Siman 43

One writes the date of the loan in a document so that we may know from which purchasers he may seize, for he cannot seize from purchasers who bought prior to the time of his loan. If he did not write a date in it, it is valid to collect with it from the borrower himself, but he cannot seize from the purchasers, as they can say: our acquisition was prior to your loan. Similarly, if there are two documents against the borrower and he only has land sufficient to pay one of them, then we authorize collection for the one who has a date in his document, for he can say: my loan was prior to the loan of the second whose document has no date [Sma], and as will be explained in siman 104 that the earlier creditor precedes in collection. And even though he does not collect from purchasers for the reason we stated, nevertheless, if someone bought land from the borrower after witnesses saw the document written and signed, he may seize from them; for in truth, from the time of writing, the witnesses of delivery spread the report, and certainly the purchasers heard and caused their own loss by what they took from the borrower. However, as long as witnesses did not testify that they saw the document in the hand of the lender, the purchasers can say: our acquisition was prior to your loan; but when witnesses saw it, and they then cannot say this, one collects from them [ibid.]. A receipt that has no date is valid, for in any event the lender received money from him, and regarding whatever time of the document that was written, he can say that he received his receipt for this document. And in siman 54 it will be explained that if the witnesses do not know the date of a document, they write the receipt initially without a date.

If the scribe omitted and did not write "from the creation of the world," and even if he did not write the thousands, such that he did not write "five thousand," it is kosher, and we do not fear that it refers to another count, for presumably he did not deviate from the custom of the world to write according to the creation of the world. This is like the custom among us in documents, even in kinyanim, where we write only the hundreds, tens, and ones, and we do not write the thousands nor "from the creation of the world." And even if he also omitted the hundreds and wrote only the minor count, it is kosher; for example, in this year [5]637, where he wrote only 37, or even only 7, it is kosher, for since everyone writes according to the creation, it is understood on its own that he adopted the minor count. But if he wrote the thousands, ones, and tens, and skipped the hundreds, or if he wrote the hundreds and ones and skipped the tens, it is pasul, for it is not the way to skip in the middle, and it appears as if he intended another count and not the creation of the world. The Shach declares it kosher in the case of skipping the hundreds; see there. So too, if he wrote "thousands" and omitted "five," it is kosher, for its deficiency is evident from within it, as one cannot say his intention was for two thousand and he intended another count, for if so, he should have written "alpayim" with two yods. Similarly, if he skipped in the day of the week, for example, if he wrote "on the fourth, the twentieth day of the month of Shevat" and did not write "on the fourth day of the week," it is kosher, for its deficiency is evident from within it. And this is a simple matter, for one does not need to write the days of the week at all, except that the day of the week sometimes saves it from being pasul. For example, if it is written in a shtar "on the twentieth day of the month," and it is known that the shtar was written on the 21st of the month, it would be a postdated document and pasul; but when the day of the week is written, for example, if it is written "on the fourth day of the week, on the twentieth day," and it is known that the fourth day of the week was the 21st day, the shtar is kosher, for it is explicitly evident that he erred in the day of the month. Therefore, if such an error occurred, and even if they omitted the word "beshabbat," it is kosher [Netivot HaMishpat], for this is evident from within it, that "the fourth" refers to the day of the week, as it has no other interpretation, and it is as if "beshabbat" was written, and it renders the shtar kosher. And this is specifically when the error was by one day of the days of the month, but if the error was by two days—for example, if the fourth day was the 22nd of the month—there is a dispute regarding this, as some declare it kosher and we say that he erred by two days, and some declare it pasul, for it is not common to err by two days. As has been explained in the laws of testimony, it is common to err regarding one intercalation but not regarding two intercalations. And should we suggest that the error was in the days of the week, that he thought Monday was Wednesday, it is not common to err in the days of the week. According to this view, even if it is clearly known that it was written on the 22nd of the month, it is pasul, for it is a postdated document; and the law requires further study. All this applies when we require a date in a shtar that is signed by witnesses. However, a shtar in his own handwriting alone, with which one does not collect from purchasers, does not need to have a date written in it, for to collect from the borrower himself, why do we need a date? Only if there are other shtarot against the borrower, and it will be explained in siman 104 that an earlier oral loan takes precedence to collect from the debtor's land over a later oral loan. According to one view there, it even takes precedence over a later shtar loan. Regarding this, this shtar has no status of precedence since it has no date, except from the day it became known via witnesses who saw the shtar in his hand. According to the view of the Shach, even if a date was written in the borrower's handwriting, it is nothing regarding collecting earlier against an oral loan that is later than the date, for we fear a conspiracy—that he predated the time intentionally so that he would be earlier to collect his land. As long as it was not known and the handwriting was not established, it has no status of precedence. The later authorities disagree with him, for we do not fear a conspiracy, for why should he lie? Behold, it is in his power to revoke his lien through sale or gift, since oral loans are not collected from encumbered properties.

