Siman 77

Two who borrowed from one in a single document, even though each is liable for half of the debt, nevertheless, each has the status of a guarantor for the half of the debt of his fellow, even if they did not specify this in the document. For presumably, the lender lent based on the trustworthiness of both of them, and his intention was that if he cannot collect from this one, he will collect from that one. And that which is customary to write in such a document that they are guarantors for one another is for the enhancement of the document, for even without the writing, the law is so [the Rosh, chapter 5 of Shevuot]. And all the laws of guarantee that will be explained in siman 129 apply here. And if one of them has no property, or when it is impossible to collect from him, he collects everything from the second. But when he is able to collect half from each one, he may not claim the entire debt from one, for even regarding a guarantor the law is so: when he is able to collect from the borrower, he may not claim from the guarantor. And if one of them paid the entire debt, he returns and collects half from the second. And even though this one could say to him, "Why did you have to pay for me when the lender had not yet claimed from me, and you have the status of one who pays the debt of his fellow, who is exempt from paying," as will be explained in siman 128, nevertheless, here, since one is a guarantor for his fellow, it is as if he commanded him to pay for him. And even though there is one who holds that even regarding a guarantor the borrower must command the guarantor to pay, as written in siman 130, nevertheless, since they are partners in the loan, it is the way of partners to pay even without the command of the second partner [Urim VeTummim]. And even if one paid the entire debt without specification, the lender cannot say that the second half was paid to him for another debt that he owed him; rather, he certainly paid him for the second one as well, and therefore the second is obligated to reimburse him for his half [Shach]. And when the lender claims the entire debt from one with the claim that it is impossible for him to collect from the second, the lender must swear that the second did not pay him, or he must clarify this, that he did not pay him. And if they specified in the document that they are kablan guarantors for one another, he may collect from whomever he wishes even if the second has property, according to the law of a kablan guarantor that will be explained in siman 129. And all the more so if it is written explicitly in the document that he may collect from whomever he wishes, as is customary to write "jointly and severally," that he collects from whomever he wishes. And if they explicitly specified that one is not a guarantor for his fellow, they have no connection to one another; rather, he collects half from each one.

And it is not specifically a loan with a document, but even an oral loan when they said to the lender, "Lend us one hundred gold pieces in partnership" [ibid.], or if they purchased a single item in partnership, or if they both together accepted a deposit, they become guarantors for one another even though they did not explicitly state so. And all the laws that were explained in the previous section apply to them as well.

Even though it has been explained that if one of the borrowers paid, he collects half from the second, nevertheless, if one of the borrowers died and his heirs found a promissory note upon which their father and Shimon are signed, they do not have the ability to claim to Shimon that certainly their father paid the entire debt and therefore the promissory note was found with him, and Shimon is obligated to pay them half. For this is no claim at all, as it is possible that Shimon paid his half to the creditor or to their father and was not meticulous about the fact that the promissory note remained with their father since both of them are signed on it; unless they claim with certainty that their father paid all of it and he has not yet paid his half to their father, and not because of the proof of the document, for then it is like all oral claims and Shimon must swear that he paid his half [see Shach subsection 6].

