Siman 169

It is written in the Torah: "And if the man does not wish to take his yevamah, then his yevamah shall go up to the gate to the elders and say, 'My yavam refuses to establish a name for his brother in Israel; he does not desire to perform yibum with me.' Then the elders of his city shall call him and speak to him, and he shall stand and say, 'I do not wish to take her.' Then his yevamah shall approach him in the presence of the elders, and she shall remove his shoe from off his foot and spit in his presence; and she shall respond and say, 'So shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother's house.' And his name shall be called in Israel: The House of the One Whose Shoe Was Removed."

The sages taught in the Mishnah (Yevamot 101a): The mitzvah of chalitzah is performed before three judges, and even if all three of them are laymen. For we derive "three" from that which is written, "the elders," and the minimum of "elders" is two, and since a beit din cannot be evenly balanced, we add to them one more, which results in three (Gemara). And from that which is written afterwards, "and the elders of his city shall call him," which is superfluous since we already know it refers to the elders, it comes to include even those who are total laymen, provided only that they know how to read to the yavam and the yevamah the verses that will be explained. This is clear from the wording of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch. However, some say that they are not total laymen, but rather it means they are not ordained and are not from the Sanhedrin of their city; but nevertheless, they must know all the laws of chalitzah (as is implied by Rashi and the Nimukei Yosef there). For in truth, how is it possible for laymen to arrange a chalitzah when they are not expert in the laws? The first opinion holds that regarding other laws, they are able to ask those who know, but regarding the reading, it is not applicable for them to ask if they read well (Tosafot). The custom for the halacha is like the second opinion, and the Rabbi in the city joins with him two Torah scholars and they arrange the chalitzah. The Rabbi may join his students with him, for in this case, a Rabbi and his student are counted as two (Mishneh LaMelech, beginning of chapter 4 of Yibbum). The Rambam and the Tur wrote that post facto, even if they performed chalitzah before ignoramuses, the chalitzah is valid if the yavam and the yevamah know how to read by themselves.

The judges shall not be related to one another, nor to the yavam, nor to the yevamah, for chalitzah is like a legal judgment and is even more stringent; for whereas in monetary laws if they accepted upon themselves a relative or an unfit person the judgment stands, in chalitzah it is unfit, for it does not depend on them and it is the law of the Torah. And relationship even through their wives disqualifies, and this is when the two women are second-to-second, such as if they married two daughters of brothers, we say "a husband is as his wife," and even two instances of "a husband is as his wife," and the chalitzah is unfit. And second-to-third is fit, as is explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 33. And according to those who hold there that we do not say two instances of "a husband is as his wife," it appears here as well that after the fact it is fit in a time of pressing need (see the Gra subsection 3 and in the commentary on Seder Chalitzah, and delve into this).

Even though in Choshen Mishpat siman 7 it is explained that a ger (in ancient times) judges his fellow, and if his mother was from Israel he judges even an Israelite, nevertheless regarding chalitzah we require that the three judges have their father and mother from Israel (Yevamot 102a). Since it is written, "and his name shall be called in Israel," we require that he be an Israelite from all sides, and it does not avail here that his conception and birth were in holiness, for the Torah was particular in this (Beit Shmuel subsection 3). And there are some of our teachers who hold that the intent of the Gemara, which said "until his father and mother are from Israel," is that his mother without his father is not sufficient, but his father without his mother is sufficient (Tosafot ibid. and the Semag and Rabbeinu Tam in Sefer HaYashar). And their reasoning is that even the lineage of the priesthood, according to the one who is most stringent (Kiddushin 77a), it is enough if his father is from Israel. And the explanation of their words is that in Ezekiel (44) it is written, "A widow or a divorcee they shall not take for themselves as wives, but only virgins of the seed of the house of Israel." And there is one who expounded there (78a) "some seed from Israel," and there is one who is stringent and expounds "until there is all seed from Israel," see there, and we require his father to be from Israel, see there. Behold, it is explicit that when his father is from Israel, he is called "all seed from Israel" even though his mother is not from Israel, and all the more so regarding chalitzah where it is not explicitly written "all seed from Israel" (and the difficulty of the Gra, subsection 8, is answered).

It is obvious that the other disqualifications for judging that were explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 7 regarding monetary laws are certainly disqualified for chalitzah. Therefore, if one of the judges of the chalitzah is found to be a relative, or disqualified, or a convert, the chalitzah is invalid and she requires another chalitzah. However, she is disqualified from the brothers and it is called an "invalid chalitzah," for even if she performed chalitzah between him and her alone, it would be an invalid chalitzah and she would be disqualified from the brothers, as will be explained in this siman regarding a yevamah who grew up among the brothers, that if she removed the shoe of one of them, she is disqualified from the brothers and may not perform yibum; and it will be explained in section 67 with the help of Heaven.

Even though three dayanim are sufficient, nevertheless, ab initio five dayanim are required. And so our Sages, of blessed memory, acted, as it is stated in the Gemara (101b) that so acted Rav Papa and Rav Huna and Rav Ashi. And this is not from the law, but rather in order to publicize the matter, that it is a chalitzah and she should not be married to a kohen (Rashi). And for this reason, if she was already a divorcee, five are not necessary. And there is another reason, so that they should know she is permitted to marry (ibid.), and for this reason, in every case five are required. And so is the simple custom and one should not deviate. And only ex post facto, if they performed chalitzah with three, her chalitzah is valid. And these two that are added should not be relatives or disqualified, and specifically ab initio; but ex post facto it is valid even if these two are relatives or disqualified. So ruled our teacher, the Rema, in section 3. And in truth the matter is astonishing, for we maintain that if one relative or disqualified person is found, the testimony and the judgment are void even when there are a hundred. However, according to our custom that the two sit on the side by themselves and not with the three, it is well, for they are not of the count (Beit Shmuel and the Gra subsection 17, and this is the intention of the Rema). But if in truth they sat together, it is disqualified (and according to the Nimukei Yosef, even in such a case it is valid if they did not designate them as dayanim but only to publicize the matter, see there and in Beit Shmuel subsection 4, and delve into this).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2: There are those who say that it is forbidden to take payment for halitza, for one who takes payment to judge, his judgments are void. And so it appears in my eyes, that regarding halitzot one must be careful not to sit among the three dayanim who sit for halitza with one who takes payment, for behold, we require a beit din that is valid according to the Torah. And see in Hoshen Mishpat siman 9 what payment a dayan is permitted to receive, and even regarding this it appears to me that one should be stringent if he takes payment for the halitza because of marit ayin, just as we are stringent regarding relatives and other matters concerning a beit din of halitza more than other batei din (his intention is to what will be explained in section 8). And I have seen and heard that the Rav takes a large payment for the halitza and relies upon the fact that he sells him the sandal of halitza, and it is a great leniency in my eyes, and one who guards his soul should distance himself from this. And it is not similar to the fact that the witnesses of the get take payment for the reason I wrote above in siman 130, and also the Rav who arranges the get, as I wrote above in the Seder HaGet section 4, for those reasons do not apply to halitza. Thus far his words. However, regarding the two additional ones, there is no concern if they take payment, since they sit by themselves and are only for the purpose of publicizing the matter.

And there is a question regarding this: how is it possible that these two are only for the publicity of the matter, when it is proven in the Shas in several places that publicity of a matter does not exist with fewer than ten (Yevamot 67a; Ketubot 7b; Bava Batra 142b)? And the answer to this is that certainly for the sake of publicity alone we would not trouble ourselves with the addition of judges, but rather because in the Shas there is a Tanna who holds that according to the core law five are required, see there; therefore they were meticulous in this, for even though the halacha is not like him, nevertheless they do so for the sake of publicity, as there is a bit of publicity even with fewer than ten. And furthermore, it can be said that in truth there are ten: the five judges, and two witnesses who are stationed according to the custom that will be explained, and the yavam and the yevamah, and it is inevitable that there will be one or two of the people who will answer "the one who had his shoe removed," as will be explained.

It is written, "Then his yevamah shall go up to the gate to the elders." From here the sages of blessed memory derived (101b) that the judges must establish a place for the purpose of the halizah, so that there will be a designated place for it. The establishing of the place is by mouth, in that the three shall say to the two: "Let us go and sit in such-and-such a place in order to perform halizah there," and similarly it is sufficient if the Rav says this. If they performed halizah without establishing a place, the Rambam wrote that it is kosher, for this is not an absolute requirement. Some say that the establishing of the place is on that same day, and some say on the day before it. And so the simple custom is that after the Minchah service preceding the day of the halizah, they establish the place. If the halizah is on Sunday, they do not establish it on Shabbat, for this is like an act of preparation for a weekday; rather, they establish it on the eve of Shabbat. The place is in the high part of the city, meaning in a prominent place. The custom among us is that they perform halizah in the synagogue or in the largest beit midrash in the city. After Minchah on the day before, all the judges stand and the three say to the two, or the Rav says to them all: "Let us go and establish a place for the halizah of tomorrow," and they go to the place where they will arrange the halizah, and the three sit on one bench and the two at their side, as will be explained in the Seder Halizah. Even at night they may establish the place, for this is not like the beginning of a legal judgment, but merely the designation of a place (Perush S.H.).

On the day they establish the location, the dayyanim send to warn the woman that on the following day, the day of the halitzah, she shall not eat or drink anything until after the halitzah, and even the washing of the mouth customary in the morning upon rising from her bed she shall not do. This matter is indispensable, for we require that she spit the spitting from the essence of the saliva and not due to another cause. Therefore, the shamash must warn her regarding this, for if she does not observe this, they will necessarily have to leave the halitzah for another day. They also warn her that she should not spit at all before the beit din until the time of the spitting, and if the saliva forces her, she should swallow it into her body or into a handkerchief. Likewise, they warn that she should not speak much while standing before them, only what is commanded. Likewise, that she should not pick her teeth so that blood does not enter the saliva. Likewise, they return and warn her regarding these matters in the morning before the halitzah as well. It is also customary that the yavam washes his right foot before the day of the halitzah so that on the following day it will be easy to wash it, for they do not rely on the washing of yesterday. It is also good that he should cut the nails of his right foot, and they should also investigate on the day before the halitzah if they are adults and fit to perform halitzah. Also, other matters that require investigation, it is better to investigate them all on the day before the halitzah. They should also teach the yavam and the yevamah on the day before the halitzah so that they will read the verses properly in one breath. All of this is not indispensable, for if they did not do so on the previous day, they can do so on the day of the halitzah.

One may only perform chalitzah during the day, and if they performed chalitzah at night, the chalitzah is invalid, for chalitzah is like the commencement of a legal proceeding, and the commencement of a legal proceeding is invalid at night (104a), as I have written in Choshen Mishpat siman 5. And even if we were to say that in civil law it is valid post facto at night, nevertheless, in chalitzah it is invalid because regarding chalitzah it is written "thus," and "thus" is an absolute requirement (Yam Shel Shlomo chapter 12, siman 21). And why is chalitzah like a legal proceeding? Because she collects her ketubah after the chalitzah, and furthermore, the Torah made it a legal proceeding, for the elders sit and she goes up to them and they call to the yavam, and it is weightier than a legal proceeding. Therefore, one should not distinguish between the chalitzah of a married woman and a betrothed woman (the Nimukei Yosef wrote it is because of the ketubah, and therefore there is one who wished to say that for a betrothed woman they may perform chalitzah at night, but in truth this is unnecessary).

