not relevant to the drinking of the water.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): A pregnant woman and a nursing woman, one may warn her and make her drink as she is. Thus far his words. This means that we do not wait for her until she gives birth or until she weans her son, and so Rashi explained (26a). And they wondered about this: why should we not be concerned for the danger to the fetus and wait? (Tosafot). And from the words of the Rambam himself in chapter 12 of Hilkhot Sanhedrin, it is clarified that whenever there is no "affliction of justice," we wait until she gives birth (Mishneh LaMelekh). And it appears to me that their reasoning is that certainly if we knew she was impure and was going to die, we would wait; but here it is a doubt, and it is closer to a certainty that she is pure since she goes to drink, for it is in her power not to drink as has been written. And if so, why should we wait, since she cries out that the drinking will clarify that she is pure? And nevertheless, some say that while she is pregnant or nursing we do not make her drink, and the intent of the Gemara is to make her drink afterward, and it comes to teach us that we do not say since she is currently not fit for drinking she is also not fit for warning, but rather she is fit for warning (Tosafot ibid., and see Mishneh LaMelekh; and it requires further study, for this is heard from a betrothed woman, and delve into this).

A woman standing to drink and her husband died before she drank, she does not drink and does not collect her ketubah from the heirs. And it appears to me that even if he died after the megillah was erased she does not drink, for the essence of the drinking is to clarify if she is permitted to her husband or not, and when he has died clarification is not applicable. Her law is like the law of one who says "I am defiled" after the erasure of the megillah, which will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

It is stated in the Yerushalmi (at the beginning of chapter 4) that the yavam can make her drink based on the kinui of his brother; for if his brother warned her and died, and the yavam performed yibbum and she subsequently secluded herself, the yavam makes her drink based on the kinui of his brother. And similarly, if the yavam warned her after he performed yibbum and died, and the second brother performed yibbum and she subsequently secluded herself, the second makes her drink. But if the yavam warned her while she was a shomeret yavam and died, and the second brother performed yibbum and she secluded herself, he does not make her drink based on the kinui of the first yavam; for since the first did not perform yibbum, the yibbum of the second is by virtue of the first brother and not by virtue of the first yavam, and she is not the wife of the first yavam. The Rambam did not mention this at all, and it was also not mentioned in our Shas (and one should not say that from Kiddushin 27b it does not imply this, for if it is like the Yerushalmi, let us establish it in such a case, as the Yerushalmi in chapter 2 also says this, see there, and perforce there is no contradiction to this, and the truth is so for one who examines there, and look closely).

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): Any man who engaged in a forbidden sexual act in his life after he reached majority, the bitter waters do not evaluate his wife. And even if he engaged in relations with his betrothed in the house of his father-in-law, which is forbidden by the words of the scribes, the waters do not evaluate his wife, as it is said, "And the man shall be clear of iniquity, and that woman shall bear her iniquity." Therefore, if his wife was forbidden to him by way of a negative commandment or a positive commandment, or even if she was a secondary relation, and he warned her and she secluded herself, she does not drink; rather, she leaves without a ketubah and shall be forbidden to him even because of this. Thus far his words. And it is a novel matter, for the derivation of "And the man shall be clear of iniquity" is brought in the Shas in several places, and in all of them it is proven that only if the husband engaged in relations with the sotah after she secluded herself does it prevent the drinking of the water. And so explained Rashi, and the Tosafot, and the Ra'avad, and all the commentators; but that another sexual act should prevent the evaluation, we have not heard.

However, in the Sifrei at the end of Parshat Sotah, it is explained like the Rambam. This is the wording of the Sifrei: Why is it said, "And the man shall be free from iniquity"? When the man is free from iniquity, "that woman shall bear her iniquity," and not like the matter that is said, "I will not punish your daughters when they commit harlotry... for they themselves go aside with harlots," etc. He said to them: Since you pursue harlotry, the water will also not test your wives; therefore it is said, "And the man shall be free from iniquity," the iniquity of that woman. Thus far his words. That is to say, the iniquity of harlotry, but another iniquity does not impede. Also in our Talmud at the end of the tractate, it is proven so, as we learned in a Mishnah: When the adulterers increased, the bitter waters ceased, etc. And the Gemara brings this derivation of "And the man shall be free from iniquity." Rashi himself explained there, and this is his wording: Free from the iniquity of adultery with a woman forbidden to him, whether from this one who secluded herself or from another. Thus far his words. Behold, this is explicitly like the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory. And the Gemara, in every place that it brought this derivation regarding when he had relations with her after seclusion, certainly this too is included in "he is not free from iniquity," and the Gemara is dealing with that matter; but in truth, any forbidden relations impede. (And as for what the Ra'avad objected from page 24b, and his intention was that they said there that he had relations with his betrothed in his father-in-law's house, and the Kesef Mishneh was pressed to answer, it can be said simply that the prohibition is because of a bride without a blessing, and it can be said that they recited the seven blessings, and nevertheless she is not married because she did not enter his domain, but a prohibition does not exist here. And as for why he did not bring that the harlotry of his sons and daughters also impede, it seems to me that he holds that certainly according to the law one cannot say the father should be punished for the iniquity of his sons, rather the verse speaks by way of moral instruction, that they were very unrestrained in harlotry, and automatically he too is certainly not free. And as for what the Mishneh LaMelekh objected, that if so there would be a slur against the women as they would say it is because he engaged in forbidden relations in his days, see there, we do not have to fear this, for all of Israel are presumed to be of proper standing, and in truth, when the adulterers increased, Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai stopped it; so it appears to me in the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory.)

