Siman 46

By Torah law, when one produces a deed signed by witnesses, we hold it to be a valid deed and collect with it, and we do not concern ourselves that perhaps it is forged, for a person is not so brazen as to forge a deed [Rashi, beginning of Gittin], and Israel are not suspected of making forged deeds [Rashbam, Bava Batra 170a]. Even if that man is suspected regarding money, if he is not suspected regarding forgery, we do not concern ourselves that he forged it, for he would be afraid to write a forged deed lest the beit din recognize its forgery [Tosafot, Ketubot 92a]. Therefore, even when the defendant claims that the deed is forged, as long as he does not clarify the forgery, we do not require the creditor to authenticate his deed, unless the witnesses of the deed came and said, "We never signed this deed," then even by Torah law we require him to provide authentication [Chelkat Mechokek, Even HaEzer siman 42, subsection 11]. There are some among the great poskim who say that when the defendant claims "it is forged," then even by Torah law we require him to provide authentication [Beit Shmuel ibid., subsection 15]. However, if the defendant is not before us and we need to collect from orphans or purchasers, according to everyone we do not require authentication by Torah law. But the sages enacted to authenticate the deed, and any deed that has not been authenticated is like a shard of pottery, and we do not collect with it even when not in the presence of the defendant, and certainly if the defendant is before us and says it is forged, that he never commanded to write this deed. And even when he admits that he commanded to write this deed, but says "I paid it," or "I wrote it to borrow or to sell or to give, and I have not yet borrowed or sold or given, and the deed fell from me and he found it," or even when he admits that the deed was in the hand of the plaintiff but says "it is a deed of trust, for I trusted him to place the deed in his hand even though I had not yet borrowed, because I relied on him that he would not sue me for nothing," and similar to these claims, we believe the defendant, and the beit din commands the plaintiff to authenticate the deed, because the defendant has a migo—a migo that he could have said "it is forged." Therefore, if the deed was not authenticated, the defendant swears a shevuat hesset that it is forged or paid or a deed of trust, and is exempt. Nevertheless, if after some time the plaintiff authenticates the deed, we collect with it and do not pay heed to his oath, and it is like other deeds. And even if it is written in the deed a "ne'emanut" that he believes the holder of the deed, as long as it has not been authenticated, the ne'emanut is nothing; since we concern ourselves that perhaps he forged the deed, we concern ourselves that perhaps he also forged the ne'emanut. And even regarding other claims, such as a claim of "paid" and the like, where he admits that he wrote the deed—and if so, since he admits that he commanded to write it, the ne'emanut also should have caused us to believe the plaintiff—nevertheless, since it was not authenticated, and had he claimed "it is forged" the ne'emanut would be nothing, therefore also regarding other claims the ne'emanut is nothing as long as it has not been authenticated. For sometimes he leaves the deed in the hand of the plaintiff for some reason and relies on him that he will not sue him another time, since it is not authenticated and he would be able to say "it is forged"; therefore the ne'emanut is not like actual witnesses, and as long as the deed has not been authenticated, the ne'emanut is nothing. There are those who disagree on this and say that regarding a claim of "paid" and the like, he is not believed if ne'emanut is written in it, but all the poskim decided like the first opinion, and such is the halacha. And when the deed is with the signature of the debtor's hand, it requires authentication, and as long as it has not been authenticated, it is like a shard of pottery. And so too all deeds in the world, whether they are with the signature of the one who is obligated or whether witnesses are signed on it, require authentication, and without authentication the deed is nothing. And see what I wrote in siman 69, section 2.

How is the validation performed? There are five methods for this. The first method is when the judges themselves recognize the signatures of the witnesses, and the judges write at the end of the deed: "In a session of three as one we were, and there came before us this deed, and since it is clear to us that these are the signatures of the witnesses, we have validated it and confirmed it as is proper." And they sign: So-and-so son of So-and-so, judge; and So-and-so son of So-and-so, judge; and So-and-so son of So-and-so, judge. For the validation of deeds is like a legal judgment, which requires a beit din of three. And likewise, one does not validate deeds at night, just like a legal judgment, as was written in siman 5. And if there is no room for them to sign at the end of the deed, they sign also on the back of the deed, on the other side of the deed.

The second method is when the witnesses of the document come and sign their names before the judges, and the judges compare the signatures to the signatures in the document. If the signatures are identical, they certify it and write: "In a session of three, etc., there came before us so-and-so and so-and-so, the witnesses of this document, and signed before us; and since it has been clarified to us that this is their signature, we have validated it, etc." And even if they signed before them at night and the next day they judge based on this, for the principle "hearing shall not be greater than seeing" does not apply here, as I wrote in siman 7. And although it turns out that the judges themselves are like witnesses, and a witness cannot become a judge, nevertheless they were lenient in this regarding the certification of documents—which is only rabbinic—that a witness may become a judge, as will be explained before us.

The third way is that the witnesses signed on the document testify to their signature. However, according to the opinion of the Rambam, it is not sufficient that they testify to their own signature, for they must testify to the matter of the document; for if they do not remember the act of the document, their testimony is nothing, as has been explained in section 15. Therefore, according to his opinion, they are obligated to say, "This is my handwriting and I am a witness in this matter," meaning to say, "I am a witness to the act, for I remember the act written in the document." And they do not need to say explicitly that they remember the testimony. And two are not needed for each signature, for since they testify to the matter of the document, there are two witnesses on the document. But there are some of the early authorities who disagree with the Rambam and hold that they can testify even to their handwriting alone and not to the matter of the document if they do not remember the matter. But in this manner, two witnesses are needed for each signature when they do not remember the matter. Therefore, it is necessary either that each one testifies to his own handwriting and to the handwriting of his fellow, or that another witness joins with the witnesses to testify to their handwriting; for since the testimony is on their handwriting, two witnesses are needed for each signature. However, even when they remember the matter of the document, it is sufficient that he says, "This is my handwriting," for presumably they are testifying to the act of the document, and there is no need to join another with them. And when they validate in this way, the judges write: "In a session of three as one we were, and so-and-so and so-and-so came before us and testified before us to their signatures, and since it was clarified to us that this is their signature, we have authorized it and validated it as is fit," and the judges sign.

