Siman 37

Anyone who is interested in the matter about which he testifies, his testimony is disqualified. Reason necessitates this, for since he is interested in this, even a slight interest and even in a remote way, it is possible that he will not testify the clear truth. Therefore, the disqualification of an interested party is not like the other disqualifications that have been explained, for they are disqualified whether to acquit or to obligate, but an interested party is only disqualified to acquit. However, to obligate he may testify, for since he testifies to his own detriment, he is no longer an interested party [Sma]. Similarly, an interested party is not like all other disqualifications where we require their beginning and their end to be in fitness; an interested party is not so, for even if he removes himself from his interest at the time of the delivery of the testimony, they accept his testimony. And there are those who disagree on this and hold that even regarding an interested party we require his beginning and his end to be in fitness, as is written in siman 33, section 9. And one of the great later authorities wrote that the one in possession may say "I stand by this opinion" [Shach]. [In the responsa of Maharam of Rothenburg, siman 995, he wrote that it is a dispute of our teachers the Tosafot, and he agreed with those who disagree, see there. And in truth, Tosafot Bava Batra 43a s.v. "ve-lisalku" disagree on this with Tosafot Niddah 50a s.v. "ve-Rabbi Meir", see there]:

And it appears to me that the reason for those who disagree is that even though regarding judging, a removal of interest is effective, as written at the end of siman 7, nevertheless regarding testimony it is not effective. The reason is that the title of dayan only applies when he sits in judgment; therefore, when he removes himself from the interest prior to his sitting in judgment, he is no longer an interested party. However, the witness has the title of witness upon him at the time of the witnessing of the testimony; therefore, his removal of interest is not effective after the witnessing of the testimony unless he removes himself prior to the witnessing of the testimony. Therefore, it appears to me that according to this opinion, even regarding a dayan, if he sat in judgment and it became known that he is an interested party, his subsequent removal of interest is not effective for him to sit in this judgment afterward, since the title of dayan was already called upon him. Furthermore, it appears to me that specifically regarding a complete interested party we require, according to this opinion, his beginning and his end to be in fitness—for example, if he is a partner in this business and is disqualified because he is a litigant and is not a witness at all. But if he was slightly interested—for example, that from this he would be able to obtain a benefit, or that his relative was a partner in this business—he or his relative can remove themselves even after the witnessing of the testimony prior to the narration in beit din. For it is certain that even according to this opinion, the disqualification of interest is not like other disqualifications; rather, a complete interested party has the title of litigant upon him and not the title of witness [so it appears to me].

The matter of negiah depends on the judgment of the dayan and the depth of his understanding, that he should understand the essence of the case and know one thing that causes another, and he should delve deeply to see if he finds for this witness a side of benefit in this testimony, even in a distant and wondrous way, behold, he shall not testify in it, and likewise he shall not be a dayan in the matter. But if he is currently not a noge'ah in the matter, even though if he becomes wealthy he will benefit from this testimony, as will be explained in this siman, he is fit to testify, since he is currently not a noge'ah in the matter, and there is no concern that perhaps he will become wealthy, and also he does not entertain the thought that he would testify falsely because of this. And a servant who is in the house of the master of the house is fit to testify for the master of the house, and likewise his hired worker and his gleaner, for even if we consider him like his friend, behold, a friend and an enemy are fit for testimony. And nevertheless, it appears to me that if the dayan understands that he is afraid of the master of the house to speak against him contrary to his will, he should not accept his testimony.