And know that all the poskim absolutely disqualified a chalitzah performed at night, as I have written. However, according to the Sugya of the Shas (ibid.), it depends on the two versions, see there, but they ruled stringently. Accordingly, if they performed chalitzah at night, she is a doubtful chalutzah and is forbidden to the priesthood, and she requires another chalitzah, and from all the brothers, according to the law of a disqualified chalitzah. Yet it is possible that from all the brothers is not required, for it is not similar to all disqualified chalitzot, as this chalitzah is either completely valid (according to the first version, as we establish the law like the Sages) or completely disqualified (according to the second version). The poskim left their words unspecified, and it requires further study (see Tosafot, Shabbat 42b, starting with the words "And this is," and examine it closely).

One does not perform halizah on Shabbat or Yom Tov, as this is among the shevutim decreed by the sages (Beitzah 36b) due to a decree lest they write a halizah document. For thus we learned there: One does not perform halizah and one does not perform yibbum on Shabbat or Yom Tov. And even according to the one who permits betrothing a woman on Shabbat when one does not have children, as is explained in Orach Chaim siman 339, and consequently the same applies to yibbum when the eldest of the brothers performs yibbum according to the essential law of the mitzvah of yibbum, as is proven there in the Gemara (ibid. 37a, which asks: "But is he not performing a mitzvah?" according to the explanation of Rabbeinu Tam there), nevertheless, regarding halizah it is obvious that it is forbidden. However, on Chol HaMoed it is permitted to perform halizah, for one adjudicates capital cases and monetary cases on Chol HaMoed (Moed Katan 14b). And if it is because of writing, behold, one writes legal documents on Chol HaMoed, and even according to the one who forbids it, as is written in Orach Chaim siman 545, nevertheless, a halizah document is permitted according to everyone, as is written there. And some say that one should not perform halizah on the eve of Shabbat or the eve of Yom Tov, and so we practice, for also regarding judgment one does not sit unless it is a time of pressing need, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 5; and halizah in a time of pressing need can also be arranged on the eve of Shabbat or the eve of Yom Tov.

It is necessary that they recognize that he is the brother of the deceased, and that they were in the world at the same time—meaning that he was not born after the death of his deceased brother—and that she is the wife of the deceased. Even if there is only one witness here who testifies to this, it is sufficient. Even a relative, even a woman and she is a relative, or a slave, or a maidservant, or a minor who is discerning and intelligent is trusted, for in a matter that is destined to be revealed, people do not lie, and it is merely the revealing of a matter (Gemara 39b). This is neither a matter of prohibition nor a matter of monetary law (the Rif). This is not among the matters that require formal testimony (from the Rif it is implied that there is no need for the reason of "destined to be revealed"). Even a maidservant is trusted (the Tur). All of these are also trusted regarding the fact that they were in the world at the same time (explanation of section 18).

Some say that in a case of pressing need, such as when the yavam wishes to go to a distant land and there is no one who recognizes him as the brother of the deceased, they perform halitzah even though they do not recognize him, and afterward she shall seek witnesses who recognize them (ibid. in the name of the Or Zarua). According to this, that which we hold later that any two who saw the halitzah may write a deed of halitzah even though they do not recognize them—because the judges would not have performed halitzah unless they recognized them—according to this opinion we do not hold so, for perhaps it was a case of pressing need and they performed halitzah without recognition. It is possible we do not concern ourselves with a case of pressing need, and it requires further study (see in the Gemara 106a).

The dayyanim must know that ninety days have passed since the husband died, excluding the day he died and the day she performs chalitzah; and this too is a mere disclosure of a matter, and the testimony of a relative or a woman is sufficient, as written (ibid.). And they must know that the yavam is thirteen years and one day old, and the yevamah is twelve years and one day old, and that they brought two hairs after they reached these times, for hairs from before this time that remained afterwards are not signs and are merely a mole, as written in siman 155. And if the yevamah has the status of "large breasts," there is no need to examine for hairs; and similarly, if the yavam's beard is full, there is no need to examine for hairs. The measure of the hairs was explained there. And some say that the examination of the breasts must be by men and not by women, but a multitude of hairs is sufficient with women. And certainly, when we know she has reached her years, the examination of women is sufficient, as written there. Therefore, that which requires men for the examination of the breasts is when the years are not known to us; nevertheless, a multitude of hairs is sufficient with women, for this is a matter that is likely to be revealed. But the sign of the breasts is not called "likely to be revealed," for the recognition is not so great. And similarly, regarding only two hairs, we do not rely on women when the years are not known to us, as written there (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 7, and it appears to me as I have written, and examine carefully).

One does not rely on the count of years based on the testimony of relatives nor based on women, but rather based on witnesses who are fit to testify. And some say that if they were established in the eyes of the neighbors as having reached the required years, and the presumption is not based on what they heard from the relatives but rather due to their own estimation or based on a rumor from others, one relies on this presumption to establish them as adults. And if they examined them, even based on women, and found two hairs according to the law, they perform chalitzah, for we stone and burn based on presumptions. And similarly, if a rumor circulated about them that they are of adult years and they examined them, even based on women, and found two hairs for them according to the law, one relies on this, for regarding this matter a rumor is like a presumption (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 9). But it is of no avail that they saw him ascend to the Sefer Torah, for a minor also ascends to the Torah; and even for aliyot that are not customarily given to a minor, one does not rely on this. And similarly, one does not rely on the fact that he was a shaliach tzibbur. And if the rumor is due to things such as these, it is nothing, for this is not a complete presumption.

And even without the presumption of the neighbors, if they have a multitude of hairs or they are long as is common for an adult man or an adult woman, there is a presumption that they have reached the age of years, and we rely on this and perform chalitzah. And on this we rely not to check if there are follicles for the hairs, since there is a multitude of hairs or they are long. And even though it was explained in siman 155 that we are not experts in checking for follicles, and if so, even without this it is impossible to check for follicles, it can be said that this is regarding the whole body, where it can be said that we are not experts; however, to check under the two hairs, we are experts (ibid. subsection 10). But when there is a multitude or length, it is not necessary. And so too if they are large in stature, one may also rely that they are adults in years even if they only brought two hairs. And it has already been explained in siman 155 that children are like signs, and if she merely gave birth, she is presumed to be an adult and performs chalitzah, and see what I wrote there regarding this (and see Beit Shmuel subsection 11). (The difficulty raised by the Bach and the Beit Shmuel subsection 10 from siman 155 requires further study, for on the contrary, there it is explained the opposite, that the lack of expertise is so that there should not be a follicle, and because of the reason of the whole body, see there):

The dayanim sit in their places that they established yesterday and sit as in a judgment, and they shall see to it that the two sit to the side so that it is known that they are not of the essence of the judgment, for halizah suffices with three as has been written. And the yavam and the yevamah shall come before the three dayanim, as it is written: "And his sister-in-law shall go up to the gate before the elders." And they shall stand before them, for the essence of the mitzvah of halizah ab initio is while standing, like litigants who stand before the dayanim. And if he is weak or old, they give him a staff to lean upon, but ex post facto if they performed halizah while sitting, it is valid. Therefore, a sick person who is unable to stand may ab initio perform halizah while sitting, for any matter that has no remedy is considered ex post facto. And later in the Seder HaHalizah the custom in this matter will be explained; see there.

When the yavam agrees to perform chalitzah, they tell him to nullify declarations of protest as with a get, for if he submitted a declaration of protest beforehand, the chalitzah is invalid. Likewise, if they coerced him to perform chalitzah, it is invalid, for chalitzah must be done willingly and not under duress. And even though according to those who hold that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence, it would have been possible to say that one may coerce for chalitzah since it is so according to the law, nevertheless, most of the poskim agreed that Heaven forbid one should perform chalitzah under duress, and one may not coerce except in a case where the Sages, of blessed memory, said so. And there is room to doubt if he desires chalitzah and she does not desire it, whether they may coerce her because the essence of the matter depends on his will and not on her will, or perhaps since she must perform the act of chalitzah, it is invalid if she is under duress; and so it appears.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (101a): If she performed chalitzah with a sandal that is not his, her chalitzah is valid, as it is not required to be specifically his. For even though it is written "his shoe," the sages of blessed memory received a tradition (103b) that even if the shoe is not his, it is valid. And that which is written "his shoe," the intention is that it should fit the measurement of his foot (ibid.), for just as it is not relevant to say "his foot" and not another's, but rather the intention is that she should remove it from his foot, so too the intention of "his shoe" is not literally his own, but rather that it should be his shoe for his foot, meaning according to the measurement of his foot. Nevertheless, we find that the sages of blessed memory there [ruled] that ab initio they should transfer ownership of the sandal to him so that he may walk in it a little, and by this it will be seen that it fits the measurement of his foot. Therefore, ab initio one must give the shoe of chalitzah to the yavam as a gift, and some say that we also require him to walk in it a little so that it appears as his, and automatically it will be seen if it is according to the measurement of his foot. However, ex post facto, if they did not give it to him and he also did not walk in it beforehand, it is valid, since at the time of the chalitzah it fits the measurement of his foot and he is able to walk in it well.

Regarding the matter of the shoe for chalitzah, know that in the time of the Shas they had two types of footwear: one called a "min'al" and one a "sandal." From the Torah there is no distinction, for in the Torah it is written "na'al," which implies both a min'al and a sandal, as min'al is the language of the sages (Rashi 102a). And that which is written, "Iron and brass shall be your min'al," this is not the term for a shoe but rather the language of a lock and a bolt (ibid.). In the time of the Shas, they were particular to perform chalitzah only with a sandal for a reason that will be explained; some forbade it ab initio with a min'al, and some permitted it even ab initio. However, in these our days and also in the time of the earlier authorities, we perform chalitzah with a min'al because it is not our custom to go out in a sandal, and its form is almost unknown to us. Something similar to this is found in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of the twelfth chapter: Rabbi Yose said, it happened that I went to Netzivin and I saw an old man there, and I asked him: with what did Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira perform chalitzah, with a min'al or a sandal? He said to me: is there a sandal in our place? etc. See there. In our Shas (ibid.) this incident is recorded in a different manner. The Rambam and all the poskim did not mention a sandal at all. Yet, despite all this, we make certain changes to the min'al of chalitzah from what is usual, so that it will be somewhat similar to a sandal, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

The minal is made of soft leather similar to ours, and the sandal is made of hard, boiled leather (Rashi), and once it is damaged, it has no remedy. However, the minal, even if it is torn, is capable of being worn, and it is forbidden to perform chalitzah with a torn minal. Therefore, the sages chose the sandal for this reason. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said (102a): A decree because of a worn-out minal, meaning torn; or alternatively, because of a half-minal, meaning that even if only half of it remains, it is capable of being worn through pressing, and in truth it is not called a shoe. Therefore, it will be explained that we are accustomed to make the minal of chalitzah from somewhat hard leather so that it will be similar to a sandal, and other things we are accustomed to do similar to a sandal, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

The form of the sandal, as is explained from the commentary of Rashi (Shabbat 60a), is thus: that it has two openings and one can wear it from two sides, but it is recognizable which is the front and which is the back, and when one wears it reversed, the one entering appears as if he is exiting (ibid.). The recognition is in the sole upon which one treads, as is understood. And there are those who wrote that the sandal is entirely from one piece, and the shoe is from two or three pieces like ours (Nimukei Yosef, chapter "Mitzvat Chalitzah," in the name of commentators). And from Rashi, of blessed memory, there, it does not imply thus, for even the sandal is of two pieces, such that its bottom is joined with the upper with nails or with other things. And there are those who wrote that it is of two pieces, only the stitching is on the outside and not on the inside, and therefore even in a chalitzah shoe they do so, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And we learned in the chapter "Mitzvat Chalitzah" that a sandal that has no heel is invalid; that is to say, that the side behind the foot must enter into the sandal, and not like there is among us a type of shoe called "pantoffel" or "steck-shuh" which have no heel. And in chapter 26 of Kelim (mishnah 4) it was explained that the sandal has a "nose" that rises against the toes of the foot from the front, and that it has two "ears," see there. And it was explained there that there are several types of sandals (Amki, Ladiki) that have straps and there is no need to tie them, rather one pulls the straps and they close on their own, see there. But an ordinary sandal is with two "ears" and with loops, similar to what they make among us for small children.