The fourth way is that other witnesses come and testify regarding the handwriting of the witnesses signed on the document, and they testify that they recognize their signatures. And even when the witnesses of the document are before us, it can be validated via other witnesses. In this, two witnesses are certainly required for each signature, even according to the opinion of the Rambam, for in this case it is not relevant that they are testifying to the act of the document, as they are only testifying to the handwriting of the witnesses. Therefore, it is necessary that the two testify to both signatures. And if each of the two only recognizes one signature, they must join with them another who recognizes both signatures, or two others where each recognizes one signature. And if three witnesses are signed on the document, and one testified to the signatures of two of the witnesses, and the second testifies to the signature of the third and to the signature of one of the other two, even though according to the words of each of them there are two validated witnesses on the document, it is nothing; for it is necessary that there be two witnesses for two of the signatures signed on the document, and in this case two are testifying only to one signature, and for the two signatures there is only one witness [Radbaz]. However, it is simple that one only needs to validate two signatures even if there are many witnesses signed on the document. And even if they only recognize half the writing of the two—their names or their fathers' names—this is sufficient [Shach]. And if two testify to the signatures of the witnesses, and the witnesses of the document themselves say that this is not their signature and it is forged: if each of the witnesses of the document only denies his own signature alone, they are not believed, for the two who testify to their signature are two against one against each of them, and the document is validated. But if each of the signers denies his signature and also the signature of his fellow, they are two against two, and one does not collect with this document [Shach, subsection 12]. And when the judges validate in the manner explained in this section, they write: "In a sitting of three as one we were, and so-and-so and so-and-so came before us and testified to the signatures of these witnesses who are signed on the document, and since it was clarified to us that these are their signatures, we have confirmed it," etc.

The validation of a document that is validated by other witnesses, which was explained in the previous section, may also be validated based on a writing, where two people send in writing that they recognize the signatures of the witnesses. And even though it was explained in siman 28 that we require testimony specifically "from their mouths" and not "from their writing," that is specifically regarding actual testimony; however, regarding the validation of documents they were lenient when other witnesses testify, for they are not testifying on the act of the document [Beit Shmuel in Even HaEzer siman 142, subsection 11]. But a mute person who is not fit to tell at all, his testimony in writing is not effective. And likewise, if the witnesses who testified to the validation in their writing died before the document was validated in beit din, it is not validated based on their writing, since they are not fit now to tell [Netivot HaMishpat]. But the witnesses of the document themselves may not testify to the validation based on their writing, for they are testifying on the act of the document and it is like all testimony where we require "from their mouths" and not "from their writing," except in a time of pressing need or for a Torah scholar, as has been explained in siman 28, section 16.

The fifth way is that the handwriting of the witnesses should be produced from other documents, and the beit din compares this writing to the writing in the other documents. If it appears to them that the handwriting of these is exactly equal to the handwriting of those, they validate it. However, the documents from which they validate must be clear documents, such as documents for fields whose owners have eaten their produce in a revealed and proper manner without any fear or dread of a claim in the world, in the manner that all owners of fields eat the produce of their fields; or from ketubot documents where the women sit under their husbands, even if they have not sat for a long time [Shach]. And we require two documents, and we do not rely on one document, for perhaps it too is forged, and the fact that the buyer eats the field or the woman sits under her husband is a coincidence [Sma]. And specifically when these two documents were produced from the hand of another and not from the hand of the holder of the document before us who wants to validate his document now, for perhaps he forged them all. According to this, when the documents are validated by a beit din, we validate from them even when they are produced from the hand of the holder of the document himself. And there are those who disagree, that even with validated documents it is not effective when they are produced from the hand of the holder of the document himself, for we fear that since the documents are before him, perhaps he forged from them to make the signatures equal. According to this, when the holder of the document has another document or some writing with these signatures, it is impossible to validate by comparison of the writing even from other documents. However, this is specifically when they do not recognize the signatures except through comparison of the writing, but when they recognize the signatures by visual recognition, then even though he has these signatures, we are not concerned, for it is impossible to forge so much that it would be recognized as visual recognition. Therefore, one must be careful that one who has two documents with signatures of equal witnesses should not validate them by comparison but rather by visual recognition [Shach]. And from a validated document that is produced from the hand of another, not from the hand of the holder of the document, we validate even from one document; since it is validated and produced from the hand of another, and these signatures were not found in the hand of the holder of the document, there is no concern in this. And although there are those who disagree, that even in this we require specifically two documents and one document is not sufficient unless there was a challenge to the document and it was validated in beit din, for then certainly the beit din applied their heart to investigate well, but without a challenge we fear perhaps it too is forged and the beit din validated it by chance; however, we do not rule accordingly, for certainly the beit din, when they validated it, investigated well even when there was no challenge to the document. Therefore, in such a case, we validate even from one document, and they must recognize the handwriting of two judges in the validated document from which they are validating.

That which we have said, that one may verify from two documents of two fields or two ketubot, the same applies to other documents that have been clarified to be true, such as loan documents where the borrowers admit that they are true documents and the like. However, when the borrowers are not before us, one may not verify from two loan documents, for there is no clarification regarding them that they are true. And the opinion of the Shach is that from three loan documents that emerge from three different people, one may verify from them even if there is no clarification regarding them that they are true, for we do not suspect all of them of having forged. And similarly, one may verify a signature from a book that the witness wrote and signed his name upon it, but not from his letter, because a person is not precise with the signature of a simple letter and his writing changes according to the quill and according to the urgency. And therefore, some say that even from a book one may not verify unless he signed his name at the end of the book, for then he is precise with his signature and one may verify from it; but from the beginning of the book or from its middle one may not verify, for it is like a letter. And the opinion of the Shach is that one may verify even from a letter, provided only that it is known with clarity that the witness wrote this letter, and it seems to me that this is the custom.

When they fulfill it in this manner, they write: "We were three sitting as one, and this document came before us, and we scrutinized other documents [to see] that this is the signature of these witnesses; and since it was clarified to us that this is their signature, we have validated it, etc."

Even though ab initio the beit din must mention in their authentication the method by which the document was authenticated, as has been written, nevertheless, ex post facto, if they wrote generally, "We were three sitting as one and this document was authenticated before us," it is authenticated, even though they did not specify the method by which it was authenticated.

One may authenticate the document even not in the presence of the litigant, and even if he stands and cries out, "It is a forgery, do not authenticate it," we do not listen to him unless he clarifies that it is a forgery; and regarding extracting from orphaned minors, it will be explained in siman 110. And specifically the signatures of witnesses may be authenticated not in the presence of the litigant, but the signature of the borrower himself may not be authenticated not in his presence, as this is like all testimony which must be in the presence of the litigant. And regarding the authentication of witnesses they were lenient because from the Torah witnesses do not require authentication at all, as it is considered as if their testimony was investigated in beit din, and only the rabbis required authentication; therefore they are lenient in this. But when it is necessary to authenticate the signature of the litigant himself, in this certainly even from the Torah it requires authentication, for regarding this it is not relevant to say that it is as if his testimony was investigated in beit din, and it is like all testimony which is required in the presence of the litigant. However, the Shach wrote that it seems they are accustomed to be lenient to authenticate even the handwriting of the borrower not in his presence, and it is possible to say in this that "custom cancels halacha," but where they are not so accustomed one should not be lenient. Thus far his words. And we have not heard of this custom clearly, and therefore one should not do so except in a time of pressing need and according to the sight of the judges, as with all testimony, as has been explained in siman 28.