Even though it is impossible to explain all the details of interests and benefits that can exist in all laws, nevertheless we will explain some details, and from these details the judge shall learn regarding all matters. For example, land that belonged to Reuven and Shimon who purchased it in partnership, and someone comes to contest this land and say that it was stolen by the one who sold it to them, or that he has a promissory note with a guarantee against the seller and the promissory note preceded the sale, and the contestant brought witnesses of the theft or witnesses of the document, and Reuven wants to disqualify the witnesses of the contestant and there is one other witness with him. Behold, it is obvious that regarding his own portion he is a litigant and is not believed, for he is not in the category of a witness. Rather, even regarding the portion of the partner he is also not believed, for if we believe him regarding the partner's portion and establish half the field in the hand of his partner, behold he will return and divide it with him since they are partners. This is unless they divided the field previously, and then his testimony is effective for the partner, and he will not have the ability to say afterward that "our division was in error" after his portion was taken, as will be explained similarly in siman 175. For since he himself says that they are false witnesses and only regarding his own portion is he not believed, he cannot say "our division was in error" and "his field was swept away." Furthermore, regarding a partner after division, some say that he does not return against him [Taz]. And as long as they have not divided, he is one who has an interest in the matter, and there is no remedy for his testimony to be fit unless he removes himself from it and they perform an acquisition from him with a kinyan sudar that he gives his portion as an absolute gift to the partner. And this is according to the first opinion in section 1, for according to the "there are those who disagree," his removal now does not help. And even according to the first opinion, there is also a concern that he has an interest even after his removal, for perhaps he has a creditor and has nothing with which to pay, and he wants it to remain in the hand of the partner so that the creditor will collect it for his debt and he will not be a "wicked borrower who does not pay." And it is preferable to him to commit a transgression in secret to testify falsely than for there to be a transgression in public that he does not pay. Therefore, he must accept upon himself a guarantee that if his creditor seizes it from the partner, he will be obligated to pay him. And if so, he will gain nothing, for he will remain wicked toward the partner when he does not pay him. And regarding the guarantee, he must stipulate explicitly that he only accepts a guarantee against seizure by a creditor and not against other claims, such as if they seize it with a claim of theft and the like, for if not so, it is obvious that he has an interest in the matter when this contestant seizes it, since he accepted a guarantee upon it. And according to the "there are those who disagree," removal is not effective, as has been explained.

And all this is when the challenger challenges the entire field, but if he only challenges the partner's portion, it is obvious that he can testify for him, such as where the challenger claims that the partner sold him his portion, and similarly other such claims. Since the matter does not affect him, and as for the concern that we should suspect him that it is better for him to be a partner with this one than to be a partner with the challenger, and that for this reason he would testify falsely—there is no reason to suspect any person of this, that for the sake of such a personal interest he would testify falsely.

An aris may not testify for the owner of the field when they contest the field in which he is an aris if there are fruits in it, because he is an interested party; for if it remains in the hand of the challenger, he will not take a portion as an aris, but rather as one who descends without permission, as will be explained in siman 375. However, if there are no fruits in it, he is fit to testify. And if it is because perhaps the challenger will not agree to give it to him in arisut, behold, he will find many fields in arisut, for arisut is common, and this is not an interested party unless he takes from him more than other arisim, for in that case he is certainly an interested party.

One who rents a house from his fellow, and a claimant comes regarding the house and brought witnesses that it was stolen by the lessor—if the lessee has not yet paid the rent, he may testify for the lessor, as he has no practical difference whether he pays the lessor or the claimant. But if he already paid the rent to the lessor, he may not testify for him, because it is his desire to establish it before the lessor, since if it remains in the hand of the claimant, he will need to pay rent again to the claimant, and he will need to sue the lessor for what he gave him, and a person does not find it comfortable to pay a second time to this one and sue from that one. And if the lessor took the rental fees and returned them to the lessee so that he may give them to whoever wins in judgment, behold, he may testify for him. And there is one who disagrees in this, because we fear perhaps because of the favor the lessor did for him by returning his money and so that he will not need to pay the claimant if he wins, he will tilt his testimony in favor of the lessor. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, himself brought this opinion as well in siman 140, see there. And even though a person is not disqualified from testimony because of a favor done for him, as he is only like a friend as I wrote in section 3 regarding a servant, nevertheless, when he did a favor for him in this very matter, he should be considered as having an interest in the matter. However, all this is when the lessee dwells in it now, or there are witnesses that he dwelt in it in the past, or even if there are no witnesses but the claimant claims with certainty that he dwelt in it and sues the rent from him, and consequently the lessee would require an oath to deny him, and any witness who is liable for an oath is not a witness. But if there are no witnesses and also the claimant does not claim with certainty that he dwelt in it and does not know except by the word of the lessee who said that he dwelt in it, he is fit for testimony even if he already paid the lessor, for behold, he is believed through a migo, for if he wanted, he could have said that he did not dwell in it, and it turns out that he has no interest in his testimony at all.