It was further explained in the Gemara (102a) that there was a type of sandal that was very tight on the foot, and there was one that was not so tight and had shnitzim, meaning two thin and short straps made at the edge of the sandal to tie it upon the leg; and some say these are the hooks that we make (Nemukei Yosef). And it appears that these are the "ears" mentioned in the Mishnah in Kelim. And they said there that, nevertheless, it also requires a mitna, meaning leather straps to fold over it to tighten it (ibid.). And with this, when she unties the straps and the hooks and removes his shoe, it will be a recognizable, proper chalitzah (Gemara); meaning, that she performed the act of chalitzah by untying and removing it from his foot, for with the removal from the foot alone the matter is not so recognizable. And such is the custom, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

It is written, "and she shall remove his shoe from off (me'al) his foot," and it is not written, "and she shall remove his shoe from (mi) his foot." Our Sages, of blessed memory, received the tradition that even "from off his foot" is valid, but "from off of off" is invalid (103a). This is what we learned there in the Mishnah: From the knee and below, her chalitzah is valid; from the knee and above, her chalitzah is invalid. The explanation of these matters is that "foot" refers to the palm of the foot where the toes are, and in height it extends until the protruding bones on this side and that, which is called "knekhel" in our language, and in the foreign tongue "kavila," and in the language of the Gemara (ibid.) "istvira," and in the language of the Mishnah "kursal" (Ohalot ch. 1). From there and above begins the leg (shok) and continues until the knee, and in our language "kni," and in the language of the Scripture "berachayim," and in the singular "berech." Therefore, a shoe that is above the knee, such as our large footwear that are called "stivl," if they reach above the knee, they are invalid for chalitzah. In the Yerushalmi it is stated that even to tie the straps above the knee is invalid. The Rosh, of blessed memory (ch. 12, sec. 7), lengthily argued that there is no logic at all to invalidate based on the tying being above the knee, for tying is not explicitly stated in the Torah, nor is it a halachah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, and according to the Torah no tying is needed at all. Therefore, he says that the Yerushalmi is dealing with a case where without tying the shoe would fall off the foot, and since the primary support is the tying, the tying is like the shoe itself and is invalid if the tying is above the knee. But in a case where the shoe stays on and he can walk in it without tying, it does not impede if the tying is above the knee. However, from other Rishonim who stated their words without qualification, it does not seem so. And so the Rambam wrote in ch. 4, law 16, that when the shoe is tied above the knee it is invalid. Thus far his words. This implies that in all cases it is invalid. The Maharshal in Yam Shel Shlomo (ibid. sec. 15) agreed in law with the Rosh. This is his wording: And nevertheless, regarding the matter of the straps being tied above the knee, his words seem correct to me where the shoe is not large and he can walk well without tying, that the chalitzah is valid ex post facto, and it is as if it were not tied at all. Thus far his words. But in this he disagrees with him and holds that if without the tying he could not walk at all, then even by means of tying it is invalid, for this is not "his shoe." But if he could walk in it, only that by means of the tying he walks more uprightly, it is valid. And there in siman 8 he explained that a shoe without straps and without hooks and loops, even if the shoe is good on his foot even without tying, the chalitzah is invalid. But when there were hooks and loops even without straps, or if there were straps and he did not tie them, it is valid ex post facto if he can walk well without tying. And so too straps without hooks, when he tied the straps it is valid, and one of them is required even ex post facto. And even if Elijah should come and say that we do not require straps and hooks and loops, we do not listen to him, for the custom has already been established; see there.

The shoe must be entirely of leather, and the support for this matter is from that which is written in Yechezkel, "And I shod thee with tachash." Therefore, one must sew all its stitches with leather, and so our sages, of blessed memory, said: A sandal sewn with flax, one may not perform chalitzah with it, as it is said, "And I shod thee with tachash" (102b). Nevertheless, some say that this is only ab initio, but post facto it is kosher, for this derivation is a mere asmachta. However, most of the poskim disqualify it even post facto, and such is the simple custom; and it is a complete derivation, for if it were not so, let a shoe of other materials be kosher. The first opinion holds that even if it is an asmachta, nevertheless, the essence of a shoe when it is not of leather is not a shoe at all, for it is not the way to make a shoe except from leather. But this is not the primary view, for if so, if in some place there would be a custom to wear shoes of other materials, we would validate other materials as well, and this is not a logical reasoning at all. Therefore, the primary law is that when it is not sewn with leather it is invalid, and not as some say that in this time when shoes are sewn with flax it must be sewn with flax—and Heaven forbid to do so. And so wrote our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 15, and such is the primary law.

But its straps do not need to be of leather, and some say that its straps also must be of leather, and such is the practice. Thus far his words in the Shulchan Aruch there. And in truth, in the Gemara there it is only found that if they are of hair it is fine; see there, for hair from an animal is no worse than leather. Nevertheless, if the entire shoe is of hair, it is not valid for chalitzah because it does not have the status of a shoe. And so they said there, that one of hair is called a "kurka," meaning that it is like a shoe and is thick leather attached with glue to another thick leather; and so too, one who makes a shoe entirely of hair, it is necessarily thick because he attaches them together, and this is not called a shoe at all, for it has its own name which is called "kurka" (Nimukei Yosef). According to this, in the view of the "some say" as well, hair is valid (ibid.). And the first opinion is the view of the Tur, who wrote that the straps do not need to be of leather. And there is one who says that the intention of the Tur is also this: that it does not need to be of leather and hair is valid, but not from another material, and they do not disagree at all (Bach and Beit Shmuel, subsection 14). But it does not appear so, for if it were so, he should not have written it without specification but rather should have explained. And it is clear that the Tur validates with any material, according to the system of his father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, which we wrote in section 26, that the straps are not indispensable. And in truth, if he can walk well without straps, it is possible that everyone agrees that it is valid from any material (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel there), and it is in such a case that the Tur is dealing. But if his primary walking is by means of the straps, the Tur admits that it must specifically be of leather or hair, and such is the primary ruling. And know that the hooks and loops also must specifically be of leather or hair, for it is like leather.

Initially, it is necessary that the leather be somewhat hard so that it somewhat resembles a sandal, as I wrote in section 22. Nevertheless, it appears to me that it should not be very thick and hard, for it would lose the status of a shoe, as I wrote in section 28. Similarly, some say that the stitching should be on the outside and not on the inside, also for this reason, so that it resembles a sandal (in the Shulchan Aruch section 16 there is a scribal error). This is the common custom and one should not deviate. Nevertheless, it appears to me that if one stitched them on the inside, it does not invalidate the matter ex post facto, for all the Rishonim did not mention this except for the Semak. This is also implied by the words of the Yam Shel Shlomo there, that this is merely for beautification; see there, and there is room to deliberate on this.

And some say that the entire shoe must be from a single piece, also for the reason we have written, so that it should be similar to a sandal. But the custom is not so, and also all the poskim did not write this, for even regarding a sandal we have already explained in section 24 that from Rashi it is clear that it was not from a single piece. Furthermore, it is known that it is the way of a shoe that the leather of its bottom, which they call "podeshva," and the leather of the heel, which they call "pyata," requires harder leather than the leather of the shoe, for such is the way of the world, and it is almost impossible otherwise to walk in it well, as is known.

Therefore, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 16, and this is his wording: However, the custom is to perform chalitzah ab initio with a shoe that is sewn from the outside and also that it be made of two pieces, meaning that its bottom, which they call sola and in our language podeshva, is a separate piece, and also the straps are a separate piece sewn into it; and they shall be careful that the leather of the sandal is not smeared with oil to soften it. Thus far his words. And it is not specifically two pieces, for the same law applies to three pieces. And so wrote one of the great authorities (Chatam Sofer, siman 112). And so it appears explicitly from the words of the Yam Shel Shlomo (siman 5), who wrote that the heel and the place of treading should be very hard, see there. And perforce, it is impossible to make the fanta, which is the upper of the shoe, together with the heel from one piece, for the fanta is soft and the heel is hard. And to make the heel together with the bottom is known to be very difficult. Therefore, we make them from three pieces: the fanta alone, and the heel that surrounds the back of the foot and the thick flesh of the foot that is in front of the foot alone, and the bottom alone; and they sew them with external stitches using leather threads or hair.

And that which he wrote, that it should not be smeared with oil to soften it, it appears the reason is so that it will be similar to a sandal in its hardness, as has been written; however, it is necessary to blacken it, as will be explained. However, the Yam Shel Shlomo there wrote that the custom is to polish it and smooth it like any other upper of a shoe, and if it has dried out, it is proper to smear it so that it will be fit to walk in. And the hair side of the leather should be on the outside and the flesh side on the inside, and the body of the shoe shall be black and it shall be sewn from the outside with a white strap. Thus far his words. And so we practice.

The Tur wrote: From whatever leather the sandal may be, it is fine, and not like the words of Rabbeinu Tam who wrote that it must be from the leather of a pure animal. Thus far his words. Many of the early authorities wondered at him regarding this, yet several of the poskim were stringent in this since it issued from the mouth of Rabbeinu Tam. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch in section 17, and this is his wording: Some say that initially one makes it from the leather of a pure animal, and also the straps and the buckles on it, and also the sewing straps, everything from a pure animal, and so we practice. Thus far his words. And it appears to me that there is a great reason in the matter, and this is the reasoning of Rabbeinu Tam, of blessed memory: For certainly if we say that "from that which is permitted in your mouth" is only required for a Sefer Torah, tefillin, and mezuzot because holy words are written upon them, then certainly we would not require leather from a pure animal. But if we say that a shofar from an impure animal is invalid, as the Ran wrote in the fourth chapter of Rosh Hashanah, and so we establish in Orach Chaim siman 586, behold that for other mitzvot we also require "from that which is permitted in your mouth," and certainly for chalitzah we require this as well. And even though the walls of a sukkah are valid even from an impure animal, as is proven in Sukkah (23a), and the walls of a sukkah are from the Torah, this is because even inanimate objects and plants are valid, and an impure animal is no worse than them. But regarding a shofar, where we require specifically from a living creature, one needs "from that which is permitted in your mouth." And so too regarding chalitzah: if a shoe were valid from anything, it would also be valid from an impure animal. But since the sages of blessed memory said (102b) that a sandal sewn with flax is invalid, it follows that we require specifically from a living creature; therefore, it is proper that we require it from a pure animal (and with this, everything that they questioned against Rabbeinu Tam, of blessed memory, is answered).

There shall be in the shoe two straps to tie it with, one on this side and one on this side, and they shall be long enough to wrap them two or three times around the foot. And some say that these straps must specifically be white, but the entire sandal shall be black on the outside, and on the inside one need not be concerned. And if the straps became blackened due to age, one need not be particular. And such is the simple custom among us, that the entire shoe is black on the outside except for the straps. And there are some of the Gaonim who challenged this and hold that since nowadays everyone goes with black straps, one must specifically make them black (the Gra, subsection 67). And we do not have the power to change from what is customary and according to the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch, and especially in our time when they do not go with straps at all, there is no difference for us between black and white, and therefore the custom in all beit din courts is that the straps shall be white.