He further wrote that if he transgressed and married the pregnant woman of another or the nursing woman of another, she drinks, for there is no transgression here. Thus far his words. And so it is in the Gemara (26a) and in the Tosefta (chapter 5). And it means to say: even though it is forbidden for him to marry her, nevertheless the cohabitation itself is not forbidden, but only because of the ordinance for the sake of the child. Therefore, it is possible for him to separate from her until twenty-four months and afterward cohabit with her, and it is not similar to any forbidden cohabitation where the act of cohabitation itself is forbidden.

If this wife of his, for whom he expressed jealousy, is an old woman, or a barren woman, or an ayalonit, and he has no other wife who is fit to bear children and he has not yet fulfilled the commandment of procreation, the sages taught in the Mishnah (chapter 4) that he does not provide her the water to drink. But if he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation or has another wife who is fit to bear children, he provides her the water to drink. And the reason for the matter is that the Torah gave permission to provide the water to drink in order to make peace between a man and his wife, and here we do not desire peace, for through this he does not fulfill the commandment of procreation. And one should not ask: on the contrary, let us provide her the water to drink so that there shall be fulfilled in her "she shall be cleared and shall conceive seed," for in truth this verse only speaks of one fit to bear children, that if she used to give birth with pain she will give birth with ease, if she used to give birth to females she will give birth to males (the Rambam). Therefore, immediately when she secluded herself after the jealousy, she shall leave without a ketubah. And also one should not ask: how is it possible to provide them the water to drink when he has fulfilled the commandment of procreation, for we do not read concerning them "and she shall conceive seed"? For the truth is that the Torah was not particular that she must be fit to bear children (the Ra'avad), and thus the Torah said that if she is fit to bear children, "she shall conceive seed," but this is not a requirement.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): If he had a wife and children and they died between the kinui and the stirah, she has already been seen as fit to drink, and he makes her drink. If he did not have children or a wife capable of bearing children except for this aylonit or her equivalent, and a son was born to him from his divorcee between the kinui and the stirah, she has already been rejected from drinking. Thus far his words. And this is from the Yerushalmi, chapter 4. And the reason is that everything follows the time of the kinui. And it appears to me that "son" is not meant specifically, but rather a son and a daughter, for if not so, he has still not fulfilled procreation. And there is one who is uncertain if he became a kerut shafkah between the kinui and the stirah whether she drinks, as in the case where the wife and children died, or perhaps regarding a Torah prohibition we do not say so, for she has become prohibited to him (Mishneh LaMelekh). And it appears to me that this law is like the case where the husband died before the drinking; for what difference is it to me if he died or if she was separated from him due to the prohibition of kerut shafkah? Furthermore, the essence of the water is to make peace between them, and here it is impossible, of course. (The laws that the Rambam wrote in chapter 2 from halakhah 12 until the end of the chapter have already been explained in siman 11, and also some of them were explained in this siman).

How was the order of the drinking of the sotah when the Beit HaMikdash existed? The husband comes to the beit din in his city and says to them: "This wife of mine, I warned her not to seclude herself with so-and-so, and she secluded herself with him, and these are my witnesses; yet she says she is pure, and I wish to have her drink to examine the matter." The beit din investigates the words of the witnesses, and if it is true that he warned her before two witnesses and there are witnesses regarding the seclusion, they send him and her to Jerusalem, for they do not have the sotot drink except before the Great Beit Din of seventy elders in the Mikdash. And we derive this from a gezerah shavah: it is written regarding the sotah, "and the kohen shall perform for her all of this Torah," and it is written there, "according to the Torah which they shall instruct you"—just as there it refers to the Great Beit Din, so too here it refers to the Great Beit Din (Gemara 7b). And one should not ask why we need a verse for this, for it is obvious that since there is a sacrifice for the sotah, and also the dust must be taken from the floor of the Mikdash to put them into the water as is explicit in the verse, it is automatically impossible for it to be in any other place besides Jerusalem. For it could be said that without the gezerah shavah, I would have said that the intimidation, the writing of the parashah, and the oath should be done by the beit din in her city, and afterwards they would go up to the Mikdash for the offering of the sacrifice and the drinking of the water; the gezerah shavah comes to teach us that "all of this Torah" of the parashah shall only be done in Jerusalem. Furthermore, while it is true that Jerusalem is required, from where do we know that the Great Beit Din is required? Perhaps a beit din of twenty-three that sits at the entrance of the Temple Mount would suffice (Rashi); thus it comes to teach us that specifically the Great Beit Din is required.