Reuven who was indebted to Shimon for money, and a challenge arose regarding Reuven's properties: if there do not remain unencumbered properties in Reuven's possession corresponding to Shimon's debt, Shimon may not testify for him, as he is a complete interested party so that he will have from where to collect his debt. However, if there still remain in Reuven's possession, corresponding to Shimon's debt, properties upon which there is no challenge, Shimon may testify for him, for he is not an interested party in the matter. And even if the unencumbered properties are ziborit and the properties upon which there is a challenge are beinonit, we do not suspect him that he would lie for the sake of the difference between beinonit and ziborit. And if Reuven has other debts, he may not testify for him unless there remain unencumbered properties against all the debts. But if it is not known that he has other debts, we do not fear that perhaps he has other debts that are not known to us, for if we fear such concerns, there is no end to the matter. And so is the law of the guarantor like the law of the creditor. And some say that a guarantor kablan may not testify for the debtor in any case, even when the debtor has other unencumbered properties corresponding to the debt. And the reason is that since with a kablan the creditor may collect from whomever he wishes, as written in siman 129, it is pleasing to the guarantor that many properties remain in the possession of the debtor so that the creditor will not seize the properties of the kablan, since he can collect with ease from the debtor. But if he will not have many properties, it will be the will of the creditor to seize the properties of the guarantor kablan, and afterwards the guarantor kablan will need to collect from the debtor, and a person does not find it pleasing to stand in legal proceedings, and he is considered an interested party in the matter.

Reuven sold a field to Shimon in Nisan and afterwards sold another field to Levi in Iyar, and a challenge arose regarding Levi's field that it is stolen property in the hand of the seller, or that a creditor of Reuven prior to the sale wants to collect it from the hand of Levi—Shimon cannot testify regarding Levi's field to establish it in his possession unless another field remains in the hand of Reuven the seller, or another field in the hand of Levi that he also purchased from Reuven, and that it be equivalent to the value of Shimon's field, so that if perhaps a challenge arises regarding Shimon's field, he will have from where to collect. For if not so, he is considered interested in the testimony, as his desire is that the field remain in Levi's hand so that he will have from where to collect if a challenge arises regarding his field. But when another field like it remains, he does not fear that perhaps he owes more, as has been written in the previous section. And likewise, if a challenge arose regarding Shimon's field that it was stolen property in the hand of Reuven, Levi does not testify regarding it to establish it in Shimon's hand unless there remains in Reuven's hand according to the value of his field, for if not so, the first one will seize from him, and you have no greater interested party than this.

Reuven who sold a field to Shimon without achrayut, and one came to contest the field claiming it is stolen property because Reuven purchased it from a robber—even though Reuven does not need to pay Shimon when they seize it from him since he did not accept achrayut upon himself, nevertheless Reuven cannot testify regarding it to establish it in the hand of Shimon. For we fear that Reuven wants to establish it before his own creditor from whom he borrowed with a document before he sold it to Shimon, and it is not his will to be a "wicked borrower who does not pay." But against Shimon he will not be wicked, since he sold it to him without achrayut. And even if there remained in the hand of Reuven another field according to the value of Shimon's field, nevertheless he may not testify for him, for perhaps he knows within himself that he has further debts upon him. And even though we have written that we do not need to concern ourselves with other debts, that is where others do not concern themselves with this, but he himself knows the truth that he is indebted to others as well. And all of this is specifically when the contestant comes to contest from the side of Reuven the seller, but if he comes to contest from the side of Shimon the buyer, such as if he says that Shimon is indebted to him, then the seller can establish it in his hand based on his testimony. For he has no practical difference whether it remains in the hand of the buyer or in the hand of the buyer's creditor, for if his will is to establish it before his creditor, his creditor can also collect from the buyer's creditor, as the creditor has no more power than the buyer himself.

And this law that has been explained is only regarding land and not regarding movable property. For example, Reuven who sold a cow or a garment to Shimon without responsibility, and Yehuda comes to protest to remove it from the hand of Shimon with the claim that it was purchased from a robber—Reuven may testify for him, for he cannot establish it before his creditor, as a creditor does not collect from movable property that the debtor sold, even when he made them an apoteiki, as written in siman 117. And even if he subordinated movable property to him along with land, he does not seize in this time from movable property that was sold due to the market enactment, as written in siman 60. And this is specifically when he claims that Reuven purchased it from a robber; but if he claims that Reuven himself robbed it from him, Reuven cannot testify regarding it if it is in a manner where the protester must give the buyer his money because of the market enactment, as written in siman 356, for in such a case Reuven is an interested party, for behold, the protester will return and claim from Reuven what he gave to Shimon. But when he claims that Reuven purchased it from a robber, Reuven is not an interested party, for behold, the protester will not return against Reuven, since he himself purchased it and gave money to the robber according to the words of the protester himself.