They shall make a type of knot that is called a "chumarta" in the language of the Gemara, and they are like large hooks on one side of the shoe, and on the other side they shall make a short strap with a hole to insert the knot into the hole like loops and hooks. They shall make two knots and corresponding to them two holes, and some say they should make three knots in this manner and not fewer than two. It is customary to make three, even though there is no reason for this, as two are required in order to tighten it to the foot, and so it was also in a sandal as is proven from the Mishnah in Kelim (chapter 26), but for three there is no reason. Nevertheless, one should not change from the custom. And know that the knots shall not be from the shoe itself, but rather another short strap attached to the top of the shoe, and likewise on the second side with the holes. The hooks shall also be from somewhat hard leather, and these stitches with which they sew the straps and the hooks shall be on the outside as I wrote regarding the shoe itself, and so they are accustomed.

Some say that it should not have a tongue as they are accustomed to make in shoes, so that it should not be "above the above." Thus it is written in the Shulchan Aruch, section 20. And "tongue" appears to be like some additional piece for the shoe. And certainly this is only a mere stringency, for even when she wears two actual shoes, if she removes both of them it is valid, as will be explained. And all the more so regarding a tongue. And "above the above" is only in one of two matters: either from the knee and above, or to remove the upper shoe while the lower remains on the foot; but not when removing both of them. And so the great Acharonim agreed (Beit Shmuel subsection 17, and the Bach, and the Divrei Pinchas).

The Mordechai wrote that it is customary to make the shoe large until the middle of the leg. Thus far his words. Meaning, large in height. However, in the Yam Shel Shlomo (siman 16) he wrote that the Or Zarua wrote that the height of the shoe should be until it covers the ankle bone (and this is like the Mordechai). And the Raviah wrote that the shoe should be lower than the ankle bone, as we learned in the Mishnah: if she performed chalitzah from the knee and below, her chalitzah is valid; this implies that after the fact it is valid, but initially one should not make it in height except according to the foot itself, and that is until the ankle bone, which is the knechel, and no more, only the heel should be slightly higher in height in the manner of a shoe, and such is the custom. And in the Shulchan Aruch nothing of this was mentioned. However, from that which they wrote in section 20, and this is his wording: And they make the ears of the shoe short so that the loops and the hooks should not be upon the shoe but only upon the foot, so that it should not be "above of above." Thus far his words. It appears that this is according to the opinion of the Mordechai and the Or Zarua, for according to the opinion of the Raviah it is not relevant to say "the ears of the shoe," for there are no ears here, rather the upper of the shoe should not be very long in a manner that the hooks and the loops will be upon the flesh of the foot and not upon the upper of the shoe for the reason of "above of above" (and we have already explained that according to the essential law this is not "above of above" and it is merely a stringency). However, there is no proof from this, as one could say that the intention of the Shulchan Aruch is regarding the ears of the loops and the hooks themselves, for so it is in the language of the Mishnah in Kelim as I wrote in section 24, and the intention is that he should make them short so that the hook with the surroundings of the hole of the loops will be placed upon the bone of the foot, and so appears the primary point of their intention even though the language is not so settled (and so it appears in the Levush). They further wrote there that some say to sew a rim around the shoe above, and they did not practice so, and he should be careful to sew it with stitches close to one another. Thus far his words. And it is simple that if they are not close it is not a mended shoe that is fit to walk in. And that which they did not practice to make a rim, perhaps because they were particular that there should not be another thing upon the shoe because of "above of above," and to make a rim necessarily requires that they sew it with some additional thing; and it has already been explained that all such as this are only mere stringencies.

They further wrote in section 21 that it should be made in the form of a right foot and he should wear it on his right foot, and it should be the size of his foot, such that it is not so large that it is unfit to walk in, nor should it be so small that it does not cover most of the foot, nor should it be torn such that he cannot walk in it. Thus far their words. And behold, regarding a torn or small one, it is a complete disqualification. However, regarding a large one that is unfit to walk in, we have already written in the name of the Rosh that even if he cannot walk in it, if by means of the straps that they tie he will be able to walk, it is kosher. But in the name of the Yam Shel Shlomo we explained that if he is completely unable to walk without the straps, then even with the straps it is disqualified; only if even without the straps he can walk poorly, such as when it is not much larger than the size of his foot, then it is kosher by means of the straps, so that he walks well when they tie the straps. And so it is possible to say even in the opinion of the Rosh. Therefore, regarding the law, if it is only slightly larger than the size of his foot in a manner that he is able to wear it and walk in it, even though the walking is not good, it is kosher; but if it is very large, it is disqualified. And that which they wrote, that it should be made in the form of a right foot, this applies in places where they sew shoes in this manner, but there are many who sew them equally for right and left, as is known. Nevertheless, we are somewhat meticulous that they should sew it with some recognition that it is for the right foot, and it is difficult to explain this in writing, but every shoemaker knows how to make it with recognition that it is for the right foot.

He shall put the mנעל on his foot while he is barefoot and not over socks. It is obvious that if she removed the mנעל from over the socks and the socks remained on his foot, it is a disqualified chalitzah, for this is "above the above" (Beit Shmuel, subsection 25), and we require the revealing of the leg. However, if she removed the mנעל together with the socks at the same time, it is valid ex post facto (ibid.). But if she removed them one after the other, it is certainly disqualified, for at the time of the removal of the mנעל it was "above the above," and at the time of the removal of the socks, this is not a removal of a mנעל at all. For this reason, there are those who are meticulous that there should not be mud stuck inside the mנעל, and also for this reason there are those who require washing his right foot very thoroughly. And although these are merely stringencies (ibid.), nevertheless they are proper stringencies and such is the widespread custom, and Heaven forbid one should change from this. However, ex post facto, one does not disqualify the chalitzah because of this. And likewise, there is one who says that the yavam should tie the edge of the trousers above his calves so that the dayanim may see clearly that there is nothing between his foot and his mנעל, and such is the widespread custom.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 28, and this is their wording: He shall put on the shoe and wrap the straps around the shoe on his foot and tie both together with two knots, one upon the other, and he should not tighten the second knot with the strength of his hand so that he can untie it with the right hand, and a bow over them. And the knot must be upon the flesh of his leg and not upon the eyelets of the shoe; therefore, he must cut the shoe in front and behind like a notch so that the returning strap will be attached directly to his bare foot. And he shall wind the straps twice around the leg until the ends of the straps return to the front of the leg above the eyelets of the shoe, that is to say, upon the bare leg, and the knots shall be on the front of the leg and not behind it. And he shall insert the knots that are in its eyelet into the holes that are in its second eyelet. Thus far their words.

From their words it is clarified that the wrapping of the straps is around the leg, meaning below the knee and above the ankle, and it is opposite the shinbone. Thus wrote the Levush, and thus wrote several of the great authorities, brought in the Yam Shel Shelomo (siman 6). The Yam Shel Shelomo himself wrote, and this is his wording: Nevertheless, it seems to me that since the essence of chalitzah is the untying of the knots, it is therefore good to make the knot of the straps on the foot, and not as several great authorities wrote, that they wrap until they tie above the shoe on the leg, which is called "shinbein" in the Ashkenazic tongue. And it is a bad custom in my eyes, since the essence of chalitzah is on the foot and the untying of the knot is like the removal of the shoe; if so, it must be on the top of the foot below. Thus far his words. And know that one who wishes to conduct himself like the Yam Shel Shelomo must necessarily make four small loops, two from here and two from here, meaning each loop shall be between the eyelets so that at the time of wrapping the straps, they wrap them through the loops, and then it will be possible to wrap them on the top of the foot. Without this, it is difficult to wrap them there, whereas with wrapping on the leg, these loops are not necessary, as is understood. And there is another practical difference, for according to the Yam Shel Shelomo, one must sew the straps above the hooks in order to wrap from above to below until the tying comes upon the foot, and thus he wrote there. Whereas for those who wrap on the leg, it is better that the straps be tied below the hooks in order to wrap from below to above. Regarding the law, there is no practical difference in which place to tie them and sew them, and therefore this was not clarified in the Shulchan Aruch. And there was one who used to connect them between the hooks, meaning below the two upper hooks and above the third hook, and thus Mahari Bruna used to practice in the name of his father (ibid.). And the Nimukei Yosef wrote explicitly that the two straps should be either below the hooks or above them, see there. Therefore, they may do as they wish.

And that which is written in the Shulchan Aruch to cut in the shoe in its front and in its back like a notch in order to wrap around the flesh of the foot, such is the custom. And there are those who make two notches and there are those who make three, and from the sides of the shoe they make small notches lower than the notches that are behind the foot. And there are those who cried out like a crane against the notches, for it appears like a torn shoe, as the Yam Shel Shelomo wrote there. Nevertheless, our custom is to make two notches behind it and two small notches from the sides. And the order of the wrappings will be explained with the help of Heaven in the Seder Halitzah, section 18, see there. And there are those who do not make notches on the sides of the shoe, only behind it, and so we are accustomed to do.

If she performed chalitzah with a sandal of wood, or with a sandal of cork, or of bulrush, or of fiber, and the like, and they are not covered with leather on the outside; or if she performed chalitzah on his left foot; or if it was a large shoe in which he cannot walk at all, such as one that is excessively large; or a small shoe that does not cover the majority of his foot; or a torn one in which he cannot walk; or with a sandal that has no heel, such as a pantoffel; or with an anpali of cloth, and even with a moq which is a type of felt that is hard and protective like our valenki—the chalitzah is invalid, as this is not a shoe at all. And the invalidity of the left foot is because we learn the foot of chalitzah from the foot of the metzora, regarding which it is written: "upon the thumb of his right foot" (104a). However, if it was of wood and covered with leather on the outside, or of leather with a linen cloth sewn on the inside, or if she performed chalitzah with a left shoe on the right foot, the chalitzah is valid ex post facto (there are those who wish in a time of great need to rely on Rabbi Eliezer ibid. who validates the left foot, but Heaven forbid to say so, and there is no need to elaborate on this at all).