Reuven and Shimon who were partners in a certain business, and Reuven borrowed money from Levi for the needs of the partnership business, and Levi comes to collect his debt from Reuven and Shimon, and Shimon claims, "I did not borrow from you; go and collect from Reuven who borrowed from you"—if Shimon does not admit at all that Reuven borrowed from Levi with his consent, and also claims that Levi's money did not enter the partnership business at all, or even if it entered the business but Reuven already received it from the business and there are no witnesses to this, Levi has no business at all with Shimon, but only with Reuven. However, if Shimon admits that such an amount of money that Reuven borrowed from Levi entered the partnership business and the money or merchandise of its value is still found in the business, but he claims that Reuven borrowed from Levi without his command and that Reuven owes him much money, therefore "I will collect mine from what is found in the business and you go and collect from Reuven," his claim is not a valid claim; rather, Levi collects from what is found in the business and Shimon shall collect from Reuven from another place, since he admits that the money his partner borrowed from Levi is still found in the business. However, if the money is not found in the business and all the money of the business has already come into Shimon's hand, Shimon can say that "this which I received, I received according to the account I have with Reuven, and you have no business with me," and only if Shimon admits that according to the account he owes Reuven or the business is he obligated to pay Levi according to what he has from this account. And all this is when there are no witnesses. But if there are witnesses that at the time of the loan Reuven borrowed from Levi for the needs of the partnership and that it was for the benefit of the business, or if Shimon admits to this and the money entered the business, then Shimon is obligated to pay half the debt even from his house, and no claim helps him whether Reuven owes him or not, since the loan was in the name of the partnership and for the benefit of the business and the money entered the business. And even if Reuven borrowed without Shimon's command, nevertheless Shimon is obligated for half of it, for every partner is like the agent of his partner in a matter that is for the benefit of the partnership. And specifically his half is he obligated to pay, but he does not have the law of a guarantor even against Reuven's half like the law of two who borrowed from one that has been explained, since Reuven did not borrow by his command. And if there are witnesses that by Shimon's command Reuven borrowed from Levi, then he becomes a guarantor also for Reuven's portion like the law of two who borrowed from one, since by his command he acted, for a person's agent is like himself. And even if the witnesses do not know if the money entered the business or not, Shimon is not believed to say that it did not enter the business, and he is obligated in guarantee for Reuven's portion, for there is a presumption that an agent performs his agency, unless Shimon brings proof that it did not enter the business, then he is only obligated for his half. And if there are no witnesses that by his command Reuven borrowed, but Shimon admits on his own that by his command Reuven borrowed from Levi, then if Shimon also admits to this that the money entered the business, he has the law of a guarantor also for Reuven's portion. But if he does not admit that it entered the business, he only pays his portion and not Reuven's portion, for he is believed by a migo that had he wanted he could have said that he did not borrow by his command. And even though there is a presumption that an agent performs his agency, nevertheless in this matter the presumption is not so great that it would nullify Shimon's migo. But for his own portion he is obligated even if Reuven changed the money, since he borrowed by his command; only regarding the guarantee does his changing the money help, for the essence of the guarantee is at the time of the business. And even though in two who borrowed from one they become guarantors at the time of the loan, this is because both of them borrowed; but in this case where one borrowed as the agent of his fellow in order to bring the money into the partnership business, the essence of the guarantee is at the time of bringing this money into the business, whereas for his own portion he became obligated from the time of the loan [as it appears to my humble opinion in these laws to reconcile the views, and see the Netivot HaMishpat who agreed to the law thus].

Two who guaranteed for one, when the lender comes to collect from the guarantor, he may collect from whichever of them he desires. And even when there is also that from which to collect from the second, the sages did not burden the lender to collect half from each. And it is not similar to two who borrowed, where initially he collects from each one his portion, for there, since each one becomes a borrower in his own right and also a guarantor for his fellow, why should he leave the borrower and collect from the guarantor? But with two guarantors, who did not become obligated on their own behalf but rather on behalf of the guarantee for which they liened themselves, and there is no lien for halves, and each one entered into the entire guarantee, therefore he may collect from whichever one he desires [Sma], unless they specified that each one is a guarantor for half the debt, in which case he collects half from each. And when he collects from whichever one he desires, the one who pays claims half from the second. And if one of them did not have enough for the debt, he returns and claims the remainder of the debt from the second. And in siman 132 it will be explained that there are those who disagree on this and hold that specifically when he does not find that from which to collect from the second, then he collects everything from the one, but when there is that from which to collect, he collects half from each according to the law of two who borrowed from one. And one who guaranteed for one lender on behalf of two borrowers, when he pays the lender, the guarantor must inform him on behalf of which of the borrowers he is paying him, so that the guarantor may return to him to collect from him; for if he does not inform him, when the guarantor comes to collect from him, he will say to him, "You did not pay on my behalf, but rather on behalf of the other." And therefore, in truth, if he paid without specification, he cannot collect from either of them until he also pays on behalf of the second, or receives authorization from the lender [Taz in siman 132].