The victim of the robbery himself may not testify for the robber even regarding movable property; for example, if Reuven robbed a field or a garment from Shimon, and Yehuda came to contest Reuven's claim and say that this field or this garment is his, Shimon cannot testify that this field or this garment does not belong to Yehuda. And even though he has the ability to extract it from Yehuda with the same proofs that he would use to extract it from Reuven, nevertheless, we suspect him that his desire is to establish it in the hand of Reuven, for perhaps it is more comfortable for him to extract it from Reuven than to extract it from the hand of Yehuda because Yehuda is more violent than Reuven. Furthermore, it could be that from Yehuda he would not truly be able to extract it according to the law, such as if Yehuda also has witnesses that it is his, and it would be a case of "two and two" and we do not extract from the possessor [Sma].

And if the gazlan sold it to another man, in this there is a distinction between land and movable property. For regarding land, when he sold it or bequeathed it to Levi, and Yehuda comes to challenge Levi, Shimon may not testify that it does not belong to Yehuda, even if he despaired of it, for regarding land there is no despair and change of domain, as has been explained in siman 371. But regarding movable property, when he sold them to Levi and Shimon despaired of it, and Yehuda comes to challenge Levi, if Reuven the gazlan died, Shimon may testify that it does not belong to Yehuda, for they will never return to him since the purchaser has already acquired them through despair and change of domain, and the gazlan is dead and he has no one from whom to collect. However, when the gazlan is alive, he may not testify because it is better for him that it does not remain in the hand of Yehuda, so that he may bring proof that Reuven stole it from him and he shall pay him the value. For even though the purchaser acquired them through despair and change of domain, nevertheless the gazlan must pay the value of their worth. And likewise, even when the gazlan died but did not sell them and they remained in the hand of his heirs, Shimon also may not testify, because it is better for him that they remain in the hand of the heirs of the gazlan and they shall return to him, for the domain of an heir is not considered like the domain of a purchaser and is not called a change of domain. And likewise, if lands remained from the gazlan, then even if he sold them, he may not testify, for the heirs must pay from his property as has been explained in siman 361. And likewise in this time, when the Geonim enacted that a creditor collects even from the movable property of orphans, as has been explained in siman 107, even if only movable property remained from the gazlan, the victim of the theft may not testify unless nothing at all remained from him. For when something remains, the heirs are obligated to pay, and it turns out that he is interested in the testimony, for if it remains in the hand of the challenger, the matter is revealed that it did not belong to the victim of the theft, and why should the gazlan or his heirs pay him?

In all the matters that have been explained, he is only disqualified from testifying when he testifies that it does not belong to Yehuda the claimant, and therefore he is a nogea b'davar because he will subsequently remove it from the hand of Reuven. However, when he testifies that it belongs to Reuven, he is fit in every case to testify, for now he is not a nogea b'davar; since he himself admitted that it belongs to Reuven, he can no longer claim against him and say that it is his, and it turns out that he is not a nogea in the testimony. And behold, we have written some details regarding the law of a nogea, and from all these the judge will understand to learn one matter from another and to understand the definition of a nogea in testimony.

And that which we explained in section 3, that whenever he is currently not affected, even though if he becomes wealthy he will benefit from his testimony, we do not suspect him that he will lie—this is specifically when for the time being the testimony is for others. And even so, this law is far from reality, since we always suspect him that perhaps he is establishing it before his creditor. And when can this suspicion not exist? Nevertheless, in a distant reality it could be, such as Reuven who had two creditors, Shimon and Levi, to each of whom he owed a thousand zuz, and Reuven had only one field worth a thousand zuz and gave it of his own will to Shimon. And Levi came to seize it from Shimon with the claim that his debt preceded Shimon's debt; Reuven can testify regarding this as to which debt is earlier, for he has no practical difference in this, because either way he will remain a "wicked borrower" to one and will not pay. And although he is somewhat affected by his testimony—for if it remains in the hand of Shimon, then even if he becomes wealthy and has money, he will not be able to redeem it from Shimon since he gave him the field for his debt of his own will, but if Levi collects it, then when he becomes wealthy he will redeem it from Levi because "an appraisal returns" as written in siman 103—nevertheless, since his interest is for when he becomes wealthy, we do not suspect him that he will lie because of this [Urim VeTumim]. And even so, this is only when for the time being he is not a litigant regarding this field, such as when the field is already in the hand of Shimon. But when the field is still in his hand and the two creditors came and each one claims that he is earlier, it is obvious that Reuven is not in the category of testimony at all, even though he has no practical difference even when he becomes wealthy because they collect against his will and from both of them it would return when he has money; since now he is a litigant, and you have no one closer than the litigant himself, who is disqualified because of the decree of the Torah, whether for merit or for liability. This is not the case when he is not currently a litigant, where his disqualification is only from the side of being affected and not from the side of proximity, but rather that we suspect him that he will lie, as has been written [Netivot HaMishpat].