A shoe of idolaters, meaning that they place the shoe on the feet of the worshipped form and walk the form in the shoe, and it is actual idolatry—she shall not perform chalitzah with it, but if she did perform chalitzah with it, her chalitzah is valid. However, with a shoe of an offering to an idol, or of a subverted city, or that was made for the shrouds of the dead, if she performed chalitzah, her chalitzah is invalid. So it is in the Gemara (103b). And there it is stated that a sandal that was quarantined or certified—meaning from leprosy of garments—is also valid. The reason for all of these is as follows: regarding an offering and a subverted city, since it is designated for burning, its required measure is considered crushed, and there is no shoe here at all; and regarding that of the dead, because it was not made for walking. But regarding quarantined and certified, even though it also requires burning, nevertheless, since the Torah called it a garment at the time of burning, "and he shall burn the garment," therefore the name "shoe" is not nullified from it. Also, regarding a shoe of idolaters, if it belongs to an Israelite, for which there is no nullification, her chalitzah is invalid because it is designated for burning. And that which we said, that her chalitzah is valid, refers to that of a Cuthean, which has nullification and does not need to be burned. And according to the opinion of the Tosafot there, it is specifically valid after nullification, but according to Rashi, even before nullification, such as where he did not intend to acquire it; for if he intended to acquire it, it becomes that of an Israelite. And if you ask, when he did not intend to acquire it, the shoe is not his—the answer to this is that it has already been explained that with a shoe that is not his, her chalitzah is valid ex post facto. And that which we prohibited regarding an offering, the intention is not that the shoe itself is the offering, for in such a case it is not prohibited as there is no offering except for that which is like the inner service, but rather the intention is that the animal was an offering and he made a shoe from its hide (the Maggid Mishneh and the Be'er Mayim subsection 23). And see what I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 139.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Arukh, wrote: If he is dominant in both his feet, and similarly if she is dominant in both her hands, they shall perform it with the right. If she is left-handed, she shall perform it with her right, which is the left of all other people. If he is left-footed, some say that he performs chalitzah with both of them, with the right shoe on the right and with the left shoe on the left. And there is one who was in doubt, saying that he has no remedy. And the custom is according to the first opinion. Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matter is that for one who rules with both, we follow the right hand of the general world as with tefillin, and a left-handed person performs it with his right, which is the left of every man, as with tefillin. According to this, it would appear that one who is left-footed should perform chalitzah with his right, which is the left of every man. However, many of the poskim wrote that the matter of chalitzah is not like tefillin, for regarding tefillin the Torah decreed "the weak hand," so perforce one must see which hand is weak for this individual. But regarding chalitzah, where we derive "foot, foot" from a metzora, and regarding a metzora it is certain that there is no distinction between a left-handed person and one who is not left-handed, for regarding a metzora it is also written "ear," and just as with the ear there is no distinction between a left-handed person and one who is not left-handed, so too with the foot. Furthermore, the foot is not similar to the hand, for regarding the foot there is not such a difference between right and left. And some say further that for a left-handed person there is no "right" at all, and he is considered as having a blemish regarding the matter of right and left; he has a left, but regarding the right he is as one who is missing it. This is the opinion of the one who holds that he has no remedy. And those who hold that he performs chalitzah with both do so because they are in doubt whether it is similar to tefillin or not. But the opinion of the Tur is that it is exactly like tefillin, and he performs chalitzah with his right, which is the left of every man; see there. And the opinion of the Yam Shel Shelomo (siman 22) is the opposite, that he should perform chalitzah with the right of every man. Therefore, for the halachah, the main point is like the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch to perform chalitzah with both, and she should remove the two shoes at one time, for if she removes one of them, perhaps it is not according to the law and it would be a disqualified chalitzah, and she would need to go around to all the brothers (Perisha, subsection 8). And some say there is no concern in this (Bach), provided they intend to exempt with that which is according to the law (Beit Shmuel, subsection 24). And this is a simple matter, that if there is a brother who is not left-handed, it is better that he perform chalitzah even if the left-handed one is older than him. And the sign of a left-footed person is if he uproots his left foot first (Yam Shel Shelomo). And it appears to me that if they did not know of his being left-footed and he performed chalitzah with his right, one may rely ex post facto on the Yam Shel Shelomo, for this is the opinion of the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol and the Sefer Mitzvot Katan (see Ran, beginning of the chapter Gid HaNasheh).

The yavam must say "Lo chafatzti lekachtah" with a mappiq heh, and she must say "Me'en yivami lehakim le'achiv shem beYisrael lo avah yivami." It is stated in the Gemara (106b) that it is proper that they should not pause at all between "lo" and "chafatzti," nor between "lo" and "avah," so that it does not appear as if he is saying "chafatzti lekachtah" or she is saying "avah yivami." However, post facto regarding "lo chafatzti," there is no concern, for all see that "chafatzti" is the conclusion of "lo"; whereas regarding "lo avah yivami," we are concerned even post facto, for if not so, they will say that the "lo" refers to what preceded it. But regarding "lo chafatzti," there is nothing preceding it. This is according to the explanation of Rashi. But the Rambam, of blessed memory, has another explanation for this and holds that there is no difference between one and the other, but rather that it must be within their ability to read the two words in one breath, and then even if they read with a pause, we have no concern, in the manner that the sages said: "Anything that is fit for mixing, the lack of mixing does not hinder it." And that which is implied in the Gemara, that the main point is regarding "lo avah yivami," is because generally it is more difficult for a woman to accustom herself to this than for a man; but as for the law, there is no difference. The widespread custom is like Rashi, and they are meticulous to read with her in one breath (and the wording of the Shulchan Aruch section 29 is slightly imprecise, see Beit Shmuel subsection 57). The verses shall be said standing and specifically in the holy tongue, since it is written "kakhah," and "kakhah" is a requirement. And so we learn this "ve'anetah" from "ve'anu haLeviyim," and there it is specifically in the holy tongue (Sotah 32a).

It is stated in the Gemara (103a): He who undergoes chalitzah must press down his foot, meaning that he should press his foot against the ground. The reason appears to be that since the Torah commanded, "and she shall remove his shoe from off his foot," the chalitzah must be clearly recognizable. If his foot were suspended in the air and she were to remove his shoe, there is not such a recognition, as she exerts no effort at all. Therefore, he must press his foot against the ground, so that when she lifts his foot and removes the shoe, the chalitzah is clearly recognizable. Furthermore, any person who removes his shoe typically lifts his foot from the ground to remove his shoe; thus, the lifting of the foot is also included in the removal. Therefore, he must press his foot against the ground so that she will lift his foot from the ground. If he did not press his foot against the ground and she removed his shoe from the air, some disqualify it and some validate it, for the sages spoke regarding the mitzvah but not as a requirement that invalidates. This is the opinion of the Ra'avad. However, the Tur wrote in the name of the Rif and the Rambam that it is invalid. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, hesitated regarding this and wrote that this is not their opinion. Nevertheless, he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch, section 32: There are those who say that if he did not press his foot against the ground, her chalitzah is invalid. Thus far his words. However, the Yam Shel Shlomo ruled simply (siman 15) that after the fact it does not invalidate; see there, and see what I wrote in section 50.

Therefore, this is the order: the yavam shall stand near a wall or near a pillar and lean on it, and press his foot into the ground, and she stands inclined and unties the knots of the shoe with her right hand alone, and afterwards unties the hooks also with her right hand alone. She shall grasp the back of his leg with her left hand and lift his leg and hold it in the air, and with her right hand she shall slip the shoe off from the heel and remove the entire shoe with her right hand; and all this without the assistance of the left hand, for so it is in the Yerushalmi. In all of this, she shall not be sitting nor on her knees, but rather she shall be standing and bend herself. Immediately when she has removed the entire shoe from his foot, she shall throw the shoe to the ground like a person acting in anger because he did not desire to establish a name for his brother. Our sages, of blessed memory, said that if she is armless, she performs chalitzah with her teeth, for it is not written "and she shall remove with her hand." From this we learned that if she performed chalitzah with her left hand, it is also valid post facto, and the Yerushalmi only said with the right as a mitzvah and not as a requirement; so the Rishonim, of blessed memory, ruled.

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said (102a): Whether he untied and she removed, or she untied and he removed, it is invalid, until she unties and she removes. This means that even the untying of the knots is indispensable, that she must untie them, for this too is included in "and she shall remove his shoe." And we have already explained that the opinion of the Rosh is that only if without the knots it would be difficult to walk in it, as with the sandal in their times where they could not walk in it without tying; but if he can walk in it without tying and she removed it from the foot, even though he untied the knots, her chalitzah is valid. The great later authorities (Beit Shmuel subsection 31 and the Gra subsection 117) agreed to this. From this it is implied that the insistence is only regarding the knots, that she must untie them, but regarding the opening of the hooks there is no insistence after the fact if he opened them. There is also some proof from this for what I wrote in section 48, that the lifting of the foot is not indispensable after the fact, since it was not counted as indispensable.

If his foot was bent backward or turned on its side, or if he walks on his toes, the Sages said (103a) that he does not perform chalitzah. Some of our teachers explained the reason is because he cannot press his foot against the ground (the Rif). If we say that the pressing of the foot is not indispensable, this is not a correct reason; however, in any case, it can be said that even if it is not indispensable, we require that it be fit for the pressing of the foot. Some say that this is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 4 (the Maggid Mishneh). But some of our teachers explained the reason is because with a bent foot or one turned on its side, his shoe is removed from above the sole of his foot and not from above his foot. For "bent" does not mean that it stands in its usual way but was only bent to the sides or backward; rather, "bent backward" means that the top of the foot is below and the sole of his foot is above, and also when he removes his shoe, he removes it below his foot, and the Torah said "his shoe from off his foot" (the Ra'avad and the Rosh, section 7). And when he walks on his toes, he is certainly not fit for chalitzah at all, for he has no foot (ibid.), as toes are not a foot and he does not walk on his foot. And one should not ask according to the poskim who hold that one with a lame foot performs chalitzah with his right foot, which is the left of every other person, that the law of this person should be like a lame person and he should perform chalitzah with his left foot, for to him it is like the right. For it can be said that it is not similar to one who is lame from birth, where the strength that every person has in the right was placed in his left foot, which is not the case with a deformity of the foot. And even if the deformity is from birth, nevertheless, the essential strength that is required to be in the right is not present in his left foot.

That which we learned in the Mishnah, if she performed chalitzah from the knee and below her chalitzah is valid, and from the knee and above her chalitzah is invalid, we have already written that the Yerushalmi explains this as referring to the tying, that the tying invalidates if it is from the knee and above; and that the Rosh explains the Yerushalmi that this is specifically when it is difficult to walk in it without tying, but when he is able to walk without tying, we are not concerned if the tying is from the knee and above, for the tying is not a hindrance at all. In any case, according to this explanation, this matter is not relevant at all to one whose leg was amputated, for an amputee, even from the knee and below, does not perform chalitzah, for the primary definition of "leg" is the foot, and when he has no foot, there is no fulfillment here of "and she shall remove his shoe from off his leg." A proof for this is from the inverted leg that was explained, that he does not perform chalitzah; and is one whose leg is inverted worse than one for whom this entire piece was cut off? This is the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam and other poskim (see Beit Yosef). According to this view, it is simple that if the height of the shoe reaches above the knee it is invalid, and it is an a fortiori argument from tying. We have already explained that we do not make its height except until the ankle, which is the knechel.

But the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel, the Meor, the Rashba, and the Rosh, of blessed memory, is that the Mishnah refers to one whose leg was severed; for if it was severed below the knee and there is a place to insert the shoe and tie it, even below the knee when he cannot walk without tying (see Beit Shmuel subsection 35), the chalitzah is valid, for everything from the knee and below is called "his leg," and this refers to the entire length of the lower leg. And it is not similar to a reversed foot where he does not perform chalitzah because he cannot press his foot against the ground, but the amputee presses his severed leg against the ground (Tosafot 103a, s.v. "man," see there). And the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, also appears to be like this opinion. However, the Tosafot hold like the first opinion, and consequently, since it is a dispute of the great authorities, the amputee does not perform chalitzah, and if he performed chalitzah, it is a disqualified chalitzah. And it is possible that she does not need to go around to all the brothers as with all disqualified chalitzot, for in any case, according to the opinion of those who validate it, it is completely valid, and according to the opinion of those who disqualify it, there is no chalitzah at all in this (see Beit Shmuel subsection 33).

If she tore the shoe from upon his foot or if she burned it while it was on his foot, the chalitzah is invalid, for we require "chalitzah" (removal) and not tearing or burning. And even if she tore it or burned it partially and removed the remainder, it is invalid, for we require the removal of his entire shoe (see Beit Shmuel subsection 36). And the Rambam wrote in chapter 4, law 21, that if he was wearing two shoes and she removed the upper one, even though she tore the lower one until his foot was revealed, this is an invalid chalitzah. Thus far his words. And this is no novelty at all, for the primary chalitzah is the lower one, and in it chalitzah was not fulfilled; rather, the novelty is that you should not say since the foot was revealed and there is also removal here of the upper one, it is valid—it comes to teach us that it is invalid. And this is the Rambam, of blessed memory, according to his version of the text in the Gemara (102a). But according to the version of Rashi, of blessed memory, even if she tore the upper one and removed the lower one, but did not take the torn upper one off the foot, the chalitzah is also invalid; for even though she removed the lower one which is the primary one, nevertheless, since the torn upper one is still on the foot, his foot was not completely revealed, and it is possible that the Torah was particular specifically about the revelation of the foot. But if she removed the two shoes together, the chalitzah is valid, and certainly when she tore the upper one and threw it away and removed the lower one. And when she removed the upper one and not the lower one, it is obvious that there is no chalitzah here at all, for it was "from upon from upon" (what the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 37, that "from upon from upon" is an invalid chalitzah, in my humble opinion this is only regarding a tying above the knee and the like where the primary chalitzah was on the foot, whereas in a case like this, it is no chalitzah at all, and it requires further study. and according to what the Beit Shmuel wrote regarding two shoes, she must remove both of them as one, for if she removes the upper one alone and afterwards the lower one, the removal of the upper one would be an invalid chalitzah).