When they are sent to Yerushalayim, they provide them with two talmidei chachamim to guard him so that her husband does not cohabit with her on the way, and they inform him that she is forbidden to him until she drinks the water, as has been written. And her husband is not trusted regarding her; even though the Torah trusted him regarding a niddah and permitted yichud, this is because it is a severe prohibition and is grave to him, but regarding a sotah, which is a light prohibition, he is not trusted (7a). And the reason two are required is because such is the law, that on the road there is a prohibition of yichud with two, for perhaps one will need to relieve himself and a single individual will remain in yichud with her, as has been written in siman 22; and furthermore, so that there will be witnesses against him if he cohabits with her. And the reason talmidei chachamim are required is so that they will know how to warn him and provide him with the formal forewarning not to cohabit with her (Gemara ibid.):

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 3: When they arrive in Yerushalayim, the great beit din seats her between them and threatens her not in the presence of her husband, and they frighten her with a great fright so that she will not drink. And they say to her: My daughter, much wine does much, much laughter does much, much youthfulness does much, bad neighbors do much; do not cause the Great Name written in holiness to be erased upon the water. And they say to her: My daughter, many preceded you and were washed away, and great and honorable men were overcome by their inclination and stumbled. And they tell her the account of Yehuda and Tamar his daughter-in-law, and the account of Reuven with his father's concubine according to its plain meaning (for according to the Midrashic interpretation he did not sin, Shabbat 55b), and the account of Amnon and his sister, in order to make it easier for her until she confesses. And if she said, "I am defiled," or "I will not drink," she leaves without a ketubah and goes her way. Thus far his words. And all of this is explained in the Mishnah (7a). And only that which he wrote, that they threaten her not in the presence of her husband, he wrote this from logical reasoning, for since our intention is that she confess, the confession is easier for her not in the presence of her husband. However, that which he wrote, that they seat her between them, I do not know from where he has this, and why would they seat her between them? And perhaps he did not mean this precisely.

If she stood by her word that she is pure, they bring her to the Eastern Gate of the Azarah, which is opposite the Holy of Holies, and they move her from place to place in order to weary her so that her spirit will be weakened, perhaps she will confess. And if she stood by her word, they bring her opposite the Eastern Gate from the outside and stand her there, and they remove the fine garments that are upon her in order to disgrace her, perhaps she will give a confession. If she was covered in white garments, she is covered in black; and if the black ones were becoming on her, she is covered in garments in which she has no beauty. And they remove the jewelry from upon her, and all ornaments of gold and silver they remove from her. And they gather a large assembly of women over her, and all the women found there are obligated to see her, as it is said (Ezekiel 23): "That all women may be taught not to do after your lewdness." And any man who desires to see her may come and see. And she stands among them without a cloak and without a kerchief, but rather in her garments and the cap that is upon her head, as a woman is inside her home and not before the public. And they do not leave there her male slaves nor her female slaves, because she recognizes them and her mind is eased by them, and our desire is perhaps she will confess; but her female relatives they do leave there, for on the contrary, she has greater shame.

And know that the order of the Mishnah is not aligned with the order of the parashah, and the order of the Rambam in chapter 3 is different from both of them. For the order of the parashah is as follows: he expressed jealousy to her and she was secluded; he brings the woman up and brings her minchah; and the kohen brings an earthen vessel and places within it a half-log of water from the kiyor, and places in it dust from the floor of the Mikdash; and he stands the woman at the Nicanor Gate and grasps her garments and undoes her hair; and he places the minchah upon her hands, and in the hand of the kohen is the water; and he adjures her and makes a condition with her; and he writes the scroll and erases it and gives her to drink; and he takes her minchah and places it in a service vessel, waves it, brings it near, takes a handful, and burns it on the altar.

And according to the order of the Mishnah, it appears thus: He warned her and she secluded herself; he brings the woman up and they threaten her, and he stands her at the Nicanor Gate, and he seizes her garments and undoes her hair, and he brings the mincha and places it upon her hands, and he brings a clay vessel and places within it a half-log of water from the Kiyor, and he places within it dust from the floor of the Mikdash, and he adjures her and makes a condition with her, and he writes the scroll and erases it and gives her to drink, and he takes her mincha and places it into a service vessel and waves and brings it near and takes a handful and burns it.

The order of the Rambam is as follows: If he warned her and she secluded herself, he brings the woman up and they intimidate her, and they bring her up to the Nicanor Gate, and he adjures her, and he writes the scroll, and he brings an earthen vessel and places in it water and dust from the floor of the Mikdash, and he erases the scroll, and afterwards he takes hold of her garments and undoes her hair, and afterwards he brings the mincha and places it in her hands, and he takes the mincha and places it in a service vessel, waves, approaches, takes a handful and burns it, and prior to the bringing of the mincha the kohen gives her to drink; see there. And besides that his order is unusual, behold in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 3, Halacha 2) they said: Everyone agrees that the erasure is adjacent to the drinking. And how can he distance the erasure from the drinking so much? And our teachers, the Tosafot, have already written (17b, s.v. "kodem") that the order of the passage is primary, and therefore we will explain, with the help of Heaven, according to the order of the passage. And they have already wondered about the Rambam (the Kesef Mishneh, and the Tosafot Yom Tov, and the Mishneh LaMelech; and the Mishnah does not deal with the order but with the laws, and you should know this because the Mishnah preceded the writing of the scroll to the oath, and this is impossible as is explained in the Gemara 17b):

When she stands opposite the Eastern Gate and her beautiful garments are removed from her, the husband brings her sacrifice because he is obligated to bring all the sacrifices for which she is liable (Kessef Mishneh). And what is her sacrifice? Neither an animal sacrifice nor a bird, but rather a meal-offering of a tenth of an ephah. And it is different from all meal-offerings, for all meal-offerings are of wheat and this one is of barley. And as for the Omer offering, although it is also from barley, nevertheless they would sift it until it was fine flour, whereas this is flour mixed with bran. For because she performed an act of a beast, therefore her sacrifice is the food of a beast; for even if she is pure, nevertheless in her seclusion she performed an act of a beast. And all sacrifices of meal-offerings require oil and frankincense, but regarding this one it is written: "He shall not pour oil upon it, nor put frankincense upon it." And if he put oil or frankincense, he violates a negative commandment, and all this is so that her sacrifice shall not be elegant. And all meal-offerings are brought in a service vessel, but this one the husband brings in an Egyptian basket, which is a basket of willows. And because she performed an Egyptian act, therefore the vessel of her sacrifice is an Egyptian basket. And the husband stands with the sacrifice.