After the witnesses have testified, they are not believed afterward to say that they have a portion in this business or another matter in which they are interested and thereby disqualify their testimony; for once the witnesses have related their testimony, they no longer have the ability to say they are interested in the matter, unless they said so before they related their testimony, or even after the relating of their testimony but others testify about them and not they themselves.

The litigant cannot disqualify witnesses even if it appears that he is not an interested party in the matter, such as when there are two sets of witnesses, and even if these are disqualified, there is still another set; nevertheless, he is not believed to testify because perhaps the other set will be disqualified or they will not testify. Therefore, if their testimony was accepted in a valid manner, then it is within the power of the litigant to testify regarding the other set, for now he is not an interested party in the testimony at all [so it appears to me, and among the later authorities there are those who spoke of this, see there].

Reuven sued two people to whom he lent a maneh, and one denied it while the second admitted that he and his fellow are liable. If they took that money in partnership according to their words, he is not believed regarding his fellow, as he is an interested party in the testimony and desires that his fellow pay half the debt. Therefore, he alone becomes liable for the entire debt, for they become guarantors for one another as is written in siman 77. And even though wherever the borrower is not obligated to pay, the guarantor is also exempt, as is written at the end of siman 49 regarding two people named Yosef ben Shimon, that is specifically when the guarantor himself does not know if it is due from this one or that one [Ketzot HaChoshen, and so it is implied from Bekhorot 48], and similarly from the borrower it is also possible that the truth is hidden there. But when the guarantor knows that it is due from the borrower, but the borrower denies it, certainly the guarantor is liable. And so ruled our teacher, the Rema, in siman 129, section 8; see there. And if they became liable for the maneh each for himself for fifty, even when they are in one deed, since they wrote explicitly that each became liable for himself, his testimony is valid for his fellow, whether for merit or for liability. And we do not fear for "reciprocators"—that this one testifies to the merit of that one so that afterwards the second will testify to the merit of the one testifying now—for we do not have to fear for this. And even if they are partners in part of the debt and are not partners in the remainder, he can testify for him regarding the remainder. And similarly, two partners who are partners in several businesses, one can testify for his partner in a matter where the testimony does not affect him. And if one of the partners claimed something that is a liability for himself and for his fellow, he is believed as a single witness to obligate an oath or to exempt the opposing party from an oath, since in this he is not an interested party. And if they are three, the two who testified to their liability can obligate the third to pay money, since they have no personal interest in this testimony. And these matters the judge must understand; and see in siman 77.

One who sells a promissory note to one of the witnesses signed upon it for testimony, it is entirely proper and he is not like one who has an interest in the matter; however, initially, a scrupulous person should refrain from this, and it will be explained in siman 66. And whether the authorized representative and his relatives may testify will be explained in siman 123. And judges, or arbitrators, or guardians are fit to testify, as written in siman 22, and it will be explained in siman 46 and in siman 290. And specifically a guardian who does not conduct business with the property of orphans, but rather they only appointed him to guard or to plead on their behalf [Netivot HaMishpat in siman 108, and so it appears from the Responsa of Maharam of Rothenburg siman 459]:

The treasurers over charities, as long as neither they nor their relatives have any right to the assets of the charity or the profits, are fit to testify; and so too the treasurers of hekdesh, and certainly their relatives are fit to testify. And even when the treasurers have a tovat hana'ah in this, in that they distribute the money to whomever they wish, nevertheless the relatives are fit to testify according to the one who holds that tovat hana'ah is not considered money, as I wrote in siman 350, see there. Nevertheless, the treasurer himself is disqualified, for in any event he has a benefit from this and is somewhat like a nogea b'davar [Shach and Urim V'Tumim]. However, the relatives are not disqualified because of his tovat hana'ah [Urim V'Tumim]. But when it is within the power of the treasurer to distribute to his relatives as much as he wishes, he and his relatives are disqualified, for this is not merely tovat hana'ah but actual money [Shach]. But when it is not within his power to distribute as much as he wishes, even though his relatives receive from the charity fund, since they only receive like other poor people, neither he nor the relatives are disqualified because of this. But the poor people who receive themselves are disqualified from testimony, for they are actual noge'im in this, for when there is more in the charity fund they will give them more; unless they always have a fixed amount, such that even if there is no money in the fund they are given their fixed amount, and even if there is much they are not given more, for then they are not noge'im b'davar and are fit for testimony [as above].