It has already been explained in section 2 that the authentication of documents is like a legal judgment, and one does not authenticate at night. However, when the two litigants come, they may authenticate even at night, as has been explained regarding legal judgment in siman 5, for it is as if they accepted a relative or one disqualified. But when the creditor comes alone, they do not authenticate at night [Sma]. And similarly, it specifically requires a beit din of three, even if they are laymen, as has been explained in siman 1 regarding legal judgment. And if they authenticated with two, it is not an authentication, for it is like a witness from the mouth of a witness, which is not effective. But with three, who are a beit din when they authenticate their signatures, then the beit din that judges this document at a later time, it is as if they heard the testimony from the witnesses of the document themselves [ibid.]. And even though authentication is not done with two, nevertheless, if the two recognize the signatures themselves and signed upon this, it is a testimony of witnesses according to what we explained, that they can testify this from their writing, and it will be effective if the judges who will judge this recognize the signatures of these two themselves. But when they do not recognize the signatures and others testify before them, this is not even testimony, for it is like a witness from the mouth of a witness, as I have written. And similarly, if the document is the signature of the debtor's hand and the debtor admits before two that this is his signature and commanded them to sign and authenticate, this is also a testimony of witnesses and not an authentication [Netivot HaMishpat]. And if the beit din that judges the document recognizes the signatures, it is effective; but if the beit din themselves do not recognize them, that which others testify before them is not effective [Taz].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there is one who wrote that since it is the custom that the Rav who heads a yeshiva validates alone, such a custom nullifies the halacha, and so is the simple custom in these lands. And it appears to me that the reason is that we hold regarding the validation of documents, which is rabbinic, that a single expert has the status of three laymen and is called a beit din, as has been explained in siman 3. And even though there is no single expert in this time, nevertheless regarding the validation of documents, which is rabbinic, one may rely on him; this appears to me to be the reason for the custom. Thus far his words. And the Rav cannot validate at night, and it is possible that where they are accustomed to validate at night, even in this we say custom nullifies halacha [Shach]. And even according to this custom, it is only specifically a Rav who sits on the seat of instruction, but that which the scribes and the cantors are accustomed to validate, this custom is nothing and it is forbidden for them to validate alone, and if they validated, the validation is nothing [Sma]. And in our time in our country, we have not seen nor heard that even the Rav validates alone, and if there is in some place this custom, they may maintain their custom, but in a place where there is no custom it is forbidden to do so, for regardless, many have challenged this custom.

Even with a validated document, it is necessary to recognize the signatures of two of the three judges or the signatures of the witnesses; if not, it does not have the status of a validated document, for we fear perhaps he also forged the validation. However, there is a practical difference regarding validation, for since two witnesses and three judges are signed upon it, it will be easier to find someone who recognizes the signatures. And even though there are those who disagree and hold that a validated document does not require recognition at all, nevertheless, the majority of Rishonim and Acharonim ruled that recognition is required even with a validated document.

We have already explained in section 4 that according to the Rambam, the witnesses must remember the act of the document. This is his wording in chapter 8 of the Laws of Testimony: One who signed on a document and comes to testify on his handwriting in beit din, and he recognized his handwriting that it is certainly his, but he does not remember the testimony at all and finds no memory in his heart at all that this one ever borrowed from that one—behold, it is forbidden to testify on his handwriting that it is his in beit din, even in conjunction with another with him [Shach]. For a person does not testify on his handwriting that it is his, but rather on the money in the document he testifies, that this one is liable to that one, and the handwriting is in order to remind him of the matter. But if he did not remember, he shall not testify. Since the matter is so, a document that was produced in beit din and witnesses came and said, "This is our handwriting, but we never knew this testimony and we do not remember that this one borrowed from that one or sold to him," the document is not validated, and behold they are like shards until they remember their testimony. And anyone who does not judge so does not know in civil laws between his right and his left. But if his handwriting was produced from another place, or there were witnesses there that this is their handwriting, they validate the document and do not pay heed to the words of these who say "we do not remember this testimony," lest they retracted, and this that they said "we do not remember" was in order to cancel the document; it is as if they said "we were minors" or "we were disqualified from testimony," for they are not believed since the document is validated not by their mouths. And because of this reason, we validate all documents and we do not need to bring the witnesses and ask them if they remember this testimony or do not remember it, for even if they came and said "we do not remember it," we do not listen to them since it is possible to validate it not by their mouths. Thus far his words. However, there are some of the Rishonim who disagree with him and hold that even if they do not remember the matter and do not remember that they ever signed on this document, since they testify that this is their handwriting, the document is validated by their mouths. For they are no worse than other witnesses who testify only on the handwriting of the witnesses. Only according to this, when they do not remember the matter at all, two witnesses are required for each signature. Therefore, it is necessary either that each one testifies on his writing and the writing of his fellow, or that another joins with them who will testify on the handwriting of both of them, so that there will be two witnesses on each signature. And we validate every document even if the two witnesses are not signed together, but rather one in one document and the second in another document, if only it was written by the command of the borrower, it is considered a document as will be explained in siman 51. And every document that was not written by the command of the borrower is not considered a document at all even when two witnesses are signed on it, as I wrote in siman 39 section 7, and validation is not applicable to it, and the witnesses must come and state their testimony orally. But every document that was written by the command of the borrower, even if it was not written according to the enactments of documents—such as if it has no kinyan or it has no date or it did not repeat the matter of the document in the final line and such like—it is like a complete document and we validate it [Shach].

If one of the witnesses said, "This is my handwriting," and he and another witness testified regarding the handwriting of the second witness, the document is not validated. This is because the witness who testified regarding his own signature testified regarding the act of the document, and half of the testimony was validated through his mouth. And when he and another testified regarding the handwriting of the second witness, another half of the second half was also validated through his mouth. Thus, three parts of the testimony were validated through his mouth, and through the mouth of the other, only a fourth part of the testimony was validated. And the Torah said, "By the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established," meaning that the testimony must be validated by the two witnesses equally, and not that more should be validated by the mouth of one witness than by the mouth of the second witness. Therefore, even if a relative of the first witness, such as his father or his brother, testified with another regarding the handwriting of the second witness, it is also not a validation. This is because three parts of the testimony emerge through the mouth of the first witness and through the mouth of his relative, and relatives are considered as one; it turns out that it does not emerge through the mouth of two witnesses equally. And in this manner one must judge in all matters of testimony, that the testimony should emerge through the mouth of two witnesses equally. Therefore, when the second witness is not before us to testify regarding his signature, two people from the street are required to testify regarding his signature, and the witness who is before us does not join with another, as I have written. And what shall they do if there is only one witness from the street who recognizes the handwriting of the second witness? The witness who is before us shall not testify in beit din regarding his signature; rather, he should sign his signature before witnesses on a paper or even on a shard, and the witnesses shall bring his signature to beit din and they will compare it to his signature in the document. It turns out that he did not testify at all regarding his signature in beit din, and he can afterwards testify regarding the handwriting of the second witness with the other. But he should not write his signature before the beit din, for if so, it is as if he testified before the beit din regarding his own signature [Shach]. And if there are two from the street who recognize the handwriting of the witness before us, it is certainly better that they testify regarding the handwriting of the witness before us, and he and the other shall testify regarding the handwriting of the second witness. And all of this is effective when the witness before us has not yet testified in beit din regarding his signature; but if he already testified regarding his signature, it does not help that two others testify afterwards or that he writes his signature, for since he already testified, his signature has been validated [ibid.]. And this remedy that we explained must necessarily be done when one of the signed witnesses died and only one person from the street is found who recognizes the handwriting of the deceased. Therefore, the living witness must be careful not to testify himself before beit din regarding his signature, so that it will not be a crookedness that they cannot rectify.