Reuven who needed to borrow a maneh from Shimon, and he did not want to lend to him until Yehuda and Levi entered as arevim and kablanim, and they signed with Reuven on the debt document, and Reuven became poor and Shimon collected his entire debt from Levi, and Levi did not protest against him and did not say to him, "Collect also from Yehuda," and Levi returned to claim half of the maneh from Yehuda, and Yehuda claimed, "I did not enter as an arev for you but only for Reuven, and that is why we all signed in the document, and I am only liable to you for the third that I became obligated to Shimon, and the remainder you shall lose"—we do not listen to him. For Shimon has the power to collect the entire debt from one when the other two do not have [the means], according to the law of two who borrowed from one. And since Reuven does not have [the means], he could have collected half from Levi and half from Yehuda, and it was with this understanding that they entered into the arevut: that if Reuven becomes poor, each one will pay half. And since Levi paid the entire debt, he collects from Yehuda the half that he paid on his behalf. And such is the law when three entered as arevim for one, and the borrower became poor and the lender collected the entire debt from one of them, and one of the arevim also became poor or is in a distant land—the second arev is liable to pay half of the debt to this one who paid the lender. But when all three are present here and they have [the means] to pay, but with one of them they must exert more effort to extract [the funds] from his hand, this one who paid does not have the power to extract the half from the second one alone; rather, he must also exert effort with the third regarding the third that is due from him, unless they explicitly became arevim and kablanim for one another.

Reuven claimed from two who borrowed from him in partnership, and one denied while one admitted; behold, the one who admitted is liable for the entire debt, even when the second also has assets, since he denies it and it is impossible for the lender to collect from him. Furthermore, his testimony does not obligate his fellow in an oath since he is an interested party, for through the denial of this one, he becomes liable for the entire debt. And even if the lender has some disadvantage in that this one denied him—for example, if the denier has medium-quality land and the admitter has only inferior land—nevertheless, the testimony of the admitter is not accepted against the denier [Shach]. This applies specifically to an oral loan, but regarding a loan with a document, testimony is not needed at all, and neither of them can deny it, for the holder of the document is trusted to collect and extract payment with his document if it is a validated document [Sma]. If it is not validated and one of them claims "it is forged" while the second admits, the law is as an oral loan. Similarly, even with a validated document where one of them claims "I paid" and the second admits that it was not paid, the law is also as an oral loan. All this applies when both signed generally for the debt, for by law he collects everything from one, and then the admitter is disqualified from testimony as has been written. However, if each one's specific amount is written in the document such that the lender cannot collect the entire debt from one, the testimony of the admitter is accepted against the denier to obligate him in an oath by Torah law, since he is not an interested party in the testimony at all. Similarly, in such a case when all of them claim "we paid," their testimony is accepted for one another, and we do not fear that they made a conspiracy between them that this one will testify for that one and that one for this one. Therefore, one who produced a document against three stating that he is owed such-and-such money by them, and for each one a specific amount is written, and they all claimed and said "we paid" in each other's presence, their testimony is accepted and they are all exempt. We do not fear for reciprocity, for we have not found that because of a fear of reciprocity one is disqualified from testimony; for if we fear this, we should fear in every testimony that perhaps he receives money for his testimony, but Israelites are not suspected of this. We find similarly regarding testimony for priesthood and testimony for a captive woman that we do not fear for reciprocity, as has been written in Even HaEzer siman 3 and siman 7. We also rule accordingly regarding the trustworthiness of wine of gentiles in Yoreh Deah siman 131, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote there in his great book; and even according to those who disagree there, it can be said that specifically regarding Cutheans do we fear, but not regarding an Israelite. And even though regarding tithes the sages feared for reciprocity, as is explained in the Rambam chapter 12 of Ma'aser, that is regarding an am ha'aretz whom the sages did not trust regarding tithes, but regarding testimony where one is fit to testify, we do not fear for reciprocity [so it appears to me]. All the more so in an oral loan in such a case where each one borrowed individually, that testimony is accepted from this one about that one, whether for merit or for liability. And three who lent to one and saw that he wanted to deny it, and they made a scheme between them that one would claim and two would testify, and the beit din extracted it from the borrower based on their testimony because they did not know they were partners, and afterwards they admitted of their own accord that they were partners—we do not extract it from their hand, for they have a migo that the matter of their being partners would not have been revealed. Therefore, even when they say they are partners and it is coming to them, they are trusted [Shach and later authorities]. But if witnesses came that they are partners, we extract it from them. Similarly, even if they admitted of their own accord, but they admitted before the borrower paid them, we do not extract it from the hand of the borrower, for we do not say migo to extract [it appears to me].