And afterward, the kohen brings a clay phial, meaning a clay vessel, and places into it a half-log of water from the kiyor, as it is written: "holy water," and they are not holy unless they were sanctified in a service vessel (Rashi 15b). And the vessel must be new, and the water is valid even if it is not spring water (Gemara ibid.). And he measures the half-log of water with the half-log measure of the sanctuary that was in the Mikdash. And the kohen enters the Heikhal and turns to his right, and there was a place there of one amah by one amah, and a marble tablet was in it with a ring fixed there, and he lifts it and takes dust from beneath it and places enough so that it is visible upon the water, as it is said: "And of the dust that is on the floor of the Mishkan the kohen shall take, and put it into the water." And if there is no dust there, he brings dust from outside and places it there and takes from there (Gemara), because the location sanctifies it (Sifrei). And even though "Mishkan" is written, the Sages, of blessed memory, already said that the Mikdash is called Mishkan and the Mishkan is called Mikdash (beginning of Eruvin), and furthermore, here the verse explicitly included the Mikdash as is found in the Gemara (16a, and see there in Tosafot). And he places into the water a bitter substance like wormwood or the like (20a), for the verse says "the bitter waters," implying they were already bitter prior to the blotting.

Afterward, a kohen comes and stands the woman at the Nicanor Gate, and the kohen stands outside and seizes her garments from opposite her face and tears them until he reveals her heart, and he reveals her hair and undoes the braids of her head in order to degrade her. And he brings an Egyptian rope and ties it above her breasts so that the garments do not fall and she remains naked, for all her garments were torn, even her undergarment. And why an Egyptian rope? In order to remind her of the Egyptian practice she performed; but it is not indispensable, for if they did not find an Egyptian rope, he brings another rope.

And behold, it is understood that this service is not a dignified service for a kohen, and who would desire this? Therefore, we learned in the Tosefta (chapter 1) that they would cast a lot among them, and upon whomsoever the lot fell, he must perform this service. And even if the lot fell upon the kohen gadol, he is obligated to perform it. And the kohen, at the time that he uncovers her hair, turns his face away; see there.

Afterward, the kohen places the mincha upon her hands in order to weary her, so that perhaps she will confess. The kohen holds the bitter waters in his hand and adjures the woman with the oath of the curse in a language that she recognizes, for the portion of the sotah is recited in any language (32a). The kohen informs her that this matter was caused by the kinui and the setirah, and he says the words to her in a language she understands. Thus he says: "If no man has lain with you, and if you have not gone astray to uncleanness while under your husband, be you free from these bitter waters that cause the curse. But if you have gone astray while under your husband, and if you have been defiled, and some man other than your husband has lain with you—the Lord make you a curse and an oath among your people, when the Lord makes your thigh fall away and your belly swell; and these waters that cause the curse shall go into your bowels, to make your belly swell and your thigh fall away." And she says, "Amen, Amen," also in a language she recognizes. The kohen informs her that the belly is stricken first and the thigh afterward, so as not to cast aspersions on the waters.

And afterward the kohen brings a scroll of pure leather like a Sefer Torah and writes upon it in the holy tongue with ink that contains no kankantum, because it requires writing that can be erased. The writing must be for its specific purpose like a get, and thus we have learned in the Tosefta of Gittin (chapter 2): A sotah scroll that was written not for its specific purpose is invalid, as it is said, "And the kohen shall perform for her all of this Torah," that all its actions must be for its specific purpose. Thus far his words. From that which is written "for her," he derives this as with a get. And he does not write on a tablet, nor on paper, nor on diphtra—which is leather that is not processed—but rather on a scroll of processed leather, as it is said, "in a book." And he does not write with gum, nor with kankantum, nor with anything that leaves a permanent mark, but only with ink. In Seder HaGet we explained what ink is; see there. And he writes all the matters with which he adjured her, letter by letter, word by word. And he writes in the holy tongue as it is written in the Torah. And he writes the Name as it is written and not as it is pronounced. And he does not write "Amen, Amen" (17a), but rather until "and the woman shall say," and not including it.

Afterward, he erases the scroll within the water, and the erasure must also be for its sake; he shall erase it very well until no impression remains at all such that letters are recognizable. The parchment is removed from the water, and immediately the kohen gives it to her to drink, and she shall drink all the water without any remainder. Afterward, he takes her minchah from within the Egyptian basket, and the kohen places it into a service vessel, and he does not provide oil or frankincense as has been written. He places the service vessel upon her hands, and the kohen places his hand beneath hers and waves it in the east like all other wavings of minchot, moving it back and forth, up and down, for waving requires the hand of the owner and the hand of the kohen, and the owner of the minchah of a sotah is the woman. Some say that the kohen would not place his hand literally beneath hers, but rather she would hold the top of the vessel and the kohen the bottom of the vessel (Tosafot Kiddushin 36b), but from the Yerushalmi it is implied according to its plain meaning, and so it is explained from the Rambam. Afterward, the kohen brings the minchah near to the south-western corner of the altar like other minchot of an individual, and he takes a handful and burns it upon the altar, and the remainders are eaten by the kohanim. It is obvious that he kneads the minchah with water alone, and with this all the acts of the sotah are completed.