We have already explained in section 14 that even with a validated shtar, one must recognize either the signatures of the witnesses or two signatures of the dayanim. Therefore, when a validated shtar comes before a beit din and two witnesses testify to two signatures of the dayanim, they may collect with this shtar. And if two dayanim from those signed on the validation testify to their signatures, even if each one testifies only to his own signature, the shtar is validated. And even though the dayan does not testify to the act of the shtar but rather to his own handwriting, and if so, we should have required two witnesses for every signature as has been explained in section 4 and in section 15 regarding witnesses, nevertheless this is sufficient. And the reason is that the dayan testifies to the validation of the shtar, and it turns out that there are two witnesses who testify to the validation of the shtar. But when others testify to their signatures, two witnesses are required for every signature, for they do not testify to the act of the validation of the shtar but rather to their signatures, and two witnesses are required for every signature.

They do not combine for the validation of the document when one of the witnesses of the document testifies to his signature and one of the judges testifies to his signature, because their testimony is not equal; for the witness testifies to the act of the document and the judge testifies to the validation of the document. And even when two others testify to the signature of the judge, or the judge and another with him testify to his signature, it is not a validation because of this reason. But if the judge testifies to his signature and two from the street testify to the signature of a witness, they combine, because their testimony is equal; for the two testify to the handwriting of the witness, and also the judge who testifies to the validation of the document, this is also as if he testifies and says "these are the signatures of the witnesses of the document." Therefore, when one from the street testifies to the signatures of the two witnesses of the document and one judge testifies to his signature, they combine for this reason, for the judge also testifies to the signatures of the witnesses, and it results that there are two witnesses regarding the witnesses of the document. And so too, when one testifies to the signatures of the two witnesses and two others testify to the signature of one judge, they combine for this reason. And so too, when two from the street testify regarding one witness and regarding one judge, it is a validation [Shach]. And there are those who disqualify in this [Sma and Taz], for regarding the second witness there is no validation except from the two who testify to the signature of the judge, and they are not superior to the judge himself who is considered only as one witness, and so one should instruct. And so too, when the writing of the scribe and one witness were validated, it is not a validation at all, and it is as if it were not validated.

The witnesses of confirmation may be relatives of the witnesses of the document, for he does not testify regarding his relative at all, but rather testifies to the owner of the document that his document is valid. Furthermore, even if the witness signed on the document died and left behind a son, even if he was a minor when he died, the son can testify regarding his father's signature after he grows up along with one witness who is valid with him. And likewise, he can testify regarding the signature of his brother and regarding the signature of his teacher, for he saw their signatures in his youth, and he may join with another valid witness to testify regarding their signatures. And specifically regarding these signatures can he testify to what he saw in his youth, because he was very familiar with them; but regarding the signatures of others, he cannot testify to what he recognized in his youth. And even though there is one who disagrees with this, nevertheless, this is the primary ruling in the law, because it is possible that he is mistaken in them, as it is not his way to recognize and be precise regarding others in his youth.

The witnesses who testify regarding the validation shall not be relatives of the judges of the validation, because we hold that in all testimony we require testimony that you are able to subject to hazamah, and the judges would not be able to accept hazamah against their relatives; and also it is a scriptural decree that no matter shall be concluded through relatives, and here the matter is concluded through the witnesses and the judges who are related to one another. And just as the witnesses or the judges are not permitted to be related to one another, so too the witnesses shall not be relatives of the judges, for this is all one matter. And there are those who permit this, that the witnesses be relatives of the judges, because an ordinary validation is that they recognize the signatures, and in this hazamah is not applicable—that they would subject them to hazamah by saying "you were with us"—and therefore even when they testify that the witnesses signed in their presence, in which case hazamah would be applicable—that they would subject them to hazamah [saying] "at that time that you say they signed in your presence, you were with us"—nevertheless one should be lenient regarding the validation of documents which is rabbinic. And also regarding the second reason they were not concerned in the validation of documents which is rabbinic, since the testimony of the witnesses is not literally one thing with the validation of the judges, for the witnesses testify that they recognize the signatures of the witnesses and not regarding the act of the document, and the judges validate the document. Nevertheless, in practice, one must certainly be concerned for the first opinion, and so one should instruct. However, when they need to validate the validation and witnesses testify regarding the signatures of the judges, they may be relatives of the witnesses who testified regarding the validation before those judges who validated the document, because they have no connection to one another; for even the witnesses of the validation may be relatives of the witnesses of the document, as was written in the previous section, and all the more so they may be relatives of the witnesses who testify regarding the signatures of the judges.

Witnesses of validation who are related to the parties of the document are disqualified, and likewise, judges of validation who are related to the parties of the document are disqualified. According to this, judges who validate a document—even though they do not need to read the body of the document's matter, for they are only validating the signatures of the witnesses—nevertheless, they must read and see the names of the parties of the document, the lender and the borrower, or the buyer and the seller, or the giver and the receiver, so that they may see that they are not related either to the judges or to the witnesses testifying before them. And if they do not wish to read the document, they shall write in the validation who the witnesses of the validation are, so that if it is discovered afterward that they are related, the validation will be disqualified. However, there are those who disagree on this and hold that regarding the validation of documents they were lenient, and the judges and the witnesses may be related to the parties of the document, since their matter is only to testify regarding the signatures of the witnesses. And even though through this the document is validated, nevertheless, they were lenient regarding the validation of documents, which is rabbinic. According to this opinion, the judges do not need to read at all what is in the document, even the names of the parties of the document [Shach].

Dayanim who sit to judge regarding the matters of the document, and not regarding the validation of the document, must be distant from the witnesses of the document. For how can they judge the matters of the document based on the testimony of their relatives who testify regarding the matters of the document? Therefore, even if witnesses testified orally before some beit din and the beit din wrote down their testimony, another beit din who are relatives of the witnesses cannot judge this matter based on the testimony of their relatives who testified regarding this matter [Shach]. Similarly, the dayanim who judge regarding the matters of the document must be distant from the dayanim of the validation of the document, for just as their judgment comes by way of the witnesses of the document, so too it comes by way of the dayanim of the validation. And there are those who validate this, for there is no comparison between the dayanim of the validation and the witnesses of the document; for the witnesses of the document are on the matter of the document itself, but the dayanim of the validation are not connected to the matter of the document, as they are not required to know the matter of the document, as has been explained, and they only validated the signatures of the witnesses. Therefore, regarding the witnesses of the validation, according to all opinions, these dayanim who judge the matters of the document are permitted to be related to them, for they are not connected at all to the matter of the document. And that which we wrote, that there are those who validate when the dayanim of the document are related to the dayanim of the validation, this is specifically when the dayanim of the validation themselves do not testify before them regarding their signature; but when they themselves testify before these dayanim regarding their signature, they must not be related to one another [Shach], according to the first opinion that was explained in section 20.