The residents of a city, when a claimant comes to challenge a matter belonging to the city, such as a bathhouse or the like, all the residents of the city are disqualified as witnesses and as judges, for they are all interested parties in the matter, unless individuals withdraw from them with a complete withdrawal by means of a kinyan, such that they will have no portion in this usage. And also, this is specifically when they have another such usage in their city, such as another bathhouse or the like in other matters, for if not so, it is impossible for them to withdraw at all. And similarly, when a sefer Torah or books or other objects are stolen from them, they may not testify and they may not judge, unless they withdraw from this sefer Torah and from these books and objects with a complete withdrawal by means of a kinyan, and that they have another sefer Torah and other books and objects like these. And such is the law when a challenge arises regarding a beit knesset or a beit midrash in the city; those who pray there must withdraw from this beit knesset or from this beit midrash with a complete withdrawal by means of a kinyan, and there must be another beit knesset or beit midrash there in the city. And similarly, one who died and left a maneh for the poor of his city and a challenge arose regarding this, they may not judge with the judges of the city and they may not bring witnesses from the people of that city. In what case does this apply? When the poor were dependent upon them to feed them and provide for them, and they constantly assess tzedakah upon them; then the entire city are interested parties. And even if individuals say, "we will give our fixed portion and become qualified," they are not listened to, for in any event they have a benefit when there is an enlargement in the tzedakah fund, and they are like interested parties since the poor are dependent upon them. But when the poor are not dependent upon them, meaning that they do not give to them constantly in a fixed manner, they are permitted to testify, for they are not interested parties.

All of this is according to the law, but now the custom in all the dispersions of Israel is that they accept witnesses from the community regarding their enactment and their agreement, and regarding the sanctified properties, and regarding the charities, and regarding all matters of the city, and they are fit even for their relatives, since the custom is such and it is as if they accepted them upon themselves, and as I wrote in siman 7 regarding taxes. And know that anything that is not according to the law but rather from custom, we do not say regarding it "two are like a hundred" as in testimony, but rather we follow the majority of opinions. And so it is in any matter where we do not require actual testimony. And similarly, we do not say in these matters "we have not seen is not proof" as in testimony, but rather it is proof; since it depends on custom, if so, when they have not seen, presumably it is not so. And similarly they judge regarding the chazakah of residency and similar to this from the rest of the needs of the city, even based on a witness from a witness from oral tradition, for even without this everyone is an interested party, and they only judge so from the side of custom, and one should not be exacting in such testimony since they have accustomed themselves so. And see in siman 156 and 163 regarding these laws. And nevertheless, they must receive the testimony in the presence of the litigant, for could it be that regarding one who says "so-and-so is trusted upon me," it would be permitted to receive his testimony not in the presence of the litigant? Behold, they did not accept him for this matter, unless the leaders understand that if he must testify in the presence of the litigant the matter will not come to light, and then they have the authority to receive it not in the presence of the litigant. And the city elders who are appointed to engage in the needs of the public or of individuals are like judges, and it is forbidden for them to seat among them one who is disqualified from judging because of his wickedness. And similarly, they do not accept wicked people for testimony, for even though they accustomed themselves to accept those disqualified, that was those disqualified due to proximity or due to being an interested party, but wicked people certainly they never accepted upon themselves, for it is obvious that there is no substance in their testimony or in their judgment since the fear of G-d is not upon their faces, and therefore they are disqualified in all matters of the city. And regarding servants and employees, we have already written that according to the law they are not disqualified for their employers, unless the judge understands that they are afraid to speak against them. And similarly, in what has been explained that they accustomed themselves to judge all needs of the city by the residents of the city, whether for judgment or for testimony, nevertheless, if the judges see that if they judge based on the residents of the city the matter will result in ruin, the authority is in their hands to command that they bring judges from another city, and similarly witnesses, even though it is against the custom, for the custom was only made for improvement and not for ruin. And a great principle in these matters is that their intention should be for the sake of Heaven, and then G-d will help them to do the good and the right, and in the path a person walks, they lead him.