Antedated promissory notes are invalid, for he would seize property from purchasers unlawfully with them; therefore, the sages penalized him, and he may not collect with an antedated note from purchasers at all, even what they purchased after the loan. He only collects from unencumbered property, as a decree lest he seize property with it from the earlier time that he antedated. Even if the beit din takes the note into their possession and does not allow him to seize from the earlier time, or if they write upon the note that he may not seize with it except from such-and-such a time, even so, he does not collect from purchasers due to the penalty [Sma]. But in any case, they must rectify the flaw, either by tearing the note and writing another note from the time of the loan, or by writing upon the note that it is only eligible to collect from unencumbered property. If he sued him in beit din and has a verdict, he collects from purchasers from the time of the verdict [Shach]. And although he does not collect from purchasers, nevertheless, it has the full status of a note regarding the fact that the borrower is not believed to say "I paid," just as with other notes. If he claimed "these things never happened," he is established as a liar. Some say that this note is completely invalid regarding the claim of "I paid," but to say "these things never happened," he is not believed, for in any case he lent to him [Sma and Netivot HaMishpat], and the borrower is obligated to pay.

And one must ask, how is the document valid even to collect with it from free assets? For the witnesses are disqualified, as they signed a predated document. And the truth is indeed so, that if it became known that the witnesses signed with the intention to predate it, they are disqualified witnesses and the document is completely void. However, that which we said—that it is not void except to collect with it from purchasers—is when the witnesses did not predate the time with intention, such as when they wrote to borrow in Nisan but he did not borrow until Tishrei, and in a document that does not contain a kinyan. And even though ab initio it is forbidden for the witnesses to do so, as written in siman 39, nevertheless if they did so, they do not become disqualified through this. And likewise, if the witnesses say that they erred in this, if it is an error that people are prone to err in, they are believed even though their handwriting is authenticated from elsewhere. And likewise, if they say that they did not pay attention to this at all, that the document is predated, because they only signed on the body of the document and not on the time, they are believed, and even if their handwriting is authenticated from elsewhere [Shach]. And even if they say they erred in a matter that is not so common to err in, some say that they are also believed, even if their handwriting is authenticated from elsewhere, for we have a general rule that there is no power to disqualify witnesses except in a clear matter. And for this, a beit din of experts is required, to deliberate on the judgment, and according to their understanding so shall they do.

And all this is when it was clarified that the document is antedated by other witnesses; but if it was not clarified except that the witnesses of the document come and say that it is antedated, if they say they did it intentionally to antedate it, they are certainly not believed to make themselves out to be wicked, even if their handwriting does not emerge from another place. And even if they say it was done in error, if the matter is not common to err in at all regarding what they are saying according to the understanding of the dayanim, they are also not believed even when their handwriting does not emerge from another place. But in an error that is possible to err in, though it is not so common that they would err in this, such as if they say they did not pay attention and only signed on the body of the document and not on the date, if their handwriting does not emerge from another place, they are believed. And if their handwriting emerges from another place, there is a dispute among the poskim regarding this, for according to the opinion of the Tur they are believed, and according to the opinion of the Ramban they are not believed. And if the error is very common according to the sight of the eyes of the dayanim, they are believed according to everyone even when their handwriting emerges from another place [Shach, subsections 16 and 19].