Even though it was explained in siman 6 that a witness cannot become a judge, nevertheless, regarding the validation of documents which is rabbinic, they were lenient that it is permitted for a witness to be a judge. Therefore, three judges who sat to validate a document, and two of them recognize the signatures of the witnesses while the third does not recognize them, these two may testify before the third regarding the signatures of the witnesses and afterwards they shall be judges over the validation. However, the two of them may not sign themselves upon the validation before they have testified before the third. And if they signed themselves, the validation is invalid, for how could they write "in a session of three etc." and sign themselves, when at the time they signed they were not a beit din of three at all? Thus it results that it was validated unlawfully. And regarding this which they permitted, that the two testify before the third, the third does not need to seat another two with him so that they shall be a beit din of three according to the law of receiving testimony; for since regarding the validation of documents a witness becomes a judge, these two judges who testify before the third also become judges, and they become together witnesses and judges [Sma]. And so too, a witness signed upon a document may be a judge to receive testimony regarding the second witness who is signed with him on the document [ibid.].

The judges are permitted to write the authentication on the document and sign themselves [Shach] before the document is authenticated, provided that they do not release the document from their possession until witnesses testify before them regarding the signatures of the witnesses of the document. And even though it appears like a falsehood that they signed themselves stating that the document is authenticated before it was authenticated, nevertheless we are not concerned for this since they do not release the document from their possession. And perhaps you will say that if so, why did we explain in the previous section that if the two signed before they testified before the third, the authentication is invalid? For it is different there, since the third did not join with them at the time they signed because they knew the signatures and he did not know, how can he join them after their signature? For once the two signed, the authentication was completed for them, and it turns out that the two authenticated alone and the third will authenticate alone, and it was not "in a session of three as one." But when they are all equal in that they do not recognize the signatures, it is properly "in a session of three as one," and they all sign themselves together, and when they testify before them afterward, it turns out the document is authenticated by all of them together. And although there are those who disagree on this, nevertheless, such is the primary ruling [Shach].

If witnesses came and testified that at the time it was validated before them they were not in one standing, but rather each one received the testimony individually, or that two received it together and the third individually, the validation is invalid, but the document is valid [Shach]. And it is not similar to what was explained in section 23, that the two may testify before the third, for there, since they are together when they testify before him, it is as if all three of them received it together [Sma]. And the judges themselves are not believed to say that they were not together and to invalidate the validation, for since it is forbidden to do so, they are not believed regarding themselves to say that they acted not according to the law. And if they say that they did not know the law that they must specifically be together, it appears to me that they are believed. And similarly, when they say they were together and witnesses say they were not together, it appears to me that the judges are believed, and one should deliberate on this, and it requires further study. And even though there are those who disagree with this general rule and say that post facto it is a validation even when they were not together, the Shach has already rejected this opinion and one should not rule accordingly.

Three judges who sat to validate a document, and two witnesses came and challenged one of them, claiming that he is a robber or that he committed another transgression such that he is disqualified from sitting in judgment, and two others came, or the two other judges themselves, and say that the matter is a lie, that he did not rob or did not commit a transgression—it is of no avail, and he is disqualified from sitting in judgment. This is because it is "two and two," two witnesses against two witnesses, and it is not possible to extract money based on his word; and how can he validate the document and we extract money based on his word? For we have a general rule that in a case of "two and two," leave the money in its established possession. However, if the judges or two others testify that it is true that he robbed or committed the transgression, but that he performed repentance, they are believed and he is fit. And specifically if these judges testified before they signed, then they are believed to testify about him; but after they have signed, the judges are not believed to testify about him. The reason is because it is a disgrace for them that they sat together with one disqualified from judgment, and therefore we fear that perhaps because of the shame they testify about him that he performed repentance even if he did not repent properly, and they are considered as having a personal interest in the matter. Therefore, if others testify about him, he is fit even after they signed. And this is specifically when the challenge was regarding a transgression; but if the challenge was that he is a slave or a mamzer, and they testify that it is a lie, he is fit even after they signed, for in this case it is not relevant to say they would testify falsely because of the shame, as this matter is a mere disclosure of a fact and is destined to be revealed to the whole world, and people do not lie about a matter that is destined to be revealed. And behold, there is another reason why they are not believed to testify after they signed: since at the time of the signing of the two, his fitness had not yet been clarified, the first assembly that they convened for the validation of the document was nullified; therefore, he does not join with them. According to this reason, even when others testified that he returned in repentance, it is of no avail since their assembly was nullified. But there is a leniency according to this reason: that if they assemble another time, the validation that they perform then will be fit. But according to the first reason, that they testify because of the disgrace, it is of no avail. And if the challenge was because of a family disqualification, such as a slave or a mamzer, even according to the second reason it is fit; for specifically regarding a challenge of transgression, where until he performed repentance he is disqualified, their assembly was indeed nullified; but regarding a challenge of family, where it is a mere disclosure of a fact that the rumor is a lie, their assembly of the session was never nullified. And according to the second reason, if they all signed before the challenge, the validation is fit; for since he returned in repentance he is fit, even if it was not yet clarified that he repented, since it was clarified afterwards [Ran, chapter 2 of Ketubot]. Only when he had not yet signed do we say that since in truth he was disqualified and became fit, and at the time the two signed his fitness was not yet clarified, their assembly is nullified [Ritva, ibid.]. But according to the first reason, even if they all signed before the challenge, the validation is nullified. And for the law, one should be stringent according to the stringencies of both reasons, for the first reason belongs to Rashi and the Ran, and the second reason belongs to the Rif, the Rambam, and the Rosh.

They wrote a validation, and one of the judges of the validation was found to be disqualified: the shtar is not disqualified, only the validation is naught, and it must be validated anew. If this validation was written at the foot of the shtar, they shall cut it off so that those who do not know it is disqualified will not rely upon it. If it was written on the back of the shtar such that it is impossible to cut it off, they shall draw ink lines over the validation. However, if they did not cut it or did not draw ink lines, the shtar is not disqualified by this; rather, they are obligated to do so ab initio so that they do not stumble through it [Shach].