And afterward, if she was pure, she goes out and departs, and is permitted to her husband. And if she is impure, immediately her face turns green and her eyes bulge, and she becomes filled with veins. The kohanim say, "Take her out, take her out," so that she does not discharge menstruation and defile the entire azarah. And they take her out from the women's azarah where she is standing and from the entire azarah. Her belly swells first, and afterward her thigh falls and she dies. And at the same time that she dies, the adulterer because of whom she was made to drink also dies; and in whatever place he may be, he dies and it happens to him as it does to her, with the swelling of the belly and the falling of the thigh. And thus the sages taught in the Mishnah (27b): Just as the water tests her, so the water tests him, as it is said, "and they shall enter, and they shall enter." And it is brought in the Yerushalmi: "The bitter [water]" (Ha-Me'arerim) in gematria is 496, corresponding to the 248 limbs within her and corresponding to the 248 limbs within him (and we do not count the limbs that a woman has in excess because they do not contract impurity in a tent).

The Rambam wrote that all this applies when the husband has never engaged in forbidden intercourse, for if not, the water does not test his wife, as has been written. And if he transgressed and provided the water, he adds transgression to his sin, for he caused the Explicit Name to be erased in the water in vain and brings a bad reputation upon the water of the sotah, as his wife says that she committed adultery and the water did not test her, and she did not know that the evil deeds of the husband caused this for her. Therefore, when adulterers increased openly during the Second House, the Sanhedrin abolished the bitter water and relied upon that which is written in the Tradition: "I will not punish your daughters," etc. Thus far his words.

Our Sages, of blessed memory, received a tradition that a woman who possesses the merit of Torah study—such as one who sent her sons to the schoolhouse to study Torah or who assisted her husband so that he might study Torah—it is possible that the waters will not test her immediately on the spot, for Torah protects from calamities both during the time one is engaged in Torah and during the time one is not engaged, whereas a mitzvah only protects during the time one is engaged in the mitzvah (21a). And there is merit that suspends for a year or more, and nevertheless it is recognizable that she is impure and she is forbidden to her husband; for even though she does not die immediately, nevertheless she wastes away and becomes emaciated, and heavy illnesses come upon her, and she dies after a time through the swelling of the belly and the falling of the thigh, and even now the illnesses are of the belly and thigh (as is evident from Rashi 26a, s.v. "b'mitnuvenet").

And so it is explained from the words of the Rambam, who wrote the previous law and afterwards wrote: A sotah who drank the bitter waters and did not die immediately, she is permitted to her husband even if he was a kohen; and even though illnesses began to come upon her and other limbs became sick, since her belly did not swell and her thigh did not begin to fall, she is permitted. But once her belly began to swell and her thigh to fall, she is certainly forbidden. Thus far his words. And ostensibly this contradicts his previous words, but according to what I wrote, it is well settled.

He further wrote: A sotah who drank and was pure, she becomes strengthened and her face shines; and if she had an illness, it departs from her, and she conceives and gives birth to a male; and if her way was to give birth with difficulty, she gives birth quickly; if her way was to give birth to females, she gives birth to males. Thus far his words. And regarding this, it must also be said that according to the majority it is so, for it cannot be said that it is a general rule that every pure woman becomes strengthened; if so, how did he write previously that she is permitted to her husband even though illnesses come upon her? Rather, it is certainly not a general rule. And a proof for this matter is that even an aylonit drinks when he has children, as was written, even though it is impossible for "and she shall be sown with seed" to be fulfilled in her as was written. Rather, it is certainly that this is only according to the majority (and so it appears from the objection of the Ra'avad, chapter 2, halacha 10, see there).

It is a simple matter that if two witnesses came [and testified] that she is impure, even after she drank the water and even if nothing happened to her from the water, she must leave her husband without a ketubah and is forbidden to him forever, for nothing stands before witnesses. And if you should ask, if so, why did the water not check her? Thus it has come down in tradition: that whenever there are witnesses who know of her zenut, the water does not check her. And furthermore, perhaps her husband is not free from iniquity. But if one witness came and testified that she was impure, we do not pay heed to him and she remains with her husband, for after the drinking of the water, one witness is not believed. And a woman who committed zenut under duress, or by error, or if the paramour had relations with her via other limbs—meaning that he acted crazed with her but did not have relations with her, neither in the natural way nor in an unnatural way—the water does not check her. Therefore, one must inform her of all this beforehand. And one should not ask: if so, why is the wife of a kohen permitted to him after the drinking? Let us be concerned that perhaps she was raped. For it can be said that we do not have to be concerned for this on our own, as duress is not common, and similarly, an error is not common in zenut, for most acts of intercourse are intentional and not under duress, as duress has a voice [is publicized], as the Tosafot wrote in Ketubot (9a, s.v. "Ve'iba'it eima").