A case came before the Rashba, of blessed memory, regarding a deed of gift that should have been written in the year 5058 of the sixth millennium, but was written in the year 5057. Even though it was evident from within it that it was an error—as it was written therein, "and give to so-and-so my son-in-law," and in the year 5057 he was not yet his son-in-law, and if so, it is evident that it was written in the year 5058 and he should not collect from purchasers who bought prior to the year 5058—and even though a man great in Torah and piety was signed on the deed, nevertheless, the Rashba disqualified the deed. For this is not called "evident from within it" like the error in the days of the month that we wrote in section 1 where it is valid, because not everyone knows that he was not his son-in-law at that time. Also, the great man who is signed on it does not make this "evident from within it" [Sma]. However, in this case the Rashba permitted that the witnesses write for him another deed of gift from the year 5058 if their handwriting is not authenticated from elsewhere. But if their handwriting is authenticated from elsewhere and they are no longer believed, then other witnesses who saw the gift shall write it, for witnesses do not need to be designated as has been written in siman 39; or they shall testify before a beit din and the beit din will write the deed of gift for him. And specifically without a guarantee of indemnity, but they do not write a guarantee if there was no kinyan, for the purchasers do not know of the second deed and the first deed is disqualified, and he would collect from the purchasers unlawfully [Shach]. But if he wishes to write the time of the deed from now, from the day it came before the beit din, those witnesses of the deed can write another deed even with a guarantee, for from now the report will spread and the purchasers must be careful [ibid.]. And regarding what we wrote, that if their handwriting is authenticated from elsewhere they cannot write another deed, the Shach, of blessed memory, disagrees with this and explains that regarding the writing of the deed there is no difference between these witnesses and others. Rather, this is the explanation: Certainly if it was clarified that there was no kinyan in the year 5057—for if there were a kinyan the deed would be valid even if it were written in the year 5058, because an ordinary kinyan is intended for writing as has been written in siman 39—then certainly even those same witnesses can write another deed from the year 5058, since they have not yet fulfilled their mission as they disqualified the deed, and they can write another deed. However, if the matter was not clarified that there was no kinyan in the year 5057, and therefore by default the deed is valid because we assume there was a kinyan in the year 5057 and the recipient of the gift is believed regarding this; therefore, if the witnesses of the deed themselves testify so, that there was no kinyan in the year 5057, then if their handwriting is not authenticated from elsewhere they are believed to disqualify the deed and to say that the kinyan was not in the year 5057 but only in the year 5058, and to contradict the recipient of the gift who says there was a kinyan in the year 5057, and they can write another deed from the year 5058. But when their handwriting is authenticated from elsewhere, they are not believed to disqualify the deed when the recipient says there was a kinyan in the year 5057. Therefore, if the recipient of the gift admits that it was an error and that there was no kinyan in the year 5057, he is believed by way of a migu that he could have said there was a kinyan in the year 5057. Therefore, he is believed for this matter, that they can write another deed from the year 5058, and even those same witnesses themselves can write another deed from the year 5058 [and see Urim VeTumim and Netivot HaMishpat].

A predated document is invalid, whether it was written for a day prior to the writing of the document or whether it was written on its day but the witnesses signed after several days. Therefore, if it was written at the end of the document before the signature of the witnesses and before the final line [Netivot HaMishpat] "this document was written on such-and-such day and was not signed until such-and-such day," it is valid, for there is no concern that perhaps the creditor will erase it, as the erasure would be recognizable and there would also be a large space between the document and the signature of the witnesses, which is invalid as I wrote in siman 45 [Sma].

We have already explained that if there was a kinyan in the presence of witnesses, they may write the shetar after some time dated to the time of the kinyan. However, if there was no kinyan, even if the loan took place in the presence of witnesses previously, if the borrower said to them after some time, "Write and sign the shetar and give it into the hand of the lender," they do not write in the shetar the day he lent to him, but rather the day it was delivered. For a shetar does not effect acquisition and he is not liened except either from the time the shetar comes into the hand of the lender or from the time of kinyan [and see the Taz that even according to the poskim who rule like Abaye that "his witnesses through their signatures acquire for him," in practice they were concerned to be stringent].