Three who sat to validate a document and received the testimony for the validation, and before they signed one of the judges died or hurried on his way and did not manage to sign, the two must write, "We were in a session of three and one is not here," in order to make known that they validated it with three, but that the third did not manage to sign. For if not so, the observer will say that two validated it. And even if it is written therein, "We were in a session of three," and there is no more to be said that there were only two, nevertheless they will say that at first they agreed to take three for the sake of thoroughness and not because it is a requirement, and the third did not happen to be with them and they validated it with two, and they will say that validation suffices with two. And so too when the language of "beit din" is written therein, which proves they know a beit din is required, nevertheless they will say perhaps they thought two are also a beit din. Therefore, if there is a clear implication in the validation that there were three, such as if it is written therein within the text, "And so-and-so said to us," or "And we said to so-and-so," which proves explicitly that there were three, it is not necessary to write "and one is not here." And so too when it is written therein "in a session of three" and also the language of "beit din," it also implies that there were three. And if all three are signed therein, then it is not necessary to write "We were in a session of three," and even if nothing is written therein except "this document was validated," it is sufficient since three are signed upon it. And we have already explained in section 10 that initially one should write everything, and also the manner in which the document was validated. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that even when one of them did not die, it is customary to write "and one is not here" in order to ease the burden upon them, for perhaps the third will not be found at the time of the signing, so that they will not need to search for him; but we have not heard of nor seen this custom.

If it is written in the kiyum "in a session of three" etc. and three are signed on it, and one of them is found to be a relative of the second or disqualified, some say it is kosher, and we hang the matter on the assumption that three kosher individuals sat and only two of them signed, and the relative or disqualified individual signed afterward, as has been explained in siman 45. And some say it is disqualified, for from where do we have the authority to hang the matter leniently? And even though the kiyum of documents is rabbinic, nevertheless, as long as we do not know that there were three kosher individuals, we do not have the power to declare it kosher. And that which we declare kosher in siman 45, there it is different, for since there are more than two witnesses, we may properly hang the matter leniently. But in a kiyum, which requires three, and among these a relationship or disqualification is found, how can we declare it kosher? For did we not see that the sages, of blessed memory, were stringent that when one of them dies they must write "and one is no longer," as I wrote in the previous section? And all the more so when the two have an additional disqualified person with them, we must be concerned and disqualify the kiyum, and so it appears primary for the law.

A validation in which it is written "we are witnesses" and not the language of a beit din is valid, for since three signed it, do we not see that they were a beit din? And regarding that which they wrote the language of testimony, it can be said that they themselves recognized the signatures and they are indeed truly witnesses as well. And specifically when it is written in it "it was clarified to us" or "we identified," but if it is written "it was clarified before us," does it not appear that they did not recognize it themselves? And the Shach questions the essence of this law, for since the language of witnesses is written in it, how can we say that they were witnesses and judges as one? For if so, they should have written "we are witnesses and judges," or they should have written neither the language of witnesses nor the language of judges; and it requires further study.

The validation must be written close to the signatures of the witnesses. If the validation was distant from the signatures of the witnesses by the measure of one line and two spaces, the validation alone is invalid, for we fear perhaps he will cut the deed and the witnesses and forge in that line to make a deed and two witnesses in one line—for a deed that comes with its witnesses in one line is valid, as has been explained in siman 45—and he will collect with this forged deed since it has a validation upon it. Therefore, if they filled the space with ink streaks it is valid, for behold, he cannot forge. And specifically ink streaks where the blank space is visible between the streaks; but if he filled the entire space with ink it is invalid, for we fear perhaps another deed was written in the place of the ink and he erased it and wrote another deed above [Sma]. And even though regarding witnesses we invalidate in such a case because we fear perhaps they signed only on the streaks and not on the essence of the deed, as has been explained in siman 45, nevertheless regarding a beit din we do not fear this, because it is not the way of a beit din to sign on a validation of streaks. And even though there are those who say that even regarding a beit din we fear, the Acharonim have already decided that we do not fear, and especially since the beit din mentions the validation of the deed. And likewise, if they distanced it one line and did not fill it with ink streaks, but rather they wrote in the validation that the witnesses are signed one under the other, the validation is also valid [Shach], for there is no concern perhaps he will cut the deed and make a deed and its witnesses in one line, as his forgery would be revealed. Therefore, if there is much space where he could write and have witnesses sign one under the other, it is invalid. And likewise, when they filled the space with ink and wrote in the validation that they validate the signatures of the witnesses who are signed on this deed which begins from the top of the paper, it is also valid [ibid.], for there is no longer a concern perhaps a deed was written there and he wrote another deed above, since the judges write that the deed begins from the top of the paper. But nevertheless, there is still a concern perhaps some obligation upon the holder of the deed was written after the signatures of the witnesses and he erased it; however, there are those who say that it is not the way to write his obligation after the signatures of the witnesses [see in the Sma and in the Shach, subsection 87].

The beit din may write the kiyum even on the side of the document, on the margin, or on the back of the document. Therefore, if the paper is short at the bottom, they write on the side. They write in the kiyum that they are writing on the margin along its length while the witnesses are signed across the width of the paper, for if not so, there is a concern that one might cut off the kiyum and make another document with those same witnesses on the other side of the margin that is on the side, and write after the signatures of the witnesses: "We, the judges who are signed on the other side of the page, confirm this document which is written on its back" [Shach]. Similarly, when they write the kiyum on the back of the document, they shall write in the kiyum that it was written on its back, and they shall be careful to write on the back of the document opposite the text. For if they write opposite the blank space on the other side, there is a concern that one might cut off the entire document and write a document on the blank part, and the kiyum would be on the forged document. Therefore, if they filled the space opposite the blank part with ink scratches, it is kosher [ibid.]. And if the document is written from its beginning to its end on its front and its back, some say that the judges may join and glue a paper to the edge of the document and make a distinct sign so that he will not be able to glue it to another paper, such as by writing some words in the document in their own handwriting and writing in the kiyum that they are confirming a document in which these words are written that are similar to this script. And now, if he removes it from this document and joins it to another, the forgery will be recognizable, as the script will not be similar to each other. One must be very, very careful in this [ibid.].

A validated document that comes before us, where the document and the witnesses were written on an erasure and the validation below is on paper that is not erased, the judges of the validation shall not validate it, but rather it must be validated by the witnesses. For there is a concern that perhaps the document and the witnesses were written on fine paper and he erased the document and wrote another document upon the erasure. And even though this concern is remote—for how could he ruin his document, and would he not fear that perhaps the judges of the validation would recognize his forgery and he would also lose the document he previously had—nevertheless, there is another concern: perhaps the document was written above the erased area, and between the document and the validation there were ink streaks, and he cut off the upper document and completely erased the area of the streaks and wrote another document upon it. And even though there are those who permit validating it through the judges of the validation, nevertheless, the halacha is not so.