After the removal of the shoe, she must spit before the yavam, as it is written: "and she shall spit in his face." Therefore, after the removal of the shoe, she shall stand opposite the yavam and spit on the ground toward the face of the yavam, so that he shall see the spit. They shall command her to gather much spit in her mouth so that there will be spit visible to the dayanim from the time it leaves her mouth until the spit reaches the ground, or at least until it reaches opposite the face of the yavam, for every act must be done before the elders as the verses prove. However, ex post facto, if the dayanim did not see when the spit left her mouth, we have no concern, for the primary requirement is that the yavam see the spit. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said (106b) that if she is tall and the yavam is short of stature, the spit must reach opposite his face, and if it was lost before the spit came opposite his face, she must spit another time. But if he is tall and she is short, we certainly read it as "in his face" even though her mouth is much lower than his face, for "in his face" means that he should see the spit, and behold, he sees it. This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 39: If she spat and the wind caught it before it reached opposite his face, such as if she is taller than him, she must spit another time. But after the spit reached opposite his face, even if it did not reach the ground, it is valid. Therefore, if he is tall and she is short, we certainly read it as "in his face." Thus far his words. (And see Beit Shmuel, sub-section 40).

A yevamah who spat blood, according to the opinion of the Ra'avad and the Rosh (section 12), even without traces of saliva, it is a valid spitting and she does not need to spit another time, for "and she shall spit" is written without qualification, and spitting blood is also included since it is not written "and she shall spit saliva." However, the Rif, the Rambam, and the Rashba ruled that spitting blood is not a valid spitting, for spitting without qualification refers to saliva, and this is proven from that which is written, "And if the zav spits upon one who is pure." Therefore, specifically when she sucked with her mouth and spat blood it is a valid spitting, because it is impossible without traces of saliva; but in a case of spitting without qualification, or if she opened her mouth and blood flowed from her, there are no traces of saliva here and she must spit another time. And so it is explicitly stated in the Yerushalmi, and so it is explained from the commentary of Rashi (105a, starting with "Is it written 'and she shall spit saliva' etc. and here too it is impossible without traces of saliva," thus far his words; and so wrote the Yam Shel Shlomo, siman 24).

And there is a question regarding this: Granted that there are traces of saliva in the blood when she sucks, the saliva should be nullified in the blood, for according to the Torah the majority nullifies the minority. The answer to this is that nullification only applies when the nullified substance is not discernible, but here the saliva is discernible on its own and is not nullified (Mordechai, end of Chullin, see there). According to this, it must be said that when the sages of blessed memory said that it is impossible without traces of saliva, they meant discernible saliva. Accordingly, the poskim should have explained this, since there is a practical halachic difference. Furthermore, it can be answered that nullification only applies to something where previously each was discernible on its own and afterwards they became mixed; but here, where they were mixed from the very moment of their emergence, nullification is not applicable to this (ibid.). That is to say, the nullifying substance did not yet have importance in the world such that it would have the power to nullify that which is a minority relative to it. Therefore, even though we find this reasoning to the contrary—that any prohibition that was not discernible from its beginning is nullified even in a "thing that has permitters" (davar she-yesh lo matirin), as written in Yoreh Deah siman 102 and in Orach Chayim siman 320 (Magen Avraham, subsection 5)—this is because the nullifying substance was discernible beforehand, and thus its power is strong to nullify the nullified substance that was not discernible, even in a davar she-yesh lo matirin. But here, where even the nullifying substance was not discernible, the power of both is equal, such that they do not nullify one another (Noda BiYehudah, Second Edition, Yoreh Deah siman 54). Furthermore, it appears to me that specifically when the forbidden and the permitted are not discernibly distinct in their source and entry; but when they are discernible from the very nature of creation and the way of growth is such, we do not say this reasoning. Therefore, regarding a limb that the fetus extended and became forbidden, as written in Yoreh Deah siman 14, where we forbid the fat of the fetus because of the mixture of the fat of this limb—if there is enough in the entire animal to nullify the fat of this limb, it is nullified, as written there (Shach, subsection 12), even though they were not discernible from their beginning. And so too regarding one who passes a perforated pot through a vineyard and it increased by one-two-hundredth, it is forbidden even though the nullified substance was not discernible. And so too regarding the immersion in rivers where there is a majority of dripping water over flowing water, as explained in Yoreh Deah siman 201, for the dripping water was never discernible; since such is the way of growth and the way of creation, how is it possible to say they have no importance? Therefore, the fat is as if both are before us and it is nullified when there is enough to nullify, and the dripping water has importance and it is impossible to nullify them when they increase, and so too in a vineyard when there is a portion of one-two-hundredth, which is the measure that is not nullified, it is impossible to nullify it on the grounds that it was not discernible. But regarding a spitting of blood where the source is not discernible and it is not the way of a person to spit blood, therefore there is no importance in this when it was never discernible (and with this, the difficulty of the Mishneh LaMelech, Chapter 1 of Hilkhot Metamei Mishkav U-Moshav, halakha 14, and all the difficulties of the son of the Noda BiYehudah there, are answered).

Saliva that is not from her essence, where the food caused the saliva to flow from her, is not saliva at all and is worse than blood, for this is not spitting at all. Therefore, if she ate garlic or a berry or similar things that increase saliva, and saliva was flowing from her mouth, even if it appears as if she is spitting with her strength, this is not spitting. Therefore, the custom is to prevent her from all food and from all drink prior to the chalitzah, because we are not experts in the matter of what brings saliva. And similarly, she should minimize speaking until after the chalitzah, for speaking also brings saliva that is not saliva in essence. And she should also be careful not to pick her teeth until after the chalitzah so that she does not bring blood into her mouth, and such is the custom (see Beit Shmuel subsection 42, and according to what I wrote, the matter is simple that their intention was not specifically "flowing," but rather that these things lead to this, and delve into this).

And after the spitting, they dictate to her the verse: "And she shall say: So shall it be done to the man who will not build up his brother's house; and his name shall be called in Israel, the house of the one who had his shoe removed." And they dictate it to her while standing. And the primary point is that they teach her the meaning of the words so that she understands what she is saying, and likewise she should understand what she said previously, "My brother-in-law refuses," etc., and also what the yavam said, "I do not desire to take her." And also that he should understand what he and she are saying, for the primary point in this is the knowledge, that they should understand the entire matter of the chalitzah and what the Torah commanded. And it is a mitzvah upon all those standing there that immediately when the yevamah finishes the verse, they all answer "the one who had his shoe removed" three times. And so it is explicitly stated in the Gemara (at the end of the chapter "Mitzvat Chalitzah"): It was taught, Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon and a yevamah came to perform chalitzah, and he said to us, "All of you answer: the one who had his shoe removed, the one who had his shoe removed, the one who had his shoe removed." And there are those who say that also the yevamah, when she finishes the verse, should say three times "the one who had his shoe removed," and there is a reason for this (as is written in the Hagahot Maimoniot, chapter 4, in the name of the Behag), and it will be explained in section 82.

It follows that the order of the chalitzah is as such: first she reads, "My husband's brother refuses to establish for his brother a name in Israel, he has not desired to perform the levirate marriage for me," and afterward the yavam says, "I do not desire to take her." And afterward she removes his shoe from off his foot, and afterward she spits in front of him, and afterward she reads, "Thus shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother's house, and his name shall be called in Israel: The house of him who had his shoe removed." And the order is not indispensable, for if she spat before she removed his shoe, it is a valid spitting, and we do not allow her to spit another time after the chalitzah in order that it be according to the order, because we are concerned lest they say that the spitting before the chalitzah is nothing, so that if she wishes to perform yibbum afterward and he also agrees, they would be able to do so; and in truth, after the spitting she is disqualified from yibbum. Therefore, we do not leave her to spit another time, so that everyone will know that the spitting before the chalitzah was a valid spitting and she is forbidden to perform yibbum after this (Gemara). And similarly, if she read "Thus shall be done" before she spat, and even if they did not read the verses at all, neither he nor she, the chalitzah is not disqualified thereby, for the essence is the chalitzah. Therefore, if she performed chalitzah alone and did not read and did not spit, her chalitzah is valid. And it is unnecessary to say that when she performed chalitzah and spat but did not read, or performed chalitzah and read but did not spit, that her chalitzah is valid. However, that which can be rectified we rectify, that she should read and spit after the conclusion when she did not spit beforehand. But if she read and spat and did not perform chalitzah, it is invalid, yet she is disqualified from the yibbum as well; but with reading alone she is not disqualified from the yibbum. And so it is explicitly stated in the Gemara (105a), as it is said, "Thus shall be done to the man," implying that the action, which is the chalitzah and the spitting, is what is effective—the chalitzah completely, and the spitting to disqualify from yibbum—but the reading is not indispensable and is not effective (the Rambam). And it is a mere asmakhta, for from the Torah spitting does not disqualify, as the Torah said "Thus shall be done to the man," a thing that is an action upon the man, which is the chalitzah from his foot, is indispensable, and other matters are not indispensable at all (Mishnah 104b according to Rabbi Akiva). And this fact that spitting disqualifies is rabbinic, lest they say it was a spitting that followed chalitzah since such is the order; what is not so regarding reading, which also exists before chalitzah, they will not attribute to after chalitzah (105a).

That which we have said, that the reading does not invalidate—to what does this apply? To those fit to read, who are able to speak. But a mute man or a mute woman who are unable to speak do not perform chalitzah, and if they performed chalitzah, their chalitzah is invalid. For it is a general rule throughout the entire Torah that even though a matter does not invalidate, nevertheless we require that one be fit for this matter (104b), for "anything fit for mixing, the mixing does not invalidate it." For if it were not so, why did the Torah command to do this thing, since it afterwards excluded it such that it does not invalidate? Rather, certainly the intent of the Torah is that one must be fit at least for this matter. Therefore, if he is mute or she is mute, the chalitzah is invalid. And so too a minor girl who performed chalitzah, if he is an adult, it is an invalid chalitzah. But if he is a minor, even if she is an adult, the chalitzah is nothing, and even the status of an invalid chalitzah does not apply to this, and she is able to be taken in yibbum afterwards by him or by the rest of his brothers. And so too the chalitzah of a shoteh. And some say that also the chalitzah of a deaf-mute man or a deaf-mute woman is nothing, for in the entire Torah, a deaf-mute, a shoteh, and a minor are equal. And some say that a deaf-mute man and a deaf-mute woman are equal to a mute man and a mute woman, such that it is at least an invalid chalitzah, and they are not similar to a shoteh, for they possess some measure of understanding, and regarding chalitzah, when the beit din stands over them and instructs them, it is somewhat like a proper understanding. And as for the minor, the Torah excluded him explicitly, but not a deaf-mute; and granted that it is not a valid chalitzah, nevertheless it does not depart from being an invalid chalitzah. And this is the opinion of the Tosafot (104b, s.v. "ve-ha"). And the first opinion is the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 44).