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote: Two who borrowed from one person in one document, and he forgave one of them, he has only forgiven his portion, and he collects half the debt from his fellow. And some disagree and say that the entire debt is forgiven, and he cannot claim anything from his fellow. Regarding the halachic ruling: if these two were arevim kablanim, such that he could then collect the entire debt from one of them, and he forgave one of them, the entire debt is forgiven and the second is also exempt. But if they are not arevim kablanim, such that he must then claim from each one, and he forgave one of them, it is not forgiven except for the half, and he collects half the debt from his fellow. Thus far their words. And it appears to my humble opinion that this law applies only if, according to the context, it does not appear that the lender desired to forgive this one more than the other; for example, if one of the borrowers came to the lender and requested of him that he forgive due to certain reasons. And since every partner is like the agent of the second, automatically, even when the lender said, "Behold, I forgive you," since he did not specify to him, "I forgive your portion," the forgiveness takes effect on both of them when they are arevim kablanim for one another, because each one is connected to the entire debt, as he has the ability to collect from one even when the second also has [funds], and he does not need to claim from the second at all, as has been explained. And so too, if even without the borrower's request the lender said, "Behold, I forgive you the debt," and it does not appear according to the context that he would forgive this one more than the other, the forgiveness takes effect on both of them when they are arevim kablanim for one another. But if they are not arevim kablanim for one another, since each of them is a borrower for his half and an arev for his partner's portion, the partner's portion is not included in the forgiveness, since they are two separate matters. However, if according to the context it appears that he only forgave him—for example, if he requested of the lender that he forgive because his situation is not good, or because he did him some favor, and similarly when the lender said of his own accord, "To you I forgive," and it is known that his reason was because of this one's situation or because of his love for him—then certainly his intention was only for his portion. And a proof for this is from the Tosefta [Bava Metzia chapter 8], as it was taught: Partners whom the tax collectors forgave, they forgave to the middle; but if they said, "For the sake of so-and-so we have forgiven," what they forgave, they forgave to him. Thus far its words. And certainly the intention of what was taught, that they said "for the sake of so-and-so," is not that they specified that they only forgave his portion, for if so, what is it coming to tell us? Rather, the intention is that they said that for the sake of so-and-so they are forgiving the tax. And the matter is a fortiori: for behold, in this they did not specify that they are forgiving him, but rather that they are forgiving the tax stam, and nevertheless, since they said "for the sake of so-and-so," the forgiveness is only for him alone. And all the more so when he said, "Behold, I forgive you," and according to the context there is a reason why he forgave him, that the forgiveness is only for his portion alone. [It appears to me]. And in all this, there is no difference between forgiving part of the debt and forgiving the entire debt. [Shach]. And if there were many partners and he forgave two, we say that since he descended to a specific count, he only forgave them, and those remaining shall pay their portion. [ibid.]. And so too, if he forgave this borrower a general forgiveness—namely, all debts that he has against him—and this debt was also included in it, the forgiveness is only for his portion alone. [ibid.]. And if he said, "I forgive you what you borrowed with your fellow," there is one who says that since he mentioned his fellow and said "forgiven to you," the forgiveness is only for his portion alone. [Sma]. And there is one who disagrees in this. [Shach]. And there is no decisive ruling in this law. [Netivot HaMishpat]. And it appears to me that if he owes him another debt, there is no proof that the forgiveness was for him alone, for in that he mentioned his fellow, his intention was to exclude the other debt; but if he does not owe him another debt, the mind leans toward the first opinion.

One who borrowed from two people, and one of the lenders forgave the entire debt, the portion of his fellow is not forgiven. This is true even when both are written in one shtar, for how can this one forgive the money of his fellow? And even if the shtar is written in the name of the one who forgave alone—in which case he could collect the entire debt himself, as will be explained—nevertheless, since the debt belongs to both of them, by what power is he able to forgive that which is not his? [Urim VeTummim and Netivot HaMishpat]. This is not like the one who disagrees in this matter. And just as one of the lenders cannot forgive the money of his fellow, so too if the borrower reached a compromise with one of the lenders, and to the second he claims "nothing is owed to you," the second cannot say, "Is it not already like an admission from you regarding the debt in that you compromised with my partner?" For the borrower can say, "To this one I yielded, but against you I do not wish to yield." And he can stand with him in judgment and claim whatever he wishes, even to deny him entirely, and let the law pierce the mountain between them. This is unless he explicitly admitted before the first that the debt is true. And it appears to me that the first can be a witness in the matter, since he already compromised with him, he is no longer an interested party in the matter and is fit for testimony.