Witnesses who signed on a document and afterwards became disqualified, for example, if one became the son-in-law of the holder of the document, when the beit din comes to validate the document, he cannot now testify about his signature, but others may testify about his signature. Similarly, if he knew oral testimony regarding a kinyan and afterwards became his son-in-law, it is forbidden for him now, while he is a relative, to sign on this document; even though an ordinary kinyan is intended for writing, nevertheless, how can he write now when he is a relative? The holder of the document is forced to obtain other witnesses who saw the kinyan so that they may write a document for him. Similarly, if he became a rasha after the signing of the document, for example, if he became a robber, he cannot testify, but others may testify about his signature. This is specifically when they saw his signature before he became a robber, for if they saw it afterwards, it is nothing; even if the date of the document is prior to the time he became a robber, we suspect perhaps they wrote it afterwards with an earlier date. But when he becomes a son-in-law, they may testify even if they did not see the signature until after he became a son-in-law. The reason is simple: for the disqualification of kinship is not because he would commit falsehood, but rather it is a decree of the Torah, and therefore we do not suspect him of having committed falsehood afterwards. But regarding a robber, since he is a rasha, we suspect this. And such is the law regarding a document where the witnesses became related to one another: they should not testify about their handwriting, but rather others shall testify about their signatures. If there are no witnesses who recognize their signatures, they shall write their signatures before witnesses on some paper, and they shall compare their signatures to their signatures in the document and testify about their signatures. And regarding a robber, they must know that he signed previously on this document, only that they did not recognize his signature, as I have written. Similarly, if he converted to idolatry after he signed, his law is like one who became a robber. Similarly, if the witness became a mute who was silenced after he signed on the document, he cannot testify about his handwriting by means of his signature or the nodding of his head, but others may testify about him. The Shach wrote that by means of comparing his signature—that he should write his signature in beit din and they compare it—this is certainly a valid validation; it is only his testimony in writing, such as if he were to write "I testify that this is my signature," that is not effective, but regarding the comparison of the script, it is effective. The practical difference is that if his signature now does not resemble his signature in the document, no validation is effective until others testify who recognized his signature from before he was silenced.

Two who are signed on a document and died, and there are no witnesses that it is their handwriting and their handwriting is not produced from another place, and two came and said "it is their handwriting, but they were minors at the time they signed," or "disqualified due to kinship," or "due to being wicked"—if within the time of a speech of "it is their handwriting" they also said their disqualification, behold these are believed, for "the mouth that prohibited is the mouth that permitted," as they have a migo that if they wanted they could have remained silent and not said it is their handwriting. Therefore, when they say it is their handwriting and they are disqualified, they are believed and the document is torn, for no seizure is effective; even if the holder of the document subsequently seizes from the borrower, we remove it from his hand, since there is no validation except through them and they testify that they are disqualified. And if the holder of the document claims that a time should be set for him and he will validate the document through others, even though even if he validates through others he would not collect with it since they are "two against two," nevertheless we give him time, for perhaps he will validate through others who will contradict the first witnesses and say that the witnesses were not disqualified, and there will be two against two, and the law of this document will be that he may not collect with it but it is not torn. And if the holder of the document seizes from the borrower, we cannot remove it from his hand, according to the law of "two against two," for the beit din does not remove from the possessor. But if he does not claim that they should give him time, the beit din does not claim on his behalf, for since even if it is validated it is not a complete document to collect with, why should they claim on his behalf? And if this document is a document of orphans, the beit din claims on their behalf, for perhaps there will be validation upon it, and if the orphans seize, we do not remove from their hand. And all this is when there are no witnesses that it is their handwriting and it is not validated, but when the document is already validated by witnesses that it is their handwriting, or it was validated through other documents as has been explained in section 7, and two came and said that these witnesses were disqualified at the time they signed, they are not believed to tear the document; rather, we do not tear it and we do not collect with it, according to the law of "two against two." And if he seizes from the borrower, even if there are witnesses to the seizure and he does not have a migo to say "I did not seize," we do not remove it from him, as I have written. And the seizure is only effective for movable property or ready money or documents or slaves, but seizure of land is not a seizure, for land stands in the possession of its owners; since it is not seized by hand and is not moved from place to place, seizure is not effective for it. And similarly, a document where two say "it is paid" and two say "it is not paid," the law is also thus: that we do not collect with it, and if he seized, we do not remove it from him [Shach].

And all this is specifically when the witnesses of the deed died, for then they do not come to disqualify the witnesses but only the deed. However, when the witnesses are alive and two witnesses came to disqualify them and say that they are wicked and they are disqualified from testimony, the deed is automatically disqualified entirely and we tear it. For the witnesses signed on the deed are no better than if they were standing before us, where they would have been able to say they are disqualified; for two witnesses who testify on any matter, even regarding a hundred people, are believed, as the Torah believed two witnesses. Therefore, even though their handwriting is established from another place, we tear the deed. And there are those who disagree on this and hold that once they are signed on the deed, it is as if their testimony was examined in beit din, and those who come to disqualify them are not entirely believed, and it becomes a case of "two against two." But the primary view is like the first opinion [Shach]. And even if the witnesses died, as I wrote in the previous section, if two disqualify them because of their wickedness, they are no better than if they were alive before us, and the deed is automatically disqualified. And thus the Acharonim agreed. And all this is specifically regarding a disqualification of wickedness, but regarding a disqualification of kinship or minority, this is not applicable, for in this the disqualification is not upon the witnesses but upon the deed, and it is a case of "two against two" when the handwriting is established from another place, as has been explained. And regarding a receipt, in any place where it is "two against two," the receipt is valid, for we establish the money in the possession of its owner, and it appears that even seizing the property does not avail.

And the witnesses of the document themselves who came and said, "This is our handwriting, but we were coerced due to a threat to our lives," or "We were minors," or "We were disqualified from testimony due to kinship and we have since become distant," such as if they were relatives through their wives and the wives died, or if they say that in our presence he delivered a moda'ah regarding the document, or if they say that it was conditional and we did not see that the condition was fulfilled—and they say all these things within the time of a continuous utterance of "This is our handwriting," and the handwriting is not produced from another source, meaning there is no other validation for the document, behold they are believed, for "the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted." And in all the things they say, they are not saying that they performed a prohibited act, for if they were coerced due to a threat to their lives, behold they were forced to sign; and minors are not subject to transgression; and those disqualified due to kinship, even though they performed a prohibition according to their words and "a person does not make himself wicked," nevertheless it can be said that they relied upon that which is revealed to all, that they are relatives, and he would not collect from the purchasers with this document and no stumbling block would result from this [Taz]. And regarding a moda'ah, on the contrary, they are performing a mitzvah if it is true that he delivered a moda'ah and they signed themselves intentionally in order to remove from him the coercion that coerced him and they would testify that he was coerced. And regarding a condition, certainly they did not perform a prohibition in this. And regarding a condition, even if one witness says "I did not know there was a condition" and one says "there was a condition and it was not fulfilled," he is believed, for behold there is only one witness on the document who says there was no condition, and the defendant swears a shevuat hesset and is exempt, and he is not obligated in a shevuat de'oraita to contradict the witness who says there was no condition because he has the second witness who says there was a condition against the witness who says there was no condition, and he is a supporting witness and exempts him from a shevuat de'oraita, and he shall swear only a hesset regarding the claim of the plaintiff as if there is no witness here at all. And there is no difference in this whether the second witness says "I did not know there was a condition in it" or if he says "I knew there was no condition in it," for their law is like witnesses who contradict one another and there is no testimony here.