Postdated promissory notes are valid, for the power of the creditor has been weakened since he cannot seize property except from the time of the note, and even from the borrower himself he does not collect before the time of the note arrives [Beit Yosef]. And even though they did not write in it that it is postdated, it is valid; and even though they postdated it without the knowledge of the creditor, it is valid, for how can we disqualify his note because of a harm that reached him [Shach]? And it appears to me that if the creditor does not wish to cancel the loan, nevertheless, from the borrower himself he can collect from the time of the loan if they wrote the postdated note without his knowledge. And that which we explained, that he does not collect even from the borrower himself before the time of the note, that is when they wrote it with his knowledge, for it is as if the lien is only until the time of the note.

This fact that we have validated a post-dated document is specifically when the borrower subordinated to him properties that he possesses and that he will acquire after the loan, as they write "that I have acquired and that I am destined to acquire." However, if he subordinated to him the properties that he possesses but did not subordinate to him the properties that he will acquire, a post-dated document is invalid unless it is explicit in the document that it is post-dated, such that they wrote "this document we have post-dated." And the reason is simple: for if he did not subordinate to him properties that he will acquire, he would be able to seize from purchasers unlawfully. For example, if he borrowed from him in Nisan and acquired land in Iyar, and the witnesses post-dated the time of the document and wrote Sivan, and afterwards he sold the land—it would turn out that had they written the time from Nisan, he would not have seized from the purchaser who bought from the borrower the land that he acquired in Iyar, since he did not write for him "that I will acquire." And because of the post-dating, he will collect this land, and the purchasers would not know to claim that perhaps it is post-dated, as it would not enter their minds. Therefore, when it is clarified in the document that it is post-dated, it is valid, for the purchasers will see in the document and will become informed from this when the loan occurred. And even if they do not become informed, the lender will not be able to extract from him, for he will claim that the borrower acquired this field after his loan, and the burden of proof is on the one who seeks to extract from his fellow. And one should not make a post-dated document ab initio, for it appears like a falsehood; and all the more so without the knowledge of the lender, there is a prohibition also to cause the lender a loss, such that he will not be able to seize from purchasers who bought before the time.

This fact that postdated promissory notes are valid applies specifically to loan documents, but postdated bills of sale and gift documents are invalid even if postdated, unless it is explicitly stated in the document that it is postdated. The reason is lest after the first sale, the buyer returned and sold it back to the seller, and this person will produce his postdated document and say that after the seller's purchase from him, he returned and bought it from the seller a second time. And the seller, when he purchases from him, will not be concerned to receive his document back, for it would not enter his mind that harm would come to him from this. Therefore, if it was written in the document that it is postdated, there is no concern in this, as I wrote in the previous section. Therefore, if the witnesses informed the seller that it is postdated, it is valid, because then when he desires to purchase it from him, he will be careful to receive his document back [Shach]. And we have already written that one should not postdate any document ab initio unless there is a necessity for this, as will be explained.

A document whose date is written as being on Shabbat or on the tenth of Tishrei, where it is a known matter that on that day one does not write, and there is a doubt whether it was written before Shabbat or Yom Kippur and they delayed the date—and it is a postdated document and valid—or whether it was written afterward with a predated time and is invalid, we do not remove the document from its presumption of validity, and the document is valid. And there is one who says that if the borrower says, "Swear to me that the witnesses did not predate it intentionally and that it is postdated," he is obligated to swear. However, if the borrower does not demand an oath, the beit din does not claim on his behalf. And specifically with a verified document do we establish it upon its presumption, and when he says "Swear to me," he swears and collects. But if it is not verified, it is upon the holder of the document to bring proof, and we say to him, "Verify your document"; and even though the borrower does not claim it, we claim it for him.