This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 49: A minor female who performed chalitzah for an adult male, her chalitzah is invalid, and she is disqualified from all the brothers; and when she grows up, she shall perform chalitzah from one of them, and she does not need to repeat it with all the brothers. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matter is that even though every invalid chalitzah requires repeating it with all the brothers, nevertheless, regarding the chalitzah of a minor female, it is not so. Because according to the Rif, the chalitzah of a minor female is valid, for "man" is written in the passage to exclude a minor male, but the Torah did not exclude a minor female at all. Conversely, there are those among the poskim who hold that the chalitzah is nothing, for it is not even an invalid chalitzah and is like a deaf-mute. It is only the opinion of the Rambam that it is an invalid chalitzah. Therefore, regarding the matter that she does not need to repeat it with all the brothers, we rely on these poskim (Beit Shmuel, subsection 50 in the name of Terumat HaDeshen). And the reasoning for these opinions depends on the variation of the versions in the Gemara (105b) and in the Mishnah (104b; see there and in the Beit Shmuel, subsection 49).

A blind man does not perform chalitzah ab initio because he cannot see the saliva of the yevamah, but if he performed chalitzah, the chalitzah is valid since the seeing is not an essential requirement. And one cannot say that in any case we should require that he be fit for this just as regarding the reading, for that is not so; for the Torah commanded the reading, but the Torah did not command the seeing of the saliva at all, rather it is only a rabbinic commandment. For that which we wrote regarding "and she shall spit in his face" is a mere asmachta, as from "in his face" it is not implied at all that he must see the saliva. Therefore, it is the opinion of the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, that if there is no brother other than him, she performs chalitzah ab initio so that she should not be an agunah. And so wrote the Nimukei Yosef (at the end of the chapter "Mitzvat Chalitzah"), and one may rely upon them in a case of pressing need, for it can be said that the Rambam also holds this way and is not dealing with a case where there is no other brother. And so ruled explicitly our teacher, the Rema, at the end of siman 172, see there. Therefore, even though from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch in this siman, section 48, it is somewhat implied that only ex post facto do we rely on this, nevertheless, when there is no brother other than him, one may rely on this ab initio (and so wrote the Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 39, in the name of the Responsa Perach Shoshan, see there). And if she is blind, or if he is blind in one of his eyes, there is no concern at all and they perform chalitzah ab initio in any case (see the Beit Yosef, that perhaps the Ra'avad holds that the mitzvah of chalitzah takes precedence and the Rambam does not hold so, and according to this, for us, even the Rambam would admit that a blind man performs chalitzah ab initio with one brother, and this is the intention of the Rema later at the end of siman 172, for otherwise there is no understanding of his words, see there and examine carefully).

All matters of chalitzah require intent, meaning that both of them must intend that through this act he exempts her from his bond and she may marry another. And so it is taught in the Gemara (102b): Whether he intended and she did not intend, or she intended and he did not intend, her chalitzah is invalid until they both intend as one. It is explained from the commentary of Rashi there that we require the intent of the mitzvah, see there; that is to say, that through this act she is exempted, as we have said, for so the Torah decreed. And so it is implied from the language of the Rambam and all the poskim, that we require the intent of the mitzvah, not like the one who is in doubt regarding this. And behold, if in the entire Torah mitzvot require intent, there is no wonder in this; but if we say that in the entire Torah mitzvot do not require intent, why is intent required for chalitzah?

And it appears to me that chalitzah is not similar to all other mitzvot, for in all other mitzvot the act of the mitzvah is recognizable, such as one who blows the shofar or takes a lulav, as it is not the way to do this without a mitzvah. And so too the eating of matzah, for it is not the way to eat matzah but rather leavened bread; therefore, even without kavanah, the mitzvah is recognizable. This is not the case regarding the removal of the shoe and spitting, for a person is compelled to do them constantly. If they do not intend for the mitzvah, there is no act of mitzvah here at all. And from the Torah itself there is proof for this, from that which the Torah required to read the verses, and we have not found anything similar to this in most mitzvot; presumably the Torah was particular that they should do this with the kavanah of a mitzvah. And it is not similar to yibbum, where even in error, or willfully, or under duress, one has fulfilled the mitzvah, for there the Torah included "and perform yibbum with her" in any case, as I wrote in siman 166. Furthermore, in yibbum the Torah intended to establish a name for his brother, and behold there is an establishing of a name here even if it was without kavanah, which is not the case in chalitzah, where without kavanah it is not considered an act at all.

There is one who asked regarding this, that if so, if the one performing chalitzah is an apostate, where certainly his intent is not for the mitzvah, what benefit is there in his chalitzah (Chacham Tzvi)? From this he proved that we do not require intent for the mitzvah. And there is one who answered this, that according to the Torah it is sufficient with the intent of one of them, and therefore regarding an apostate, since she intends for the mitzvah, this is sufficient; and that which the sages, of blessed memory, said that both must intend, this is rabbinic, and regarding an apostate we establish it upon the Torah law (Beit Meir). But it does not imply such from the language of the Shas and the poskim. And it seems to me that it is not a difficulty at all, for since he says that he intends to exempt her from his zikah, and says "I do not desire to take her," and allows himself to have her remove his shoe and spit before him in the presence of a beit din, behold he performs the mitzvah like any upright Jew. To what is this comparable? To an apostate who divorces his wife; shall we also say that he does not intend to exempt her with this get? Rather, certainly since he gives her the get and says to her "behold this is your get," and commands the scribe to write it for his sake and for her sake, we do not say that in his heart he imagines the opposite of this. And why should chalitzah be inferior to a get? And it is not comparable to that which an apostate may not write a get, for there, since during the writing of the entire get he must intend for her sake, he is not trusted by us; but when he is the divorcer and commands the scribe to write for her sake, we say that at the time of his command he resolved so in his heart. And the same applies to chalitzah, for the intent is only at the time of the act. Furthermore, do we require that the one performing chalitzah intend specifically for the sake of Heaven? Intent for the mitzvah is defined as when he intends through this act to exempt her from his zikah, and this even the apostate intends, for if not so, who forces him to do this?

Even though without the intent of both of them it is not permitted, nevertheless, if he intended and she did not, or she intended and he did not, it is a disqualified chalitzah, and she is disqualified from yibum with him and with all the brothers. But if neither of them intended, it appears from the wording of the poskim that it is nothing. Therefore, a yevamah who grew up among the brothers and we saw that she removed the shoe of one of them, she is forbidden to perform yibum, for we concern ourselves that perhaps there was intent for the sake of chalitzah, and therefore she requires a valid chalitzah to permit her to a stranger. But as long as we did not see that she removed [the shoe] of one of them, she is permitted to perform yibum and we do not concern ourselves that perhaps she performed chalitzah. And even if she removed a shoe privately between him and her, nevertheless, regarding the matter of being disqualified from performing yibum, it is effective even privately (the Rambam chapter 4).

And know that from the sugyot of the Shas (102b) it appears to me that according to one version, even if one of them did not intend, she is disqualified, for thus it is stated there: A yevamah who grew up, etc., we do not fear lest she performed halitzah with a sandal for one of them. And it asks: The reason is that we did not see, but if we saw, we would fear? But is it not taught: Whether etc., until both of them intend? And it answers: This is what it says: Even though we saw, we do not fear lest they intended. And there are those who say: The reason is that we did not see, but if we saw, we would fear; and that which was taught that intention is required, that is regarding being permitted to the world, but regarding the brothers, she is disqualified. Thus far the wording of the Gemara. And behold, according to the "there are those who say," even without any intention she is disqualified. And if so, the Rambam and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who ruled like the "there are those who say," for according to the first version even though we saw we do not fear—if so, from where do they have it that we require the intention of one of them? And more than this, one must question the wording of the Rambam and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch who wrote that if we saw that she performed halitzah with the shoe of one of them, she is forbidden to be taken in yibbum lest they intended for the sake of halitzah. Thus far their words. And it implies that we fear lest both of them intended, and this is like no one; for according to the first version we do not fear, and according to the "there are those who say," even without intending she is disqualified.

And the matter is clear to me that they had a different version of the text in the Gemara, for so it is proven from the Maggid Mishneh who transcribed the Shas in this wording from the Rif: that when it asks from the Baraita, it answers "these words apply to permitting her to the world, but to the brothers she is disqualified," and he does not have the version "and that which was taught requires intent." And according to this version, this is the explanation: that this which we must know with certainty—that they both intended—these words apply to permitting her to the market, but to disqualify her to them, she is disqualified even when we do not know with certainty, for we fear perhaps they intended. However, even according to our version, it can be explained thus, even though the language is a bit strained. And so it is explained from the commentary of Rashi who wrote, and this is his wording: And some say "yes," certainly the reason is that we did not see that she performed chalitzah, but if we saw that she performed chalitzah, we fear perhaps they intended and she is disqualified to them. Thus far his words. Behold, he also wrote that the disqualification is only because we fear perhaps they intended. And according to the explanation we explained—that to permit her to the market one must know with certainty that they both intended—there is proof from the words of the Tosafot there who wrote, and this is their wording: And from that which was taught "until they both intend as one," it implies that we require that we know they intend for chalitzah. Thus far their words. And this is explicit like our words (see the Avodat HaGershuni who questioned this, that even without intent she is disqualified, and he answered that they took this as an extra measure, but indeed even without intent she is disqualified; and one could further say that the fact she is disqualified is because we fear perhaps she intended, but if she also did not intend, she is not disqualified. Thus far his words. And the Maharalnach already wondered at him in the glosses to the Tur; also the Bach was greatly pressed. And it is clear as I wrote, and so the Rosh wrote explicitly that if it is known that they both did not intend, she is not disqualified; see there. And so appears the opinion of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 45. And the Nimukei Yosef wrote that by the letter of the law she is not disqualified without the intent of both of them, only because of appearance [marit ha-ayin] she is disqualified by her intent alone; see there. And so wrote the Yam Shel Shlomo, and it requires further study from where he has this. And therefore, that which was said in section 67, that by the intent of one of them she is disqualified, has no foundation except according to the words of the Nimukei Yosef. And if so, the law requires further study, for from all the poskim the law is clear that if we knew with certainty that one of them did not intend, this is nothing).