That which was explained, that when witnesses say there was a condition and we do not know if the condition was fulfilled they are believed to invalidate the document, this is specifically regarding a condition of "arise and act," for then it is incumbent upon the holder of the document to bring proof that the condition was fulfilled. However, if the condition is "sit and do not act," the document remains in its status of legal presumption until the opposing party brings proof that he did the opposite of the "sit and do not act" that was in the condition [Shach]. And this is specifically regarding a condition for the future, but regarding a condition for the past, the holder of the document must always clarify that the condition was fulfilled, even when it is "sit and do not act" [Netivot HaMishpat]. And the reason is that it is well and good when the condition was for the future, that he should not do such and such, we establish it on its legal presumption that presumably he did not do it; but when the condition was on the terms that he had not done such and such, there was a doubt at the time of the act that perhaps he had done it and the document was void, and perforce he must bring proof to remove the doubt. And if it is written in the document, "and we witnesses testify that there was no reservation in this document," they are not believed to say there was a condition in our words, for it is like they are retracting and testifying. However, if they say that this which is written, that there is no reservation here, its meaning is that in the essence of the matter there is no reservation, such as in the sale and the like, but it was not stated to negate conditions, they are believed even when their handwriting is produced from elsewhere [Shach], unless it is written explicitly that it was done without a condition, for then they are not believed. And it is a great principle that the witnesses can explain the words of the document in any matter where the language of the document does not completely contradict their words, and even with a forced explanation they are able to reconcile the language of the document, and even when their handwriting is produced from elsewhere.

And if the witnesses said that they were coerced by means of money, or that it is a deed of trust, or that they were disqualified due to transgression, they are not believed, for a man does not make himself out to be wicked. And a deed of trust is also forbidden to sign, for even though it is a daily occurrence that they perform a kinyan and he trusts him regarding the money, nevertheless it is forbidden to sign a deed unless they see the giving of the money or the borrower admitted before them that he received the money. And even though we establish that we write a deed for a borrower even if the lender is not with him, that is specifically to hand it over to the borrower and not to the lender [Tosafot Ketubot 19a]. And it is not necessary to state that if he did not transfer by kinyan at all that his properties should be liened from today when he gives him the money at a later time, that they are completely wicked even if the lender gives him the money after this time, because the lender will seize from the purchasers from the date of the deed. Rather, even if he liened his properties from now for when he borrows from him at a later time, and it turns out that if he gave him the money at a later time it is a valid deed, nevertheless they should not have signed themselves even with the will of the borrower to hand over the deed into the hand of the lender and to trust him that he will give the borrower the money afterward, because the lender himself is forbidden to keep such a deed with him, and it is a negative commandment from the words of tradition: "Let not injustice dwell in your tents." And since the lender is performing a prohibition, the witnesses should not have attended to such a deed unless they say that at the time they signed they did not know it was a deed of trust and afterward it became known to them, for then they are believed when their handwriting is not produced from elsewhere. And if the borrower liened his properties whether he gives him money or whether he does not give him, it is obvious that it is a completely valid deed and this is not trust [I learned this from Rashi and the Ran ibid.]. And this which we said, that if they say that at the time of the act they did not know that it was trust and afterward they became aware of this they are believed, truly it is a difficult matter how they became aware afterward; for if the borrower told them, it is obvious that he is not believed, and even if the lender told them afterward, he can say "I said so in order not to appear wealthy." However, it could be that the lender swore in their presence that he did not give money, or that he came afterward with the borrower and designated them as witnesses that he had not yet received the money [Yam Shel Shelomo Ketubot chapter 2, siman 13]. And in any place where the witnesses are not believed, even if they said they did teshuvah, they are not believed to make themselves out to be wicked even regarding the prior time. However, even though they are not believed regarding the lender, they are believed regarding the borrower if according to their words they obligated him falsely, such as in "coerced by means of money," and all the more so in "trust" if they say that they handed over the deed to the lender without the knowledge of the borrower. But in "trust" when it was handed over with the knowledge of the borrower, they are not obligated to pay. And so too if they say they were disqualified due to transgression but the loan is true, certainly payment is not relevant in this [so it appears to me].

And all this is when their handwriting does not emerge from another place, but when their handwriting emerges from another place or there are witnesses that this is their handwriting, they are not believed regarding anything to nullify the document. Even when they say "we were coerced under threat of life," only regarding a moda'ah are their words believed, for they are performing a mitzvah to save the oppressed from the hand of his oppressor. And there are those who say that even regarding a moda'ah they are not believed, for it is not within their power to nullify a document. And there is one who says that even regarding a condition they are believed, for specifically in oral testimony they cannot add to their testimony, but in a document they are believed when they do not contradict the essence of the document, such as "our words were subject to a condition," for they do not nullify the document but rather add a side matter [Sma]. And the main view is like the first opinion [Shach], and so it appears primary, for why did they not write the condition in the document? Therefore, if they say that after the writing of the document the condition was newly established between them, they are believed [Urim VeTumim]. But other witnesses who say there was a condition in the document or that it is a document of trust are believed in any case. And regarding a moda'ah they are believed even when the witnesses of the document do not know of the moda'ah, for how would they know of the moda'ah that he delivered before these others? But regarding a condition they are not believed at all unless they say that the condition was newly established after the writing of the document, for in this they do not contradict the witnesses of the signature. But when they say it was at the time of the writing of the document, we judge this as if they contradict the witnesses of the document, since they did not write the condition in the document as has been stated [Netivot HaMishpat]. And their law is like "two against two," and we have already explained the law of "two against two," that we do not tear the document and we do not collect with it, and if he seized [property], we do not remove it from him. And know that when they say that the document is paid, they are believed, even the witnesses of the document themselves and even when their handwriting emerges from another place, for payment is an entirely different matter and does not impair the document at all, for every document is destined to be paid.

Witnesses signed on a document who said that the borrower was a minor at the time of the loan are not believed, even if their handwriting does not emerge from another place, for they make themselves out to be wicked, as they should not have signed on the document of a minor without a beit din or an apotropos, unless it was clarified from the date of the document that he was a minor then, and the document is automatically invalidated. And even though they are not believed, nevertheless they must pay the borrower for the loss he incurred according to their words, for they are believed regarding themselves, as has been written.

There is one who says that regarding that which we establish that witnesses signed on a document are considered as if their testimony was investigated in beit din and they cannot retract, this is specifically in a document where two witnesses are signed; however, a single witness signed on a document can retract, and specifically before the document has come to beit din, for the status of a document is not yet upon it when only one witness is signed on it. But once it has come to beit din and been verified, he can no longer retract, for it is as if he testified with his mouth [Netivot HaMishpat].