Any document that comes before us, we assume that it was delivered at the time written in it, except where it has been weakened, such as if it fell; for since a weakness has been born in it, he cannot collect with it until he brings proof that it came into his hand from the time written in it, if it does not contain a kinyan, for with a kinyan we do not care when it came into his hand, as has been written several times. And likewise, he must bring proof that he did not pay him, and in a place where there is no concern for payment, it is sufficient that he brings proof that it came into his hand from the time written in it [Shach and Taz]. And see what I wrote in section 8 in the name of the Taz.

If the document was written at night and signed on the following day, it is valid, for the day follows the night. But if it was written during the day and signed at night, it is invalid, because from the night a different day begins, and it is a predated document. In what case does this apply? When they are not occupied with that same matter; but if they are occupied with that same matter, it is valid. And even when they are not occupied with that same matter, it is specifically when he did not perform a kinyan sudar; but if he performed a kinyan sudar, even if they did not sign until a long time later, it is valid, and even if they did not sign at all, for a kinyan has a voice and one may seize even from encumbered properties [Shach]. And similarly, an act of beit din is valid even if written during the day and signed at night, for from the time of the final verdict the property is encumbered, and it is not called predated [Sma]. And regarding a ketubah, there is a dispute among the poskim whether it is like an act of beit din and a predated one is valid, or not [Shach]. And if the groom performed a kinyan sudar, it is obvious that it is valid even if they did not sign, as with other documents. And since the kinyan validates the document even when it is written and signed afterwards, therefore, witnesses who saw the kinyan and delayed writing it until a later time, if they remember the time of the kinyan, they shall write the date from that day, and if not, they shall write from the day of the writing. And similarly, regarding being occupied with that same matter, where it is valid if written during the day and signed at night, the same applies even if it was not signed at night, but rather he performed a kinyan at night, and during the day they were occupied with that same matter regarding the encumbrance and the loan and what pertains to this matter, the obligation takes effect from the previous day. However, some say that this which we say, that being occupied with that same matter is valid, is specifically regarding a loan, for then the debt of the money is encumbered from the day of the loan even though the document was signed or the kinyan was later, since they were occupied with this from the loan until the document or until the kinyan. But in a document of obligation or a kinyan of obligation where one obligates himself in a monetary obligation or another obligation, as I wrote in siman 40 that a person can obligate himself even if he received nothing from the one to whom he is obligated, being occupied with that same matter is not considered to create an obligation from that time if the document or the kinyan was later, for with what would he be obligated beforehand? And even though there is a voice, nevertheless, in mere words without receipt of money and without a document and without a kinyan, he is not encumbered [and the Shach and the Taz wrote that the Rambam disagrees with this and holds that in this case as well he is encumbered from the time they were occupied with that same matter even though the document or the kinyan was later].

Since we said in the previous section that witnesses who saw the kinyan, if they remember the time of the kinyan, they shall write for that day, and if not, they shall write from the day of the writing; therefore, when they write the day on which they acquired, they link the kinyan to that day and write: "we acquired from so-and-so on such-and-such a day, and we wrote and delivered into the hand of so-and-so." And when they write the day on which they are standing, they link the writing to that day and write: "we acquired from so-and-so, and we wrote and signed on such-and-such a day and delivered to so-and-so." And if not, it appears like a lie, and one must be careful in this. However, the shetar is not disqualified by this if they did not write so, but rather wrote that they acquired on such-and-such a day of the day of the writing, if they write the time of the writing. And likewise if they write the day of the kinyan and write that the time of the writing was also on that day, since it has no practical halachic consequence, but only that it should not appear like a lie, therefore it is not disqualified ex post facto [Sma], and see in the Taz.

If the witnesses do not remember the day of the kinyan, but only know this—that it was in the month of Tishrei and not afterwards—they should not say that since it is clear to us that it was not after Tishrei, we shall write from Rosh Chodesh Cheshvan. They should not do so ab initio, and even if they write that they postdated it or if "de'iknei" is written in it, such that there is no concern in this, nevertheless, it appears like a lie. They should not write anything except the day of the kinyan or the day of the writing, as has been explained. However, if they remember that the kinyan was in the first third of the month, or in the last third, or in the middle third, and they do not remember the specific day, they may write "in the first third of such-and-such month." And there is no concern that he might collect with it from the beginning of that third, for "the one who extracts from his fellow bears the burden of proof" [Sma].