And all of this is regarding the removal of the shoe for one of the yevamim, but regarding spitting and the recitation before them, the Rambam did not mention anything of this. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 45, wrote: And so too, if she spat before the yavam in the presence of a beit din, she is forbidden to perform yibbum. However, this is specifically when she spat saliva, but if she spat blood before him, she is not disqualified by this unless there is saliva mixed with it (even according to those who validate it during the time of chalitzah with blood alone). And if she only recited, she is not disqualified by this from performing yibbum. Thus far their words. And they divided this law into three distinctions: for in the removal of the shoe, she is disqualified even when she removed it between him and her if there is a concern of intent; and in the recitation, she is not disqualified in any manner; and in spitting, if she spat before him in the presence of a beit din, she is disqualified, and not in the presence of a beit din, she is not disqualified. And all of this is not explicitly stated in the Gemara, but rather the reasoning is thus: for if we were to say that in spitting she is disqualified even between him and her, you would not leave any life, as it is the way of people to spit and this is not a recognizable act at all. But in the presence of a beit din, it is called a recognizable act. And recitation, even in the presence of a beit din, is nothing, for this is not an act at all. But the removal of a shoe is a significant act, and it is not the way for one to remove another's shoe, and therefore there is a concern in this in every manner when there is reason to concern for intent. And such is the consensus of all the poskim.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 46: There is one who says that one must be careful that the yevamah does not spit before the yavam prior to the halitzah, so that it should not be a disqualified halitzah and she would be required to go back to all the brothers. Thus far his words. And it is an excessive stringency, for how does a disqualified halitzah apply here, given that they are engaged in the order of halitzah? And if it is because she spat before the removal of the shoe, it has already been explained that the order is not indispensable. The Yam Shel Shelomo in siman 23 already complained about this. Nevertheless, such is the custom, that she is careful not to spit before the dayyanim command her.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said (106a): A mistaken halitzah is valid. What is the case of a mistaken halitzah? For example, where they said to him, "Perform halitzah for her on the condition that she gives you two hundred zuz," the halitzah is valid even if she gives him nothing, and even if he doubled the condition. And even if he said to her at the time of the halitzah, "On the condition that you do not marry any man," and even if he doubled his condition, it is nothing. And the reason for the matter is that by law, no condition should have the power to nullify the act, but we learn from the children of Gad and the children of Reuben that a condition, if it was according to its law, nullifies the act when the condition is not fulfilled. And we only learn from them a condition that can be fulfilled by an agent, similar to the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben, for a monetary matter is fulfilled by an agent. And so too with gittin and kiddushin, he can betroth and divorce by an agent; and regarding kiddushin through intercourse, even though it cannot be fulfilled by an agent, the forms of betrothal were compared to one another (Ketubot 74a). And since he has complete control over the matter such that he can perform it by an agent, therefore he also has the power to impose a condition on it (Tosafot ibid.). But halitzah, which cannot be performed by an agent—for he cannot say to his agent, "Take money from her and perform halitzah for her in my stead"—therefore there is no power of condition in halitzah, and the condition does not nullify the act of halitzah (ibid.) even when the condition is not fulfilled. And even though in halitzah we require intent to exempt her, it is certainly so that he intended to exempt her completely, but he thought to forbid her based on the condition of two hundred zuz or that she should not marry any man; and a condition does not apply to this, and he did not forbid her because of the halitzah, but rather because of the condition (in the headings of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel).

And one should not ask that, after all, why is she exempt from the money? Even though the condition does not impede the chalitzah, nevertheless she should be obligated to give him the money because she thus concluded with him. For in truth, the reason for the exemption from the money is because she can say, "I was mocking you," since she does not owe him money and she was coerced to promise him in order that he would permit her to marry. And since this does not impede the law of chalitzah, she is not obligated to give to him even by the law of money, just as it is with a fugitive who had to cross at a ferry and the ferryman did not want to transport him until he promised him a hundred maneh, where he can say, "I was mocking you," and he only has his accustomed wage, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 264. And here too it is so, and regarding chalitzah an accustomed wage is not applicable, for he is obligated by the law of the Torah to perform the chalitzah, and therefore she is entirely exempt.

And since this is the reason, she is only exempt when he was obligated by Torah law to perform chalitzah. However, when he was able to perform yibbum according to Torah law and he agreed to perform chalitzah because of the money, even though the chalitzah is valid, she is nevertheless obligated to give him his payment like any other hired worker, for he lost the yibbum because of her. And she is not obligated by the law of a condition, but rather like any other hired worker. I have doubted whether we appraise what she shall give him or if it is according to his condition, for he can say, "To me it was worth this much, as I stipulated." From the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 50, it implies that we appraise, but from the wording of the Nimukei Yosef it implies that she gives according to the condition; see there. Therefore, if there is a correct claim that she does not desire him, such as if he is not suitable for her, she is exempt from everything, and so too in similar cases. According to this, in our lands where they do not allow one to perform yibbum, it would seem that in every case she is exempt. However, from the wording of the poskim it does not imply so, and the reasoning is that since the Torah gave him permission to perform yibbum, he can say, "I desire yibbum."

And our teacher, the Rema, wrote: But if she gave him the money or deposited the money with a third party, she cannot retract. Thus far his words. In Choshen Mishpat siman 264, they did not mention this matter of being in the hand of a third party; however, we have already explained there in section 18 according to the Mordechai in the chapter "HaCholetz" that if she handed over the money to the third party in his presence and said to the third party, "When he performs chalitzah for me, give it to him," the third party is obligated to give it to him, for he has already acquired it through ma'amad sheloshtan. But if they did not speak explicitly with ma'amad sheloshtan, but rather he said, "I will not perform chalitzah for you until you deposit such and such with so-and-so," and she deposited it, this is nothing, for he has not acquired it. And so too, even if she gave a promissory note and performed a kinyan, it is nothing (as is implied in the Responsa of the Rashba, siman 1,240).

If they said to him, "Perform chalitzah for her and through this you may marry her," because he was an ignoramus, or if they said to him, "Perform chalitzah for her as this is a mitzvah, but you will lose nothing, for if you wish to perform yibbum afterward you may do so," and similar matters where they misled him, this is not a chalitzah to permit her to the world. It is not similar to the previous law where he intended to permit her to the world but thought he would receive money; rather, in this case, he did not intend to permit her to the world, and it has already been explained that chalitzah without intent does not permit. Nevertheless, she is disqualified by this chalitzah from performing yibbum, and therefore they compel him with all types of compulsion to release her afterward with a valid chalitzah. The general rule is that in any place where she is disqualified from yibbum, it is necessary to compel him to release her validly according to the law of the Torah with a proper chalitzah.

It is a simple matter that just as the get must be given willingly, and the submission of a moda'ah invalidates it as written in siman 134, so too regarding chalitzah; and the manner of nullifying moda'ot in chalitzah will be explained in Seder Chalitzah. And in a case where the sages said we compel regarding chalitzah, the intention is to compel him until he says "I am willing," just as with a get. And when he submitted a moda'ah regarding the chalitzah and did not nullify the moda'ot at the time of the chalitzah, it is a disqualified chalitzah and requires another chalitzah, and it has the entire law of disqualified chalitzot. And the law of a chalitzah coerced by Israel or by the courts of gentiles is like the law of a coerced get explained there, that they shall compel him to obey the dayanim of Israel.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 52: If they said to him, "This woman does not want you by way of yibbum, but rather perform chalitzah for her and uproot her bond from her, and she will be married to you by way of marriage," there is one who says that her chalitzah is valid. Thus far his words. And so it is explained in the Yerushalmi. And the reason is that even though he was mistaken that he would marry her afterwards, nevertheless, in this chalitzah he intended to uproot her bond and to permit her, and what does it matter to us that he was mistaken in this and thought that he would marry her afterwards? Nevertheless, there are those who disagree on this, and so it is implied from the words of the Rambam (the Maggid Mishneh), and there is no proof from the Yerushalmi as there is a dispute there regarding this. And one can further say that in truth they compelled him to give a valid chalitzah afterwards, and the Yerushalmi was brief in this. But the Rashba, of blessed memory, ruled like the words of the Shulchan Aruch.

The law of a pasul halitza is as follows: she is disqualified from all the brothers from being taken in yibbum, and she is disqualified from the priesthood, and her relatives become forbidden to him. The reason is that the name of halitza applies to this, and therefore in all these matters its law is like a complete halitza; however, to permit her to the world, she is not yet permitted until he performs a kosher halitza for her. This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 4, law 26: Everywhere that we have said "it is not halitza" or "he has done nothing" or "it is nothing," she is as if she did not receive halitza from him, and her relatives are not forbidden to him, and she is not disqualified from the priesthood, and she is permitted to be taken in yibbum. And everywhere that we have said "her halitza is pasul," her relatives are forbidden to him, etc., and she is not permitted to marry a stranger until she receives a kosher halitza. If she transgressed and married, he performs a kosher halitza for her and she remains with her husband, and we do not remove her from his hand. Thus far his words. For since she has already become forbidden to him, why should we remove her from her husband for nothing? Nevertheless, we separate her from her husband until the yabam performs halitza for her. And know that this rule that the Rambam formulated, one cannot learn from this for the language of the other poskim, just as with the rule he formulated regarding a get concerning the terms "pasul" and "batel," as I wrote in siman 150; see there.

After she has performed chalitzah, the beit din writes for her a shetar chalitzah in their presence as proof that she is permitted to marry. And if the beit din did not write it for her, two others may write it even though they do not recognize the yavam or the yevamah, because the beit din would not have performed the chalitzah if they did not recognize them. We have already explained in section 15 that which there is to slightly doubt regarding this. And they must rule lines upon it because they write the verses that the yavam and the yevamah say. This is the text of the shetar chalitzah that the Rambam and the Tur wrote (and we do not follow the custom of a shetar chalitzah as I wrote in the Seder Chalitzah; and know that the explanation of the Seder Chalitzah in the Shulchan Aruch we have not written because we have already explained everything within):

On such-and-such day of such-and-such month, in the year such-and-such from the creation of the world, according to the count that we count here in such-and-such place, we the judges, some of whom are signed below, were in a sitting of three as one. There came before us so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, the widow of so-and-so son of so-and-so, and she brought before us a man whose name is so-and-so son of so-and-so. And thus this so-and-so said to us: "This so-and-so is the brother of so-and-so my husband from his father, to whom I was married, and he died and left life to the rabbis and to all Israel, and a son or daughter, an heir or one who passes on the inheritance and establishes his name in Israel, he did not leave. And this so-and-so his brother is fit to perform yibbum with me. And now, rabbis the judges, say to him: if you desire to perform yibbum with me, perform yibbum; and if not, let him extend to me before you his right foot, and I shall loosen his shoe from off his foot and spit before him." And we identified this so-and-so, that she is the wife of the deceased so-and-so, and we identified that this so-and-so is the brother of so-and-so from his father. And we said to him: "If you desire to perform yibbum with her, perform yibbum; and if not, extend to her before us your right foot, and she shall loosen your shoe from off your foot and spit before you." And he answered and said to us: "I do not desire to perform yibbum with her." Immediately, we had this so-and-so read: "My husband's brother refuses to establish for his brother a name in Israel; he will not perform the duty of my husband's brother." And also to this so-and-so we had him read: "I do not wish to take her." And he extended to her the right foot, and she loosened his shoe from off his foot and spat before him spit that was visible to us from her mouth onto the ground. And again we had this so-and-so read: "So shall be done to the man who will not build up his brother's house, and his name shall be called in Israel: The House of the One Whose Shoe Was Removed." And we the judges and all who were sitting there answered after her: "The one whose shoe was removed," three times. And since this act was performed before us, we have permitted this so-and-so to go and be married to any man she may desire, and no man shall protest against her from this day and forever. And this so-and-so requested from us this get of chalitzah, and we have written and signed and given it to her for merit and for proof, according to the law of Moses and Israel. And the three judges sign. And she does not need to wait three months and is permitted to be married immediately.

The Bahag wrote: The Holy One, Blessed be He, said to Moses: Say to the yavam who does not wish to perform yibbum, "You are defective in your body; you have refused to fulfill a mitzvah. Therefore, you shall remove your shoe like a mourner and like one who is excommunicated, whose way is to be barefoot. And with the putrid drop in your body, you were able to establish offspring for your brother; therefore, she shall spit before him a putrid drop." And the judges answer: "The one whose shoe was removed is like a mourner; the one whose shoe was removed is like one who is excommunicated; the one whose shoe was removed is like one who rebels against the commandments of Sinai." Thus far his words. And in the name of our teacher, Yechiel of Paris, we found this wording: She laments before the beit din that her husband will be like a dead man without offspring, and the yavam responds, "I do not desire to take her," as if to say, "I do not care if he remains without offspring." And then she removes his shoe to say to him that he should mourn for his brother, for from now on he is like a dead man and will be forgotten since he is not establishing offspring for him. And she spits before him, as if to say, "It was not because of your beauty that I desired you," and she calls him thus to shame him because he did not perform yibbum with her. And those standing there also call out three times, "the one whose shoe was removed," to publicize his shame. Completed with the help of Heaven.