The "Amen, Amen" that she says is: Amen to the curse, Amen to the oath. That is to say, she says Amen that "I have not become defiled," which is the acceptance of the oath, and Amen that "if I have become defiled, may they come upon me," which is the acceptance of the curse (Rashi 18b). For Amen contains acceptance and contains an oath, and it is considered as if she uttered the oath from her mouth (Shevuot 36a). Furthermore, there is in the doubling of "Amen" the inclusion of an additional oath (gilgul shevuah), which is that he adjures her even regarding another man about whom he did not warn her. And thus the sages taught in the Mishnah (18b): Amen regarding this man, Amen regarding another man; and that she did not stray while under him from the time she was betrothed, before the marriage, and after the marriage. However, he does not include an additional oath that she did not stray before betrothal, for he only includes an additional oath regarding a matter through which she would become forbidden to him, and before betrothal, even if she strayed, she does not become forbidden to him. Similarly, if she was a divorcee and he took her back, he does not include an additional oath regarding straying that occurred after the divorce, but rather regarding straying during the first marriage that was prior to the divorce. Similarly, if she was his yevamah, he does not include an additional oath regarding straying during the time she was awaiting the yavam (shomeret yavam), because we establish that a shomeret yavam who strayed is permitted to her yavam; but he does include an additional oath regarding whether she strayed while she was under his brother, for through this she became forbidden to this yavam. This is the rule: regarding anything where if she were to have relations she would not be forbidden to him, he would not make a condition with her (ibid. in the Mishnah).

And furthermore, included in "Amen, Amen" is "Amen on the past" and "Amen on the future," meaning that she accepts upon herself for the future that if she shall commit adultery while under him, or after he divorces her and takes her back, that the water shall then check her and all these occurrences shall happen to her, with the swelling of the belly and the falling of the thigh; and they explain all these matters to her before she drinks.

A sotah who said, "I will not drink," if it is seen that she says this due to awe and fear, because she was terrified by the words and the water, she may retract after her mind has settled and say, "I will drink." However, if it is seen that she is of settled mind and is not terrified or fearful, and she says, "I will not drink," it is like an admission that she became defiled, and it is not within her power to retract and say, "I will drink."

However, there is a time when we do not heed her even when she says "I will not drink." That is, until the megillah is erased, if she says "I will not drink," we listen to her, and the megillah is hidden under the hinge of the Heikhal (Yerushalmi), and the water is poured out and is not fit to give another sotah to drink, for we require "for her sake" as I have written, and her minchah is scattered upon the ash-heap in the Azarah. But if the megillah has already been erased, then specifically when she says explicitly "I am defiled," the water is poured out, for it possesses no sanctity; even though the Name was erased into it, nevertheless it is not discernible, and her minchah is scattered upon the ash-heap. But if she says "I will not drink," we do not heed her, and we force her against her will and give her to drink.

And the reason for the matter is because in her saying "I will not drink," it is not like a complete admission of defilement; rather, we say based on an assessment that she has presumably been defiled, and therefore she says "I will not drink." Consequently, once the Holy Name has been erased, we do not follow an assessment until she says explicitly that she was defiled. As long as she has not said so explicitly, we maintain the presumption that she shall drink; we also threaten her, and the kohen says to her: "My daughter, if it is clear to you that you are pure, do not be afraid at all, and drink the water and remain in your health, and do not fear at all, because the water is similar to a dry drug placed upon dry flesh—if there is a wound there, it seeps and descends, and if there is no wound there, it does nothing" (7b).

One does not give the sotah to drink except by day, and likewise the megillah, one does not write it except by day, and the entire day is valid; and initially it is required from the sunrise, but post facto it is valid after the dawn (end of the second chapter of Megillah). And if they wrote it at night it is invalid, and likewise when he gave her to drink at night, as it is said: "And he shall write... and he shall give her to drink... and he shall bring near," just as her offering is by day, for all offerings are invalid at night, as it is written: "On the day He commanded the children of Israel to offer," etc., so too the writing and the giving to drink at night is invalid. And the Rambam wrote this derivation in chapter 4, but in the Gemara (17b) they derived it from the verse: "The kohen shall perform for her all of this Torah," and it is written: "According to the Torah which they shall teach you and according to the judgment," just as judgment is by day, so too the megillah of the sotah and all the acts of the sotah (Tosafot) are by day. (And it appears to me that he therefore changed from the derivation of the Gemara, for it is Rava who said it in the Gemara, and the Rambam follows his own reasoning in chapter 3 of Sanhedrin and as we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 5, section 10, see there; and the Gemara was not satisfied with the derivation of the Rambam because it desired to learn for all the laws of sotah, and examine this closely).

At the beginning of Shekalim we learned in a Mishnah that on the fifteenth of Adar the Sanhedrin see to it to involve themselves in the needs of the public, and it is explained in the Tosefta and in the Yerushalmi several needs of the public, and among them to give the sotot to drink. And regarding this the Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 4 that on the fifteenth of Adar the beit din turn to the needs of the public and examine regarding the one fit to drink to give her to drink, and regarding the one fit to be warned and to be divorced without a ketubah, and at all times they give the sotot to drink. Thus far his words. And his intention is that the intention of the Yerushalmi is not that only on the fifteenth of Adar they give the sotot to drink, for certainly at all times they give them to drink, rather the intention is to examine who needs to drink (Kesef Mishneh). And that which he wrote "at all times," he means all year, but only during the day. And likewise the matter is simple that they do not give them to drink on Shabbat or Yom Tov, for there is a need for the blotting of the scroll and the offering of a sacrifice, which is impossible on Shabbat and Yom Tov.