Those to whom testimony was delivered in one city, and the kinyan was there, and afterwards at the time of the writing of the shetar they were in another city, they do not mention in the shetar the place where the kinyan was, but rather the place where they write and sign the shetar. This is specifically when they do not write the time of the kinyan and they write the time of the writing, such as when they do not remember the time of the kinyan. However, if they remember the time of the kinyan and they write it, then they shall write the place where the kinyan was performed, for if they write the place of the writing, they are found to be lying, and there is a concern of invalidation [see in the Shach]. And when they write the place of the writing, they write: "So-and-so said to us and we wrote in such-and-such place." But when they write the place where the matters were delivered, they write: "So-and-so said to us" or "we performed a kinyan from so-and-so in such-and-such place, and we wrote and signed and delivered to so-and-so." And many great authorities hold that when they write the place of the kinyan, they write both places, and they write: "We performed a kinyan from so-and-so in such-and-such place, and we wrote and signed in such-and-such place and delivered to so-and-so." And so it is proper to do.

That which we say, that they write the place of the writing even though they performed the kinyan in another place, is specifically when the currency does not change from the place of the kinyan to the place of the writing, or even if it changes, provided that it is written in the shetar the currency that is circulated in such-and-such a place. But if he did not write in the shetar the currency of such-and-such a place and the currency changes, they shall only write the name of the place where the matters were delivered there and the currency of that place became obligated. And even though they do not know today [the date] on which the matters were delivered, nevertheless they shall write from today, for certainly the kinyan occurred, because it is impossible to do in any other manner.

A document in which the place it was written is not recorded is a valid document, and this is not a hindrance. And even though, according to this, this is not testimony that can be refuted through alibi (hazama), as the investigation of "which place" is missing, we have already explained in siman 30 that in monetary laws this is not a hindrance. And he shall pay the currency according to the place where the document was produced, as I have written. And if it becomes clear in which place the loan occurred, he must pay according to the currency of that place.

Reuven and Shimon each have a promissory note against Levi; in Reuven's it was written on the twenty-eighth of Nisan, and in Shimon's it is written "Nisan" without specification. Nevertheless, if Levi has only one field according to the value of the debt of one of them, we give it to Reuven, for we say perhaps Shimon's was on the twenty-ninth of Nisan. And nevertheless, Shimon cannot seize from purchasers who bought from Levi from Iyar and onward, for they will say to him: Your date was on the first of Nisan, and we left you room to collect your debt, and it is that same field that Reuven took, for you are prior to him. Therefore, if Reuven and Shimon write a power of attorney to one another, they may collect from purchasers who bought from Iyar and onward in any case, either because of the debt of Reuven or because of the debt of Shimon.

Two documents that were produced in a leap year, one in which "Adar" is written without specification and one in which "Adar Sheni" is written, and the debtor does not have assets corresponding to both of them, we give to the one in which "Adar" is written without specification, for "Adar" without specification is Adar Rishon. And if in both of them "Adar" was written without specification, it is as if Adar Rishon was written in both of them, and we give to the one whose time is earlier in the count of the days of the month. And likewise, if in one "Adar" is written without specification and in the second "Adar Rishon," it is as if Adar Rishon was written in both of them [Sma], for "Adar" without specification is Adar Rishon. But according to the Rambam, "Adar" without specification is Adar Sheni, as is explained in Yoreh Deah [siman 220, and see in the Shach and in the Urim VeTumim].

If it is written in a document "until Pesah" or "until the harvest," the law is as in the case of vows, meaning until the beginning of Pesah and until the beginning of the harvest. Plain "harvest" refers to the wheat harvest, but in a province where the majority of the harvest is barley, the intent is for barley; every province follows the majority of the species sown there. If it is written in the document "until Pesah shall be," the interpretation is until Pesah concludes. If it is written "until the face of Pesah," there is a dispute whether the interpretation is until the beginning or until the end. However, regarding the harvest, even if it was written "until the harvest shall be," it is only until the beginning of the harvest; for any matter whose time is not fixed and known, even if he said "until it shall be," the interpretation is only until its beginning. Since there is no known duration, he presumably would not enter into a doubt regarding an unknown matter, and the intent is until the beginning.