Two who served as guarantors for one debtor, and the creditor released one of them from the guarantee, the second is not released, and the creditor is able to collect the entire debt from him. And it is not similar to what was written in section 8, for a guarantee is different, as the primary debt is upon the debtor and he did not forgive him. Therefore, naturally, even though he forgave one guarantor, he collects from the debtor, and when the debtor has nothing, he collects the entire debt from the second guarantor. For it was explained in section 5 that in a guarantee, he collects from whomever he wishes even when there is that which to collect from the second. Therefore, even though he forgave one, it was within his power even without the forgiveness to collect the entire debt from the second. According to this, for the second opinion explained there, he is not able to collect the entire debt from the second guarantor unless he has nothing from which to collect from the other; but if he has that which to collect from him and he forgave him, he only collects half the debt from the second. And see what I wrote at the end of siman 132.

Two who lent or deposited with one person, and one of them comes to take his portion, we do not listen to him until his fellow comes; for just as he received from two, so too he must return to two. Therefore, he must inform the second one so that he too shall come and both of them will receive. And if he is in the city and they informed him and he did not come, he must give everything to this claimant, for certainly it is pleasing to him that he should be his agent to receive the debt or the deposit, for if not so, why did he not come? But as long as the second one does not know, he shall not give even his portion to the claimant. And even though to litigate with him regarding his portion he is obligated to litigate even when the second is not here, as will be explained in siman 176 and siman 122, nevertheless, to deliver his portion into his hand he is unable without the knowledge of the second because of the reason we wrote, that just as he received from two, so too he must return to two. And some say that this is specifically when the portion of each one is not known, and therefore he is unable to deliver to him for perhaps he does not have that much, but when the portion of each one is known, he must deliver his portion to him even when the second is not here [Shach]. And according to this, one who deposited a deposit in the hand of one and died, and he had two sons, and one of them comes to take his portion, we give it to him since his portion is clarified. However, even according to the first opinion, if the claimant gives a justification that he is afraid to leave the money or the deposit in the hand of this person and his desire is that he leave it in the hand of the beit din, his claim is a valid claim even regarding the entire debt, and we remove it from the hand of this person and deliver it into the hand of the beit din. And so too when the second is in a distant place in a manner that it is impossible to inform him, we give this claimant his portion even according to the first opinion, for there is no logic at all to withhold the money of this one because of the second since it is impossible to inform him, and the portion of the second shall be placed in the hand of the beit din or in the hand of the borrower or the depositary if he is a secure man [it appears to me]. And so too even when the second is in the city and they informed him and he did not come, that he must deliver everything to the claimant as I wrote, nevertheless, if the borrower or the depositary does not want to give this one except his portion and the portion of the other shall be delivered to the beit din, the authority is in his hand, for there is no loss in this to the second; even if we estimate his intention that his desire is that his partner shall receive, nevertheless, behold the beit din is better for him, and he shall come and receive from the beit din, and if it will be his desire to deliver to his partner he shall deliver to him afterwards, unless the partner needs it for business, then certainly they give it to him immediately [it appears to me].

One who borrowed from two people and the shtar was written in the name of one of them—if the one whose name was not written in the shtar sued him, he can repel him and say to him, "I will not give you anything." And when the second one wants even only to litigate with the borrower, he requires an ersha'ah from this one in whose name the shtar was written. And this one in whose name the shtar is written can collect the whole amount even without an ersha'ah from the second. And the same law applies if both of them are written in the shtar: whoever has the shtar in his hand can collect the whole amount. And if the borrower claims, "I paid one of them"—if he paid the one producing the shtar, the second has nothing against him, and he should go and collect his portion from his partner. But if he paid the one who did not have the shtar in his hand, when this one who has the shtar in his hand comes, he must pay him his portion, and he shall take back the portion of that one from the second if he gave it to him. However, the other portion that he paid, he does not need to pay to this one who has the shtar in his hand, since the other is also written in the shtar, as I wrote in siman 71, section 25; see there.