One does not give two sotot to drink as one, as it is said, "And the kohen shall stand her," and not her and her fellow, but rather her alone (8a). And even if two kohanim are occupied, this one with this woman and that one with that woman, it is also forbidden together (ibid.). And even if they are not drinking as one, but rather both are standing in the Azarah together to give them to drink, it is forbidden. And there is a reason in the Gemara, because one does not perform mitzvot in bundles (from Rashi there it is implied that with one kohen the reason is because of bundles, and if so, with two kohanim it is from the verse; and this requires further study, for the verse deals with one kohen).

One must write the verses in the megilla in the order that we have written, and if he wrote them out of order, it is invalid (17b), as it is said, "these curses," implying as they are ordered in the verse. And likewise, if he wrote it before the acceptance of the oath, it is invalid, as it is said, "and he shall adjure... and he shall write" (ibid.). If he wrote it as a letter without shirtut, it is invalid, as it is written "in a book." And likewise, if he wrote it on two pages, it is invalid, as it is said "in a book"—the Merciful One said one book and not two or three books (18a). Rashi explained this as the columns of a Sefer Torah which are made column by column, and the Tosafot explained that this is specifically when they are cut into two pieces. And so it appears to be the opinion of the poskim regarding a get, that as long as it is one piece, we are not concerned about two columns. The Rambam leaves the matter undefined. And we have already explained that one specifically requires klaf and ink and that it must be able to be erased, and if not, it is invalid, and that no impression of the writing at all should remain in the megilla. And specifically the kohen must write, and if an Israelite or a minor kohen wrote it, it is invalid, as it is said, "And the kohen shall write," and it follows that we require an adult who is fit for the service.

One must write the entire text and afterward erase it entirely, but if he wrote one letter or one word and erased it, and returned and wrote and erased until its end, it is invalid. Similarly, if he wrote it not for its sake or erased it not for its sake, it is invalid. If he wrote two megillot for two sotot and erased them into one cup, or into two cups and mixed them into one cup and gave both of them to drink, it is invalid, because each one of them did not drink her own megilla (ibid.). However, if he erased them in two cups and mixed them and then returned and divided them into the two cups, the Rambam wrote that he should not give them to drink, but if he gave them to drink, it is valid. And I wonder, for in the Gemara there it remains in a state of teiku, and the doubt is due to the reason of bereirah, see there. And yet we hold that there is no bereirah. And perhaps because this is not absolute bereirah, see there in Tosafot. And if the water was spilled after the erasure, he writes another megilla and brings other water. And if they were spilled and a portion of them remained, behold, he should not give it to drink, but if he gave it to drink, it is valid. (In the Gemara there, there is a query: if he gave her to drink with a fiber, what is the law? With a tube, what is the law? Teiku. And I do not know why the Rambam omitted them; and according to his opinion in the previous laws, that in every teiku it is valid ex post facto, also with a fiber and a tube it is valid ex post facto).

The Rambam wrote: Our sota waters are disqualified by remaining overnight. Thus far his words. And certainly it is so, for they were sanctified in a service vessel, and anything sanctified in a service vessel is disqualified by remaining overnight, as taught in the Mishna at the beginning of the second chapter of Me'ila. However, in the Yerushalmi there is a dispute regarding this, and there is one who holds that since it is not offered upon the altar, it is not disqualified by remaining overnight (and see the Kesef Mishneh). And it appears to me that regarding leaving the boundaries, all agree that they are not disqualified, for we have not found a disqualification of leaving the boundaries in something that is not offered upon the altar. And if the waters became impure, there is room for doubt whether others are required or not.

It has already been explained that the kohen must place the dust into the water as is written in the verse, and if he preceded by placing the dust in the vessel and afterwards the water, it is invalid (16b). And it has already been explained that if there was no dust on the floor of the Mikdash, he brings dust and places it there, and he should not dig there with axes to take dust, but if he did so, it is valid. And he should not place ash instead of dust; and even though regarding the covering of the blood ash is called dust (Chullin 88a), as I have written in Yoreh Deah siman 28, nevertheless here, where it is written "on the floor of the Mishkan," we require specifically dust (16b). And vegetable mold is like dust, for it is from dust (ibid).

Even though it has been explained that the drinking of the water is prior to the offering of the sacrifice, nevertheless, if he offered the sacrifice and afterwards gave her to drink, it is valid. Thus ruled the Rambam, and so it is in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of the third chapter. In our Talmud, nothing is explained regarding this matter, and from the commentary of Rashi (19b, s.v. "Hachi Garsinan") it is implied that it is not valid. However, the Tosafot there also wrote like the Rambam, and the reason is that in the verse it is written "and he shall give her to drink" even after the offering. Although the primary rule follows the preceding verses where the drinking is written prior to the offering, nevertheless, post facto it is valid, and for this purpose that verse comes.