If it is written in a document "until after Pesach," the explanation is until the majority of the days between Pesach and Shavuot have passed, for the intention is for half of the time between Pesach and Shavuot. However, because in the diaspora there is an even number between Pesach and Shavuot, forty-two days, and we could say half, which is twenty-one days, but in Eretz Yisrael it is an odd number, forty-three days, and it is impossible to divide the day into halves, and the hand of the document holder is at a disadvantage, and he must perforce wait for a majority of days, which is twenty-two days after Pesach. And similarly, if it is written in a document "until after Sukkot," he has a time of three months [Sma]. And the Shach disagrees with all of this and holds that whenever one says "until after such-and-such festival," it is only fifteen days after the festival. And it appears to me that according to the language of our country, everyone holds like the Shach, for it is known that anyone who says or writes in our country "until after such-and-such time," his intention is not to distance it so much, and therefore one should rule according to his words. And if he swore to pay at such-and-such time, certainly one must follow the stringency in all the details. Also regarding an unspecified Adar, when he swore, he must follow the stringency so that he does not violate his oath. And the same applies to a hand-clasp or if he accepted under a cherem to pay at such-and-such time or after such-and-such time, he must follow the stringency, for a doubt regarding a prohibition is resolved stringently.

We have already explained that in every matter of doubt, the holder of the document is at a disadvantage and the holder of the receipt is at an advantage, for the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from his fellow. Therefore, if Reuven has a document against Shimon, and Shimon produced a receipt signed by Reuven stating that he received a maneh from Shimon, even if there are no witnesses on the document, nor a date, nor a location, he deducts a maneh from his debt. This is unless it is proven from the language of the receipt that it was not written regarding this document, such as if the document was for one thousand zuz and the receipt is written: "From the debt of five hundred zuz that is owed to me from Shimon, I received on this such and such an amount," and it is clearly apparent that the receipt was not written regarding this document. However, as long as it is written in the receipt without specification, "From the debt owed to me from Shimon I received such and such," he deducts it from his document. Similarly, if in the document it is written "Nisan" without specification, and in the receipt it is written "the 18th of Nisan" and the like, the receipt cancels the document. And so too the reverse, if in the receipt the month is written without specification and in the document the day of the month is written. Similarly, a document of forgiveness of debt has the same law as a receipt, and the holder of the forgiveness is at an advantage, for the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from his fellow. Likewise, when the document and the receipt or the forgiveness are written on the same day, the holder of the receipt and the forgiveness is also at an advantage. Even though it is not the common practice to pay on the day one borrows, nevertheless, since he produces a receipt, we say that he paid him on that day, for we have a general rule: the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from his fellow. Similarly, when it is not known which was written first, the document or the receipt, the holder of the receipt is at an advantage. But when it is known that the receipt was written first, then the document remains in its full strength and he collects with it [Shach], for it is not the common practice to write a receipt before a document; and so too regarding a document of forgiveness.

Reuven produced a promissory note against Shimon whose date is the fifth of Nisan, and Shimon produced a deed of forgiveness that was written on the fifth of Nisan, and it is written therein that Reuven forgave Shimon for all claims that he had against him until the fifth of Nisan, Reuven collects his note; for in the common tongue "until" is "until and not including." Therefore, the intent is until the fifth of Nisan and not including the fifth of Nisan. However, if it is written in the receipt that he forgave him all claims "until this day" or "until now," it is a matter of doubt, and the burden of proof rests on the claimant. For when it is written "until the fifth of Nisan," it is clear in the common tongue that the fifth of Nisan is not included since he specified the day; but a general expression like "until this day" or "until now" is a legal doubt, and the burden of proof rests on the claimant [Shach, and his intent is as I have written, and the difficulty of the Urim VeTummim is not a question]. [And so it is in the language of the Torah, "until the one and twentieth day of the month at evening," which implies that if "at evening" were not written, it would imply "until and not including"].