A man and his wife who borrowed from one person are judged as two who borrowed, and she is obligated to pay half and the husband half. If she has assets of her own, they collect her portion from her, and if she does not have assets, they collect her portion from the husband according to the law of two who borrowed where one does not have [assets], for they collect from the second. This debt remains upon her to the husband, and the heirs of the husband, if he dies first, shall deduct it for her from her ketubah. Also, the husband himself can compel her to sell him her ketubah for its benefit of enjoyment if there will still remain for her the Torah-mandated ketubah, as this law will be explained in siman 424 regarding matters of injury. However, all this applies to a woman who has a business of her own and the business does not belong to the husband at all. But with ordinary women, even when she conducts trade within the house, there is no obligation upon her at all, only upon the husband. And even if she borrowed alone, although the lender can sue her and she is obligated to pay, nevertheless the obligation is upon the assets of her husband, and the husband and his heirs do not collect from her. She is believed to say that the husband took all the money into his hand or that the money entered into the husband's business affairs, and that her signing with her husband or her signing alone on the document was for the benefit of the husband's business [Levush], unless the husband clarifies that money remained in her hand, and let the law pierce the mountain between them. And so too if she took merchandise on credit in a shop, since it is known to all that everything she trades belongs to the husband and she has nothing of her own, the obligation of payment falls upon the husband, for she is like his agent, as the law is with the sender as written in siman 182, unless she signed herself on the document, for then it is as if the lender specified that his security is upon her and she is obligated to pay, and she sues the husband [Netivot HaMishpat]. And if the beit din understands that even though she signed, the security of the lender or the shopkeeper was upon the husband, they do not have the power to sue her, but rather they sue the husband. Only if the husband has nothing with which to pay, or he is a violent person and it is impossible to collect from him, she is obligated to endeavor that the husband pays, for presumably they relied only upon her [it appears to me].

Two who borrowed and signed themselves on the document, or a man and his wife, neither of them is believed to say, "I did not take any of the money at all, rather I entered with you into the document at your request." However, if this one who claims so has a migu of "I paid you"—such as where one says, "I paid the creditor the entire document, pay me your half," and this one says, "I paid you my half," he is believed. Therefore, he is also believed if he says, "I did not take any of the money at all" with a migu of "I paid you." And this one who has the document in his hand cannot say, "If you paid me, why did you leave the document in my hand?" for since both of them are signed on it, the document must necessarily be under only one of them, and this is no proof that he did not pay him. But if this one who has the document in his hand has a written proof from the creditor who wrote to him, "I received from you the entire debt," the second is not believed to say, "I paid you half" [Sma and Taz], for this one who is believed to say "I paid you the half" is also because of a migu that he could have said, "I paid my half to the creditor, and in what way are you more believed to say 'I paid the creditor' than I am?"—for from the fact that the document is in your hand there is no proof, as we have written. But when this one has in his hand a writing from the creditor, the second can no longer say "I paid the creditor," and consequently he cannot say "I paid you half," and consequently he cannot claim "I did not take any of the money" since he has no migu.

Reuven who wrote a house to his son and daughter-in-law and wrote that they should only collect both of them together, and the son died, his wife may collect her ketubah from this gift. For the language of "together" that he wrote to them did not come to exclude if one died, but rather that each one should not collect half a house without the knowledge of the second; but to collect a ketubah, behold even if he were alive and were divorcing her, she would collect from it, and all the more so when he died, that she collects her ketubah from it. And it appears to me that this is specifically if, in any event, both of them entered the house and afterwards he died; but if they did not enter the house at all, his gift was not established at all, for behold he only gave to both of them. But from the language of our teacher, the Rema, in section 10, it does not imply so, see there [and his source is from Rivash siman 185 and it is not found there, and in siman 481 there is found one teshuvah similar to this and not regarding this house, and it was brought in Even HaEzer siman 102, and in that it is certainly so, and this law requires further study].

Reuven was indebted to Shimon for a maneh, and afterwards Reuven and his wife borrowed a maneh from Levi. Reuven passed away, and the beit din collected from Reuven's property for his wife's ketubah, and nothing remained for the creditors because her ketubah was prior, as is written in Even HaEzer siman 102. Levi then came and collected his entire debt from the widow, according to the law of two who borrowed from one, where he collects the entirety from one when there is nothing from which to collect from the second. Shimon cannot collect from Levi with the claim that his debt is prior, for Levi did not collect from Reuven but rather from his wife, and she did not sign on Shimon's document. The law of two who took money from one to engage in business will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 81.