The Rambam wrote: If her mincha became tamei before he placed it in a klei sharet, it is redeemed like all mincha offerings that became tamei before they were sanctified in a klei sharet, and he brings another mincha. If the mincha became tamei after he placed it in a klei sharet, it is burned. And similarly, if she said "I am tamei" before the mincha was scooped, or if she said "I will not drink," or if her husband does not want to make her drink, or if witnesses of tumah arrived, or if he died, or if she died—the mincha is entirely burned. And if one of these occurred after the kometz was offered, the remnants are not eaten. Thus far his words. And in the Tosefta, chapter 2, it is taught that the remnants are eaten, and it gives the reason that because it comes for a doubt, it has atoned for its doubt and gone its way; see there. And we learned similarly in chapter 6 of Keritot regarding an asham talui, that when it became known after the sprinkling of the blood, the meat is eaten. And the Rambam himself ruled accordingly in chapter 4 of Pesulei HaMukdashin; see there. Nevertheless, he did not rule so here because there is a dispute in the Yerushalmi regarding this in chapter 2, and he ruled like the one who is stringent. And one can distinguish between this and an asham talui, because the sprinkling completely finishes the act of the korban, but regarding a sotah, the essence of the matter is to make peace between them and to clarify if she is tamei or tahorah. If so, when one of them dies or witnesses arrive, the essence of the matter has been completely nullified, and it is like an asham talui when it became known before the sprinkling, where the meat is burned, as is stated there. (And nevertheless, it requires further study, for this Tosefta is also brought in the Gemara in the first chapter, page 6b).

It is a known matter that the mincha of a kohen is entirely consumed, as it is written: "And every mincha of a kohen shall be entirely consumed; it shall not be eaten," and there is no kometz and remains in it. And the mincha of a kohen's wife is not like the mincha of an Israelite which is scooped and its remains are eaten (Mishnah Sotah 23a). Therefore, if the sotah is the wife of a kohen and her offering is also considered like his offering, for behold he brings it as has been written, therefore our sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid.) that to offer it entirely is not possible because she has a portion in it, and to burn the kometz and eat the remains is impossible because he has a portion in it. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, commanded that they scoop the mincha and burn the kometz alone, and the remains are neither eaten nor burned, but rather they scatter them upon the place of the ashes in the Azarah. And they judge the remains as disqualified items; and even though disqualified holy items are burned, this is when they were fit and became disqualified, but these remains were not fit from their beginning, and therefore they are scattered to be lost, for from their beginning they stood to be lost.

One who warns his wife regarding many men and she was secluded with each of them, he brings one mincha for all of them when he makes her drink, as it is said: "It is a mincha of jealousies" (Numbers 5:15)—one mincha for many warnings (Keritot 9b). And certainly one drinking suffices for all of them, for even with one drinking he stipulates regarding others as has been written. And the Rambam wrote: If the witnesses were found to be zomemim, her mincha shall go out to chullin. Thus far his words. And he means to say that witnesses came and proved the witnesses of seclusion to be zomemim; consequently, there is neither sanctity of speech nor sanctity of a vessel here, and one does not commit me'ilah with it since it was in error (Rashi 6a, s.v. "minchatah"). And we do not fear that they will say we remove from a sacred vessel to chullin, for with witnesses who are zomemim the matter has a voice, and everyone knows it was in error (Gemara ibid.). And this is specifically before the taking of the handful, but after the taking of the handful it is burned (Tosafot ibid.), for since a complete service was performed with it, it is a disgrace to sacred items that it should go out to chullin, and therefore it is burned by rabbinic decree. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, leaves it unspecified. And know that it is a simple matter that the megillah of a sotah requires parchment from the skin of a pure animal, and so it is stated in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 2, Halacha 4).

The Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 4: It is a commandment of the sages upon the children of Israel to be jealous for their wives, as it is said, "and he shall be jealous for his wife," and anyone who is jealous for his wife, a spirit of purity has entered him. And he should not be jealous for her out of laughter, nor out of conversation, nor out of lightheadedness, nor out of a quarrel, nor to cast fear upon her. And if he transgressed and was jealous for her before witnesses out of one of all these things, behold this is a kinui. Thus far his words. And we have already written at the beginning of this siman that his intention is when he sees in her some matters that are not proper. And regarding that which he wrote, that if he was jealous for her from all these things his kinui is a kinui, they raised a difficulty against him, for in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of Sotah it implies that his kinui is not a kinui. And in truth his words are clear, for the Yerushalmi holds that it is a mitzvah to be jealous and did not bring a dispute regarding this, but in our Shas there is a dispute regarding this as I wrote at the beginning of the siman. And we explained that they do not disagree at all, for if she is a proper woman, it is certainly forbidden to be jealous, and when she is licentious, it is a mitzvah to be jealous, and both ways are explicit in the Torah as I wrote there, and the Torah explained that the kinui is effective. And according to our Shas, even the anonymous view of the first Mishnah holds that it is forbidden to be jealous, as is explained in the Gemara at the beginning of our tractate, and this is obvious when she is a proper woman as I wrote, and nevertheless his kinui is a kinui, and therefore the Rambam ruled so (and the Kesef Mishneh and many commentators of the Yerushalmi were hard-pressed regarding this, and according to what I wrote it is settled simply):

There is further proof that the Rambam is dealing with a case where she is somewhat loose from what he wrote afterwards, and this is his wording: It is not proper to jump and warn her before witnesses initially, but rather privately between him and her, calmly and in a manner of purity and warning, in order to guide her on a straight path and to remove the obstacle. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that he is dealing with a case where she does not follow the straight path. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch at the end of this siman, and they concluded in their words that anyone who is not meticulous with his wife, his children, and the members of his household, and does not warn them and does not constantly oversee their ways until he knows that they are complete from all sin and iniquity, behold, he is a sinner, as it is said: "And you shall know that your tent is in peace; and you shall visit your habitation, and shall not sin." With the help of Heaven, the laws of sotah and the entire book of Even HaEzer are completed.